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ПОСТАНОВЛЕНИЕ ЕВРОПЕЙСКОГО СУДА ПО ПРАВАМ ЧЕЛОВЕКА ОТ 28.11.1984 РАСМЮССЕН (RASMUSSEN) ПРОТИВ ДАНИИ [РУС. (ИЗВЛЕЧЕНИЕ), АНГЛ.]

(по состоянию на 20 октября 2006 года)

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                                              [неофициальный перевод]
   
                   ЕВРОПЕЙСКИЙ СУД ПО ПРАВАМ ЧЕЛОВЕКА
   
                            СУДЕБНОЕ РЕШЕНИЕ
                   РАСМЮССЕН (RASMUSSEN) ПРОТИВ ДАНИИ
   
                    (Страсбург, 28 ноября 1984 года)
   
                              (Извлечение)
   
           КРАТКОЕ НЕОФИЦИАЛЬНОЕ ИЗЛОЖЕНИЕ ОБСТОЯТЕЛЬСТВ ДЕЛА
   
                           A. Основные факты
   
       Г-н Расмюссен,  1945 г.  рождения,  гражданин Дании, женился в
   1966 г.,  и в январе 1971 г.  его жена родила девочку. У заявителя
   возникли сомнения относительно своего отцовства, но он воздержался
   от непризнания отцовства, поскольку хотел сохранить брак.
       Заявитель и его жена разошлись в июне 1975 г. В соответствии с
   соглашением,  заключенным с женой ранее, г-н Расмюссен обязался не
   инициировать  разбирательство  с целью оспорить свое отцовство,  а
   его жена отказалась от алиментов на содержание ребенка.
       В январе 1976 г.  бывшая жена заявила, что она не связана этим
   соглашением.  Г-н  Расмюссен  обратился  в  Апелляционный  суд  за
   разрешением  подать  иск о непризнании отцовства,  поскольку истек
   срок,  установленный   статьей 5 з 2  Закона  1960 г.  о  правовом
   статусе детей.  Однако Апелляционный суд 12 апреля 1976 г. отказал
   ему в разрешении,  поскольку в его  деле  не  существовало  особых
   обстоятельств,   на   основании  которых  можно  было  бы  сделать
   исключение в отношении срока давности.  Получив новую  информацию,
   г-н Расмюссен  еще  раз  обратился  в  Апелляционный  суд в ноябре
   1978 г.,  но ему снова было отказано.  Это Решение Суда затем было
   подтверждено Верховным судом в январе 1979 г.
   
            B. Разбирательство в Комиссии по правам человека
   
       В жалобе,   поданной  в   Комиссию  г-ном  Расмюссеном  21 мая
   1979 г.,  он утверждал, что стал жертвой дискриминации по признаку
   пола,  поскольку, согласно датскому законодательству, его право на
   доступ в суды с целью оспорить отцовство по  отношению  к  ребенку
   было  ограничено  определенным  сроком,  в то время как его бывшая
   жена могла бы обратиться в суд  в  любое  время.  Он  ссылался  на
   статью 14 в сочетании со статьями 6 и 8 Конвенции.
       Комиссия признала жалобу приемлемой 8 декабря 1981 г.  В своем
   докладе  от  5  июля 1983 г.  она  высказала  мнение  о  нарушении
   статьи 14 в сочетании со статьями 6 и 8 (восемью  голосами  против
   пяти).
       Комиссия передала дело в Суд 12 октября 1983 г.
   
                    ИЗВЛЕЧЕНИЕ ИЗ СУДЕБНОГО РЕШЕНИЯ
   
                             ВОПРОСЫ ПРАВА
   
       27. Г-н Расмюссен жаловался на то,  что по Закону 1960 г. (см.
   п. 19  выше)  его право оспорить отцовство ребенка,  рожденного  в
   период,  когда он состоял в браке,  зависело от установленного для
   этого   срока,  в  то  время  как  его  бывшая  жена  имела  право
   потребовать  проведения  теста  с  целью  установления   отцовства
   ребенка   в   любое   время.  Он  утверждал,  что  явился  жертвой
   дискриминации  по  признаку  пола,   что  противоречит   статье 14
   Конвенции в сочетании со статьей 6 (право на справедливое судебное
   разбирательство,  включая право  на доступ  к  Суду)  и  статьей 8
   (право на уважение личной и семейной жизни).
       28. Статья 14 Конвенции гласит:
       "Пользование правами  и  свободами,  признанными  в  настоящей
   Конвенции,  должно быть обеспечено без какой-либо дискриминации по
   признаку пола,  расы, цвета кожи, языка, религии, политических или
   иных  убеждений,  национального  или  социального   происхождения,
   принадлежности   к   национальным   меньшинствам,   имущественного
   положения, рождения или любым иным обстоятельствам".
   
         I. Подпадают ли обстоятельства этого дела под действие
                  одной или нескольких норм Конвенции?
   
       29. Статья 14  дополняет другие нормы Конвенции и  Протоколов.
   Она не имеет самостоятельного существования,  поскольку  действует
   лишь  в  отношении "пользования правами и свободами",  охраняемыми
   этими   нормами.  Хотя   применение   статьи 14   не   обязательно
   предполагает  нарушение  этих  норм  - и в этих пределах она имеет
   автономное значение, - данная статья не может быть применена, если
   только  обстоятельства дела не попадают в сферу действия одной или
   нескольких таких норм (см. inter alia Судебное решение по делу Ван
   дер Мюсселе от 23 ноября 1983 г. Серия A, т. 70, с. 22, п. 43).
       30. По мнению  заявителя,  иски  об  отцовстве  подпадают  под
   действие статьи   6,  а  желание  мужа  определить  свой  семейный
   статус - под действие  статьи  8.  Комиссия  согласилась  с  этими
   утверждениями.
       31. Правительство сомневалось в том, что обращения по вопросам
   отцовства    ведут    к    определению    "прав   и   обязанностей
   гражданско-правового характера"  по смыслу статьи 6  п. 1  главным
   образом потому,  что они связаны с публичным интересом.  Оно также
   оспаривало применимость статьи 8, утверждая, что ее целью является
   защита семьи, а не расторжение существующих семейных уз.
       32. Статья 6 п. 1  обеспечивает каждому право  на  определение
   вопроса  его  прав  и  обязанностей гражданско-правового характера
   (см.  Судебное  решение  по  делу  Голдера  от  21 февраля 1975 г.
   Серия A,  т.  18,  с.  18,  п. 36). Правда, при этом весьма значим
   публичный интерес,  но,  с точки зрения Суда, этот фактор не может
   исключить  применимость  статьи 6  к спору,  который в силу самого
   своего характера является "гражданско-правовым". Иск о непризнании
   отцовства относится к семейному праву и на одном этом основании он
   носит "гражданско-правовой" характер.
       33. Статья 8 в свою очередь защищает не только "семейную",  но
   также и "личную" жизнь.  Хотя целью судебного разбирательства,  на
   котором    настаивал    заявитель,   было   законное   расторжение
   существующих семейных связей,  определение его правового статуса в
   отношении  ребенка,  несомненно,  касалось личной жизни заявителя.
   Факты этого  дела  соответственно  также  попадают  под   действие
   статьи 8.
   
                II. Существовало ли различие в подходе?
   
       34. По Закону 1960 г. муж в отличие от ребенка, его попечителя
   или  матери,  ограничен  определенным   сроком   для   оспаривания
   отцовства (см. п. 19 выше).
       Правительство указало,  что это различие, появившееся в тексте
   Закона,   сглаживалось   двумя   факторами.  Во-первых,  муж  имел
   возможность  просить  Апелляционный   суд   дать   разрешение   на
   предъявление  иска  по  истечении   этого срока (см.  п. 19 выше);
   во-вторых,  не только муж,  но и  жена  могла  быть  лишена  права
   оспаривать отцовство в силу "доктрины  признания" (см.  п. 17 и 20
   выше).  Однако Правительство не утверждало, что этих факторов было
   достаточно,   чтобы  исключить  различие,  установленное  Законом.
   Действительно,  матери ребенка  в  отличие  от  мужа  не  было  бы
   отказано  только  по  причине  истечения преклюзивного срока;  она
   могла  бы  проиграть  процесс  только  по  причине  упречности  ее
   поведения в прошлом.
       В целях применения статьи 14 Суд видит различие  в  подходе  к
   г-ну  Расмюссену  и  к  его  бывшей  жене  в отношении возможности
   оспорить  в  судебном  порядке  отцовство  г-на  Расмюссена.   Нет
   необходимости определять,  на чем основано это различие,  перечень
   оснований в статье 14 не является исчерпывающим  (см.  Решение  по
   делу  Энгель  и другие от 8 июня 1976 г.  Серия A,  т. 22,  с. 30,
   п. 72).
   
             III. Находились ли заявитель и его бывшая жена
                         в одинаковой ситуации?
   
       35. Статья 14   защищает    от   дискриминации   лиц,  которые
   "находятся в одинаковых ситуациях" (см.  вышеупомянутое Решение по
   делу Ван дер Мюсселе. Серия A, т. 70, с. 22, п. 46).
       36. Правительство  поддержало  заключение  меньшинства  членов
   Комиссии,  согласно которому муж и жена не находились в одинаковой
   ситуации с точки зрения возможности  начать  судебный  процесс  об
   отцовстве;  их  ситуации  и  интересы  были  во  многом  различны.
   Впрочем, большинство членов Комиссии полагало, что эти характерные
   особенности   не  были  достаточно  существенными,  чтобы  служить
   основанием для выводов меньшинства.
       37. Суд  не  считает,  что  ему необходимо решать этот спорный
   вопрос,  в особенности ввиду того,  что интересы,  о которых  идет
   речь,  были учтены при рассмотрении вопроса о различии в обращении
   с г-ном Расмюссеном и его бывшей женой.  Суд исходит из допущения,
   что речь идет о лицах, находящихся в одинаковой ситуации.
   
              IV. Имело ли различие в подходе объективное
                        и разумное обоснование?
   
       38. В   целях   статьи 14   различие    в   подходе   является
   дискриминационным,  если  у  него  "нет  объективного  и разумного
   обоснования", т.е. если оно не преследует "законную цель" или если
   нет  "разумной  соразмерности  между  используемыми  средствами  и
   преследуемой целью" (см. inter alia Судебное решение по делу Маркс
   от 13 июня 1979 г. Серия A, т. 31, с. 16, п. 33).
       39. Правительство  заявило,  что  имевшее  место  ограниченное
   различие  в  подходе  было объективным и оправданным.  Оно привело
   inter alia следующие аргументы:
       i) интересы мужа и матери в споре  по  установлению  отцовства
   различны.  В  отличие  от  интересов  мужа  интересы  матери,  как
   правило,  совпадают с  интересами  ребенка;  и  естественно,  что,
   взвешивая     интересы    различных    членов    семьи,    датское
   законодательство в 1960 г. встало на ту точку зрения, что интересы
   более   слабой   стороны,   а   именно  ребенка,  следует  считать
   превалирующими (см. п. 18 выше);
       ii) датское   законодательство  сочло  необходимым  установить
   предельные сроки для предъявления иска  о  непризнании  отцовства,
   поскольку  существует  риск,  что  муж  может угрожать таким иском
   матери, чтобы избежать алиментных обязательств;
       iii) при   решении  вопроса  о  том,  находились  ли  действия
   национальных властей в предоставленных им  "пределах  усмотрения",
   следует  принять  во внимание экономические и социальные условия в
   данный   период   времени   в   конкретной   стране   и    генезис
   соответствующего законодательства;
       iv) Дания внесла  изменения  в  Закон  1960  г.,  когда  этого
   потребовали новые обстоятельства (см.  п. 22 - 24 выше), но нельзя
   сказать,  что прежнее законодательство Дании  было  в  тот  период
   времени   менее   прогрессивным,   чем   законодательство   других
   государств - участников.
       Комиссия пришла к заключению, что единственно, что оправдывало
   различия,  было  стремление избежать ухудшения положения ребенка в
   результате  иска  г-на   Расмюссена   о   непризнании   отцовства,
   предъявленного через несколько лет после его рождения. Поскольку к
   тому  же  результату  могла  привести и "доктрина признания"  (см.
   п. 17 и 20 выше),  то Комиссия заключила, что в деле отсутствовала
   разумная   соразмерность   между   используемыми   средствами    -
   ограничение сроков лишь для мужа - и преследуемой целью.
       40. В ряде решений Суд  указал  на  то,  что  Договаривающимся
   государствам  предоставлены  определенные "пределы усмотрения" для
   того, чтобы определить, оправданны ли, и в какой мере, юридические
   различия в подходе к лицам,  во всех других отношениях находящимся
   в одинаковых ситуациях (см.  Решение по делу "О языках в  Бельгии"
   от 23 июля 1968 г.  Серия A,  т. 6,  с. 35, п. 10; Решение по делу
   Национального профсоюза бельгийской  полиции от 27 октября 1975 г.
   Серия A,  т. 19, с. 20, п. 47 и с. 21 - 22, п. 49; Решение по делу
   Профсоюза машинистов Швеции от 6 февраля 1976 г.  Серия A,  т. 20,
   с. 17,  п. 47;  вышеупомянутое  Решение по  делу  Энгель и другие.
   Серия A,  т. 22,  с. 31,  п. 72;  Решение по делу  Ирландия против
   Соединенного Королевства  от   18 января 1978 г.  Серия A,  т. 25,
   с. 87,  п. 229).  Широта  пределов    усмотрения   варьируется   в
   зависимости  от  конкретных  обстоятельств,  предмета  спора и его
   контекста.  В этом отношении одним из релевантных  факторов  может
   служить   наличие  или  отсутствие  некоторой  общей  доминанты  в
   правовых системах   Договаривающихся   государств   (см.   mutatis
   mutandis  Решение  по  делу  "Санди  таймс"  от  26 апреля 1979 г.
   Серия A, т. 30, с. 36, п. 59).
       41. Изучение  законодательства  Договаривающихся государств об
   установлении  отцовства  показывает,   что   такой   общности   не
   существует  и что в большинстве стран положение матери и положение
   мужа регулируются по-разному.
       Датское законодательство,   на  которое  жаловался  заявитель,
   основывалось  на  рекомендациях,   сделанных   после   тщательного
   изучения проблемы Комитетом по отцовству,  созданным Министерством
   юстиции в 1949 г.  (см.  п. 18 выше).   Суд  тщательно  рассмотрел
   обстоятельства  и  общий  контекст  дела,  принял  во  внимание те
   пределы  усмотрения,  которые  предоставлены  властям   в   данном
   вопросе.  Эти  последние  были  вправе  считать,  что установление
   предельных сроков для предъявления иска  о  непризнании  отцовства
   было  оправдано  желанием  обеспечить юридическую определенность и
   защитить интересы ребенка.  В этом отношении законодательство,  на
   которое   жаловался   заявитель,   существенно  не  отличалось  от
   законодательства других Договаривающихся государств или от Закона,
   действующего  в  настоящее  время  в  Дании.  Различие в подходе к
   мужьям и женам основывалось  на  представлении,  что  ограниченные
   сроки подачи иска были в меньшей степени необходимы женам,  нежели
   мужьям,  поскольку интересы матери обычно совпадают  с  интересами
   ребенка и в большинстве случаев развода или раздельного жительства
   супругов ребенок остается у  матери.  Действовавшие  правила  были
   видоизменены датским Парламентом в 1982 г., поскольку законодатели
   сочли,  что концепция,  лежащая в основе  Закона  1960  г.,  стала
   несовместимой с процессами,  происходящими в обществе (см. п. 22 -
   24 выше);  из этого нельзя сделать вывод,  что оценка  ситуации  в
   стране двадцать два года назад была неоправданной.
       Верно, что такой же результат мог  быть  следствием  "доктрины
   признания" (см.  п.  17 - 20 выше). Но в силу уже указанных причин
   власти имели право допустить,  что в отношении  мужа  преследуемая
   ими  цель  будет  достигнута  наиболее удовлетворительно с помощью
   нормы Закона,  в то время как в отношении матери  было  достаточно
   оставить  дела такого рода на усмотрение судов,  которые подходили
   бы к их решению дифференцированно.  Учитывая  пределы  усмотрения,
   предоставленные властям, они не нарушили принцип соразмерности.
       Таким образом,  Суд приходит к  заключению,  что  оспариваемое
   различие в подходе не было дискриминирующим в смысле статьи 14.
   
                   ПО ЭТИМ ОСНОВАНИЯМ СУД ЕДИНОГЛАСНО
   
       Постановил, что  нарушение  статьи 14 в сочетании со статьей 6
   или статьей 8 не имело места.
   
       Совершено на английском и французском  языках  и  оглашено  во
   Дворце прав человека в Страсбурге 28 ноября 1984 г.
   
                                                         Председатель
                                                         Жерар ВИАРДА
   
                                                               Грефье
                                                    Марк-Андре ЭЙССЕН
   
   
   
   
   
   
       В соответствии со статьей 51 п. 2  Конвенции и статьей 52 п. 2
   Регламента  Суда  к  настоящему  Решению  прилагается  совпадающее
   мнение судьи Герсинга.
   
                   СОВПАДАЮЩЕЕ МНЕНИЕ СУДЬИ ГЕРСИНГА
   
       1. К сожалению,  я не могу разделить мотивировку  большинства,
   касающуюся применимости статьи 8.
       Большинство находит,  что  определение  юридических  отношений
   заявителя с ребенком,  безусловно,  касалось его личной жизни, что
   соответственно попадает в сферу действия статьи 8.  С  моей  точки
   зрения,  это  слишком  широкое  понимание права,  защищаемого этой
   нормой.
       2. Формулировка   статьи   обязывает   Датское   Правительство
   "уважать личную... жизнь" (г-на  Расмюссена).   Обычное   значение
   этого  выражения не охватывает право отца не признавать отцовство.
   Поэтому следует принять во внимание происхождение этой нормы.
       3. Подготовительная  работа  над  статьей 8  свидетельствует о
   том,  что авторы Конвенции имели намерение  защитить  человека  от
   "произвольного  вмешательства  в  его  личную  жизнь"  (Recueil de
   "Travaux {Preparatoires}", <*> Гаага, 1976 г., т. III, с. 222 и т.
   IV,  с.  110, 188,  202  и  222). Несмотря на то, что следует быть
   осмотрительным и не придавать слишком большого значения  намерению
   тридцатилетней давности,  если последующие социальные и культурные
   процессы  оправдывают  более  широкое  толкование  статьи   в   ее
   лингвистических   границах,   я   считаю,  что  расхождение  между
   первоначальным намерением и применением данной статьи большинством
   настолько  велико,  что  представляется  сомнительным,  можно ли в
   данном случае полностью игнорировать подготовительную работу.
       --------------------------------
       <*> Здесь  и  далее  по  тексту  слова  на  национальном языке
   набраны латинским шрифтом и выделены фигурными скобками.
   
       4. В своем Решении по делу Маркс от 13 июня 1979 г.  (Серия A,
   т. 31,  с. 15,  п. 31)  Суд  постановил,  что статья 8  не  просто
   обязывает  государство воздерживаться от вмешательства:  она также
   имеет в виду его  позитивные  обязательства,  присущие  подлинному
   "уважению" к    гарантированным    правам.   Это   означало,   что
   государству - ответчику пришлось изменить свою  правовую  систему,
   чтобы  позволить  матери,  не состоящей в браке,  вести нормальную
   семейную жизнь со своим ребенком.
       Похожее рассуждение привело Суд к заключению в Решении по делу
   Эйри  от  9 октября 1979 г.  (Серия A,  т. 32,  с. 17, п.33),  что
   замужняя женщина имела право добиваться признания по закону своего
   de facto раздельного жительства с мужем.
       Однако обстоятельства  вышеупомянутых дел настолько отличаются
   от ситуации,  рассматриваемой  Судом  сейчас,  что  этим  Судебным
   решениям  не  следует  придавать  слишком  большого  значения  для
   вынесения решения по данному делу.
       5. Рассуждения   большинства   основаны   на   более   широком
   толковании статьи 8,  чем ранее принятое  Судом,  и,  похоже,  оно
   подразумевает,  что  любая правовая проблема,  имеющая отношение к
   личной жизни человека, попадает в сферу действия статьи 8.
       Протокол N 7 к Конвенции,  который почти готов для подписания,
   содержит,  однако,  в статье 5   положение,  касающееся  отношений
   супругов  со  своими  детьми.  Я  воспринимаю  это  как дальнейшее
   подтверждение того,  что  Договаривающиеся  Стороны  Конвенции  не
   считают, что статья 8 полностью охватывает эту область.
       6. По  вышеизложенным основаниям я  не  нахожу,  что  статья 8
   применима в этом деле.
   
   
   
   
   
   
                     EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
   
                      CASE OF RASMUSSEN v. DENMARK
   
                                JUDGMENT
   
                        (Strasbourg, 28.XI.1984)
   
       In the Rasmussen case <1>,
       --------------------------------
       <1> The  case  is  numbered  9/1983/65/100.  The second figure
   indicates the year in which the case was referred to the Court and
   the  first  figure its place on the list of cases referred in that
   year;  the last two figures  indicate,  respectively,  the  case's
   order on the list of cases and of originating applications (to the
   Commission) referred to the Court since its creation.
   
       The European Court of Human  Rights,  sitting,  in  accordance
   with Article 43 (art.  43) of the Convention for the Protection of
   Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ("the Convention")  and  the
   relevant provisions  of  the  Rules  of  Court  <2>,  as a Chamber
   composed of the following judges:
       --------------------------------
       <2> The revised Rules of Court,  which entered into force on 1
   January 1983, are applicable to the present case.
   
       Mr. G. Wiarda, President,
       Mr. W. Ganshof van der Meersch,
       Mrs. D. Bindschedler-Robert,
       Mr. F. Matscher,
       Mr. R. Macdonald,
       Mr. C. Russo,
       Mr. J. Gersing,
       and also of Mr.  M.-A.  Eissen, Registrar, and Mr. H. Petzold,
   Deputy Registrar,
       Having deliberated in private on 28 June  and  on  22  October
   1984,
       Delivers the following judgment,  which  was  adopted  on  the
   last-mentioned date:
   
                               PROCEDURE
   
       1. The  present case was referred to the Court by the European
   Commission of Human Rights ("the Commission") on 12 October  1983,
   within the three-month period laid down by Articles 32 para. 1 and
   47 (art.  32-1, art. 47) of the Convention. The case originated in
   an application (no. 8777/79) against the Kingdom of Denmark lodged
   with the Commission on 21 May 1979 under Article 25 (art.  25)  by
   Mr. Per Krohn Rasmussen, a Danish national.
       2. The Commission's request referred to  Articles  44  and  48
   (art.  44,  art.  48)  and  to  the  declaration  whereby  Denmark
   recognised the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court  (Article  46)
   (art.  46). The purpose of the request was to obtain a decision as
   to whether or not the facts of the case disclosed a breach by  the
   respondent  State  of  its  obligations  under  Article  14 of the
   Convention taken in conjunction with Articles 6 and 8 (art.  14+6,
   art. 14+8).
       3. In response to the inquiry made in accordance with Rule  33
   para.  3  (d) of the Rules of Court,  the applicant stated that he
   wished to take part in the proceedings pending  before  the  Court
   and designated the lawyer who would represent him (Rule 30).
       4. The Chamber of seven judges to be constituted included,  as
   ex officio members,  Mr.  J.  Gersing, the elected judge of Danish
   nationality (Article 43 of the Convention) (art.  43),  and Mr. G.
   Wiarda,  the President of the Court (Rule 21 para.  3 (b)).  On 27
   October 1983,  the President drew by lot,  in the presence of  the
   Registrar,  the  names  of the five other members,  namely Mr.  M.
   Zekia,  Mr.  W.  Ganshof van der Meersch,  Mr. F. Matscher, Mr. B.
   Walsh and Mr.  R.  Macdonald (Article 43 in fine of the Convention
   and Rule 21 para.  4) (art.  43).  Subsequently, Mr. Zekia and Mr.
   Walsh, who were prevented from taking part in the consideration of
   the  case,  were  replaced  by  Mr.   C.   Russo   and   Mrs.   D.
   Bindschedler-Robert,  substitute  judges (Rules 22 para.  1 and 24
   para. 1).
       5. Mr.  Wiarda, who had assumed the office of President of the
   Chamber (Rule 21 para. 5), ascertained, through the Registrar, the
   views  of  the  Agent of the Danish Government ("the Government"),
   the Delegate of the  Commission  and  the  representative  of  the
   applicant regarding the necessity for a written procedure (Rule 37
   para.  1).  On 14 November 1983,  the President directed that  the
   Agent  and  the  representative should each have until 15 February
   1984 to file a memorial and that the Delegate should  be  entitled
   to  reply  in  writing  within  two  months  from  the date of the
   transmission to him by the Registrar of whichever of the aforesaid
   documents should last be filed.  On 6 February 1984, the President
   extended the first time-limit until 15 March.
       The Government's  and  the applicant's memorials were received
   at the registry on 19 March.  On 17 April,  the Secretary  to  the
   Commission informed the Registrar that the Delegate would reply at
   the hearing.
       6. After consulting,  through the Registrar,  the Agent of the
   Government,  the  Commission's  Delegate   and   the   applicant's
   representative,  the  President  directed  on  3 May that the oral
   hearings should open on 26 June 1984 (Rule  38).  On  24  November
   1983, he had granted to the representative leave to use the Danish
   language on this occasion (Rule 27 para. 3).
       On 30  May,  the Registrar,  acting on the instructions of the
   President,  requested the Commission and the Government to produce
   certain documents, which were received on 7, 12 and 15 June.
       7. The hearings were held in public on 26 June  at  the  Human
   Rights Building,  Strasbourg.  Immediately before they opened, the
   Court had held a preparatory meeting.
       There appeared before the Court:
       - for the Government
       Mr. T. Lehmann, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Agent,
       Mr. T. Melchior, Ministry of Justice, Counsel,
       Mr. J. Bernhard, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
       Mr. B. Vesterdorf, Ministry of Justice, Advisers;
       - for the Commission
       Mr. T. Opsahl, Delegate;
       - for the applicant
       Mrs. {J. Lindglrd}, advokat, Counsels
       The Court heard addresses by Mr.  Lehmann and Mr. Melchior for
   the Government,  by Mr.  Opsahl for the  Commission  and  by  Mrs.
   {Lindglrd} for the applicant, as well as replies to its questions.
   
                            AS TO THE FACTS
   
              I. The particular circumstances of the case
   
       8. The  applicant,  Mr.  Per  Krohn  Rasmussen,  is  a  Danish
   citizen,  born in 1945.  He currently works as a clerk and resides
   in Nyborg.
       He was married in 1966. During the marriage, two children were
   born,  a boy in 1966 and a girl, Pernille, on 20 January 1971. The
   applicant  had  grounds,  even  before  the  latter's  birth,  for
   assuming that another man might be the father;  however,  in order
   to  save  the  marriage,  he  took  no  steps  to  have  paternity
   determined.
       9. In June 1973,  Mr.  Rasmussen and his wife  applied  for  a
   separation  (separation  ved bevilling),  which they obtained on 9
   August.  In  accordance  with  their  agreement,  Mrs.   Rasmussen
   retained  custody  of  the  children  and  the competent authority
   issued a decision to the effect  that  Mr.  Rasmussen  should  pay
   maintenance for them from 1 September 1973. He in fact did so from
   that date until 1 June 1975.
       10. In  March  1975,  the applicant,  who had previously still
   nurtured hopes of preserving the  marriage,  took  some  steps  to
   institute  proceedings to challenge his paternity of Pernille.  To
   this end, he applied for legal aid. However, he did not pursue the
   matter  since,  on  28  April  1975,  he  and  his  wife signed an
   agreement whereby she waived all claims for  maintenance  for  the
   child   and  he  undertook  to  refrain  from  bringing  any  such
   proceedings.
       11. In  June  1975,  the  applicant and his wife applied for a
   divorce (skilmisse ved bevilling),  which was granted on 16  July.
   On  this  occasion,  he reaffirmed before the authorities that the
   mother should have sole custody of the children and was once  more
   ordered  to  pay  maintenance  for  them.  He  did  not  raise any
   objection.
       12. On  16  January  1976,  four  days before Pernille's fifth
   birthday,  the applicant's former wife wrote to him asserting that
   she  was  not  bound by the agreement of 28 April 1975.  She later
   lodged  with  the  public  authorities  a  renewed  petition   for
   maintenance,  which  was  granted  by order effective from 1 March
   1976.  Since  then,  Mr.  Rasmussen   has   regularly   paid   the
   maintenance.
       13. On 27 January 1976,  Mr.  Rasmussen sought leave from  the
   Eastern   Court   of   Appeal   ({Rstre}  Landsret)  to  institute
   proceedings  out  of  time  to determine the paternity of the girl
   (see paragraph 19 below).
       In accordance with the normal procedure,  the police,  at  the
   Court  of  Appeal's  request,  interviewed  Mr.  Rasmussen and his
   former wife in March 1976  and  recorded  their  statements  in  a
   report.
       14. The Court of Appeal refused the application  on  12  April
   1976,  for  the  reason that the statutory conditions for granting
   leave at that time were not satisfied (see paragraph 19 below).
       The applicant  did  not appeal against the decision within the
   statutory time-limit.  However, on 27 July 1976, he petitioned the
   Ministry of Justice for leave to appeal out of time to the Supreme
   Court ({Hrjesteret}), but this was refused on 3 September 1976.
       15. On  20 November 1978,  Mr.  Rasmussen applied again to the
   Court of Appeal for leave to institute paternity proceedings.  His
   former  wife  opposed  the  application,  on  the ground that such
   proceedings would have a detrimental effect on the child.
       By a decision of 11 December 1978, the Court of Appeal refused
   the application for the reason that the applicant had not  brought
   the  action  contesting  paternity within the time-limits provided
   for in section 5(2) of  the  1960  Act  on  the  Legal  Status  of
   Children  ("the 1960 Act" -  Lov  nr. 200  af 18.5.1960 om {brrns}
   retsstilling;  see paragraph 19 below) and that there was no cause
   to  grant  him  any  exemption  since  the conditions laid down in
   section 5(3) were not met.  A similar decision was  given  by  the
   Supreme Court on 12 January 1979.
   
                       II. Relevant domestic law
   
                  A. Background to the 1960 Act on the
                        Legal Status of Children
   
       16. Prior to the enactment of the 1960 Act,  which applied  in
   Mr.  Rasmussen's case, the status of children was regulated in the
   Illegitimacy Act of 1937 and the Legitimacy Act of the same  year.
   Section  3  of  the  latter  provided  that proceedings to contest
   paternity of a legitimate child could be instituted by the mother,
   the  husband,  the  child  or  a  person appointed guardian of the
   child.  No time-limit was laid down for the  institution  of  such
   proceedings.
       17. According to Danish case-law and legal writing, however, a
   husband  could  be  estopped  from contesting paternity of a child
   born  in  wedlock  if,  knowing  that  his  wife  had  had  sexual
   intercourse  with  another man during the relevant period,  he had
   expressly or tacitly acknowledged after the child's birth that  he
   was    the    father.    The    "doctrine    of   acknowledgement"
   (anerkendelseslaeren) was first established in 1956 by a  judgment
   of  the  Supreme  Court,  reported  in  Ugeskrift  for  Retsvaesen
   (U.f.R.) 1956,  p.  107.  Although there was no  case-law  on  the
   point, legal writers expressed the view that this doctrine applied
   also to mothers (see,  for instance, Ernst Andersen, Aegteskabsret
   I, 1954, p. 95).
       18. In December  1949,  the  Ministry  of  Justice  set  up  a
   committee,  called the "Paternity Committee",  to consider,  inter
   alia,  certain aspects of the status of children born in  wedlock.
   In June 1955, the Committee submitted its report (no. 126/1955) on
   the amendment of the rules regarding determination of paternity.
       As to   the   husband's  right  to  institute  proceedings  to
   challenge paternity of a child  born  in  wedlock,  the  Committee
   recommended  the  institution of a double time-limit of six months
   from the time when the husband became aware of the facts affording
   grounds  for  contesting  his  paternity  and not later than three
   years from the birth of  the  child;  but  that  the  Ministry  of
   Justice   should  be  empowered  to  grant  exemption  from  these
   time-limits in special circumstances.  The Committee took the view
   that  the welfare of the child (and of the marriage) required that
   his status should be established as soon as possible and that  the
   husband's  interests should yield to these considerations (page 60
   of the report). One of the reasons given by the Committee for this
   recommendation was that a paternity suit instituted by the husband
   several years after the child's birth would place the child  in  a
   worse  position  than  if proceedings had been instituted earlier:
   the court would possibly have to give judgment  in  the  husband's
   favour  on  the  basis of the blood-group determination,  while it
   would be difficult to obtain a paternity and a  maintenance  order
   against another man.
       On the other hand,  the Committee found that the child's right
   to  institute proceedings should not be subject to any time-limit,
   since the views which might  lead  to  restricting  the  husband's
   right  to  institute proceedings were not of relevance in the case
   of an action brought by the child.  For the  same  reasons,  there
   should likewise be no time-limit with regard to actions brought by
   the child's guardian or the mother (page 59 of the report).
       The Committee also discussed the question whether the doctrine
   of acknowledgement should be embodied in legislation.  However, it
   considered  that  this  was  a matter which was better left to the
   courts to decide on a case-by-case basis.
   
                            B. The 1960 Act
   
       19. The  Government  subsequently  introduced  a  Bill   which
   incorporated   in   part  the  recommendations  of  the  Paternity
   Committee but increased the time-limits to twelve months and  five
   years  respectively and conferred competence to grant exemption on
   the Courts of Appeal.  This legislation entered into force, as the
   1960  Act,  on  1  January 1961.  It provided in section 5(1) that
   proceedings to challenge paternity of a child could be brought  by
   the  husband,  the  mother,  the child or a guardian of the child.
   Sub-sections 2 and 3 of section 5 read as follows:
       "(2) Paternity  proceedings  must be instituted by the husband
   within  twelve  months  after  he   becomes   cognizant   of   the
   circumstances  which  may  give  grounds  for  his renunciation of
   paternity,  and not later than five years after the birth  of  the
   child.
       (3) However,  a Court of Appeal may, on the conditions set out
   in section 456r,  sub-section 4,  of the Administration of Justice
   Act,  grant leave to institute proceedings after the expiry of the
   time-limits set out in sub-section 2 above."
       Section 456r,  sub-section 4, of the Administration of Justice
   Act  concerns  re-opening  of a paternity case after the expiry of
   the applicable time-limit or time-limits.  It provides that  leave
   may  be  granted by a Court of Appeal if quite exceptional reasons
   are given as to why a  review  was  not  sought  earlier,  if  the
   particular  circumstances of the case especially warrant it and if
   it can be assumed that the re-opening will not cause the child any
   great inconvenience.
       The 1960 Act did not impose any restriction  on  the  mother's
   right to institute paternity proceedings,  nor did it refer to the
   doctrine of acknowledgement (see paragraph 17 above).
       20. In  case-law,  however,  the "doctrine of acknowledgement"
   continued to be applied and there were Court of Appeal and Supreme
   Court decisions confirming the earlier view that the doctrine also
   applied to mothers.
       21. The   circumstances   which,   under   the   doctrine   of
   acknowledgement, estop the husband from contesting paternity will,
   as  a  general  rule,  also militate against granting him leave to
   institute proceedings out of time.  However,  a decision to  grant
   leave  is  without  prejudice  to  the  outcome  of the subsequent
   procedure (see the Eastern Court of  Appeal's  judgment  of  1977,
   U.f.R. 1977, p. 907).
   
                     C. Amendments to the 1960 Act
   
       22. In  1969,  the  Ministry  of  Justice  set up a committee,
   called  the  "Matrimonial  Committee",  to  consider  whether  the
   evolution  of  social  conditions,  and notably the changes in the
   social status of women and the resultant changes in the conception
   of  the institution of marriage since the introduction of the 1960
   Act, called for amendment of, inter alia, the provisions governing
   the legal status, during marriage and after separation or divorce,
   of children born in wedlock.  In fact,  the  proportion  of  women
   working outside their homes has increased to about 60 per cent. As
   a result,  men are,  to a much higher degree than before,  looking
   after  the  children and are more frequently granted their custody
   in the event of separation or divorce.  Mothers are therefore  now
   more  likely  to  challenge  paternity in order to prevent custody
   being given to the husband.  In a report on  cohabitation  without
   marriage (samliv uden aegteskab I - n- 915/1980, p. 72), published
   in January 1981, the Matrimonial Committee stated:
       "There is  consensus  in  the Committee that also the mother's
   right to institute paternity proceedings  and  request  re-opening
   should  be  subject to a relatively short time-limit,  for example
   corresponding to the time-limits which today apply to the  father.
   Furthermore,  the  Committee  is  to  some  degree in favour of an
   absolute  time-limit,  applicable  to  all,  for  instituting  and
   re-opening paternity proceedings."
       23. On the basis of the  recommendations  of  the  Matrimonial
   Committee, the Government tabled a Bill before Parliament in March
   1982, proposing certain amendments to the 1960 Act.
       The explanatory  memorandum  to  this  Bill  referred  to  the
   Rasmussen case,  then pending before the European  Commission.  On
   page 4, it mentioned that the Agent of the Government had declared
   in evidence before the Commission  that  new  legislation  on  the
   matter  would  be  introduced,  establishing  uniform  time-limits
   within which both  men  and  women  could  contest  the  husband's
   paternity;  the  memorandum  added  that  the  Ministry of Justice
   considered such legislation "desirable  in  the  interest  of  the
   child's needs" (af hensyn til barnets tarv).
       24. On 26 May 1982,  the  Danish  legislature  passed  an  Act
   amending the 1960 Act, which entered into force on 1 July 1982.
       Following this amendment, sub-sections 2 and 3 of section 5 of
   the 1960 Act now provide:
       "(2) Paternity proceedings must be instituted not  later  than
   three years after the birth of the child. This provision shall not
   apply,  however,  where proceedings are instituted  by  the  child
   after having attained the age of 18.
       (3) A Court of Appeal may grant leave to institute proceedings
   after  the  expiry of the time-limit set out in the first sentence
   of sub-section 2 of this section where quite  exceptional  grounds
   are  given as to why proceedings were not instituted at an earlier
   stage,  in  circumstances  where  institution  of  proceedings  is
   especially  warranted,  and  where  it  can  be  presumed that the
   proceedings will not cause the child any great inconvenience."
       The "doctrine  of  acknowledgement"  is  still  applied by the
   Danish courts to estop spouses  from  contesting  paternity  of  a
   child (see the Supreme Court's judgment of 17 January 1984).
   
                   PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION
   
       25. In  his  application of 21 May 1979 to the Commission (no.
   8777/79),  Mr.  Rasmussen alleged that he had  been  subjected  to
   discrimination based on sex in that, under the relevant Danish law
   applicable at the time,  his former wife had an unlimited right of
   access to court to challenge his paternity, whilst he did not.
       26. The Commission declared the application  admissible  on  8
   December 1981. In its report adopted on 5 July 1983 (Article 31 of
   the Convention) (art.  31),  the Commission expressed the  opinion
   that  there  had  been a breach of Article 14 taken in conjunction
   with Articles 6 and 8 (art.  14+6, art. 14+8) (eight votes against
   five).  The  full  text  of  the  Commission's  opinion and of the
   separate opinion contained in the report is reproduced as an annex
   to the present judgment.
   
                             AS TO THE LAW
   
       27. Mr.  Rasmussen complained of the fact that, under the 1960
   Act (see paragraph 19 above),  his right to contest his  paternity
   of  a  child  born during the marriage was subject to time-limits,
   whereas his  former  wife  was  entitled  to  institute  paternity
   proceedings at any time. He alleged that he had been the victim of
   discrimination on the ground of sex, contrary to Article 14 of the
   Convention, taken in conjunction with Article 6 (art. 14+6) (right
   to a fair trial,  including the right of access to court) and with
   Article  8  (art.  14+8)  (right to respect for private and family
   life).
       28. Article 14 (art. 14) of the Convention reads as follows:
       "The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set  forth  in  this
   Convention  shall  be secured without discrimination on any ground
   such as sex,  race, colour, language, religion, political or other
   opinion,  national  or social origin,  association with a national
   minority, property, birth or other status."
   
                I. Do the facts of the case fall within
           the ambit of one or more of the other substantive
                     provisions of the Convention?
   
       29. Article 14 (art.  14) complements  the  other  substantive
   provisions  of  the  Convention  and  the  Protocols.  It  has  no
   independent existence since it has effect solely  in  relation  to
   "the  enjoyment  of  the rights and freedoms" safeguarded by those
   provisions.  Although the application of Article 14 (art. 14) does
   not  necessarily  presuppose a breach of those provisions - and to
   this extent it has an autonomous meaning -,  there can be no  room
   for  its  application  unless  the  facts at issue fall within the
   ambit of one or more of the latter (see,  inter alia,  the Van der
   Mussele  judgment of 23 November 1983,  Series A no.  70,  p.  22,
   para. 43).
       30. The  applicant  submitted  that  Article  6  (art.  6) was
   applicable to paternity proceedings and, further, that a husband's
   wish to have his family status determined fell within the scope of
   Article 8  (art.  8).  These  contentions  were  accepted  by  the
   Commission.
       31. For the Government, it was questionable whether the object
   of  a  paternity  suit  was  a  determination of "civil rights and
   obligations",  within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1),
   mainly   because   of  the  strong  public  interest  involved  in
   proceedings of this kind. They also contested the applicability of
   Article 8 (art. 8), maintaining that its object was the protection
   of the family and not the dissolution of existing family ties.
       32. Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) secures to everyone the right
   to have any claim relating to his  civil  rights  and  obligations
   brought  before a court or tribunal (see the Golder judgment of 21
   February 1975,  Series A no. 18, p. 18, para. 36). It is true that
   the  public  interest  may  be affected by proceedings of the kind
   which Mr. Rasmussen wished to institute, but, in the Court's view,
   this factor cannot exclude the applicability of Article 6 (art. 6)
   to litigation which,  by its very nature, is "civil" in character.
   And  an action contesting paternity is a matter of family law;  on
   that account alone, it is "civil" in character.
       33. Article  8  (art.  8),  for  its  part,  protects not only
   "family" but  also  "private"  life.  Even  though  the  paternity
   proceedings  which the applicant wished to institute were aimed at
   the dissolution in law of existing family ties,  the determination
   of  his  legal  relations  with Pernille undoubtedly concerned his
   private life.  The facts of the case accordingly also fall  within
   the ambit of Article 8 (art. 8).
   
                II. Was there a difference of treatment?
   
       34. Under  the 1960 Act,  the husband,  unlike the child,  its
   guardian or the mother,  had to  institute  paternity  proceedings
   within prescribed time-limits (see paragraph 19 above).
       The Government pointed out that this difference which appeared
   on  the  face  of  the  Act  was  reduced in scope by two factors:
   firstly,  it was open to the husband to seek leave from the  Court
   of  Appeal  to institute proceedings out of time (see paragraph 19
   above);  secondly,  not only the husband but also the mother might
   be  debarred  from contesting paternity by virtue of the "doctrine
   of acknowledgement" (see paragraphs 17 and 20 above). However, the
   Government  did  not suggest that these factors were sufficient to
   eliminate the difference laid down by statute.  Indeed, the mother
   would not,  like her husband,  be estopped solely for being out of
   time;  her action might simply fail as a result  of  her  previous
   attitude.
       For the  purposes  of  Article  14  (art.   14),   the   Court
   accordingly  finds  that  there  was  a difference of treatment as
   between  Mr.  Rasmussen  and  his  former  wife  as  regards   the
   possibility  of  instituting  proceedings  to contest the former's
   paternity.  There is no call to  determine  on  what  ground  this
   difference was based,  the list of grounds appearing in Article 14
   (art.  14) not being exhaustive (see the Engel and Others judgment
   of 8 June 1976, Series A no. 22, p. 30, para. 72).
   
                 III. Were the applicant and his former
                  wife placed in analogous situations?
   
       35. Article  14  (art.  14)  safeguards  individuals  who  are
   "placed    in   analogous   situations"   against   discriminatory
   differences of treatment (see the above-mentioned Van der  Mussele
   judgment, Series A no. 70, p. 22, para. 46).
       36. The Government supported the conclusion of the minority of
   the  Commission that husband and wife were not placed in analogous
   situations as far as a paternity suit was concerned, there being a
   number  of distinguishing characteristics between their respective
   positions and interests.  The majority of the Commission,  on  the
   other hand, found that those characteristics were not sufficiently
   fundamental to warrant that conclusion.
       37. The  Court  does  not consider that it has to resolve this
   issue,  especially as the positions and interests referred to  are
   also  of  relevance  in  determining  whether  the  difference  of
   treatment was justified.  It will proceed on the  assumption  that
   the  difference  was  made  between  persons  placed  in analogous
   situations.
   
                IV. Did the difference of treatment have
               an objective and reasonable justification?
   
       38. For the purposes of Article 14 (art.  14), a difference of
   treatment is discriminatory if it "has no objective and reasonable
   justification",  that is, if it does not pursue a "legitimate aim"
   or if there is not a "reasonable relationship  of  proportionality
   between  the  means  employed  and  the aim sought to be realised"
   (see,  inter alia,  the Marckx judgment of 13 June 1979,  Series A
   no. 31, p. 16, para. 33).
       39. The Government pleaded  that  the  limited  difference  of
   treatment   that   existed   had   an   objective  and  reasonable
   justification. They relied, inter alia, on the following points:
       (i) the  respective interests of the husband and of the mother
   in paternity proceedings  were  different:  unlike  the  husband's
   interests,  the  mother's  generally  coincided  with those of the
   child;  and it was natural that,  in weighing the interests of the
   different  family  members,  the Danish legislature should in 1960
   have taken the view that the interests of the weaker party, namely
   the child, should prevail (see paragraph 18 above);
       (ii) the legislature had also regarded it as necessary to  lay
   down time-limits for the institution of paternity proceedings by a
   husband because of the risk that he might use  them  as  a  threat
   against the mother, in order to escape maintenance obligations;
       (iii) in deciding whether the national authorities have  acted
   within the "margin of appreciation" which they enjoy in this area,
   regard should be had to  the  economic  and  social  circumstances
   prevailing  at  the  relevant time in the country concerned and to
   the background to the legislation in question;
       (iv) Denmark  had  undoubtedly  amended the 1960 Act when this
   proved to be warranted by subsequent developments (see  paragraphs
   22 - 24 above),  but it  could  not be said that the former Danish
   legislation  on  this  matter  was  at  the  relevant  time   less
   progressive  than  that  of  the  other Contracting Parties to the
   Convention.
       The Commission  found that the only legitimate purpose for the
   difference of treatment complained of by  the  applicant  was  the
   desire  to  avoid  the child's being placed in a worse position by
   the institution of paternity proceedings several years  after  its
   birth.  However,  since  this aim could have been achieved through
   the "doctrine  of  acknowledgement"  (see  paragraphs  17  and  20
   above),  there  was  no reasonable relationship of proportionality
   between the means employed - the laying-down of time-limits solely
   for the husband - and the aim sought to be realised.
       40. The Court has pointed out in several  judgments  that  the
   Contracting  States  enjoy  a  certain "margin of appreciation" in
   assessing whether and to  what  extent  differences  in  otherwise
   similar  situations  justify a different treatment in law (see the
   judgment of 23 July 1968 in the "Belgian Linguistic" case,  Series
   A no.  6,  p.  35,  para. 10; the National Union of Belgian Police
   judgment of 27 October 1975, Series A no. 19, p. 20, para. 47, and
   pp.  21 - 22, para. 49; the Swedish Engine Drivers' Union judgment
   of  6  February  1976,  Series  A  no.  20,  p.  17, para. 47; the
   above-mentioned Engel and Others judgment, Series A no. 22, p. 31,
   para.  72;  and the Ireland v.  the United Kingdom judgment of  18
   January 1978, Series A no. 25, p. 87, para. 229). The scope of the
   margin of appreciation will vary according to  the  circumstances,
   the subject-matter and its background; in this respect, one of the
   relevant factors may be the existence or non-existence  of  common
   ground  between  the laws of the Contracting States (see,  mutatis
   mutandis, the Sunday Times judgment of 26 April 1979, Series A no.
   30, p. 36, para. 59).
       41. Examination  of  the   Contracting   States'   legislation
   regarding paternity proceedings shows that there is no such common
   ground and that in most of them the position  of  the  mother  and
   that of the husband are regulated in different ways.
       The Danish   legislation   complained   of   was   based    on
   recommendations made, after a careful study of the problem, by the
   Paternity Committee set up by the Ministry of Justice in 1949 (see
   paragraph  18  above).  The  Court  has  had  close  regard to the
   circumstances and the general background and has borne in mind the
   margin of appreciation which must be allowed to the authorities in
   the matter.  In its view,  they were entitled to  think  that  the
   introduction  of  time-limits  for  the  institution  of paternity
   proceedings was justified by the desire to ensure legal  certainty
   and  to protect the interests of the child.  In this respect,  the
   legislation complained of did not differ substantially  from  that
   of  most  other Contracting States or from that currently in force
   in Denmark.  The difference of treatment established on this point
   between  husbands  and  wives  was  based  on the notion that such
   time-limits were less necessary for wives than for husbands  since
   the  mother's interests usually coincided with those of the child,
   she being awarded custody in most cases of divorce or  separation.
   The  rules in force were modified by the Danish Parliament in 1982
   because it considered that the thinking underlying  the  1960  Act
   was  no  longer  consistent  with the developments in society (see
   paragraphs  22  - 24 above);  it cannot be inferred from this that
   the  manner  in  which  it  had evaluated the situation twenty-two
   years earlier was not tenable.
       It is  true that an equivalent result might have been obtained
   through the "doctrine of acknowledgement" (see paragraphs  17  and
   20 above),  but,  for the reasons already indicated, the competent
   authorities were entitled to think that as regards the husband the
   aim sought to be realised would be most satisfactorily achieved by
   the enactment of a statutory rule,  whereas as regards the  mother
   it  was sufficient to leave the matter to be decided by the courts
   on a case-by-case  basis.  Accordingly,  having  regard  to  their
   margin  of  appreciation,  the authorities also did not transgress
   the principle of proportionality.
       42. The  Court thus concludes that the difference of treatment
   complained of  was  not  discriminatory,  within  the  meaning  of
   Article 14 (art. 14).
   
                FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
   
       Holds that  there has been no violation of Article 14 taken in
   conjunction with Article 6 (art.  14+6) or with  Article  8  (art.
   14+8).
   
       Done in  English  and  in  French,  and  delivered at a public
   hearing at the Human Rights Building,  Strasbourg,  on 28 November
   1984.
   
                                              Signed: {Gerard} WIARDA
                                                            President
   
                                          Signed: {Marc-Andre} EISSEN
                                                            Registrar
   
   
   
   
   
   
       The separate opinion of Mr.  Gersing is annexed to the present
   judgment in accordance with Article 51 para.  2 (art. 51-2) of the
   Convention and Rule 52 para. 2 of the Rules of Court.
   
                                                     Initialled: G.W.
   
                                                   Initialled: M.-A.E
   
                  CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE GERSING
   
       1. To my regret,  I am not able to share the reasoning of  the
   majority concerning the applicability of Article 8 (art. 8).
       The majority  finds  that  as   the   determination   of   the
   applicant's  legal  relations  with Pernille undoubtedly concerned
   his private life, the case accordingly also falls within the ambit
   of  Article  8  (art.  8).  In  my  view,  this is far too wide an
   understanding of the right protected by this provision.
       2. The  wording of the provision obliges the Danish Government
   to show "respect for [Mr.  Rasmussen's]  private  ...  life".  The
   ordinary  meaning  of  this  expression  does  not clearly cover a
   father's right to disclaim his paternity of a child.  Regard  must
   therefore be had to the origin of the provision.
       3. The preparatory work on Article 8 (art. 8)  indicates  that
   the  authors  of  the  Convention  had  in  mind  to  protect  the
   individual against an "arbitrary interference  with  his  privacy"
   (Collected  Editions  of  the  "Travaux  {Preparatoires}"  of  the
   European Convention on Human Rights,  The  Hague,  Nijhoff,  1976,
   Vol. III, p. 222, and  Vol.  IV,  pp.  110,  188,  202  and  222).
   Although one should be careful not to attach too  much  importance
   to the intention behind a provision that is more than thirty years
   old if later social and cultural developments  justify  a  broader
   understanding of its words within their linguistic limits, I  find
   that the gap between the original  intention  and  the  majority's
   application of the Article is so  great  that  it  seems  doubtful
   whether one can ignore the preparatory  work  completely  in  this
   case.
       4. In its Marckx judgment of 13 June 1979 (Series A no. 31, p.
   15,  para.  31),  the Court held that Article 8 (art.  8) does not
   merely compel the State to abstain from interference: in addition,
   there  may  be  positive  obligations  inherent  in  an  effective
   "respect" for the guaranteed rights. This meant that the State had
   to adapt its legal system to allow an unmarried mother to  lead  a
   normal family life with her child.
       A similar consideration led the Court to the conclusion in its
   Airey judgment of 9 October 1979 (Series A no.  32,  p.  17, para.
   33) that a married woman had the right to seek recognition in  law
   of her de facto separation from her husband.
       The facts in the above cases are,  however,  so different from
   the  situation now before the Court that these judgments cannot be
   of decisive importance for the ruling in the case.
       5. The  majority's  reasoning is based on an interpretation of
   Article 8 (art.  8) which is broader than that previously  adopted
   by  the Court and seems to imply that any legal problem that has a
   bearing on a person's private  life  falls  within  the  scope  of
   Article 8 (art. 8).
       Protocol No.  7 (P7) to the Convention,  which is about to  be
   opened for signature,  contains, however, in Article 5 (art. P7-5)
   a provision concerning spouses' relations with their  children.  I
   take  that  as  a  further  indication  that  the  Parties  to the
   Convention have not found that Article  8  (art.  8)  covers  this
   aspect.
       6. For the above reasons,  I do not find Article 8 (art. 8) to
   be applicable in this case.
   
   

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