[неофициальный перевод]
ЕВРОПЕЙСКИЙ СУД ПО ПРАВАМ ЧЕЛОВЕКА
СУДЕБНОЕ РЕШЕНИЕ
КИГАН (KEEGAN) ПРОТИВ ИРЛАНДИИ
(Страсбург, 26 мая 1994 года)
(Извлечение)
КРАТКОЕ НЕОФИЦИАЛЬНОЕ ИЗЛОЖЕНИЕ ОБСТОЯТЕЛЬСТВ ДЕЛА
A. Основные факты
29 сентября 1988 г. подруга заявителя, с которой он был
обручен, родила от него дочь S., но до этого они расстались. После
рождения ему не разрешили увидеть ни бывшую подругу, ни дочь. 17
ноября 1988 г. мать отдала S. для удочерения, о чем впоследствии
сообщила заявителю.
Последний возбудил дело о назначении его опекуном S. в
соответствии с Разделом 6A Закона об опеке над младенцами 1964 г.,
что позволило бы ему воспрепятствовать процессу удочерения другим
лицом. 29 мая 1989 г. суд первой инстанции назначил заявителя
опекуном.
Мать и предполагаемые усыновители подали апелляцию в Высокий
Суд, который в июле 1989 г. признал, что заявитель отвечал
условиям назначения опекуном. Вместе с тем Суд направил дело в
Верховный суд, обратившись с просьбой о толковании двух статей
Закона 1964 г. 1 декабря 1989 г. Верховный суд в своем толковании
inter alia указал, что отец ребенка, рожденного вне брака, не
имеет права быть опекуном.
Высокий Суд снова рассмотрел дело и 9 февраля 1990 г. отклонил
иск заявителя об опеке, потому что по прошествии определенного
времени привязанность ребенка к предполагаемым усыновителям
усилилась и, соответственно, любые перемены, вероятнее всего,
оказали бы травмирующее воздействие на ребенка.
B. Разбирательство в Комиссии по правам человека
В своей жалобе в Комиссию от 1 мая 1991 г. господин Киган
утверждал, что имело место нарушение права на уважение его
семейной жизни (статья 8), выразившееся в том, что его ребенок был
удочерен без его ведома и согласия и что национальное
законодательство не дает ему даже права быть назначенным опекуном.
Далее он жаловался на нарушение статьи 6 п. 1, поскольку он не мог
участвовать в процедуре решения вопроса в Совете по усыновлению.
Он также утверждал, что как внебрачный отец он подвергся
дискриминации при осуществлении вышеназванных прав по сравнению с
положением отца ребенка, рожденного в браке (статья 14 в сочетании
со статьями 6 и 8).
Комиссия признала заявление приемлемым 13 февраля 1992 г. В
своем докладе от 17 февраля 1993 г. она выразила мнение, что имело
место нарушение статьи 8 и статьи 6 п. 1 (единогласно) и что нет
необходимости рассматривать вопрос, было ли также нарушение статьи
14 в сочетании с этими статьями (одиннадцатью голосами против
одного).
Дело было передано Комиссией в Суд 7 апреля 1994 г.
ИЗВЛЕЧЕНИЕ ИЗ СУДЕБНОГО РЕШЕНИЯ
ВОПРОСЫ ПРАВА
I. Предварительные возражения Правительства
A. Может ли заявитель предъявлять иск
от имени своей дочери?
33. Правительство заявило, что заявитель не имеет locus standi
для предъявления иска от имени дочери, т.к. в соответствии с
Конвенцией только человек, пользующийся родительскими правами, или
опекун имеет право подавать иск от имени ребенка.
34. В процессе слушаний в Суде заявитель указал, что более не
настаивает на жалобе о нарушении прав его дочери в результате ее
удочерения (см. п. 15 выше).
35. В свете данного обстоятельства Суд считает, что он призван
рассмотреть лишь вопрос о нарушении прав самого заявителя. Поэтому
нет необходимости рассматривать возражение Правительства по этому
вопросу.
B. Об исчерпании внутренних средств правовой защиты
36. Правительство утверждало, что жалоба должна быть
отвергнута, т.к. не были исчерпаны внутренние правовые средства,
что противоречит статье 26 Конвенции, поскольку:
1) заявитель не обжаловал в Верховном суде окончательное
Решение Высокого Суда об опеке;
2) он не предъявил иск в ирландские суды по поводу того, что
Закон не позволил ему принять участие в процедуре удочерения, а
Совет по усыновлению не принял во внимание его мнение до начала
процедуры удочерения;
3) он не оспорил в Высоком Суде конституционность правовых
норм, которые, по его мнению, ставят внебрачного отца в неравное
положение с отцом ребенка, рожденного в браке, что не дало ему
возможности отстаивать свои собственные права.
37. И заявитель, и Комиссия указали, что эти утверждения не
имеют отношения к существу дела.
38. Суд отмечает, что во время разбирательства в Комиссии
Правительство выдвигало лишь возражения, сформулированные выше в
п. 2 и 3, но не в п. 1. Соответственно оно лишило себя права
выдвигать данное возражение в Суде.
Кроме того, ирландское право не предусматривает обжалование
Решения Высокого Суда, вынесенного им в качестве апелляционной
инстанции.
39. Что касается п. 2 и 3, Суд напоминает, что требуется
исчерпать только те правовые средства, которые эффективны и
способны исправить предполагаемое нарушение (см. Решение по делу
"Открытая дверь" и "Дублинские повитухи" против Ирландии от 29
октября 1992 г. Серия A, т. 246, с. 23, п. 48). Суд считает, что у
заявителя не было никаких шансов на успех при обращении в эти
суды, принимая во внимание практику Верховного суда, который
отрицает за внебрачным отцом конституционное право участвовать в
процедуре усыновления (см. п. 21 выше).
40. Из этого следует, что возражения Правительства, основанные
на неисчерпании внутренних правовых средств, отклоняются.
II. О предполагаемом нарушении статьи 8
41. Заявитель утверждает, что было нарушено его право на
уважение его семейной жизни, что противоречит статье 8 Конвенции,
которая гласит:
"1. Каждый человек имеет право на уважение его личной и
семейной жизни, неприкосновенности его жилища и тайны
корреспонденции.
2. Не допускается вмешательство со стороны государственных
органов в осуществление этого права, за исключением вмешательства,
предусмотреного законом и необходимого в демократическом обществе
в интересах государственной безопасности и общественного
спокойствия, экономического благосостояния страны, в целях
предотвращения беспорядков или преступлений, для охраны здоровья
или нравственности или защиты прав и свобод других лиц".
A. Применимость статьи 8
42. Правительство считает, что нерегулярные и нестабильные
отношения между заявителем и матерью закончились до рождения
ребенка и не были достаточно серьезными и обязательными, чтобы
соответствовать семейной жизни в смысле статьи 8. Ребенок ни
минуты не жил в семейных условиях. Ни кровные узы, ни искреннее и
сердечное стремление к семейной жизни недостаточны, чтобы создать
ее.
43. По мнению заявителя и Комиссии, его связь с ребенком была
достаточна для создания семейной жизни. Они подчеркивали, что дочь
была плодом продуманного взаимного решения, принятого в период
отношений любви.
44. Суд напоминает, что понятие "семья" в данной статье не
ограничивается исключительно отношениями, основанными на браке, и
может включать другие de facto "семейные" узы, когда стороны живут
совместно вне брака (см. inter alia Решение по делу Джонстон и
другие против Ирландии от 18 декабря 1986 г. Серия A, т. 112, с.
25, п. 55). Ребенок, рожденный в результате таких взаимоотношений,
является ipso jure частью этой "семейной" ячейки с момента его
рождения и именно благодаря самому факту своего рождения. Поэтому
между ребенком и его родителями существует связь, равнозначная
семейной жизни, даже если на момент его или ее рождения родители
больше не проживали совместно или если их отношения закончились
(см. mutatis mutandis Решение по делу Беррехаб против Нидерландов
от 21 июня 1988 г. Серия A, т. 138, с. 14, п. 21).
45. В данном случае отношения между заявителем и матерью
ребенка продолжались более двух лет, в течение одного года они
проживали совместно. Более того, зачатие их ребенка было
результатом продуманного решения, и они также планировали
пожениться (см. п. 6 выше). Их отношения в то время подпадали под
понятие семейной жизни в смысле статьи 8. Тот факт, что их
отношения впоследствии испортились, меняет данный вывод не больше,
чем если бы они были супружеской парой, законно зарегистрировавшей
брак и оказавшейся в аналогичной ситуации. Из этого следует, что с
момента рождения ребенка между заявителем и его дочерью
существовала связь, образующая семейную жизнь.
B. Соблюдение статьи 8
1. Статья 8 п. 1
46. Заявитель утверждал, что государство не уважает его
семейную жизнь, т.к. способствовало тайной передаче его дочери и
ее удочерению без его ведома и согласия; оно не сделало ничего для
того, чтобы между ним и его дочерью с момента ее рождения
установилась правовая связь.
Более того, критерий, который использовал Верховный суд при
решении вопроса об опеке, поставил его в невыгодное положение по
сравнению с приемными родителями. От него требовали доказать, что
то, что ребенок может получить от приемных родителей, недостаточно
для его благополучия. По утверждению заявителя, в соответствии со
статьей 8 он должен по закону иметь право на опекунство, и в любом
соперничестве должна была действовать опровержимая законная
презумпция, что благополучие ребенка обеспечивается наилучшим
образом, если дочь будет находиться на его попечении. Он
подчеркнул, однако, что не стремится отменить выданное разрешение
на удочерение его ребенка.
47. С точки зрения Правительства, государства - участники
пользуются широкой свободой усмотрения в вопросах усыновления.
Право на уважение семейной жизни не должно быть истолковано так,
чтобы право отца ребенка, рожденного вне брака, было поставлено
выше интересов самого ребенка вопреки фактам, установленным судом.
Заявитель, как признал Верховный суд, имел право просить суд о
признании его опекуном, и это право он использовал. Более того,
Верховный суд принял во внимание кровные узы между ним и его
дочерью как один из факторов, определяющих благополучие ребенка.
Заявитель имел широкую возможность представить свое дело в суде, с
тем чтобы его интересы были учтены. При этом права и интересы
матери, желающей отдать ребенка для удочерения, также должны быть
учтены.
В частности, Правительство подчеркивало, что признание за
внебрачным отцом могущего быть отозванным права на опекунство
могло вызвать осложнения и трудности в других делах, затронуло бы
вопросы социальной политики, от вмешательства в которые
Европейский суд должен воздерживаться.
48. По мнению Комиссии, установленные ирландским правом
запреты, мешающие заявителю установить отношения со своей дочерью,
должны быть квалифицированы как отсутствие уважения его семейной
жизни в нарушение позитивного обязательства, взятого на себя
государством - участником в соответствии со статьей 8.
49. Суд напоминает, что основная цель статьи 8 состоит в защите
отдельного лица от своевольного вмешательства государственных
властей; она устанавливает определенные позитивные обязанности,
призванные обеспечить "уважение" семейной жизни. Однако границы
между позитивными и негативными обязательствами, вытекающие из
этой статьи, трудно точно определить. В обоих случаях - и в этом
они схожи - необходим справедливый баланс между конкурирующими
интересами отдельного лица, с одной стороны, и общества - с
другой, и в обоих контекстах государство пользуется определенной
свободой усмотрения (см., например, Решение по делу Пауэлл и
Рейнер против Соединенного Королевства от 21 февраля 1990 г. Серия
A, т. 172, с. 18, п. 41, и вышеупомянутое Решение по делу Джонстон
и другие против Ирландии, с. 25, п. 55).
50. В соответствии с принципами, подтвержденными практикой
Суда, там, где существование семейных связей с ребенком очевидно,
государство должно действовать так, чтобы эти связи развивались, и
создать законные гарантии, которые бы позволили ребенку влиться в
семью с самого его рождения (см. mutatis mutandis Решение по делу
Маркс против Бельгии от 13 июня 1979 г. Серия A, т. 31, с. 15, п.
31, и вышеупомянутое Решение по делу Джонстон и другие). В этом
контексте можно сделать ссылку на принцип, заложенный в статье 7
Конвенции ООН о правах ребенка от 20 ноября 1989 г., в
соответствии с которой ребенок имеет, насколько это возможно,
право знать своих родителей и право на их заботу. Кроме того,
уместно напомнить, что взаимное общение родителя и ребенка
является основным элементом семейной жизни, даже когда отношения
между родителями испортились (см. inter alia Решение по делу
]phjqnm против Швеции от 22 июня 1989 г. Серия A, т. 156, с. 24,
п. 58).
51. В данном деле участие государства в процедуре усыновления
ведет к тому, что оба вида обязательств по статье 8 тесно
переплетаются. Тот факт, что ирландское законодательство разрешает
передачу ребенка на усыновление втайне, без ведома и согласия
заявителя, что ведет к возникновению привязанности у ребенка к
предполагаемым усыновителям, и последующая выдача официального
разрешения на усыновление равносильны вмешательству в право
заявителя на уважение семейной жизни. Такое вмешательство
допустимо, только если выполнены условия, изложенные в статье 8 п.
2
52. Ввиду данных обстоятельств нет необходимости рассматривать,
налагает ли статья 8 на Ирландию позитивные обязанности
автоматически предоставлять внебрачным отцам, таким как заявитель,
право на опекунство, могущее при определенных обстоятельствах быть
отмененным.
2. Статья 8 п. 2
a) "Предусмотрено законом" и правомерная цель
53. Решение передать ребенка на усыновление без ведома и
согласия отца соответствовало ирландскому законодательству так же,
как и решения судов. Совершенно очевидно также, что решения
Высокого Суда и Верховного суда преследовали правомерную цель
защиты прав и свобод ребенка (см. п. 10 - 14 выше).
b) "Необходимо в демократическом обществе"
54. По мнению Правительства, вмешательство было соразмерно
требованиям защиты здоровья девочки, равно как и защите ее прав и
свобод. Верховный суд при толковании ирландского законодательства
должным образом принял во внимание высшие интересы ребенка. Для
внебрачного отца оставалась открытой возможность обратиться в суд
с иском о назначении его, если это осуществимо, опекуном и / или
воспитателем ребенка.
Правительство утверждало, что введение специальных норм для
защиты интересов ребенка, рожденного вне брака, было бы
справедливо и полностью соответствовало Конвенции. Тем не менее
непрактично и потенциально вредно для интересов ребенка
предоставлять внебрачному отцу больше, чем право требовать
назначения его опекуном. В любом случае Совет по усыновлению по
своему усмотрению мог заслушать этого отца.
55. Суд отмечает, что заявителю была предоставлена возможность
в соответствии с ирландским законодательством заявлять права на
опекунство своей дочери, и его интересы были справедливо взвешены
Высоким Судом. Однако основным вопросом в данном деле является то,
что ирландский закон позволяет вскоре после рождения ребенка без
ведома и согласия отца передать ребенка на усыновление. Как ранее
отмечал Суд, в аналогичном контексте, когда ребенка передают на
попечение других людей, у него с течением времени возникают узы
привязанности, разрыв которых в случае отмены решения об опеке
может отрицательно сказаться на ребенке (см. inter alia Решение по
делу W. против Соединенного Королевства от 8 июля 1987 г. Серия A,
т. 121, с. 28, п. 62). Такое положение дел не только подвергнет
опасности нормальное развитие отношений заявителя с его ребенком,
но и приведет в движение могущий оказаться необратимым процесс,
который поставит заявителя в существенно менее выгодное положение
в его споре с возможными усыновителями.
Правительство не выдвинуло никаких доводов относительно
благополучия ребенка заявителя, оправдывающих такое отступление от
принципов, утверждающих уважение семейных отношений. При таком
положении дел Суд не может считать, что обнаруженное им
вмешательство в право заявителя на уважение его семейной жизни,
которую государство обязалось охранять, было необходимо в
демократическом обществе. Таким образом, была нарушена статья 8.
III. О предполагаемом нарушении статьи 6 п. 1
56. Заявитель в своей жалобе утверждал, что по ирландскому
праву он не имел возможности обратиться в суд, чтобы оспорить
передачу ребенка для усыновления, и не мог ни в каком качестве
участвовать в процедуре усыновления. Он ссылался на статью 6 п. 1
Конвенции, в которой сказано:
"1. Каждый человек имеет право при определении его гражданских
прав и обязанностей... на справедливое и публичное разбирательство
дела... независимым и беспристрастным судом..."
Комиссия поддержала его жалобу.
A. Применимость
57. Суд считает, что статья 6 п. 1 применима в данном споре
(см. inter alia вышеупомянутое Решение по делу W. против
Соединенного Королевства). Это не было оспорено Правительством при
рассмотрении дела в Суде.
B. Соблюдение
58. Правительство заявляет, во-первых, что Совет по усыновлению
не является судом и, следовательно, тот факт, что заявитель не
имел предусмотренного законом права на рассмотрение его дела этим
органом, не может нарушать данную статью. Во-вторых, заявитель
имел возможность обратиться в суд, что он и сделал. Это обращение
является контролем за деятельностью Совета по усыновлению, который
в случае такого обращения не может принять свое решение до того,
как узнает о решении суда. Следовательно, статья 6 п. 1 не была
нарушена (см п. 20 выше).
59. По мнению Суда, нужно установить четкие различия между
процедурой усыновления и судебным процессом. Как уже было
отмечено, центральным вопросом в данном деле является передача
ребенка для усыновления без ведома и предварительного согласия
заявителя (см. п. 51 выше). По ирландскому закону заявитель не
имел права оспаривать это решение ни перед Советом по усыновлению,
ни в суде (см. п. 20 - 22 выше). Его единственным правом на
обращение в Суд, чтобы воспрепятствовать удочерению его ребенка,
было возбуждение иска об опеке и воспитании (см. п. 8 - 14 выше).
К тому моменту, когда эти судебные разбирательства закончились,
чаша весов неизбежно качнулась в сторону предполагаемых
усыновителей.
На основании данных обстоятельств нет необходимости решать,
является ли Совет по усыновлению, который вполне допустимо
пользуется некоторыми квазиюридическими функциями, органом
правосудия в свете статьи 6 п. 1.
60. Таким образом, данная статья не была нарушена.
IV. О предполагаемом нарушении статьи 14
61. Заявитель обжаловал то обстоятельство, что при
осуществлении им своего права на уважение семейной жизни была
допущена дискриминация, что противоречит статье 14 Конвенции в
сочетании со статьей 8, равно как в отношении его права на суд в
сочетании со статьей 6 п. 1. Он утверждал, что отец ребенка,
родившегося в браке, в подобных обстоятельствах находится
полностью под защитой статей 8 и 6.
62. Принимая во внимание ранее сделанные выводы (см. п. 55 и 60
выше), Суд не считает необходимым рассматривать жалобу в этой
части (см. вышеупомянутое Решение по делу "Открытая дверь" и
"Дублинские повитухи" против Ирландии, с. 32, п. 83).
V. Применимость статьи 50
Статья 50 Конвенции предусматривает следующее:
"Если Суд установит, что решение или мера, принятые судебными
или иными властями Высокой Договаривающейся Стороны, полностью или
частично противоречат обязательствам, вытекающим из настоящей
Конвенции, а также если внутреннее право упомянутой Стороны
допускает лишь частичное возмещение последствий такого решения или
такой меры, то решением Суда, если в этом есть необходимость,
предусматривается справедливое возмещение потерпевшей стороне".
A. Ущерб
1. Материальный ущерб
64. Заявитель требует 2000 ирландских фунтов, которые он был
вынужден уплатить до того, как получил юридическую помощь для
ведения судебного процесса.
65. Правительство не выдвинуло никаких возражений. Суд считает,
что эта сумма должна быть выплачена полностью.
2. Моральный вред
66. Заявитель утверждает, что ему должно быть присуждено
значительное возмещение вреда, принимая во внимание тот факт, что
после двух лет болезненных судебных разбирательств его дочь сейчас
уже удочерена, и маловероятно, что он с ней когда-либо
воссоединится. Он уточнил, как уже было ранее упомянуто, что не
требует отменить состоявшееся удочерение (см. п. 46 выше).
67. Правительство считает, что признание факта нарушения было
бы достаточным справедливым удовлетворением в обстоятельствах
данного дела.
68. Суд же считает, что возмещение морального вреда будет
надлежащим в данном деле, принимая во внимание страдания,
беспокойство и чувство несправедливости, которые заявитель должен
был испытать в результате процедуры, приведшей к удочерению его
ребенка, а также в результате судебных разбирательств. Суд
присуждает ему 10000 ирландских фунтов в качестве соответствующего
возмещения.
B. Расходы и издержки
69. Заявитель требует выплатить ему общую сумму в 42863
ирландских фунта в возмещение расходов и издержек.
70. Правительство полагает необходимым уменьшить сумму на 5000
ирландских фунтов в отношении гонорара адвокату и на 3700
ирландских фунтов - гонорара советнику.
71. Суд отмечает, что, в отличие от заявителя, Правительство не
представило доказательств в поддержку своего утверждения. В таких
обстоятельствах требование должно быть полностью удовлетворено за
вычетом 51691,29 французского франка, уже выплаченных заявителю в
виде судебной помощи. Эта сумма увеличивается за счет налога на
добавленную стоимость там, где он может взиматься.
ПО ЭТИМ ОСНОВАНИЯМ СУД ЕДИНОГЛАСНО
1. Постановил, что нет необходимости рассматривать
предварительные возражения Правительства о возможности заявителя
подавать иск от имени дочери;
2. Отклонил другие предварительные возражения Правительства;
3. Постановил, что имело место нарушение статьи 8;
4. Постановил, что имело место нарушение статьи 6 п. 1;
5. Постановил, что нет необходимости рассматривать жалобу
заявителя по статье 14;
6. Постановил, что Ирландия должна заплатить заявителю не
позднее чем через три месяца 12000 (двенадцать тысяч) ирландских
фунтов в качестве возмещения материального и морального ущерба, и
в отношении расходов и издержек - суммы, вытекающие из расчетов,
сделанных в соответствии с п. 71 данного Судебного решения.
Совершено на английском и французском языках и оглашено во
Дворце прав человека в Страсбурге 26 мая 1994 г.
Председатель
Рольф РИССДАЛ
Заместитель Грефье
Герберт ПЕТЦОЛЬД
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
CASE OF KEEGAN v. IRELAND
JUDGMENT
(Strasbourg, 26.V.1994)
In the case of Keegan v. Ireland <*>,
--------------------------------
<*> Note by the Registrar: The case is numbered
16/1993/411/490. The first number is the case's position on the
list of cases referred to the Court in the relevant year (second
number). The last two numbers indicate the case's position on the
list of cases referred to the Court since its creation and on the
list of the corresponding originating applications to the
Commission.
The European Court of Human Rights, sitting, in accordance with
Article 43 (art. 43) of the Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ("the Convention") and the
relevant provisions of the Rules of Court, as a Chamber composed
of the following judges:
Mr R. Ryssdal, President,
Mr J. De Meyer,
Mr S.K. Martens,
Mrs E. Palm,
Mr R. Pekkanen,
Mr A.N. Loizou,
Mr J.M. Morenilla,
Mr J. Makarczyk,
Mr J. Blayney, ad hoc judge,
and also of Mr M.-A. Eissen, Registrar, and Mr H. Petzold,
Deputy Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 26 November 1993 and on 19
April 1994,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the last-
mentioned date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case was referred to the Court by the European
Commission of Human Rights ("the Commission") on 7 April 1993,
within the three-month period laid down by Article 32 para. 1 and
Article 47 (art. 32-1, art. 47) of the Convention. It originated
in an application (no. 16969/90) against Ireland lodged with the
Commission under Article 25 (art. 25) on 1 May 1990 by an Irish
citizen, Mr Joseph Keegan.
The Commission's request referred to Articles 44 and 48 (art.
44, art. 48) and to the declaration whereby Ireland recognised the
compulsory jurisdiction of the Court (Article 46) (art. 46). The
object of the request was to obtain a decision as to whether the
facts of the case disclosed a breach by the respondent State of
its obligations under Articles 6, 8 and/or 14 (art. 6, art. 8,
art. 14) of the Convention.
2. In response to the enquiry made in accordance with Rule 33
para. 3 (d) of the Rules of Court, the applicant stated that he
wished to take part in the proceedings and designated the lawyer
who would represent him (Rule 30).
3. The Chamber to be constituted included ex officio Mr B.
Walsh, the elected judge of Irish nationality (Article 43 of the
Convention) (art. 43), and Mr R. Ryssdal, the President of the
Court (Rule 21 para. 3 (b)). On 23 April 1993, in the presence of
the Registrar, the President drew by lot the names of the other
seven members, namely Mr J. De Meyer, Mr S.K. Martens, Mrs E.
Palm, Mr R. Pekkanen, Mr A.N. Loizou, Mr J.M. Morenilla and Mr J.
Makarczyk (Article 43 in fine of the Convention and Rule 21 para.
4) (art. 43).
On 25 May 1993 Mr Walsh withdrew from the Chamber pursuant to
Rule 24 para. 2. By letter of 30 June 1993 the Agent of the
Government of Ireland ("the Government") notified the Registrar of
the appointment of the Hon. Mr Justice John Blayney, a judge of
the Supreme Court of Ireland, as an ad hoc judge (Article 43 of
the Convention and Rule 23) (art. 43).
4. As President of the Chamber (Rule 21 para. 5), Mr Ryssdal,
through the Registrar, consulted the Agent of the Government, the
applicant's lawyer and the Delegate of the Commission on the
organisation of the procedure (Rules 37 para. 1 and 38). Pursuant
to the order made in consequence, the Registrar received on 23
September 1993 the applicant's memorial and, on 14 October 1993,
the Government's. He was subsequently informed by the Secretary to
the Commission that the Delegate would submit his observations at
the hearing.
5. In accordance with the President's decision, the hearing
took place in public in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on
23 November 1993. The Court had held a preparatory meeting
beforehand.
There appeared before the Court:
(a) for the Government
Mrs E. Kilcullen, Assistant Legal Adviser,
Department of Foreign Affairs, Agent,
Mr D. Gleeson, Senior Counsel,
Mr M. Hanna, Counsel,
Mr D. McFadden,
Mr B. Carey, Advisers;
(b) for the Commission
Sir Basil Hall, Delegate;
(c) for the applicant
Ms D. Browne, Counsel,
Mr B. Walsh, Solicitor,
Ms C. Walsh, Adviser.
The Court heard addresses by Sir Basil Hall, Ms Browne and Mr
Gleeson as well as replies to questions put by several of its
members.
AS TO THE FACTS
I. The particular circumstances of the case
6. The applicant met his girlfriend Miss V. ("V.") in May 1986.
They lived together from February 1987 until February 1988. Around
Christmas 1987 they decided to have a child. Subsequently, on 14
February 1988, they became engaged to be married.
On 22 February 1988 it was confirmed that V. was pregnant.
Shortly after this the relationship between the applicant and V.
broke down and they ceased co-habiting. On 29 September 1988 V.
gave birth to a daughter S. of whom the applicant was the father.
The applicant visited V. at a private nursing home and saw the
baby when it was one day old. Two weeks later he visited V.'s
parents' home but was not permitted to see either V. or the child.
7. During her pregnancy V. had made arrangements to have the
child adopted and on 17 November 1988 she had the child placed by
a registered adoption society with the prospective adopters. She
informed the applicant of this in a letter dated 22 November 1988.
A. The proceedings before the Circuit Court
8. The applicant subsequently instituted proceedings before the
Circuit Court to be appointed guardian under section 6A, sub-
section 1, of the Guardianship of Infants Act 1964, which would
have enabled him to challenge the proposed adoption. He also
applied for custody of the child. Pursuant to the Adoption Act
1952, an adoption order cannot be made, inter alia, without the
consent of the child's mother and the child's guardian (see
paragraph 19 below). While a married man is a guardian of his
children, an unmarried man is not unless so appointed by the court
(see paragraphs 25 and 26 below).
9. On 29 May 1989 the Circuit Court appointed the applicant
guardian and awarded him custody.
B. The proceedings before the High Court
10. Following an appeal against the judgment of the Circuit
Court by V. and the prospective adopters, the High Court found in
July 1989 that the applicant was a fit person to be appointed
guardian and that there were no circumstances involving the
welfare of the child which required that the father's rights be
denied. Mr Justice Barron of the High Court stated:
"I am of the opinion that in considering the applications both
for custody and guardianship I must have regard to circumstances
as they presently exist and that in considering the welfare of the
child I must take into account the fact that she has been placed
for adoption. Each application must be taken as part of a global
application and not as a separate and distinct one. The test
therefore is:
(1) whether the natural father is a fit person to be appointed
guardian, and, if so:
(2) whether there are circumstances involving the welfare of
the child which require that, notwithstanding he is a fit person,
he should not be so appointed.
In the present case, I am of the opinion that he satisfies the
first condition and that unless the welfare of the child is to be
regarded as the sole consideration, he satisfies the second
condition ...
In my opinion, having regard to the purposes of the Status of
Children Act 1987, the rights of the father should not be denied
by considerations of the welfare of the child alone, but only
where - and they do not exist in the present case - there are good
reasons for so doing."
C. The proceedings before the Supreme Court
11. After the conclusion of the High Court proceedings Mr
Justice Barron acceded to an application by V. and the prospective
adopters to state a case for the opinion of the Supreme Court. The
questions put to the Supreme Court by the judge were as follows:
"(1) Am I correct in my opinion as to the manner in which
section 6A of the Guardianship of Infants Act 1964, as inserted by
section 12 of the Status of Children Act 1987, should be
construed?
(2) If not, what is the proper construction of that section and
what other, if any, principles should I have applied or considered
whether in relation to guardianship or custody which derive either
from law or from the provisions of the Constitution?"
12. Delivering the majority judgment of the Supreme Court on 1
December 1989, Chief Justice Finlay stated that the High Court had
incorrectly construed section 6A of the 1964 Act as conferring on
the natural father a right to be a guardian. He considered that
the Act only gave the natural father a right to apply to be
guardian. It did not equate his position with that of a married
father. The first and paramount consideration in the exercise of
the court's discretion was the welfare of the child, and the blood
link between child and father as merely one of the many relevant
factors which may be viewed by the court as relevant to that
question. He added, inter alia:
"... although there may be rights of interest or concern
arising from the blood link between the father and the child, no
constitutional right to guardianship in the father of the child
exists. This conclusion does not, of course, in any way infringe
on such considerations appropriate to the welfare of the child in
different circumstances as may make it desirable for the child to
enjoy the society, protection and guardianship of its father, even
though its father and mother are not married.
The extent and character of the rights which accrue arising
from the relationship of a father to a child to whose mother he is
not married must vary very greatly indeed, depending on the
circumstances of each individual case.
The range of variation would, I am satisfied, extend from the
situation of the father of a child conceived as the result of a
casual intercourse, where the rights might well be so minimal as
practically to be non-existent, to the situation of a child born
as the result of a stable and established relationship and
nurtured at the commencement of his life by his father and mother
in a situation bearing nearly all of the characteristics of a
constitutionally protected family, when the rights would be very
extensive indeed ..."
He concluded that:
"... regard should not be had to the objective of satisfying
the wishes and desires of the father to be involved in the
guardianship of and to enjoy the society of his child unless the
Court has first concluded that the quality of welfare which would
probably be achieved for the infant by its present custody which
is with the prospective adoptive parents, as compared with the
quality of welfare which would probably be achieved by custody
with the father is not to an important extent better".
The matter was then referred back to the High Court for the
case to be decided in light of this interpretation.
D. The subsequent proceedings before the High Court
13. The High Court resumed its examination of the case in early
1990. It heard, inter alia, the evidence of a consultant child
psychiatrist who considered that the child would suffer short-term
trauma if moved to the applicant's custody. In the longer term she
would be more vulnerable to stress and be less able to cope with
it. She would also have difficulty in forming "trust"
relationships.
14. In his judgment of 9 February 1990 Mr Justice Barron
recalled that the applicant wished bona fide to have custody of
his daughter and that he felt the existence of an emotional bond.
He had also noted that if the child remained with the adopters
she would obtain the benefit of a higher standard of living and
would be likely to remain at school longer. However, he considered
that differences springing solely from socio-economic causes
should not be taken into account where one of the claimants is a
natural parent. In his view "to do otherwise would be to favour
the affluent as against the less well-off which does not accord
with the constitutional obligation to hold all citizens as human
persons equal before the law".
Applying the test laid down by the Supreme Court in the light
of the dangers to the psychological health of the child he allowed
the appeal of the natural mother and the prospective adopters and
concluded as follows:
"The result, it seems to me, is this. If the child remains
where she is, she will if the adoption procedures are completed
become a member of a family recognised by the Constitution and
freed from the danger of psychological trauma. On the other hand
if she is moved she will not be a member of such a family and in
the short and long term her future is likely to be very different.
The security of knowing herself to be a member of a loving and
caring family would be lost. If moved, she will I am sure be a
member of a loving and caring unit equivalent to a family in her
eyes. Nevertheless the security will be lost and there will be
insecurity arising from the several factors which have been
enumerated.
In my view these differences and the danger to her
psychological health are of such an importance that I cannot hold
that the quality of welfare likely to be achieved with the
prospective adopters would not be to an important extent better
than that likely to be achieved by custody with the father. That
being so, his wish and desire to be involved in the guardianship
of and to enjoy the society of his child is not a factor which I
am to take into account. In these circumstances, the welfare of
the infant requires her to remain in her present custody.
Accordingly the application for relief must be refused."
15. An adoption order was subsequently made in respect of the
child.
II. Relevant domestic law and practice
A. Appeals to the Supreme Court
16. A decision of the High Court which determines an appeal
from the Circuit Court cannot be appealed to the Supreme Court
(Eamonn Andrews Productions Limited v. Gaiety Theatre Enterprises
[1978] Irish Reports 295). The High Court can, however, ask for
the opinion of the Supreme Court on points of law by way of a case
stated.
B. Adoption
17. The adoption of children in Ireland is governed by the
Adoption Act 1952. This Act was amended in 1964, 1974 and 1976.
Section 8 of the 1952 Act established a body to be known as the
Adoption Board (An Bord {Uchtala})<*> to fulfil the functions
assigned to it by the Act, its principal function being to make
adoption orders on application being made to it by persons
desiring to adopt a child.
--------------------------------
<*> Здесь и далее по тексту слова на национальном языке набраны
латинским шрифтом и выделены фигурными скобками.
18. Arrangements for the adoption of a child under the age of
seven years may only be made by a registered adoption society or a
Health Board (section 34 of the 1952 Act) and where the mother or
guardian of a child proposes to place the child at the disposal of
a registered adoption society for adoption the society must,
before accepting the child, furnish the mother or father with a
statement in writing explaining clearly the effect of an adoption
order on the rights of the mother or guardian and the provisions
of the Act relating to consent to the making of an adoption order
(section 39 of the 1952 Act). When the applicant's child was
placed for adoption there was also a requirement that notice in
writing had to be given to the Adoption Board before or within
seven days after the reception of the child into the home of the
proposed adopters (section 10 of the Adoption Act 1964).
1. Consent
19. As regards the requisite consent of the natural parent,
section 14 of the 1952 Act provides as follows:
"(1) An adoption order shall not be made without the consent of
every person being the child's mother or guardian or having charge
of or control over the child, unless the Board dispenses with any
such consent in accordance with this section.
(2) The Board may dispense with the consent of any person if
the Board is satisfied that that person is incapable by reason of
mental infirmity of giving consent or cannot be found.
...
(6) A consent may be withdrawn at any time before the making of
an adoption order."
2. Entitlement to be heard by the Adoption Board
20. As regards those persons who are entitled to be heard on an
application for an adoption order, section 16 of the 1952 Act
provides as follows:
"(1) The following persons and no other persons shall be
entitled to be heard on an application for an adoption order -
(a) the applicants,
(b) the mother of the child,
(c) the guardian of the child,
(d) a person having charge of or control over the child,
(e) a relative of the child,
(f) a representative of a registered adoption society which is
or has been at any time concerned with the child,
(g) a priest or minister of a religion recognised by the
Constitution (or, in the case of any such religion which has no
ministry, an authorised representative of the religion) where the
child or a parent (whether alive or dead) is claimed to be or to
have been of that religion,
(h) an officer of the Board,
(i) any other person whom the Board, in its discretion, decides
to hear.
(2) A person who is entitled to be heard may be represented by
counsel or solicitor.
(3) The Board may hear the application wholly or partly in
private.
(4) Where the Board has notice of proceedings pending in any
court of justice in regard to the custody of a child in respect of
whom an application is before the Board, the Board shall make no
order in the matter until the proceedings have been disposed of."
21. The Supreme Court has held in the leading case of the State
(Nicolaou) v. An Bord {Uchtala} (the Adoption Board) [1966] Irish
Reports 567 that the relevant provisions of the Adoption Act 1952,
which permitted the adoption of a child born out of wedlock
without the consent of the natural father or without the right to
be heard by the Adoption Board prior to the making of an adoption
order, were not repugnant to the Constitution on the grounds that
they discriminated against the natural father or infringed his
constitutional rights (Article 40, sections 1 and 3 of the
Constitution). It also held that the protection afforded to the
"family" in Article 41 of the Constitution related only to the
"family" based on marriage.
3. Application to the High Court
22. Section 20 of the 1952 Act provides:
"20. (1) The Board may (and, if so requested by an applicant
for an adoption order, the mother or guardian of the child or any
person having charge of or control over the child, shall, unless
it considers the request frivolous) refer any question of law
arising on an application for an adoption order to the High Court
for determination.
(2) Subject to rules of court, a case stated under this section
may be heard in camera."
C. Custody and guardianship
1. Welfare of the child
23. As regards proceedings relating, inter alia, to the custody
or guardianship or upbringing of an infant, the Guardianship of
Infants Act 1964 provided as follows:
"3. Where in any proceedings before any court the custody,
guardianship or upbringing of an infant, or the administration of
any property belonging to or held on trust for an infant, or the
application of the income thereof, is in question, the court, in
deciding that question, shall regard the welfare of the infant as
the first and paramount consideration."
"Welfare" in relation to an infant is defined as follows in
section 2 of the said Act:
"Welfare", in relation to an infant, comprises the religious
and moral, intellectual, physical and social welfare of the
infant."
2. Rights of married parents
24. Section 6 of the 1964 Act provided as follows:
"(1) The father and mother of an infant shall be guardians of
the infant jointly.
(2) On the death of the father of an infant the mother, if
surviving, shall be guardian of the infant, either alone or
jointly with any guardian appointed by the father or by the court.
(3) On the death of the mother of an infant the father, if
surviving, shall be guardian of the infant, either alone or
jointly with any guardian appointed by the mother or by the
court."
3. Rights of the natural father
25. The definition of "father" under section 2 of the 1964 Act
did not include the father of a child born out of wedlock.
26. The Status of Children Act 1987 amended the Guardianship of
Infants Act 1964 in the following way:
"11. Section 6 of the Act of 1964 is hereby amended by the
substitution of the following subsection for subsection (4):
"(4) Where the mother of an infant has not married the infant's
father, she, while living, shall alone be the guardian of the
infant unless there is in force an order under section 6A
(inserted by the Act of 1987) of this Act or a guardian has
otherwise been appointed in accordance with this Act."
12. The Act of 1964 is hereby amended by the insertion after
section 6 of the following section:
"6A (1) Where the father and mother of an infant have not
married each other, the court may on the application of the
father, by order appoint him to be a guardian of the infant.
(2) ... the appointment by the court under this section of the
father of an infant as his guardian shall not affect the prior
appointment of any person as guardian of the infant under section
8 (1) of this Act unless the court otherwise orders ..."
27. As regards court applications for custody of an infant, the
1964 Act provided as follows:
"11. (1) Any person being a guardian of an infant may apply to
the court for its direction on any question affecting the welfare
of the infant and the court may make such order as it thinks
proper.
(2) The court may by an order under this section
(a) give such directions as it thinks proper regarding the
custody of the infant and the right of access to the infant of his
father or mother;
..."
28. This section of the 1964 Act was amended by the 1987 Act as
follows:
"13. Section 11 of the Act of 1964 is hereby amended by the
substitution of the following subsection for subsection (4):
"(4) In the case of an infant whose father and mother have not
married each other, the right to make an application under this
section regarding the custody of the infant and the right of
access thereto of his father or mother shall extend to the father
who is not a guardian of the infant, and for this purpose
references in this section to the father or parent of an infant
shall be construed as including him."
4. Powers of guardians
29. The 1964 Act provides, inter alia, that a guardian under
the Act shall be entitled (1) to the custody of the infant and to
take proceedings for the restoration of his custody of the infant
against any person who wrongfully takes away or detains the child
and (2) to the possession and control of all property of the
infant (section 10).
D. Recent developments in Irish adoption practice
30. The following developments have taken place subsequent to
the facts of the present case.
By memorandum of 30 April 1990 from the Registrar of the
Adoption Board, the relevant adoption societies and social workers
have been notified, inter alia, of the rights of the natural
father to apply for joint guardianship and/or custody of or access
to his child. The memorandum also draws attention to the
desirability of ascertaining from the mother and, where
practicable, the father, his intentions in relation to the child
as regards adoption although it recognises the practical
difficulties which may arise when mothers do not want to involve
the father or do not know who or where he is.
Where an adoption agency is given an indication by the natural
father that he opposes the placement of the child for adoption the
agency is advised to consider the prudence of delaying the
placement for a period. The memorandum further states that where a
natural father has applied to a court under no circumstances
should the child be placed for adoption pending the determination
of the court proceedings.
By a letter of 6 April 1992 the Adoption Board has informed the
relevant adoption societies and social workers of a review of its
policy in relation to natural fathers of children placed for
adoption and the necessity of following new procedures. The letter
indicates that whenever a natural father is
(a) named as father on the child's birth certificate,
(b) in a continuous relationship with the mother,
he should be notified, if not already aware, of the application
to adopt his child and offered a hearing by the Board on the
application.
In addition two forms must now be completed by the adoption
agency or by the applicant or applicants. These forms make the
fullest relevant enquiries for the purpose, inter alia, of
ascertaining the identity and intentions of the natural father as
regards the proposed adoption.
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION
31. Mr Keegan applied to the Commission on 1 May 1990. He
complained that there had been a violation of his right to respect
for family life (Article 8 of the Convention) (art. 8) in that his
child had been placed for adoption without his knowledge or
consent and that national law did not afford him even a defeasible
right to be appointed guardian. He further complained of a denial
of his right of access to court (Article 6 para. 1) (art. 6-1) in
that he had no locus standi in the proceedings before the Adoption
Board. He also alleged that, as the natural father, he had been
discriminated against in the exercise of the above-mentioned
rights (Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 6 and/or
Article 8) (art. 14+6, art. 14+8) when his position was compared
to that of a married father.
32. The application (no. 16969/90) was declared admissible on
13 February 1992. In its report of 17 February 1993 (Article 31)
(art. 31), the Commission expressed the opinion that there had
been a violation of Article 8 and of Article 6 para. 1 (art. 8,
art. 6-1) (unanimously) and that it was not necessary to examine
whether there had been a violation of Article 14 taken in
conjunction with Article 6 and/or Article 8 (art. 14+6, art. 14+8)
(by eleven votes to one).
The full text of the Commission's opinion is reproduced as an
annex to this judgment <*>.
--------------------------------
<*> Note by the Registrar: for practical reasons this annex
will appear only with the printed version of the judgment (volume
290 of Series A of the Publications of the Court), but a copy of
the Commission's report is available from the registry.
AS TO THE LAW
I. The government's preliminary objections
A. Whether the applicant can complain on
his daughter's behalf
33. The Government submitted that the applicant has no locus
standi in relation to complaints by his daughter since only a
person who exercises parental rights or is a guardian is entitled
to bring a complaint under the Convention on behalf of a child.
34. In the course of the hearing before the Court the applicant
indicated that it would no longer be appropriate for him to pursue
any claim in respect of alleged infringements of his daughter's
rights in the light of an adoption order now having been made in
respect of her (see paragraph 15 above).
35. In view of this position, the Court considers that it is
only called upon to examine allegations concerning violations of
the applicant's rights. It is thus unnecessary to examine the
Government's objection on this point.
B. Whether the applicant failed to exhaust
domestic remedies
36. The Government contended that the application should be
rejected for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies, contrary to
Article 26 (art. 26) of the Convention, on the grounds:
(1) that the applicant had not appealed to the Supreme Court
against the final determination of the guardianship and custody
proceedings by the High Court;
(2) that he had failed to complain before the Irish courts of
the fact that the law did not enable him to become involved in the
adoption process and, in particular, to be consulted by the
Adoption Board prior to any adoption;
(3) that he had not challenged the constitutionality of the
legal provisions relating to a natural father by bringing
proceedings in the High Court alleging that the State had failed
to afford him equal treatment compared to a married father and had
failed to vindicate his personal rights.
37. Both the applicant and the Commission contended that there
was no substance in any of these grounds.
38. The Court notes that the Government had raised points (2)
and (3) in the proceedings before the Commission but not point
(1). Accordingly they are estopped from raising this objection
before the Court.
Apart from this, under Irish law no appeal lies from the
decision of the High Court on an appeal from the Circuit Court
(see paragraph 16 above).
39. As regards points (2) and (3) the Court recalls that the
only remedies required to be exhausted are remedies which are
effective and capable of redressing the alleged violation (see,
amongst many authorities, the Open Door and Dublin Well Woman v.
Ireland judgment of 29 October 1992, Series A no. 246, p.23, para.
48). It considers that the applicant would have had no prospect of
success in making these claims before the courts having regard to
the case-law of the Supreme Court which denies to a natural father
any constitutional right to take part in the adoption process (see
paragraph 21 above).
40. It follows that the Government's objections based on non-
exhaustion of domestic remedies fail.
II. Alleged violation of Article 8 (art. 8)
41. The applicant alleged a violation of his right to respect
for family life contrary to Article 8 (art. 8) of the Convention
which provides:
"1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and
family life, his home and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with
the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with
the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests
of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of
the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the
protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the
rights and freedoms of others."
A. Applicability of Article 8 (art. 8)
42. The Government maintained that the sporadic and unstable
relationship between the applicant and the mother had come to an
end before the birth of the child and did not have the minimal
levels of seriousness, depth and commitment to cross the threshold
into family life within the meaning of Article 8 (art. 8).
Moreover, there was no period during the life of the child in
which a recognised family life involving her had been in
existence. In their view neither a mere blood link nor a sincere
and heartfelt desire for family life were enough to create it.
43. For both the applicant and the Commission, on the other
hand, his links with the child were sufficient to establish family
life. They stressed that his daughter was the fruit of a planned
decision taken in the context of a loving relationship.
44. The Court recalls that the notion of the "family" in this
provision is not confined solely to marriage-based relationships
and may encompass other de facto "family" ties where the parties
are living together outside of marriage (see, inter alia, the
Johnston and Others v. Ireland judgment of 18 December 1986,
Series A no. 112, p. 25, para. 55). A child born out of such a
relationship is ipso iure part of that "family" unit from the
moment of his birth and by the very fact of it. There thus exists
between the child and his parents a bond amounting to family life
even if at the time of his or her birth the parents are no longer
co-habiting or if their relationship has then ended (see, mutatis
mutandis, the Berrehab v. the Netherlands judgment of 21 June
1988, Series A no. 138, p. 14, para. 21).
45. In the present case, the relationship between the applicant
and the child's mother lasted for two years during one of which
they co-habited. Moreover, the conception of their child was the
result of a deliberate decision and they had also planned to get
married (see paragraph 6 above). Their relationship at this time
had thus the hallmark of family life for the purposes of Article 8
(art. 8). The fact that it subsequently broke down does not alter
this conclusion any more than it would for a couple who were
lawfully married and in a similar situation. It follows that from
the moment of the child's birth there existed between the
applicant and his daughter a bond amounting to family life.
B. Compliance with Article 8 (art. 8)
1. Paragraph 1 of Article 8 (art. 8-1)
46. The applicant maintained that the State failed to respect
his family life by facilitating the secret placement of his
daughter for adoption without his knowledge or consent and by
failing to create a legal nexus between himself and his daughter
from the moment of birth.
Moreover, the test applied by the Supreme Court to determine
the question of custody placed him at a considerable disadvantage
{vis-a-vis} the adoptive parents by requiring him to show that any
advantages that they had to offer the child were not important for
her welfare. In his submission, to be consistent with Article 8
(art. 8) the law ought to have conferred on him a defeasible right
to guardianship and, in any competition for custody with
strangers, there ought to have existed a rebuttable legal
presumption that the child's welfare was best served by being in
his care and custody. He stressed, however, that he was not
seeking to overturn the adoption order that had been made in
respect of his child.
47. For the Government, Contracting States enjoy a wide margin
of appreciation in the area of adoption. The right to respect for
family life cannot be interpreted so broadly as to embrace a right
to impose the wishes of the natural father over the interests of
the child in disregard of the findings of fact made by the courts.
The applicant, as the Supreme Court had held, had a right to
apply to be made a guardian, which right he had exercised.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court took into account the blood link
between him and his daughter as one of the factors to be weighed
in the balance in assessing the child's welfare. In addition, the
applicant had every opportunity to present his case and to have
his interests considered by the courts. However, in this process
the rights and interests of the mother, who had wanted her child
to be adopted, had also to be taken into account.
In particular, the Government emphasised that to grant a
natural father a defeasible right to guardianship could give rise
to complications, anguish and hardship in other cases and
concerned a matter of social policy on which the European Court
should be reluctant to intervene.
48. In the Commission's view the obstacles under Irish law to
the applicant establishing a relationship with his daughter
constituted a lack of respect for his family life in breach of a
positive obligation imposed by Article 8 (art. 8).
49. The Court recalls that the essential object of Article 8
(art. 8) is to protect the individual against arbitrary action by
the public authorities. There may in addition be positive
obligations inherent in an effective "respect" for family life.
However, the boundaries between the State's positive and negative
obligations under this provision do not lend themselves to precise
definition. The applicable principles are, none the less, similar.
In both contexts regard must be had to the fair balance that has
to be struck between the competing interests of the individual and
of the community as a whole; and in both contexts the State enjoys
a certain margin of appreciation (see, for example, the Powell and
Rayner v. the United Kingdom judgment of 21 February 1990, Series
A no. 172, p. 18, para. 41, and the above-mentioned Johnston and
Others judgment, p. 25, para. 55 ).
50. According to the principles set out by the Court in its
case-law, where the existence of a family tie with a child has
been established, the State must act in a manner calculated to
enable that tie to be developed and legal safeguards must be
created that render possible as from the moment of birth the
child's integration in his family (see, mutatis mutandis, the
Marckx v. Belgium judgment of 13 June 1979, Series A no. 31, p.
15, para. 31, and the above-mentioned Johnston and Others
judgment, p. 29, para. 72). In this context reference may be made
to the principle laid down in Article 7 of the United Nations
Convention on the Rights of the Child of 20 November 1989 that a
child has, as far as possible, the right to be cared for by his or
her parents. It is, moreover, appropriate to recall that the
mutual enjoyment by parent and child of each other's company
constitutes a fundamental element of family life even when the
relationship between the parents has broken down (see, inter alia,
the Eriksson v. Sweden judgment of 22 June 1989, Series A no. 156,
p. 24, para. 58).
51. In the present case the obligations inherent in Article 8
(art. 8) are closely intertwined, bearing in mind the State's
involvement in the adoption process. The fact that Irish law
permitted the secret placement of the child for adoption without
the applicant's knowledge or consent, leading to the bonding of
the child with the proposed adopters and to the subsequent making
of an adoption order, amounted to an interference with his right
to respect for family life. Such interference is permissible only
if the conditions set out in paragraph 2 of Article 8 (art. 8-2)
are satisfied.
52. In view of this finding, it is not necessary to examine
whether Article 8 (art. 8) imposed a positive obligation on
Ireland to confer an automatic but defeasible right to
guardianship on natural fathers such as the applicant.
2. Paragraph 2 of Article 8 (art. 8-2)
(a) "In accordance with the law" and legitimate aim
53. It is clear that the decision to place the child for
adoption without the father's knowledge or consent was in
accordance with Irish law as were the decisions taken by the
courts concerning the welfare of the child. That they pursued the
legitimate aim of protecting the rights and freedoms of the child
is evident from the judgments of the High Court and the Supreme
Court in this case (see paragraphs 10 - 14 above).
(b) Necessity in a democratic society
54. For the Government, the interference was proportionate to
the protection of the child's health as well as of her rights and
freedoms. The interpretation of Irish law by the Supreme Court
took proper account of the paramount interests of the child. It
remained open to the natural father to apply to the courts to be
appointed, where appropriate, the guardian and/or custodian of the
child.
They contended that it was fair and wholly consistent with the
Convention that special regulations be enforced to protect the
interests of a child born out of wedlock. Indeed it would be
impractical and potentially harmful to the interests of such a
child to grant the natural father rights that extended beyond a
right to apply for guardianship. In any event the Adoption Board
may, in its discretion, decide to hear the natural father.
55. The Court notes that the applicant was afforded an
opportunity under Irish law to claim the guardianship and custody
of his daughter and that his interests were fairly weighed in the
balance by the High Court in its evaluation of her welfare.
However, the essential problem in the present case is not with
this assessment but rather with the fact that Irish law permitted
the applicant's child to have been placed for adoption shortly
after her birth without his knowledge or consent. As has been
observed in a similar context, where a child is placed with
alternative carers he or she may in the course of time establish
with them new bonds which it might not be in his or her interests
to disturb or interrupt by reversing a previous decision as to
care (see, inter alia, the W. v. the United Kingdom judgment of 8
July 1987, Series A no. 121, p. 28, para. 62). Such a state of
affairs not only jeopardised the proper development of the
applicant's ties with the child but also set in motion a process
which was likely to prove to be irreversible, thereby putting the
applicant at a significant disadvantage in his contest with the
prospective adopters for the custody of the child.
The Government have advanced no reasons relevant to the welfare
of the applicant's daughter to justify such a departure from the
principles that govern respect for family ties. That being so, the
Court cannot consider that the interference which it has found
with the applicant's right to respect for family life,
encompassing the full scope of the State's obligations, was
necessary in a democratic society. There has thus been a violation
of Article 8 (art. 8).
III. Alleged violation of Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1)
56. The applicant complained that he had no access to a court
under Irish law to challenge the placement of his child for
adoption and no standing in the adoption procedure. He invoked
Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) of the Convention according to which:
"1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations
..., everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing ... by an
independent and impartial tribunal ..."
The Commission upheld his complaint.
A. Applicability
57. The Court considers that Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) is
applicable to the present dispute (see, inter alia, the above-
mentioned W. v. the United Kingdom judgment, pp. 32 - 35, paras.
72 - 79). Indeed this has not been seriously contested by the
Government in the proceedings before the Court.
B. Compliance
58. The Government submitted in the first place that the
Adoption Board was not a court and thus the fact that the
applicant had no statutory right to be heard by that body could
not infringe this provision. Secondly, it was open to the
applicant to apply to the courts for guardianship and custody of
his daughter, which he did. Since these proceedings controlled and
determined the activities of the Adoption Board which can make no
order where it has notice of such an action, Article 6 para. 1
(art. 6-1) was complied with (see paragraph 20 above).
59. In the Court's view the adoption process must be
distinguished from the guardianship and custody proceedings. As
has been previously observed, the central problem in the present
case relates to the placement of the child for adoption without
the prior knowledge and consent of the applicant (see paragraph 51
above). The applicant had no rights under Irish law to challenge
this decision either before the Adoption Board or before the
courts or, indeed, any standing in the adoption procedure
generally (see paragraphs 20 - 22 above). His only recourse to
impede the adoption of his daughter was to bring guardianship and
custody proceedings (see paragraphs 8 - 14 above). By the time
these proceedings had terminated the scales concerning the child's
welfare had tilted inevitably in favour of the prospective
adopters.
Against this background, it is not necessary to decide whether
the Adoption Board, which admittedly exercises certain quasi-
judicial functions, is a tribunal within the meaning of Article 6
para. 1 (art. 6-1).
60. There has thus been a breach of this provision.
IV. Alleged violation of Article 14 (art. 14)
61. The applicant further complained that he had been
discriminated against contrary to Article 14 of the Convention in
conjunction with Article 8 (art. 14+8) in the enjoyment of his
right to respect for family life and in conjunction with Article 6
para. 1 (art. 14+6-1) as regards his right of access to court. He
maintained that a married father in similar circumstances enjoyed
the full protection of Articles 8 and 6 (art. 8, art. 6).
62. Having regard to its findings in respect of both of these
provisions (see paragraphs 55 and 60 above) the Court does not
consider it necessary to examine this complaint (see the above-
mentioned Open Door and Dublin Well Woman judgment, p. 32, para.
83).
V. Application of Article 50 (art. 50)
63. Article 50 (art. 50) of the Convention provides as follows:
"If the Court finds that a decision or a measure taken by a
legal authority or any other authority of a High Contracting Party
is completely or partially in conflict with the obligations
arising from the... Convention, and if the internal law of the
said Party allows only partial reparation to be made for the
consequences of this decision or measure, the decision of the
Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured
party."
A. Damage
1. Pecuniary loss
64. The applicant claimed IR GBP 2,000 which he had been
obliged to pay before his entitlement to legal aid in respect of
the guardianship and custody proceedings.
65. The Government made no objection. The Court considers that
this sum should be awarded in full.
2. Non-pecuniary loss
66. The applicant submitted that he should be awarded
substantial damages having regard to the fact that his daughter
has now been adopted following two years of traumatic court
proceedings and that it is unlikely that he will ever be re-united
with her. He emphasised, as previously mentioned, that he was not
seeking to overturn the adoption order (see paragraph 46 above).
67. The Government contended that a finding of a violation
would constitute adequate just satisfaction in the circumstances
of the case.
68. The Court is of the view that damages are appropriate in
this case having regard to the trauma, anxiety and feelings of
injustice that the applicant must have experienced as a result of
the procedure leading to the adoption of his daughter as well as
the guardianship and custody proceedings. It awards him IR GBP
10,000 under this head.
B. Costs and expenses
69. The applicant claimed a total amount of IR GBP 42,863 by
way of costs and expenses. He submitted inter alia an affidavit
from a practising cost accountant in Ireland by way of
substantiation of the reasonableness of his claim.
70. The Government submitted that there should be a reduction
of IR GBP 5,000 in respect of solicitor's fees and IR GBP 3,700 in
respect of counsel's fees.
71. The Court observes that whereas the applicant has furnished
it with a detailed substantiation of his claim the Government have
provided no evidence in support of their submission. In such
circumstances the claim should be allowed in full less 51,691.29
French francs already paid by way of legal aid in respect of fees
and expenses.
This amount is to be increased by any value-added tax that may
be chargeable.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
1. Holds that it is not necessary to examine the Government's
objection concerning the applicant's standing to complain on
behalf of his daughter;
2. Dismisses the remainder of the Government's preliminary
objections;
3. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 8 (art. 8);
4. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 para. 1
(art. 6-1);
5. Holds that it is not necessary to examine the applicant's
complaint under Article 14 (art. 14);
6. Holds that Ireland is to pay to the applicant, within three
months, IR GBP 12,000 (twelve thousand) in respect of non-
pecuniary and pecuniary damage and, in respect of costs and
expenses, the sums resulting from the calculation to be made in
accordance with paragraph 71 of the judgment.
Done in English and in French, and delivered at a public
hearing in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 26 May 1994.
Signed: Rolv RYSSDAL
President
Signed: For the Registrar
Herbert PETZOLD
Deputy Registrar
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