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ПОСТАНОВЛЕНИЕ ЕВРОПЕЙСКОГО СУДА ПО ПРАВАМ ЧЕЛОВЕКА ОТ 26.03.1992 БЕЛЬДЖУДИ (BELDJOUDI) ПРОТИВ ФРАНЦИИ [РУС. (ИЗВЛЕЧЕНИЕ), АНГЛ.]

(по состоянию на 20 октября 2006 года)

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                                               [неофициальный перевод]
   
                  ЕВРОПЕЙСКИЙ СУД ПО ПРАВАМ ЧЕЛОВЕКА
                                   
                           СУДЕБНОЕ РЕШЕНИЕ
                 БЕЛЬДЖУДИ (BELDJOUDI) ПРОТИВ ФРАНЦИИ
                                   
                    (Страсбург, 26 марта 1992 года)
   
                             (Извлечение)
   
          КРАТКОЕ НЕОФИЦИАЛЬНОЕ ИЗЛОЖЕНИЕ ОБСТОЯТЕЛЬСТВ ДЕЛА
   
                           A. Основные факты
   
       Г-н Моханд Бельджуди родился во Франции в 1950 г., его родители
   -  выходцы из Алжира, как и он, потеряли французское гражданство  в
   1963  г., после обретения Алжиром независимости. Г-н Бельджуди  был
   воспитан   во  Франции  и  всегда  там  проживал  либо  со   своими
   родителями,  либо  с  гражданкой Франции  г-жой  Мартин  Бельджуди,
   урожденной  Тейшен,  с которой он состоит в браке  с  1970  г.  Его
   родители, а также пять братьев и сестер проживают во Франции.
       В  1969, 1974, 1977 и 1978 гг. он осуждался за разные уголовные
   преступления, в т.ч. и за кражу с отягчающими обстоятельствами,  за
   что был приговорен к восьми годам тюремного заключения.
       В  ноябре  1979 г. министр внутренних дел издал распоряжение  о
   его  высылке  из  страны на том основании, что его  присутствие  на
   территории  Франции  представляет  угрозу  общественному   порядку.
   Жалоба    г-на   Бельджуди   на   это   решение   была    отклонена
   административным  судом Версаля в апреле 1988  г.  Тем  временем  в
   1986  г.  г-н Бельджуди привлекался к суду за другие правонарушения
   и  безуспешно  пытался получить французское гражданство  в  1983  и
   1984  гг.  18  января  1991 г. Государственный совет  отклонил  его
   жалобу на решение административного суда и распоряжение министра  о
   его  высылке из страны. Данное распоряжение еще не выполнено,  т.к.
   г-н  Бельджуди ожидает вызова в суд в департаменте Верхняя  Сена  и
   находится  под  судебным  надзором,  в  частности  по  обвинению  в
   укрывательстве краденого товара при отягчающих обстоятельствах.
   
           B. Разбирательство в Комиссии по правам человека
   
       В  жалобе,  поданной  в Комиссию 28 марта  1986  г.,  заявитель
   утверждал,  что  решение  о его высылке нарушает  несколько  статей
   Конвенции: 8, 3 и 9, 12 и 14 в сочетании со статьей 8. Жалоба  была
   объявлена  приемлемой  11  июля 1989 г. После  безуспешных  попыток
   урегулировать  дело мировым соглашением сторон 6 сентября  1990  г.
   Комиссия  подготовила  доклад, в котором  установлены  факты  и  ее
   выводы о том:
       a)  что высылка г-на Бельджуди является нарушением его права  и
   права  г-жи Бельджуди на уважение их семейной жизни в смысле статьи
   8  Конвенции  (двенадцать  голосов против  пяти),  но  не  является
   нарушением статьи 3 (единогласно);
       b) что не было нарушения статьи 14 в сочетании со статьей 8 или
   статьями 9 и 12 (единогласно).
       Данное дело передано Комиссией в Суд 12 ноября 1990 г.
   
                    ИЗВЛЕЧЕНИЕ ИЗ СУДЕБНОГО РЕШЕНИЯ
   
                             ВОПРОСЫ ПРАВА
   
                I. О предполагаемом нарушении статьи 8
   
       65.  По  мнению  заявителей, решение о высылке из  страны  г-на
   Бельджуди  является посягательством на их личную и семейную  жизнь.
   Они ссылаются на статью 8 Конвенции, которая гласит:
       "1.  Каждый  человек  имеет  право на  уважение  его  личной  и
   семейной   жизни,   неприкосновенности   его   жилища    и    тайны
   корреспонденции.
       2.  Не  допускается  вмешательство со  стороны  государственных
   органов  в осуществление этого права, за исключением вмешательства,
   предусмотренного законом и необходимого в демократическом  обществе
   в    интересах   государственной   безопасности   и   общественного
   спокойствия,   экономического  благосостояния   страны,   в   целях
   предотвращения  беспорядков или преступлений, для  охраны  здоровья
   или нравственности или защиты прав и свобод других лиц".
       Правительство  оспаривает  это положение,  тогда  как  Комиссия
   разделяет  его,  по  крайней  мере в той  части,  которая  касается
   семейной жизни.
   
                           A. Статья 8 п. 1
   
       66.  Прежде  всего  Правительство выразило сомнения  по  поводу
   наличия  действительной семейной жизни между, с одной  стороны,  г-
   ном  Бельджуди  и,  с  другой  стороны, его  родителями,  братьями,
   сестрами и его супругой.
       В  дальнейшем Правительство не поднимало больше этот  вопрос  в
   Суде.
       67. Как и Комиссия, Суд считает, что такая мера, как высылка из
   страны, представляет собой вмешательство государственных органов  в
   осуществление  заявителями  права на уважение  их  семейной  жизни,
   гарантированного статьей 8 п. 1.
   
                           B. Статья 8 п. 2
   
       68.  В  связи  с  этим  следует  определить,  соответствует  ли
   оспариваемая  высылка  требованиям  п.  2,  т.е.  является  ли  она
   "предусмотренной  законом", направлена ли на достижение  одной  или
   нескольких   правомерных  целей,  которые  в  нем  перечислены,   и
   "необходимой  в  демократическом  обществе"  для  реализации   этих
   целей.
   
                      1. "Предусмотрено законом"
   
       69.  Суд  и  стороны отмечают, что распоряжение министра  от  2
   ноября  1979  г. основывается на статье 23 Ордонанса  от  2  ноября
   1945  г.  об  условиях въезда и пребывания иностранцев  во  Франции
   (см.  п.  43  выше).  Государственный совет  подтвердил  законность
   распоряжения своим Решением от 18 января 1991 г. (см. п. 28 выше).
   
                          2. Правомерная цель
   
       70.   Правительство   и  Комиссия  считают,   что   обсуждаемое
   вмешательство преследует цели, абсолютно совместимые с  Конвенцией:
   "защита   публичного  порядка"  и  "предотвращение   преступлений".
   Заявители не оспаривают данное положение.
       Суд пришел к такому же заключению.
   
              3. "Необходимо в демократическом обществе"
   
       71.  По утверждению заявителей, высылка г-на Бельджуди не может
   считаться "необходимой в демократическом обществе".
       Они  ссылаются,  в  частности, на ряд обстоятельств.  Заявитель
   родился  во  Франции  от  родителей -  выходцев  из  Алжира,  тогда
   французской территории, он всегда жил во Франции, так же,  как  его
   братья  и  сестры  (см.  п.  9 выше); он  заявляет,  что  не  знает
   арабского  языка, вырос в условиях французской культуры  и  получил
   французское  образование; в 1970 г. он женился на француженке  (см.
   п.  10,  11  выше),  которой  придется покинуть  родину,  чтобы  не
   расставаться  с  мужем;  он  пользовался  статусом  француза  до  3
   февраля 1972 г., т.е. до даты получения официального уведомления  о
   декрете    премьер-министра,   отказавшего   ему   во   французском
   гражданстве   (см.  п.  32  выше);  в  начале   1994   г.   префект
   департамента   Верхняя  Сена  предложил  ему   временный   вид   на
   жительство (см. п. 22 выше), а министром внутренних дел 31  августа
   1989  г.  ему  было предоставлено право на жительство  (см.  п.  16
   выше);  его высылка из страны стала бы невозможной, если бы  Законы
   от  29  октября 1981 г. и 9 сентября 1986 г. вступили в силу раньше
   (см. п. 44, 45 выше).
       Короче  говоря, г-н Бельджуди, который отнюдь не  считает  себя
   "иммигрантом во втором поколении", и его жена утверждают,  что  все
   их  семейные, социальные, культурные и языковые корни находятся  во
   Франции.  Они  ссылаются на отсутствие чрезвычайных  обстоятельств,
   способных служить основанием для высылки.
       72.  Комиссия  в  основном соглашается с  данным  утверждением,
   вместе  с  тем  она особо выделяет два дополнительных момента.  Во-
   первых,  г-жа  Бельджуди  вполне  могла  иметь  веские  причины  не
   следовать  за  своим мужем в Алжир, тем более что в  момент  выхода
   замуж  она  думала,  что  будет жить с ним во  Франции.  Во-вторых,
   правонарушения, совершенные г-ном Бельджуди (до и после  решения  о
   высылке),   по  всей  вероятности,  не  таковы,  чтобы  соображения
   публичного порядка взяли верх над уважением семейной жизни.
       73.  Правительство, в свою очередь, ссылается прежде  всего  на
   характер  деяний, являющихся основанием для высылки из страны.  Оно
   обращает   внимание  на  множественность  и  тяжесть  преступлений,
   совершенных заявителем (в совершеннолетнем возрасте) на  протяжении
   пятнадцати  лет  (см.  п.  12 выше). Оно отмечает  также  суровость
   наказаний,   наложенных  французскими  судами,  и,   в   частности,
   приговор,  вынесенный судом ассизов департамента Верхняя Сена  (см.
   п.  12  выше). В целом все эти приговоры предусматривают  более  10
   лет   лишения   свободы.  Правительство  отмечает,   наконец,   что
   заявитель   продолжал  преступную  деятельность   после   получения
   уведомления   о   высылке,  и  в  настоящий  момент   находится   в
   предварительном   заключении  по  обвинению  в  совершении   нового
   преступления  (см.  п.  12,  14 выше). В целом,  опасность  деяний,
   совершаемых  г-ном Бельджуди, делает невозможным для  общества  его
   пребывание на французской территории.
       Правительство  считает  также, что  не  следует  преувеличивать
   степень  вмешательства. Оно затрагивает семейную  жизнь  заявителей
   только  в  качестве супругов. Г-н Бельджуди с 1969 г. не  проживает
   совместно со своими родителями и не поддерживает материально  своих
   братьев   и  сестер.  Кроме  того,  у  него  нет  детей.   Супругам
   приходилось в течение продолжительного времени проживать  раздельно
   вследствие  пребывания  г-на Бельджуди в местах  заключения.  Кроме
   того,   г-н   Бельджуди  не  доказал,  что  его  жена,   если   ему
   действительно  придется  покинуть  территорию  Франции,  не  сможет
   последовать  за  ним  либо в Алжир, где, как известно,  сохранились
   многочисленные  связи  с  Францией,  либо  в  какое-нибудь   третье
   государство.  В конечном счете трудности обосноваться где-либо  вне
   Франции,   без  разрыва  семейных  отношений,  вовсе  не   являются
   непреодолимыми.
       74.  Суд признает, что в обязанность государств - членов входит
   обеспечение  публичного  порядка,  а  также  контроля  за  въездом,
   пребыванием  и  высылкой  лиц, не являющихся  гражданами  страны  в
   соответствии  с  установившимся принципом  международного  права  и
   обязательствами,  вытекающими из договоров  (см.  Решения  по  делу
   Абдулазиз,  Кабаль и Балкандали против Соединенного Королевства  от
   28  мая  1985  г.  Серия A, т. 94, с. 34, п. 67, по  делу  Беррехаб
   против Нидерландов от 21 июня 1988 г. Серия А, т. 138, с. 15 -  16,
   п.  28,  29, по делу Мустаким против Бельгии от 18 февраля 1991  г.
   Серия A, т. 193, с. 19, п. 43).
       Вместе с тем, учитывая, что их решения по данному вопросу могут
   нарушить  право,  закрепленное в статье 8 п.  1,  они  должны  быть
   необходимыми  в демократическом обществе, т.е. должны оправдываться
   насущной  общественной потребностью и, кроме того, быть  соразмерны
   преследуемой цели.
       75.  В  данном  конкретном случае уголовное  прошлое  Бельджуди
   представляется   более   тяжелым,  чем   прошлое   Мустакима   (см.
   вышеупомянутое   Решение).  Правительство  совершенно   справедливо
   обращает  на это внимание. В связи с этим важно выяснить,  являются
   ли  остальные  обстоятельства дела - обоих  заявителей  вместе  или
   только  одного  из  них - достаточными, чтобы служить  противовесом
   этому серьезному обстоятельству.
       76.   Заявители  подали  одну  совместную  жалобу  и  высказали
   одинаковые  претензии.  Учитывая их  возраст,  а  также  отсутствие
   детей,  оспариваемое  вмешательство касается в  первую  очередь  их
   совместной   семейной  жизни  в  качестве  супругов.  Правительство
   резонно обращает внимание на это обстоятельство.
       Между  тем  их брак был заключен во Франции более 20  лет  тому
   назад,  и  Франция  всегда  была местом  проживания  их  семьи.  Не
   вызывает    сомнения,   что   продолжительные   периоды    времени,
   проведенные г-ном Бельджуди в местах заключения, надолго  разлучали
   супругов,  но  они  тем не менее не разрушили  их  семейную  жизнь,
   право на которую гарантировано в статье 8.
       77. Г-н Бельджуди, лицо, подлежащее высылке, родился во Франции
   от  родителей, которые в тот момент имели французское  гражданство;
   он  сам имел французское гражданство до 1 января 1963 г. Считается,
   что  он  потерял  право на французское гражданство в  этот  момент,
   т.к.  его  родители  не  подали до 27 марта  1967  г.  заявление  о
   сохранении  за  ним французского гражданства (см. п.  9  выше).  Не
   следует,    однако,   забывать,   что,   будучи    в    то    время
   несовершеннолетним, заявитель не мог лично высказать  свое  мнение.
   Кроме  того, уже в 1970 г., т.е. через год после первой  судимости,
   но  вместе  с  тем  за  9 лет до вынесения решения  о  высылке,  он
   выразил  желание вновь обрести французское гражданство; призванный,
   по  его  просьбе,  в вооруженные силы Франции в  1971  г.,  он  был
   признан  французскими военными властями пригодным к несению военной
   службы (см. п. 31, 33 выше).
       Более  того, заявитель женился на француженке. Все его  близкие
   родственники  сохраняли французское гражданство до  1  января  1963
   г., сам он живет во Франции вот уже несколько десятков лет.
       Наконец,  вся  жизнь,  более 40 лет, г-на Бельджуди  прошла  во
   Франции;  он  учился во французской школе и, по всей видимости,  не
   знает  арабского  языка. Единственное, что, по-видимому,  связывает
   его с Алжиром, - это его национальность.
       78. Что касается г-жи Бельджуди, то она родилась во Франции, от
   родителей  -  французов,  всю  жизнь прожила  во  Франции  и  имеет
   французское  гражданство. Если бы она последовала  за  своим  мужем
   после  его  высылки  из страны, то ей пришлось бы  обосноваться  за
   границей,  вероятнее всего в Алжире, в государстве,  язык  которого
   она,  скорее  всего, не знает. Такая резкая смена обстановки  могла
   бы  создать  ей  значительные трудности,  вызванные  необходимостью
   адаптироваться   к   новым  условиям,  и   породила   бы   реальные
   препятствия    практического    и    даже    юридического    плана.
   Правительственный    комиссар    признал    это    на     заседании
   Государственного  совета  (см.  п.  27  выше).  В  связи   с   этим
   оспариваемое  вмешательство могло бы нарушить единство  или,  может
   быть, даже само существование семьи.
       79. С учетом всех этих обстоятельств, очевидно, что в отношении
   соблюдения права заявителей на семейную жизнь решение о высылке  г-
   на  Бельджуди,  в случае его исполнения, оказалось бы несоразмерным
   преследуемой  правомерной цели и тем самым была бы нарушена  статья
   8.
       80. Данный вывод освобождает Суд от необходимости рассматривать
   вопрос,  является  ли  высылка  из страны  также  нарушением  права
   заявителей на личную жизнь.
   
               II. О предполагаемом нарушении статьи 14
                       в сочетании со статьей 8
   
       81.  В  связи со сделанным выше в п. 79 выводом Суд не  считает
   нужным  рассматривать  и жалобу заявителей  на  то,  что  в  случае
   высылки    г-на    Бельджуди   они   подвергнутся    дискриминации,
   противоречащей статье 14.
   
           III. О предполагаемом нарушении статей 3, 9 и 12
   
       82.  При рассмотрении дела в Комиссии заявители сослались также
   на статьи 3, 9 и 12.
       В  дальнейшем  они не ссылались на них в Суде, поэтому  Суд  не
   считает себя обязанным рассматривать эти вопросы.
   
                       IV. Применение статьи 50
   
       83. В соответствии со статьей 50,
       "Если  Суд  установит, что решение или мера, принятые судебными
   или  иными властями Высокой Договаривающейся Стороны, полностью или
   частично   противоречат  обязательствам,  вытекающим  из  настоящей
   Конвенции,  а  также  если  внутреннее  право  упомянутой   Стороны
   допускает лишь частичное возмещение последствий такого решения  или
   такой  меры,  то  Решением  Суда, если в этом  есть  необходимость,
   предусматривается справедливое возмещение потерпевшей стороне".
       На  основании  этого  положения  заявители  требуют  возмещения
   понесенного ущерба и судебных расходов.
       84.  Ни одно из положений статьи 8 на настоящий момент не  было
   нарушено.  Тем  не  менее  Суд пришел  к  заключению,  что  решение
   выслать  г-на Бельджуди повлекло бы за собой таковое, если  бы  оно
   было  принято  к исполнению. Исходя из этого следует  рассматривать
   статью  50  как  применимую к данному случаю (см. mutatis  mutandis
   Решение по делу Серинга от 7 июля 1989 г. Серия A, т. 161,  с.  49,
   п. 126).
   
                         A. Возмещение ущерба
   
       85.   Считая  себя  понесшими  ущерб  в  результате   нарушения
   Конвенции,  г-н и г-жа Бельджуди требуют выплатить  им  в  качестве
   возмещения 10000000 французских франков.
       Правительство  находит эту сумму абсолютно  беспрецедентной  и,
   главное, необоснованной, поскольку мера по выдворению из страны  не
   была осуществлена.
       Представитель   Комиссии   также  считает   данное   требование
   чрезмерно  завышенным.  Он  предлагает  тем  не  менее  в  качестве
   возмещения  морального  вреда приемлемую сумму,  меньшую,  чем  та,
   которую  получил  г-н  Мустаким, вынужденный  после  выдворения  из
   Бельгии проживать несколько лет за ее пределами.
       86.  Заявителям  был  нанесен  моральный  вред.  Вместе  с  тем
   настоящее Решение Суда является его достаточным возмещением.
   
                    B. Судебные издержки и расходы
   
       87. Г-н и г-жа Бельджуди ходатайствуют о возмещении им судебных
   издержек  и  расходов, которые они, по их утверждению,  понесли  во
   время  рассмотрения  дела  в  органах Конвенции,  а  именно  100000
   французских франков.
       По  утверждению  Правительства, счет, представленный  от  имени
   заявителей,  грешит  неточностью.  Вместе  с  тем  сумма  в   40000
   франков,  по-видимому,  может  быть  приемлемой,  если  только   не
   возникнут особые обстоятельства, установленные надлежащим образом.
       88.  Учитывая  изложенные  в  последующем  обстоятельства,  Суд
   считает  справедливым  определить для  этих  целей  сумму  в  60000
   французских франков.
   
                        ПО ЭТИМ ОСНОВАНИЯМ СУД
   
       1.  Постановил семью голосами против двух, что нарушение статьи
   8  по  отношению к обоим заявителям имело бы место, если бы решение
   выслать г-на Бельджуди было исполнено;
       2.  Постановил восемью голосами против одного, что не требуется
   рассматривать дело ни в свете статьи 14 в сочетании со  статьей  8,
   ни в свете статей 3, 9 и 12;
       3.   Постановил   единогласно  по  поводу  морального   ущерба,
   понесенного  заявителями, что данное Решение само по себе  является
   справедливым и достаточным возмещением для целей статьи 50;
       4.  Постановил  единогласно, что государство - ответчик  должно
   выплатить  заявителям в трехмесячный срок 60000 (шестьдесят  тысяч)
   французских  франков  в  качестве возмещения  судебных  издержек  и
   расходов;
       5.  Отклонил единогласно требование заявителей о выплате суммы,
   превышающей данную.
   
       Совершено  на  английском и французском языках  и  оглашено  во
   Дворце прав человека в Страсбурге 26 мая 1992 г.
   
                                                          Председатель
                                                         Рольф РИССДАЛ
   
                                                                Грефье
                                                     Марк-Андре ЭЙССЕН
   
   
   
   
   
   
       В  соответствии со статьей 51 п. 2 Конвенции и статьей 53 п.  2
   Регламента  Суда к настоящему Решению прилагаются отдельные  мнения
   судей.
   
                      ОСОБОЕ МНЕНИЕ СУДЬИ ПЕТТИТИ
   
       В  отличие от большинства я не голосовал за признание нарушения
   статьи 8.
       Совершенно  очевидно, что вынесенное Решение имеет ограниченное
   значение  и  обусловлено особыми обстоятельствами:  на  сегодняшний
   момент  г-н Бельджуди прожил во Франции 41 год и 22 года  женат  на
   француженке.  Тем  не  менее ни принципиальный  подход,  ни  мотивы
   Решения, как мне кажется, в точности не соответствуют толкованию  и
   оценке  статьи 8 Конвенции в части, касающейся высылки  иностранцев
   - преступников.
       Большинство  судей учитывало, что распоряжение о высылке  от  2
   ноября 1979 г. дано до осуждения заявителя в 1978 г. и 1986 г.,  но
   основывалось  также на том дополнительном критерии,  что  заявителю
   было  отказано в получении гражданства в 1970 г. и что  у  него  не
   было  связей  с  Алжиром.  Оно считает,  что  высылка  несоразмерна
   правомерной   цели,   не   уточняя   при   этом   параметров   этой
   несоразмерности,   о  чем  говорится  в  решении   Государственного
   совета.
       Конвенция   не   ограничивает  суверенного   права   государств
   принимать  решение  о  высылке со своей  территории  иностранцев  -
   правонарушителей и преступников.
       Конвенция   не   гарантирует  как  таковое  право   иностранцев
   пребывать  на территории государств - участников. Право  убежища  и
   право  не быть высланным не фигурируют также как таковые и в  числе
   прав  и  свобод, гарантированных Конвенцией (многие решения  такого
   плана были приняты Комиссией).
       Только  при  исключительных обстоятельствах высылка  из  страны
   может  явиться  нарушением  Конвенции, например,  когда  существует
   серьезная угроза того, что высылаемое лицо в том государстве,  куда
   его    высылают,   подвергнется   бесчеловечному   или   унижающему
   достоинство   обращению,  особенно  если  нет  никакой  возможности
   выслать  это  лицо в какое-либо иное государство. Постановление  по
   делу  Мустакима  имело иной характер, т.к. речь  шла  о  подростке,
   который  был  связан только с той страной, где жила  его  семья,  и
   который вернулся в это общество.
       В  деле  Бельджуди  обстоятельства  совершенно  иные:  взрослый
   рецидивист;  личность,  нарушающая публичный  порядок.  Его  случай
   вполне отвечает законным требованиям выдворения из страны.
       Помимо  всего  прочего,  он  отказался  приобрести  французское
   гражданство при вступлении в брак с француженкой.
       Европейский суд исходил, по всей видимости, из непредоставления
   заявителю   французского  гражданства.  Рассуждать  таким   образом
   означает  забыть,  что Эвианские соглашения являются  международным
   договором.  Вопросы гражданства, в т.ч. и возможности  его  выбора,
   были  определены совместно Францией и Алжиром. Таким  образом,  это
   не  одностороннее решение Франции. Алжир также потребовал для  себя
   возможности выбора и широко пользуется правом выдворять  из  страны
   правонарушителей - французов, даже если они родились  и  выросли  в
   Алжире.   Такого   рода   двусторонний  договор   основывается   на
   взаимности   и   международном  публичном  праве.  Францию   нельзя
   обвинить  в нарушении Европейской конвенции о защите прав человека,
   если  исходить  из  того, что в решении вопроса о гражданстве  г-на
   Бельджуди  она  опиралась на Эвианские соглашения  и  на  Кодекс  о
   гражданстве.  Кроме  того, как и любое другое государство,  Франция
   суверенна в вопросах предоставления гражданства или отказа в нем.
       Большинство судей, по-видимому, считали г-на Бельджуди "как  бы
   французом", а такого понятия в международном праве не существует.
       Факт  постоянного  проживания  либо  пребывания  в  принимающей
   стране  не  может  быть  безусловным  препятствием,  противоречащим
   осуществлению  права  на  высылку  правонарушителей.   Не   следует
   считать,  что  особые  отношения,  существующие  между  Францией  и
   Алжиром,  сами  по  себе  могут быть препятствием  для  высылки  из
   страны,  поскольку и в других государствах - членах  Совета  Европы
   имеются   подобного   рода   ситуации,  связанные   с   исторически
   сложившимися   отношениями,  например   между   Великобританией   и
   выходцами  из  стран  Содружества,  и  т.д.,  где  подобного   рода
   отношения  не  являются  препятствием  для  высылки  из  страны  на
   законных основаниях.
       Государства  -  члены Совета Европы достаточно  часто  высылают
   правонарушителей. Единственно возможным общим исключением  из  этой
   практики  может  быть  ссылка  на статью  3  либо,  при  длительном
   периоде пребывания в стране, можно сослаться на статью 8.
       Большинство  судей,  несомненно, принимают  во  внимание  такой
   немаловажный   аспект,   как   прошлые   судимости   и    поведение
   правонарушителя.  При  этом, исходя из критерия  соразмерности,  на
   одной  чаше  весов оказывается этот аспект его жизни, а  на  другой
   его  личная  и  семейная  жизнь.  Между  тем  следовало  бы  точнее
   сбалансировать эти два аспекта, Европейский суд это делает в  общих
   чертах.   В   рассматриваемом  Решении  не  уточняется  тот   порог
   общественной  опасности и возможных рецидивов,  по  которому  можно
   определить,  следует или нет высылать иностранца - правонарушителя.
   Как  явствует  из  Решения, большинство посчитало также,  что  если
   высылка  будет осуществлена, то заявитель окажется именно в Алжире,
   что отнюдь не очевидно.
       В   отличие  от  выдворений  в  административном  порядке,   не
   связанных  с  преступной  деятельностью (хотя  и  они  могут  иметь
   драматические  последствия для семейной жизни), серьезная  проблема
   высылки   иностранцев  -  правонарушителей  вызывает  озабоченность
   Европейского Экономического Сообщества, Совета Европы и  Интерпола.
   В  этой  связи  необходимо выработать общую  европейскую  политику,
   отвечающую  духу  Конвенции  о  защите  прав  человека  и  основных
   свобод.
       Решение  большинства  является,  по  моему  мнению,  источником
   противоречий  вследствие  расширительного  толкования  статьи  8  в
   вопросе  о  том, является ли вмешательство в частную либо  семейную
   жизнь  правонарушителя  - рецидивиста обстоятельством,  достаточным
   для  того,  чтобы помешать высылке из страны; в этом случае  статус
   рецидивиста  является  для него своего рода  иммунитетом.  В  самом
   деле,  как  и содержание под стражей, всякое выдворение  из  страны
   затрагивает  частную  или  семейную  жизнь.  Между  тем   нарушение
   частной  жизни  в  данном  конкретном деле  происходит  в  связи  с
   поведением самого правонарушителя.
       Каждое  государство самостоятельно определяет свою  политику  в
   борьбе  с  правонарушениями, так же, как и тяжесть  наказаний.  Для
   многих    государств   высылка   служит   показательным   примером,
   сопровождающим   наказание.   В  странах,   где   проживает   много
   иностранцев,  эта  мера  в большей степени,  чем  угроза  тюремного
   заключения,   является   барьером   на   пути   совершения    новых
   преступлений; она укрепляет также национальное согласие  в  вопросе
   о  приеме  новых  иммигрантов, которые  своим  трудом  способствуют
   процветанию  нации. Высылка из страны, в том виде, как она  принята
   в  криминологии и уголовной политике, является также и мерой защиты
   потенциальных   жертв  рецидивистов,  особенно   в   странах,   где
   наблюдается  резкий  рост  преступлений и существует  разветвленная
   сеть организованной преступности.
       Конвенция  о защите прав человека не может не признавать  такой
   параметр, как права других лиц и необходимость их защиты.  Конечно,
   в   данном  случае  было  бы  предпочтительнее,  чтобы  французское
   Правительство,  учитывая  новые нормы (более  близкие  к  статье  8
   Конвенции),  содержащиеся в Законах от 29 октября 1981  г.  (статьи
   23,  25)  и  от 2 августа 1989 г., отказалось бы в этом  конкретном
   деле  от выдворения данного лица, приняв во внимание положение  его
   супруги  -  француженки. Европейский суд, осуществляя  контроль  за
   высылкой  из  страны, мог бы применять либо статью  6,  если  имеет
   место  нарушение  внутренней процедуры с точки  зрения  Европейской
   конвенции  о  защите прав человека, либо статью 3 (бесчеловечное  и
   унижающее достоинство обращение). Понятие равновесия интересов  при
   возможном  и  неочевидном  применении  статьи  8  требует  строгого
   критерия  соразмерности, который, по моему  мнению,  отсутствует  в
   мотивировочной части Решения по делу Бельджуди.
       Право  государства  выдворять иностранцев - правонарушителей  и
   преступников    призвано   сбалансировать   широкие    возможности,
   предоставленные мигрантам и лицам, пользующимся правом на  убежище,
   что  является важным моментом международной солидарности  и  защиты
   прав человека.
   
                   ОТДЕЛЬНОЕ МНЕНИЕ СУДЬИ ДЕ МЕЙЕРА
   
       Как  и  большинство  моих коллег, я считаю,  что  произошло  бы
   нарушение  основных прав заявителей, "если бы решение выдворить  г-
   на Бельджуди из страны было исполнено".
       Но о каком праве или о каких правах идет речь?
       Наш  коллега  господин  Мартенс совершенно  справедливо  ставил
   вопрос  о  том,  что данное дело не затрагивает права  на  уважение
   частной жизни, равно как и права на семейную жизнь.
       Я в значительной мере поддерживаю его замечания.
       Мне   кажется  тем  не  менее,  что,  учитывая  обстоятельства,
   упомянутые  в  пунктах  77  и  78  данного  Решения,  высылка  г-на
   Бельджуди по отношению к обоим заявителям представляла бы собой  не
   только  недопустимое вмешательство в их частную и  семейную  жизнь,
   но и, прежде всего, бесчеловечное обращение.
       Так  обстояло бы дело, причем не в отдаленном будущем,  имея  в
   виду,  что  их ожидало в Алжире, в данном случае речь  идет  не  об
   этом,  а вполне реально, учитывая, что г-на Бельджуди выдворили  бы
   из  страны,  в которой он прожил более 40 лет и которая практически
   всегда  была  "его" с самого рождения, даже если он и не  имеет  ее
   "гражданства".  И  если  верно, что,  как  явствует  из  дела,  г-н
   Бельджуди был осужден за многочисленные правонарушения, по  большей
   части   достаточно  серьезные,  и  еще  сегодня   подозревается   в
   совершении   других,  то  применения  уголовного   законодательства
   достаточно, чтобы наказать его за содеянное.
   
                    ОСОБОЕ МНЕНИЕ СУДЬИ ВАЛЬТИКОСА
   
       К  сожалению,  я  должен  выразить свое  несогласие  с  мнением
   большинства  судей,  которые посчитали, что  в  данном  деле  имело
   место  нарушение  статьи  8  Конвенции,  в  частности  в  том,  что
   касается семейной жизни заявителя.
       Мое объяснение может быть кратким, поскольку оно основывается в
   основном  на несогласии, выраженном мною в аналогичном, хотя  и  не
   идентичном деле, касающемся молодого человека по имени Мустаким.
       Различия  между  этими двумя делами имеют двоякий  характер.  С
   одной  стороны,  в  рассматриваемом  случае  речь  идет  о  связях,
   существующих  между мужем и женой, а не о связях молодого  человека
   с  его  семьей.  С другой стороны, Мустаким совершил многочисленные
   правонарушения  относительно меньшей степени тяжести,  в  то  время
   как   в   данном   случае  речь  идет  о  повторных  насильственных
   преступлениях,  совершенных  на  протяжении  17  лет   сорокалетним
   мужчиной, приговоренным почти к 11 годам тюремного заключения.  Суд
   не  отрицает,  впрочем,  что  здесь  речь  идет  о  "гораздо  более
   тяжелом" уголовном прошлом.
       Высылка иностранцев как мера, предусмотренная для подобных дел,
   является  прерогативой государств, при этом Конвенция  ограничивает
   ее использование. (см. статьи 5 п. 1 "f" Конвенции и Протоколы N  4
   и  7)  лишь в строго определенных случаях. Данный случай к  таковым
   не относится.
       Конечно, при рассмотрении данного дела Суд обращается к понятию
   "семейная  жизнь", которая гарантируется статьей 8  Конвенции.  Суд
   считает,  что  со  стороны Правительства имело место  вмешательство
   публичной  власти в осуществление права заявителей на  уважение  их
   семейной  жизни. Тем не менее можно поставить вопрос: применима  ли
   статья 8 в деле, подобном этому? Разве она создана для того,  чтобы
   сделать  невозможным  высылку  иностранцев,  состоящих  в  браке  с
   гражданами  данного государства? Такое толкование могло бы  открыть
   путь для многих злоупотреблений.
       Во  всяком  случае  я не вижу возможности применения  статьи  8
   Конвенции   для  ограничения  прав  государств  свободно  принимать
   обоснованные  соображениями  общественной  безопасности   меры   по
   выдворению иностранцев из страны.
   
                   СОВПАДАЮЩЕЕ МНЕНИЕ СУДЬИ МАРТЕНСА
   
       1.  Я  разделяю выводы Суда, вместе с тем я бы предпочел, чтобы
   по делу г-на Бельджуди свое Решение Суд основывал:
       a) на менее казуистическом рассуждении;
       b) на нарушении права на уважение частной жизни.
       2.  Пункт  1 статьи 3 дополнительного Протокола N 4 к Конвенции
   запрещает  высылать граждан страны. В сегодняшней Европе,  где  уже
   второе   поколение  иммигрантов  <1>  воспитывает  детей   (и   где
   наблюдается    вызывающий   большую   тревогу   рост    безудержной
   ксенофобии),  уже  давно  пора  поставить  вопрос,  не  следует  ли
   распространить этот запрет на иностранцев, родившихся и выросших  в
   одном  из государств - участников либо полностью интегрированных  в
   это  общество  вследствие долгого проживания в нем  и  не  имеющих,
   таким образом, более никаких связей со страной происхождения <2>.
   --------------------------------
       <1>  Я, безусловно, отдаю себе отчет в том, что настоящее  дело
   отличается   от  рядового  случая  выдворения  иммигранта   второго
   поколения  тем, что родители г-на Бельджуди, когда они обосновались
   во  Франции,  были  не  "иммигрантами" в строгом  смысле  слова,  а
   французскими  гражданами, приехавшими жить в свою  страну.  Тем  не
   менее  мне  кажется оправданным не принимать здесь во внимание  эту
   разницу.
       <2>   Данный  вопрос  имеет,  по-видимому,  более  ограниченное
   значение  в  государствах - членах, в которых в  силу  права  земли
   иммигранты  второго  поколения имеют право на  гражданство  в  силу
   рождения   на   территории  этого  государства;  в  таком   случае,
   вероятно,   точнее   будет  говорить  о  высылке   "интегрированных
   иностранцев", а не о высылке "иммигрантов второго поколения".
   
       Я  считаю,  что  просто гражданство само по  себе  не  является
   объективным и разумным оправданием разных подходов к высылке  кого-
   либо  из  страны,  которую  в  обоих  случаях  можно  назвать   его
   "собственной   страной".  Вот  почему  я  без   колебаний   ответил
   утвердительно  на  поставленный выше вопрос.  Я  понимаю,  что  все
   большее  число  государств - членов Совета Европы согласны  с  тем,
   что   не   следует   высылать   <3>  из   страны   "интегрированных
   иностранцев",  как  и граждан страны, причем отступление  от  этого
   правила может быть оправданным лишь в исключительных случаях.
   --------------------------------
       <3>  Этот  принцип уже принят в рамках международного  Пакта  о
   гражданских и политических правах, статья 12 п. 4 которого  гласит:
   "Никто  не  может  быть  произвольно  лишен  права  въезда  в  свою
   страну";  из этого вытекает, что запрет на высылку распространяется
   не  только на граждан своего государства, но и, как это вытекает из
   формулировки  "своя  собственная страна", на всех  "интегрированных
   иностранцев"  (например,  на иммигрантов второго  поколения):  (см.
   Nowak  М. CCPR-Kommentar, Art. 12, Randnummern 45-51; Van  Dijk  et
   Van  Hoof.  De  Europese Conventie, 2nd edition, p.  551;  Velu  et
   Ergec. La Convention Eur. DH, з 372, p. 322).
   
       Моя  собственная страна входит в число этих государств <4>,  и,
   начиная  с  1981 г., за исключением периода с 1986 г. по  1989  г.,
   такое же положение дел существует во Франции <5>.
   --------------------------------
       <4>  См.  версию  1990  г.  "Circular on  Aliens":  Nederlandse
   Staatscourant".  12  maart 1990, no. 50; см.  также  на  эту  тему:
   Groenendijk.  Nederlands  Juristenblad.  1987,  p.  1341  et  seq.;
   Swart,  Preadvies, Nederlandse Juristen-vereniging. 1990, з 35,  p.
   242 et seq.
       <5> См. п. 42 - 50 Решения Суда.
   
       На  мой  взгляд, Суду следовало бы исходить в своем Решении  из
   вышеуказанного  принципа  и  сделать  заключение  об  отсутствии  в
   данном    случае    исключительных   обстоятельств,   оправдывающих
   отступление от этого принципа. При такой мотивировке Решения  можно
   было  бы  достичь  того, чего не удалось достичь Решением  по  делу
   Мустакима  <6>,  как  и настоящим Решением, а  именно  установления
   определенного  уровня правовой безопасности, которая представляется
   особенно желательной в этой области.
   --------------------------------
       <6> Решение от 18 февраля 1991 г. Серия A, т. 193.
   
       3.  Как  совершенно  справедливо  подчеркнул  г-н  Шермер  <7>,
   последнее  соображение  является также аргументом  в  пользу  того,
   чтобы  Решение Суда мотивировать, по возможности, нарушением  права
   на   частную   жизнь,  поскольку,  хотя  не  все   "интегрированные
   иностранцы", которым угрожает высылка, состоят в браке,  у  всех  у
   них есть частная жизнь.
   --------------------------------
       <7>  См.  его  совпадающее  мнение,  приложенное  к  заключению
   Комиссии по данному делу, с. 48 и 49.
   
       Я   считаю  такую  мотивировку  возможной.  Высылка  из  страны
   необратимым   образом   разрывает  все   социальные   связи   между
   высылаемым  лицом и обществом, в котором он живет, а я  думаю,  что
   все  эти связи могут быть включены в понятие частной жизни в смысле
   статьи  8.  При  поверхностном рассмотрении создается  впечатление,
   что  в  этой  статье  выражена иная точка зрения.  В  целом  в  ней
   гарантируется  иммунитет тесного круга лиц, внутри которого  каждый
   проживает  свою  собственную частную жизнь  по  своему  усмотрению.
   Понятие  "тесный круг" предполагает существование "внешнего  мира",
   который,  по  логике  вещей, не входит  в  понятие  частной  жизни.
   Однако   по  зрелом  размышлении  приходится  констатировать,   что
   понятие  "тесный  круг"  оказывается  слишком  ограниченным.  Слова
   "семейная  жизнь"  уже  расширяют этот  круг,  однако  есть  еще  и
   близкие  родственники, с которыми, в строгом смысле слова, семейной
   жизни  не  существует.  Тем  не менее отношения  с  такими  лицами,
   например со своими родителями, вне всякого сомнения входят в  сферу
   отношений,  уважение  которых гарантирует статья  8.  То  же  самое
   можно  сказать  по  поводу отношений с любовниками  и  друзьями.  Я
   разделяю,  таким  образом,  мнение Комиссии,  которая  неоднократно
   заявляла, что понятие "уважение частной жизни" "включает  также,  в
   определенной  мере,  право устанавливать  и  поддерживать  связи  с
   другими  людьми, в частности в сфере эмоциональных  отношений,  для
   развития и становления своей собственной личности" <8>.
   --------------------------------
       <8> См. inter alia D.R., т. 5, с. 86 - 87; D.R., т. 10, с. 100;
   Серия B, т. 36, с. 25 - 26.
       Если,  поступая  таким  образом, Комиссия  имела  в  виду  дать
   определение  понятия "частная жизнь" в смысле  статьи  8  (как  это
   было  предложено Doswald-Beck в Human Rights Law Journal, 1983,  p.
   288),  то  я должен выразить свое несогласие с такой формулировкой:
   "очень  трудно дать определение этого понятия", и, на  мой  взгляд,
   не наступило еще время браться за эту задачу.
   
       На  мой взгляд, Решения Суда по делу Даджен против Соединенного
   Королевства, по делу Риз против Соединенного Королевства,  по  делу
   Косси  против Соединенного Королевства и по делу Б. против  Франции
   <9>  основаны  на мысли о том, что "в определенной  мере  "внешние"
   nrmnxemh% одного человека с другими (за пределами "тесного  круга")
   относятся к области частной жизни" <10>.
   --------------------------------
       <9>  Решения  от  22 октября 1981 г., 17 октября  1986  г.,  27
   сентября 1990 г. и 25 марта 1992 г. Серия А, т. 45, 106, 184 и 232-
   С.
       <10>  См. также: Velu et Ergec. La Convention Enr. DH з 652  p.
   535 et seq.
   
       В  основе  упомянутого выше запрета высылки  своих  собственных
   граждан  лежит,  по-видимому, та же самая мысль:  когда  говорят  о
   гражданах  страны, то почти всегда в первую очередь  имеют  в  виду
   тех,   кого   с   этой   страной  связывают   особенно   тесные   и
   многочисленные   узы,   т.к.  они  родились   в   этой   стране   и
   воспитывались <11> в семье, многие поколения которой издавна  живут
   на  этой  земле <12>; по всей видимости, было сочтено неприемлемым,
   чтобы  государство, вынуждая таких лиц покинуть  страну  и  никогда
   более в нее не возвращаться, необратимо разрывало эти связи.
   --------------------------------
       <11>  См.  п.  88  Решения  Суда от 28  мая  1985  г.  по  делу
   Абдулазиз,  Кабал  и  Балкандали против  Соединенного  Королевства.
   Серия A, т. 94, с. 41.
       <12> О том, что история жизни отдельного человека и связанные с
   ним  личные  воспоминания могут относиться к тем  сферам,  уважение
   которых  гарантируется статьей 8, см. Решение Суда от 7  июля  1989
   г.  по  делу  Гаскин против Соединенного Королевства (Серия  A,  т.
   160).
   
       Резюмируя  сказанное,  я думаю, что высылка  какого-либо  лица,
   особенно  (как в данном случае) в страну, где условия  жизни  резко
   отличаются  от  тех,  к  которым он  привык,  и  где,  ощущая  себя
   иностранцем  в  обстановке  чуждой ему культуры,  он  рискует  жить
   почти  в полной социальной изоляции, является нарушением его  права
   на частную жизнь.
   
   
   
   
   
   
                    EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
                                   
                      CASE OF BELDJOUDI v. FRANCE
                                   
                               JUDGMENT
                                   
                       (Strasbourg, 26.III.1992)
   
       In the case of Beldjoudi v. France <1>,
       The European Court of Human Rights, sitting, in accordance with
   Article 43 (art. 43) of the Convention for the Protection of  Human
   Rights  and  Fundamental Freedoms ("the Convention")  <2>  and  the
   relevant  provisions of the Rules of Court, as a  Chamber  composed
   of the following judges:
   --------------------------------
       Notes by the Registrar
       <1>  The case is numbered 55/1990/246/317. The first number  is
   the  case's position on the list of cases referred to the Court  in
   the  relevant  year (second number). The last two numbers  indicate
   the  case's  position on the list of cases referred  to  the  Court
   since   its   creation  and  on  the  list  of  the   corresponding
   originating applications to the Commission.
       <2>  As amended by Article 11 of Protocol No. 8 (P8-11),  which
   came into force on 1 January 1990.
   
       Mr R. Ryssdal, President,
       Mr F. Matscher,
       Mr L.-E. Pettiti,
       Mr C. Russo,
       Mr A. Spielmann,
       Mr J. De Meyer,
       Mr N. Valticos,
       Mr S.K. Martens,
       Mr R. Pekkanen,
       and  also  of  Mr M.-A. Eissen, Registrar, and Mr  H.  Petzold,
   Deputy Registrar,
       Having  deliberated  in  private on  25  October  1991  and  26
   February 1992,
       Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the last-
   mentioned date:
   
                               PROCEDURE
   
       1.  The  case  was  referred  to  the  Court  by  the  European
   Commission of Human Rights ("the Commission") on 12 November  1990,
   within the three-month period laid down by Article 32 para.  1  and
   Article  47  (art. 32-1, art. 47) of the Convention. It  originated
   in  an  application  (no.  12083/86) against  the  French  Republic
   lodged  with the Commission under Article 25 (art. 25) by Mr Mohand
   Beldjoudi, an Algerian citizen, and his wife Mrs Martine  Beldjoudi
   {nee} Teychene, a French national, on 28 March 1986.
       The  Commission's request referred to Articles 44 and 48  (art.
   44,  art. 48) and to the declaration whereby France recognised  the
   compulsory  jurisdiction of the Court (Article 46) (art.  46).  The
   object  of  the request was to obtain a decision as to whether  the
   facts  of  the case disclosed a breach by the respondent  State  of
   its  obligations  under Article 8 (art. 8), taken either  alone  or
   together  with Article 14 (art. 14+8), and Articles  3,  9  and  12
   (art. 3, art. 9, art. 12).
       2.  In response to the enquiry made in accordance with Rule  33
   para. 3 (d) of the Rules of Court, the applicants stated that  they
   wished  to  take part in the proceedings and designated the  lawyer
   who would represent them (Rule 30).
       3.  On  22  November 1990 the President decided  that,  in  the
   interests  of  the  proper administration  of  justice,  this  case
   should  be considered by the Chamber constituted on 24 May 1990  to
   hear  the  Djeroud  case  <3> (Rule 21 para.  6).  It  included  ex
   officio  Mr  L.-E. Pettiti, the elected judge of French nationality
   (Article  43  of the Convention) (art. 43), and Mr R. Ryssdal,  the
   President  of  the  Court (Rule 21 para. 3 (b)).  The  other  seven
   members,  whose names had been drawn by lot, were Mr  F.  Matscher,
   Mr  J.  Pinheiro Farinha, Sir Vincent Evans, Mr C. Russo, Mr J.  De
   Meyer,  Mr  N. Valticos and Mr R. Pekkanen (Article 43 in  fine  of
   the  Convention  and Rule 21 para. 4) (art. 43).  Subsequently,  Mr
   S.K.  Martens and Mr A. Spielmann, substitute judges, replaced  Sir
   Vincent  Evans and Mr Pinheiro Farinha, who had resigned  from  the
   Court  and  whose successors had taken up their duties  before  the
   hearing (Rules 2 para. 3, 22 para. 1 and 24 para. 1).
   --------------------------------
       <3> Note by the Registrar: case no. 34/1990/225/289, struck out
   of  the  list  on  23 January 1991 following a friendly  settlement
   (Series A no. 191-B).
   
       4.  As  President of the Chamber (Rule 21 para. 5) Mr  Ryssdal,
   through   the  Registrar,  consulted  the  Agent  of   the   French
   Government  ("the Government"), the Delegate of the Commission  and
   the  lawyer for the applicants on the organisation of the procedure
   (Rule  37  para.  1 and Rule 38). Pursuant to the  orders  made  in
   consequence, the Registrar received the applicants' memorial on  29
   April  1991 and the Government's memorial on 30 April.  On  8  July
   the  Secretary  to  the Commission informed him that  the  Delegate
   would submit his observations at the hearing.
       5.  Counsel  for  the applicants wrote to the President  on  14
   October 1991, as did the Agent of the Government on 17 October,  on
   the  question  whether Mr Beldjoudi would be  able  to  attend  the
   hearing in person, despite his detention (Article 4 para. 1 (a)  of
   the  European  Agreement  relating  to  Persons  Participating   in
   Proceedings  before  the European Commission  and  Court  of  Human
   Rights).
       6.  In  accordance with the President's decision,  the  hearing
   took  place in public in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg,  on
   21   October  1991.  The  Court  had  held  a  preparatory  meeting
   beforehand.
       There appeared before the Court:
       (a) for the Government
       Mr  J.-P.  Puissochet, Director of Legal Affairs,  Ministry  of
   Foreign Affairs, Agent,
       Mrs  E.  Florent, Administrative Court Judge, on secondment  to
   the Department of Legal Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
       Mr  R.  Riera,  Head of the Litigation Section,  Department  of
   Civil  Liberties  and  Legal  Affairs, Ministry  of  the  Interior,
   Counsel;
       (b) for the Commission
       Mr H. Danelius, Delegate;
       (c) for the applicants
       Mr B. Donche, avocat, Counsel.
       The  Court heard addresses by Mr Puissochet for the Government,
   Mr  Danelius  for the Commission and Mr Donche for the  applicants,
   as well as their replies to its questions.
       Mr Beldjoudi was able to attend the hearing in person.
       7.  At  the hearing, the Agent of the Government and the lawyer
   representing  the  applicants produced various documents.  On  that
   day  and  the  following  day,  the former  also  provided  certain
   information.
       8.  On  18 November the Agent supplied further information  and
   observations, and produced certain documents, as the President  had
   invited him to do during the hearing.
       In  a letter received at the registry on 6 December, the lawyer
   for  the  applicants  made  observations on  these  documents,  and
   produced a schedule of costs and fees.
       On 21 February 1992, the Government submitted a memorandum.
   
                            AS TO THE FACTS
   
                   I. The circumstances of the case
   
                            A. Introduction
   
       9.  Mr Mohand Beldjoudi, who is a mechanic by profession, is an
   Algerian  citizen.  He  was  born in France  on  23  May  1950,  in
   Courbevoie  (Hauts-de-Seine department). He lived with his  parents
   in  the  Paris region until October 1969. His parents were born  in
   Algeria  in 1909 and 1926 respectively. That country was  a  French
   department  at  the time, and became independent on  3  July  1962,
   following  the Evian "Agreements" of 19 March 1962. In common  with
   their  children,  they were deemed to have lost French  nationality
   on  1  January  1963 (Law of 20 December 1966 -  see  paragraph  58
   below), because they had not made a declaration recognising  French
   nationality  before 27 March 1967 (section 2 of  the  Order  of  21
   July  1962 - see paragraph 57 below). Mr Beldjoudi's father arrived
   in  metropolitan France in 1926 and served in the French army  from
   1931  to 1955. He subsequently worked until his retirement in  1970
   as  an  assistant, later a civil servant, in the Ministry of Public
   Health  and  Population Affairs, this being  a  post  reserved  for
   French nationals. He died in Colombes (Hauts-de-Seine) in 1986.
       Mohand  Beldjoudi's mother, who left Algeria in 1948, and  four
   of  his  brothers  and  sisters - all born in  metropolitan  France
   prior  to  1 January 1963 - each have an Algerian national identity
   card.  They  reside  in France, where they hold  residence  permits
   which  are  valid  for  ten years and are renewable.  The  youngest
   sister resumed French nationality on 20 July 1988.
       10. Mrs Martine Teychene was born in France on 8 November 1951,
   both  her  parents  being  French. She has French  nationality  and
   works as a secretary.
       11.  The applicants were married at Colombes on 11 April  1970,
   after  living  together for some time. They  live  at  La  Garenne-
   Colombes (Hauts-de-Seine); they have no children.
       12.  Over  the  years Mr Beldjoudi was convicted  and  received
   custodial sentences as follows:
       (a)  27 March 1969, eight months' imprisonment for assault  and
   battery (Paris Criminal Court);
       (b)  29  July  1974,  six months' imprisonment  for  driving  a
   vehicle  without  a  licence  and possession  of  category  one  or
   category four weapons or ammunition (same court);
       (c)  10  January 1976, eighteen months' imprisonment, of  which
   fourteen  months  suspended, and four years'  probation  for  theft
   (Paris Court of Appeal);
       (d)  25 November 1977, eight years' imprisonment for aggravated
   theft (Hauts-de-Seine Assize Court);
       (e)  28  March 1978, three months' imprisonment for acquisition
   and  possession  of  category  one  or  category  four  weapons  or
   ammunition (Nanterre Criminal Court);
       (f)  4  February 1986, eighteen months' imprisonment, of  which
   ten  months  suspended, and five years' probation for  assault  and
   battery and criminal damage (same court).
       13.  His periods of imprisonment before 1991, pending trial  or
   after conviction, were as follows:
       (a)  20  July  - 17 September 1968, one month and  twenty-eight
   days;
       (b) 25 August - 8 October 1973, one month and fourteen days;
       (c) 3 April - 21 August 1974, four months and eighteen days;
       (d)  26  March 1975 - 4 December 1981, six years, eight  months
   and eight days;
       (e) 20 October 1985 - 25 April 1986, six months and five days.
       Their  total length was almost seven years, ten months and  two
   weeks.
       14. On 17 January 1991 the applicant was detained on remand  at
   {Fleury-Merogis}  <*>  (Essonne) and  his  wife  was  placed  under
   judicial supervision in Ecos (Eure), both having been charged  with
   aggravated  receiving of stolen property by an investigating  judge
   at the Melun tribunal de grande instance (Seine-et-Marne).
   --------------------------------
       <*> Здесь и далее по тексту слова на национальном языке набраны
   латинским шрифтом и выделены фигурными скобками.
   
       In  a  judgment of 23 January 1992 the Indictments Division  of
   the  Paris  Court of Appeal ordered Mr Beldjoudi's release  subject
   to judicial supervision.
   
                    B. The deportation proceedings
   
                       1. The deportation order
   
       15.  The Minister of the Interior had on 2 November 1979 issued
   a  deportation order against Mr Beldjoudi, on the ground  that  his
   presence  on  French territory was a threat to public order  (ordre
   public).
       The  order,  which was in accordance with the  opinion  of  the
   Commission  on  Deportation of Aliens (Commission  d'expulsion  des
   {etrangers}),  was served on the applicant on 14 November  1979  at
   Melun Prison.
   
             2. The requests for the order to be withdrawn
   
       16. Mr Beldjoudi requested the Minister of the Interior on five
   occasions  to  withdraw the order. The last request,  of  8  August
   1984,  was  the only one to receive a reply. This was sent  to  his
   lawyer  on  4  December 1989 by the Director of the  Department  of
   Civil  Liberties and Legal Affairs at the Ministry of the Interior,
   and read as follows:
       "Following  the  decision of the European Commission  of  Human
   Rights  of  11  July  1989  declaring  Mr  Beldjoudi's  application
   admissible [(see paragraph 62 below)], you again drew my  attention
   to  your  client's case. You wished in particular to  know  whether
   the  Minister  might be prepared to consider a friendly  settlement
   of this matter.
       In  the  light  of a careful re-examination of  Mr  Beldjoudi's
   case,  the  Minister issued a compulsory residence  order  ({arrete
   d'assignation  a  residence}) on 31 August 1989  for  the  Hauts-de
   Seine department, where the applicant has his habitual residence.
       The  residence  document  issued to  him  has  attached  to  it
   permission to undertake paid work.
       This  goodwill  decision in favour of Mr Beldjoudi,  which  has
   been  taken  in  view of his family ties, may be continued  if  his
   conduct is not in conflict therewith.
       I  confirm,  however, that in view of the seriousness  and  the
   number  of  the  offences committed by Mr  Beldjoudi,  it  has  not
   appeared  possible to revoke the deportation order  issued  against
   him.
       ..."
       17. The compulsory residence order was served in November 1989.
   
              3. The appeal for the order to be set aside
   
       (a) Before the Versailles Administrative Court
       18.  On  27  December 1979 Mr Beldjoudi appealed to  the  Paris
   Administrative  Court for the deportation order to  be  set  aside.
   Having  been  born in France of parents who were themselves  French
   at  the  time, he was to be regarded as French and hence not liable
   to  deportation; further, he had no ties with Algeria and had  been
   married to a Frenchwoman for nearly ten years.
       19.  The  Conseil  d'Etat assigned the case to  the  Versailles
   Administrative Court, within whose local jurisdiction it fell.
       20.   On   27  November  1980  that  court  ordered  additional
   investigative  measures: it asked the Minister of the  Interior  to
   submit  his observations on the applicant's latest memorial and  to
   produce  a  copy  of the decree of 16 September 1970  refusing  him
   French nationality (see paragraph 32 below).
       21.  In an interlocutory judgment of 14 October 1983 it decided
   to  adjourn  the  case until the ordinary courts  had  decided  the
   question  of Mr Beldjoudi's nationality (see paragraphs 34  and  35
   below).
       22. On 8 February 1984 Mr Beldjoudi turned down the provisional
   residence  permit which had been offered to him by  the  prefecture
   of  the Hauts-de-Seine department, on the grounds that by accepting
   it he would be acknowledging that he was of Algerian nationality.
       23.  Mr  Beldjoudi resumed the proceedings on 20 January  1988,
   submitting  a  supplementary  memorial,  without  waiting   for   a
   decision on his appeal to the Court of Cassation (see paragraph  41
   below).  He  argued  from  a  law of 9 September  1986,  which  had
   amended  the  second paragraph of section 25 of the 1945  Order  on
   which  the  deportation  order was based:  having  been  habitually
   resident in France from birth, he could not be the subject of  such
   an  order, as he had not been convicted and sentenced to a term  of
   imprisonment  of  at  least six months not suspended  or  one  year
   suspended  in respect of offences committed after the  coming  into
   force of that law.
       24. On 18 February 1988 Mr Beldjoudi added to his supplementary
   memorial.  With reference to Article 8 (art. 8) of the  Convention,
   he  maintained  that implementation of the said order  would  be  a
   serious  interference  with the respect  due  to  his  private  and
   family  life; he pointed out in this connection that  he  had  been
   married  to  a Frenchwoman since 1970, he had been born in  France,
   had   lived  there  uninterruptedly  and  had  received  a   French
   education and upbringing there.
       25.  On  21 April 1988 the court dismissed the appeal  for  the
   following reasons:
       "Considering  that  by  the order dated  2  November  1979  the
   Minister  of  the Interior, following the opinion  of  the  special
   commission  set  up  under section 25 of the Order  of  2  November
   1945,   ordered  the  deportation  of  Mr  Beldjoudi,  an  Algerian
   citizen,  who had been convicted by a criminal court on 25 November
   1977  and  sentenced  to eight years' imprisonment  for  aggravated
   theft;
       Considering that it does not appear from the case-file that the
   Minister,  in  deciding that the presence of  Mr  Beldjoudi  was  a
   threat  to  public order and consequently ordering his deportation,
   failed  to  examine  all the evidence relating to  the  applicant's
   conduct  or assessed that conduct in a manifestly erroneous manner;
   and  that  it  is  not alleged that this assessment  was  based  on
   material errors of fact;
       Considering  that Mr Beldjoudi is not justified in  relying  on
   provisions emanating from the Declaration of the Rights of Man  and
   of  the Citizen, claiming to this end the benefit of provisions  in
   section  25 of the Order of 2 November 1945 as amended in a version
   subsequent to the decision appealed against; that having regard  to
   the   fact  that  the  measure  taken  against  the  applicant  was
   necessary  for public safety, he is not entitled to take  advantage
   of  the provisions of Article 8 (art. 8) of the European Convention
   on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;".
       (b) Before the Conseil d'Etat
       26.  Mr  Beldjoudi appealed to the Conseil d'Etat  on  17  June
   1988,  asking  it to quash the judgment of 21 April  1988  and  set
   aside the order of 2 November 1979 as being ultra vires.
       27.  The Government Commissioner (commissaire du Gouvernement),
   Mr Ronny Abraham, made the following submissions:
       "The  majority  of the grounds of appeal should  not  keep  you
   long.  One  of them, however, should induce you to re-examine,  and
   in  our  opinion  to amend, your case-law on a point  which  is  of
   considerable importance.
       ...
       According  to the appellant, the deportation order against  him
   is  in  breach  of  Article 8 (art. 8) [of the Convention],  as  it
   constitutes  an  excessive interference with his  family  life.  Mr
   Beldjoudi  has been married to a Frenchwoman since 11  April  1970.
   He  had thus been so married for over nine years at the time of the
   decision appealed against.
       In  the  current state of your case-law this ground  of  appeal
   would have to be dismissed as ineffective.
       Thus  in  a  decision  of 25 July 1980,  Touami  ben  Abdeslem,
   [Recueil   Lebon,   tables],  p.  820,  and   JCP   [Juris-Classeur
   {periodique}]  1981.II.19.613, note Pacteau, your court  held  that
   an  alien  'cannot  to  any effect rely on ...  the  provisions  of
   Article  8 (art. 8) of the Convention for the Protection  of  Human
   Rights  and  Fundamental Freedoms ... in support of his submissions
   asking  for  the  deportation order against him to be  set  aside'.
   Making  the  same  point, but expressed slightly  differently,  the
   Chrouki  judgment of 6 December 1985 found that Article 8 (art.  8)
   of  the  European  Convention  on  Human  Rights  did  not  prevent
   exercise of the power conferred on the Minister of the Interior  by
   section  23  of  the  Order of 2 November 1945, and  dismissed  the
   ground of appeal without further consideration (appeal no. 55912).
       This is the dominant line of your case-law, although there  are
   also  some  decisions in which you appear rather to  have  taken  a
   position  on the merits and circumstances of the case in  order  to
   reject the ground of appeal: the Bahi decision of 6 February  1981,
   for  instance, held that the requirements of Article 8 (art. 8)  of
   the  Convention  could  not  in  the  particular  case  prevent   a
   deportation order, but the wording used is too lapidary to be  seen
   as a real change of direction of your case-law.
       Whatever  the position may be on these uncertainties,  we  will
   suggest to you today that you definitely abandon the solution  laid
   down in the Touami ben Abdeslem judgment and adopt an entirely  new
   approach to the question before us.
       There  are  three  principal reasons why we  suggest  this  new
   approach to you.
       The first reason is a negative one. It is that we do not really
   see  what  can justify the radically unfavourable answer  given  in
   1980.
       You  surely did not intend to deny Article 8 (art.  8)  of  the
   Convention   its  character  as  a  provision  which  is   directly
   applicable  in  the  domestic legal order.  All  your  case-law  is
   consistent  as  to the direct effect of the European Convention  on
   Human  Rights,  nor does the actual wording of the Touami  judgment
   in  any  way suggest such an interpretation, as Article 8 (art.  8)
   was  not  rejected as such, but only with reference to the  removal
   of aliens.
       Was  it  your  intention rather to apply the technique  of  the
   'screen  law',  considering that as the law gives  a  complete  and
   exclusive  definition of the legal conditions for deportation,  the
   addition  of  supplementary conditions derived  from  international
   agreements   would   amount  to  disregarding   the   legislature's
   intention?  If that was the reason for your decision at  the  time,
   it  would  clearly  no longer be applicable today,  following  your
   plenary  court  decision of 20 October 1989  in  the  Nicolo  case,
   according to which treaties take precedence over laws, even if  the
   laws  postdate them. But we doubt whether this was the  explanation
   of  your  decision  in  Touami: the  decision  related  to  a  1978
   deportation   order;  but  at  that  time  the  relevant   internal
   legislation  was not subsequent but prior to France's  ratification
   of  the Convention, and the 'screen law' theory explanation is thus
   not tenable.
       More simply, it seems probable to us that you considered that a
   deportation  order  was  not in itself  an  interference  with  the
   alien's  family  life:  if  the alien has  family  ties  on  French
   territory,  nothing prevents the other members of the family  group
   leaving  France  with him. But this is a very  theoretical  way  of
   looking  at  things. It is no doubt correct that in  certain  cases
   there  is  nothing to prevent the family leaving French  territory;
   but  in  other  cases,  especially if the alien  has  a  spouse  or
   children  of  French nationality, it may be difficult on  practical
   or  even  legal  grounds for the other members  of  the  family  to
   follow  him, with the effect that the expulsion measure jeopardises
   the  pursuit of an ordinary family life. In any event, it is in our
   opinion not possible to state that a deportation measure can  never
   of  itself  be capable of interfering with the family life  of  the
   person  concerned, and there is no reason to dismiss  a  priori  as
   ineffective a ground of appeal based on Article 8 (art. 8).
       There  is a second reason which supports us in this view:  your
   case-law  is  not  at  all in harmony with that  developed  by  the
   European Court of Human Rights in recent years.
       In the Berrehab v. the Netherlands judgment of 21 June 1988 the
   Strasbourg Court defined for the first time the possible impact  of
   Article  8  (art.  8)  on expulsion measures  against  aliens.  The
   substance of its decision was that where the alien has real  family
   ties in the territory of the State in which he is resident and  the
   expulsion  measure  is  such as to jeopardise  the  maintenance  of
   those  ties,  the  measure is justified with regard  to  Article  8
   (art.  8)  only  if  it  is proportionate  to  the  legitimate  aim
   pursued,  in  other  words, if the interference  with  family  life
   which  follows from it is not excessive with respect to the  public
   interest  to  be  protected. This balance between  the  public  and
   private  interests induced the Court to find in the  Berrehab  case
   that  there  had  been  a  violation  of  the  Convention  by   the
   Netherlands,  with  respect to an alien who was  the  father  of  a
   child  born of a (dissolved) marriage with a Netherlands woman  and
   who  had  been refused renewal of his residence permit  for  purely
   economic  reasons, reasons which were indeed legitimate, but  which
   led  in  the particular case to consequences whose seriousness  was
   not proportionate to the public interest pursued.
       Such an intellectual approach ought not to disconcert you,  and
   we  see nothing to prevent you henceforth adopting it as yours with
   reference  to  the deportation of aliens, provided of  course  that
   Article 8 (art. 8) of the Convention is in fact pleaded.
       Reviewing  proportionality  is  among  your  tried  and  tested
   techniques,  and  the  concept of a balance to  be  struck  between
   divergent  public and private interests is certainly not unfamiliar
   to  you,  since you constantly make use of it in certain  contexts.
   Admittedly,  the field of deportation has until now been  dominated
   rather  by the concept of discretionary power and its corollary  of
   a   limited  power  of  review  restricted  to  manifest  abuse  of
   discretion. But even in this field you carry out a complete  review
   where  the  statutory provisions require this - as in the  case  of
   the  concepts  of 'absolute urgency' and 'compelling necessity  for
   national  security'  which exceptionally permit  the  expulsion  of
   aliens  belonging  to  categories who in  principle  are  protected
   against  such a measure, under the legislation in force after  1981
   -  and  in  our opinion the same should apply in the  case  of  the
   application of Article 8 (art. 8) of the Convention.
       Furthermore  -  and  here  we come  to  our  final  argument  -
   maintaining your case-law as in Touami ben Abdeslem would have  the
   awkward   consequence   of  making  appeals   to   the   Strasbourg
   institutions directly available to aliens who were the  subject  of
   a  deportation order and complained of an interference  with  their
   family life, without their being obliged first to have recourse  to
   the domestic courts.
       For  it is a known fact that, according to the consistent case-
   law  of  the  European Commission of Human Rights,  the  rule  that
   domestic  remedies must first be exhausted, which under Article  26
   (art.  26)  of  the  Convention is a condition of admissibility  of
   individual  applications  submitted  to  the  Commission,  must  be
   understood as imposing on an applicant the obligation only to  have
   prior  recourse to domestic remedies which have a reasonable chance
   of  success,  having regard in particular to the  case-law  of  the
   highest  courts,  with the effect that a definite line  of  caselaw
   excluding  a priori the taking into account of Article 8  (art.  8)
   of  the  Convention  would  entitle an alien  to  take  his  claims
   directly to the European institutions.
       The  present  case is a perfect illustration of  this.  Without
   waiting  for  you  to  give  a decision  and  hence  before  having
   exhausted all possible domestic remedies, Mr Beldjoudi lodged  with
   the  European Commission of Human Rights an application complaining
   of  a  violation of Article 8 (art. 8) of the Convention  which  he
   claimed  to be the victim of. Despite the proceedings still pending
   before  you,  the European Commission of Human Rights declared  the
   application admissible in a decision of 11 July 1989, referring  in
   particular to your Touami ben Abdeslem decision.
       Further, after adopting its report, the European Commission  of
   Human  Rights  referred the application to the  European  Court  of
   Human  Rights,  and  the  same case is thus simultaneously  pending
   before  you  and before the Strasbourg Court, which will  no  doubt
   give  a decision this year. This is an exceptional situation, which
   cannot  be regarded as satisfactory or normal with respect  to  the
   control  machinery  set  up  by the European  Convention  on  Human
   Rights,  which  is  based  on the concept of  the  subsidiarity  of
   control  by  the European institutions to control by  the  domestic
   courts.
       The  only  way to avoid such a situation occurring  again,  and
   indeed  to avoid the domestic courts losing jurisdiction altogether
   in  favour  of  the  European  Court, consists  in  you  yourselves
   reviewing  compliance with Article 8 (art. 8) rather  than  leaving
   this  task  to  the Strasbourg institutions, whom incidentally  you
   would  not  be  doing  a  favour by allowing  applicants  immediate
   access to them.
       If  you  agree with us on this question of principle, you  will
   then  have  to  make a decision on two points in the present  case:
   firstly,  does  the  deportation  of  Mr  Beldjoudi  constitute  an
   'interference' with his 'right to respect for his family life',  to
   use  the  language  of  Article  8  (art.  8)?  Secondly,  is  this
   'interference' necessary and proportionate to the aim  pursued,  in
   the circumstances of the case?
       We suggest that you answer both questions in the affirmative.
       In  our  opinion, it cannot be doubted that the deportation  of
   the applicant jeopardises his family life to a certain extent.
       No  doubt  the  possibility cannot be excluded  of  his  French
   spouse being able to follow him abroad, which in practice means  to
   Algeria.  But it must be admitted that that would not be easy,  and
   that legal and practical obstacles could make it difficult for  the
   couple to restart life abroad.
       However,  the serious nature of the offences committed  by  the
   applicant  appears  to us to justify the deportation  order  issued
   against him, and the interference with the applicant's family  life
   is  in  the  instant case not disproportionate  to  the  threat  to
   public  order  which the applicant's presence on  French  territory
   represented on 2 November 1979, the date for you to have  reference
   to.
       We  are  indeed far removed from the circumstances  which  gave
   rise to the above-mentioned Berrehab judgment.
       From 1969, when he was only nineteen years of age, Mr Beldjoudi
   committed   various   offences  for  which  he   received   various
   convictions:  assault  and battery, driving  a  vehicle  without  a
   licence, carrying a prohibited weapon.
       Above  all,  on  5  February 1975 he  gained  entry  at  night,
   together with accomplices, to the residence of two people who  were
   subjected  to  violence by the criminals in order  to  steal  their
   savings.  For these acts the applicant was convicted on 25 November
   1977  and  sentenced  to eight years' imprisonment  for  aggravated
   theft.
       In  these circumstances, the decision taken with respect to him
   in  1979 does not appear to us to have been disproportionate to the
   aim  pursued, or to be excessive even having regard to  the  family
   consequences it has for the applicant.
       In  one pan of the scales one must place the public interest in
   the  removal of an individual who is a serious threat to the safety
   of  persons  and property. In the other pan one must bear  in  mind
   the  difficulties  Mr Beldjoudi and his wife (the  couple  have  no
   children)  would have in resettling abroad without  damaging  their
   family life. It seems to us that the balance is tilted towards  the
   public interest.
       We  would  not have any doubt in reaching this conclusion,  had
   not  the  European  Commission of Human  Rights  -  as  it  is  now
   necessary to mention - adopted an opposite position, in the  report
   it  drew  up on this case under Article 31 para. 1 (art.  31-1)  of
   the  Convention  and which it referred to the Court  together  with
   the application.
       The  Commission  was of the opinion, by twelve votes  to  five,
   that  the  deportation of Mr Beldjoudi constituted a  violation  of
   Article 8 (art. 8).
       The  greatest regard must of course be had to such an  opinion,
   but  it must, however, not be forgotten that it is only an opinion,
   albeit a highly authoritative one and deserving of respect, as  the
   Commission  in a sense fulfils for the Court the same  function  as
   the   Government  Commissioner  before  your  court;  this   is   a
   sufficient  indication of its importance,  but  the  Court  is  not
   obliged  to  follow it; and in the past the Court  has  on  several
   occasions differed from the Commission's opinion.
       We  for  our  part  are unable to agree with  the  Commission's
   reasoning.  It  is  clear from reading its  report  that  it  based
   itself  not so much on Mr Beldjoudi's matrimonial ties, as  on  the
   fact  that  the  applicant  was born in France,  has  always  lived
   there,  appears  not to have personal ties with Algeria,  and  does
   not  know  the  Arabic  language and that,  in  the  words  of  the
   Commission,  'the nationality link, though a legal reality,  in  no
   way  reflects the real situation in human terms' (see paragraph  64
   of the report).
       We  appreciate the significance in human terms of these  facts.
   Under  the  post-1981 legislation they might perhaps have protected
   Mr  Beldjoudi against deportation, despite the seriousness  of  the
   offences  committed by him. But they appear to us to  have  nothing
   to  do  with  the concept of 'family life' protected by  Article  8
   (art. 8), or with that of 'private life', which two members of  the
   Commission,  in  a concurring but separate opinion annexed  to  the
   report,  suggested as a better basis for a finding of  a  violation
   of Article 8 (art. 8).
       In  fact, what the Commission intended to protect was  not  the
   applicant's  'family  life'  or  'private  life'  but  rather   his
   personal  life and social life. But that seems to us to be  outside
   the scope of the Article relied on.
       We  add  for the sake of completeness of information  that  the
   deportation  of  Mr  Beldjoudi has not actually been  enforced  and
   that  the  authorities have, in a spirit of conciliation,  assigned
   him  to  compulsory  residence  in the  Hauts-de-Seine  department,
   where he still is.
       For  all  these  reasons, we submit that the appeal  should  be
   dismissed."
       28.  On  18 January 1991 the Conseil d'Etat ruled in accordance
   with the above submissions, and gave the following reasons for  its
   decision:
       "The technical correctness of the judgment appealed against
       Considering,  firstly,  that contrary  to  what  the  appellant
   maintains,  the judgment appealed against did not omit to  rule  on
   the  ground of appeal based on the application of section 25 of the
   Order of 2 November 1945;
       Considering, secondly, that it follows from a judgment  of  the
   Versailles Court of Appeal of 14 October 1987, given prior  to  the
   judgment  appealed  against,  that the  appellant  is  of  Algerian
   nationality;  that the Administrative Court was thus  rightly  able
   to  regard  the  question of nationality, on which  it  had  by  an
   earlier  judgment adjourned a decision, as having been settled  and
   to   give  no  decision  on  the  ground  of  appeal  based  on  Mr
   Beldjoudi's French nationality, abandoned by him;
       The  lawfulness of the Minister of the Interior's  order  of  2
   November 1979
       Considering that Mr Beldjoudi, who did not raise any ground  of
   appeal  before  the Administrative Court relating  to  the  outward
   legality  of  the order for his deportation, is in  any  event  not
   entitled  to raise for the first time on appeal arguments based  on
   the   lack  of  reasons  in  the  opinion  of  the  Commission   on
   Deportation,  the  order  pronouncing deportation  and  the  letter
   notifying  it,  which  are based on legal  grounds  different  from
   those on which his application at first instance was based;
       Considering that according to section [23] of the  Order  of  2
   November  1945, in the wording in force at the time of the decision
   appealed   against,  prior  to  the  Law  of   29   October   1981,
   'deportation  may  be ordered by an order of the  Minister  of  the
   Interior if the alien's presence on French territory constitutes  a
   threat  to  public order or public finance'; that it  can  be  seen
   from the documents in the case-file that the aforesaid measure  was
   taken  by  the  Minister of the Interior after he  had  taken  into
   consideration not only the criminal convictions pronounced  against
   Mr  Beldjoudi but also the totality of Mr Beldjoudi's conduct; that
   it is thus not tainted by error of law;
       Considering  that  under Article 8 (art.  8)  of  the  European
   Convention  for  the  Protection of Human  Rights  and  Fundamental
   Freedoms,  '1.  Everyone has the right to respect for  his  private
   and  family life, his home and his correspondence - 2. There  shall
   be  no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this
   right  except  such  as  is  in accordance  with  the  law  and  is
   necessary  in  a  democratic society in the interests  of  national
   security, public safety or the economic well-being of the  country,
   for  the  prevention of disorder or crime, for  the  protection  of
   health  or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms
   of  others';  that  the  measure appealed  against,  based  on  the
   defence  of  public order, was necessary for the  defence  of  that
   order  in  view  of the applicant's conduct and the seriousness  of
   the  offences committed by him; that in these circumstances it  was
   not in violation of Article 8 (art. 8) of the said Convention;
       Considering  that  it  follows  from  the  foregoing  that   Mr
   Beldjoudi  is  not  justified in requesting  the  quashing  of  the
   judgment  appealed against, by which the Versailles  Administrative
   Court  dismissed  his claim that the order of the Minister  of  the
   Interior  of  2  November  1979,  requiring  him  to  leave  French
   territory, be set aside;" (Recueil Lebon 1991, p. 18)
   
              4. The applications for a stay of execution
   
       29.  On  27  December  1979 Mr Beldjoudi had  lodged  with  the
   registry  of  the  Conseil  d'Etat an application  for  a  stay  of
   execution.  It was dismissed by the court on 16 May  1980,  on  the
   grounds  that "none of the arguments relied on appear[ed]  such  as
   to justify withdrawal of the deportation order".
       30.  While his appeal for the order to be set aside was pending
   before the Versailles Administrative Court (see paragraphs 18 -  25
   above),  the  applicant twice requested a stay  of  execution.  The
   requests,  which were registered on 26 March 1986 and  22  February
   1988,  were  joined to the merits of the case and dismissed  on  21
   April 1988 (see paragraph 25 above).
   
         C. The applications for resumption or recognition of
                          French nationality
   
                   1. The application for resumption
   
       31.  On  1  April  1970, eleven days before  his  marriage,  Mr
   Beldjoudi   made   a  declaration  before  the  Colombes   tribunal
   d'instance  with  a  view to resumption of French  nationality.  He
   relied  on section 3 of the Law of 20 December 1966, which  allowed
   such  a  right to minor children born before 1 January  1963  whose
   parents had not made such a declaration.
       32. A prime ministerial Decree, adopted on 16 September 1970 in
   accordance with the opinion of the Conseil d'Etat and served  on  3
   February  1972,  refused  him  recognition  of  French  nationality
   (section 4 of the Decree of 27 November 1962).
       33.  The applicant was at his request registered with the  1973
   intake,  and on 7 July 1971 at Blois he was given a certificate  of
   fitness  for national service, issued by the commanding officer  of
   the  French  Army selection centre no. 10. He did not do  the  said
   military  service,  however,  as  the  commanding  officer  of  the
   Versailles  recruitment  office  had  deleted  his  name  from  the
   register on 25 June 1971.
   
                  2. The application for recognition
   
       (a) Before the Colombes tribunal d'instance
       34.  On  17  June 1983 Mr Beldjoudi submitted a declaration  of
   nationality  to  the Colombes tribunal d'instance, accompanying  it
   by   supporting   documents.  He  claimed  that  he   had   enjoyed
   uninterrupted  ostensible  possession  (possession   {d'etat})   of
   French status.
       35.  On 15 July the judge sent the file back to the applicant's
   lawyer,  informing  him  that the applicant  should  apply  to  the
   prefecture  of  the Hauts-de-Seine department with  a  request  for
   naturalisation.
       36. On 21 December Mr Beldjoudi asked the judge in question  to
   issue  him with a certificate of French nationality. In an  opinion
   of  28  December the judge declined, as the evidence  produced  was
   not   sufficient  to  prove  that  the  applicant  enjoyed   French
   nationality.
       (b) Before the Nanterre tribunal de grande instance
       37.  On  17  January  1984  the applicant  started  proceedings
   against  the procureur de la {Republique} in the Nanterre  tribunal
   de  grande  instance,  in  order to  have  his  French  nationality
   recognised.
       38.  The court dismissed the claim on 15 December 1985, on  the
   grounds  that  the  applicant  had lost  French  nationality  on  1
   January 1963, pursuant to the second paragraph of section 1 of  the
   Law of 20 December 1966 (see paragraph 58 below).
       (c) Before the Versailles Court of Appeal
       39.   Mr  Beldjoudi  appealed  against  the  judgment  to   the
   Versailles Court of Appeal on 7 March 1986. He maintained that  his
   father  had not passed on to him anything which would allow him  to
   claim  an  Algerian identity as to culture and language,  that  the
   Islamic  religion  was  foreign to  him,  that  he  had  ostensible
   possession  of French status, and that the challenge to his  French
   nationality  on  the  basis  of his Islamic  status  represented  a
   discriminatory interference with his freedom of conscience and  his
   right  to lead a normal family life, in manifest breach of Articles
   3,  8,  9, 12 and 14 (art. 3, art. 8, art. 9, art. 12, art. 14)  of
   the Convention.
       40.  The  Court  of Appeal dismissed his appeal on  14  October
   1987. It gave the following reasons for its decision:
       "Considering that civil status is transmitted by descent;  that
   a  child  born  of  two parents with special civil  status  (statut
   civil  de  droit  local)  possesses  that  status;  that  prior  to
   Algerian  independence Mr Beldjoudi senior did  not,  as  he  could
   have  done,  declare that he renounced his personal  special  civil
   status  in  order to acquire normal civil status (statut  civil  de
   droit  commun); that the fact that Mr Mohand Beldjoudi had  Islamic
   special  civil  status concerned only the rules applicable  to  the
   exercise  of  his  civil  rights  and  respected  his  freedom   of
   religious  conviction  and did not require him  to  adhere  to  the
   Islamic  religion;  that,  contrary to  his  claims,  Mr  Beldjoudi
   cannot  claim  for himself and his father ostensible possession  of
   French  status  when, according to a letter from  the  Prefect  and
   Commissioner  of the Republic for the Department of  Hauts-de-Seine
   dated  4  June 1984, his father, brothers and sisters have all  for
   many  years  been holders of Algerian national identity  cards  and
   aliens'  residence permits, and he himself has never since Algerian
   independence  held  documents such as a  French  national  identity
   card  or  a  French passport providing evidence of  his  ostensible
   possession  of French status, but was the subject of a  deportation
   order on 2 November 1979 which has apparently not prevented him  up
   to  now  leading  a normal family life in France; that  accordingly
   the  final  ground  of  appeal he relies on,  based  on  ostensible
   possession  of  French  status  and a  violation  of  the  European
   Convention  on Human Rights, which was moreover not in  force  when
   he lost French nationality, must be dismissed;"
       The decision was served on the applicant on 20 July 1989.
       (d) Before the Court of Cassation
       41.  Mr  Beldjoudi had appealed on 15 February 1989. The appeal
   was  dismissed by the Court of Cassation (First Civil Division)  on
   12 March 1991 for the following reasons:
       "Whereas  according  to the recitals of the  judgment  appealed
   against  (Versailles, 14 October 1987), Mr Mohand  Beldjoudi,  born
   at  Courbevoie on 23 May 1950, the son of Seghir Beldjoudi, born on
   9  April 1909 at Sidi-Moufouk (Algeria), and Hanifa Khalis, born in
   1926  at  Elflaya (Algeria), brought proceedings in order  to  have
   his  French nationality recognised; and whereas his application was
   dismissed  on  the grounds that, being aged under eighteen  on  the
   coming  into force of Order no. 62-825 of 21 July 1962, he had,  as
   regards  the  effect  of  the  independence  of  Algeria   on   his
   nationality,  followed the status of his parents, who were  natives
   of  that  territory and had special civil status, and,  not  having
   benefited  from the collective effect of a declaration  recognising
   French  nationality made by his father at the appropriate time,  he
   was  deemed to have lost French nationality on 1 January  1963,  in
   accordance  with paragraph 2 of section 1 of Law no. 66-945  of  20
   December 1966;
       Whereas  Mr  Beldjoudi  complains that  the  judgment  appealed
   against  reached  its  decision on an invalid ground,  namely  that
   review of the constitutionality of the Law of 20 December 1966  was
   not  a matter for the ordinary courts, in dismissing his ground  of
   appeal  based  on  the fact that the said Law was contrary  to  the
   provisions  of Article 5 (d) (iii) of the International  Convention
   of  7  March  1966  on  the  Elimination of  All  Forms  of  Racial
   Discrimination,  ratified by France and published in  the  Official
   Journal  of  10  November 1971, which prohibited all discrimination
   based  on  origin,  especially ethnic origin, in  the  granting  or
   withdrawing of nationality of the citizens of member States;
       But whereas the judgment appealed against held that Law no. 66-
   945  of  20  December 1966 based itself, in order to  regulate  the
   consequences  for  nationality  of Algerian  independence,  on  the
   civil status of persons originating from that territory and not  on
   criteria prohibited by the aforesaid convention;
       It  follows  that the judgment does not warrant  the  criticism
   made of it by the ground of appeal, which cannot be upheld;"
   
                       II. Relevant domestic law
   
                       A. Deportation of aliens
   
       42.  Deportation of aliens is governed by the provisions of the
   Order  of  2 November 1945 relating to the conditions of entry  and
   residence  of aliens in France. The wording of the Order  has  been
   amended on several occasions, including amendments subsequent to  2
   November 1979, the date when the ministerial order relating to  the
   applicant  was issued (see paragraph 15 above). The legislation  in
   question did not include any transitional provisions.
   
                      1. Grounds for deportation
   
       (a) The position in 1979
       43. In 1979, section 23 of the 1945 Order read as follows:
       "... deportation may be ordered by an order of the Minister  of
   the   Interior   if  the  alien's  presence  on  French   territory
   constitutes a threat to public order or public finance."
       (b) The situation after 1979
       44.  Section 23 was amended by a Law of 29 October 1981,  under
   which  deportation was now subject to the existence of  a  "serious
   threat to public order".
       Section  26 of the new Law, however, provided for a derogation,
   except in the case of aliens under eighteen years of age:
       "In  the  event  of  absolute urgency ..., deportation  may  be
   ordered  where  it  constitutes  a  compelling  necessity  for  the
   security of the State or for public safety.
       ..."
       45. These rules were altered by a Law of 9 September 1986.
       Section  23  resumed its original wording,  that  of  1945.  It
   added,  however, that "the deportation order [could] be revoked  at
   any time by the Minister of the Interior".
       As  for  section 26, it stated that "a threat [to public order]
   having  a  particularly serious character" could in  the  event  of
   absolute urgency justify deportation.
       46. A Law of 2 August 1989 reintroduced the 1981 provisions.
       47.  The Minister of the Interior issued 383 deportation orders
   in  1990. Of these, 101 were based on section 26 of the 1945 Order,
   54  relating  to  ordinary criminal offences  and  47  to  offences
   against the external or internal security of the State.
   
                   2. Persons liable to deportation
   
       (a) The position in 1979
       48. The 1945 Order did not define any categories of persons who
   were protected against all deportation measures.
       (b) The position after 1979
       49.  By  contrast, after being amended by the Law of 29 October
   1981, section 25 of the Order stated:
       "The  following  may not be the subject of a deportation  order
   under section 23:
       1. An alien under eighteen years of age;
       2.  An  alien  who proves by any means that he  has  habitually
   resided  in  France since attaining the age of  ten  years  at  the
   most;
       3.  An  alien  who proves by any means that he  has  habitually
   resided  in  France for over fifteen years, and also an  alien  who
   has lawfully resided in France for over ten years;
       4.  An  alien who has been married for at least six months  and
   whose spouse is of French nationality;
       5.  An  alien  who is the father or mother of  a  French  child
   residing  in France, provided that he exercises parental  authority
   (at  least  in  part)  with respect to that child  or  is  actually
   meeting his needs;
       6.  An alien who is the beneficiary of a pension in respect  of
   an  accident in employment or occupational illness paid by a French
   organisation, and whose permanent disability percentage is  greater
   than or equal to 20%;
       7.  An  alien  lawfully residing in France  under  one  of  the
   residence   documents  provided  for  by  the  present   Order   or
   international  agreements,  and  who  has  not  been   definitively
   convicted  and sentenced to a penalty equivalent at  least  to  one
   year's non-suspended imprisonment.
       However,  as a derogation from no. 7 above, any alien  who  has
   been   definitively  convicted  and  sentenced  to  a  penalty   of
   nonsuspended  imprisonment for any length of time  for  an  offence
   under  sections  4  and 8 of Law no. 73-548  of  27  June  1973  on
   multiple  occupation, Article L.364-2-1 of the Code  of  Employment
   or  Articles  334,  334-1  and 335 of the  Criminal  Code,  may  be
   deported.
       ..."
       50.  The  Law of 9 September 1986 restricted the categories  of
   nondeportation, but the Law of 2 August 1989 returned to  the  1981
   legislation.
       3. Enforcement of deportation
       51.  Deportation is regarded in French law as a police measure,
   not  a  criminal sanction. An alien affected does not benefit  from
   the  retrospective effect of the more favourable later  provisions.
   He  can  thus not rely on them in support of an application  for  a
   decision concerning him to be set aside.
       52. Once a deportation order has been issued by the Minister of
   the   Interior,  it  remains  in  force  indefinitely.  The   alien
   concerned may at any time, as often as he wishes, request  that  it
   be revoked.
       53. If the alien has been absent from French territory for over
   five  years  and wishes to obtain such revocation, his  request  is
   considered  by a committee which consists of judges  only.  If  the
   committee  finds  in  his favour, its opinion  is  binding  on  the
   Minister.
       54.  It  frequently happens that the Minister of  the  Interior
   waives  enforcement  of  a  deportation  order  while  nevertheless
   declining to revoke it. In such cases a compulsory residence  order
   is   issued  in  respect  of  the  alien,  in  the  hope   of   his
   reintegration  into  society.  If he continues  to  disturb  public
   order,  he  may  be  deported.  This  is  then  a  fresh  decision,
   separable  from  the order and itself capable of  being  challenged
   before the administrative court judge.
       If  the  matter  is  referred to the judge,  he  considers  the
   behaviour  of  the  person concerned during  the  period  when  his
   presence  on  French  territory has been  tolerated.  In  order  to
   assess  the lawfulness of the measure, he thus considers the  facts
   as they are at the date when he takes his decision.
       4. The case-law of the Conseil d'Etat
       55.  For  a  period  of  some  ten  years  the  Conseil  d'Etat
   considered  arguments based on Article 8 (art. 8) of the Convention
   to  be of no effect as against a deportation order (see for example
   the  Touami  ben Abdeslem judgment of 25 July 1980,  Recueil  Lebon
   1980,  p. 820, and Juris-Classeur {periodique} 1981, jurisprudence,
   no.  19613,  with  note  by  Mr Bernard Pacteau,  and  the  Chrouki
   judgment of 6 December 1985).
       The  Beldjoudi  judgment of 18 January 1991 (see  paragraph  28
   above)  marks the abandonment of this line of case-law. Instead  of
   reviewing  whether  there has been a manifest error  of  discretion
   with  reference only to the threat to public order, the  court  now
   carries  out  a complete review of proportionality,  and  this  has
   sometimes led to the setting aside of deportation orders  (see  for
   example  the  Belgacem judgment of 19 April 1991  (plenary  court),
   with  submissions  by  Government Commissioner  Mr  Ronny  Abraham,
   Revue  {francaise} de droit administratif 1991, pp. 497 - 510,  and
   the  Hadad judgment of 26 July 1991 (the President of the  Judicial
   Division), to be reported in the Recueil Lebon).
   
                 B. Acquisition of French nationality
   
                     1. Recognition of nationality
   
       (a) The Law of 28 July 1960
       56.  The  Law  of  28  July  1960 inserted  into  the  Code  of
   Nationality a Part VII, "Recognition of French Nationality".
       It was limited to overseas territories (TOM), and introduced  a
   new  method for certain categories of "domiciled persons" and their
   descendants  to  have their French nationality recognised,  subject
   to the two conditions of settling on French territory and making  a
   declaration.
       (b) The Order of 21 July 1962
       57.  Algeria  did not have the status of a TOM when  it  gained
   independence.  This  induced the French legislature  to  enact  the
   Order   of   21  July  1962  relating  to  various  provisions   on
   nationality.
       Under this Order persons of normal civil status, and persons of
   special  civil status who had not been granted Algerian nationality
   under Algerian law, kept their French nationality as of right.
       With  respect  to other persons of special civil status  -  the
   category  to  which the applicant's family belonged  -  section  21
   provided that as from 1 January 1963 they and their children  would
   not  be  able  to  establish  their French  nationality  except  by
   showing that they had made a declaration of "recognition of  French
   nationality".
       (c) The Law of 20 December 1966
       58.  The Law of 20 December 1966 terminated the application  of
   the 1962 Order as from 21 March 1967. It brought about the loss  of
   French nationality in the absence of a declaration of recognition.
       Paragraph 2 (c) of section 1 of the Law stated that:
       "Persons  of special civil status of Algerian origin  who  have
   not  by that date made the declaration provided for in Article  152
   of  the  Code  of Nationality shall be deemed to have  lost  French
   nationality  on 1 January 1963. However, persons of  special  civil
   status  of  Algerian  origin shall keep French  nationality  as  of
   right  if no other nationality has been conferred on them  after  3
   July 1962."
       Section  3  nevertheless offered minor children born  before  1
   January  1963 - such as the applicant - the possibility of resuming
   French  nationality  where the parent whose  nationality  they  had
   taken had not made the declaration of recognition.
       (d) The Law of 9 January 1973
       59. The Law of 9 January 1973 abolished recognition and deleted
   this  word  from the Code of Nationality. Part VIII  of  the  Code,
   completely  rewritten, laid down for the future special  conditions
   for  resumption  of nationality for certain categories  of  persons
   who   had   lost  French  nationality  following  the  gaining   of
   independence by their country.
   
                           2. Naturalisation
   
       60.  Naturalisation is granted by decree.  It  may  be  granted
   inter  alia  to  "nationals or former nationals of  territories  or
   States   over   which  France  has  exercised  sovereignty   or   a
   protectorate or a mandate or trusteeship" (paragraph 5  of  Article
   64 of the Code of Nationality).
       However,  "an  alien who has been the subject of a  deportation
   order  or  a  compulsory residence order shall not be eligible  for
   naturalisation unless such order has been revoked in  the  form  in
   which  it was issued" (first paragraph of Article 65). In addition,
   "no  one  may  be  naturalised if he is not of good  character  and
   morals  or  if  he  has  been convicted  of  one  of  the  offences
   mentioned in Article 79 ..." (Article 68).
   
                   PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION
   
       61.  In  their  application  (no.  12083/86)  lodged  with  the
   Commission on 28 March 1986 Mr and Mrs Beldjoudi alleged  that  the
   deportation order against Mr Beldjoudi violated several  provisions
   of  the  Convention: Article 8 (art. 8), by infringing their  right
   to  respect for their private and family life; Article 3 (art.  3),
   as  the  probable refusal of the Algerian authorities to  issue  Mr
   Beldjoudi  with  a  passport allowing him to  leave  Algeria  would
   constitute   inhuman  and  degrading  treatment;  Article   14   in
   conjunction  with Article 8 (art. 14+8), by discriminating  on  the
   grounds  of  Mr  Beldjoudi's religious beliefs  or  ethnic  origin;
   Article  9 (art. 9), by interfering with their freedom of  thought,
   conscience  and religion; and Article 12 (art. 12),  by  infringing
   their right to marry and to found a family.
       62.  The Commission declared the application admissible  on  11
   July  1989.  In its report of 6 September 1990 (Article  31)  (art.
   31), it expressed the opinion:
       (a)  that the deportation of Mr Beldjoudi would violate his and
   his  spouse's  right to respect for their family  life  within  the
   meaning  of  Article 8 (art. 8) (twelve votes to five),  but  would
   not violate Article 3 (art. 3) (unanimously);
       (b)  that  there  had  not been a failure to  comply  with  the
   requirements  of  Article 14 in conjunction with  Article  8  (art.
   14+8)  (unanimously) or with those of Articles 9 and  12  (art.  9,
   art. 12) (unanimously).
       The  full  text  of the Commission's opinion  and  of  the  two
   separate  opinions  contained in the report  is  reproduced  as  an
   annex to this judgment <3>,
   ---------------------------------
       <3>  Note  by the Registrar: For practical reasons  this  annex
   will  appear only with the printed version of the judgment  (volume
   234-A of Series A of the Publications of the Court), but a copy  of
   the Commission's report is obtainable from the registry.
   
                    FINAL SUBMISSIONS TO THE COURT
   
       63.  In their memorial the Government asked the Court "to  hold
   that  in  the  present  case there [had] not been  a  violation  of
   Article  8  (art.  8) of the Convention, or of the  other  Articles
   relied on by the applicants".
       64.  Counsel  for  the  applicants  made  the  following  final
   submissions:
       "Mr and Mrs Beldjoudi ask the Court:
       to  hold  that the deportation order issued against  Mr  Mohand
   Beldjoudi  by the French Government on 2 November 1979  constitutes
   a  violation  both of Article 8 (art. 8) of the ... Convention  ...
   and  of Article 8 in conjunction with Article 14 (art. 14+8) of the
   said Convention.
       Should  the French Government not put an end to this  violation
   without  delay, Mr and Mrs Beldjoudi ask that France be ordered  to
   pay  them,  as  compensation for the damage  resulting  from  these
   violations, the sum of 10,000,000 French francs as damages and  the
   sum  of  100,000  French francs as reimbursement  of  irrecoverable
   costs  incurred  for  the  defence of their  interests  before  the
   European Commission and Court of Human Rights."
   
                             AS TO THE LAW
   
              I. Alleged violation of Article 8 (art. 8)
   
       65.  The  applicants  claimed that the decision  to  deport  Mr
   Beldjoudi  interfered  with their private  and  family  life.  They
   relied  on  Article 8 (art. 8) of the Convention,  which  reads  as
   follows:
       "1.  Everyone  has  the right to respect for  his  private  and
   family life, his home and his correspondence.
       2.  There  shall be no interference by a public authority  with
   the  exercise  of  this right except such as is in accordance  with
   the  law  and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests
   of  national security, public safety or the economic well-being  of
   the  country,  for  the prevention of disorder or  crime,  for  the
   protection  of  health  or morals, or for  the  protection  of  the
   rights and freedoms of others."
       This  claim  was disputed by the Government, but the Commission
   agreed with it, at least with regard to family life.
   
                A. Paragraph 1 of Article 8 (art. 8-1)
   
       66.   The  Government  initially  expressed  doubt  as  to  the
   existence  of a real family life linking Mr Beldjoudi  on  the  one
   hand  and  his parents, brothers and sisters and his  wife  on  the
   other hand. They did not repeat this point before the Court.
   
       67.  The  Court merely notes, in agreement with the Commission,
   that  enforcement  of  the deportation order  would  constitute  an
   interference  by  a  public  authority with  the  exercise  of  the
   applicants'  right to respect for their family life, as  guaranteed
   by paragraph 1 of Article 8 (art. 8-1).
   
                B. Paragraph 2 of Article 8 (art. 8-2)
   
       68.  It  must therefore be determined whether the expulsion  in
   issue  would comply with the conditions of paragraph 2 (art.  8-2),
   that  is to say, whether it would be "in accordance with the  law",
   directed  towards  one or more of the legitimate aims  listed,  and
   "necessary"  for  the realisation of those aims  "in  a  democratic
   society".
   
                    1. "In accordance with the law"
   
       69.  The  Court, in agreement with those appearing  before  it,
   takes  note that the ministerial order of 2 November 1979 was based
   on  section  23  of the Order of 2 November 1945  relating  to  the
   conditions  of  entry  and  residence  of  aliens  in  France  (see
   paragraph 43 above). It was also found to be lawful by the  Conseil
   d'Etat  in  its  judgment  of 18 January  1991  (see  paragraph  28
   above).
   
                           2. Legitimate aim
   
       70.  The  Government  and the Commission  considered  that  the
   interference in issue was directed at aims which were  entirely  in
   accordance  with the Convention, the "prevention of  disorder"  and
   the "prevention of crime". The applicants did not dispute this.
       The Court reaches the same conclusion.
   
                3. "Necessary in a democratic society"
   
       71.  The applicants argued that the deportation of Mr Beldjoudi
   could not be regarded as "necessary in a democratic society".
       They  relied  on a number of circumstances. Thus, Mr  Beldjoudi
   was  born  in  France of parents who originated  from  a  territory
   which  was French at the time, namely Algeria; he had always  lived
   in  France,  as  had  his  brothers and sisters  (see  paragraph  9
   above);  he stated that he did not know Arabic, and had received  a
   French  education and upbringing; he had married a  Frenchwoman  in
   1970  (see paragraphs 10-11 above), who would be forced to go  into
   exile  from her own country in order not to be separated  from  her
   husband;  he  claimed to have had ostensible possession  of  French
   status  until  3 February 1972, when he was served with  the  prime
   ministerial  decree  refusing to recognise his  French  nationality
   (see  paragraph 32 above); the Prefect of Hauts-deSeine  had  early
   in  1984 offered him a temporary residence permit (see paragraph 22
   above)  and  the Minister of the Interior had issued  a  compulsory
   residence  order in his favour on 31 August 1989 (see paragraph  16
   above);  he would not have been liable to deportation if  the  Laws
   of  29  October  1981 and 9 September 1986 had entered  into  force
   earlier (see paragraphs 44 and 45 above).
       In  short,  Mr  Beldjoudi - who does not regard  himself  as  a
   "second  generation  immigrant" - and his  wife  claimed  that  all
   their   family   ties,  social  links,  cultural  connections   and
   linguistic  ties were in France. They claimed that  there  were  no
   exceptional circumstances which could justify deportation.
       72.  The Commission agreed in substance with this argument, but
   attached particular weight to two additional factors. Firstly,  Mrs
   Beldjoudi might have good grounds for not following her husband  to
   Algeria,  especially as she had reason to believe at  the  time  of
   her marriage that she would be able to continue living with him  in
   France.  Secondly, the offences committed by Mr  Beldjoudi  -  both
   before  and  after the deportation order - were ultimately  not  of
   such  a  type that the requirements of public order should outweigh
   considerations of a family nature.
       73. The Government's first argument was based on the nature  of
   the  facts  justifying  the deportation. They  stressed  the  large
   number  and  serious  nature  of  the  offences  committed  by   Mr
   Beldjoudi,  all  of them during his adult life, over  a  period  of
   fifteen  years  (see  paragraph 12  above).  They  also  noted  the
   severity  of  the  sentences  passed  by  the  French  courts,   in
   particular  by  the  Hauts-de-Seine Assize  Court  for  an  offence
   classified  as  a  serious  crime (see paragraph  12  above);  they
   totalled  over ten years in prison. Finally, they pointed out  that
   Mr  Beldjoudi had continued with his life of crime even after being
   served  with  the  deportation order, and  that  he  was  currently
   detained  on  remand, charged with a fresh offence (see  paragraphs
   12  and  14  above).  In  short,  the  dangerous  character  of  Mr
   Beldjoudi meant that his presence on French territory could not  be
   tolerated by the community.
       The   Government  also  considered  that  the  extent  of   the
   interference  complained  of should not be  exaggerated.  Only  the
   family  life  of  the  applicants as spouses was  relevant,  as  Mr
   Beldjoudi  had not lived with his parents since 1969  and  did  not
   contribute  to  the  maintenance  of  his  brothers  and   sisters;
   furthermore,  the  couple had no children. But the  applicants  had
   had  to  separate for long periods because of Mr Beldjoudi's  terms
   of  imprisonment.  Moreover, Mr Beldjoudi had not  shown  that  his
   wife  would  be unable to accompany him to Algeria (a  State  which
   had preserved numerous ties with France) or a third country, if  he
   were  in  fact compelled to leave French territory. In  short,  the
   difficulties  of  resettling  outside  France  without   destroying
   family life would not be insurmountable.
       74.  The  Court  acknowledges that it is  for  the  Contracting
   States to maintain public order, in particular by exercising  their
   right,  as  a  matter  of  well-established international  law  and
   subject  to  their  treaty  obligations,  to  control  the   entry,
   residence  and expulsion of aliens (see the Abdulaziz, Cabales  and
   Balkandali v. the United Kingdom judgment of 28 May 1985, Series  A
   no.  94,  p. 34, para. 67, the Berrehab v. the Netherlands judgment
   of  21  June 1988, Series A no. 138, pp. 15 - 16, зз 28 -  29,  and
   the  Moustaquim v. Belgium judgment of 18 February 1991,  Series  A
   no. 193, p. 19, para. 43).
       However, their decisions in this field must, in so far as  they
   may  interfere with a right protected under paragraph 1 of  Article
   8  (art.  8-1), be necessary in a democratic society,  that  is  to
   say,  justified  by  a  pressing social need  and,  in  particular,
   proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.
       75.  In  the  present case, as was rightly  emphasised  by  the
   Government, Mr Beldjoudi's criminal record appears much worse  than
   that  of Mr Moustaquim (see the above-mentioned judgment, Series  A
   no.  193, p. 19, para. 44). It should therefore be examined whether
   the  other  circumstances of the case, relating to both  applicants
   or  to  one  of  them  only,  are enough  to  compensate  for  this
   important fact.
       76.  The applicants lodged a single application and raised  the
   same  complaints. Having regard to their age and the fact that they
   have  no  children, the interference in question primarily  affects
   their  family  life as spouses, as the Government  rightly  pointed
   out.
       They  were  married in France over twenty years  ago  and  have
   always  had  their  matrimonial home there.  The  periods  when  Mr
   Beldjoudi  was  in  prison undoubtedly prevented them  from  living
   together  for  a  considerable time, but did  not  terminate  their
   family  life,  which  remained under the protection  of  Article  8
   (art. 8).
       77.  Mr  Beldjoudi,  the  person immediately  affected  by  the
   deportation,  was born in France of parents who were  then  French.
   He  had  French nationality until 1 January 1963. He was deemed  to
   have  lost  it  on  that  date,  as his  parents  had  not  made  a
   declaration  of recognition before 27 March 1967 (see  paragraph  9
   above).  It should not be forgotten, however, that he was  a  minor
   at  the time and unable to make a declaration personally. Moreover,
   as  early as 1970, a year after his first conviction but over  nine
   years  before the adoption of the deportation order, he  manifested
   the  wish to recover French nationality; after being registered  at
   his  request  in  1971,  he was declared  by  the  French  military
   authorities to be fit for national service (see paragraphs  31  and
   33 above).
       Furthermore,  Mr  Beldjoudi married a  Frenchwoman.  His  close
   relatives  all  kept French nationality until 1 January  1963,  and
   have resided in France for several decades.
       Finally,  he has spent his whole life - over forty years  -  in
   France,  was educated in French and appears not to know Arabic.  He
   does  not  seem to have any links with Algeria apart from  that  of
   nationality.
       78.  Mrs  Beldjoudi for her part was born in France  of  French
   parents,  has  always lived there and has French nationality.  Were
   she to follow her husband after his deportation, she would have  to
   settle  abroad, presumably in Algeria, a State whose  language  she
   probably  does not know. To be uprooted like this could  cause  her
   great difficulty in adapting, and there might be real practical  or
   even  legal obstacles, as was indeed acknowledged by the Government
   Commissioner  before the Conseil d'Etat (see paragraph  27  above).
   The  interference in question might therefore imperil the unity  or
   even the very existence of the marriage.
       79.  Having regard to these various circumstances, it  appears,
   from  the point of view of respect for the applicants' family life,
   that  the  decision  to deport Mr Beldjoudi, if  put  into  effect,
   would  not be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued and would
   therefore violate Article 8 (art. 8).
       80.  Having reached this conclusion, the Court need not examine
   whether  the deportation would also infringe the applicants'  right
   to respect for their private life.
   
                  II. Alleged violation of Article 14
               in conjunction with Article 8 (art. 14+8)
   
       81.  In  view of the finding in paragraph 79 above,  the  Court
   does  not consider it necessary also to examine the complaint  that
   the  applicants  would,  if  Mr  Beldjoudi  were  deported,  suffer
   discrimination  contrary to Article 14 (art. 14) in  the  enjoyment
   of their right to respect for their family life.
   
            III.  Alleged violation of Articles 3, 9 and 12
                       (art. 3, art. 9 art. 12)
   
       82. The applicants also relied on Articles 3, 9 and 12 (art. 3,
   art. 9, art. 12) before the Commission.
       These  complaints  were not mentioned before the  Court,  which
   does not consider it necessary to examine them of its own motion.
   
                IV. Application of Article 50 (art. 50)
   
       83. Under Article 50 (art. 50),
       "If  the  Court finds that a decision or a measure taken  by  a
   legal  authority or any other authority of a High Contracting Party
   is  completely  or  partially  in  conflict  with  the  obligations
   arising  from the ... Convention, and if the internal  law  of  the
   said  Party  allows  only partial reparation to  be  made  for  the
   consequences  of  this decision or measure,  the  decision  of  the
   Court  shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured
   party."
       Pursuant  to  this  Article (art. 50), the  applicants  claimed
   compensation for loss and reimbursement of costs.
       84.  No  breach  of  Article 8 (art. 8) has  as  yet  occurred.
   Nevertheless,  the Court having found that the Minister's  decision
   to  deport Mr Beldjoudi would, if implemented, give rise to such  a
   breach,  Article  50  (art. 50) must be taken as  applying  to  the
   facts  of  the present case (see, mutatis mutandis, the Soering  v.
   the  United Kingdom judgment of 7 July 1989, Series A no.  161,  p.
   49, para. 126).
   
                               A. Damage
   
       85.  Mr and Mrs Beldjoudi alleged that they had suffered damage
   because  of  the  failure to comply with the  requirements  of  the
   Convention, and claimed 10,000,000 French francs.
       The   Government   considered  this  figure  to   be   entirely
   unprecedented  and  in  any  case completely  unjustified,  as  the
   deportation order had not been enforced.
       The Delegate of the Commission also considered the claim to  be
   excessive. He suggested, however, that a reasonable sum  should  be
   awarded  in  respect of non-pecuniary damage; this should  be  less
   than  that awarded to Mr Moustaquim, who had been obliged  to  live
   outside Belgium for some years after being deported.
       86. The applicants must have suffered non-pecuniary damage, but
   the present judgment provides them with sufficient compensation  in
   this respect.
   
                         B. Costs and expenses
   
       87.  Mr and Mrs Beldjoudi sought reimbursement of the costs and
   expenses  allegedly incurred by them during the proceedings  before
   the Convention institutions, namely 100,000 French francs.
       The Government argued that the account submitted by counsel for
   the  applicants  was excessively vague. However, a  sum  of  40,000
   francs   would   be   acceptable,  in  the   absence   of   special
   circumstances duly proved.
       88.  Having  regard  to  the detailed information  subsequently
   provided, the Court considers it reasonable to award 60,000  French
   francs under this head.
   
                      FOR THESE REASONS THE COURT
   
       1.  Holds  by  seven votes to two that, in  the  event  of  the
   decision  to deport Mr Beldjoudi being implemented, there would  be
   a violation of Article 8 (art. 8) with respect to both applicants;
       2. Holds by eight votes to one that it is not necessary also to
   consider  the  case  from  the point  of  view  of  Article  14  in
   conjunction with Article 8 (art. 14+8), or of Articles 3, 9 and  12
   (art. 3, art. 9, art. 12);
       3.  Holds  unanimously that with respect to  the  non-pecuniary
   damage  suffered by the applicants the present judgment constitutes
   in  itself sufficient just satisfaction for the purposes of Article
   50 (art. 50);
       4. Holds unanimously that the respondent State is to pay to the
   applicants  within  three  months 60,000  (sixty  thousand)  French
   francs for costs and expenses;
       5.  Dismisses unanimously the remainder of the claim  for  just
   satisfaction.
   
       Done  in  English  and  in French, and delivered  at  a  public
   hearing  in  the  Human Rights Building, Strasbourg,  on  26  March
   1992.
   
                                                  Signed: Rolv RYSSDAL
                                                             President
   
                                           Signed: {Marc-Andre} EISSEN
                                                             Registrar
   
   
   
   
   
   
       In  accordance  with  Article 51 para. 2  (art.  51-2)  of  the
   Convention  and  Rule  53  para. 2  of  the  Rules  of  Court,  the
   following separate opinions are annexed to this judgment:
       (a) dissenting opinion of Mr Pettiti;
       (b) separate opinion of Mr De Meyer;
       (c) dissenting opinion of Mr Valticos;
       (d) concurring opinion of Mr Martens.
   
                                                     Initialled: R. R.
   
                                                   Initialled: M.-A.E.
   
                  DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE PETTITI
   
                             (Translation)
   
       Unlike  the majority, I have not voted in favour of a violation
   of Article 8 (art. 8).
       To  be  sure,  the  effect of the judgment is confined  to  the
   particular case and to the special circumstances: Mr Beldjoudi  has
   spent  forty-one years of his life to date in France and  has  been
   married to a Frenchwoman for twenty-two years. But it seems  to  me
   that  neither the reasoning on the principle nor the grounds  given
   for  the  decision  are consistent with a precise construction  and
   evaluation  of Article 8 (art. 8) of the European Convention,  with
   reference to the deportation of aliens who have committed crimes.
       The  majority have indeed taken into account the fact that  the
   deportation  order  was  issued on  2  November  1979,  before  the
   convictions  of 28 March 1978 and 4 December 1986;  but  they  also
   seem  to  have  accepted  as additional  criteria  or  reasons  the
   authorities'  refusal  in  1970 to grant Mr  Beldjoudi  the  French
   nationality  sought  by  him, and also the absence  of  links  with
   Algeria.  They consider that deportation would not be proportionate
   to  the  legitimate aim, without giving adequate specifications  of
   the  extent  of  that proportionality in reply to the  distinctions
   drawn by the Conseil d'Etat.
       The Convention does not limit the sovereign right of States  to
   decide  to  deport from their territory aliens who  have  committed
   crimes.
       The  right  of an alien to reside on the territory  of  a  High
   Contracting  Party  is not guaranteed as such  by  the  Convention.
   Similarly, the right of asylum and the right not to be deported  do
   not  appear as such in the series of rights and freedoms guaranteed
   by  the  Convention  (this is stated in several  decisions  of  the
   Commission).
       Only   in  exceptional  circumstances  can  expulsion  mean   a
   violation  of  the  Convention, for example  if  there  is  a  very
   serious  risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 (art.  3)  in  the
   destination  State,  especially where there is  no  possibility  of
   deportation   to  some  other  democratic  State.  The   Moustaquim
   judgment  had  a  different  context,  as  it  concerned  a   young
   adolescent  who had no roots outside the country where  his  family
   lived, and who had been reintegrated into society.
       In  the present Beldjoudi case, the circumstances are just  the
   contrary:  as an adult, a persistent offender, a person within  the
   sphere  of  attacks on public order, he came within  the  class  of
   legitimate deportations.
       Moreover,  he apparently refused to acquire French  nationality
   by  marriage,  and  had  even turned down  a  compulsory  residence
   order, and so forth.
       The  European  Court  appears also to  have  considered  as  an
   implicit  reason  for  its decision the non-attribution  of  French
   nationality.  This  is to forget that the Evian agreements  are  an
   international  treaty. The determination of nationality,  including
   the  opportunity to choose, was defined by France and Algeria. This
   was  therefore not a unilateral decision by France. Algeria for its
   part  had also insisted on such choices, and does not refrain  from
   deporting  Frenchmen who have committed crimes, even if  they  were
   born  in  Algeria and have lived there. Such a bilateral treaty  is
   based  on  reciprocity and public international law. France  cannot
   be  accused  of violating the European Convention on  Human  Rights
   for  having applied the provisions of the Evian agreements and  the
   Code  of  Nationality  to  determine  Mr  Beldjoudi's  nationality.
   Moreover,  like  any  State, France is  sovereign  in  granting  or
   refusing naturalisation.
       It  appears that the majority of the Court also considered that
   Mr  Beldjoudi was a quasi-Frenchman, a concept which is unknown  in
   international law.
       The  fact  of having lived continuously in the host country  or
   country  of  residence cannot be a complete bar to the exercise  of
   the  right  to  deport criminals. The special relationship  between
   France  and  Algeria cannot in itself be considered  as  preventing
   deportation, as other member States of the Council of  Europe  also
   have  similar  situations  arising  from  historical  relationships
   between  Germans  and  Poles, Austrians and Italians,  Britons  and
   Commonwealth citizens, etc., and such relationships do not  prevent
   justified deportations.
       Member  States expel criminal citizens in the normal course  of
   events. The only possible general defence should be a reference  to
   Article  3  (art.  3), otherwise a long period of  residence  would
   suffice  for  reliance  on  Article  8  (art.  8).  A  great   many
   deportations of aliens from Europe would be affected.
       The  majority  did  indeed take note of the significant  factor
   following  from  Mr Beldjoudi's criminal record and  conduct,  even
   after  the deportation order of 1979; but they balanced this factor
   against   his   personal  and  family  life,  on   the   basis   of
   proportionality.  Again, precise criteria  should  be  defined  for
   this  balancing exercise, as the European Court normally  does.  In
   this judgment there is no definition of the threshold of risks  and
   level  of  reoffending  which  should  determine  whether  or   not
   criminal  aliens are to be deported. The majority  also  appear  to
   have  considered  that departure for Algeria would inevitably  have
   followed in the event of deportation, but this is not certain.
       The   serious  problem  of  deportations  of  aliens  who  have
   committed  crimes, which is a very different problem from  that  of
   administrative   deportations  not  brought   about   by   criminal
   convictions,   some  of  which  have  dramatic   consequences   for
   families,  is  the  subject  of concern by  the  European  Economic
   Community,   the   Council   of  Europe   and   the   international
   organisation  Interpol.  An  overall  European  policy  should   be
   sought,  in  the  spirit of the Convention for  the  Protection  of
   Fundamental Rights.
       In my opinion, the decision of the majority carries within it a
   source  of  contradictions,  in  an exponential  interpretation  of
   Article  8 (art. 8), if an interference with the private or  family
   life  of a persistent offender suffices to prevent deportation,  as
   the  position of a persistent offender would amount to  a  sort  of
   immunity for his benefit. In fact, any deportation affects  private
   or  family  life, just as any detention does. If a further  offence
   is  committed, there would be a further interference. But  in  that
   case  private  life  is  affected by  the  conduct  of  the  person
   concerned.
       Each  member  State  remains the master  of  its  own  criminal
   policy,  just  as  it retains the right to define the  severity  of
   sentences.  In many States deportation is an exemplary  penalty  in
   addition  to  the sentence. In countries with a high proportion  of
   aliens  in the population, it is deportation much rather  than  the
   threat  of  prison which is a safeguard against repeated  offending
   and  strengthens  the  national consensus in  favour  of  welcoming
   immigrants  of  good  character who by  their  work  share  in  the
   prosperity  of  the nation. A deportation measure, as  accepted  in
   criminology  and criminal policy, is also a measure  of  protection
   for  the  potential  victims of repeated offenders,  especially  in
   countries   with   a  serious  increase  in  crime   and   a   high
   concentration of organised crime.
       The  Convention on Human Rights cannot ignore the aspect of the
   rights of others and their necessary protection. It would no  doubt
   have been preferable if the French Government, bearing in mind  the
   new provisions (closer to Article 8 of the Convention) (art. 8)  of
   the  Law of 29 October 1981 (sections 23 and 25) and the Law  of  2
   August  1989,  had waived deportation in this particular  case,  in
   view  of  the position of the French spouse. If the European  Court
   intended  to  move  towards the review of deportations  in  similar
   cases for all member States, it would have to examine matters  from
   the  point  of  view either of Article 6 (art. 6), if that  Article
   had  been violated with reference to the domestic proceedings  seen
   in  the  light  of the European Convention on Human Rights,  or  of
   Article  3 (art. 3) (inhuman and degrading treatment). The  concept
   of  a  balance  of interests in the event of the possible  but  not
   certain  use  of  Article  8  (art.  8)  would  require  a   strict
   application of proportionality, which in my opinion is  lacking  in
   the  reasoning  of  the Beldjoudi judgment. The  State's  right  to
   deport  aliens  who commit crimes is to a certain  extent  for  the
   general  interest the counterpart of the welcome given  to  persons
   enjoying  the right of asylum and migrants, which is a key  element
   of international solidarity and the protection of human rights.
   
                  SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE DE MEYER
   
                             (Translation)
   
       Like the majority of my colleagues, I consider that there would
   be  a violation of the applicants' fundamental rights "in the event
   of the decision to deport Mr Beldjoudi being implemented".
       But which right or rights are these?
       Our  colleague Mr Martens was right to wonder whether the  case
   did  not concern their right to respect for their private life just
   as  much  as their right to respect for their family life. I  agree
   to a great extent with his observations <4>.
   --------------------------------
       <4> See pp. 37 to 39 below.
   
       It  seems to me, however, that ultimately, bearing in mind  the
   circumstances  mentioned in paragraphs 77 and 78 of  the  judgment,
   the  deportation of Mr Beldjoudi, with respect to both  applicants,
   would  not  merely  constitute  an unacceptable  interference  with
   their  private  and  family  life, but would  actually  be  inhuman
   treatment <5>.
   --------------------------------
       <5>  It is because the case should in my opinion also have been
   examined  from  this  point of view that  I  have  been  unable  to
   approve  of point 2 of the operative provisions of the judgment.  I
   entirely  agree with it in so far as it relates to Articles  9,  12
   and 14 (art. 9, art. 12, art. 14) of the Convention.
   
   
       This  would  be so, not indirectly because of what might  await
   them  in  Algeria - that is not the point in issue here <6>  -  but
   directly,  in that Mr Beldjoudi would be ejected, after over  forty
   years,  from  a country which has always in fact been  "his"  since
   birth, even though he does not possess its "nationality".
   --------------------------------
       <6>  The  present case differs in this respect from the Soering
   (Series A no. 161) and Cruz Varas (Series A no. 201) cases.
   
       While  it is true, as the documents in the case show,  that  Mr
   Beldjoudi  has already been convicted of numerous offences,  mostly
   comparatively  serious ones, and is now once more  under  suspicion
   of  having  committed  others <7>, he can be sufficiently  punished
   for these by the criminal law.
   ---------------------------------
       <7> See paragraphs 12, 14, 73 and 75 of the judgment.
   
                 DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE VALTICOS
   
                             (Translation)
   
       I regret that I must express my dissent from the opinion of the
   majority  of  the  Court,  who  have concluded  that  there  was  a
   violation  of Article 8 (art. 8) of the Convention in  the  instant
   case, with reference in particular to Mr Beldjoudi's family life.
       My  explanation need not be long, as it is based in essence  on
   the  dissenting  opinion  I  gave  in  the  similar,  although  not
   identical, case of the youth Moustaquim.
       The differences between the two cases cut both ways: on the one
   hand, the present case concerns the ties between a husband and  his
   wife,  not  those between a young man and his family. On the  other
   hand,  young  Moustaquim's  criminal  behaviour  consisted  of  the
   offences  of  an adolescent, very numerous but for  the  most  part
   comparatively unimportant, whereas here there were repeated  crimes
   of  violence committed by a person aged about forty, who  had  been
   sentenced  to  nearly  eleven  years'  imprisonment  in  less  than
   seventeen   years.  Moreover,  the  Court  acknowledged   that   Mr
   Beldjoudi's criminal record was "much worse".
       The  deportation  of  aliens - which one can  understand  being
   contemplated  in a case as serious as this one - is  a  prerogative
   of  States, and its use is restricted by the Convention (Article  5
   para. 1 (f) of the Convention and Protocols Nos. 4 and 7) (art.  5-
   1-f, P4, P7) only in well-defined cases. This is not one of them.
       Admittedly,  the Court has in the present case  interposed  the
   concept  of family life, which is protected by Article 8  (art.  8)
   of  the Convention. It considers that there was on the part of  the
   Government an interference by a public authority with the  exercise
   of  the applicants' right to respect for their family life. One may
   well  wonder,  however,  whether  Article  8  (art.  8)  is  really
   applicable  to a case such as this and whether it was  designed  to
   prohibit the deportation of aliens married to citizens of the  host
   country. Such an interpretation might open the way to many abuses.
       In  any  event,  it does not seem to me to be possible  to  use
   Article  8  (art.  8) of the Convention to restrict  the  right  of
   States  to take deportation measures, where they have valid reasons
   for  deciding on them in defence of public safety, and where  their
   effect on family life is only an indirect consequence.
   
                  CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE MARTENS
   
       1.  I  agree with the findings of the Court but, as far  as  Mr
   Beldjoudi  is  concerned, I would have preferred  its  decision  to
   have  been  based  on  (a)  a  less  casuistic  reasoning  and  (b)
   interference with the right to respect for private life.
       2.  Paragraph  1 of Article 3 of Protocol No. 4 (P4-3)  to  the
   Convention forbids the expulsion of nationals. In a Europe where  a
   second  generation  of immigrants <8> is already  raising  children
   (and  where violent xenophobia is increasing to an alarming extent)
   it  is high time to ask ourselves whether this ban should not apply
   equally to aliens who were born and bred in a member State  or  who
   have   otherwise,  by  virtue  of  long  residence,  become   fully
   integrated  there  (and, conversely, become  completely  segregated
   from their country of origin) <9>.
   --------------------------------
       <8>  I  realise,  of  course, that  the  present  case  may  be
   distinguished  from  an  ordinary  "second-generation   immigrant's
   expulsion case" in that Mr Beldjoudi's parents, when they  took  up
   residence  in  France,  were  not "immigrants"  stricto  sensu  but
   French  citizens  coming to live in their  own  country.  I  think,
   however,  that  it  is  legitimate to ignore  this  difference  for
   present purposes.
       <9> This question has, of course, a more limited scope in those
   member   States   where,   under  the  principle   of   ius   soli,
   secondgeneration immigrants acquire citizenship by reason of  their
   birth  within the territory; it is, therefore, probably more  exact
   to  refer  to expulsion of "integrated aliens" rather than "second-
   generation immigrants' expulsion".
   
       In   my  opinion,  mere  nationality  does  not  constitute  an
   objective  and  reasonable justification for  the  existence  of  a
   difference  as regards the admissibility of expelling someone  from
   what,  in  both cases, may be called his "own country". I therefore
   have  no  hesitation  in  answering  the  above  question  in   the
   affirmative.  I believe that an increasing number of member  States
   of   the   Council  of  Europe  accept  the  principle  that   such
   "integrated  aliens"  should be no more liable  to  expulsion  than
   nationals  <10>, an exception being justified, if at all,  only  in
   very  exceptional circumstances. My own country  is  one  of  those
   States <11> and since 1981 - with the exception of the period 1986-
   1989 so is France <12>.
   --------------------------------
       <10> This principle has already been accepted in the context of
   the  International  Covenant on Civil and Political  Rights:  under
   Article  12  para. 4 of the Covenant "no one shall  be  arbitrarily
   deprived  of  the  right  to  enter his own  country";  this  right
   implies  a ban on the expulsion not only of nationals, but  also  -
   as  appears  from  the  drafting history  of  the  words  "his  own
   country"  -  of  all "integrated aliens" (such as second-generation
   immigrants); see M. Nowak, CCPR-Kommentar, Art. 12, Randnummern  45
   -  51; Van Dijk & Van Hoof, De Europese Conventie, 2nd edition,  p.
   551;  Velu  and  Ergec, La Convention {europeenne}  des  Droits  de
   l'Homme, para. 372 (p. 322).
       <11>  See  the  1990  version  of  the  "Circular  on  Aliens":
   Nederlandse  Staatscourant 12 maart 1990, no. 50;  see  further  on
   this  issue, inter alia: Groenendijk, Nederlands Juristenblad 1987,
   pp.   1341   et  seq.;  Swart,  Preadvies,  Nederlandse   Juristen-
   vereniging 1990, para. 35 (pp. 242 et seq.).
       <12> See paragraphs 42 - 50 of the Court's judgment.
   
       I would have preferred the Court's decision in the present case
   to  have  been  based on the aforesaid principle,  coupled  with  a
   finding   that   there  were  no  very  exceptional   circumstances
   justifying  a  departure therefrom. A judgment  along  those  lines
   would  have  achieved what the Moustaquim v. Belgium <13>  and  the
   present  judgment have failed to do, namely introduce a measure  of
   legal  certainty; this seems highly desirable, especially  in  this
   field.
   --------------------------------
       <13> Judgment of 18 February 1991, Series A no. 193.
   
       3.  The  latter consideration also militated, as  Mr  Schermers
   rightly  pointed out <14>, in favour of basing the Court's decision
   -  if  possible  - on interference with the right  to  respect  for
   private  life, since, whilst not all "integrated aliens" threatened
   with expulsion are married, they all have a private life.
   --------------------------------
       <14>  See  his  concurring opinion appended to the Commission's
   opinion in the present case pp. 48 and 49.
   
       In  my  opinion,  it  is  possible to do so.  Expulsion  severs
   irrevocably all social ties between the deportee and the  community
   he  is living in and I think that the totality of those ties may be
   said  to be part of the concept of private life, within the meaning
   of Article 8 (art. 8).
       It  is  true  that, at least at first sight, the text  of  this
   provision  seems  to  suggest  otherwise.  Read  as  a  whole,   it
   apparently guarantees immunity of an inner circle in which one  may
   live  one's  own, one's private, life as one chooses.  This  "inner
   circle"  concept  presupposes an "outside world" which,  logically,
   is  not  encompassed  within  the concept  of  private  life.  Upon
   further   consideration,  however,  this  "inner  circle"   concept
   appears  too  restrictive.  "Family  life"  already  enlarges   the
   circle,  but  there are relatives with whom one has no family  life
   stricto  sensu.  Yet  the  relationship  with  such  persons,   for
   instance  one's parents, undoubtedly falls within the sphere  which
   has  to be respected under Article 8 (art. 8). The same may be said
   with  regard  to  one's relationships with lovers  and  friends.  I
   therefore  share the view of the Commission, which  has  repeatedly
   held that "respect for private life"
       "comprises also to a certain degree the right to establish  and
   to  develop  relationships with other human beings,  especially  in
   the  emotional field, for the development and fulfilment  of  one's
   own personality" <15>.
   --------------------------------
       <15>. See, inter alia: Decisions and Reports, no. 5, pp.  86  -
   87, and no. 10, p. 100; Series B no. 36, pp. 25 - 26.
       If the Commission, in so holding, intended to give a definition
   of  "private life" within the meaning of Article 8 (art. 8) (as has
   been  suggested  by  Doswald-Beck, Human Rights Law  Journal  1983,
   p.288),  I  do  not  agree: it is highly difficult  to  define  the
   concept  and I submit that the time has not yet come to try  to  do
   so.
   
       I think that the Court's Dudgeon v. the United Kingdom, Rees v.
   the  United Kingdom, Cossey v. the United Kingdom and B. v.  France
   judgments <16> are also based on the idea that to a certain  extent
   a  person's  "external" relations with others (outside  the  "inner
   circle") do fall within the sphere of private life <17>.
   --------------------------------
       <16>  Judgments  of  22  October  1981,  17  October  1986,  27
   September  1990 and 25 March 1992, Series A nos. 45, 106,  184  and
   232-C.
       <17>  See  further: Velu and Ergec, La Convention  {europeenne}
   des Droits de l'Homme, para. 652 (pp. 535 et seq.).
   
       The  same idea presumably underlies the aforementioned  ban  on
   the  expulsion of nationals: when speaking of nationals, one almost
   always  thinks primarily of those whose links with a given  country
   are  particularly close and manifold because they  have  been  born
   and  bred  there  <18>,  in  a family which  has  lived  there  for
   generations <19>; it was clearly felt to be unacceptable  that,  by
   compelling  such persons to leave, never to return, a State  should
   be entitled to sever those ties irrevocably.
   --------------------------------
       <18>  See  paragraph 88 of the Court's Abdulaziz,  Cabales  and
   Balkandali v. the United Kingdom judgment of 28 May 1985 (Series  A
   no. 94, p. 41).
       <19> For the idea that a person's personal history and memories
   may  be  said  to fall within the sphere which has to be  respected
   under  Article  8 (art. 8), see the Court's Gaskin  v.  the  United
   Kingdom judgment of 7 July 1989 (Series A no. 160).
   
       To  sum  up:  I  think that expulsion, especially  (as  in  the
   present  case)  to a country where living conditions  are  markedly
   different  from  those  in  the expelling  country  and  where  the
   deportee,  as  a  stranger  to  the  land,  its  culture  and   its
   inhabitants,  runs  the  risk of having to  live  in  almost  total
   social  isolation,  constitutes  interference  with  his  right  to
   respect for his private life.
   
   

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