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ПОСТАНОВЛЕНИЕ ЕВРОПЕЙСКОГО СУДА ПО ПРАВАМ ЧЕЛОВЕКА ОТ 15.07.1982 N ... ЭКЛЕ (ECKLE) ПРОТИВ ФЕДЕРАТИВНОЙ РЕСПУБЛИКИ ГЕРМАНИИ [РУС. (ИЗВЛЕЧЕНИЕ), АНГЛ.]

(по состоянию на 20 октября 2006 года)

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                                              [неофициальный перевод]
   
                   ЕВРОПЕЙСКИЙ СУД ПО ПРАВАМ ЧЕЛОВЕКА
   
                            СУДЕБНОЕ РЕШЕНИЕ
          ЭКЛЕ (ECKLE) ПРОТИВ ФЕДЕРАТИВНОЙ РЕСПУБЛИКИ ГЕРМАНИИ
   
                     (Страсбург, 15 июля 1982 года)
   
                              (Извлечение)
   
           КРАТКОЕ НЕОФИЦИАЛЬНОЕ ИЗЛОЖЕНИЕ ОБСТОЯТЕЛЬСТВ ДЕЛА
   
                           A. Основные факты
   
       Г-н Ганс Экле и его жена Марианна,  1926-го и 1935 г. рождения
   соответственно, являются гражданами Германии.
       Г-н Экле был владельцем фирмы,  которая занималась поставкой в
   кредит материалов и подготовкой площадок для  желающих  строиться.
   Его жена работала на этой фирме. Деятельность фирмы в период между
   1959-м и 1967 г.  стала предметом трех  самостоятельных  уголовных
   дел в Трире, Саарбрюкене и Кельне.
       В 1959 г.  прокуратура Трира начала расследование,  подозревая
   заявителя в заключении многочисленных договоров, основывавшихся на
   ложных  обещаниях,  и  в  получении  займов  обманным  путем.  Суд
   открылся  11 ноября 1970 г.  17 марта 1972 г.  Земельный суд Трира
   приговорил  г-на  и  г-жу   Экле   к   тюремному   заключению   за
   мошенничество. 19 февраля 1976 г. их жалоба по вопросам права была
   отклонена  Верховным  федеральным  судом.  Жалоба  в   Федеральный
   Конституционный Суд,  в том числе на длительность разбирательства,
   в июне 1977 г. была отклонена как не имеющая шансов на успех.
       По завершении другого расследования,  которое началось в конце
   1963 г.,  Земельный суд Саарбрюкена  в  октябре  1967  г.  признал
   заявителей виновными  в  мошенничестве;  после  того  как  в марте
   1969 г.  Верховный федеральный суд отменил приговор,  в  1970-м  и
   1971 г. Земельный суд осудил их повторно. Новая жалоба по вопросам
   права была отклонена 20 апреля 1972 г.
       Наконец, прокуратура  Кельна  начала по аналогичным основаниям
   расследование в марте 1967 г.,  но дело было  закрыто  в  сентябре
   1977 г. по причине незначительности приговора, который мог бы быть
   вынесен, по сравнению с приговорами, уже вынесенными в двух других
   судах.
       В ноябре  1977  г.  Земельный  суд   Трира   по   совокупности
   приговоров  определил  г-ну  Экле  семь  лет,  и два года и восемь
   месяцев для его жены.  23 апреля 1978 г. Верховный земельный суд в
   Кобленце   отклонил   "немедленную   апелляцию",  поданную  обоими
   заявителями против Решения Земельного суда.
   
            B. Разбирательство в Комиссии по правам человека
   
       В основе дела лежит жалоба,  направленная г-ном и г-жой Экле в
   Комиссию  в  декабре  1977 г.  Они жаловались,  среди прочего,  на
   чрезмерную длительность  разбирательств  уголовных  дел  в  Трире,
   Саарбрюкене  и  Кельне и утверждали,  что стали жертвами нарушения
   права на разбирательство дела в "разумные сроки" в смысле статьи 6
   п.  1  Конвенции.  В  мае  1979  г.  Комиссия объявила ходатайства
   приемлемыми в отношении длительности судебного  разбирательства  в
   Трире  и  Кельне.  В своем докладе от 11 декабря 1980 г.  Комиссия
   единогласно высказала мнение о нарушении статьи 6 п. 1.
   
                    ИЗВЛЕЧЕНИЕ ИЗ СУДЕБНОГО РЕШЕНИЯ
   
                             ВОПРОСЫ ПРАВА
   
       63. Заявители  жаловались  на  длительность  рассмотрения   их
   уголовных  дел  в  судах  Трира  и  Кельна;  они  утверждали,  что
   разбирательство превысило "разумный срок" (статья 6 п. 1).
   
                           I. Статья 25 п. 1
   
       64. В своей  памятной  записке,  а  впоследствии  и  в  устных
   выступлениях представители Правительства официально просили Суд не
   рассматривать   дело   по    существу.    Согласно    утверждениям
   Правительства, заявители не могли рассматриваться в качестве жертв
   в смысле статьи 25 п. 1 Конвенции, которая гласит:
       "Комиссия может   принимать   жалобы,   направленные  в  адрес
   Генерального  секретаря  Совета  Европы,  от  любого  лица,  любой
   неправительственной  организации  или  любой  группы  частных лиц,
   которые  утверждают,  что  явились  жертвами  нарушения  одной  из
   Высоких  Договаривающихся  Сторон их прав,  признанных в настоящей
   Конвенции..."
       Суды Германии,  утверждало Правительство,  фактически признали
   чрезмерную длительность разбирательства:  Земельный суд Трира учел
   это обстоятельство при вынесении приговора;  аналогично поступил и
   Земельный  суд  Кельна,   вынеся   постановление   о   прекращении
   уголовного преследования (см. п. 35 и 55 выше).
       Заявители оспаривали логику этих  рассуждений.  Комиссия  была
   согласна с ним.  По мнению Комиссии,  суды не признавали нарушения
   статьи  6;  уменьшение   срока   наказания   судом   Трира,   было
   незначительным;  отнюдь  не  очевидно,  что  Земельный суд Кельна,
   вынося решение о прекращении уголовного преследования,  принял  во
   внимание чрезмерную длительность разбирательства.
       65. Суд  вправе  вынести  решение  по   поводу   такого   рода
   предварительных возражений,   если   государство  -  ответчик  уже
   выдвигало их перед Комиссией в той мере,  в какой это позволяли их
   характер  и  обстоятельства (см.  Решение по делу Артико от 13 мая
   1980 г. Серия A, т. 37, с. 12, п. 24).
       Эти условия  были  выполнены  по  настоящему делу,  и право на
   принесение возражений не утрачено.
       66. Слово  "жертва"  в  контексте  статьи  25  и  данного дела
   означает лицо, непосредственно пострадавшее в результате упущения,
   причем нарушение возможно даже в отсутствие ущерба,  который имеет
   значение лишь в контексте статьи 50 (см.  inter  alia  Решение  по
   делу Адольфа от 26 марта 1982 г. Серия A, т. 49, с. 17, п. 37).
       Соответственно, смягчение приговора и  прекращение  уголовного
   преследования, с учетом чрезмерной длительности разбирательства, в
   принципе не лишают заинтересованное лицо статуса жертвы  в  смысле
   статьи 25; они должны быть приняты во внимание единственно с целью
   оценки размера ущерба,  который предположительно был  ему  нанесен
   (см.  mutatis mutandis вышеназванное Решение по делу Рингейзена от
   22 июня 1972 г.  Серия A, т. 15, с. 8, п. 20 - 21; Решение по делу
   Неймастера от 7 мая 1974 г. Серия A, т. 17, с. 18 - 19, п. 40).
       Суд не исключает возможности изъятия из этого общего правила в
   случае, когда национальные власти признали открыто либо фактически
   нарушение  Конвенции  и  предусмотрели  компенсацию  за  это  (см.
   Решение  Комиссии  от 16 октября 1980 г.  о приемлемости жалобы по
   делу Шлоффер против Федеративной Республики Германии).  В подобных
   обстоятельствах   дублирование   внутригосударственного   процесса
   разбирательством в Комиссии и Суде вряд ли выглядит совместимым  с
   субсидиарным    характером    механизма   защиты,   установленного
   Конвенцией. Конвенция   предоставляет   каждому   государству    -
   участнику  первое  место в обеспечении охраняемых ею прав и свобод
   (см. Решение по делу "О языках в  Бельгии"  от  23  июля  1968  г.
   Серия A,  т. 6, с. 35, п. 10 in fine; и Решение по делу Хэндисайда
   от 7 декабря 1976 г.  Серия A,  т. 24, с. 22, п. 48). Субсидиарный
   характер    становится    особенно    очевиден   применительно   к
   государствам, которые включили Конвенцию в свое внутреннее право и
   где  нормы  Конвенции  считаются действующими непосредственно (см.
   Решение по делу Ван Дроогенбрука от  24  июня  1982  г.  Серия  A,
   т. 50, п. 55).
       67. Поскольку Конвенция  интегрирована  в  право  Федеративной
   Республики Германии, ничто не препятствовало судам страны, если бы
   они посчитали это уместным, вынести решение о нарушении Конвенции,
   а именно статьи 6 п.  1. В распоряжении национальных судов имеются
   средства,  позволяющие   присуждать   при   этом   соответствующее
   возмещение:  согласно сложившейся практике Верховного федерального
   суда при вынесении приговора  судья  должен  принять  во  внимание
   любое превышение   "разумных   сроков"  разбирательства  в  смысле
   статьи 6 п.  1 (см.  Решение от 10 ноября 1971 г.  "Entscheidungen
   des Bundesgerichtshofes in Strafsachen". Т. 24, с. 239 - 243).
       Соответственно, Суд  должен  установить,  учитывали  ли,   как
   утверждает   Правительство,   германские  суды  в  своих  решениях
   нарушение статьи 6 п.  1 и предоставили ли  они  в  связи  с  этим
   возмещение.
       68. В   решениях   Земельного   суда   Трира   сказано,    что
   разбирательство в  нем  шло  "необычно  долгое  время" (Решение от
   17 марта 1972 г. п. 27 выше); было "чрезмерно длительным" (Решение
   от 24 ноября 1977 г.  п.  35 выше). Об этом же говорится в Решении
   Верховного федерального суда от 19 февраля 1976  г.  и  в  Решении
   Верховного земельного   суда   Кобленца   от  23  января  1978  г.
   (см. п.  33 и 36 выше). Все эти решения, кроме Решения суда Трира,
   ссылались  на судебную практику,  о которой сказано выше в п.  67.
   Только суд Кобленца упоминает о статье 6 п.  1, когда говорит, что
   даже  с  учетом  этой  статьи  приговор,  вынесенный  в Трире,  не
   является излишне суровым.
       В Решении  Земельного  суда  Кельна  от 21 сентября 1977 г.  о
   прекращении уголовного дела против г-на  и  г-жи  Экле  отмечается
   согласие  обвиняемого и сделана ссылка на формальные представления
   прокуратуры (см.  п.  33 выше).  Последняя сослалась  на  указания
   Верховного  федерального  суда о кумуляции приговоров,  что и было
   сделано Земельным судом Трира.
       69. Из  вышесказанного  видно,  что ни один из рассматривавших
   дело судов не признал факта нарушения статьи 6 п.  1. Тем не менее
   формулировки,  использованные  названными выше судами,  могут быть
   приравнены  к  установлению  этого   обстоятельства   в   судебном
   заседании.  Меньше  оснований в этом отношении дает решение суда в
   Кельне; оно вряд ли позволяет сделать вывод, что этот суд признал,
   что  длительность  разбирательства является   нарушением  статьи 6
   п. 1.
       70. Даже   если  согласиться  с  тем,  что  названные  решения
   действительно  признают  в  достаточно  ясной  форме  несоблюдение
   требования  "разумных  сроков",  то  остается  вопрос  -  было  ли
   предоставлено возмещение? Были ли смягчение приговора, вынесенного
   судом Трира,  и прекращение уголовного дела по Решению суда Кельна
   совершены в исправление того,  на что была принесена рассмотренная
   жалоба?
       Суд отмечает,  что ответ на эти вопросы тесно связан с  другим
   аспектом  дела,  а  именно  масштабами  совершенного  нарушения  и
   соответственно  основными  доводами  предварительного   возражения
   Правительства.
   
                     II. О нарушении статьи 6 п. 1
   
       71. Комиссия   выразила  мнение,  что  имело  место  нарушение
   статьи 6 п. 1, которая предусматривает:
       "Каждый человек  имеет  право  при определении его гражданских
   прав  и  обязанностей  или  при  рассмотрении  любого   уголовного
   обвинения,   предъявляемого   ему,   на   справедливое   публичное
   разбирательство дела в разумный срок независимым и беспристрастным
   судом, созданным на основании закона..."
       Правительство признало,  что  разбирательство   на   некоторых
   стадиях было неразумно длительным.
   
                    A. Длительность разбирательства
   
       72. В жалобе заявителя говорится, что судебный процесс в Трире
   начался в ноябре 1959 г. и завершился 24 ноября 1977 г., когда суд
   кумулировал   вынесенные   всеми  приговорами  наказания.  В  ходе
   слушаний  Правительство  утверждало,  что  разбирательство  шло  с
   7 октября  1964  г.  (обыск  в помещениях заявителя) до 19 февраля
   1976  г.  (Решение   Верховного   федерального   суда).   Комиссия
   согласилась со второй датой,  но,  по мнению Комиссии, дату начала
   разбирательства можно отнести по крайней мере к 1 января 1961 г.
       По мнению  заявителей  и Комиссии,  процесс в Кельне начался с
   выдачи 25 апреля 1967 г. приказа об обыске помещений и аресте г-на
   и   г-жи  Экле.  В  Суде  Правительство,  по-видимому,  предложило
   рассматривать дату исполнения данного судебного приказа,  а именно
   11  мая  1967  г.,  а  не  более  позднюю,  как это было сделано в
   Комиссии,  дату взятия г-на Экле под стражу (25 ноября  1969  г.).
   Что касается окончания этого периода,  то заявители, Правительство
   и Комиссия - все согласились с датой 21 сентября  1977  г.,  день,
   когда процесс завершился.
   
         1. Начало периодов, которые следует принимать в расчет
   
       73. В  уголовных делах "разумный срок",  о котором говорится в
   статье 6 п.  1,  начинает течь с момента,  когда лицу "предъявлено
   обвинение";  это  может  произойти раньше,  чем дело попадет в суд
   (см.,  например,  Решение от 27 февраля 1980 г.  по делу  Девеера.
   Серия A,  т.  35,  с.  22,  п.  42),  со дня ареста, с даты, когда
   заинтересованное лицо было официально уведомлено,  что против него
   возбуждено   уголовное   дело,  или  с  даты,  когда  было  начато
   предварительное следствие  (см.  вышеупомянутые  Решения  по  делу
   Вемхофа от 27 июня 1968 г.;  по делу Неймастера,  вынесенное в тот
   же день;  по делу Рингейзена от 16 июля 1971 г.).  "Обвинение" для
   целей  статьи 6 п.  1 можно определить как официальное уведомление
   лица компетентными властями, что есть основание утверждать, что им
   совершено уголовное преступление.
       74. Применяя  эти  принципы  к   обстоятельствам   дела,   Суд
   полагает,   что   дата,   предложенная   заявителями   в  связи  с
   разбирательством  в  Трире,  не  является  соответствующей,   т.к.
   представленные  Правительством  документы показывают,  что жалоба,
   поданная 28 октября  1959  г.  на  супругов  Экле,  не  привела  к
   назначению формального расследования;  ни прокуратура,  ни полиция
   не  проводили  опроса   свидетелей   или   заявителей.   Настоящее
   предварительное следствие началось только в августе 1960 г., когда
   в связи с обвинениями,  выдвинутыми против г-на Экле, опрашивались
   многочисленные свидетели (см. п. 11 - 12 выше).
       Тем не   менее,   поскольку   невозможно   установить,   когда
   заявителям стало официально известно о следствии, Суд согласился с
   мнением   Комиссии  и взял за точку отсчета  в  качестве  "начала"
   1 января 1961 г.
       Суд не счел необходимым проводить  какое-либо  различие  между
   двумя  заявителями,  так как,  хотя следствие и не было направлено
   против г-жи Экле с самого начала,  она ощущала последствия этого в
   той же мере, как и ее муж.
       75. Соответствующей датой начала процесса  в  Кельне  является
   дата вручения судебного приказа, изданного 25 апреля 1967 г., т.е.
   11 мая 1967 г. (см. п. 72 выше).
   
                         2. Окончание периодов,
                   которые следует принимать в расчет
   
       76. Что  касается  времени  окончания,  то  в  уголовных делах
   период,  на который распространяются  положения  статьи  6  п.  1,
   охватывает  все  время  прохождения  дела,  включая  апелляционную
   процедуру (см.  Решение по делу Кенига от 28 июня 1978 г. Серия A,
   т. 27, с. 33, п. 98).
       77. Решением Верховного федерального суда от 19  февраля  1976
   г. на суд Трира была возложена обязанность кумулировать наложенные
   на г-на и г-жу Экле наказания по приговорам  судов  Саарбрюкена  и
   Трира.  При этом высшая инстанция напомнила, что такая обязанность
   прямо возложена на суды действующим правом (ст. 53 - 54 Уголовного
   кодекса).   Такое   соединение   приговоров   не   является  чисто
   арифметическим  действием,  т.к.  согласно  статье  54  Уголовного
   кодекса судьи Трира должны были дать собственную общую оценку всех
   преступлений,  в  совершении  которых  заявители   были   признаны
   виновными и в Саарбрюкене, и в Трире, а также свою оценку личности
   преступников; фактически это и было сделано в Решении от 24 ноября
   1977  г.  Дополнительно Земельный суд должен был учесть в качестве
   смягчающего обстоятельства время,  которое прошло со  дня  решения
   высшей судебной инстанции "до окончательного решения".
       Отсюда следует,  что после этого решения  заявители  не  могли
   вычислить,   какой  срок  они  могли  получить  по  окончательному
   приговору. Они лишь знали, что он должен быть меньше, нежели сумма
   сроков  по  ранее  вынесенным  приговорам  двух  земельных   судов
   (статья 54 п. 2 Уголовного кодекса).
       Пока наказание  не  было окончательно определено,  нельзя было
   установить - отвечало ли осуждение всем требованиям обоснованности
   уголовного  обвинения  в смысле статьи 6 п.  1.  В Решении по делу
   Рингейзена,  уже  упоминавшемуся  выше,  Суд  посчитал  окончанием
   процесса дату, когда закончилось кассационное производство по делу
   и  при  определении  срока  наказания  было   учтено   все   время
   предварительного заключения заявителя.
       Соответственно,  период,   подлежавший    учету,    завершился
   23 января   1978   г.,  когда  Верховный  земельный  суд  Кобленца
   подтвердил  кумулятивный  приговор,   вынесенный  Земельным  судом
   24 ноября 1978 г.
       78. Процедура  судебного   разбирательства   в   Кельне   была
   завершена 21 сентября 1977 г., когда Земельный суд прекратил дело.
   
                                3. Вывод
   
       79. Длительность процесса,  которая рассматривалась на предмет
   соответствия требованиям статьи 6 п.  1, составила, таким образом,
   семнадцать лет и три недели (1 января 1961 г. - 23 января 1978 г.)
   в отношении судебного процесса в Трире и десять лет четыре  месяца
   и  десять  дней  в  отношении процесса в Кельне (11 мая 1967 г.  -
   21 сентября 1977 г.).
       Поскольку заявители     продолжали     свою    противозаконную
   деятельность пока шло расследование дела  в  Трире,  Правительство
   обратилось  в  Суд  с  просьбой вычесть из общей продолжительности
   судебного разбирательства время,  в течение  которого  совершались
   новые правонарушения.
       Суд рассматривает данный фактор как один из  важных  элементов
   оценки "разумности сроков".
   
                  B. Разумность срока разбирательства
   
       80. Разумность  срока  разбирательства  должна  оцениваться  в
   каждом случае исходя из конкретных  обстоятельств.  При  этом  Суд
   должен учитывать сложность дела,  поведение заявителей и поведение
   судебных  властей  (см.  вышеупомянутое  Решение  по  делу Кенига.
   Серия A, т. 27, с. 34, п. 99).
       Настоящий случай затрагивает совокупность  судебных  процедур,
   которые  длились  соответственно  семнадцать  и десять лет.  Такая
   продолжительность,  без сомнения,  является необычной и должна, по
   общему правилу, рассматриваться как превосходящая "разумный срок",
   о котором говорится в статье 6 п. 1 (см. вышеупомянутые Решения по
   делу Неймастера,  т.  8.  с.  41,  п.  20;  по делу Кенига, с. 34,
   п. 102).  В подобных обстоятельствах от  государства  -  ответчика
   требуется получить объяснения.
   
                       1. Разбирательство в Трире
   
       81. Хотя предмет следствия и судебного разбирательства в Трире
   в правовом аспекте выглядит относительно просто, тем не менее дело
   достаточно   сложно,   особенно  в  свете  масштабов  деятельности
   заявителей  и  изобретательности,  проявленной  ими  в  разработке
   методов    финансирования    договоров    продажи.   Более   того,
   дополнительные сложности возникли по ходу расследования в связи  с
   тем,  что  в  конце 1963 г.  и в течение 1964 г.  был заключен еще
   целый ряд договоров займа мошеннического характера.
       82. Отнюдь не содействуя ускорению разбирательства, г-н и г-жа
   Экле многократно прибегали к  действиям,  включая  систематический
   отвод   судей,   причем   некоторые   из   этих   действий   можно
   интерпретировать  как  затягивание  дела  и  умышленную обструкцию
   (см. п. 15, 20, 22, 23, 24, 25 и 32 выше).
       Однако, как справедливо указала Комиссия,  статья 6 не требует
   от  заявителей  активного  сотрудничества  с  судебными  властями.
   Нельзя также упрекать их в том,  что  они  полностью  использовали
   средства защиты, предоставляемые внутренним законодательством. Тем
   не менее их поведение представляет собой объективный факт, который
   не может  быть  отнесен  на  счет  государства - ответчика,  и это
   следует принимать во внимание,  определяя,  превышало ли  судебное
   разбирательство разумный срок в смысле статьи 6 п.  1 (см. mutatis
   mutandis вышеупомянутое Решение по делу Кенига, п. 103, 105, 108 и
   111, а  также  Решение по делу Бухольца от 6 мая 1981 г.  Серия A,
   т. 42, с. 18 и 22, п. 56, 63).
       83. Из    жалоб   заявителей   следовало,   что   длительность
   разбирательства  -   следствие   организации   рассмотрения   дела
   судебными  властями.  Главным  объектом  их  критики было то,  что
   судебные власти провели три самостоятельных  расследования  и  три
   судебных  процесса  вместо  того,  чтобы  объединить  их,  а также
   проводили расследования слишком многих отдельных эпизодов.
       Комиссия также сочла, что длительность разбирательства следует
   отнести прежде всего на счет судебных властей. По мнению Комиссии,
   предварительные    следствия,    отзыв    "обвинительного   акта",
   составление проекта решения Земельного суда,  рассмотрение высшими
   инстанциями жалоб о пересмотре дела по правовым основаниям вызвали
   неоправданные задержки.
       Правительство выразило свое несогласие с этим мнением.
       84. Суд,  как и Комиссия,  пришел к выводу,  что  компетентные
   власти не действовали с необходимым старанием и рациональностью.
       Так, огромное число  расследовавшихся  эпизодов  не  могло  не
   сказаться  на  сроках  предварительного  следствия  (п.  16 выше).
   Правительство утверждало, что принцип обязательности расследования
   всех  уголовных  преступлений,  вменяемых  лицу,  заставлял власти
   действовать именно так.  Однако Суд  отверг  этот  аргумент.  Хотя
   статья  154  Уголовно-процессуального  уложения  только в 1979 г.,
   после ее изменения,  допускала возможность в  определенный  момент
   остановить  расследование,  само  Правительство признало,  что эта
   реформа лишь отразила сложившуюся ранее практику.  В любом  случае
   Правительство   не   вправе,   когда   речь   идет   о  выполнении
   обязательств,  взятых им на себя в силу  статьи  6,  ссылаться  на
   недостатки   своего   внутреннего  законодательства.  Более  того,
   действовавший на тот период закон не препятствовал  прокуратуре  и
   Земельному  суду  прекратить  расследование  по некоторым эпизодам
   (см. п. 16 и 26 выше).
       Кроме того,  нелегко понять,  почему в 1967 г., т.е. шесть лет
   спустя после начала следствия,  служба государственного  обвинения
   Трира,  столкнувшись  с  новыми преступлениями,  которые,  как она
   полагала,  ей удалось раскрыть,  посчитала,  что существует только
   один  подходящий  способ  действовать  в такой ситуации,  а именно
   отозвать "акт обвинения". Следует также отметить, что прошел почти
   год, прежде чем в прокуратуру Кельна были переданы новые дела (там
   же).
       Нет и подобающего объяснения того,  почему оглашенное 17 марта
   1972 г.  Решение суда затем почти одиннадцать месяцев  оформлялось
   как окончательный  приговор,  текст  которого  заявители  получили
   12 февраля  1973   г.   Несомненно,   и   это   было   подчеркнуто
   Правительством,  составление решения требует анализа большой массы
   документов,  но одно  это  не  может  оправдать  столь  длительной
   задержки.
       Наконец, процедура  кассационного  обжалования  тянулась почти
   три года (см. п. 29 - 33 выше).
       85. Правительство обратило внимание Суда на то обстоятельство,
   что дело Экле было одним из первых крупных  дел  об  экономических
   преступлениях  в  земле  Рейнланд-Пфальц.  В то время власти,  как
   объясняло Правительство, не имели необходимого опыта и средств для
   быстрой  и  эффективной  борьбы с такого рода правонарушениями.  В
   дальнейшем  с  этой   целью   была   принята   целая   серия   мер
   законодательного и административного характера.
       Суд сознает,    что    специфические    формы    экономических
   преступлений  первоначально  создавали судебным властям трудности,
   которые сказывались на длительности уголовного преследования.  Суд
   не  может  придавать  этим  факторам решающее значение,  поскольку
   обстоятельства данного    дела    не    являются   исключительными
   (см. mutatis mutandis вышеупомянутое  Решение  по  делу  Бухольца,
   п. 51, 61 и 63).
       86. В  свете  всех  этих  факторов Суд приходит к выводу,  что
   сложности расследования и поведение заявителей  сами  по  себе  не
   оправдывают  длительность  судебной  процедуры;  одна  из  главных
   причин заключается в том, как вели дело судебные власти.
       87. С  учетом  сказанного  выше  в  п.  86,  уменьшение  срока
   наказания в окончательном  приговоре  Земельного  суда  не  лишает
   заявителей права считаться жертвами в смысле статьи 25 (см. п. 68,
   70  выше).  Решение  Земельного  суда  не   содержит   достаточных
   указаний, позволяющих оценить, в какой мере длительность судебного
   разбирательства была принята во внимание в целях Конвенции.
       88. Соответственно,  Суд  отвергает предварительное возражение
   Правительства  в  этой  части  дела  и  приходит  к  выводу,   что
   разбирательство в   Трире  превысило  разумный  срок  в  нарушение
   статьи 6 п. 1 Конвенции.
   
                  2. Судебное разбирательство в Кельне
   
       89. Дело,  по которому следствие и суд  состоялись  в  Кельне,
   первоначально  касалось  пятнадцати  человек,  а  его разветвления
   вышли за пределы страны; в деле фигурировали не только обвинения в
   мошенничестве, но также злостное банкротство и уклонение от уплаты
   налогов (см.  п.  37 выше).  Как и Комиссия,  Суд  счел  это  дело
   особенно трудным и сложным.
       90. Как  и  в  Трире,  г-н   и   г-жа   Экле   тормозили   ход
   разбирательства,  подавая  многочисленные  заявления  и апелляции,
   нередко  сопровождаемые  просьбой  о   продлении   сроков   подачи
   письменных возражений (см.  п.  43,  45,  47,  48, 49, 51, 53 и 54
   выше; для сравнения п. 82 выше).
       91. Заявители  утверждали,  что  одни  только  судебные власти
   несут ответственность за проволочки.  В дополнение к основаниям, о
   которых  уже  шла  речь  (в  п.  83),  они делали упор на то,  что
   судебные власти не отделили обвинения в мошенничестве от обвинений
   в других преступлениях.
       Комиссия сочла,  что на длительность разбирательства  повлияло
   главным образом то,  как вели дело судебные власти. Она указала на
   чрезмерную  продолжительность  следствия  и  в  качестве   примера
   привела задержку с завершением доклада эксперта;  она также сочла,
   что начало судебного разбирательства было задержано без  веских  к
   тому  причин,  и что Земельный суд вполне мог прекратить уголовное
   преследование на более ранней стадии.
       Правительство выразило несогласие с этим мнением.
       92. Суд,  как и Комиссия,  пришел к выводу,  что  компетентные
   власти   не   действовали   с   необходимой  степенью  старания  и
   рациональности.  Особо следует отметить, что прошло около трех лет
   между  предъявлением  "уголовного обвинения" (25 сентября 1973 г.,
   п. 52 выше) и началом суда (16 сентября 1976 г., п. 53 выше).
       В связи с последним обстоятельством Правительство сослалось на
   большую   загрузку   в   то   время   палат    Земельного    суда,
   специализирующихся  на экономических преступлениях;  Правительство
   перечислило различные меры, принятые для исправления положения.
       Суд отмечает,  что  власти  стремились  сократить длительность
   рассмотрения   дел    в    Земельном    суде,    увеличив    число
   специализированных  палат с двух (в 1973 г.) до шести (в 1977 г.).
   Тем не менее Суд считает,  что сам по себе  объем  работы  не  был
   исключительным   и  данная  ссылка  Правительства  не  может  быть
   принята,  хотя  Суд  и  отдает  должное  принятым  в  Федеративной
   Республике Германии мерам для более быстрой и эффективной борьбы с
   экономическими преступлениями.
       93. На  основании  всех этих принятых во внимание факторов Суд
   пришел  к  выводу,  что  сложности   расследования   и   поведение
   заявителей сами по себе длительность разбирательства не объясняют:
   одна из основных причин ее кроется в том, как судебные власти вели
   дело.
       94. Прекращение  с  согласия  заявителей  уголовного  дела   -
   Решение Земельного суда 21 сентября 1977 г.  - в принципе могло бы
   помешать  заявителям  претендовать  на  статус "жертв"  в   смысле
   статьи 25,  но длительность задержек, происшедших по вине властей,
   такова,  что заявители этот статус не утрачивают,  тем  более  что
   решение  о  прекращении  дела  не  содержит  каких  бы  то ни было
   указаний,  что это было сделано с учетом  вышеупомянутых  задержек
   (см. п. 68, 70).
       95. Соответственно,  Суд отклоняет предварительное  возражение
   Правительства  относительно  этой  части дела и констатирует,  что
   разбирательство в  Кельне  превысило  разумный  срок  в  нарушение
   статьи 6 п. 1 Конвенции.
   
                       III. Применение статьи 50
   
       96. Адвокат   заявителей   заявил,  что,  если  Суд  установит
   нарушение Конвенции, тогда его клиенты подадут жалобу на основании
   статьи   50  о  справедливом  возмещении  ущерба,  нанесенного  им
   неразумной длительностью процесса,  и,  возможно,  будут просить о
   возмещении судебных издержек, однако он не определил их притязания
   в количественном отношении.  Правительство  со  своей  стороны  не
   занимало какой-либо позиции по данному вопросу.
       Соответственно, вопрос еще  не  готов  для  принятия  по  нему
   решения.  Поэтому Суд обязан оговорить это и определить дальнейшую
   процедуру,  учитывая  возможность  соглашения между государством -
   ответчиком и заявителями.
   
                   ПО ЭТИМ ОСНОВАНИЯМ СУД ЕДИНОГЛАСНО
   
       1. Признал возможным предварительное возражение Правительства,
   но после рассмотрения отклонил его;
       2. Постановил,  что  имело  место  нарушение  статьи  6  п.  1
   Конвенции;
       3. Постановил,  что вопрос о применении статьи 50 не готов для
   вынесения по нему решения;
       соответственно,
       a) сделал оговорку относительно данного вопроса в целом;
       b) пригласил  Комиссию  представить  Суду  в двухмесячный срок
   после вынесения настоящего Решения письменные  замечания  Комиссии
   по  указанному  вопросу  и,  в частности,  уведомить Суд о мировом
   соглашении, к которому могли бы прийти государство  -  ответчик  и
   заявители;
       c) отложил дальнейшее рассмотрение и делегировал  председателю
   Палаты   полномочия   возобновить   его,   если  в  том  возникнет
   необходимость.
   
       Совершено на   английском   и   французском   языках,   причем
   французский текст является аутентичным,  и оглашено во Дворце прав
   человека в Страсбурге 15 июля 1982 г.
   
                                                         Председатель
                                                        Рольф РИССДАЛ
   
                                                            За Грефье
                                                   Заместитель Грефье
                                                     Герберт ПЕТЦОЛЬД
   
   
   
   
   
   
                     EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
   
                        CASE OF ECKLE v. GERMANY
   
                                JUDGMENT
   
                       (Strasbourg, 15.VII.1982)
   
       In the Eckle case,
       The European  Court of Human Rights,  sitting ,  in accordance
   with Article 43 (art.  43) of the Convention for the Protection of
   Human  Rights  and Fundamental Freedoms ("the Convention") and the
   relevant provisions of the Rules of Court,  as a Chamber  composed
   of the following judges:
       Mr. R. Ryssdal, President,
       Mr. {Thor Vilhjalmsson} <*>,
       Mr. W. Ganshof Van Der Meersch,
       Mr. D. Evrigenis,
       Mr. J. Pinheiro Farinha,
       Mr. L.-E. Pettiti,
       Mr. R. Bernhardt,
       and also Mr.  M.-A.  Eissen,  Registrar,  and Mr.  H. Petzold,
   Deputy Registrar,
       --------------------------------
       <*> Здесь  и  далее  по  тексту  слова  на  национальном языке
   набраны латинским шрифтом и выделены фигурными скобками.
   
       Having  deliberated  in  private  on 23 and 24  March  and  on
   23 June 1982,
       Delivers the  following  judgment  which  was  adopted  on the
   last-mentioned date:
   
                               PROCEDURE
   
       1. The Eckle case was referred to the Court  by  the  European
   Commission of Human Rights ("the Commission"). The case originated
   in an application (no.  8130/78) against the Federal  Republic  of
   Germany  lodged  with  the  Commission  on  27 December 1977 under
   Article 25 (art.  25) of the Convention by two  German  nationals,
   Mr. Hans Eckle and his wife, Marianne.
       2. The Commission's request was lodged with the registry on 18
   May 1981,  within the period of three months laid down by Articles
   32 par.  1 and 47 (art.  32-1,  art. 47). It refers to Articles 44
   and  48  (art.  44,  art.  48)  and to the declaration whereby the
   Federal Republic of Germany recognised the Court's jurisdiction as
   compulsory  (Article  46)  (art.  46).  Its purpose is to obtain a
   judgment on whether or not the facts of the case reveal  a  breach
   by the respondent State of its obligations under Article 6 par.  1
   (art. 6-1).
       3. The Chamber of seven judges to be constituted included,  as
   ex officio members,  Mr. R. Bernhardt, the elected judge of German
   nationality  (Article  43  of  the  Convention)  (art.  43),   and
   Mr. G.  Wiarda,  President of the Court (Rule 21 par. 3 (b) of the
   Rules of Court). On 30 May 1981, the President drew by lot, in the
   presence  of  the Registrar,  the names of the five other members,
   namely Mr.  Thor Vilhjalmsson, Mr. W. Ganshof van der Meersch, Mr.
   D.  Evrigenis,  Mr.  J.  Pinheiro  Farinha and Mr.  L.-E.  Pettiti
   (Article  43  in  fine  of  the  Convention  and Rule 21  par.  4)
   (art. 43).
       4. Mr.  Wiarda assumed the office of President of the  Chamber
   (Rule  21 par.  5) until 17 December 1981 when he exempted himself
   from sitting (Rule 24 par.  4).  He was replaced by  Mr.  Ryssdal,
   Vice-President of the Court (Rule 21 par. 3 (b) and 5).
       5. Through the Registrar,  the President ascertained the views
   of  the Agent of the Government and the Delegate of the Commission
   regarding the procedure to  be  followed.  On  15  June  1981,  he
   directed  that  the  Agent should have until 30 November to file a
   memorial and  that  the  Delegate  of  the  Commission  should  be
   entitled  to  file  a memorial in reply within two months from the
   date of transmission of the Government's memorial to  him  by  the
   Registrar.
       The  Government's  memorial  was received at the  registry  on
   2 December.  On  3 February 1982,  the Secretary to the Commission
   advised the Registrar that the  Delegate  would  present  his  own
   observations   at   the   hearings,   and  forwarded  to  him  the
   observations  of  the  applicants'  lawyer  on  the   Government's
   memorial.
       6. After consulting,  through the Deputy Registrar,  the Agent
   of  the  Government  and  the  Delegate  of  the  Commission,  the
   President directed on 9 February that the hearings should open  on
   22 March.
       7. On 15 and 19 March,  acting  on  the  instructions  of  the
   President,  the  Registrar  asked  the  representatives to produce
   several documents;  those documents were received at the  registry
   on 19 and 22 March.
       8. The hearings were  held  in  public  at  the  Human  Rights
   Building, Strasbourg, on 22 March. Immediately before they opened,
   the Chamber held a preparatory meeting at which it gave  leave  to
   the  Agent  and  advocates  of  the  Government  and to the person
   assisting the  Delegate  of  the  Commission  to  use  the  German
   Language (Rule 27 par. 2 and 3).
       There appeared before the Court:
       - for the Government
       Mrs. I.  Maier,  Ministerialdirigentin at the Federal Ministry
   of Justice, Agent,
       Mr. K.-R. Winkler, Oberstaatsanwalt at the Ministry of Justice
   of the Land of Rhineland-Palatinate,
       Mr. A.  Ring,  Oberstaatsanwalt  at  the  public  prosecutor's
   office attached to the Trier Regional Court,
       Mr. M. Willems, Erster Staatsanwalt at the public prosecutor's
   office attached to the Cologne Regional Court,
       Mr. B. Weckauf, Wirtschaftsreferent at the public prosecutor's
   office attached to the Cologne Regional Court,
       Mr. K.  Kemper,  Regierungsdirektor at the Federal Ministry of
   Justice, Advisers;
       - for the Commission
       Mr. J. A. Frowein, Delegate,
       Mr. T.  Vogler,  Professor at the University of  Giessen,  the
   applicant's  lawyer before the Commission,  assisting the Delegate
   (Rule 29 par. 1, second sentence, of the Rules of Court).
       The Court heard addresses by Mrs. Maier for the Government and
   by Mr. Frowein and Mr. Vogler for the Commission, as well as their
   replies   to  its  questions.  The  Government  submitted  several
   documents during the hearings;  on  30  March,  they  supplemented
   their answer to one of the questions put at the hearings and filed
   some further documents.
   
                               THE FACTS
   
       9. In 1952 Mr.  Hans Eckle,  who was born in 1926, founded the
   building   firm   of  "Hans  Eckle,  timber,  steel  and  building
   materials" at {Puttlingen} (Saarland),  and worked there with  his
   wife,  Marianne.  He subsequently set up several branches in other
   places and,  in particular,  a branch at Schweich,  near Trier, in
   1958,  which  was transferred shortly afterwards to Wittlich,  and
   then in 1961 an office in Cologne.  In 1962 he was employing about
   120 people.
       The firm's business  consisted  in  supplying  materials  and,
   later, building sites on credit for people who wanted to build but
   had few financial resources.  Such a system,  which the  applicant
   himself  called the "Eckle system",  had not hitherto been used in
   the building materials trade.
       He covered his financial needs - from 1962 at least - by loans
   from  individuals,  who  were  offered   mortgages   as   security
   (Grundschulden).   In   1965,   however,  he  began  to  encounter
   difficulties  in  this  regard  and  towards  the  middle  of  the
   following  year he ceased payment to his creditors of the sums due
   to them.  The overall total of money he owed amounted at the  time
   to about ten million Marks.
       10. The trade practices of the applicants from  1959  to  1967
   were  the subject of three separate sets of prosecutions in Trier,
   {Saarbrucken}  and  Cologne.  The  first  and last of these are in
   issue  in  the  instant  case:  the applicants complain that their
   duration  exceeded  the "reasonable time" referred to in Article 6
   par. 1 (art. 6-1) of the Convention.
       In a case of this kind,  it is necessary to set out in  detail
   each stage of the impugned proceedings.
   
                        I. The Trier proceedings
   
           1. From the opening of a preliminary investigation
          to the final preferment of the "bill of indictment"
                    (November 1959 - 15 March 1968)
   
       11. Acting on a complaint lodged on 28 October 1959 by a  bank
   at  Wittlich,  the  public prosecutor's office began,  in November
   1959,  a  preliminary  investigation   (Ermittlungsverfahren)   in
   respect of Mr.  Eckle.  On 22 February 1960, after it had obtained
   information from the Trier Bezirksregierung as to the existence of
   maximum  prices in the building materials trade and without having
   questioned  either  the   applicants   or   any   witnesses,   the
   prosecutor's office stopped the investigation.  Examination of the
   complaint was  resumed  with  a  fresh  preliminary  investigation
   prompted  by  the receipt in mid-August of a letter from the Trier
   Chamber of Industry and Commerce advising  the  public  prosecutor
   that  Mr.  Eckle was promising to supply his clients with building
   materials  "at  average  market  prices" ({handelsubliche} Preise)
   whereas his prices were in fact 25 per cent higher.
       In September,  the investigation  was  suspected  pending  the
   outcome of a civil action brought against Mr.  Eckle by one of his
   customers, in which the concept of "average market prices" used by
   Mr. Eckle in his contracts would have to be clarified. These civil
   proceedings were concluded on 30 October 1962 with a  judgment  of
   the  Koblenz  Court of Appeal (Oberlandesgericht) holding that the
   applicant had  charged  prices  higher  than  the  average  market
   prices,  contrary  to the commitments he had entered into with his
   customers.
       12. Forty  witnesses  were  interviewed between 1960 and 1962,
   and thirty-six witnesses in 1963.
       In 1964,  the  competent  authorities  held  hearings  of  133
   witnesses,  15  of  them outside the Land of Rhineland-Palatinate.
   The same year the applicant's business premises were searched  and
   business  records  ({Geschaftsunterlagen}) seized.  These searches
   took  place  firstly  on  4  March  on  an  application  from  the
   {Saarbrucken}  public  prosecutor's  office but in the presence of
   two  officials  from  Trier,  and  subsequently on 7 October on an
   application from the Trier public prosecutor's office which,  on 8
   and 9 October, questioned Mrs. Eckle for the first time.
       In 1965,  325 witnesses were heard,  106 of them  outside  the
   Land.
       13. One of the twelve public  prosecutors  (Staatasanwalt)  at
   Trier, who was in charge of the investigation, was relieved of his
   other duties in January 1965 in  order  to  allow  him  to  devote
   himself  entirely  to  the  Eckle  case.  At  the  instance of the
   Minister of Justice of the Land,  a  special  commission  of  five
   officers  from  the  criminal  police  began  assisting the public
   prosecutor from this date onwards so that the investigation  could
   be intensified.  Previously,  as from April 1963,  a member of the
   criminal police had been dealing specifically with the case.
       14. On  9  September  1965,  the  public  prosecutor's  office
   ordered the closure of the investigation,  during which  according
   to  undisputed  information  provided  by  the  Government  -  540
   witnesses had testified and nearly 3,000 documents - extracts from
   land registers ({Grundbucher}),  contracts,  bills, drafts, etc. -
   had been examined.  The prosecutor's office had made  up  37  main
   files (Hauptakten) and 300 subsidiary files (Nebenakten), to which
   had been added 120 files relating to civil suits.
       15. On  9  September likewise,  the public prosecutor's office
   informed the applicants and two former  female  employees  of  the
   Eckle firm that it intended to "indict" them.  They were requested
   to give notice within two weeks if they  wished  to  have,  before
   their  committal  for  trial,  a  "final  hearing"  by  the public
   prosecutor's office ({Schlussgehor}) under Article 169  b  of  the
   Code of Criminal Procedure (in force until 31 December 1974).
       On 20 September, two counsel for Mr. Eckle asked to be allowed
   to inspect the file before replying.
       After a  conference  with  them  on  12  October,  the  public
   prosecutor's  office  notified  them  on  3 November that the file
   would be available to them at the secretariat until 20 November.
       The legal  advisers  acting  for  Mrs.  Eckle  and for the two
   employees did not respond.  Accordingly,  counsel were assigned to
   them  officially  but  were  replaced in December 1965 and January
   1966 by counsel instructed by the parties themselves.
       In mid-December 1965,  the public prosecutor's office sent Mr.
   Eckle's legal representatives a copy of the main sections  of  the
   file,  as  had been agreed a month earlier,  and gave them until 2
   February 1966 to decide  whether  or  not  they  wanted  a  "final
   hearing".
       A further counsel appeared for Mr.  Eckle on 1 February  1966,
   and  then  a fourth.  They too asked for an opportunity to consult
   the file and for copies of  certain  documents  in  the  file;  in
   mid-March,  they  were  given  a deadline for stating whether they
   were requesting a "final hearing".
       Between 13  and  15  March,  the  seven  counsel applied for a
   "final hearing" and for the original file to be made available  to
   each of them beforehand for a period of six months.  However, they
   withdrew their requests on 19 April and 9 May, respectively.
       16. Once  proceedings relating to the "final hearing" had thus
   been concluded,  the public prosecutor's office drew up the  "bill
   of indictment" (Anklageschrift). Drafting of this was completed on
   3 August and the typescript was sent to the First Criminal Chamber
   (1.  Grosse Strafkammer) of the Regional Court (Landgericht) on 26
   October.
       The "bill  of  indictment",  which  filled  four  volumes  and
   comprised 793 pages in all,  was directed against  the  applicants
   and the two former female employees of the Eckle firm.  It alleged
   a total of 474 offences of fraud and extortion,  listed almost 500
   witnesses  and  mentioned  more  than  250  documents  produced in
   evidence.
       Proceedings had been dropped by the public prosecutor's office
   in respect of 68 cases,  in 61 of them pursuant to Article 154  of
   the Code of Criminal Procedure.  In the version in force until the
   end of 1978, this provision empowered the court (paragraph 2) and,
   until  a  "bill  of  indictment"  had  been preferred,  the public
   prosecutor (paragraph 1) to take such a measure at  any  stage  of
   the  proceedings  if,  in  particular,  the  sentence liable to be
   passed at the end of the proceedings was negligible in  comparison
   with one  already finally ({rechtskraftig}) imposed on the accused
   - or which the accused had to expect - for another offence.
       17. On  23  December 1966,  the public prosecutor in charge of
   the case conferred with the  President  of  the  Criminal  Chamber
   about  the  duplications arising from criminal proceedings pending
   in  {Saarbrucken},  where  the  trial  hearing was due to begin on
   17 March 1967 (see paragraph 58 below).
       18. On  16  January  1967,  the  public  prosecutor's   office
   withdrew  the "bill of indictment" because it had learned of other
   possible offences and felt that further inquiries were necessary.
       On 22  August,  the Cologne public prosecutor's office,  which
   had openend a preliminary investigation in respect of Mr. Eckle on
   21 March (see paragraph 37 below),  stated its willingness to deal
   with the new cases which the Trier public prosecutor's office  had
   begun to inquire into.  As a result, the Trier public prosecutor's
   office transferred these cases to Cologne on 15 March 1968 and  on
   the same day preferred the "bill of indictment" - unchanged in any
   way - for a second time.
       Between 16 January 1967 and 8 February 1968,  234 fresh cases,
   of which  217  concerned  the  {Saarbrucken}  and   Trier   public
   prosecutor's offices, had been examined.
   
        2. From the final preferment of the "bill of indictment"
             to the beginning of the trial (Hauptverfahren)
                   (15 March 1968 - 28 January 1969)
   
       19. Between  26  March  and 25 May 1968,  the President of the
   First Criminal Chamber of the Regional Court took several steps to
   ensure that the accused were represented; on the last-mentioned of
   these dates,  the Regional Court assigned to them four  officially
   appointed defence counsel.
       On 30 May,  the President drew the  attention  of  the  public
   prosecutor's  office  to  the fact that it had not yet offered the
   accused a "final  hearing"  in  respect  of  the  new  cases.  The
   prosecutor's  offfice replied on 11 June,  pointing out that these
   cases had been transferred to Cologne (see paragraph 18 above).
       On 2  July,  the  Regional Court asked to be sent the "bill of
   indictment" drawn  up  by  the  {Saarbrucken}  public prosecutor's
   office (see paragraph 58 below):  the Court was examining  whether
   the  numerous  offences alleged against the applicants amounted to
   continuous conduct which had to be regarded as a  single  offence,
   in which   event  the  prior  conviction  at  {Saarbrucken}  would
   preclude  any   further   conviction.   Three   days   later   the
   {Saaurbrucken}  public  prosecutor's  office  transmitted  to  the
   Regional Court a copy of the judgment  of  17  October  1967  (see
   paragraph  58  below)  and  informed  it  that  the files had been
   forwarded   to   the   federal    public    prosecutor's    office
   (Bundesanwaltschaft)  for  the  purposes  of  the  proceedings for
   review on a point of law (Revisionsverfahren).
       In response to a request from one of the defence  counsel  for
   the  applicants  that  he should be given copies of the file,  the
   Regional Court,  declared,  inter alia,  on 23 July 1968  that  it
   remained  to  be decided whether the above-mentioned preferment of
   the "bill of indictment" could validly stand.
       On 19  August,  the Regional Court sought information from the
   {Saarbrucken} public  prosecutor's  office  about the state of the
   proceedings;  it stressed that it needed the "bill of  indictment"
   it had asked for on 2 July.  This was finally sent on 4 October by
   the Trier public prosecutor's office, which urged at the same time
   that a decision be taken on the "bill of indictment" it had itself
   preferred.
       On 28 January 1969,  the Regional Court  admitted  the  latter
   "bill  of indictment" (Zulassung der Anklage) and ordered that the
   trial open ({Eroffnung} des Hauptverfahrens).
   
             3. Proceedings before the Trier Regional Court
                  (28 January 1969 - 12 February 1973)
   
       20. Counsel  for  Mrs.  Eckle having asked on 14 February 1969
   for the file to be made  available  to  him,  the  Regional  Court
   replied  on 18 February that copies would be forwarded to him.  On
   the same day counsel for Mr. Eckle called on the Regional Court to
   quash the preferment of the "bill of indictment".
       On 16 April,  counsel for Mrs.  Eckle urgently  requested  the
   Regional Court not to take any action in the case before receiving
   the text of the judgment delivered on 14 March 1969 by the Federal
   Court   of  Justice  (Bundesgerichtshof)  in  the  matter  of  the
   {Saarbrucken} proceedings  (see paragraph 58 below).  The judgment
   was  transmitted  to  the  Regional  Court  on  29  April  by  the
   {Saarbruuken} public prosecutor's office.
       On the  previous day the Regional Court had refused to issue a
   warrant for the arrest of Mr.  Eckle on the grounds  that  he  was
   still subject to such a warrant in the {Saarbrucken} proceedings.
       On 28 May, it informed counsel for Mrs. Eckle, who on 16 April
   had  complained that eight files were missing,  that these related
   to proceedings which had been dropped.
       On 2 April, one of the officially assigned defence lawyers had
   asked the Court to revoke his appointment.  In order to enable him
   to  continue  to  act,  the Regional Court suggested to the public
   prosecutor's office  on  30  September  that  it  should  ask  for
   proceedings  to  be  terminated in the case in which the lawyer in
   question had  previously  appeared  in  another  capacity.  On  14
   October,  the  public  prosecutor's  office made a request to this
   effect, which the Regional Court granted on 17 November.
       21. On 14 October 1969, the public prosecutor's office applied
   for a warrant for the arrest of Mr.  Eckle who had  been  released
   from detention in relation to the {Saarbrucken}  proceedings,  but
   the  Regional  Court  refused  the application on 17 November.  On
   appeal by the public prosecutor's office,  the  Koblenz  Court  of
   Appeal  quashed  this  decision  on  28  January 1970 and issued a
   warrant for the arrest on the applicant.
       At the request of the public prosecutor's office (6  February)
   the  Cologne  District  Court (Amtsgericht) on 12 March served the
   warrant on Mr. Eckle who was in detention in Cologne in respect of
   the   proceedings  there  (see  paragraph  43  below).  Mr.  Eckle
   immediately appealed against the issuing of the warrant,  but  the
   Koblenz Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on 2 April.
       22. On 20 April 1970,  the President  of  the  First  Criminal
   Chamber of the Trier Regional Court advised the relevant authority
   that the magnitude of the  Eckle  case  was  preventing  him  from
   handling other cases.  On 1 June, he reached an agreement with his
   colleague at  the  {Saarbrucken} Regional Court as to the dates of
   the hearings to be held by their respective courts (see  paragraph
   58  below).  On  2 July,  he fixed the date of 11 November for the
   opening  of  the  trial  hearing  and  notified  defence   counsel
   accordingly.
       On 19  October,  counsel  for Mrs.  Eckle withdrew a statement
   whereby,  on 19 April 1968,  he had waived his  claim  to  certain
   costs  and  expenses,  and requested the Regional Court to appoint
   him as defence counsel unconditionally.  Four days later,  counsel
   for  Mr.  Eckle  applied  for  a  postponement  of  the  hearings,
   asserting that he dit not have enough time to prepare the defence.
   The Regional Court rejected both applications on 27 October.
       On 31 October,  Mr. Eckle himself asked for the hearings to be
   postponed, pleading, inter alia, Article 6 par. 3 (b) (art. 6-3-b)
   of the  Convention, but  the Regional Court refused the request on
   4 November.
       23. The trial opened on 11  November.  Mr.  Eckle  immediately
   sought   an   adjournment,   and  Mrs.  Eckle  suspension  of  the
   proceedings; the third defendant challenged two of the judges.
       The Regional Court dismissed the challenge on 17 November.  On
   the same day,  it excluded Mr. Eckle from the courtroom on grounds
   of  his behaviour before the Court and,  in answer to an objection
   raised by one of the co-defendants,  affirmed its jurisdiction  in
   the case.
       Two days later, it declined to grant a further application for
   an  adjournment  which Mr.  Eckle had made on 17 November.  On the
   same day,  Mr.  Eckle requested his release from detention; he and
   his  wife went so far as to refuse to give their particulars,  and
   counsel for the defence asked the Court  for  the  author  of  the
   "bill  of  indictment"  to  be called as a witness so that certain
   points in it could be clarified.
       The public   prosecutor   who   had  drawn  up  the  "bill  of
   indictment"  was  heard  on  26  November,  after  which  all  the
   defendants applied for the proceedings to be terminated. Mr. Eckle
   declared himself unfit to stand trial and sought a formal decision
   from the Regional Court on this matter.
       The "bill of indictment" and the prior order to  commence  the
   trial hearing were read out in court on 3 December. Prior to that,
   the Regional Court had ordered that prosecution  in  some  of  the
   cases   should   be  dropped.  It  also  refused  the  defendant's
   applications  for  the  discontinuance  or   suspension   of   the
   proceedings.  On the same day,  Mr.  Eckle challenged three of the
   judges and asked the Regional Court to  postpone  the  hearing  in
   order  to  give him time to obtain the documents needed to support
   his challenge.
       On 10  December,  Mr.  Eckle  was  once  more removed from the
   courtroom  and  sentenced  to  one  day's  imprisonment  for   his
   behaviour  before  the  Court:  he  had insulted the President and
   thrown paper at him.  In evidence to the Regional Court,  a doctor
   who  had examined the applicant considered him fit to stand trial,
   although stating that it would be necessary to keep the  applicant
   under observation before being able to give a final opinion.
       The Regional Court thereupon decided  that  Mr.  Eckle  should
   provisionnally  be placed in a psychiatric hospital with a view to
   a medical report being made on him; the hearing was adjourned sine
   die on 17 December.
       24. The psychiatric examination was completed  on  23  January
   1971 and the medical report filed on 20 February. According to the
   doctor,  the applicant's behaviour during the hearings was not the
   result of any illness.
       Between 24 February and 26 March,  hearings took place in  the
   {Saarbrucken} proceedings, which ended on the latter date with the
   conviction of Mr. Eckle (see paragraph 58 below).
       25. On  16  June,  hearings  resumed before the First Criminal
   Chamber of the Trier Regional Court,  the President of  which  had
   been  replaced  in December 1970;  the hearings continued until 17
   March 1972.  During the 28 days of hearings,  the  Regional  Court
   heard  approximately  110 witnesses,  including an expert witness,
   and more than 500 documents were read out.
       According to   the   undisputed  account  of  the  proceedings
   furnished by the Government, Mr. Eckle challenged judges on twenty
   occasions - sometimes twice on the same days - and his wife did so
   some ten times. Furthermore, he objected to the composition of the
   Regional Court,  challenged two experts, introduced ten motions to
   take evidence   ({Beweisantrage}),   requested  his  release  from
   detention ten times and suspension of the trial four  times.  Five
   times  he  claimed  to  be  unfit  to  stand trial and requested a
   medical examination;  on five occasions the  Regional  Court  took
   evidence from a doctor who,  on one of these occasions, judged the
   applicant to be incapable of attending court for the rest  of  the
   day.  On  seven occasions Mr.  Eckle was sentenced to two or three
   day's imprisonment on account of his behaviour and  he  was  eight
   times removed from the courtroom for several days,  notably in the
   period from 18 October 1971 to 19 January 1972.
       According to  the  same  account,  Mrs.  Eckle  for  her  part
   submitted motions to take evidence on three occasions; she applied
   three times to the Regional Court for the  instructions  given  to
   the  counsel  officially  assigned  to defend her to be withdrawn,
   twice for the trial to be suspended,  twice again  for  it  to  be
   discontinued  and  on  three  occasions  for  the appointment of a
   second lawyer.
       26. On  23  November  1971,  the Regional Court terminated the
   proceedings,  pursuant to Article 154  of  the  Code  of  Criminal
   Procedure (see paragraph 16 above), in respect of more than 400 of
   the counts in the "bill of indictment".
       27. On 17 March 1972,  Mr. Eckle was sentenced to imprisonment
   for four years and six months,  his wife to  a  term  of  eighteen
   months   and   the   two  co-defendants  to  ten  and  six  months
   respectively.  At the same time, the Regional Court discharged the
   warrant for the arrest of the applicant.
       The Regional Court's judgment found Mr.  Eckle guilty of fraud
   committed jointly with other persons to the detriment of customers
   in forty-two cases and to the detriment of  creditors  in  sixteen
   cases,  and  of attempted fraud in one case concerning a creditor.
   On two charges relating to a customer and a creditor  respectively
   he was acquitted.  The Court terminated proceedings in three cases
   because they were time-barred.
       Mrs. Eckle was convicted of fraud committed jointly with other
   persons in thirty-nine cases to the detriment of customers and  in
   sixteen  cases  to  the  detriment of creditors,  and of attempted
   fraud in one case involving a creditor. The Court acquitted her on
   the  same  two counts as her husband and terminated proceedings in
   six cases,  including the three  cases  that  also  concerned  her
   husband.
       According to the findings in the judgment,  the conclusion  of
   the  illegal  contracts  dated back to 1959-1960 in respect of the
   customers and 1962-1964 in respect of the creditors.
       When deciding  the  sentences  the  Regional  Court  took into
   account,  inter alia,  "to the advantage of all  the  defendants",
   "the  inordinate length of time during which they had been exposed
   to the drawbacks and unpleasantness of the investigation and trial
   proceedings, something which was not wholly their own fault".
       The judgment - which ran to 236 pages  -  was  served  on  the
   applicants on 12 February 1973,  that is a little less than eleven
   months after its delivery.
       28. Whilst  the  trial  hearing  was continuing,  an auxiliary
   chamber (Hilfskammer)  specially  set  up  to  relieve  the  First
   Criminal  Chamber  dealt with all the other cases allocated to the
   latter.
   
              4. Proceedings for review on a point of law
        (Revisionsverfahren) (February 1973 - 11 February 1976)
   
       29. The  four  persons  convicted  petitioned  for review on a
   point of law (Revision).  In this connection,  between 27 February
   and 8 March 1973 Mr. and Mrs. Eckle submitted several memorials to
   the Federal Court of Justice,  alleging various errors in  law  as
   well as procedural irregularities.
       After the counter-memorial by the  Trier  public  prosecutor's
   office  had  been drafted on 31 October,  the file was sent to the
   federal public prosecutor's office on 28 November.
       30. On 4 February 1974, the federal public prosecutor's office
   noticed that it was not clear from the file how eight of the cases
   heard by the Regional Court had been disposed of.
       When consulted on this,  the Trier public prosecutor's  office
   pointed  out  that most of the obscurities arose from inaccuracies
   in the minutes of the hearings,  while in two cases the failure to
   cease prosecution was due to inadvertence. The matter was referred
   to the Trier Regional Court,  which decided on 22 February  and  4
   March  to  rectify  the  minutes  and  terminate  the  proceedings
   relating to the two cases in  question.  On  6  March,  the  Trier
   public  prosecutor's  office  returned  the file,  together with a
   supplementary report,  to the federal public  prosecutor's  office
   and   at   the  latter's  request  also  forwarded  the  "bill  of
   indictment" of 19 March.
       31. On 1 August 1974,  the federal public prosecutor's  office
   requested the Trier public prosecutor's office to reply in writing
   to the applicant's objections to the composition of  the  Regional
   Court  and,  in particular,  to produce the official statements of
   the judges concerned and the  charts  showing  the  allocation  of
   business in 1971.
       After taking  -  between  September  and   December   1974   -
   statements  from  eleven  judges  (some  of whom were no longer in
   Trier),  the public prosecutor's office sent them to  the  federal
   public  prosecutor's  office  on  29  January  1975  together with
   comments.  On 21 February,  it transmitted some further  documents
   which  the  federal  public prosecutor's office had asked for on 4
   February.
       32. On  7  April 1975,  the applicant's new lawyer applied for
   the proceedings to be dropped as being time-barred.  On 24  April,
   the  member of the federal public prosecutor's office dealing with
   the case requested the President of the Second Devision (Senat) of
   the Federal Court of Justice to set down a date for the opening of
   the  hearing:  in  his  submission,  the  proceedings   were   not
   time-barred.
       On 2 December,  the President directed that the hearing should
   be held on 11 February 1976.
       Mrs. Eckle's  new  defence  counsel  submitted   supplementary
   written pleadings on 26 February 1976;  and on 4 February,  one of
   the two co-defendants withdrew her petition for review on a  point
   of law.
       33. Following the hearing on 11 February, the Federal Court of
   Justice dismissed the petitions on 19 February.
       At the end of the judgment,  the Federal Court  recalled  that
   cumulative  sentences  (Gesamtstrafe)  combining  those  passed in
   Trier and in {Saarbrucken} (see paragraph 58 below) remained to be
   determined. In this connection, it stated, inter alia:
       "Excessive length  of  criminal  proceedings  may  -  and  the
   Regional  Court  did  not  overlook  this  -  constitute a special
   mitigating circumstance (Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in
   Strafsachen,  vol.  24, p. 239). When a cumulative sentence has to
   be determined retrospectively,  this consideration  must  likewise
   apply  to the period which has already elapsed between the hearing
   before the trial court and the moment when the  principle  of  res
   judicata  took  effect in respect of the judgment,  and which will
   continue to elapse until the final decision.  Attention must  also
   be  drawn  in  this  case  to  the  special  burden imposed on the
   defendants by the dividing up of groups of cases consisting in the
   repeated  commission of similar offences into two sets of criminal
   proceedings.  The Court is not required to rule on the  merits  of
   this allocation. It considers, however, that the spirit of the law
   would be lost sight of ...  if,  when determining  sentence,  this
   circumstance were not clearly (deutlich) taken into account."
   
             5. Proceedings relating to the constitutional
                complaints (24 May 1976 - 30 June 1977)
   
       34. On 24 and 28 May 1976,  Mr.  and Mrs. Eckle applied to the
   Federal     Constitutional    Court    (Bundesverfassungsgericht).
   Challenging the judgments of both the Federal Court of Justice and
   the Trier Regional Court,  they alleged a violation of sections 1,
   2,  3, 19 par. 4 and 103 of the Basic Law (Grundgezetz), mainly on
   account  of the excessive length of the trial and of the existence
   of three distinct sets of proceedings.
       On 30   June   1977,   a   bench   of  three  members  of  the
   Constitutional Court decided not  to  hear  the  applications;  it
   judged that they did not offer sufficient prospects of success.
   
                  6. Determining cumulative sentences
                   (Gesamtstrafen) (24 November 1977)
   
       35. On 24  November  1977,  the  Trier  Regional  Court  fixed
   cumulative  sentences combining those it had pronounced itself and
   those imposed by the {Saarbrucken} Regional Court (see  paragraphs
   27 above and 58 below). The new sentences fixed were: imprisonment
   for seven years in the case of Mr.  Eckle and for  two  years  and
   eight months in the case of his wife.  Acting on submissions dated
   19 October from the Trier public prosecutor's  office,  the  Court
   suspended  for five years that part of Mr.  Eckle's sentence which
   was in excess of five years and eleven days, and suspended for two
   years  that  part of Mrs.  Eckle's sentence which was in excess of
   one year and four months.
       In the grounds given for its decision in respect of Mr. Eckle,
   the Trier Regional Court repeated the  above-quoted  reasoning  of
   the Federal Court of Justice (see paragraph 33 above). It appeared
   to the Court that the long duration of  the  criminal  proceedings
   should be taken into account in Mrs. Eckle's favour too.
       36. On 23 January 1978,  the Koblenz Court of Appeal dismissed
   an  "immediate  appeal"  (sofortige Beschwerde) entered by each of
   the applicants,  on 1 and 2  December  respectively,  against  the
   Regional Court's decision. The Court of Appeal held, inter alia:
       "... the  Criminal  Chamber  rightly  regarded  the  excessive
   length of the criminal proceedings and the separation of groups of
   comparable cases into several acts of  proceedings  as  a  special
   mitigating   circumstance   and  it  took  account  of  this  when
   determining sentence (Echtscheidungen des  Bundesgerichtshofes  in
   Strafsachen,  vol.  24,  p.  239).  Its  dicta  on  this point are
   comprehensive, sensible and in accordance with the principles laid
   down  by  the  Federal  Court  of  Justice  in  its judgment of 19
   February 1976 in the instant case ... [The Court of Appeal] too is
   of  the  opninion that these reasons justify a cumulative sentence
   of [seven years for Mr.  Eckle and two years and eight months  for
   Mrs.  Eckle].  Even  having  regard  to Article 6 (art.  6) of the
   Convention ...,  this sentence does not appear to be unduly severe
   (ibid,  vol.  24, p. 239). Considering also the culpability (unter
   {Abwagung} auch der  Schuld) of the  defendants,  a  reduction  of
   sentence does not seem appropriate ..."
       According to the Government,  Mr.  and  Mrs.  Eckle  thereupon
   applied  to  the Federal Constitutional Court which rejected their
   applications.
   
                      II. The Cologne proceedings
   
           1. From the opening of a preliminary investigation
             to the preferment of the "bill of indictment"
                  (21 march 1967 - 25 September 1973)
   
       37. On  21 March 1967,  the Cologne public prosecutor's office
   began a preliminary investigation of Mr.  Eckle, who was suspected
   of  having committed,  inter alia,  various frauds.  From 29 March
   onwards the investigation - which had been  commenced  ex  officio
   followig the appearance of a number of articles in the press - was
   extended to cover several complaints lodged in February and  March
   by purchasers of building materials and persons who had made loans
   to the Eckle firm.
       The Cologne  proceedings  comprised  five groups of charges in
   all (see paragraph 80 of the Commission's report):
       (a) They  covered  first  of  all  a complex of frauds against
   customers of the Eckle firm  who  had  allegedly  suffered  losses
   after the latter had gone bankrupt.  The persons concerned in this
   part of  the  proceedings  were  the  applicants,  the  two  close
   collaborators  who were later convicted at Trier (see paragraph 27
   above), a tax consultant, two architects and a building expert.
       (b) The second group concerned the "Hobby-Bau GmbH" company in
   Frankfurt.  The object of this company,  which was founded in 1965
   by  two  former  employees of the applicants,  was to carry on the
   Eckle firm's business activities in the Frankfurt area.  Mr. Eckle
   was supposedly in control of this company; his wife had been given
   power of disposal over its assets. The company had ceased payments
   at  the  end of 1966,  and in December 1967 bankruptcy proceedings
   were commenced.
       (c) The third group of charges was connected with Mr.  Eckle's
   relations with a Mr.  Neubeck of  Cologne  and  the  companies  he
   controlled,   and   in  particular  their  financial  and  trading
   operations,  with alleged transfers of property  to  Liechtenstein
   and Switzerland, and with the bankruptcy of the Neubeck companies;
   proceedings in respect of the latter were,  however,  severed from
   the rest.
       (d) The fourth group dealt with the business relations of  the
   Eckle  firm  or the Hobby-Bau GmbH company and its manager with an
   accountant and  two  companies  both  called  Westropa-Bauservice,
   whose head offices were in Zug (Switzerland) and Munich.
       (e) The fifth group related mainly to the Eckle  company;  the
   applicants,  those  of their employees accused with them and other
   persons were suspected of having committed either  as  principals,
   co-principals or accessories offences of fraudulent bankruptcy and
   tax evasion.
       During 1967  and 1968,  the investigation was widened to cover
   thirteen persons other than the applicants.
       38. At  the  request  of  the public prosecutor's office,  the
   Cologne District Court (Amtsgericht) issued a search  and  seizure
   warrant in respect of the applicants on 25 April 1967.  The police
   thereupon searched the business premises of the Eckle  company  on
   11 and 12 May. They seized four metric tons of documents which the
   public  prosecutor's  office  made  available  to  an   accountant
   ({Wirtschaftsprufer}) whom  it  had  appointed as a consultant the
   previous month.  Also in May  a  special  commission  was  set  up
   composed of a public prosecutor and three police officers who were
   specialists  in  investigating  economic  crime;  this  commission
   worked  exclusively  on  the Eckle case and continued in existence
   until May 1972.
       According to the account of events provided by the Government,
   between 1967  and  1972  the  relevant  authorities  applied  for,
   authorised and, with a few exceptions, performed numerous searches
   of the offices and private dwellings of the applicants and some of
   their  co-accused,  the offices of other companies and the offices
   of more than thirty-five banks; in addition, they seized a mass of
   documents.  In 1967:  such measures were carried out on 23 May, at
   {Volklingen}; on 20 and 21  July,  in  Cologne;  on  25  July,  at
   {Puttlingen};  and  on  24  and  25  August  and  14  October,  in
   Frankfurt;  on 30 January,  at Steinau;  on 6 and 7  February,  in
   Cologne;  on 16 February, in Frankfurt; in 1968: on 29 January, in
   Frankfurt;  on 18 and 22 February, at Miesbach and in Munich; on 8
   March, in Frankfurt; on 15 March, in {Dusseldorf} and Essen; on 15
   and 16 March, in Frankfurt; from 1 to 4 April, at {Volklingen} and
   in {Saarbrucken};  on 2 April in Munich; on 10 April, in Augsburg;
   on 18 and 19 April, in Frankfurt; on 6 and 7 May, in {Saarbrucken}
   and at Wittlich; on 15 May, in Trier; on 24 June, at Seligenstadt;
   on 23 July,  in Munich;  on 19 September,  in Kassel;  from 1 to 5
   October,  in  Munich;  on  11 November,  in Frankfurt;  on 3 and 4
   December,  in Hamburg; and on 12 December, in Cologne; in 1969: on
   30 January   in   Frankfurt   and   Darmstadt;   on  8  April,  at
   {Volklingen}; on 11 and 24 April, in {Saarbrucken}; on 14 June, in
   Cologne;  on 24 and 26 November,  at Ottweiler;  on 25,  26 and 27
   November,  at Saarlouis and Bous; on 1 December at Bous; and on 11
   December, in {Saarbrucken} and at Saarlouis; in 1970: on 6 August,
   in {Saarbrucken}  and  at  Gersweiler;  and  on  30  November,  in
   Frankfurt;  in  1971:  on  19 April,  in {Saarbrucken};  and on 20
   April, at Saarlouis; and in 1972: on 14 April, in Munich.
       The appeals  which  the  parties concerned lodged from time to
   time (for example,  on 31 July and 13 and 29 September 1967 and on
   26  September and 14 October 1969) were dismissed,  except for the
   second one,  which was partly allowed on 4  October  1967  by  the
   Cologne Regional Court.
       39. The prosecutor in charge of the investigation conferred on
   9  and  16  May  1967 with the criminal investigation police about
   coordination of action and, on 16 May, with the consultant whom he
   instructed to carry out certain tasks (Teilgutachten).
       On 10 August,  he requested the criminal investigation  police
   to question four witnesses about certain specified points, and, on
   16 August, he sent further documents to the consultant.
       On 22 August,  he assumed responsibility for a number of cases
   and agreed to  the  transfer  of  those  which  the  Trier  public
   prosecutor's  office  had  begun to inquire into (see paragraph 18
   above).  Seven days later,  he requested the  public  prosecutor's
   offices  in Frankfurt and Offenburg to forward to him various file
   of which he had copies made on 18 September.
       During the  months  that followed,  the prosecutor took over a
   number of preliminary investigations which  had  begun  elsewhere:
   three  of  them  on  10  October,  207 on 10 November,  five on 11
   December, two on 11 January 1968 and three on 8 February 1968.
       On 15  February  1968,  he  asked  the  federal  office of the
   criminal  investigation   police   (Bundeskriminalamt)   to   make
   inquiries  into  a  company  in  Switzerland  and  four  others in
   Liechtenstein which he suspected were being run by Mr.  Eckle  and
   his fellow accused Neubeck.
       On 11 and 20 June,  he asked for certain inquiries to be  made
   by  the  criminal  investigation police in Dudenhofen,  Kassel and
   other  places,  and  circulated  a  letter  written  in  May   and
   containing  a  list of questions to numerous foreign companies and
   individuals residing abroad who had allegedly suffered loss.
       On 20  June  too,  he  summoned a witness in order to have him
   questioned by the criminal investigation police;  other  witnesses
   made statements on 24, 25 and 27 July.
       At the request and in the presence of the public  prosecutor's
   office,  one of the co-accused was questioned on 18 September by a
   judge from the Seligenstadt District Court; another co-accused was
   similarly questioned on 4 October.
       40. On  29  November  1968,  the  public  prosecutor's  office
   instructed  the consultant it had appointed in 1967 (see paragraph
   38 above) to produce an expert opinion  on  seven  listed  points,
   including  the  history  of  the  Hobby-Bau  GmbH  company and its
   relations with the Westropa company.  On 23 July 1969, it sent him
   other documents for the purpose.
       41. On  10  January  and  23  July  1969,   four   preliminary
   investigations  in  respect  of  Mr.  Eckle  which  had been begun
   notably in {Saarbrucken},  Frankfurt and Trier were transferred to
   the Cologne public prosecutor's office,  which on 20 February made
   inquiries  of  the  local  authorities   of   six   municipalities
   concerning  the purchase of land by the Hobby-Bau GmbH company and
   at the same time asked for the production of the land registers of
   the relevant district courts.
       On 31 March and 8 July prosecutor's office heard the applicant
   informally for information purposes.  On 16 April and 19 June,  it
   summoned witnesses in {Saarbrucken} and Saarlouis for questioning;
   on 18,  21 and 22 April, it advised the public prosecutor's office
   in {Saarbrucken} and Koblenz of the purpose of  the  investigation
   and of a number of inquiries made and still to be made. On 14 May,
   the Trier public prosecutor's office sent to Cologne nine  volumes
   of  the  file on the proceedings in Trier;  these were returned by
   the Cologne office on 6 June.  On 9 June,  the  latter  asked  the
   presiding judges   of   the   District   Courts   of  Cologne  and
   {Volklingen} to provide it with a list of the seizures  which  had
   been made in respect of the Eckle firm and the applicants.
       In July,  August and September, the public prosecutor's office
   instructed   the   criminal   investigation  police  in  Mannheim,
   {Saarbrucken}, Berlin  and  Hamburg   to   make   inquiries   into
   life-insurance  policies  which  Mr.  Eckle  had  taken out with a
   number  of  companies;  sought  information  from  an  insurer  in
   {Saarbrucken}; obtained   the   opinion  of  the  Federal  Banking
   Supervisory Office  (Bundesaufsichtsamt  {fur}  Kreditwesen);  and
   applied for   the   files   concerning   the   land   register  at
   {Volklingen}.
       42. According to the report of the Commission, from March 1967
   to  August  1968  statements  were taken from about 832 creditors,
   from the majority of some 3,500 purchasers of  building  materials
   from  the Eckle company and from a large number of other witnesses
   or  employees;  and  the  Eckle  company's  accounts   with   some
   twenty-five credit institutions were examined.  Until October 1969
   the investigation was focused on the alleged frauds  committed  by
   the accused to the detriment of 832 creditors and 3,590 purchasers
   of building materials.
       43. As   requested   by   the  public  prosecutor's  office on
   13 November  1969,  the  Cologne District Court issued,  five days
   later,  a warrant for the arrest of two co-accused and Mr.  Eckle.
   The  latter was remanded in custody on 25 November and he remained
   in custody on that basis until 5 September 1970; from the next day
   onwards  in accordance with a decision taken by the District Court
   on 1 September,  he was detained on the basis of the  warrant  for
   his  arrest  which   the   Koblenz  Court  of Appeal had issued on
   28 January 1970  in  the  proceedings   at  Trier  (see  paragraph
   21 above).
       The applicant several times  appealed  unsuccessfully  to  the
   Cologne District Court, Regional Court and Court of Appeal against
   the issue of the arrest warrant on 18 November.
       44. During  the  latter period,  that is between December 1969
   and September 1970,  the Cologne public prosecutor's office  heard
   Mrs.   Eckle   (12   December);  discussed  the  progress  of  the
   proceedings with the public prosecutor's office  in  {Saarbrucken}
   (26  January  1970)  which,  by  mutual agreement,  transferred to
   Cologne an investigation in respect of one of  the  other  persons
   accused (5  March);  had  four witnesses summoned in {Saarbrucken}
   (20 May);  and set dates for the hearing of a  number  of  people,
   notably in  {Saarbrucken},  Frankfurt,  Ahrweiler and Hamburg (21,
   22, 28 and 30 July, 26 August).
       On 30  July  1970,  the  consultant's  terms of reference were
   widened,  and the  consultant  informed  the  public  prosecutor's
   office  11  August  that  an  expert opinion could not be produced
   before mid-1971.
       45. On 1 September, the Cologne District Court refused to make
   available to Mr.  Eckle the legal codes, books and periodicals and
   the 2,000 files which he had asked for.
       On 9 September,  Mr.  Eckle challenged a judge on the District
   Court,  which rejected the challenge on 21 September as no grounds
   for it had been adduced.  An appeal was dismissed on 4 December by
   the  Cologne  Court of appeal - two of whose judges Mr.  Eckle had
   previously challenged  -  because  he  had  not  put  forward  any
   supporting  reasons,  although the Court had twice given him extra
   time to do so.
       46. Continuing  its  investigation,  the  public  prosecutor's
   office proceeded to set dates  for  hearing  a  number  of  people
   itself,  mainly  elsewhere  than  in Cologne,  or alternatively to
   request the appropriate criminal investigation police or courts to
   question  them  (24  and  26 November 1970,  18 and 19 January,  3
   February,  30 March, 6, 7, 28 and 29 April 1971); business records
   of  the  Eckle  company  were  examined,  seized  and  sent to the
   consultant by  the  prosecutor's  office  (12  to  14  May  1971);
   requests  for  the  production of files were made to other courts,
   including the Federal Constitutional Court (24 May,  18  June,  19
   July,  23 August,  29 September);  information was sought from the
   Cologne Court of Appeal (24 May);  and the Cologne Social Security
   Office was asked to make certain inquiries (18 August).
       On 13 August 1971,  the consultant submitted an interim report
   on the Eckle company's indebtedness,  insolvency and suspension of
   payments.
       On 21 October, a doctor transmitted to the public prosecutor's
   office an expert opinion,  which it had requested on 4 October, on
   Mr. Eckle's fitness to stand trial.
       47. On 21 November,  Mr.  Eckle applied, amongst other things,
   for the warrant for his arrest to be revoked. The Cologne District
   Court refused the application  on  30  November.  On  appeal,  the
   Cologne  Regional  Court  on 13 December 1971 and then the Cologne
   Court of Appeal on 17 January 1972 upheld that decision.
       Between January and April 1972, the public prosecutor's office
   summoned,  or caused to be summoned,  a number of witnesses,  Mrs.
   Eckle and other accused persons so that they could make statements
   (notably on 6 January 1972,  1,  17 and 28 February and  3  and  8
   March)  and  on  22  March  requested  another  doctor to give his
   opinion on Mr. Eckle's fitness to stand trial.
       From 17  March  1972,  the  day  he was convicted in the Trier
   proceedings (see paragraph 27 above),  the applicant was  detained
   on remand under a warrant issued,  and subsequently confirmed on 8
   May,  by the relevant Cologne court.  On 2 June,  the  same  court
   decided to suspend Mr.  Eckle's remand in custody to enable him to
   serve the  sentence  passed  on  him  on  26  March  1971  by  the
   {Saarbrucken} Regional Court (see paragraph 58 below). The Cologne
   Regional Court dismissed appeals by Mr.  Eckle on 22 June  and  20
   November.
       48. The public prosecutor's office completed the investigation
   on  10  May  1972  and  on  the same date dropped the prosecutions
   against some of the co-accused.
       It asked  the  Cologne Regional Court on 14 June to assign two
   official defence counsel, in particular for Mr. Eckle. On 20 June,
   the  Court  appointed  one  of them - Mr.  Muhr to whom the public
   prosecutor's office sent a copy of the files and  other  documents
   on 14 August and 2 October - but refused Mr.  Eckle's request that
   it should nominate Mr.  Becker,  who had defended him in the trial
   at Trier.  An appeal by Mr. Eckle against this latter decision was
   dismissed on 20 November.  On the same  day,  the  Regional  Court
   discharged  Mr.  Muhr from his duties and replaced him as official
   defence counsel by the applicant's lawyer,  Mr. Preyer, to whom it
   had  already  sent  the  main  files,  among  other things,  on 13
   November.
       On 20  June,  the consultant had filed his final report on the
   Eckle firm;  four months later he submitted one on  the  Hobby-Bau
   GmbH company.
       On 17 July,  the public prosecutor's office had called on  the
   applicant  and  his  fellow  accused to state by 30 August whether
   they wanted a "final hearing".  This time-limit was extended on 31
   August,  and  Mr.  Eckle  subsequently replied affirmatively on 18
   September.
       49. On  11  and  17  July 1972,  Mr.  Eckle had challenged two
   judges on  the  Regional  Court.  After  giving  him  an  ultimate
   deadline  until  15  September to state his grounds,  the Regional
   Court rejected his challenges on 2 November;  a subsequent appeal,
   for  which  he  was granted extra time to put forward his reasons,
   was likewise dismissed on 6 April 1973.
       On 14  November  1972,  the  Cologne District Court decided to
   confirm the authorisation to serve  the  sentence  passed  on  Mr.
   Eckle by the {Saarbrucken} Regional Court (see paragraphs 47 above
   and 58 below).  An appeal lodged by Mr.  Eckle on 30 November, for
   which  he had asked to be given until 31 January 1973 to state his
   reasons, seems to have been unsuccessful.
       On 12 December,  the public prosecutor's office sent copies of
   files to counsel for the defence for inspection.
       Between November 1972 and March 1973, Mr. Eckle lodged several
   other applications and appeals whose purpose is not apparent  from
   the  same  time  he  asked  the competent authorities to grant him
   extensions of time in order  to  formulate  the  grounds  for  his
   applications.
       50. On 1 March 1973,  the public prosecutor's office  set  the
   date  of  13  March  for  the  "final hearing" of Mrs.  Eckle and,
   pursuant to Article 154 of the Code  of  Criminal  Procedure  (see
   paragraph  16 above),  dropped the charges of fraud in a number of
   cases.
       The hearing of Mrs.  Eckle took place on the appointed day. On
   the next day,  Mr.  Eckle,  acting through  his  defence  counsel,
   waived his right to a "final hearing",  but on 28 March his lawyer
   applied for one,  explaining that the waiver had  been  due  to  a
   misunderstanding.  As  on the same day the prison doctor expressed
   the opinion that the state of  the  applicant's  health  made  him
   unfit to appear, the hearing was adjourned.
       51. On 29 March 1973, Mr. Eckle sought an extension of time to
   submit  reasons in support of a number of his appeals;  lodged two
   fresh  appeals  against  decisions  of  the  Regional  Court;  and
   challenged the presiding judge of the Ninth Criminal Chamber.  The
   time-limit originally allotted to him for stating his grounds  for
   the  challenge  was to have expired on 30 April,  but the Regional
   Court agreed to put the deadline back to 31 May,  then to 30 June,
   to 31 July and, finally, to 31 August.
       On 6 April 1973,  Mr.  Eckle applied to the District Court for
   Mr. Preyer's instructions to be withdrawn and for Mr. Becker to be
   assigned as official defence counsel,  and asked  also  for  three
   day's  leave of absence (Urlaub);  these applications were refused
   on 6 June. On 9 July, his defence counsel asked the District Court
   to  discharge  the  warrant for his client's arrest;  the District
   Court refused this request on 23 July.
       On 3  September,  Mr.  Eckle stated that he would not agree to
   attend  the  "final  hearing"  so  long  as  Mr.  Preyer  remained
   responsible  for  his defence.  Mr.  Preyer,  however,  said on 19
   September that his client still wished to have such a hearing, but
   wanted  first  of  all  to  confer with other defence counsel.  He
   accordingly requested that the hearing  should  be  postponed  for
   three weeks.
       On 19 September too,  the prosecutor  concerned  set  down  24
   September as the date for the hearing. On that date he went to the
   prison where Mr.  Eckle was being detained.  Mr.  Eckle,  however,
   declared that he was unfit to undergo the hearing and unwilling to
   give an account of himself, whilst at the same time refusing to be
   examined by a medical expert.
       52. On 25 September,  the public prosecutor's office preferred
   the  "bill  of indictment" before the Cologne Regional Court after
   deciding not to proceed with the charges  in  a  large  number  of
   individual cases.
       Four people,  including the applicants,  were "indicted".  The
   applicants  were  charged with fraudulent bankruptcy,  tax evasion
   and fraud;  Mr.  Eckle, alone or with others, was charged with the
   latter offence in 55 cases, and Mrs. Eckle, alone or together with
   others,  in 27 cases.  The "indictment",  which ran to 432  pages,
   mentioned 3 experts and 143 witnesses.  On 15 and 16 October,  the
   public prosecutor's  office  filed  with  the  Regional  Court  14
   volumes  of  appendices,  various  subsidiary files (Beiakten) and
   experts' reports.
   
           2. From the preferment of the "bill of indictment"
              to the opening of the trial (Hauptverfahren)
                (25 September 1973 - 16 September 1976)
   
       53. The  presiding  judge of the Sixth Criminal Chamber of the
   Regional Court notified the parties concerned  and  their  defence
   counsel  of  the "bill of indictment" on 16 October 1973 and set a
   time-limit for the submission of any comments by them.  Extensions
   of  time  were  granted  on several occasions,  notably on 7 March
   1974;  a final request for extension was,  however, refused by the
   Regional Court on 21 June 1974.
       Having once more been in detention on remand since 21 November
   1973  under  an  arrest  warrant issued by the appropriate Cologne
   court,  Mr.  Eckle applied on 7  December  for  his  release  from
   custody; he was released on 10 January 1974.
       On 28 January 1974,  the Regional Court transmitted the  whole
   of  the  file  to  the  Federal  Constitutional  Court,  which had
   requested  it  on  16  January;  the  file  was  returned  by  the
   Constitutional Court on 26 February.
       Four days previously,  Mr.  Becker - of the Trier  Bar  -  had
   requested  the  Regional  Court  to  appoint him officially as the
   applicant's defence counsel;  the  Regional  Court  rejected  this
   request on 7 March.
       On 19 March, 3 April and 24 and 30 May, counsel for one of the
   co-accused  requested,  inter alia,  to have parts of the file and
   other documents made available to him for a short period.  He also
   asked  for  variation  of  a  1970  decision  granting  his client
   conditional release,  for further inquiries and for a  preliminary
   judicial examination (Voruntersuchung). The Court allowed at least
   the penultimate application (29 May and 1 July). On 11 August, the
   same  lawyer submitted written pleadings,  on which the consultant
   commented on 12 December.
       On 9  January 1975,  the counsel who had made the applications
   of 19 March,  3 April and 30 May  1974  discussed  them  with  the
   responsible prosecutor, after which he withdrew the application of
   30 May. The file on the case, which was at the public prosecutor's
   office, was returned to the Regional Court.
       In a note entered in the file on 22 May,  the presiding  judge
   of the Tenth Criminal Chamber of the Regional Court commented that
   the trial would probably last for about a year.
       On 21 January 1976,  one of the applicant's co-accused,  whose
   case had been severed from  theirs,  applied  for  the  return  of
   certain  documents,  but  the  Regional  Court  refused this on 10
   March;  between 13 March and 26 September he filed  various  other
   applications.
       On 16  September,  the  Regional  Court   opened   the   trial
   proceedings  (Hauptverfahren) in respect of the applicants and the
   two other persons who had been "indicted" with them,  and notified
   them accordingly.
   
                    3. From the opening of the trial
             (Hauptverfahren) to the end of the proceedings
                (16 September 1976 - 21 September 1977)
   
       54. On 19 October 1976, Mr. Eckle requested the Regional Court
   to discharge the warrants for his arrest which had been issued  by
   the  Cologne  District Court and Regional Court (see paragraphs 43
   and 53 above); these requests were refused on 3 February 1977.
       Earlier, on 3 January 1977, the public prosecutor's office had
   informed the Regional Court that cumulative sentences remained  to
   be  determined  combining  those  passed by the Regional Courts of
   {Saarbrucken} and Trier,  but that no decision could be taken  for
   the  time  being  as  the file was with the Federal Constitutional
   Court for the purposes of an application lodged by Mr. Eckle.
       On 31  August,  the  Regional  Court  inquired  of  the public
   prosecutor's offices in {Saarbrucken} and Trier  whether,  amongst
   other  things,  cumulative  sentences  had  been determined in the
   meantime.
       55. At  the  request  of  the  public  prosecutor's office (14
   September 1977), the Regional Court on 21 September made an order,
   pursuant  to  Article  154  of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see
   paragraph 16 above),  discontinuing the  proceedings  against  the
   applicants; the latter had consented thereto.
       At the same  time,  the  Regional  Court  revoked  the  arrest
   warrants  mentioned  above (at paragraph 54) and directed that the
   applicants should themselves meet their own  expenses,  while  the
   court costs would be borne by the State.
       In accordance with the public  prosecutor's  submissions,  the
   Regional  Court did not award the applicants any compensation;  on
   27 December 1979, it refused a subsequent request by Mr. Eckle and
   this  decision  was  upheld  by  the  Cologne Court of Appeal on 6
   February 1980.
       56. Following  an order for separate trials,  the prosecutions
   against eleven of the thirteen co-accused were discontinued during
   the  course  of  proceedings either in pursuance of Article 154 of
   the Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraph  16  above)  or  for
   lack  of  adequate evidence or because of the intervening death of
   those concerned.  The two remaining  co-accused  were,  for  their
   part,  sentenced  by  the  relevant  courts  to  various penalties
   between 1970 and 1980;  in their cases also,  separate  trial  had
   been ordered.
   
                   III. The {Saarbrucken} proceedings
                      (late 1963 - 20 April 1972)
   
       57. The criminal prosecutions brought  against  Mr.  and  Mrs.
   Eckle in  {Saarbrucken}  are  not  in  issue,  but they need to be
   mentioned because of their bearing on the proceedings in Trier and
   Cologne.
       58. Towards the end of 1963, the public prosecutor's office in
   {Saarbrucken} began  a preliminary investigation in respect of the
   applicants. They were suspected of having defrauded clients in the
   Saar  in  transactions  of the kind that were later the subject of
   prosecutions in Trier and, in part, in Cologne.
       After being  "indicted"  with others in March 1965,  they were
   convicted by the {Saarbrucken} Regional Court on 17  October  1967
   on  99  counts  of  fraud:  Mr.  Eckle was sentenced to six years'
   imprisonment and his wife to a term of three years and six months.
       On petitions  for review on a point of law,  the Federal Court
   of Justice quashed the convictions on 14 March 1969  and  remitted
   the case to another chamber of the Regional Court.
       On 19 February 1970,  after eight days of hearings, the latter
   chamber  sentenced  Mrs.  Eckle  to  two years' imprisonment on 74
   counts of fraud. Mr. Eckle, whose trial had had to be severed from
   his wife's, was convicted on 26 March 1971 after hearings that had
   commenced on 24 February;  the Regional Court found him guilty  on
   68  counts of fraud and sentenced him to four years' imprisonment.
   A fresh petition for review on a  point  of  law  by  the  parties
   concerned  was  dismissed  by  the  Federal Court of Justice on 20
   April 1972.
       59. The  sentences  passed by the {Saarbrucken} Regional Court
   were combined on 24 November 1977 with those imposed on  17  March
   1972 by the Trier Regional Court (see paragraphs 27 and 35 above).
   
                  IV. Mr. Eckle's detention on remand
   
       60. In  the  course  of the proceedings against him Mr.  Eckle
   spent approximately five years in detention on remand. The various
   courts  placed  reliance on a risk of his absconding and tampering
   with evidence.
   
                   PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION
   
       61. In their application of 27 December 1977 to the Commission
   (no.  8130/78),  Mr. and Mrs. Eckle claimed that the length of the
   proceedings brought in Trier,  {Saarbrucken} and Cologne gave rise
   to a breach of Article 6 par.  1 (art. 6-1) of the Convention. Mr.
   Eckle,  relying on Article 5 par.  3  (art.  5-3),  complained  in
   addition   of   his   detention   on  remand.  Subsequent  to  the
   registration of their application, Mr. and Mrs. Eckle also alleged
   violation of Article 6 par. 2 (art. 6-2) on account of the refusal
   to reimburse their expenses in the Cologne proceedings.
       On 10  May  1979,  the  Commission  declared  the  application
   admissible  as  far  as  the  alleged  failure  to   observe   the
   "reasonable time" in the Trier and Cologne cases was concerned; it
   declared the other complaints inadmissible either as being out  of
   time  or  for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies (Articles 26 and
   27 par. 3), (art. 26, art. 27-3) depending upon the circumstances.
       In its report of 11 December 1980 (Article 31) (art.  31), the
   Commission expressed the unanimous opinion  that  there  had  been
   breach of Article 6 par. 1 (art. 6-1).
   
         FINAL SUBMISSIONS MADE TO THE COURT BY THE GOVERNMENT
   
       62. In their memorial and at the close of the hearings held on
   22 March 1982, the Government sought from the Court "a declaration
   to  the  effect  that,  owing to the lack of grievance,  the Court
   cannot decide on the merits of the case".
   
                             AS TO THE LAW
   
       63. The applicants complained of the length  of  the  criminal
   proceedings  brought  against  them  in  Trier  and Cologne;  they
   claimed that it had  exceeded  the  "reasonable  time"  stipulated
   under Article 6 par. 1 (art. 6-1).
   
                    I. Article 25 par. 1 (art. 25-1)
   
       64. In   their   memorial   and  subsequently  in  their  oral
   pleadings,  the Government formally requested the  Court  to  hold
   that,  because of the lack of an existing grievance, the Court was
   unable to take cognisance of  the  merits  of  the  case.  In  the
   Government's  submissions,  the  applicants  could  no  longer  be
   regarded as victims within the meaning of Article 25 par.  1 (art.
   25-1) of the Convention which reads:
       "The Commission  may  receive  petitions  addressed   to   the
   Secretary  General  of  the  Council  of  Europe  from any person,
   non-governmental organisation or group of individuals claiming  to
   be  the  victim  of  a  violation  by  one of the High Contracting
   Parties of the rights set forth in (the) Convention ..."
       The German   courts,   so   it  was  argued,  have  in  effect
   acknowledged the excessive length  of  the  proceedings  and  have
   afforded  redress:  the  Trier Regional Court took the matter into
   account when determining sentence and the Cologne  Regional  Court
   did  likewise when ordering the discontinuance of the prosecutions
   (see paragraphs 35 and 55 above).
       The applicants  contested this line of reasoning.  Neither did
   it find favour with the Commission. In the view of the Commission,
   the  courts  had  not made any finding of a violation of Article 6
   (art.  6); the reduction of sentence that the Trier Regional Court
   had declared itself to be granting was not measurable; finally, it
   was not clearly established that the Cologne  Regional  Court  had
   paid  regard  to  the  excessive  length  of  the proceedings when
   discontinuing the prosecutions.
       65. The Court has jurisdiction to rule on preliminary pleas of
   this kind in so far as the respondent State may have first  raised
   them  before the Commission to the extent that their character and
   the circumstances permitted (see the Artico  judgment  of  13  May
   1980, Series A no. 37, p. 12, par. 24).
       These conditions being satisfied in the present case, there is
   no estoppel.
       66. The word "victim", in the context of Article 25 (art. 25),
   denotes  the person directly affected by the act or omission which
   is in issue,  the existence of a violation conceivable even in the
   absence of prejudice; prejudice is relevant only in the context of
   Article 50 (art.  50) (see,  inter alia,  the Adolf judgment of 26
   March 1982, Series A no. 49, p. 17, par. 37).
       Consequently, mitigation of  sentence  and  discontinuance  of
   prosecution   granted  on  account  of  the  excessive  length  of
   proceedings do not in principle deprive the  individual  concerned
   of  his  status as a victim within the meaning of Article 25 (art.
   25);  they are to be  taken  into  consideration  solely  for  the
   purpose  of  assessing  the  extent of the damage he has allegedly
   suffered (see, mutatis mutandis, the Ringeisen judgment of 22 June
   1972, Series A no. 15, p. 8, par. 20 - 21, the Neumeister judgment
   of 7 May 1974, Series A no. 17, pp. 18 - 19, par. 40, and also the
   Commission's opinion in the Wemhoff case,  Series B no.  5, pp. 89
   and 273 - 274).
       The Court  does  not  exclude  that this general rule might be
   subject  to  an  exception  when  the  national  authorities  have
   acknowledged  either expressly or in substance,  and then afforded
   redress for,  the breach of the Convention (see  the  Commission's
   decision  of  16  October 1980 on the admissibility of application
   no.  8182/80,  Schloffer v.  the Federal Republic of Germany).  In
   such   circumstances,  to  duplicate  the  domestic  process  with
   proceedings before the  Commission  and  the  Court  would  appear
   hardly  compatible  with the subsidiary character of the machinery
   of protection established by the Convention. The Convention leaves
   to  each  Contracting  State,  in  the  first  place,  the task of
   securing the enjoyment of the rights  and  freedoms  it  enshrines
   (see  especially the judgment of 23 July 1968 on the merits of the
   "Belgian Linguistic" case, Series A no. 6, p. 35, par. 10 in fine,
   and the Handyside judgment of 7 December 1976, Series A no. 24, p.
   22, par. 48). This subsidiary character is all the more pronounced
   in  the case of States which have incorporated the Convention into
   their domestic legal order  and  which  treat  the  rules  of  the
   Convention  as  directly  applicable  (see  the  Van Droogenbroeck
   judgment of 24 June 1982, Series A no. 50, par. 55).
       67. As the Convention forms an integral part of the law of the
   Federal Republic of Germany,  there was  nothing  to  prevent  the
   courts  of  the  country  from holding,  if appropriate,  that the
   Convention and,  in particular,  Article 6 par.  1 (art.  6-1) had
   been  breached.  The  national courts also had available to them a
   means of affording reparation which,  in the Court's  opinion,  is
   capable   of   proving  suitable:  according  to  well-established
   case-law  of  the  Federal  Court  of  Justice,  when  determining
   sentence  the  judge must take proper account of any over-stepping
   of the "reasonable time" within the meaning of Article  6  par.  1
   (art.  6-1) (see the judgment of 10 November 1971,  Entscheidungen
   des Bundesgerichtshofes in Strafsachen, vol. 24, pp. 239 - 243).
       Accordingly, it   has   to  be  ascertained  whether,  as  the
   Government submitted, the German courts held that Article 6 par. 1
   (art.  6-1)  had  been breached and,  if so,  whether they granted
   redress.
       68. In the words of the Trier Regional Court,  the proceedings
   before it had lasted for an "inordinate length of time"  (judgment
   of 17 March 1972, paragraph 27 above); they had been of "long" and
   "excessive" duration (decision of 24 November 1977,  paragraph  35
   above).  This  latter  description  is  also  to  be  found in the
   judgment of 19 February 1976 by the Federal Court of  Justice  and
   in  the judgment of 23 January 1978 by the Koblenz Court of Appeal
   (see paragraphs 33 and 36 above).  All these decisions,  save  the
   judgment  by  the  Trier  Regional  Court,  make  reference to the
   case-law cited at paragraph 67.  The Koblenz Court of Appeal alone
   alludes  to Article 6 par.  1 (art.  6-1) when stating that,  even
   having regard to this Article,  the sentence pronounced  at  Trier
   was not unduly severe.
       The Cologne Regional Court's decision  of  21  September  1977
   discontinuing the criminal proceedings against Mr.  and Mrs. Eckle
   simply takes note of the consent of the accused and refers to  the
   formal  submissions  presented  by the public prosecutor's office.
   The latter had cited the reasoning enunciated by the Federal Court
   in  relation  to the cumulative sentences to be fixed by the Trier
   Regional Court (see paragraph 33 above).  The prosecutor's  office
   had  further  submitted that this reasoning would apply a fortiori
   in  the  event  of  fresh  cumulative  sentences   being   imposed
   subsequent to a possible conviction in Cologne.
       69. It is  apparent  from  the  foregoing  that  none  of  the
   relevant  courts  expressly acknowledged the existence of a breach
   of Article 6 par. 1 (art. 6-1). Nonetheless, the language employed
   by  the  Trier Regional Court (decision of 24 November 1977),  the
   Federal Court of Justice and the Koblenz Court  of  Appeal,  taken
   together with the references to the Federal Court's judgment of 10
   November 1971,  could be taken as amounting to a finding  to  that
   effect. Less certain in this respect is the import of the decision
   by the Cologne Regional Court.  Even assuming that  this  decision
   should,  as the Government contended,  be read in the light of the
   formal submissions presented by the public prosecutor's office, it
   hardly  warrants  the  conclusion that the Regional Court held the
   length of the proceedings to be in breach  of  Article  6  par.  1
   (art. 6-1).
       70. Even if it were accepted that the  relevant  decisions  do
   acknowledge  in a sufficiently clear manner the failure to observe
   the "reasonable time" requirement,  it would  still  be  necessary
   that redress should have been given. The issue that arises is thus
   whether the mitigation of sentence granted, according to the terms
   of   its   decision,   by   the   Trier  Regional  Court  and  the
   discontinuance of proceedings  ordered  by  the  Cologne  Regional
   Court remedied the matters complained of.
       The Court notes,  however,  that this part of the Government's
   case is intimately connected with another aspect of the complaint,
   namely the extent of the alleged breach.  Consequently,  the Court
   considers  that  it should join to the merits the preliminary plea
   relied on by the Government  (see,  mutatis  mutandis,  the  Airey
   judgment of 9 October 1979, Series A no. 32, p. 11, par. 19).
   
         II. The alleged breach of Article 6 PAR. 1 (art. 6-1)
   
       71. The  Commission  expressed the opinion that there had been
   breach of Article 6 par. 1 (art. 6-1) which provides:
       "In the  determination  of his civil rights and obligations or
   of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair
   and  public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and
   impartial tribunal established by law ..."
       The Government conceded that the proceedings had,  at  certain
   stages, been unreasonably long.
   
                    A. The length of the proceedings
   
       72. In the applicants' submission,  the Trier proceedings were
   set  in motion in November 1959 and came to a close on 24 November
   1977 when the Regional Court fixed the  cumulative  sentences.  At
   the  hearings,  the  Government argued that the proceedings lasted
   from 7 October 1964 (searches of the applicants'  premises)  until
   19  February 1976 (judgment by the Federal Court of Justice).  The
   Commission concurred with this line of thinking as to  the  second
   date,  but  not  as  to the first:  in the Commission's view,  the
   opening date must be traced back to at least 1 January 1961.
       For the applicants and the Commission, the Cologne proceedings
   commenced with the issue on 25 April 1967 of a search and  seizure
   warrant  against  Mr.  and  Mrs.  Eckle.  Before  the  Court,  the
   Government appeared to put forward the date on which this  warrant
   was  served and executed,  namely 11 May 1967,  and no longer,  as
   they had done before the Commission,  the date on which Mr.  Eckle
   was  remanded in custody (25 November 1969).  As far as the end of
   the period is concerned,  the applicants,  the Government and  the
   Commission were all agreed in proposing 21 September 1977, the day
   on which the proceedings were discontinued.
   
        1. Commencement of the periods to be taken into account
   
       73. In criminal matters,  the "reasonable time" referred to in
   Article 6 par.  1 (art.  6-1) begins to run as soon as a person is
   "charged";  this may occur on a date  prior  to  the  case  coming
   before the trial court (see,  for example,  the Deweer judgment of
   27 February 1980,  Series A no.  35,  p. 22, par. 42), such as the
   date of arrest,  the date when the person concerned was officially
   notified that he would be prosecuted or the date when  preliminary
   investigations  were  opened  (see the Wemhoff judgment of 27 June
   1968,  Series A no. 7, pp. 26-27, par. 19, the Neumeister judgment
   of  the  same date,  Series A no.  8,  p.  41,  par.  18,  and the
   Ringeisen judgment of 16 July 1971,  Series A no.  13, p. 45, par.
   110).  "Charge",  for the purposes of Article 6 par. 1 (art. 6-1),
   may  be  defined  as  "the  official  notification  given  to   an
   individual by the competent authority of an allegation that he has
   committed a criminal offence",  a definition that also corresponds
   to  the  test  whether  "the  situation  of the [suspect] has been
   substantially affected" (see the above-mentioned Deweer  judgment,
   p. 24, par. 46).
       74. Applying these principles to the facts of  the  case,  the
   Court  considers  that  the  date put forward by the applicants in
   respect of the  Trier  proceedings  cannot  be  the  relevant  one
   because  documents  produced  by  the  Government  show  that  the
   complaint lodged on 28 October 1959 did not  lead  to  any  formal
   measures of inquiry being ordered.  The public prosecutor's office
   closed the file on the matter after obtaining information from the
   competent  administrative  authorities  as  to  the  existence  of
   maximum prices  in  the  building  materials  trade;  neither  the
   prosecutor's  office  nor  the  police questioned witnesses or the
   applicants.  A true preliminary investigation was  begun  only  in
   August 1960 when numerous witnesses were interviewed in connection
   with  the allegations made against Mr.  Eckle (see paragraphs 11 -
   12  above).  As  the  Delegate of the Commission pointed out,  the
   object  of  these  interviews  was  not  to  determine  whether  a
   preliminary   investigation  should  be  opened;   the  interviews
   themselves formed part of the preliminary investigation.
       Nevertheless, having  been  unable  to  ascertain as from what
   moment the applicants officially learnt of  the  investigation  or
   began to be affected by it,  the Court concurs with the opinion of
   the Commission and takes as the starting point for the "time"  the
   date of 1 January 1961.
       In this connection,  the Court does not deem it necessary,  as
   the  Government  at one point seemed to have in mind,  to draw any
   distinction  between  the  two  applicants,   for   although   the
   investigation  does  not appear to have been directed against Mrs.
   Eckle from the outset, she must have felt the repercussions to the
   same extent as her husband.
       75. The appropriate date for the commencement of  the  Cologne
   proceedings is,  on the case-law cited above,  the date of service
   of the warrant issued on 25 April 1967,  that is 11 May 1967  (see
   paragraph 72 above).
   
             2. End of the periods to be taken into account
   
       76. As regards the end of the "time",  in criminal matters the
   period governed by Article 6 par. 1 (art. 6-1) covers the whole of
   the  proceedings  in issue,  including appeal proceedings (see the
   {Konig} judgment  of  28  June  1978,  Series  A  no. 27,  p.  33,
   par. 98).
       77. In  the  Trier  proceedings,  it still remained necessary,
   after the judgment of 19 February 1976 by  the  Federal  Court  of
   Justice,  to  fix  cumulative sentences combining those previously
   imposed on 19 February 1970 and 26 March 1971 by the {Saarbrucken}
   Regional  Court  and  then  on 17 March 1972 by the Trier Regional
   Court (see paragraphs 27 and 58  above).  The  Federal  Court  had
   itself  drawn  the  Regional  Court's attention to the duty of the
   courts under German law (Articles 53 and 55 of the Penal Code)  to
   render, if need be of their own motion, a decision to this effect.
   Furthermore,  the determination of cumulative  sentences  did  not
   represent  for  the  Trier  judges  a  mere matter of mathematical
   calculation,  for under Article 54 of the  Penal  Code  they  were
   bound to make their own overall assessment of all the offences for
   which the applicants had been convicted at {Saarbrucken} and Trier
   as well as their own assessment of the character of the offenders;
   this,  in fact, they did in their decision of 24 November 1977. In
   addition,  the  Regional  Court had to take into account by way of
   mitigating circumstance,  amongst other matters, the time that had
   elapsed  from  the  Federal  Court's  judgment  "until  the  final
   decision" (see paragraph 33 above).
       It follows  that  after  the  judgment by the Federal Court of
   Justice the applicants were not in a  position  to  calculate  the
   size of the sentences that were to be fixed. They simply knew that
   those sentences had to be less than the  total  of  the  sentences
   that  the  two  Regional  Courts  had,  each within its respective
   domain,  imposed on them in respect of the various offences  found
   (Article 54 par. 2 of the Penal Code).
       In the event of conviction,  there is no "determination ... of
   any criminal charge", within the meaning of Article 6 par. 1 (art.
   6-1),  as long as the sentence is not definitively fixed. Thus, in
   the Ringeisen judgment of 16 July 1971 the Court took as the close
   of the proceedings the date on which the trial court had  decided,
   following appeal proceedings,  that the entire period spent by the
   applicant in detention on remand should be reckoned as part of the
   sentence (Series A no. 13, pp. 20 and 45, par. 48 and 110).
       Consequently, the period to be taken into account ended on  23
   January  1978  when  the  Koblenz  Court  of  Appeal delivered its
   judgments upholding the cumulative  sentences  pronounced  by  the
   Regional Court on 24 November 1977.
       78. The Cologne proceedings,  for their part,  came to a close
   on   21   September   1977   when   the   Regional  Court  ordered
   discontinuance of prosecution.
   
                             3. Conclusion
   
       79. The length of time to be examined under Article 6  par.  1
   (art.  6-1)  thus  amounted  to seventeen years and three weeks (1
   January 1961 - 23 January 1978) as regards the  Trier  proceedings
   and  ten  years,  four  months and ten days as regards the Cologne
   proceedings (11 May 1967 - 21 September 1977).
       Drawing attention   to   the  fact  that  the  applicants  had
   continued their  illegal  activities  during  the  course  of  the
   investigation  of the case at Trier,  the Government requested the
   Court to deduct from the total length  of  those  proceedings  the
   periods during which the fresh offences were being committed.
       The Court views this factor as simply one of the elements that
   are  of  importance  for  reviewing  the  "reasonableness"  of the
   "time".
   
         B. The reasonableness of the length of the proceedings
   
       80. The reasonableness of the length of the  proceedings  must
   be   assessed   in  each  instance  according  to  the  particular
   circumstances.  In this exercise,  the Court has regard to,  among
   other  things,  the  complexity  of  the case,  the conduct of the
   applicants and the conduct of the judicial  authorities  (see  the
   above-mentioned {Konig}  judgment,  Series  A   no.  27,   p.  34,
   par. 99).
       The present case concerns sets  of  proceedings  that  endured
   seventeen  years  and  ten  years  respectively.  Such  a delay is
   undoubtedly inordinate and is,  as a general rule,  to be regarded
   as,  exceeding the "reasonable time" referred to in Article 6 par.
   1 (art.  6-1) (see the above-mentioned Neumeister judgment  of  27
   June  1968,  Series  A  no.  8,  p.  41,  par.  20;  see  also the
   above-mentioned  {Konig} judgment,  p.  34,  par. 102).  In   such
   circumstances,  it  falls  to the respondent State to come forward
   with explanations.
   
                        1. The Trier proceedings
   
       81. Although the legal issues it  involved  appear  relatively
   simple,  the  case  that  was  investigated and tried at Trier did
   undisputedly pose serious problems especially in view of the sheer
   volume  of  the  applicants'  activities  and the ingenious way in
   which they presented their methods of financing contracts of sale.
   Moreover,  further  complexity  was added during the course of the
   inquiries since,  as is  stated  in  the  judgment  of  the  Trier
   Regional  Court,  a number of fraudulent loan contracts were still
   being concluded at the end of 1963 and in 1964.
       82. Far from helping to expedite the proceedings, Mr. and Mrs.
   Eckle increasingly resorted to actions - including the  systematic
   recourse to challenge of judges - likely to delay matters; some of
   these actions could even be interpreted as illustrating  a  policy
   of deliberate obstruction (see paragraphes 15,  20, 22, 23, 24, 25
   and 32 above).
       However, as  the  Commission  rightly  pointed out,  Article 6
   (art.  6) did not require the applicants  actively  to  co-operate
   with  the  judicial  authorities.  Neither  can  any  reproach  be
   levelled against them for having made full  use  of  the  remedies
   available  under  the  domestic  law.  Nonetheless,  their conduct
   referred to above constitutes an objective fact,  not  capable  of
   being  attributed  to  the respondent State,  which is to be taken
   into account when  determining  whether  or  not  the  proceedings
   lasted  longer  than  the reasonable time referred to in Article 6
   par.  1 (art.  6-1) (see,  mutatis mutandis,  the  above-mentioned
   {Konig} judgment, pp. 35-36, 37, 38 and 40, par. 103, 105, 108 and
   111, and  the  Buchholz  judgment  of 6 May 1981, Series A no. 42,
   pp. 18 and 22, par. 56 and 63).
       83. In  the  applicant's  submission,  the   length   of   the
   proceedings stemmed from the way in which the judicial authorities
   handled the case. Their principal ground of criticism was that the
   judicial    authorities   undertook   three   distinct   sets   of
   investigation and trial proceedings instead of  joining  them  and
   carried out inquiries into too many individual cases.
       The Commission likewise considered  that  the  length  of  the
   proceedings was primarily referable to the conduct of the judicial
   authorities.   In   the   Commission's   view,   the   preliminary
   investigations,  the  withdrawal of the "bill of indictment",  the
   drafting of the Regional Court's judgment and the hearing  of  the
   petitions  for  review  on  a point of law occasioned unreasonable
   delays.
       The Government expressed disagreement with this opinion.
       84. The Court, like the Commission, has come to the conclusion
   that  the  competent  authorities  did  not act with the necessary
   diligence and expedition.
       Thus, the  enormous  number  of cases subjected to inquiry was
   not without effect in  prolonging  the  preliminary  investigation
   (see  paragraphe  16 above).  In the Government's submission,  the
   principle  of  "legality  of  prosecution"   (the   principle   of
   obligatory  prosecution  of  all criminal offences),  as laid down
   under the law,  compelled the authorities to proceed in the manner
   they did.  The Court,  however, is not convinced by this argument.
   Although Article 154 of the  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure,  which
   provides  for  the  possibility of discontinuing prosecution,  was
   amended only in 1979, the Government themselves conceded that this
   reform  embodied  a  practice  that  had  been  current  under the
   previous legislation.  In any event,  the Government may  not,  in
   relation  to  the fulfilment of the engagements undertaken by them
   by virtue of Article 6 (art.  6),  seek refuge behind the possible
   failings of their own domestic law. Moreover, the text in force at
   the relevant time proved no obstacle to  the  public  prosecutor's
   office and the Regional Court discontinuing prosecution on certain
   counts (see paragraphs 16 and 26 above).
       In addition,  it  is not easy to understand why in 1967,  thus
   six years after the opening of the investigation, the Trier public
   prosecutor's office,  when confronted with the further offences it
   believed to have discovered,  should have judged there to be  only
   one suitable course of action,  namely the withdrawal of the "bill
   of indictment" (see paragraph 18 above).  It should also be  noted
   that  approximately  one  more year elapsed before transfer of the
   fresh cases to the Cologne public procecutor's office (ibid).
       Neither is there any proper explanation as to why the judgment
   of 17 March  1972   was   not  served  on  the   applicants  until
   12 February 1973 (see paragraph 27  above).  Undoubtedly,  as  was
   stressed by the Government,  the drafting of the judgment required
   analysing an enormous mass of documents,  but  that  alone  cannot
   justify  a  period  of  almost eleven months after delivery of the
   judgment.
       Finally, the proceedings for review on a point of  law  lasted
   almost three years (see paragraphs 29 - 33 above).
       85. Before the Court,  the Governement drew attention  to  the
   fact  that  the  Eckle case had been one of the first big cases of
   economic crime,  especially for the Land Rhineland-Palatinate.  At
   the  relevant  time the authorities,  so the Government explained,
   lacked the necessary experience and means to  combat  rapidly  and
   effectively  this  type of offence.  In the meantime,  a series of
   legislative and administrative measures  was  said  to  have  been
   taken to this end.
       The Court  realises  that  initially  the  specific  forms  of
   economic  crime  caused  the  judicial  authorities  a  variety of
   problems,  notably in relation to the speedy and smooth conduct of
   criminal  proceedings.  It also recognises the efforts made by the
   Federal Republic of Germany in the legislative and  administrative
   sphere  in  order  to  deal  with this mischief with the requisite
   expedition.  Nevertheless,  the Court  cannot  attach  a  decisive
   weight  to  these factors for its ruling on the instant case,  for
   the state of affairs confronting the competent authorities was not
   at  all  exceptional (see,  mutatis mutandis,  the above-mentioned
   Buchholz judgment, pp. 16, 20 - 21 and 22, par. 51, 61 and 63).
       86. In  the  light  of  all  these various factors,  the Court
   reaches the conclusion that the difficulties of investigation  and
   the  behaviour  of  the applicants do not on their own account for
   the length  of  the  proceedings:  one  of  the  principal  causes
   therefor  is  to  be  found  in  the  manner in which the judicial
   authorities conducted the case.
       87. Having  regard to the length of the delays attributable to
   the respondent State,  the reduction of sentence that the Regional
   Court  stated it was granting to the applicants was not capable of
   divesting the latter of their entitlement to claim to be  victims,
   within the meaning of Article 25 (art.  25) (see paragraphs 68 and
   70  above):  the  Regional  Court's  decision  did   not   contain
   sufficient  indications  to  allow  an assessment of the extent to
   which the length of the proceedings was being taken  into  account
   for the purposes of the Convention.
       88. Accordingly,   the   Court   rejects   the    Government's
   preliminary  plea  as  regards this part of the case and concludes
   that the Trier proceedings exceeded a reasonable time in breach of
   Article 6 par. 1 (art. 6-1) of the Convention.
   
                       2. The Cologne proceedings
   
       89. The  case  investigated  and  tried  at  Cologne concerned
   fifteen  persons  initially  and  had  ramifications  outside  the
   country;  it  dealt  with  charges  not  only of fraud but also of
   fraudulent bankruptcy and tax evasion (see  paragraph  37  above).
   Like the Commission,  the Court considers that it was particularly
   difficult and complex.
       90. As at Trier,  Mr.  and Mrs. Eckle slowed down the progress
   of the proceedings by making numerous  applications  and  appeals,
   often  accompanied  by requests for an extension of the time-limit
   for the filing of written pleadings (see especially paragraphs 43,
   45,  47,  48,  49,  51, 53 and 54 above; compare with paragraph 82
   above).
       91. The   applicants  held  the  judicial  authorities  solely
   responsible for the delays. In addition to the grounds already set
   out (at paragraph 83 above), they placed reliance on the fact that
   the judicial authorities had not severed the  fraud  charges  from
   the charges in respect of the other offences.
       The Commision  attributed  the  length  of   the   proceedings
   principally  to  the  manner in which the judicial authorities had
   handled the case.  It pointed to the  excessive  duration  of  the
   inquiries and, by way of example, to the belated completion of the
   expert's report;  it also considered that the opening of the trial
   had  been  delayed without good reason and that the Regional Court
   could well have discontinued the prosecutions at an earlier stage.
       The Government expressed disagreement with this opinion.
       92. The Court, like the Commission, has come to the conclusion
   that  the  competent  authorities  did  not act with the necessary
   diligence and expedition. It notes in particular that nearly three
   years elapsed  between  preferment  of  the "bill  of  indictment"
   (25 September  1973,  paragraph 52 above) and opening of the trial
   (16 September 1976, paragraph 53 above).
       In this latter connection,  the Government pleaded  the  heavy
   work-load  which  was  at the time confronting the chambers of the
   Regional Court specialised in dealing  with  economic  crime;  the
   Government listed various measures taken to remedy the situation.
       The Court  recognises  that  the  authorities  endeavoured  to
   reduce  the  backlog of pending business before the Regional Court
   by increasing the number of  specialised  chambers  from  two  (in
   1973)  to  six  (in  1977).  The Court nonetheless considers that,
   having regard to the great length of time that  had  elapsed,  the
   Regional Court's volume of work,  which was nothing exceptional in
   itself,  cannot be relied on by the Government (compare  with  the
   above-mentioned Buchholz judgment,  Series A no. 42, pp. 16, 20-21
   and 22,  par.  51, 61 and 63). For the same reason, and just as in
   relation  to  the  case  investigated  and  tried  at  Trier  (see
   paragraph 85 above),  the Court does not feel  able  to  attach  a
   decisive  weight to the efforts,  albeit meritorious,  made in the
   Federal Republic of Germany to combat economic crime with  greater
   speed and efficacy.
       93. On the  basis  of  all  the  various  factors  taken  into
   account, the Court reaches the conclusion that the difficulties of
   investigation and the behaviour of the applicants do not on  their
   own  account  for  the length of the proceedings:  one of the main
   causes therefor is to be found in the manner in which the judicial
   authorities conducted the case.
       94. The discontinuance of the  prosecutions,  ordered  by  the
   Regional  Court  on  21  September  1977  with  the consent of the
   applicants,  was  in  principle   capable   of   affecting   their
   entitlement  to  claim  to  be  "victims",  within  the meaning of
   Article 25 (art. 25), but the length of the delays attributable to
   the  authorities  was such that the applicants in no way forfeited
   their status as "victims";  moreover, the discontinuance decision,
   whether  or  not  read  in  the  light  of  the formal submissions
   presented  by  the  public  prosecutor's  office,   discloses   no
   indication  whatsoever that it had been taken having regard to the
   above-mentioned delays (see paragraphs 68 and 70 above).
       95. Accordingly,    the   Court   rejects   the   Government's
   preliminary plea as regards this part of the  case  and  concludes
   that  the Cologne proceedings exceeded a reasonable time in breach
   of Article 6 par. 1 (art. 6-1) of the Convention.
   
              III. The application of Article 50 (art. 50)
   
       96. Counsel for the applicants stated that,  should the  Court
   find   a  violation  of  the  Convention,  his  clients  would  be
   submitting  a  claim  under  Article  50  (art.   50)   for   just
   satisfaction  for  the  prejudice  suffered  as  a  result  of the
   unreasonable length of the  proceedings  and  possibly  for  legal
   costs;  he did not, however, quantify their claim. The Government,
   for their part, did not take a stand on the issue.
       Accordingly, although  it  was raised under Rule 47 bis of the
   Rules of Court,  the question is not yet ready for  decision.  The
   Court  is  therefore  obliged to reserve the matter and to fix the
   further procedure,  taking due account of the  possibility  of  an
   agreement between the respondent State and the applicants.
   
                FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
   
       1. Joins  to  the  merits  the  preliminary plea raised by the
   Government, but rejects it after an examination on the merits;
       2. Holds  that  there  has  been a breach of Article 6 par.  1
   (art. 6-1) of the Convention;
       3. Holds  that  the  question of the application of Article 50
   (art. 50) is not ready for decision;
       accordingly,
       (a) reserves the whole of the said question;
       (b) invites the Commission to submit to the Court,  within two
   months from the delivery of the present judgment, the Commission's
   written observations on the said question and,  in particular,  to
   notify  the  Court  of  any  friendly  settlement  at  which   the
   Government and the applicants may have arrived;
       (c) reserves  the  further  procedure  and  delegates  to  the
   President of the Chamber power to fix the same if need be.
   
       Done in   English   and  in  French,  the  French  text  being
   authentic,  at  the  Human  Rights  Building,   Strasbourg,   this
   fifteenth day of July one thousand nine hundred and eighty-two.
   
                                                 Signed: Rolv RYSSDAL
                                                            President
   
                                                    For the Registrar
                                              Signed: Herbert PETZOLD
                                                     Deputy Registrar
   
   

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