[неофициальный перевод]
ЕВРОПЕЙСКИЙ СУД ПО ПРАВАМ ЧЕЛОВЕКА
СУДЕБНОЕ РЕШЕНИЕ
ГИНЧО (GUINCHO) ПРОТИВ ПОРТУГАЛИИ
(Страсбург, 10 июля 1984 года)
(Извлечение)
КРАТКОЕ НЕОФИЦИАЛЬНОЕ ИЗЛОЖЕНИЕ ОБСТОЯТЕЛЬСТВ ДЕЛА
A. Основные факты
18 августа 1976 г. г-н Гинчо, 1949 г. рождения, проживающий в
Лиссабоне, и еще два человека стали жертвами дорожно-транспортного
происшествия в Алверса. Заявитель был ранен и утратил зрение в
левом глазу.
7 декабря 1978 г. заявитель и водитель машины, в которой ехал
заявитель, подали гражданский иск в Окружной суд Вила Франка де
Хира против владельца и водителя другого автомобиля, который, как
они утверждали, стал причиной аварии.
9 декабря 1978 г. судья принял иск к производству и
распорядился уведомить о том ответчиков, которые постоянно
проживали в Лиссабоне. Последующее вручение ответчикам материалов
дела, их возражения на иск, передача возражения истцам заняли
значительное время. Устное разбирательство с вызовом свидетелей
состоялось лишь 20 октября 1982 г. Суд признал право заявителя на
возмещение ущерба. Однако он нашел, что вопрос об оценке ущерба
еще не готов для решения, и отложил его до рассмотрения вопроса о
порядке исполнения данного Судебного решения. Г-н Гинчо обратился
за исполнением решения 22 сентября 1983 г.
B. Разбирательство в Комиссии по правам человека
В жалобе, поданной в Комиссию г-ном Гинчо в мае 1980 г.,
заявитель утверждал, что длительность разбирательства его
гражданского дела в Окружном суде Вила Франка де Хира является
нарушением статьи 6 п. 1 Конвенции.
6 июля 1982 г. Комиссия объявила жалобу приемлемой. В своем
докладе от 10 марта 1983 г. она выразила единогласное мнение, что
имело место нарушение статьи 6 п. 1 Конвенции.
Дело было передано Комиссией в Суд 18 июля 1983 г.
ИЗВЛЕЧЕНИЕ ИЗ СУДЕБНОГО РЕШЕНИЯ
ВОПРОСЫ ПРАВА
I. О предполагаемом нарушении статьи 6 п. 1
28. Заявитель жаловался на длительность судебного
разбирательства, начатого им и г-ном Лопесом в Окружном суде Вила
Франка де Хира. Он ссылался на статью 6 п. 1 Конвенции, которая
предусматривает:
"Каждый человек имеет право при определении его гражданских
прав и обязанностей... на... разбирательство дела в разумный
срок... судом..."
Гражданский характер спора ясен и не вызывает сомнений,
единственный вопрос, который предстоит решить по настоящему делу,
было ли соблюдено требование о "разумном сроке". По мнению
Комиссии, оно не было соблюдено, тогда как Правительство считает,
что нарушения не было.
A. Срок, принятый в расчет
29. Точка отсчета соответствующего периода - и это никто не
оспаривал - 7 декабря 1978 г., дата возбуждения дела в Окружном
суде Вила Франка де Хира (см. п. 10 выше).
По мнению Правительства, соответствующий "срок" закончился
25 октября 1982 г. вынесением Судебного решения, по которому было
признано право г-на Гинчо на возмещение ущерба, но отложено
определение его размера до процедуры "исполнения" Решения
(см. п. 19 выше).
Суд, как и Комиссия, полагает, что данное Решение не является
окончательным, т.к. Окружной суд еще не определил сумму возмещения
ущерба (см. п. 65 доклада). Суд отмечает, что производство по делу
распалось на две стадии, первая продолжалась до 25 октября
1982 г., а вторая все еще не завершена и представляет собой
процедуру "исполнения". Эта процедура, возможная только по
инициативе заявителя, была начата лишь 23 сентября 1983 г., т.е.
по прошествии почти одиннадцати месяцев (см. п. 20 выше);
материалы дела свидетельствуют, что последующая стадия не может
быть подвергнута какой бы то ни было критике. Следовательно, Суд
ограничится рассмотрением первой стадии, которая длилась с
7 декабря 1978 г. до 25 октября 1982 г. (три года десять месяцев и
восемнадцать дней).
30. Такой продолжительный отрезок времени, потребовавшийся для
рассмотрения дела только в одной инстанции, кажется на первый
взгляд неразумным (см. mutatis mutandis Решение по делу Циммермана
и Стейнера от 13 июля 1983 г. Серия A, т. 66, с. 11, п. 23), тем
более что Судебное решение не было окончательным. Таким образом,
движение дела нуждается в тщательном рассмотрении на предмет
соответствия статье 6 п. 1.
B. Применяемые критерии
31. Разумность срока разбирательства оценивается в каждом
случае в зависимости от конкретных обстоятельств и с учетом
критериев, сложившихся в практике Суда (см. inter alia
вышеупомянутое Решение по делу Циммермана и Стейнера, там же,
с. 11, п. 24).
32. В Португалии, как указало Правительство, гражданский
процесс основан на "принципе диспозитивности": правом начать такой
процесс наделены стороны (статья 264 п. 1
Гражданско-процессуального кодекса), которые должны также принять
надлежащие меры для быстрого прохождения дела в судебных
инстанциях. По мнению Суда, указанный принцип, однако, не
освобождает сами суды от рассмотрения дела в надлежащие сроки, как
того требует от них статья 6 Конвенции (см. Решение по делу
Бухольца от 6 мая 1981 г. Серия A, т. 42, с. 16, п. 50). Более
того, законодательство Португалии обязывает судей соблюдать
разумные сроки прохождения дел (статья 266 упомянутого Кодекса), а
статья 68 Дорожно-транспортного кодекса предусматривает, что дела,
подобные делу г-на Гинчо, должны рассматриваться в порядке
суммарного производства, которое характеризуется, в частности,
сокращением некоторых процессуальных сроков (см. п. 10 выше).
1. Сложность дела
33. Правительство признало, что дело по существу не было
сложным. Тем не менее его представители утверждали, что
рассмотрение было затруднено поведением сторон, в частности, в
результате ходатайств об отсрочке со стороны страховой компании и
неявки свидетелей и адвокатов (см. п. 12, 15 - 16 и 18 выше). По
мнению Комиссии, судебное разбирательство не было сопряжено с
какими-либо особыми трудностями.
Суд согласен с последней точкой зрения: обстоятельства, на
которые ссылается Правительство, не усложняют ведение судебного
разбирательства каким-либо способом, который был бы необычен для
подобного рода споров.
2. Поведение заявителя
34. По мнению Правительства, г-н Гинчо мог бы ускорить ход
судебного разбирательства, направив жалобу в Высший совет
магистратуры. Помимо того различные задержки, например, в
отношении вызова в качестве свидетеля г-жи Марии Силва и г-на
Адриано да Круз Суррейра в такой же мере лежат на совести
заявителя, как и другой стороны. Правительство настаивало на том,
что по крайней мере нельзя возлагать вину на португальские власти
за период после 25 октября 1982 г.
Суд уже решил этот вопрос (см. п. 29 выше). Относительно
оставшихся доводов Суд прежде всего отмечает, что на заявителе не
лежала обязанность обращения в Высший совет магистратуры. Кроме
того, подобный шаг не сократил бы сроков разбирательства, т.к.
самое большее, что мог сделать Высший совет, - это наложить
дисциплинарные санкции, если бы они были уместны, на провинившихся
судей или должностных лиц. Хотя г-н Гинчо представил неверный
адрес, что вызвало некоторую задержку с заслушиванием показаний
г-жи Силва (см. п. 15 - 16 выше), эта задержка незначительна по
сравнению с общей продолжительностью разбирательства. Другие
обстоятельства, приведенные Правительством, в частности неявка
свидетелей и адвокатов ответчиков, не могут, с точки зрения Суда,
быть поставлены в вину заявителю.
Короче говоря, медлительность судебного разбирательства не
может быть отнесена на счет заявителя.
3. Поведение португальских властей
35. Из представленных доказательств можно увидеть, что дело
оставалось без движения дважды: с 9 декабря 1978 г. до 18 июня
1979 г., т.е. более шести месяцев в ожидании исполнения
направленного в Лиссабон поручения о вручении искового заявления
ответчикам, а затем с 4 июля 1979 г. до 28 января 1981 г.,
т.е. более полутора лет, для передачи истцам возражений ответчиков
(см. п. 11, 13 выше).
Правительство признало, что во время этих двух периодов
движение дела в некоторой степени застопорилось, но оно проводило
при этом различие между ритмом разбирательства и его общей
продолжительностью. Общая продолжительность судебного
разбирательства имеет существенное значение в целях статьи 6 п. 1,
но в данном конкретном деле она представляется приемлемой.
Заявитель оспаривал это, утверждая, что полное прекращение
движения дела в течение двух лет отрицательно сказалось на
разбирательстве в целом.
36. Мнение Суда в принципе совпадает с последней точкой
зрения. Он отмечает, что в период почти полного бездействия должны
были быть совершены процессуальные действия чисто рутинного
характера, такие как вручение искового заявления ответчикам и
передача возражений ответчиков истцам. Продолжительность этих
периодов могла бы найти оправдание лишь в существовании особо
исключительных обстоятельств (см. mutatis mutandis вышеупомянутое
Решение по делу Циммермана и Стейнера. Серия A, т. 66, с. 12,
п. 27 in fine).
37. Правительство утверждало, что отступления от правил в ходе
производства в судах Вила Франка де Хира и Лиссабона явились
следствием "институционной перестройки", которой сопровождалось
возвращение Португалии к демократии (см. п. 21 выше).
В этот период, утверждало Правительство, страна столкнулась с
внезапным и непредвиденным увеличением количества тяжб. Вследствие
этого для отправления правосудия в перегруженных судах пришлось
призвать малоопытных судей. Компетентные власти, и в особенности
Высший совет магистратуры, делали все, что могли, для принятия
необходимых мер по исправлению ситуации (см. п. 25 выше).
38. Суд признает значимость первого довода. Он не может пройти
мимо того, что восстановление демократии в Португалии, начавшееся
в апреле 1974 г., сопровождалось трансформацией ее судебной
системы в сложных условиях, не имевших аналога в большинстве
других европейских стран; эти трудности были усугублены процессом
деколонизации и разразившимся экономическим кризисом (см. п. 21
выше). Суд ни в коей мере не собирается недооценивать усилий,
направленных на улучшение судебной организации и доступа граждан к
правосудию, особенно после принятия Конституции 1976 г. (см. п. 21
выше).
Тем не менее по данному вопросу мнение Суда совпадает с точкой
зрения Комиссии и заявителя. При ратификации Конвенции Португалия
гарантировала "каждому человеку, находящемуся под [ее]
юрисдикцией, права и свободы, определенные в разделе I настоящей
Конвенции" (статья 1). В частности, Португалия взяла на себя
обязательство организовать свою правовую систему таким образом,
чтобы обеспечить соблюдение требований статьи 6 п. 1, включая и
требование судебного разбирательства в "разумный срок"
(см. вышеупомянутое Решение по делу Циммермана и Стейнера.
Серия A, т. 66, с. 12, п. 29). Суд хотел бы еще раз привлечь
внимание к крайней важности этого требования для надлежащего
отправления правосудия.
39. Нисколько не игнорируя общую обстановку, Суд тем не менее
исходит из того, что его задача ограничивается в принципе
рассмотрением находящегося перед ним одного частного дела, которое
касается в основном одного конкретного суда.
На протяжении более года в Окружном суде Вила Франка де Хира
одному-единственному судье приходилось вести дела в двух палатах
по причине незаполненной вакансии: пост судьи во второй палате
оставался незанятым с 7 января до 26 июня 1979 г., а затем в
первой палате - с 21 июня 1979 г. до 8 апреля 1980 г. В то же
самое время произошло резкое увеличение числа незавершенных дел;
оно более чем удвоилось за период между 1976 г. и 1980 г.
(см. п. 22 - 23 выше).
Компетентные власти, для того чтобы устранить накапливающееся
отставание, решили в октябре 1980 г. назначить судью - помощника;
в марте 1981 г. из Лиссабона были направлены три судьи для работы
в Вила Франка де Хира на условиях неполного рабочего дня; аппарат
канцелярии суда был также значительно увеличен (см. п. 25 выше).
40. Согласно установившейся практике Суда, временные задержки
в судопроизводстве не влекут за собой международно-правовой
ответственности государства - ответчика Конвенции при условии, что
оно примет эффективные меры для быстрейшего исправления ситуации
(см. в качестве новейшего источника по данному вопросу
вышеупомянутое Решение по делу Циммермана и Стейнера, с. 12,
п. 29).
В данном случае Суд отмечает, как это ранее было сделано
Комиссией, что перегрузка судов растянулась на несколько лет. Суд
хотел бы напомнить, что после принятия Конституции 1976 г. были
введены различные меры, направленные на улучшение доступа граждан
к правосудию, в то время когда почти миллион человек,
репатриированных из бывших колоний, устраивались в Португалии
(см. п. 21 и 38 выше). В этих условиях следовало ожидать ощутимого
увеличения числа тяжб. В декабре 1979 г. адвокаты, практиковавшие
в Вила Франка де Хира, привлекли внимание к этой проблеме Высшего
совета магистратуры и министра юстиции (см. п. 24 выше).
Однако с учетом сложности ситуации, сложившейся в судебной
системе, шаги, предпринятые в октябре 1980 г. и в марте 1981 г.,
очевидно, были недостаточными и запоздалыми. Они, хотя и отражали
намерение справиться с проблемой, были неспособны по самой своей
природе достичь удовлетворительных результатов (см. mutatis
mutandis вышеупомянутое Решение по делу Циммермана и Стейнера.
Серия A, т. 66, с. 13, п. 31).
41. Принимая во внимание все обстоятельства дела, Суд приходит
к выводу, что исключительные трудности, с которыми столкнулась
Португалия, не были такими, которые лишали бы заявителя его права
на правосудное решение в "разумный срок" (там же, с. 13, п. 32).
Следовательно, имело место нарушение статьи 6 п. 1.
II. Применение статьи 50
42. Статья 50 гласит:
"Если Суд установит, что решение или мера, принятые судебными
или иными властями Высокой Договаривающейся Стороны, полностью или
частично противоречат обязательствам, вытекающим из настоящей
Конвенции, а также если внутреннее право упомянутой Стороны
допускает лишь частичное возмещение последствий такого решения или
такой меры, то решением Суда, если в этом есть необходимость,
предусматривается справедливое возмещение потерпевшей стороне".
В своем письменном дополнительном обращении от 27 февраля
1984 г. г-н Гинчо потребовал в качестве справедливого возмещения
проценты - за два года - от заявленной в иске суммы ущерба в
размере 350000 эскудо.
43. Правительство заявило, что судебная практика Португалии
разрешает учитывать при расчетах инфляцию и обесценение денег и
адвокат заявителя уже увеличил 9 февраля 1981 г. его требования до
700 тысяч эскудо; однако в процессе "исполнения" ограничился
первоначально заявленной суммой.
Г-н Гинчо возражал, что темпы инфляции и проценты, которые
причитаются в связи с необычайной длительностью производства по
делу, - две разные вещи и что он и без того был ограничен в своих
требованиях, т.к. сумма выплат по его страховке ограничена
потолком в 200000 эскудо.
44. Суд хотел бы напомнить, что несоблюдение требования о
"разумном сроке" - прямое следствие двух периодов почти полного
бездействия судов Вила Франка де Хира и Лиссабона (см. п. 35
выше); эти периоды длились в общей сложности более двух лет. Это
дополнительное по сравнению с нормальной продолжительностью
судебного разбирательства время, на которое соответственно
задержалось решение спора в суде. Задержка в условиях инфляции не
только уменьшила реальную значимость суммы, заявленной по иску, но
и поставила заявителя в ситуацию неопределенности, которая
сохраняется до сих пор, причем даже окончательное решение в его
пользу может оказаться недостаточной компенсацией.
Соответственно Суд присуждает г-ну Гинчо сумму в 150 тысяч
эскудо в порядке справедливого возмещения в целях статьи 50.
ПО ЭТИМ ОСНОВАНИЯМ СУД ЕДИНОГЛАСНО
1. Постановил, что имело место нарушение статьи 6 п. 1;
2. Постановил, что государство - ответчик должно выплатить
заявителю 150000 (сто пятьдесят тысяч) эскудо на основании
статьи 50.
Совершено на английском и французском языках и оглашено во
Дворце прав человека в Страсбурге 10 июля 1984 г.
За Председателя
Судья
Вальтер Гансгоф ван дер МЕЕРШ
За Грефье
Заместитель Грефье
Герберт ПЕТЦОЛЬД
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
CASE OF GUINCHO v. PORTUGAL
JUDGMENT
(Strasbourg, 10.VII.1984)
In the Guincho case,
The European Court of Human Rights, sitting, in accordance
with Article 43 (art. 43) of the Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ("the Convention") and the
relevant provisions of the Rules of Court <1>, as a Chamber
composed of the following judges:
--------------------------------
<1> Note by the registry: The revised Rules of Court, which
entered into force on 1 January 1983, are applicable to the
present case.
Mr. G. Wiarda, President,
Mr. J. Cremona,
Mr. W. Ganshof van der Meersch,
Mr. {F. Golcuklu} <*>,
Mr. J. Pinheiro Farinha,
Mr. {E. Garcia de Enterria},
Mr. J. Gersing,
and also Mr. M.-A. Eissen, Registrar, and Mr. H. Petzold,
Deputy Registrar
--------------------------------
<*> Здесь и далее по тексту слова на национальном языке
набраны латинским шрифтом и выделены фигурными скобками.
Having deliberated in private on 30 March and 23 June 1984,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the
last-mentioned date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case was brought before the Court by the European
Commission of Human Rights ("the Commission") and the Portuguese
Government ("the Government"). The case originated in an
application (No. 8990/80) against that State lodged with the
Commission by a Portuguese national, Mr. Manuel dos Santos
Guincho, on 20 May 1980 in accordance with Article 25 (art. 25) of
the Convention.
2. The Commission's request and the Government's application
were lodged with the registry of the Court on 18 July and 26
September 1983 respectively, within the period of three months
laid down by Articles 32 para. 1 and 47 (art. 32-1, art. 47) of
the Convention. The request referred to Articles 44 and 48 (art.
44, art. 48) and to the declaration whereby the Republic of
Portugal recognised the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court
(Article 46) (art. 46). The application referred to Article 48
(art. 48). The purpose of the request and the application was to
obtain a decision as to whether or not the reasonable time
requirement laid down in Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) of the
Convention had been complied with.
3. In response to the inquiry made in accordance with Rule 33
para. 3 (d) of the Rules of Court, the applicant stated that he
wished to take part in the proceedings pending before the Court
and designated the lawyer who would represent him (Rule 30).
4. The Chamber of seven judges to be constituted included, as
ex officio members, Mr. J. Pinheiro Farinha, the elected judge of
Portuguese nationality (Article 43 of the Convention) (art. 43),
and Mr. G. Wiarda, the President of the Court (Rule 21 para. 3 (b)
of the Rules of Court). On 21 September 1983, the President of the
Court drew by lot, in the presence of the Registrar, the names of
the five other members, namely Mr. J. Cremona, Mr. W. Ganshof van
der Meersch, Mr. L. Liesch, Mr. {F. Golcuklu} and Mr. J. Gersing
(Article 43 in fine of the Convention and Rule 21 para. 4) (art.
43). Mr. {E. Garcia de Enterria}, substitute judge, subsequently
replaced Mr. Liesch, who was prevented from taking further part in
the consideration of the case (Rules 22 para. 1 and 24 para. 1).
5. Mr. Wiarda, who had assumed the office of President of the
Chamber (Rule 21 para. 5), consulted, through the Registrar, the
Agent of the Government, the Delegate of the Commission and the
lawyer for the applicant regarding the need for a written
procedure (Rule 37 para. 1). He directed on 6 October 1983 that
the Agent and the lawyer should have until 6 January 1984 to file
a memorial and that the Delegate should be entitled to file a
memorial in reply within two months from the date of the
transmission to him by the Registrar of whichever of the aforesaid
documents should last be filed. The lawyer for Mr. Guincho waived
this right in a letter received at the registry on 11 October
1983.
On 7 October 1983, the Registrar, acting on the instructions
of the President, invited the Commission and the Government to
produce certain documents; he received them on 18 October and 10
November respectively.
The Government filed their memorial with the registry on 3
January 1984; on 27 January, the Secretary to the Commission
informed the Registrar that the Delegate would be presenting his
observations at the hearings.
6. On 6 February, the President, after consulting, through the
Registrar, the Agent of the Government, the Delegate of the
Commission and the lawyer for the applicant, directed that the
hearings should open on 28 March (Rule 38). He also authorised the
Agent and lawyer to use the Portuguese language (Rule 27 paras. 2
and 3).
On 27 February, the lawyer for Mr. Guincho transmitted to the
Court his client's claims under Article 50 (art. 50) of the
Convention; on 26 March, he replied in writing to various
questions that the Registrar had put to him on the instructions of
the President.
7. The hearings were held in public at the Human Rights
Building, Strasbourg, on the appointed day. Immediately
beforehand, the Court had held a preparatory meeting.
There appeared before the Court:
- for the Government
Mr. J.N. da Cunha Rodrigues, Deputy Procurador-Geral, Agent;
Mr. A.V. Coelho, Judge on the Supreme Court and Vice-Chairman
of the Supreme Council of the Judiciary,
Mr. J.A. Sacadura Garcia Marques, Secretary General of the
Ministry of Justice and Director General of the Judicial Services,
Counsel;
- for the Commission
Mr. J.C. Soyer, Delegate;
- for the applicant
Mr. J.A. Pires de Lima, advogado, Counsel.
The Court heard addresses by Mr. da Cunha Rodrigues and Mr.
Sacadura Garcia Marques for the Government, Mr. Soyer for the
Commission and Mr. Pires de Lima for the applicant, as well as
their replies to its questions. During the hearings, the
Government produced a document to the Court.
On 9 April and 21 May 1984, the registry received
supplementary answers from the applicant and then comments thereon
from the Government.
THE FACTS
8. The applicant is a Portuguese citizen, born in 1949. He
works as an electrician and resides in Lisbon.
On 18 August 1976, he was travelling in a car with Mr.
Domingos Lopes, who was the owner and driver of the car, and with
the latter's brother, Mr. {Jose Carlos Lopes}. At Alverca, the car
entered into collision with a vehicle belonging to the Canalux
Company of Lisbon and driven by Mr. Antonio Rodrigues Baptista
Dinis. Mr. Guincho was injured and lost the use of his left eye;
on 18 May 1977, he was certified as having a permanent partial
disability.
9. After being notified of the accident by the local police,
the public prosecutor's department at the Vila Franca de Xira
Regional Court instituted criminal proceedings against the drivers
of both vehicles for causing unintentional bodily harm.
On 20 January 1977, the applicant learnt that the file on the
case had been closed as a result of an amnesty granted under a
Legislative Decree.
10. On 7 December 1978, Mr. Guincho and Mr. D. Lopes ("the
plaintiffs") commenced a civil action in the Vila Franca de Xira
Regional Court against Mr. Dinis, the Canalux Company and the
"Tranquilidade" Insurance Company ("the defendants"). The
applicant claimed damages of 350,000 Escudos.
Under Article 68 of the Road Traffic Code, civil liability
actions in road traffic matters must be conducted in accordance
with summary procedure. Under the Code of Civil Procedure
(Articles 783 to 800), this procedure is characterised, inter
alia, by the reduction of certain time-limits.
11. On 9 December 1978, the judge of the second chamber
(2- juizo) of the Vila Franca de Xira Regional Court granted the
plaintiffs legal aid and ordered service of the writ on the
defendants. In this connection, the judge issued a request for
service (oficio precatorio) in Lisbon, the defendants' place of
residence.
In principle, when such a request is received at a court the
registry has two days in which to submit it to the judge. The
latter must then order the writ to be dispatched for service
within five days, following which the relevant registry official
is bound to execute the request for service within a similar
five-day interval unless he has a justifiable excuse (Articles 159
and 167 of the Code of Civil Procedure).
On 30 January, 28 February, 2 April, 4 May and 11 June 1979,
the judge of the first chamber of the Vila Franca de Xira Regional
Court, replacing the judge of the second chamber (whose post was
vacant), insisted that the request for service of the writ be
given effect. However, this was not done until 18 June.
12. The "Tranquilidade" Insurance Company filed its defence
({contestacao}) on 27 June contesting the plaintiffs' claims. It
applied to have a third party, Mr. {Jose Lopes} (see paragraph 8
above), joined in the proceedings ({intervencao} principal).
On 2 July 1979, Mr. Dinis and the Canalux Company filed their
defence. They indicated that at the appropriate moment they would
be seeking to have a medical examination of the plaintiffs.
13. The registry of the Vila Franca de Xira Regional Court
transmitted the file to the judge on 4 July.
On 28 January 1981, the judge directed that the defence
pleadings be communicated to the plaintiffs and that they be
allowed five days to reply to the interlocutory application by the
"Tranquilidade" Insurance Company.
In their reply filed on 9 February 1981, the plaintiffs took
issue with the other side's submissions and claimed that the
interlocutory application was a delaying tactic as Mr. {Jose
Lopes}, who was the brother of Mr. Domingos Lopes, had suffered no
prejudice and had expressly waived his right to claim damages. In
addition, they complained that they had not been notified until
January 1981 of defence pleadings dating back to June and July
1979, and informed the Regional Court that Mr. Guincho had lodged
a petition with the European Commission of Human Rights in
connection with the length of the proceedings. The registry of the
Regional Court did not transmit this reply to the judge until 26
March 1981.
14. In the meantime on 10 February 1981, the judge had
declared the interlocutory application admissible on the ground
that no objection had been raised against it, and he directed that
a summons be served on Mr. {Jose Lopes}, who resided in Loures. A
request for service in that jurisdiction was issued on the same
day and service was effected on 26 February.
On 27 March 1981, the above-mentioned judge, having received
late notice of the objection to the application, decided
nonetheless to maintain his decision of 10 February 1981. In a
preliminary decision (despacho saneador) taken on the same day, he
declared the main action admissible and drew up a list of
uncontested facts ({especificacao}) and a list of facts that had
to be clarified at the hearing (questionario).
15. The parties did not enter an appeal (agravo) against this
decision. On 29 April, 30 April and 5 May 1981, they filed in the
registry the list of witnesses they proposed to call.
Mr. Guincho and Mr. D. Lopes asked that one of their
witnesses, Maria do Sacramento Peixoto Silva, be heard at Almada,
the seat of the Regional Court within whose jurisdiction she was
said by them to reside. The judge consented on 18 May 1981 and a
request for evidence on commission (carta precatoria) was issued
on 1 June.
On 8 June, the Almada Regional Court set the hearing down for
9 July 1981. However, the Court discovered soon afterwards that
Mrs. Silva did not reside within its jurisdiction; on 12 June, it
forwarded the request to the Seixal Regional Court, the competent
court in this respect.
16. On 26 June, the judge of the Seixal Regional Court issed a
direction to the effect that he would hear the witness on 12
October. On 9 October, the lawyer representing the first two
defendants sent the judge a telegram saying that he could not be
present because of illness.
Mrs. Silva failed to appear on 12 October. The same day, the
judge fined her and directed that she be heard on 17 November
1981. However, the lawyer once more notified the judge by telegram
that he was still unwell, and the witness did not attend.
The judge thereupon adjourned the hearing of the witness until
10 February 1982; Mrs. Silva was finally examined on that date.
17. The evidence taken on commission was sent to the Vila
Franca de Xira Regional Court. The judge dealing with the case
received it on 16 February 1982. The following day, he submitted
the file to the two other judges of the full Court who certified
it on 18 February. On 19 February, he directed that the hearings
be held on 12 March 1982.
The hearings could not be held on that day because of the
absence of the lawyer representing the first two defendants and of
two other persons, namely Fernanda do Carmo Oliveira, in respect
of whom the summons as requested by the "Tranquilidade" Insurance
Company indicated an address where she was not known, and a
witness called by the plaintiffs, the police officer Adriano da
Cruz Surreira. The latter witness had drawn up the report on the
accident (see paragraphs 8 and 9 above) but had subsequently been
transferred to Oporto.
The judge therefore adjourned the hearings until 16 June and
then until 15 December 1982. He also issued a request for the
evidence of the latter witness to be taken on commission in
Oporto, as he had been asked to do by counsel for Mr. Guincho and
Mr. Lopes.
18. The Oporto Regional Court summoned Mr. Surreira to appear
on 14 May 1982, but on that day neither he nor the lawyers
representing the plaintiffs and the first two defendants attended
and the hearing was deferred until 3 June. However on 18 May, the
judge was informed that the witness had again changed his
residence and was serving in Montalegre; the request for evidence
on commission was therefore forwarded to the Regional Court of
that town.
The Montalegre Regional Court set the hearings down for 1 June
1982. On that day, Mr. Surreira's superiors gave notice that the
demands of public service (razoes inadiaveis de servico publico)
prevented his attendance. Counsel on both sides also failed to
appear.
Examination of the witness took place finally on 17 June 1982
and the evidence on commission was remitted to the Vila Franca de
Xira Regional Court.
19. On 29 July 1982, because of the impending court vacation,
the competent judge decided to bring the hearings forward to 20
October 1982. The hearings were duly held on that day.
Judgment was given on 25 October 1982. The Regional Court
found for the plaintiffs; it held that they were entitled to
damages from the defendants within the limits of the statement of
claim but subject to the proviso that the liability of the
"Tranquilidade" Insurance Company could not exceed 200,000
Escudos. The Regional Court awarded Mr. D. Lopes, compensation for
repairs to the car and for pecuniary and non-pecuniary prejudice.
In the case of Mr. Guincho, on the other hand, it considered that
the amount of the award could not yet be assessed, and it reserved
the decision on quantum for the procedure for "execution" of the
judgment (liquidacao en execucao de sentenca) in accordance with
Article 661 para. 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The judgment
was notified in writing to the applicant on 3 November.
The Regional Court subsequently liquidated the costs and
expenses, having varied its decision with regard to this point in
December 1982. The applicant was given notification thereof on 9
December 1982 and then on 17 January 1983.
None of the parties appealed.
20. On 22 September 1983, Mr. Guincho sought "execution" of
the judgment in the Vila Franca de Xira Regional Court. Prior to
that, he had received from the "Tranquiladade" Insurance Company
part of the sum claimed.
According to the evidence adduced before the Court, the Vila
Franca de Xira Regional Court has not yet fixed the quantum of
compensation to be awarded to the applicant.
The socio-political situation
21. The Government stressed that at the relevant time the
Portuguese legal system had to operate under exceptional
circumstances on account of the restoration of democracy in April
1974, the need to consolidate the newly set up institutions and
the repatriation of almost a million people from the former
colonies. The domestic courts had to be reorganised in a period of
serious economic recession. From 1974 to 1979, the volume of
litigation almost doubled.
On 25 April 1974, there were only 336 judges in office, that
is approximately four times fewer judges per inhabitant than the
European average; by the end of 1983, the number had risen to 952.
In 1976, court administration posts totalled 2,844, including 20
per cent vacant; currently, on the other hand, 5,566 of the 5,714
existing posts are filled.
After the Constitution was published in 1976, several measures
relating to the administration of justice were taken. Notably,
access to legal aid was improved, Acts governing the judiciary,
the Supreme Council of the Judiciary and the office of the
Procurador-Geral were passed, a judicial re-organisation of the
territory was carried out and a Centre of Judicial Studies (Centro
de Estudos Judiciarios) was set up to train judges and judicial
officers.
Situation at the Vila Franca de Xira Regional Court
22. Against this general background, the population of Vila
Franca de Xira increased by nearly one quarter between 1978 and
1984, partly because of the privileged position of the town on an
important main road and partly because of the influx of people
repatriated from the former colonies.
According to the statistics supplied by the Government, the
number of cases, both civil and criminal, before the chambers of
the Vila Franca de Xira Regional Court increased sharply: 2,377 in
1976, 2,705 in 1977, 4,079 in 1978, 4,175 in 1979 and 5,485 in
1980. As far as civil actions were concerned, the following
figures were cited:
1978 - first chamber: 206
second chamber: 199
1979 - first chamber: 457
second chamber: 337
1980 - first chamber: 579
second chamber: 508
23. The established posts of judge in the second and first
chambers of the Vila Franca de Xira Regional Court remained vacant
for more than five months (from 7 January 1979 to 26 June 1979)
and nine months (21 June 1979 - 8 April 1980), respectively. On
each occasion, the judge sitting in the other chamber was obliged
to deputise during the period of vacancy; in particular, the judge
of the first chamber acted in this way in the applicant's case
(see paragraph 11 above).
24. According to uncontested information furnished by Mr.
Guincho's representative, the lawyers in Vila Franca de Xira met
on 14 December 1979 and drew the attention of the Supreme Council
of the Judiciary and the Minister of Justice to the "chaotic"
situation of the Regional Court and asked for urgent measures to
be taken, in particular the appointment of another permanent
judge, three seconded assistant judges, an investigating judge, a
registrar and six court officials whose posts were then vacant.
On 18 February 1980, they raised the matter again with the
Minister of Justice. On 29 May, they sent a telegram to the
Supreme Council of the Judiciary once more urging the appointment
of judges and emphasising that it was "humanly impossible" for the
two judges in office to cope with the backlog of cases. On 27
February 1981, they made further representations to the Minister
and the Supreme Council.
On 19 March 1981, the judge of the second chamber himself
requested the relevant department of the Ministry of Justice to
recruit a number of court officials as a matter of urgency.
Steps taken by the Government
25. The Government pointed out that from 1 October 1980 to 19
February 1981, the four judges sitting on the Vila Franca de Xira
Regional Court were aided by a seconded assistant judge.
Furthermore, as from March 1981, the Supreme Council of the
Judiciary decided that three judges from Lisbon should work on a
part-time basis in in the Vila Franca de Xira Regional Court.
The number of court officials varied as follows:
1977: 14 out of 17 posts filled;
1978: 15 out of 23 posts filled;
1979: 27 out of 33 posts filled;
1980: 24 out of 27 posts filled;
1981: 23 out of 26 posts filled;
1984: 33 posts, all filled.
According to the Government, the Supreme Council of the
Judiciary recommended especial speediness in the conduct of the
applicant's case.
Proceedings before the Commission
26. In his application of 20 May 1980 to the Commission (no.
8990/80), Mr. Guincho complained of the length of civil
proceedings he had instituted on 7 December 1978 in the Vila
Franca de Xira Regional Court and relied on Article 6 para. 1
(art. 6-1) of the Convention.
27. The Commission declared the application admissible on 6
July 1982. In its report of 10 March 1983 (Article 31) (art. 31),
it expressed the unanimous opinion that there had been a violation
of Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1). The full text of the Commission's
opinion is reproduced as an annex to the present judgment. (*)
AS TO THE LAW
I. Alleged violation of Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1)
28. The applicant complained of the length of the civil
proceedings brought by himself and Mr. Lopes in the Vila Franca de
Xira Regional Court. He invoked Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) of
the Convention, which provides:
"In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ...,
everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time by
a ... tribunal ..."
The civil character of the litigation being clear and
undisputed, the sole issue to be decided in the present case is
whether the "reasonable time" requirement was complied with. In
the Commission's opinion, it was not, whereas the Government
argued that there had been no violation.
A. Period to be taken into account
29. The starting point of the relevant period - likewise a
matter on which there was no dispute - was 7 December 1978, the
date proceedings were instituted before the Vila Franca de Xira
Regional Court (see paragraph 10 above).
In the submission of the Government, the relevant "time" came
to a close on 25 October 1982 with the judgment which held that
Mr. Guincho was entitled to damages but reserved the assessment of
the quantum for the procedure for "execution" of the ruling (see
paragraph 19 above).
The Court, like the Commission, finds that this judgment did
not constitute the final decision since the Regional Court had not
yet assessed the damages to be awarded to Mr. Guincho (see
paragraph 65 of the report). The Court notes that the action fell
into two phases, the first one lasting until 25 October 1982 and
the second one, as yet uncompleted, being the "execution"
procedure. The latter procedure, which was entirely dependent upon
the initiative being taken by the applicant, was not commenced
until 23 September 1983, that is after approximately eleven months
(see paragraph 20 above); on the basis of the evidence adduced
before the Court, it cannot be open to any criticism. The Court
will consequently confine its examination to the first phase,
which ran from 7 December 1978 until 25 October 1982 (three years,
ten months and eighteen days).
30. Such a lapse of time would at first sight seem
unreasonable for a single jurisdictional level (see, mutatis
mutandis, the Zimmermann and Steiner judgment of 13 July 1983,
Series A no. 66, p. 11, para. 23), especially considering that the
judgment in question concerned solely the first phase of the
action and did not constitute the final decision on the
applicant's claims. It thus calls for close examination under
Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1).
B. Criteria applicable
31. The reasonableness of the length of proceedings is to be
assessed in each case according to the particular circumstances
and having regard to the criteria laid down in the Court's
case-law (see, inter alia, the above-mentioned Zimmermann and
Steiner judgment, ibid., p. 11, para. 24).
32. In Portugal, the Government pointed out, civil procedure
is governed by the so-called "principle of determination": the
power of initiative rests with the parties (Article 264 para. 1 of
the Code of Civil Procedure) who must take all appropriate steps
to further the expeditious conduct of the litigation. In the
opinion of the Court, this principle does not however dispense the
courts from ensuring the expeditious trial of the action as
required by Article 6 (art. 6) (see the Buchholz judgment of 6 May
1981, Series A no. 42, p. 16, para. 50). Moreover, Portuguese law
places judges under a duty to show diligence (Article 266 of the
said Code); in addition, Article 68 of the Road Traffic Code
provides that cases such as Mr. Guincho's should be dealt with
under the summary procedure which is characterised by, amongst
other things, reduction of some time-limits (see paragraph 10
above).
1. Complexity of the case
33. The Government acknowledged that the case was not complex
in substance. They nonetheless contended that the case became
complex through the behaviour of the parties, in particular as a
result of the interlocutory application by the insurance company
and the failure of witnesses and lawyers to appear (see paragraphs
12, 15 - 16 and 18 above). In the opinion of the Commission, on
the other hand, the proceedings did not entail any particular
difficulty.
The Court agrees with the latter view: the circumstances
adverted to by the Government did not complicate the conduct of
the proceedings in a manner unusual for such litigation.
2. Conduct of the applicant
34. According to the Government, Mr. Guincho could have
accelerated the progress of the proceedings by addressing a
complaint to the Supreme Council of the Judiciary. In addition,
various delays, for example with regard to the appearance of the
witnesses Maria Silva and Adriano da Cruz Surreira, were said to
be as much the responsibility of the applicant as of the other
parties. At the very least, so the Government maintained, no blame
could be laid at the door of the Portuguese authorities for the
period subsequent to 25 October 1982.
The Court has already given its ruling on this latter point
(see paragraph 29 above). With regard to the remaining arguments,
the Court would firstly note that the applicant was under no duty
to refer the matter to the Supreme Council of the Judiciary.
Furthermore, the taking of such a step would not have shortened
the duration of the procedure, since at most the Supreme Council
could have imposed disciplinary sanctions, if appropriate, on any
judges or officials at fault. Next, although the furnishing by Mr.
Guincho of an incorrect address may have somewhat delayed the
hearing of Mrs. Silva (see paragraphs 15 and 16 above), the period
of time involved is insignificant in comparison with the total
length of the proceedings. The other circumstances set out by the
Government, and in particular the failure to appear of witnesses
and of lawyers for the defendants, cannot, in the Court's view, be
held against the applicant.
In sum, the dilatory nature of the proceedings cannot be
attributed to the applicant.
3. Conduct of the Portuguese authorities
35. From the evidence adduced, it can be seen that on two
occasions the case remained dormant: from 9 December 1978 until 18
June 1979, that is more than six months, for the execution of a
request sent to Lisbon for service of the writ on the defendants,
and then from 4 July 1979 until 28 January 1981, that is more than
a year and a half, for the transmission of the defence pleadings
to the plaintiffs (see paragraphs 11 and 13 above).
The Government acknowledged that matters were held up to a
certain extent during the two periods mentioned above, but they
drew a distinction betwen the rhythm at which the action proceeded
and its overall length; in the Government's submission, the latter
factor alone was material for the purposes of Article 6 para. 1
(art. 6-1) and, in the particular circumstances, the overall
length of the action was acceptable.
The applicant contended that the existence of a total
cessation of activity during two years adversely affected the
proceedings as a whole.
36. The Court concurs in principle with the latter view. It
would also note that the two periods of almost total inactivity
related to the performance of procedural acts of a purely routine
character, such as the service of the writ on the defendants and
the transmission of the defence pleadings to the plaintiffs. These
periods could thus have been justified only by very exceptional
circumstances (see, mutatis mutandis, the above-mentioned
Zimmermann and Steiner judgment, Series A no. 66, p. 12, para. 27
in fine).
37. According to the Government, the abnormalities in the
proceedings before both the Vila Franca de Xira Regional Court and
the Lisbon Regional Court resulted from the disruption of
institutions that accompanied Portugal's return to democracy (see
paragraph 21 above).
At the same time, the Government contended, the country was
confronted with a sudden and unforeseen increase in the volume of
litigation. In consequence, judges with little experience were
called on to administer justice in overburdened courts.
Nonetheless, the competent authorities, and notably the Supreme
Council of the Judiciary, did what they could to take the
necessary remedial action (see paragraph 25 above).
38. The Court recognises the value of the first argument. It
cannot overlook that the restoration of democracy as from April
1974 led Portugal to carry out an overhaul of its judicial system
in troubled circumstances which were without equivalent in most of
the other European countries and which were rendered more
difficult by the process of decolonisation as well as by the
economic crisis (see paragraph 21 above). Nor does the Court in
any way underestimate the efforts taken to improve the citizen's
access to justice and the administration of the courts, in
particular after the promulgation of the Constitution in 1976 (see
paragraph 21 above).
Nonetheless, the Court must on this issue concur with the
views of the Commission and the applicant. In ratifying the
Convention, Portugal guaranteed to "secure to everyone within
[its] jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I"
(Article 1) (art. 1). In particular, Portugal undertook the
obligation of organising its legal system so as to ensure
compliance with the requirements of Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1),
including that of trial within a "reasonable time" (see the
above-mentioned Zimmermann and Steiner judgment, Series A no. 66,
p. 12, para. 29). The Court would once more draw attention to the
extreme importance of this requirement for the proper
administration of justice.
39. Furthermore, and without ignoring the general background
outlined above, the Court would point out that its task is
confined in principle to the examination of the particular case
before it, which essentially concerns one specific court.
At the Vila Franca de Xira Regional Court, for more than a
year a single judge had to deal with the business of two chambers
because of an unfilled vacancy: the post of judge was vacant in
the second chamber from 7 January until 26 June 1979 and then in
the first chamber from 21 June 1979 until 8 April 1980. At the
same time, there was a sharp rise in the number of pending cases,
which more than doubled between 1976 and 1980 (see paragraphs 22
and 23 above).
In order to eliminate the accumulated backlog, the competent
authorities decided in October 1980 to appoint an assistant judge;
in March 1981, they dispatched from Lisbon three judges to work in
Vila Franca de Xira on a part-time basis; the staff of the
registry was also greatly increased (see paragraph 25 above).
40. According to the established case-law of the Court, a
temporary backlog of court business does not engage the
international responsibility of the State concerned under the
Convention provided that the State takes effective remedial action
with the requisite promptness (see, as the most recent authority,
the above-mentioned Zimmermann and Steiner judgment, p. 12,
para. 29).
In the present case, the Court notes, as did the Commission,
that the growth in the burden of work was spread over several
years. The Court would recall that following the promulgation of
the Constitution in 1976, various measures were introduced with a
view to improving the citizen's access to justice, at a time when
nearly a million persons repatriated from the former colonies were
being resettled in Portugal (see paragraphs 21 and 38 above). In
these conditions, an appreciable expansion in the volume of
litigation was to be expected. In addition, by December 1979 the
lawyers practising at Vila Franca de Xira had brought the matter
to the attention of the Supreme Council of the Judiciary and the
Minister of Justice (see paragraph 24 above).
However, in the face of a state of affairs that had developed
into one of structural organisation, the steps taken in October
1980 and March 1981 were evidently insufficient and belated.
Although reflecting the will to tackle the problem, they were, by
their very nature, incapable of achieving satisfactory results
(see, mutatis mutandis, the above-mentioned Zimmermann and Steiner
judgment, Series A no. 66, p. 13, para. 31).
41. Having regard to all the circumstances of the case, the
Court concludes that the exceptional difficulties encountered in
Portugal were not such as to deprive the applicant of his
entitlement to a judicial determination within "a reasonable time"
(ibid., p. 13, para. 32). There has accordingly been a breach of
Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1).
II. Application of Article 50 (art. 50)
42. Article 50 (art. 50) reads as follows:
"If the Court finds that a decision or a measure taken by a
legal authority or any other authority of a High Contracting Party
is completely or partially in conflict with the obligations
arising from the ... Convention, and if the internal law of the
said Party allows only partial reparation to be made for the
consequences of this decision or measure, the decision of the
Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured
party."
In his written comments of 27 February 1984, Mr. Guincho
sought under the head of just satisfaction the interest that he
would have earned in two years on the damages - had they been
recovered - of 350,000 Escudos claimed in his civil action.
43. The Government stated that Portuguese case-law already
allows account to be taken of inflation and monetary erosion. The
applicant's lawyer had, it was said, raised to 700,000 Escudos his
client's claims when replying on 9 February 1981 to the defence
pleadings (see paragraph 13 above); yet, in the procedure for
"execution" of the judgment, the lawyer had limited himself to the
initial sum specified.
Mr. Guincho contended, on the other hand, that inflation rates
and interest due on account of the inordinate length of
proceedings constitute two different things and that in any event
he had been obliged to curtail his claims since the sum covered by
the insurance policy was subject to a maximum ceiling of 200,000
Escudos.
44. The Court would recall that the failure to ensure trial
within a "reasonable time" stemmed directly from two periods of
almost total inactivity on the part of the Regional Courts of Vila
Franca de Xira and Lisbon (see paragraph 35 above); these periods
total more than two years. The resultant lapse of time, which was
additional to the normal length of the proceedings, delayed to a
corresponding extent the completion of the litigation. Not only
did it reduce the effectiveness of the action brought, but it also
placed the applicant in a state of uncertainty which still
persists and in such a position that even a final decision in his
favour will not be able to provide compensation for the lost
interest.
Accordingly, the Court awards Mr. Guincho the sum of 150,000
Escudos by way of just satisfaction for the purposes of Article 50
(art. 50).
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
1. Holds that there has been a breach of Article 6 para. 1
(art. 6-1);
2. Holds that the respondent State is to pay the applicant one
hundred and fifty thousand (150,000) Escudos under Article 50
(art. 50).
Done in English and in French at the Human Rights Building,
Strasbourg, this tenth day of July, one thousand nine hundred and
eighty-four.
Signed: For the President
Walter GANSHOF VAN DER MEERSCH
Judge
Signed: For the Registrar
Herbert PETZOLD
Deputy Registrar
|
