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ПОСТАНОВЛЕНИЕ ЕВРОПЕЙСКОГО СУДА ПО ПРАВАМ ЧЕЛОВЕКА ОТ 23.04.1992 КАСТЕЛЛС (CASTELLS) ПРОТИВ ИСПАНИИ [РУС. (ИЗВЛЕЧЕНИЕ), АНГЛ.]

(по состоянию на 20 октября 2006 года)

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                                               [неофициальный перевод]
   
                  ЕВРОПЕЙСКИЙ СУД ПО ПРАВАМ ЧЕЛОВЕКА
                                   
                           СУДЕБНОЕ РЕШЕНИЕ
                  КАСТЕЛЛС (CASTELLS) ПРОТИВ ИСПАНИИ
                                   
                   (Страсбург, 23 апреля 1992 года)
   
                             (Извлечение)
   
          КРАТКОЕ НЕОФИЦИАЛЬНОЕ ИЗЛОЖЕНИЕ ОБСТОЯТЕЛЬСТВ ДЕЛА
   
                           A. Основные факты
   
       В  1979  г.  заявитель,  сенатор,  избранный  от  политического
   движения,  выступающего за независимость Страны Басков, опубликовал
   в  еженедельнике  "Пунто и Ора де Еускалхерриа" статью,  в  которой
   привлек  внимание  общественного мнения к убийствам  и  нападениям,
   совершенным вооруженными группировками против баскских граждан.  Он
   утверждал,    что    эти   группировки   орудовали    при    полной
   безнаказанности, поскольку за ними стояли Правительство и  правящая
   партия.   "Мы   должны  открыто  назвать  ответственных",   -   так
   заканчивалась статья.
       Органы   прокуратуры   возбудили  против  Кастеллса   уголовное
   преследование.  Он был лишен парламентского иммунитета,  и  7  июля
   1981  г. ему было предъявлено обвинение в оскорблении Правительства
   (статья 161 Уголовного кодекса).
       31  октября  1983 г. Палата по уголовным делам Верховного  суда
   признала  заявителя  виновным  и  приговорила  его  к  одному  году
   тюремного  заключения.  Суд посчитал, что положение  заявителя  как
   сенатора   обязывало  его  ограничиться  теми  средствами   критики
   Правительства, которые предусмотрены Правилами процедуры  Сената  и
   которые  он  не выполнил. Более того, его статья продемонстрировала
   намерение   опорочить   Правительство.  Суд   отказался   допустить
   доказательства,  которые  защита просила приобщить  к  делу,  чтобы
   показать,  что содержавшаяся в статье информация была общеизвестной
   и соответствовала действительности.
       10  апреля  1985  г. Конституционный Суд отклонил  жалобу  г-на
   Кастеллса,  поданную 22 ноября 1983 г. в процедуре  ампаро.  Однако
   исполнение приговора было приостановлено.
   
           B. Разбирательство в Комиссии по правам человека
   
       В  жалобе,  поданной в Комиссию 17 сентября 1985 г.,  заявитель
   утверждал, что были нарушены статьи 6, 7, 10, 14 Конвенции.
       Комиссия признала жалобу неприемлемой в отношении статей 6 и  7
   и приемлемой в отношении статей 10 и 14.
       В своем докладе 8 января 1991 г. Комиссия пришла к выводу:
       a) девятью голосами против трех, что было нарушение статьи 10;
       b)  единогласно, что никакого отдельного вопроса  на  основании
   статьи 14 в сочетании со статьей 10 не возникает.
       Комиссия передала дело в Суд 8 марта 1991 г.
   
                    ИЗВЛЕЧЕНИЕ ИЗ СУДЕБНОГО РЕШЕНИЯ
   
                             ВОПРОСЫ ПРАВА
   
           I. О предполагаемом нарушении статьи 10 Конвенции
   
       23.  Г-н Кастеллс заявляет, что он стал жертвой нарушения права
   на  свободу  слова,  в  том виде как она гарантирована  статьей  10
   Конвенции, которая гласит:
       "1. Каждый человек имеет право на свободу выражать свое мнение.
   Это  право включает свободу придерживаться своего мнения и  свободу
   получать   и  распространять  информацию  и  идеи  без  какого-либо
   вмешательства  со стороны государственных органов и  независимо  от
   государственных границ...
       2.   Осуществление  этих  свобод,  налагающее   обязанности   и
   ответственность, может быть сопряжено с формальностями,  условиями,
   ограничениями или санкциями, которые установлены законом и  которые
   необходимы  в  демократическом обществе в интересах государственной
   безопасности,   территориальной   целостности   или   общественного
   спокойствия,  в  целях предотвращения беспорядков  и  преступлений,
   для  охраны  здоровья и нравственности, защиты репутации  или  прав
   других   лиц,  предотвращения  разглашения  информации,  полученной
   конфиденциально,  или  обеспечения авторитета  и  беспристрастности
   правосудия".
       Правительство  оспаривает это утверждение, тогда  как  Комиссия
   согласна с ним.
   
              A. Предварительное возражение Правительства
   
       24.  Правительство  утверждает, как и  ранее  в  Комиссии,  что
   заявитель  не исчерпал внутренние средства правовой защиты  (статья
   26  Конвенции).  Возможно,  "по  тактическим  соображениям"  он  не
   поднимал   в  Конституционном  Суде  вопроса  о  якобы  происшедшем
   нарушении его права на свободу слова, охраняемую в соответствии  со
   статьей  20  Конституции. В своей жалобе,  переданной  в  процедуре
   ампаро,  он  ссылался  на  эту статью  лишь  косвенно,  жалуясь  на
   дискриминацию при осуществлении данной свободы; кроме того,  он  не
   упоминал  ни  о  статье  10 Конвенции, ни об аналогичных  нормах  в
   других   международных  пакетах.  В  соответствии  с  Учредительным
   актом,  регламентирующим  процедуру  подачи  и  рассмотрения  таких
   жалоб  (N  2/1070),  ему  надлежало  четко  указать  и  фактические
   обстоятельства,  и  те нормы, которые якобы были  нарушены.  Отсюда
   следует,  что г-н Кастеллс не дал Конституционному Суду возможности
   вынести решение по вопросу, который сейчас рассматривается в Суде.
       25. В ответ заявитель утверждал, что в Конституционном Суде  он
   специально  ссылался на статью 20 Конституции.  Прежде  всего  сами
   обстоятельства,  изложенные в его жалобе ампаро, свидетельствовали,
   что  предметом  спора  был типичный пример осуществления  права  на
   свободу  слова,  и со всей очевидностью доказывали вмешательство  в
   это право. Более того, он письменно процитировал искомую статью,  а
   в  своей  устной аргументации настаивал, что имело место  нарушение
   статьи  20  в сочетании со статьей 14 Конституции (равенство  перед
   законом).  Верно,  что  в основном он строил свою  аргументацию  на
   более  ограниченной  основе  -  праве  выборного  представителя  на
   основании  статьи 23 Конституции выступать с критикой политического
   характера,  но  достаточно  прочесть п. 10  части  "Вопросы  права"
   Судебного решения по его делу от 10 апреля 1985 г., чтобы  увидеть,
   что  и  вопрос  о  свободе слова в свете статьи  20  также  был  им
   поставлен.  В  этом пункте Конституционный Суд подробно  исследовал
   вопрос о соответствии статьи 161 Уголовного кодекса, по которой  он
   обвинялся  и  был осужден, конституционному принципу свободы  слова
   (см. п. 15 и 17 выше).
       26.  Выразив свое согласие с заявителем, Комиссия прежде  всего
   просила  Суд  констатировать, что рассмотрение  данного  возражения
   находится вне его компетенции.
       27.  По этому вопросу Суд ограничивается ссылкой на общую линию
   своей  практики,  которая  нашла  свое  недавнее  подтверждение   в
   Решении по делу Б. против Франции от 25 марта 1992 г. (Серия A,  т.
   232-C, с. 45, п. 35 - 36).
       Относительно  существа возражения Суд отмечает, что  статья  26
   Конвенции  должна применяться "с определенной степенью  гибкости  и
   без  излишнего  формализма";  достаточно,  чтобы  "жалобы,  которые
   предназначены   для   последующего   представления   в   учреждения
   Конвенции",  разбирались  бы  "по крайней  мере  по  существу  и  в
   соответствии  с  формальными  требованиями  и  в  пределах  сроков,
   установленных  внутренним законодательством" (см. Решение  по  делу
   Гуцарди  против Италии от 6 ноября 1980 г. Серия A, т. 39,  с.  26,
   п.  72, и Судебное решение по делу Кардо против Франции от 19 марта
   1991 г. Серия A, т. 200, с. 18, п. 34).
       28. Заявитель ссылается на статью 10 Конвенции в двух аспектах:
   как  он  утверждает,  его  преследовали и осудили  за  утверждения,
   которые  были  истинными,  но ему помешали  установить  в  суде  их
   соответствие   действительности;  кроме  того,  опубликованная   им
   статья   относится  к  области  политической  критики,   заниматься
   которой - долг любого члена Парламента.
       29.  Г-н  Кастеллс поднимал оба эти вопроса в  Верховном  суде.
   Судебное  решение  от  31  октября 1983  г.  отвергло  эти  доводы,
   посчитав,  что  они  не  оправдывают оскорбления  Правительства,  и
   признало,  что заявитель преступил границы приемлемой  политической
   критики (см. п. 13 выше).
       30.  Основывая  свою  жалобу ампаро на статье  23  Конституции,
   заявитель   отстаивал   как  сенатор  право  критиковать   действия
   Правительства, что, очевидно, является неотъемлемой частью  свободы
   слова  выборных  представителей. Более  того,  Конституционный  Суд
   признал  это,  соединив жалобу по статьям 14  и  20  с  жалобой  по
   статье 23 (см. п. 17 выше).
       Заявитель ссылался на презумпцию невиновности и право приобщать
   к    делу   доказательства,   подтверждающие   достоверность    его
   высказываний, что прямо связано с предполагаемым нарушением  статьи
   10  Конвенции.  Такой же вывод следует из позиции  Конституционного
   Суда,  который соединил вопрос о приобщении к делу доказательств  с
   рассмотрением  дела по существу на основании статьи 161  Уголовного
   кодекса  (п. 9 и 10 части "Вопросы права" Судебного решения  от  10
   апреля 1985 г.; см. п. 17 выше).
       31.   Суд,   как   и  Комиссия,  отмечает,  что  г-н   Кастеллс
   неоднократно  цитировал статью 20 Конституции в своих обращениях  в
   суды  (см.  п.  13  и  15  выше).  В ряде  письменных  обращений  в
   Конституционный  Суд  он  настаивал  на  своем  праве  "получать  и
   распространять правдивую информацию" (см. п. 16 выше).
       Нет  сомнений, что причину неудачи жалобы ампаро следует искать
   в    тех    границах,    которыми   ограничил   свою    компетенцию
   Конституционный   Суд;  он  сосредоточился   по   преимуществу   на
   толковании  понятия  "оскорбление Правительства"  и  соответственно
   применении  статьи 161 Уголовного кодекса, чем подлежало заниматься
   общим  судам  (см.  п. 17 выше), и, следовательно,  конституционный
   аспект свободы слова остался в стороне.
       32.  Следовательно,  Суд полагает, что заявитель  действительно
   ставил  перед Конституционным Судом, "по крайней мере в  принципе",
   вопросы,   относящиеся  к  статье  10  Конвенции.  Таким   образом,
   возражение,  что  г-н  Кастеллс  не  исчерпал  внутренних   средств
   правовой защиты, должно быть отклонено.
   
                      B. Об обоснованности жалобы
   
       33.  Согласно жалобе г-на Кастеллса, уголовное дело против него
   и  последовавшее  затем его осуждение за оскорбление  Правительства
   представляет  собой  вмешательство  в  осуществление  им  права  на
   свободу  слова  в  частности, потому  что  ему  не  было  позволено
   доказать достоверность содержавшихся в его статье утверждений.
       34.   Ограничения  и  наказания,  на  которые   он   жаловался,
   несомненно,  являются "вмешательством" в осуществление  свободы,  о
   которой  идет речь. Для того чтобы такое вмешательство не  нарушало
   статьи 10, оно должно быть "предусмотрено законом" и направлено  на
   достижение  одной или более правомерных целей, указанных  в  статье
   10 п. 2 и "необходимых в демократическом обществе".
   
                      1. "Предусмотрено законом"
   
       35.   Не   вызывает   сомнений,   что   оспариваемое   судебное
   преследование имеет правовое основание, а именно статьи 161  и  162
   Уголовного   кодекса.  Заявитель  этого  не   оспаривает,   но   он
   утверждает,  будто не представлял себе, что ему  будет  отказано  в
   таком   средстве  защиты,  как  доказательство  достоверности   его
   утверждений,  особенно  после  принятия  Конституции  1978  г.   Он
   настаивал,  что  до  19  мая  1982  г.  Верховный  суд  никогда  не
   рассматривал  дела  об  оскорблении  Правительства  и  о  допущении
   доказательств  в целях защиты от обвинений в подобных преступлениях
   (статья  240).  В  доктрине  и судебной практике  высказывались  по
   этому поводу разные точки зрения.
       36.   В   возражении   Правительства   указывалось,   что    по
   законодательству  Испании, в частности  по  статье  461  Уголовного
   кодекса,  доказательство  достоверности  распространенных  сведений
   как  средство  защиты  допустимо только  тогда,  когда  оскорбления
   направлены  против гражданских служащих, находящихся при исполнении
   служебных  обязанностей; ни до, ни после 1978 г. Верховный  суд  не
   позволял    когда-либо   использовать   exceptio   veritatis    для
   оскорблений,  которые  не  были  бы  направлены  против   отдельных
   личностей. Однако г-н Кастеллс оскорбил Правительство в целом.
       37. Исходя из текста статьи 461 Уголовного кодекса, Суд считает
   такое  толкование  разумным. Прецедентов такого рода,  по-видимому,
   не  было  -  отсюда  колебания, выказанные Верховным  судом  в  его
   разъяснениях  от 19 мая 1982 г. (см. п. 12 выше), что,  однако,  не
   имеет  значения:  разъяснение охватывало в  общей  форме  несколько
   возможных  типов  оскорблений и должно  было  применяться  в  новых
   ситуациях;  вышеупомянутое Решение ограничилось тем, что  применило
   его  к особым обстоятельствам (см. mutatis mutandis Решение по делу
   "Обсервер"  и  "Гардиан"  против  Соединенного  Королевства  от  26
   ноября 1991 г. Серия A, т. 216, с. 27 - 28, п. 53).
       Поэтому  Суд,  как и Комиссия, считает, что нормы, регулирующие
   условия  оспариваемого вмешательства, были достаточно предсказуемы,
   исходя из целей статьи 10 п. 2 Конвенции.
   
                  2. Правомерность преследуемой цели
   
       38.  Согласно утверждению заявителя ни выдвинутое  против  него
   обвинение,   ни   последующее   его   осуждение   не   преследовали
   правомерной  цели,  подпадающей  под  действие  статьи  10  п.   2.
   Действия,  в которых он был обвинен, - и это допускал сам Верховный
   суд,  не  вызывали  какой-либо тревоги; как явствует  из  Судебного
   решения  от  31  октября 1983 г., вмешательство  решало  не  задачу
   защиты   общественного  порядка  и  национальной  безопасности,   а
   фактически охраняло честь Правительства - ответчика.
       39.  Однако  в своем Решении от 10 апреля 1985 г.,  на  которое
   ссылается  Правительство, Конституционный Суд сделал  упор  на  то,
   что  безопасность  государства может оказаться  в  опасности  из-за
   попыток  дискредитировать  демократические  институты  (см.  п.  17
   выше).  В  своей  статье  г-н Кастеллс не  просто  описывает  очень
   серьезную   ситуацию  в  Стране  Басков,  он  обвиняет  власти,   в
   частности   полицию,   в   пассивности   и   даже   попустительстве
   организаторам преступной деятельности, подразумевая тем самым,  что
   Правительство также несет ответственность.
       Таким  образом, можно сказать, и это соответствует точке зрения
   Правительства и Комиссии, что в конкретных обстоятельствах  Испании
   1979  г.  судебное  преследование заявителя  было  начато  в  целях
   "предотвращения беспорядков" в смысле статьи 10 п. 2, а  не  только
   для "защиты репутации... других лиц".
   
                    3. Необходимость вмешательства
   
       40. Г-н Кастеллс отметил свое согласие с Комиссией и подчеркнул
   чрезвычайную  важность свободы слова для выборного представителя  -
   выразителя мнений и обеспокоенности своего электората. Эта  свобода
   заслуживает  дополнительных  гарантий, когда  обсуждаются  вопросы,
   представляющие  общественный интерес. Так было  и  в  этом  случае;
   спорная   статья   была   частью  широкой   дискуссии   о   климате
   нестабильности,  сложившемся в Стране  Басков  начиная  с  1977  г.
   Осуждение  заявителя скорее призвано было защитить власти  от  атак
   оппозиции,   чем  Правительство  от  необоснованных   и   порочащих
   обвинений;  хотя  разглашение фактов, о которых шла  речь,  ставило
   Правительство  в  неловкое  положение,  оно  отвечало  общественным
   интересам.
       41.  Правительство подчеркивало, что свобода слова не  является
   абсолютной;  она  налагает "обязанности и ответственность"  (статья
   10   п.  2  Конвенции).  Г-н  Кастеллс  преступил  обычные  границы
   политической  дискуссии; он оскорбил демократическое Правительство,
   способствуя  дестабилизации в критический  для  Испании  период,  а
   именно  вскоре  после  принятия Конституции,  когда  группы  разной
   ориентации равно прибегают к насилию.
       42.  Суд напомнил, что свобода слова, закрепленная в статье  10
   п.  1,  составляет одну из важнейших опор демократического общества
   и  одно  из  главных условий его прогресса. При условии  соблюдения
   требований  статьи 10 п. 2 она применима не только  к  "информации"
   или  "идеям",  которые встречаются благосклонно или рассматриваются
   как  безобидные  либо безразличные, но и в отношении  тех,  которые
   задевают,  шокируют  или  беспокоят. Таковы требования  плюрализма,
   толерантности  и  либерализма,  без которых  нет  "демократического
   общества"  (см.  inter  alia  Решение  по  делу  Хэндисайд   против
   Соединенного Королевства от 7 декабря 1976 г. Серия A,  т.  24,  с.
   23,   п.  49,  и  вышеупомянутое  Решение  по  делу  "Обсервер"   и
   "Гардиан". Серия A, т. 216, с. 30, п. 59 "a").
       Свобода  слова  важна  для всех, но это  особенно  справедливо,
   когда  речь идет о выборных представителях народа. Они представляют
   свой электорат, привлекают внимание к его заботам и отстаивают  его
   интересы.  Соответственно, вмешательство  в  осуществление  свободы
   слова  члена  Парламента от оппозиции, каковым является  заявитель,
   требует самого пристального внимания со стороны Суда.
       43. В рассматриваемом деле г-н Кастеллс выражал свое мнение  не
   в  зале  заседаний  Сената,  что он  мог  бы  делать,  не  опасаясь
   санкций,  он  предпочел сделать это в периодической печати.  Однако
   это  не  означает, что он был не вправе критиковать  таким  образом
   Правительство.
       В  этой связи не следует забывать особую роль прессы в правовом
   государстве.  Хотя она и не должна преступать определенных  границ,
   установленных  inter alia для предотвращения беспорядков  и  защиты
   репутации  других лиц, тем не менее на нее возлагается  обязанность
   передавать  информацию  и  идеи по политическим  и  иным  вопросам,
   представляющим  общественный интерес (см. mutatis mutandis  Решение
   по  делу "Санди таймс" против Соединенного Королевства от 26 апреля
   1979  г. Серия A, т. 30, с. 40, п. 65, и вышеупомянутое Решение  по
   делу "Обсервер" и "Гардиан". Серия A, т. 216, с. 30, п. 59 "b").
       Свобода   печати  предоставляет  для  граждан  один  из   самых
   совершенных  способов  открывать для себя и вырабатывать  мнение  о
   взглядах  и  позиции своих политических лидеров. В  частности,  она
   дает  политикам  возможность  высказываться  по  поводу  того,  что
   заботит  общественное  мнение, позволяет  участвовать  в  свободной
   политической  дискуссии  каждому,  что  является  стержнем  понятия
   демократического  общества  (см. Решение  по  делу  Лингенс  против
   Австрии от 8 июля 1986 г. Серия A, т. 103, с. 26, п. 42).
       44.  В  своем Решении от 31 октября 1983 г. Верховный суд встал
   на  ту  точку  зрения, что статья перешла грань между  политической
   критикой  и оскорблением, хотя и несколько смягченным образом  (см.
   п. 13 выше).
       45.  Суд,  как  и Комиссия, отметил, что г-н Кастеллс  начал  с
   критики   безнаказанности,  которой  пользуются   члены   различных
   экстремистских  группировок, совершивших  ряд  нападений  в  Стране
   Басков  начиная  с  1977  г.  Тем самым он  рассказывал  о  фактах,
   представляющих  большой  интерес  для  общественного  мнения   того
   региона,  где продается большая часть тиража данного периодического
   издания.  Однако  в  своих выводах он выдвинул серьезные  обвинения
   против    Правительства,   которое,   по    его    мнению,    несет
   ответственность за возникшее положение (см. п. 7 выше).
       46.  Свобода  политической дискуссии, несомненно,  не  является
   абсолютной   по  своей  природе.  Государства  -  участники   могут
   подвергать ее определенным "ограничениям" или "санкциям",  но  Суду
   принадлежит  право выносить окончательное решение  о  совместимости
   этих  мер  со свободой слова, воплощенной в статье 10 (см.  mutatis
   mutandis вышеупомянутое Решение по делу "Обсервер" и "Гардиан").
       Пределы допустимой критики в отношении Правительства шире,  чем
   в  отношении рядового гражданина или даже политического деятеля.  В
   демократической системе действия или упущения Правительства  должны
   стать  предметом пристального внимания не только законодательных  и
   судебных  властей,  но также прессы и общественного  мнения.  Более
   того,   доминирующее  положение,  которое  занимает  Правительство,
   делает  необходимым, чтобы оно демонстрировало сдержанность,  когда
   встает  вопрос  об  уголовном преследовании  за  критику,  особенно
   когда  имеются другие средства ответа на неоправданные нападки  его
   противников  или  средств  массовой  информации.  Тем  не  менее  у
   компетентных   органов   государственной   власти   как    гарантов
   общественного  порядка остается открытой возможность принятия  мер,
   в  том  числе  уголовно-правового характера,  направленных  на  то,
   чтобы  адекватным  образом, без излишних эксцессов  реагировать  на
   безосновательные   или   недобросовестные   обвинения    порочащего
   характера.
       47. Г-н Кастеллс несколько раз предлагал в Верховном суде, а  в
   последующем в Конституционном Суде, установить, что приведенные  им
   факты  достоверны и хорошо известны; с его точки зрения, это лишало
   его  утверждения какого-либо оскорбительного звучания (см. п. 11  и
   16 выше).
       19  мая  1982  г.  Верховный суд объявил  такие  доказательства
   недопустимыми   на   том   основании,   что   нельзя   использовать
   достоверность  фактов  как  средство  защиты,  если  речь  идет  об
   оскорблениях,  направленных против государственных институтов  (см.
   п.  12  и  13 выше); он подтвердил такое толкование в своем Решении
   от  31 октября 1983 г. (см. п. 13 выше). Конституционный Суд решил,
   что  это  вопрос  о  соблюдении законности и  в  качестве  такового
   находится за пределами его компетенции (см. п. 17 выше).
       Поэтому  заявитель при рассмотрении возбужденного  против  него
   уголовного  дела по статье 161 Уголовного кодекса не мог  ссылаться
   в свою защиту на добросовестность и достоверность фактов.
       48.   В   возражении   Правительства  говорилось,   что,   т.к.
   утверждения г-на Кастеллса не были достаточно точны, они  не  могли
   претендовать  на  то, что их правдивость будет подтверждена;  более
   того,  они имеют оценочный характер, в отношении к которым критерий
   достоверности неприменим.
       Этот  аргумент  не  убедителен. Вышедшая  в  "Пунто  и  Ора  де
   Еускалхерриа"  статья  должна рассматриваться  в  целом.  Заявитель
   начал  ее  с  длинного  списка нападений и убийств,  совершенных  в
   Стране  Басков,  затем подчеркнул, что они остались безнаказанными;
   далее  в  статье  он  утверждал  о  причастности  к  ним  различных
   экстремистских  организаций, которые он назвал, а в конце  возложил
   ответственность  за  создавшееся  положение  на  Правительство.  На
   самом  деле  достоверность многих из этих  утверждений  поддавалась
   проверке,  а  г-н  Кастеллс обоснованно мог рассчитывать,  что  ему
   дадут возможность доказать свою добросовестность.
       Невозможно судить, каков был бы результат разбирательства, если
   бы  Верховный  суд  согласился  допустить  доказательства,  которые
   заявитель хотел приобщить к делу, но Суд придает решающее  значение
   тому    обстоятельству,   что   Верховный   суд    объявил    такие
   доказательства   неприемлемыми  применительно  к   рассматриваемому
   преступлению  (см. п. 12 выше). Он считает, что такое вмешательство
   в  осуществление  свободы слова заявителя  не  было  необходимым  в
   демократическом обществе.
       49.   Правительство  ссылается  также  на  относительно  мягкий
   характер наложенных санкций, но в свете предыдущего вывода  Суд  не
   обязан анализировать данный довод.
       50. Суд решил, что имело место нарушение статьи 10.
   
                II. Предполагаемое нарушение статьи 14
                       в сочетании со статьей 10
   
       51.  Г-н  Кастеллс требовал считать его жертвой  дискриминации,
   потому  что другие люди высказывали подобные взгляды без  наложения
   на  них  каких-либо уголовных санкций. Он ссылался  на  статью  14,
   которая сформулирована следующим образом:
       "Пользование  правами  и  свободами,  признанными  в  настоящей
   Конвенции,  должно быть обеспечено без какой-либо дискриминации  по
   признаку  пола, расы, цвета кожи, языка, религии, политических  или
   иных   убеждений,  национального  или  социального   происхождения,
   принадлежности    к   национальным   меньшинствам,   имущественного
   положения, рождения или любым иным обстоятельствам".
       Правительство отрицало утверждение заявителя.
       52. Поскольку данный вопрос не является ключевым в деле, Суд не
   считает  необходимым его рассмотрение (см. inter  alia  Решение  по
   делу  Эйри против Ирландии от 9 октября 1979 г. Серия A, т. 32,  с.
   16, п. 30).
   
                       III. Применение статьи 50
   
       53. В соответствии со статьей 50,
       "Если  Суд  установит, что решение или мера, принятые судебными
   или  иными властями Высокой Договаривающейся Стороны, полностью или
   частично   противоречат  обязательствам,  вытекающим  из  настоящей
   Конвенции,  а  также  если  внутреннее  право  упомянутой   Стороны
   допускает лишь частичное возмещение последствий такого решения  или
   такой  меры,  то  решением  Суда, если в этом  есть  необходимость,
   предусматривается справедливое возмещение потерпевшей стороне".
       54.  Заявитель хотел прежде всего добиться публикации  краткого
   изложения  решения Суда в газетах Страны Басков, Мадрида  и  других
   провинциях  страны,  а  также  изъятия  всякого  упоминания  о  его
   осуждении из Центрального уголовного архива.
       Суд  указал,  что он не компетентен принимать такие обязывающие
   решения  (см.  mutatis  mutandis Решение по делу  "Манифаттура  ФЛ"
   против  Италии от 27 февраля 1992 г. Серия A, т. 230-B, с.  21,  п.
   22).
   
                         A. Материальный ущерб
   
       55. Г-н Кастеллс потребовал 375000 песет в качестве компенсации
   за  потерю  заработка.  Как обвиняемый, отпущенный  под  залог,  он
   должен   был  пятьдесят  два  раза  отмечаться  в  суде  по   месту
   жительства (Сан-Себастьян), и три раза в Верховном суде  в  Мадриде
   (см.  п.  8  и  9 выше), что привело к потере времени и возможности
   заниматься профессиональной деятельностью в качестве адвоката.
       Суд  придерживается  той точки зрения, что  данное  ограничение
   вряд   ли  могло  причинить  ущерб  г-ну  Кастеллсу,  т.к.,  будучи
   адвокатом,  он часто посещал суды, о которых идет речь.  Причинение
   ему материального ущерба, таким образом, не установлено.
   
                        B. Нематериальный вред
   
       56. Заявитель потребовал также компенсации морального вреда, не
   называя конкретных цифр. Суд не исключает наличие такого вреда,  но
   исходя  из  обстоятельств  дела считает,  что  признание  настоящим
   Судебным   решением  факта  нарушения  само  по  себе  представляет
   достаточно справедливое удовлетворение.
   
                         C. Издержки и расходы
   
       57. В качестве компенсации издержек и расходов, понесенных им в
   испанских  судах,  г-н  Кастеллс  потребовал  2181476  песет.   Суд
   присуждает  ему только 1000000 песет, т.к. спорные суммы относились
   к  жалобам  ампаро,  т.е. тем, которые не были  признаны  Комиссией
   приемлемыми.
       58.   Наконец  заявитель  хотел  получить  3328000   песет   за
   понесенные  им  издержки  и расходы в органах  Конвенции,  а  также
   20000 немецких марок гонораров г-ну Корффу и г-ну Верваеле.
       Как  и  Правительство, Суд считает чрезмерным число  адвокатов,
   представлявших  г-на  Кастеллса, который  предстал  перед  Судом  в
   сопровождении четырех адвокатов; следует также иметь  в  виду,  что
   Комиссия   объявила   некоторые  первоначально  заявленные   жалобы
   неприемлемыми.
       Проведя оценку по справедливости, Суд присуждает г-ну Кастеллсу
   компенсацию на общую сумму 2000000 песет.
   
                  ПО ЭТИМ ОСНОВАНИЯМ СУД ЕДИНОГЛАСНО
   
       1. Постановил, что он компетентен рассматривать предварительное
   возражение Правительства, но отверг его;
       2. Постановил, что имело место нарушение статьи 10;
       3.  Постановил,  что  нет необходимости рассматривать  дело  по
   статье 14, в сочетании со статьей 10;
       4.  Постановил,  что  настоящее Судебное  решение  представляет
   собой   достаточное  справедливое  удовлетворение   предполагаемого
   морального вреда в целях статьи 50;
       5.   Постановил,  что  Королевство  Испания  должно   выплатить
   заявителю  в течение трех месяцев 3000000 (три миллиона)  песет  за
   издержки и расходы;
       6. Отверг оставшуюся часть требований заявителя.
   
       Совершено  на  английском и французском языках  и  оглашено  во
   Дворце прав человека в Страсбурге 23 апреля 1992 г.
   
                                                          Председатель
                                                         Рольф РИССДАЛ
   
                                                                Грефье
                                                     Марк-Андре ЭЙССЕН
   
   
   
   
   
   
       В  соответствии со статьей 51 п. 2 Конвенции и статьей 53 п.  2
   Регламента  Суда к настоящему Решению прилагаются отдельные  мнения
   судей.
   
                  СОВПАДАЮЩЕЕ МНЕНИЕ СУДЬИ ДЕ МЕЙЕРА
   
       Г-н Кастеллс приводит в спорной статье длинный перечень убийств
   и   нападений,  совершенных  в  Стране  Басков  <1>,   и   осуждает
   безнаказанность, которой пользуются лица, их совершившие,  описывая
   ее  как  возмутительную  <2>. Он жаловался на  бездействие  властей
   <3>,  которые, как он утверждал, ничего не сделали для установления
   личности  преступников,  хотя те же самые власти  выказали  большое
   рвение  "в  других  случаях" <4>. Он усмотрел в этом  свидетельство
   сговора с виновной стороной <5> и приписал ответственность за  "эти
   действия" Правительству и его сторонникам <6>.
   --------------------------------
       <1>  Пункт  48  Судебного решения. См. первый и  второй  абзацы
   статьи в п. 7 Судебного решения.
       <2> Название статьи и п. 45 и 48 Судебного решения.
       <3> Пункт 39 Судебного решения.
       <4> См., в частности, третий и шестой абзацы статьи.
       <5> Пункт 39 Судебного решения.
       <6> Последний абзац статьи и п. 39 и 45 Судебного решения.
   
       Это, несомненно, были серьезные обвинения <*>.
   --------------------------------
       <*> Пункт 45 Судебного решения.
   
       Однако,  выдвигая их, он правомерно осуществлял свое  право  на
   свободу  слова.  Это право, как видно из материалов поступившего  в
   Суд  дела,  оказалось  нарушено, т.к. г-н Кастеллс  был  подвергнут
   судебному  преследованию и осужден за обнародование своих  взглядов
   по  вопросу,  представлявшему общий интерес; наказывать  гражданина
   за такие действия в "демократическом обществе" недопустимо.
       В  этой  связи безразлично, прав или не прав был г-н  Кастеллс.
   Вопрос  о  достоверности  фактов  как  средстве  защиты  не   имеет
   отношения  к  оценке ситуации <*>; это тем более  справедливо,  что
   убийства  и  нападения,  на  которые  делаются  ссылки  в   статье,
   действительно  имели место, а безнаказанность лиц, их  совершивших,
   никто не отрицал.
   --------------------------------
       <*> См. по этому вопросу отдельное мнение г-на Пекканена, с. 29
   ниже,  и  mutatis mutandis Судебное решение по делу Лингенс  против
   Австрии от 8 июля 1986 г. Серия A, т. 103, с. 27 - 28, п. 45 и 46.
   
       Стоит  добавить  также, что в той мере, в  какой  это  касается
   оскорблений,  ложных обвинений и диффамации, нет никаких  оснований
   для  предоставления  институтам  государства  большей  защиты,  чем
   индивиду,   либо  охранять  репутацию  Правительства  больше,   чем
   оппозиции <*>.
   --------------------------------
       <*>   Поэтому   я   не   могу  одобрить   "усиленную   защиту",
   предоставляемую  Правительством в соответствии со  статьями  161  и
   162 Уголовного кодекса Испании (п. 20 Судебного решения).
   
                  СОВПАДАЮЩЕЕ МНЕНИЕ СУДЬИ ПЕККАНЕНА
   
       В  своей  статье г-н Кастеллс вначале привел список  убийств  и
   нападений,  происшедших  в Стране Басков,  и  подчеркнул,  что  эти
   преступления  остались  нераскрытыми  и  безнаказанными.  Он  также
   упомянул   о   причастности  к  ним  различных  правоэкстремистских
   организаций.  Из  этих  фактов  он  сделал  вывод,  что  "за  этими
   действиями  может стоять только Правительство, партия Правительства
   и их люди".
       Г-н  Кастеллс был приговорен Верховным судом за оскорбительные,
   но  не  грубые  высказывания в адрес Правительства.  Верховный  суд
   нашел  inter  alia,  что эти оскорбительные  высказывания  с  целью
   политической критики превысили допустимые пределы такой  критики  и
   задели  честь  Правительства. Верховный суд придерживается  мнения,
   что   по  испанскому  законодательству  достоверность  фактов   как
   средство   защиты  (exceptio  veritatis)  недопустимо  в   подобных
   случаях.
       Суд придал решающее значение тому обстоятельству, что Верховный
   суд  Испании  объявил недопустимой такую достоверность  фактов  как
   средство  защиты по рассматриваемому преступлению. К  сожалению,  я
   не  могу  разделить данное мнение. Решающим в нарушении  статьи  10
   Конвенции,  с моей точки зрения, является наказание г-на  Кастеллса
   за  то,  что  он посчитал Правительство ответственным за  указанные
   инциденты и опубликовал свое мнение.
       Относительно  вопроса об exceptio veritatis,  который  подробно
   обсуждается  в Судебном решении, я полагаю, что для г-на  Кастеллса
   оказалось   бы  невозможным  доказать  достоверность  его   мнения,
   выраженного   в  порядке  политической  полемики,  -  мнения,   где
   утверждалось,  что  за всеми этими убийствами и  нападениями  стоит
   Правительство.  Поэтому exceptio veritatis  не  имеет  отношения  к
   настоящему  делу.  Для обнаружения нарушения  статьи  10  Конвенции
   достаточно   того,  что  г-н  Кастеллс  был  осужден   за   критику
   Правительства,  совершенную  им  способом,  который   должен   быть
   позволен в демократическом обществе.
   
               СОВПАДАЮЩЕЕ МНЕНИЕ СУДЬИ КАРИЛЬО САЛСЕДО
   
       Я  полностью  разделяю  точку зрения, высказанную  Судом  в  46
   пункте  Решения. Я хотел бы подчеркнуть, что свобода слова является
   одним  из  опорных столпов демократического общества. Но  я  должен
   отметить,  что  осуществление этой свободы "налагает обязанности  и
   ответственность"  (статья 10 п. 2 Конвенции),  и  в  ситуации,  где
   насилие  по политическим мотивам создает постоянную угрозу жизни  и
   безопасности  населения, бывает особенно трудно найти  справедливое
   соотношение   между   потребностями   защиты   свободы   слова    и
   императивами защиты демократического государства.
       Предусмотрев в п. 2 статьи 10, что осуществление свободы  слова
   и  мнений,  свободы  получать и распространять  информацию  и  идеи
   "может  быть  сопряжено с формальностями, условиями,  ограничениями
   или  санкциями, которые установлены законом и которые необходимы  в
   демократическом обществе", Конвенция признает, что эти  свободы  не
   являются  абсолютными.  Более того, Конвенция  также  признает  тот
   принцип,  что  никакая  группа  лиц  или  индивид  не  имеют  права
   заниматься  деятельностью  и совершать  действия,  направленные  на
   невыполнение  содержащихся в ней прав и  свобод  (статья  17),  что
   подразумевает,  на  мой  взгляд, наличие  у  государств  позитивных
   обязательств.
       Поэтому у государств развязаны руки в принятии мер, в том числе
   уголовно-правового  характера, которые направлены  на  соразмерную,
   без  эксцессов  и в соответствии с требованиями Конвенции,  реакцию
   на недобросовестные и безосновательные порочащие обвинения.
   
   
   
   
   
   
                    EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
                                   
                       CASE OF CASTELLS v. SPAIN
                                   
                               JUDGMENT
                                   
                       (Strasbourg, 23.IV.1992)
   
       In the case of Castells v. Spain <*>,
       The European Court of Human Rights, sitting, in accordance with
   Article 43 (art. 43) of the Convention for the Protection of  Human
   Rights  and  Fundamental Freedoms ("the Convention") <**>  and  the
   relevant  provisions of the Rules of Court, as a  Chamber  composed
   of the following judges:
   --------------------------------
       Notes by the Registrar
       <*>  The  case is numbered 2/1991/254/325. The first number  is
   the  case's position on the list of cases referred to the Court  in
   the  relevant  year (second number). The last two numbers  indicate
   the  case's  position on the list of cases referred  to  the  Court
   since   its   creation  and  on  the  list  of  the   corresponding
   originating applications to the Commission.
       <**>  As amended by Article 11 of Protocol No. 8 (P8-11), which
   came into force on 1 January 1990.
   
       Mr R. Ryssdal, President,
       Mr {Thor Viljhalmsson} <*>,
       Mr R. Macdonald,
       Mr J. De Meyer,
       Mr S.K. Martens,
       Mrs E. Palm,
       Mr R. Pekkanen,
       Mr A.N. Loizou,
       Mr J.A. Carrillo Salcedo, ad hoc Judge,
   --------------------------------
       <*> Здесь и далее по тексту слова на национальном языке набраны
   латинским шрифтом и выделены фигурными скобками.
   
       and  also  of  Mr M.-A. Eissen, Registrar, and Mr  H.  Petzold,
   Deputy Registrar,
       Having deliberated in private on 29 November 1991 and 26  March
   1992,
       Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the last-
   mentioned date:
   
                               PROCEDURE
   
       1.  The  case  was  referred  to  the  Court  by  the  European
   Commission   of  Human  Rights  ("the  Commission")  and   by   the
   Government of the Kingdom of Spain ("the Government") on 8  and  21
   March  1991 respectively, within the three-month period  laid  down
   by  Article 32 para. 1 and Article 47 (art. 32-1, art. 47)  of  the
   Convention. It originated in an application (no. 11798/85)  against
   Spain  lodged with the Commission under Article 25 (art. 25)  by  a
   Spanish national, Mr Miguel Castells, on 17 September 1985.
       The  Commission's request referred to Articles 44 and 48  (art.
   44,  art.  48) and to the declaration whereby Spain recognised  the
   compulsory  jurisdiction of the Court (Article 46) (art.  46);  the
   Government's  application referred to Article  48  (art.  48).  The
   object  of  the  request and of the application  was  to  obtain  a
   decision as to whether the facts of the case disclosed a breach  by
   the  respondent State of its obligations under Article 10 (art. 10)
   of  the  Convention, taken alone or in conjunction with Article  14
   (art. 14+10).
       2.  In response to the enquiry made in accordance with Rule  33
   para.  3  (d) of the Rules of Court, the applicant stated  that  he
   wished  to  take  part in the proceedings and sought  leave,  as  a
   lawyer,  to  present his own case, assisted by two  Spanish  fellow
   lawyers (Rule 30 para. 1).
       The  President  granted  this request  on  15  April  1991  and
   authorised  the  applicant  to use the Spanish  language  (Rule  27
   para. 3).
       3.  The  Chamber to be constituted included ex officio Mr  J.M.
   Morenilla, the elected judge of Spanish nationality (Article 43  of
   the  Convention) (art. 43), and Mr R. Ryssdal, the President of the
   Court  (Rule  21  para. 3 (b)). On 22 March 1991, Mr  F.  Matscher,
   having  been duly delegated by the President, drew by lot,  in  the
   presence  of  the Registrar, the names of the other seven  members,
   namely Mr {Thor Vilhjalmsson}, Mr R. Macdonald, Mr J. De Meyer,  Mr
   S.K.  Martens,  Mrs  E. Palm, Mr R. Pekkanen  and  Mr  A.N.  Loizou
   (Article  43 in fine of the Convention and Rule 21 para.  4)  (art.
   43).
       By  a  letter  to the President of 15 March, Mr  Morenilla  had
   declared  his  intention of withdrawing from the case  pursuant  to
   Rule  24  para. 2 because he had represented the Spanish Government
   before  the  Commission  as  Agent.  On  26  April  the  Government
   notified  the  Registrar  that Mr Juan  Antonio  Carrillo  Salcedo,
   professor  at Seville University, had been appointed ad  hoc  judge
   (Article 43 of the Convention and Rule 23) (art. 43).
       4.  Mr  Ryssdal assumed the office of President of the  Chamber
   (Rule  21 para. 5) and, through the Registrar, consulted the  Agent
   of   the  Government,  the  Delegate  of  the  Commission  and  the
   applicant  on the organisation of the procedure (Rules 37  para.  1
   and  38). Pursuant to the President's orders and instructions,  the
   Registrar  received  the  memorials  of  the  Government  and   the
   applicant  on  29  July  and  29 August 1991  respectively.  On  25
   September   the  Secretary  to  the  Commission  produced   various
   documents  at the Registrar's request, then on 5 November submitted
   the Delegate's observations.
       5.  In  accordance with the President's decision,  the  hearing
   took  place in public in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg,  on
   27  November  1991.  The  Court  had  held  a  preparatory  meeting
   beforehand.
       There appeared before the Court:
       (a) for the Government
       Mr  J.  Borrego Borrego, Head of the Legal Department for Human
   Rights, Ministry of Justice, Agent,
       Mr J.M. Villar Uribarri, Ministry of Justice, Counsel;
       (b) for the Commission
       Mr L. Loucaides, Delegate;
       (c) for the applicant
       Mr M. Castells, abogado, applicant,
       Mr J.M. Montero, abogado,
       Mr E. Villa, abogado, Counsel,
       Mr J. Vervaele, Professor,
       Mr D. Korff, assistants.
       The  Court  heard  addresses  by Mr  Borrego  Borrego  for  the
   Government,  by  Mr  Loucaides  for the  Commission  and,  for  the
   applicant, by Mr Castells himself, by Mr Montero, by Mr  Villa  and
   by  Mr  Vervaele, as well as their replies to its questions and  to
   the question of a judge.
   
                            AS TO THE FACTS
   
       6.  Mr  Miguel  Castells, a Spanish national,  resides  at  San
   Sebastiсn  ({Guipuzcoa}), where he is a  lawyer.  At  the  material
   time  he  was  a senator elected on the list of Herri  Batasuna,  a
   political grouping supporting independence for the Basque Country.
   
              A. The particular circumstances of the case
   
                        1. The disputed article
   
       7. In the week of 4 to 11 June 1979, the weekly magazine "Punto
   y  Hora  de  Euskalherria" published an article entitled Insultante
   Impunidad  (Outrageous Impunity) and signed by the  applicant.  The
   article read as follows:
       "In  a few days, at the San {Fermin} holiday, a year will  have
   gone  by  since  the  murders  of {German  Rodriguez}  at  Pamplona
   (Iruna)  and of Joseba {Barandiaran} at San {Sebastian}  (Donosti).
   The  authorities  have  not identified the  perpetrators  of  these
   crimes.  They  have  not even acknowledged to  which  organisations
   they  belong.  Nor  have they identified the  persons  who  killed,
   between  12 and 15 May 1977, Gregorio Marichalar {Ayestaran},  aged
   63,  and  Rafael  {Gomez Jauregui}, aged 78, at {Renteria},  {Jose}
   Luis  Cano at Irun and Manuel Fuentes Mesa at Ortuella; on 14  May,
   again  in 1977, {Jose} Luis {Aristizabal} at San {Sebastian},  and,
   at  around  the  same  date, in the same town,  Isidro  Susperregui
   Aldekoa,  over  70 years old; at the beginning of  June,  still  in
   1977,   Javier   {Nunez  Fernandez}  at  Bilbao;  Francisco   Aznar
   Clemente,  Pedro {Maria Martinez} Ocio, Romualdo Barroso  Chaparro,
   Juan  {Jose} Castillo and Bienvenido Pereda Moral, on 3 March  1976
   at  Gasteiz, and, in the same year, on 7 March at Basauri,  Vicente
   {Anton}  Ferrero,  on  9 May at Montejurra,  Aniano  {Jimenez}  and
   Ricardo  Pellejero, in June Alberto Romero {Solino}  at  Eibar,  in
   September  {Jesus  Maria}  Zabala at  {Fuenterrabia},  in  November
   Santiago  Navas  and {Jose} Javier Nuin at Santesteban  and  on  10
   July   Normi   Menchaka  at  Santurce;  {Jose}  Emilio  {Fernandez}
   {Perez},  16 years old, and Felipe Carro Flores, 15 years  old,  on
   24  July and 25 July 1978, one at Apatomonasterio and the other  at
   Sestao.  I  only  mention the dead ones and the list  is  far  from
   being  exhaustive. These are only examples. Not one, I repeat,  not
   one  of  the  murders, of the interminable list of fascist  murders
   carried  out  in  the  Basque  Country  (Euzkadi),  has  shown  the
   slightest  sign  of being cleared up by the authorities.  Will  the
   individuals  who  assassinated  Emilia  Larrea,  Roberto  Aramburu,
   Josemari  Iturrioz, Agurtzane Arregui, Argala,  {Jose}  Ramon  Ansa
   and  Gladys del Estal, the most recent murders, be identified?  And
   when  I  say most recent I should specify the date - 9 June 1979  -
   because tomorrow there will be others.
       And  there remain the hundreds of cases, for there are hundreds
   of  them,  in which people burst in, pistols at the ready,  to  the
   bars   of  the  villages  and  the  suburbs  (Amorebieta,  Durango,
   {Eguia},  Loyola, etc.) or simply run through the streets  wounding
   and  beating  up  everyone  they come across;  the  bombs  left  in
   popular  meeting  places (Punto y Hora, Bordatxo, Alay  Bar,  Santi
   Bar,  Askatasuna  etc.) or in cars, attacks whose survivors  suffer
   the consequences for life etc.
       The  perpetrators  of these crimes act, continue  to  work  and
   remain  in posts of responsibility, with total impunity. No warrant
   has  been  issued for their arrest. The description of the  persons
   who  carried out these acts has been neither drawn up or published;
   nor  have  there  been any lists of suspects in the newspapers,  or
   photokit pictures, and, far less, rewardsoffered to the public,  or
   arrests,  or  inspections or searches of their homes. The  public's
   help  has  not  been sought through the media, as has  happened  in
   other  cases. Indeed it is significant that such help is  not  even
   accepted  in  connection  with  these  crimes.  No  link  has  been
   established,  there  have  been  no official  communiquщs  full  of
   explicit  accusations and reprobation in the  press,  as  in  other
   cases.
       The  right-wing, who are in power, have all the means at  their
   disposal  (police, courts and prisons) to seek out and  punish  the
   perpetrators  of so many crimes. But don't worry,  the  right  will
   not seek itself out.
       Extreme right-wing organisations? Before Franco's death no  one
   in  the  Basque Country thought that it was possible to secure  the
   arrest  or  conviction  for  "unlawful  association"  of  a  single
   member, and far less one of the leaders, of the "Triple A", of  the
   "{Batallon}  {Vasco-Espanol}", of the  "{Batallon}  Guezalaga",  of
   the  ATE,  of  the  Adolf Hitler commando, of the Francisco  Franco
   commando,  of the Mussolini commando, of the New Order,  of  Omega,
   of   the  "Movimiento  Social  {Espanol}",  of  "{Accion}  Nacional
   {Espanola}"  or  of the "Guerrilleros de Cristo Rey".  No  one  can
   believe it now either.
       "ETA" members held as prisoners? Hundreds of them have been  to
   prison.  Persons suspected of being members of "ETA"? Thousands  of
   them  have  been  detained  in police stations.  Sympathisers?  One
   could  go  on  with the list for ever. Yet not a single  leader  or
   member of the Triple A has been bothered.
       Those  responsible  for public order and criminal  prosecutions
   are  the  same  today as they were before. And here in  the  Basque
   Country  nothing  has changed as far as impunity and  questions  of
   liability are concerned.
       The period when Ibanez Freire was Director General of the Civil
   Guard,  and  Fraga was Minister of the Interior, was  also  a  time
   when  there  was  a great increase in so-called extreme  right-wing
   activities  in  the Basque Country. The same phenomenon,  the  same
   coincidences are recurring now.
       The  increase in the activities of groups free to act  as  they
   will  is generally accompanied in the Basque Country by an increase
   in the strength of the security forces.
       These  commandos, because we have to call them something,  seem
   totally  at  home  in  the  Basque Country,  in  the  middle  of  a
   community completely hostile to them. This is too inexplicable  for
   there   not  to  be  an  obvious  explanation.  They  have  precise
   information  to carry out their attacks, often more  detailed  than
   that available to local people.
       They  have  substantial files which are kept up to  date.  They
   have  a  considerable  supply of weapons and of  money.  They  have
   unlimited   material  and  resources  and  operate  with   complete
   impunity.  Considering  the  timing of  their  operations  and  the
   conditions in which they are carried out it can be said  that  they
   are  guaranteed legal immunity in advance. Forbidding people to see
   this is futile.
       This  is important to the people. In the Basque Country  it  is
   more   important  than  all  the  provisional  schemes  for   self-
   government, democratic consensus and other meaningless or  abstract
   nonsense,   because  it  is  a  visible,  tangible  reality   which
   confronts people on a daily basis.
       Frankly, I do not believe that the fascist associations which I
   cited  earlier  have any independent existence, outside  the  State
   apparatus.  In  other  words I do not believe  that  they  actually
   exist.  Despite all these different badges, it is always  the  same
   people.
       Behind  these acts there can only be the Government, the  party
   of  the  Government  and their personnel. We  know  that  they  are
   increasingly  going to use as a political instrument  the  ruthless
   hunting  down  of Basque dissidents and their physical elimination.
   If  they  want  to  be  so lacking in a sense of  political  vision
   that's their problem! But for the sake of the next victim from  our
   people,  those  responsible  must be  identified  right  away  with
   maximum publicity."
   
           2. The criminal proceedings against the applicant
   
       (a) The judicial investigation
       8.  On  3  July  1979  the  prosecuting authorities  instituted
   criminal   proceedings  against  Mr  Castells  for  insulting   the
   Government  (Article  161 of the Criminal Code;  see  paragraph  20
   below).  The court with competence for the investigation procedure,
   the   Supreme   Court,  requested  the  Senate  to   withdraw   the
   applicant's  parliamentary immunity, which it did by a majority  on
   27 May 1981.
       9.  On 7 July 1981 the Supreme Court charged the applicant with
   having  proffered serious insults against the Government and  civil
   servants  (Articles 161 para. 1 and 242 of the Criminal  Code).  It
   further  ordered his detention on remand, taking into  account  the
   sentences  laid  down for the offences in question (six  to  twelve
   years'  imprisonment;  see paragraph 20  below),  but  allowed  his
   release  on bail in view of his status as a senator and  the  "lack
   of alarm" (falta de alarma) caused by the alleged offences.
       On 28 September 1981 the court varied its previous decision. It
   allowed the applicant's provisional release subject solely  to  the
   obligation  to  report  to  the  judge  at  regular  intervals.  In
   addition  to  the  circumstances already cited, it  stressed  that,
   during  his  questioning,  Mr Castells  had  shown  a  co-operative
   attitude  and  had  declared  that his article  had  been  intended
   merely  as  a political denunciation and not to insult or  threaten
   the Government or its members.
       10.  On  12  December  1981  the  applicant's  defence  counsel
   challenged  four  of the five members of the relevant  division  of
   the   Supreme   Court.  It  was  submitted  that  their   political
   convictions  and the posts which they had held under  the  previous
   political  regime disqualified them from hearing a case  concerning
   the  freedom  of opinion of an individual who, like the  applicant,
   had  been  a  notorious opponent of the regime  in  question.  They
   relied on Article 54 para. 9 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
       After  several interlocutory applications, including one  which
   resulted in a decision of the Constitutional Court on 12 July  1982
   enjoining  the Supreme Court to find the challenge admissible,  the
   latter  court, sitting in plenary session, dismissed the  challenge
   on  its merits on 11 January 1983. The Supreme Court took the  view
   that  although  the judges had indeed sat in the Criminal  Division
   of  the  Supreme Court under the previous political regime and  one
   of  them  had, from 1966 to 1968, been the presiding judge  in  the
   Public  Order  Court,  they had at that  time  merely  applied  the
   legislation in force.
       On  4  May  1983 the Constitutional Court dismissed  an  appeal
   (amparo)  which  Mr  Castells had lodged alleging  a  violation  of
   Article  24  para.  2 of the Constitution (right  to  an  impartial
   tribunal).  It  found  that the fact that the  judges  in  question
   might  have  political  convictions differing  from  those  of  the
   applicant  could  not be regarded as being of  direct  or  indirect
   relevance  ({interes} directo o indirecto) to the solution  of  the
   dispute  within the meaning of Article 54 para. 9 of  the  Code  of
   Criminal Procedure.
       11.   In  the  meantime  the  investigation  of  the  case  had
   progressed. On 3 February 1982 the public prosecutor had  concluded
   that  the  facts  constituted  an  offence  of  proffering  serious
   insults  against the Government and demanded a prison  sentence  of
   six years and a day.
       In their memorial (conclusiones provisionales) of 2 April 1982,
   the  defence lawyers contended that the disputed article  contained
   accurate  information  and did not express the  accused's  personal
   opinion,  but  the  views of the general public.  They  offered  to
   adduce  evidence  to  establish the truth of  the  information.  In
   particular  they  suggested that the competent  authorities  should
   produce  reports on any police inquiries, detentions,  prosecutions
   or  other  measures undertaken against the members of  the  extreme
   right-wing  groups  responsible for the attacks  denounced  in  the
   article;  as  the facts reported were common knowledge  they  could
   not  be  said  to  be insulting. In addition, the  defence  lawyers
   requested   that  evidence  be  taken  from  fifty-two   witnesses,
   including  members of the Belgian, Italian, French, English,  Irish
   and  Danish  parliaments  and of the European  Parliament,  on  the
   matter   of   parliamentary  practice  regarding  the  freedom   of
   political criticism; they argued that the accused had acted in  his
   capacity  as an elected representative and in conformity  with  the
   obligations attaching thereto.
       12.  By  decision  (Auto)  of 19 May 1982,  the  Supreme  Court
   refused  to admit the majority of the evidence put forward  by  the
   defence,  on the ground that it was intended to show the  truth  of
   the information disseminated.
       There were divergences in academic opinion and even in its  own
   case-law  as  to whether the defence of truth (exceptio  veritatis)
   could  be  pleaded  in  respect of insults directed  at  the  State
   institutions, but the reforms of the Criminal Code then  under  way
   clarified  the question: those institutions fell outside the  scope
   of  that  defence  and  Article  461  of  the  Criminal  Code  (see
   paragraph  21  below) authorised it only where civil servants  were
   involved.  The  evidence which the defence proposed to  adduce  was
   not  therefore  admissible  in  the  proceedings  pending,  without
   prejudice   to  the  possibility  available  to  the   accused   of
   instituting criminal proceedings as he considered fit.
       Mr  Castells filed an appeal (recurso de {suplica}), but on  16
   June  1982  the Supreme Court confirmed its decision on the  ground
   that  the accuracy of the information was not decisive for a charge
   of insulting the Government.
       The   applicant   then  filed  an  appeal   (amparo)   in   the
   Constitutional Court, alleging that the rights of the  defence  had
   been  disregarded.  That court dismissed it on  10  November  1982,
   holding  that the question could be resolved only in the  light  of
   the  proceedings  in their entirety and after the decision  of  the
   trial court.
       (b) The trial
       13.  The  Criminal Division of the Supreme Court held a hearing
   on  27  October 1983 and gave judgment on 31 October. It  sentenced
   the  applicant to a term of imprisonment of one year and a day  for
   proffering  insults of a less serious kind (menos  graves)  against
   the  Government;  as an accessory penalty he was also  disqualified
   for  the  same period from holding any public office and exercising
   a profession and ordered to pay costs.
       It  found  in  the  first place, with regard to  the  objective
   element  of  the offence, that the expressions used in the  article
   were  sufficiently strong to damage the reputation of  the  injured
   parties  and  to  reveal an attitude of contempt.  As  far  as  the
   subjective  element  was  concerned,  it  considered  that,  as   a
   senator,  Mr  Castells had available to him very obvious  means  of
   expression,  provided  for in the Assembly's  rules  of  procedure,
   through   which   to  carry  out  his  duties  of  monitoring   and
   criticising  the Government's activities; as he had failed  to  use
   these  means,  he could not claim to have acted on  behalf  of  his
   electorate.  The defence's second argument, based  on  the  aim  of
   political  criticism  (animus  criticandi),  did  not  remove   its
   defamatory  purpose (animus injuriandi), but reduced the importance
   thereof. In the case under examination, the insults proffered  with
   the  aim of political criticism had exceeded the permissible limits
   of  such  criticism and attacked the Government's  honour.  It  was
   therefore  preferable to apply Article 162 of  the  Criminal  Code,
   which  provided for the offence of proffering less serious  insults
   against  the  Government, rather than Article 161. On the  question
   of  the  constitutional right to freedom of expression (Article  20
   of  the Constitution; see paragraph 19 below) there were limits  to
   that  right, in particular in relation to the right to  honour  and
   to  a  private life and the right to control use of one's likeness.
   Furthermore,  the fact that the insult appeared in a press  article
   suggested  that it was the fruit of a more complicated intellectual
   process  and  a  degree of reasoning which made it more  clear  and
   precise.
       Finally,  the Supreme Court confirmed its decision  of  19  May
   1982 regarding the admissibility of the defence of truth.
       The   applicant  again  indicated  in  the  Supreme  Court  his
   intention  of  filing  an  appeal (amparo)  against  the  judgment,
   relying  inter  alia  on  Articles  14,  20,  23  and  24  of   the
   Constitution. He lodged his appeal on 22 November 1983.
       14.  On 6 December 1983 the Supreme Court, having regard to the
   circumstances of the case, stayed for two years the enforcement  of
   the prison sentence (Article 93 of the Criminal Code), but left  in
   place  the accessory penalty. The enforcement of the latter measure
   was  nevertheless stayed by the Constitutional Court on 22 February
   1984.
   
          3. The appeal (amparo) to the Constitutional Court
   
       15.  In  his  appeal (amparo) of 22 November 1983, Mr  Castells
   complained  that  he had not been able to have the Supreme  Court's
   judgment  examined  by  a higher court and of  the  length  of  the
   proceedings.
       He maintained further that the court had violated the principle
   of  the presumption of innocence by refusing to allow him to adduce
   evidence.  He  considered it contrary to the most elementary  rules
   of  justice to convict someone - and in this case a senator  -  for
   making  statements  which were accurate and sufficiently  important
   for  it  to  be  necessary to bring them to the  attention  of  the
   community  as  a  matter of urgency and in detail,  without  having
   allowed him to establish their truth.
       He  alleged, in addition, a breach of the principle of equality
   before the law (Article 14 of the Constitution), taken alone or  in
   conjunction  with the right to freedom of expression (Article  20),
   as   other   persons   had  published  similar   articles   without
   encountering  difficulties. Furthermore, he  claimed  that  he  had
   been  the victim of a violation of his right to formulate political
   criticism,  which  he  argued was inherent  in  Article  23  as  it
   applied  to  him  in his capacity as a senator. According  to  him,
   that  provision,  which  guarantees the  right  to  participate  in
   public  affairs, entitled him to carry out his parliamentary duties
   of scrutiny through any organ or means generally available.
       The  applicant made a further reference to Article  20  of  the
   Constitution in the summary of his complaints (suplico).
       16. In his observations of 22 March 1984, the public prosecutor
   noted  that Article 14 guaranteed equality before the law  and  not
   equality  outside  the  law.  As regards  the  complaint  based  on
   Article  23,  it  overlapped with the preceding  complaint  or  was
   based  on  a  misunderstanding: clearly a member of parliament  did
   not  carry out his duties only in the assembly, but outside  it  he
   did  not  enjoy any immunity; although he could, like any  citizen,
   criticise  the action of the Government, he should not forget  that
   the   freedom   of  expression  had  its  limits,  fixed   by   the
   Constitution.
       For  his  part, Mr Castells, by a letter of 21 May 1984,  again
   offered  to  prove  the  truth  of  his  statements,  because  that
   demonstrated "the violation by the contested judgment of the  right
   to  "receive  and  communicate true information  by  any  means  of
   dissemination", referred to in Article 20 of the Constitution".  He
   also  mentioned  this  right in his appeal (recurso  de  {suplica})
   against  the  rejection of this offer by the  Constitutional  Court
   (20 July 1984) and in his observations of 21 February 1985.
       17.  The Constitutional Court dismissed the appeal on 10  April
   1985.
       In summarising the applicant's complaints at point 2 of the "As
   to  the  Law"  part  of its judgment, it took  together,  like  the
   public  prosecutor, those relating to Articles 14 and  23,  without
   referring  to  Article  20:  alleged  violation  of  the  right  to
   equality  before the law, guaranteed under Article 14  taken  alone
   or  in  conjunction  with  Article 23, inasmuch  as  the  contested
   decision   restricted  the  powers  of  monitoring,  scrutiny   and
   criticism of a senator.
       At  point 6 it stated that parliamentary privileges were to  be
   interpreted  strictly  as otherwise they could  become  instruments
   for  infringing the rights of others; they lapsed when their holder
   had acted as a mere citizen, even in his capacity as a politician.
       At  points 9 and 10 it considered the central issue: the  right
   to  rely  on relevant evidence in presenting the defence case,  and
   in  particular  to  plead the defence of truth  in  respect  of  an
   offence  of  the  type  in  question.  The  court  noted  in   this
   connection:
       "In  order  to  assess whether evidence which it is  sought  to
   adduce  is  relevant, it is necessary to establish a  link  between
   that  evidence  and  the  thema  decidendi,  which  must  first  be
   determined on the basis of the parties' allegations. Except in  the
   case  of  facts which are manifest or common knowledge,  the  court
   must  not intervene in this regard, otherwise it will prejudge  the
   merits,  if only in part ... . It is preferable for the  courts  to
   avoid  [such  a  preliminary assessment]; it does  not  however  in
   itself  infringe  constitutional rights  provided  that  the  other
   defence  rights are respected. Even though in the present case  the
   court  ought  perhaps not to have anticipated its  opinion  on  the
   defence  of  truth  when assessing the relevance of  the  evidence,
   [that  irregularity]  therefore infringes the constitutional  right
   to  use relevant evidence - particularly where as here the decision
   is  taken  at  a single level of jurisdiction - only if  there  has
   been a breach of a substantive right in issue.
       ..."
       Article  161  of the Criminal Code had given rise to  criticism
   among  academic  writers  because  it  restricted  the  freedom  of
   expression.  In  any event, it should be read in  conjunction  with
   Article  20  which guaranteed that freedom. In this  connection  it
   had  to  be accepted that criminal legislation could constitute  an
   adequate  means  of  regulating the exercise of fundamental  rights
   provided  that it respected the essential content of the  right  in
   question. The limits of the freedoms of information and of  opinion
   were  beyond  question to be found in the area of  State  security,
   which  could  be  jeopardised by attempts to  discredit  democratic
   institutions.  In conclusion the question whether  the  defence  of
   truth  was  or was not admissible in this field was purely  one  of
   statutory  interpretation and the specific application  of  Article
   161  in  the  case  under review was a matter  falling  within  the
   exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
       18.  On  1 April 1986 the Supreme Court ruled that the term  of
   imprisonment  had  been  definitively  served.  Subsequently,   the
   record  of  the conviction was annulled in accordance with  Article
   118  of  the  Criminal  Code.  It  could  therefore  no  longer  be
   disclosed  by  investigation  of the  applicant's  criminal  record
   unless the request came from judges or courts in connection with  a
   new criminal inquiry.
   
                        B. Relevant legislation
   
                        1. Constitution of 1978
   
       19.  The  relevant  articles  of the  Constitution  provide  as
   follows:
   
                              Article 14
   
       "All   Spanish   citizens  are  equal  before  the   law.   Any
   discrimination based on birth, race, sex, religion, opinion or  any
   other  condition  or  personal  or social  circumstances  shall  be
   prohibited."
   
                              Article 18
   
       "1. The right to honour, to a private life and to a family life
   and the right to control use of one's likeness shall be protected.
       ..."
   
                              Article 20
   
       "1. The following rights shall be recognised and protected:
       (a) the right freely to express and disseminate thoughts, ideas
   and opinions by word of mouth, in writing or by any other means  of
   reproduction;
       ...
       (d)  the  right to receive and communicate true information  by
   any  means  of  dissemination. The right to invoke  the  conscience
   clause  and that of professional confidentiality shall be  governed
   by statute.
       2.  The  exercise of these rights may not be restricted by  any
   prior censorship.
       ...
       4.  These  freedoms shall be limited by respect for the  rights
   secured  in this Title, by the provisions of the implementing  Acts
   and  in particular by the right to honour and to a private life and
   the  right  to control use of one's likeness and to the  protection
   of youth and children."
   
                              Article 23
   
       "1. Citizens shall have the right to participate in public life
   directly  or  through  their  representatives  freely  elected   at
   periodically held elections by universal suffrage.
       ..."
   
                         2. The Criminal Code
   
       20.  The Institutional Act 8/1983 of 25 June 1983 reformed  the
   Criminal  Code.  It  provides that the offences  of  insulting  the
   Government shall be punishable by the following penalties:
   
                              Article 161
   
       "The  following  shall be liable to long-term prison  sentences
   [from  six  years  and a day to twelve years - Article  30  of  the
   Criminal Code]:
       1.  Those who seriously insult, falsely accuse or threaten  ...
   the Government ...;
       2. ..."
   
                              Article 162
   
       "When the insult or threat referred to in the preceding Article
   is  not  serious,  it  shall be punishable by  a  shortterm  prison
   sentence  [from six months and a day to six years - Article  30  of
   the Criminal Code]."
       These  provisions appear in a separate chapter of the  Criminal
   Code.  The  chapter  in  question is  based  on  the  principle  of
   authority  (decision  of the Supreme Court  of  19  May  1982;  see
   paragraph 12 above) and provides for a strengthened protection  for
   the  life, freedom and honour of the senior officials of the State.
   The  offence of falsely accusing the Government was not  introduced
   until 1983.
       21.  Title  X  of  Book  II of the Criminal  Code  defines  the
   offences  of  proffering insults and making false accusations.  The
   latter  consists of accusing a person wrongly of an offence  coming
   within  the  category  of those which have to  be  prosecuted  even
   without  a  complaint (Article 453 of the Criminal  Code).  On  the
   other  hand, an insult is any expression or action which discredits
   a  person or exposes him to contempt, in particular by accusing him
   of  an  offence  of  the  kind which may be prosecuted  only  if  a
   complaint is laid (Articles 457 and 458 of the Criminal Code).  The
   practical  importance of the distinction is  that  the  defence  of
   truth  is  admissible for the offence of false accusation  (Article
   456)  but  not for the offence of proffering insults, except  where
   the  insults are directed against civil servants in respect of acts
   relating  to the performance of their duties (Article  461  of  the
   Criminal Code).
       By  the judgment of 31 October 1983 the Supreme Court specified
   that  the defence of truth could not be pleaded in connection  with
   the  offence  of  insulting one of the senior institutions  of  the
   State:  in  the first place no official as such was concerned  and,
   secondly, the institutions in question enjoyed extra protection  in
   this  field  under  the  criminal law (see  paragraphs  12  and  13
   above).
   
                   PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION
   
       22.  In  his application of 17 September 1985 to the Commission
   (no.  11798/85), Mr Castells relied on Articles 6,  7,  10  and  14
   (art. 6, art. 7, art. 10, art. 14) of the Convention.
       By  a  partial decision of 9 May 1989, the Commission dismissed
   the  complaints  based on Articles 6 and 7  (art.  6,  art.  7)  as
   inadmissible.  On  7 November 1989 it found the  remainder  of  the
   application  admissible. In its report of 8 January  1991  (Article
   31)  (art.  31),  it expressed the opinion that there  had  been  a
   violation  of Article 10 (art. 10) (nine votes to three)  and  that
   no   separate   question   arose  under  Article   14   (art.   14)
   (unanimously).  The  full  text of  its  opinion  and  of  the  two
   dissenting  opinions contained in the report is  reproduced  as  an
   annex to this judgment <*>.
   --------------------------------
       <*>  Note  by the Registrar: for practical reasons  this  annex
   will  appear only with the printed version of the judgment  (volume
   236  of  Series A of the Publications of the Court), but a copy  of
   the Commission's report is obtainable from the registry.
   
                             AS TO THE LAW
   
             I. Alleged violation of Article 10 (art. 10)
   
       23.  Mr  Castells claimed to be a victim of a violation of  his
   right  to  freedom  of expression as guaranteed  under  Article  10
   (art. 10) of the Convention, which is worded as follows:
       "1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression.
       This  right  shall  include freedom to  hold  opinions  and  to
   receive  and  impart information and ideas without interference  by
   public authority and regardless of frontiers. ...
       2.  The  exercise of these freedoms, since it carries  with  it
   duties  and  responsibilities, may be subject to such  formalities,
   conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law  and
   are  necessary  in  a  democratic  society,  in  the  interests  of
   national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for  the
   prevention  of disorder or crime, for the protection of  health  or
   morals,  for the protection of the reputation or rights of  others,
   for   preventing   the  disclosure  of  information   received   in
   confidence,  or  for maintaining the authority and impartiality  of
   the judiciary."
       The Government contested this assertion, whereas the Commission
   agreed with it.
   
               A. The Government's preliminary objection
   
       24.  The  Government  contended, as they had  done  before  the
   Commission,  that the applicant had failed to exhaust his  domestic
   remedies  (Article 26 of the Convention) (art. 26).  Probably  "for
   tactical   reasons",  he  had  not  specifically  raised   in   the
   Constitutional  Court the complaint concerning the  alleged  breach
   of  the  right to freedom of expression protected under Article  20
   of  the Constitution. In his amparo appeal he had referred to  this
   provision  only  indirectly, complaining of discrimination  in  the
   exercise  of that freedom; in addition, he had made no  mention  of
   Article 10 (art. 10) of the Convention or of similar provisions  in
   other  international  instruments. According to  the  Institutional
   Act  governing the amparo appeal procedure (no. 2/1979),  he  ought
   to  have  indicated  clearly  both the  facts  and  the  provisions
   allegedly  infringed. It followed that Mr Castells  had  not  given
   the  Constitutional Court the opportunity to rule on  the  question
   which was now before the Court.
       25.  In  reply  the applicant maintained that he had  expressly
   invoked  Article  20  of  the Constitution  in  the  Constitutional
   Court.  In  the  first  place  the facts  set  out  in  his  amparo
   application  established  that what was  at  stake  was  a  typical
   example  of the exercise of the right to freedom of expression  and
   showed  evidently that there had been an interference. Furthermore,
   in  the  suplico he had cited, among other provisions, the  article
   in  question  and in the legal argument he had alleged a  violation
   of  Article 20, taken together with Article 14 (equality before the
   law).  It was true that he had argued on the more limited basis  of
   the  right  of  an  elected representative to  formulate  political
   criticism,  under Article 23, but it was sufficient to  read  point
   10  of the "As to the Law" part of the judgment of 10 April 1985 to
   see  that  the problem had indeed been raised. In that passage  the
   Constitutional  Court  examined  in  detail  the  compatibility  of
   Article  161  of  the Criminal Code, the basis  for  the  contested
   prosecution  and  conviction, with the freedom of  expression  (see
   paragraphs 15 and 17 above).
       26.  While  expressing its agreement with  the  applicant,  the
   Commission  primarily  invited the Court to  find  that  it  lacked
   jurisdiction to entertain the objection.
       27. On this point the Court confines itself to referring to its
   consistent  case-law, confirmed most recently in its B.  v.  France
   judgment  of 25 March 1992 (Series A no. 232-C, p.45, paras.  35  -
   36).
       As  regards  the  merits of the submission,  it  observes  that
   Article  26  (art.  26)  must  be  applied  "with  some  degree  of
   flexibility  and  without excessive formalism";  it  is  sufficient
   that  "the  complaints intended to be made subsequently before  the
   Convention  organs" should have been raised "at least in  substance
   and  in  compliance  with the formal requirements  and  time-limits
   laid  down in domestic law" (see the Guzzardi v. Italy judgment  of
   6  November 1980, Series A no. 39, p. 26, para. 72, and the  Cardot
   v.  France  judgment of 19 March 1991, Series A  no.  200,  p.  18,
   para. 34).
       28.  The  applicant  relied on Article  10  (art.  10)  of  the
   Convention  in  two respects: he had, he claimed,  been  prosecuted
   and  convicted  for making statements which were  true,  but  whose
   accuracy he had been prevented from establishing; in addition,  the
   contested   article  came  within  the  sphere  of  the   political
   criticism  which  it was the duty of any member  of  parliament  to
   engage in.
       29. It appears that Mr Castells had raised both of these points
   in  the  Supreme Court. The judgment of 31 October 1983 refused  to
   admit  the defence of truth in relation to the offence of insulting
   the  Government  and ruled that the applicant had  overstepped  the
   bounds of acceptable political criticism (see paragraph 13 above).
       30.  The  submissions  in support of the amparo  appeal  of  22
   November 1983 made only an indirect and brief reference to  Article
   20  of  the Constitution (see paragraph 15 above); they did however
   set out the complaints discussed above.
       While  basing his case on a narrower provision, Article  23  of
   the  Constitution, the applicant claimed the right, in his capacity
   as  a  senator, to criticise the Government's action, a right which
   is  manifestly  inherent  in  the  freedom  of  expression  in  the
   specific   case   of   elected   representatives.   Moreover    the
   Constitutional  Court  recognised  this  in  its  summary  of   the
   complaints;  it took together the complaint concerning Articles  14
   and 20 and that relating to Article 23 (see paragraph 17 above).
       The  applicant  also  invoked both his  right  to  be  presumed
   innocent  and  his right to adduce evidence capable of establishing
   the  accuracy of his statements. In so doing, he was formulating  a
   complaint  which  was  plainly linked to the alleged  violation  of
   Article  10  (art. 10) of the Convention. Indeed that was  how  the
   Constitutional  Court  construed  the  complaint;  it  joined   the
   question of the relevance of the evidence to that of the merits  of
   the  case,  namely the offence provided for in Article 161  of  the
   Criminal  Code, whose compatibility with the freedom of  expression
   it  examined  (points 9 and 10 of the "As to the Law" part  of  the
   judgment of 10 April 1985; see paragraph 17 above).
       31.  The  Court  notes  finally, like the Commission,  that  Mr
   Castells  cited Article 20 of the Constitution both in  his  notice
   of  the  amparo  appeal, filed in the Supreme  Court,  and  in  the
   suplico  of his application of 22 November 1983 (see paragraphs  13
   and  15 above). Subsequently, in a number of written communications
   to  the Constitutional Court, he also referred, in connection  with
   the  defence  of  truth, to his right "to receive  and  communicate
   true information" (see paragraph 16 above).
       No doubt the reason why the appeal failed in this respect is to
   be  found in the limits which at the time the Constitutional  Court
   set   to  its  jurisdiction.  In  its  view,  the  problem  of  the
   admissibility  of the defence of truth in relation to  the  offence
   of   insulting  the  Government  raised  a  question  of  statutory
   interpretation  rather  than  an  issue  of  compliance  with   the
   Constitution,  and the application of Article 161 of  the  Criminal
   Code  in  the  case under review was exclusively a matter  for  the
   ordinary  courts  (see paragraph 17 above; and,  mutatis  mutandis,
   the  Guzzardi v. Italy judgment, cited above, Series A no.  39,  p.
   27, para. 72).
       32.  Accordingly,  the Court considers that the  applicant  did
   invoke  before  the Constitutional Court, "at least in  substance",
   the  complaints relating to Article 10 (art. 10) of the Convention.
   The  objection that Mr Castells failed to exhaust domestic remedies
   must therefore be dismissed.
   
                      B. Merits of the complaint
   
       33.  In  Mr  Castells's  submission, the  criminal  proceedings
   brought  against him, and his subsequent conviction  for  insulting
   the  Government,  interfered with his  freedom  of  expression,  in
   particular  because he was not allowed to establish  the  truth  of
   the statements contained in his article.
       34.  The restrictions and penalties of which he complained  are
   undeniably  an "interference" with the exercise of the  freedom  in
   question.  For such an interference to avoid infringing Article  10
   (art.  10), it must be "prescribed by law", carried out in  pursuit
   of  one or more of the legitimate aims set out in Article 10  para.
   2  (art. 10-2) and "necessary in a democratic society" in order  to
   attain such an aim or aims.
   
                        1. "Prescribed by law"
   
       35. There can be no doubt that the contested prosecution had  a
   legal basis, namely Articles 161 and 162 of the Criminal Code.  The
   applicant  did not dispute this, but he alleged that he  could  not
   have  expected  that  his defence of truth  would  be  held  to  be
   inadmissible,  in  particular following the adoption  of  the  1978
   Constitution.  He maintained that, until 19 May 1982,  the  Supreme
   Court  had  never ruled on the question in relation to the  offence
   of  insulting  the  Government  and the  admissibility  of  such  a
   defence  for offences of this nature (Article 240) was the  subject
   of  differing opinions both among academic writers and in the case-
   law.
       36.  In the Government's contention, on the other hand,  it  is
   clear  from the Spanish legislation, and in particular from Article
   461  of  the  Criminal  Code, that in the  field  in  question  the
   defence  of truth is admissible only where the insults are directed
   against  civil servants in the performance of their duties; neither
   before  nor  after  1978  had the Supreme Court  ever  allowed  the
   exceptio  veritatis  for insults which were  not  directed  against
   individuals. Mr Castells, however, had accused the Government as  a
   whole.
       37.  In the light of the wording of Article 461 of the Criminal
   Code,  the  Court considers this interpretation to  be  reasonable.
   There  was apparently no precedent - hence the hesitation shown  by
   the Supreme Court in its decision of 19 May 1982 (see paragraph  12
   above)  -, but that is immaterial here: it was a text which covered
   in  a  general fashion several possible types of insult  and  which
   had  inevitably  to be capable of being brought into  play  in  new
   situations;  the  above-mentioned  decision  confined   itself   to
   applying it to different circumstances (see, mutatis mutandis,  the
   Observer  and  Guardian  v.  the  United  Kingdom  judgment  of  26
   November 1991, Series A no. 216, pp. 27 - 28, para. 53).
       The  Court therefore finds, like the Commission, that the rules
   governing  the contested interference were sufficiently foreseeable
   for  the  purposes  of  Article 10  para.  2  (art.  10-2)  of  the
   Convention.
   
                  2. Was the aim pursued legitimate?
   
       38. According to the applicant, neither the charge laid against
   him  nor  his subsequent conviction pursued a legitimate aim  under
   paragraph  2  of Article 10 (art. 10-2). The acts of which  he  was
   accused,  as the Supreme Court itself admitted, had not  engendered
   any  alarm  (see paragraph 9 above); in addition, it appeared  from
   the   judgment  of  31  October  1983  that  the  object   of   the
   interference  had  been not to protect public  order  and  national
   security,  but  in  fact  to preserve the  respondent  Government's
   honour.
       39.  However, in its decision of 10 April 1985 - on  which  the
   Government  relied  - the Constitutional Court  stressed  that  the
   security  of the State could be threatened by attempts to discredit
   democratic  institutions (see paragraph 17 above). In  his  article
   Mr  Castells  did  not  merely describe a very  serious  situation,
   involving  numerous attacks and murders in the Basque  Country;  he
   also  complained of the inactivity on the part of the  authorities,
   in  particular the police, and even their collusion with the guilty
   parties   and   inferred   therefrom  that   the   Government   was
   responsible.
       It may therefore be said, and this conforms to the view held by
   the  Government  and  the  Commission, that  in  the  circumstances
   obtaining  in Spain in 1979 the proceedings instituted against  the
   applicant  were  brought for the "prevention of  disorder",  within
   the  meaning  of Article 10 para. 2 (art. 10-2), and not  only  for
   the "protection of the reputation ... of others".
   
                   3. Necessity of the interference
   
       40.  Mr  Castells noted his agreement with the  Commission  and
   emphasised the crucial importance of freedom of expression  for  an
   elected  representative,  as the spokesman  for  the  opinions  and
   anxieties  of  his  electorate. In addition, that freedom  required
   extra  guarantees when the discussion related to a matter of public
   interest.  This  had  indeed been the case in  this  instance;  the
   contested  article  was part of a wide debate  on  the  climate  of
   insecurity  which had prevailed in the Basque Country  since  1977.
   The  applicant's  conviction  had  been  intended  to  protect  the
   authorities against the attacks of the opposition rather  than  the
   Government   against   unjustified  and   defamatory   accusations;
   although  embarrassing for the Government, the  revelation  of  the
   facts in question had served the public interest.
       41.  The Government stressed that freedom of expression was not
   absolute;  it  carried  with  it  "duties"  and  "responsibilities"
   (Article  10  para. 2 of the Convention) (art. 10-2).  Mr  Castells
   had  overstepped  the  normal limits of political  debate;  he  had
   insulted  a democratic government in order to destabilise  it,  and
   during  a very sensitive, indeed critical, period for Spain, namely
   shortly  after  the adoption of the Constitution, at  a  time  when
   groups  of  differing  political  persuasions  were  resorting   to
   violence concurrently.
       42. The Court recalls that the freedom of expression, enshrined
   in  paragraph 1 of Article 10 (art. 10-1), constitutes one  of  the
   essential foundations of a democratic society and one of the  basic
   conditions  for  its progress. Subject to paragraph  2  of  Article
   10(art.  10-2),  it  is  applicable not only  to  "information"  or
   "ideas" that are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive  or
   as  a  matter of indifference, but also to those that offend, shock
   or  disturb. Such are the demands of that pluralism, tolerance  and
   broadmindedness  without  which there is  no  "democratic  society"
   (see,  inter alia, the Handyside v. the United Kingdom judgment  of
   7  December  1976,  Series  A no. 24, p.  23,  para.  49,  and  the
   Observer and Guardian judgment, cited above, Series A no.  216,  p.
   30, para. 59 (a)).
       While  freedom of expression is important for everybody, it  is
   especially  so  for  an elected representative of  the  people.  He
   represents  his electorate, draws attention to their preoccupations
   and  defends their interests. Accordingly, interferences  with  the
   freedom  of expression of an opposition member of parliament,  like
   the  applicant, call for the closest scrutiny on the  part  of  the
   Court.
       43.  In  the case under review Mr Castells did not express  his
   opinion  from the senate floor, as he might have done without  fear
   of  sanctions,  but chose to do so in a periodical. That  does  not
   mean, however, that he lost his right to criticise the Government.
       In  this respect, the pre-eminent role of the press in a  State
   governed  by  the  rule of law must not be forgotten.  Although  it
   must  not  overstep  various  bounds  set,  inter  alia,  for   the
   prevention  of  disorder and the protection of  the  reputation  of
   others,  it  is nevertheless incumbent on it to impart  information
   and  ideas  on political questions and on other matters  of  public
   interest  (see, mutatis mutandis, the Sunday Times  v.  the  United
   Kingdom  judgment of 26 April 1979, Series A no. 30, p.  40,  para.
   65,  and the Observer and Guardian judgment, cited above, Series  A
   no. 216, p. 30, para. 59 (b)).
       Freedom  of the press affords the public one of the best  means
   of  discovering and forming an opinion of the ideas  and  attitudes
   of  their  political leaders. In particular, it  gives  politicians
   the  opportunity  to reflect and comment on the  preoccupations  of
   public  opinion;  it  thus enables everyone to participate  in  the
   free  political debate which is at the very core of the concept  of
   a  democratic  society (see the Lingens v. Austria  judgment  of  8
   July 1986, Series A no. 103, p. 26, para. 42).
       44.  In its judgment of 31 October 1983, the Supreme Court took
   the  view  that  the contested article had crossed  over  the  line
   between  political criticism and insult, albeit only  slightly,  by
   its use of certain terms (see paragraph 13 above).
       45.  The  Court observes, like the Commission, that Mr Castells
   began  by denouncing the impunity enjoyed by the members of various
   extremist  groups,  the  perpetrators of numerous  attacks  in  the
   Basque  Country  since 1977. He thereby recounted  facts  of  great
   interest  to the public opinion of this region, where the  majority
   of  the  copies  of the periodical in question were  sold.  In  his
   conclusion,  however, he levelled serious accusations  against  the
   Government,  which  in his view was responsible for  the  situation
   which had arisen (see paragraph 7 above).
       46. The freedom of political debate is undoubtedly not absolute
   in  nature.  A  Contracting State may make it  subject  to  certain
   "restrictions" or "penalties", but it is for the Court  to  give  a
   final  ruling  on  the  compatibility of  such  measures  with  the
   freedom  of  expression enshrined in Article  10  (art.  10)  (see,
   mutatis mutandis, the Observer and Guardian judgment, cited  above,
   Series A no. 216, para. 59 (c)).
       The  limits of permissible criticism are wider with  regard  to
   the  Government than in relation to a private citizen,  or  even  a
   politician. In a democratic system the actions or omissions of  the
   Government  must be subject to the close scrutiny not only  of  the
   legislative  and  judicial authorities but also of  the  press  and
   public  opinion.  Furthermore,  the  dominant  position  which  the
   Government occupies makes it necessary for it to display  restraint
   in  resorting  to  criminal proceedings, particularly  where  other
   means  are  available for replying to the unjustified  attacks  and
   criticisms  of  its  adversaries  or  the  media.  Nevertheless  it
   remains open to the competent State authorities to adopt, in  their
   capacity  as  guarantors  of  public order,  measures,  even  of  a
   criminal  law nature, intended to react appropriately  and  without
   excess   to   defamatory  accusations  devoid  of   foundation   or
   formulated in bad faith.
       47. In this instance, Mr Castells offered on several occasions,
   before  the  Supreme  Court and subsequently in the  Constitutional
   Court,  to establish that the facts recounted by him were true  and
   well  known;  in  his  view, this deprived his  statements  of  any
   insulting effect (see paragraphs 11 and 16 above).
       On  19  May  1982  the  Supreme Court  declared  such  evidence
   inadmissible on the ground that the defence of truth could  not  be
   pleaded in respect of insults directed at the institutions  of  the
   nation  (see  paragraphs  12  and  21  above);  it  confirmed  this
   interpretation  in its judgment of 31 October 1983  (see  paragraph
   13  above). The Constitutional Court took the view that  it  was  a
   question  of  ordinary statutory interpretation and  as  such  fell
   outside its jurisdiction (see paragraph 17 above).
       The  applicant could not therefore, in the criminal proceedings
   brought  against him under Article 161 of the Criminal Code,  plead
   the defences of truth and good faith.
       48.  In  the  Government's contention,  because  Mr  Castells's
   allegations  were not sufficiently precise, their truth  could  not
   be  demonstrated;  in addition, they were to be regarded  as  value
   judgments,  in  relation  to  which  the  defence  of   truth   was
   irrelevant.
       This argument is not convincing. The article which appeared  in
   Punto  y  Hora  de  Euskalherria (see paragraph 7  above)  must  be
   considered  as a whole. The applicant began by drawing  up  a  long
   list  of  murders  and attacks perpetrated in the  Basque  Country,
   then  stressed that they had remained unpunished; he  continued  by
   alleging the involvement of various extremist organisations,  which
   he   named,   and   finally  attributed  to  the   Government   the
   responsibility for the situation. In fact many of these  assertions
   were  susceptible to an attempt to establish their truth,  just  as
   Mr  Castells  could reasonably have tried to demonstrate  his  good
   faith.
       It  is  impossible to state what the outcome of the proceedings
   would  have been had the Supreme Court admitted the evidence  which
   the  applicant  sought to adduce; but the Court  attaches  decisive
   importance  to the fact that it declared such evidence inadmissible
   for  the offence in question (see paragraph 12 above). It considers
   that  such  an  interference  in the exercise  of  the  applicant's
   freedom of expression was not necessary in a democratic society.
       49. The Government also relied on the relatively lenient nature
   of  the  sanction  imposed,  but in  the  light  of  the  foregoing
   conclusion the Court does not have to examine this argument.
       50. In sum, there has been a violation of Article 10 (art. 10).
   
          II. Alleged violation of Article 14 in conjunction
                     with Article 10 (art. 14+10)
   
       51. Mr Castells also claimed to be the victim of discrimination
   because  other  persons  had expressed similar  views  without  any
   criminal  sanctions being imposed on them. He relied on Article  14
   (art. 14), which is worded as follows:
       "The  enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth  in  [the]
   Convention  shall be secured without discrimination on  any  ground
   such  as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or  other
   opinion,  national or social origin, association  with  a  national
   minority, property, birth or other status."
       The Government denied this assertion.
       52.  As this question is not a fundamental aspect of the  case,
   the  Court  does  not  consider  it  necessary  to  deal  with   it
   separately  (see, inter alia, the Airey v. Ireland  judgment  of  9
   October 1979, Series A no. 32, p. 16, para. 30).
   
               III. Application of Article 50 (art. 50)
   
       53. According to Article 50 (art. 50):
       "If  the  Court finds that a decision or a measure taken  by  a
   legal  authority or any other authority of a High Contracting Party
   is  completely  or  partially  in  conflict  with  the  obligations
   arising  from the ... Convention, and if the internal  law  of  the
   said  Party  allows  only partial reparation to  be  made  for  the
   consequences  of  this decision or measure,  the  decision  of  the
   Court  shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured
   party."
       54. The applicant sought in the first place the publication  of
   a  summary of the Court's judgment in the newspapers of the  Basque
   Country,  of Madrid and the rest of the State, and the  removal  of
   any  reference  to  his conviction in the central criminal  records
   (Registro Central de Penados y Rebeldes).
       The Court points out that it does not have jurisdiction to make
   such  orders  (see, mutatis mutandis, the Manifattura FL  v.  Italy
   judgment  of  27 February 1992, Series A no. 230-B,  p.  21,  para.
   22).
   
                          A. Pecuniary damage
   
       55. Mr Castells also claimed 375,000 pesetas in respect of loss
   of  earnings.  As  an accused on bail, he had to  appear  fifty-two
   times  before the court of his place of residence (San {Sebastian})
   and  three times before the Supreme Court of Madrid (see paragraphs
   8  - 9 above), which resulted in a loss of time and opportunity  in
   the exercise of his professional activity as a lawyer.
       The  Court takes the view that this constraint can have  caused
   him  hardly any loss since, as a lawyer, he frequently attended the
   courts   in  question.  That  he  sustained  pecuniary  damage   is
   therefore not established.
   
                        B. Non-pecuniary damage
   
       56.  The  applicant also claimed, without giving  any  figures,
   compensation for non-pecuniary damage. The Court does not rule  out
   the  possibility that he may have sustained such damage, but in the
   circumstances  of the case the finding of a violation  set  out  in
   the   present  judgment  constitutes  in  itself  sufficient   just
   satisfaction.
   
                         C. Costs and expenses
   
       57.  In  respect  of  his costs and expenses  incurred  in  the
   Spanish  courts, Mr Castells claimed 2,181,476 pesetas.  The  Court
   awards  him only 1,000,000 of this amount, since some of  the  sums
   in   question  related  to  amparo  appeals  unconnected  with  the
   complaints found admissible by the Commission.
       58.  Finally  the  applicant sought 3,328,000 pesetas  for  his
   costs  and  expenses  before the Convention organs,  together  with
   20,000 DM for the fees of Mr Korff and Mr Vervaele.
       Like  the Government, the Court considers excessive the  number
   of  lawyers representing Mr Castells, who appeared before  it  with
   four  lawyers; it should also be borne in mind that the  Commission
   declared inadmissible some of the complaints raised initially.
       Making an assessment on an equitable basis, the Court awards Mr
   Castells an overall amount of 2,000,000 pesetas.
   
               FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
   
       1.  Holds that it has jurisdiction to consider the Government's
   preliminary objection, but dismisses it;
       2.  Holds  that there has been a violation of Article 10  (art.
   10);
       3.  Holds  that it is not necessary to consider the  case  also
   under Article 14, taken together with Article 10 (art. 14+10);
       4. Holds that, as regards the non-pecuniary damage alleged, the
   present  judgment constitutes sufficient just satisfaction for  the
   purposes of Article 50 (art. 50);
       5.  Holds that the Kingdom of Spain is to pay to the applicant,
   within  three months, 3,000,000 (three million) pesetas  for  costs
   and expenses;
       6. Dismisses the remainder of the applicant's claims.
   
       Done  in  English  and  in French, and delivered  at  a  public
   hearing  in  the  Human Rights Building, Strasbourg,  on  23  April
   1992.
   
                                                  Signed: Rolv RYSSDAL
                                                             President
   
                                           Signed: {Marc-Andre} EISSEN
                                                             Registrar
   
   
   
   
   
   
       In  accordance  with  Article 51 para. 2  (art.  51-2)  of  the
   Convention  and  Rule  53  para. 2  of  the  Rules  of  Court,  the
   following separate opinions are annexed to this judgment:
       (a) concurring opinion of Mr De Meyer;
       (b) concurring opinion of Mr Pekkanen;
       (c) concurring opinion of Mr Carillo Salcedo, ad hoc judge.
   
                                                      Initialled: R.R.
   
                                                   Initialled: M.-A.E.
   
                 CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE DE MEYER
   
                             (Translation)
   
       In  the  disputed article Mr Castells drew up a  long  list  of
   murders  and  attacks  carried out in the Basque  Country  <1>  and
   denounced  the impunity, described by him as outrageous (insultante
   impunidad),  enjoyed by their perpetrators <2>.  He  complained  of
   the  inaction  of  the authorities <3>, who, he alleged,  had  done
   nothing  to  identify  them,  although  the  same  authorities  had
   displayed  great  diligence "in other cases" (en  otros  supuestos)
   <4>.  He  saw this as evidence of collusion with the guilty parties
   <5>   and   attributed  responsibility  for  "these  acts"   (estas
   acciones) to the Government and its supporters <6>.
   --------------------------------
       <1>  Paragraph  48  of the judgment. See the first  and  second
   paragraphs of the article (paragraph 7 of the judgment).
       <2>  Title  of  the article and paragraphs 45  and  48  of  the
   judgment.
       <3> Paragraph 39 of the judgment.
       <4>  See  in particular the third and sixth paragraphs  of  the
   article.
       <5> Paragraph 39 of the judgment.
       <6>  Last paragraph of the article and paragraphs 39 and 45  of
   the judgment.
   
       These were undoubtedly serious accusations <*>.
   --------------------------------
       <*> Paragraph 45 of the judgment.
   
       In   levelling   them,  however,  he  was  merely  legitimately
   exercising his right to freedom of opinion and of expression.  This
   right  was  infringed  in  the case before  the  Court  because  Mr
   Castells  was  prosecuted  and convicted  for  having  written  and
   published  his  views  on  a question of  general  interest;  in  a
   "democratic  society"  it  is  not acceptable  that  a  citizen  be
   punished for doing this.
       In  this  connection it makes no difference whether Mr Castells
   was  right or wrong. The question of the defence of truth  was  not
   relevant  in relation to his assessment of the situation <*>;  this
   is  especially  so because the murders and attacks referred  to  in
   the  article really occurred and the impunity of their perpetrators
   does not even seem to have been denied.
   --------------------------------
       <*>  See on this point the separate opinion of Mr Pekkanen,  p.
   29  below,  and, mutatis mutandis, the Lingens v. Austria  judgment
   of 8 July 1986, Series A no. 103, pp. 27-28, paras. 45 and 46.
   
       It may be worth adding that as far as insults, false accusation
   and  defamation  are concerned there are no grounds  for  affording
   better  protection to the institutions than to individuals,  or  to
   the Government than the opposition <*>.
   --------------------------------
       <*>  I  cannot therefore approve the "strengthened  protection"
   afforded  the Government under Articles 161 and 162 of the  Spanish
   Criminal Code (paragraph 20 of the judgment).
   
                 CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE PEKKANEN
   
       In his article Mr Castells firstly enumerated a list of murders
   and  attacks  carried out in the Basque Country and  stressed  that
   they  still  remained unsolved and unpunished. He also  evoked  the
   involvement  of  various  extreme  right-wing  organisations.  From
   these  facts he then drew the conclusion that: "Behind  these  acts
   there  can only be the Government, the party of the Government  and
   their personnel".
       Mr  Castells was sentenced by the Supreme Court for  proffering
   insults  of a less serious kind against the Government. The Supreme
   Court  found inter alia that the insults proffered with the aim  of
   political  criticism had exceeded the permissible  limits  of  such
   criticism  and attacked the Government's honour. The Supreme  Court
   was  also  of  the  opinion  that the defence  of  truth  (exceptio
   veritatis) was not admissible in such cases under Spanish law.
       The  Court  attached decisive importance to the fact  that  the
   Supreme  Court of Spain declared the defence of truth  inadmissible
   for  the  offence in question. Unfortunately I am unable to  accept
   this  opinion.  The  decisive fact for a violation  of  Article  10
   (art.  10)  of the Convention is, in my view, that Mr Castells  was
   punished   for   holding  the  opinion  that  the  Government   was
   responsible for the incidents in question and publishing it.
       With  regard  to the question of exceptio veritatis,  which  is
   discussed  at length in the judgment, I consider that  it  was  not
   possible  for Mr Castells to prove the truthfulness of his opinion,
   an  opinion  expressed as part of a political debate and  affirming
   that  the  Government  was  behind  the  murders  and  attacks   in
   question.  Exceptio  veritatis is therefore  not  relevant  in  the
   instant case. For a finding of a violation of Article 10 (art.  10)
   of  the  Convention it is sufficient that Mr Castells was  punished
   for  criticising the Government when he had done so in a way  which
   should be allowed in a democratic society.
   
             CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE CARRILLO SALCEDO
   
       I  fully share the views expressed by the Court at paragraph 46
   of   the  judgment.  I  should  like  to  stress  that  freedom  of
   expression  constitutes  one  of the  essential  foundations  of  a
   democratic society. But I must also emphasise that the exercise  of
   that   freedom   "carries  with  it  duties  and  responsibilities"
   (Article 10 para. 2 of the Convention) (art. 10-2), and that, in  a
   situation  where  politically motivated violence poses  a  constant
   threat  to  the  lives  and  security  of  the  population,  it  is
   particularly  difficult  to  strike  a  fair  balance  between  the
   requirements   of   protecting  freedom  of  expression   and   the
   imperatives of protecting the democratic State.
       By  providing,  in  Article 10 para. 2 (art.  10-2),  that  the
   exercise  of  the  freedom of expression and the  freedom  to  hold
   opinions  and to receive and impart information and ideas  "may  be
   subject  to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties
   as  are  prescribed  by  law  and are  necessary  in  a  democratic
   society",  the  Convention recognises that these freedoms  are  not
   absolute.  Moreover, the Convention also recognises  the  principle
   that  no  group or person has the right to pursue activities  which
   aim  at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms enshrined
   in  it  (Article  17) (art. 17); that implies in  addition,  in  my
   view, positive obligations for the States parties.
       Therefore,  it  remains open to the States to  adopt  measures,
   even of a criminal law nature, intended to react appropriately  and
   without   excess,  that  is,  in  conformity  with  the  Convention
   requirements,   to   defamatory  accusations  devoid   of   factual
   foundation or formulated in bad faith.
   
   

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