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ПОСТАНОВЛЕНИЕ ЕВРОПЕЙСКОГО СУДА ПО ПРАВАМ ЧЕЛОВЕКА ОТ 22.11.1995 S. W. ПРОТИВ СОЕДИНЕННОГО КОРОЛЕВСТВА [РУС. (ИЗВЛЕЧЕНИЕ), АНГЛ.]

(по состоянию на 20 октября 2006 года)

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                                              [неофициальный перевод]
   
                   ЕВРОПЕЙСКИЙ СУД ПО ПРАВАМ ЧЕЛОВЕКА
   
                            СУДЕБНОЕ РЕШЕНИЕ
                 S. W. ПРОТИВ СОЕДИНЕННОГО КОРОЛЕВСТВА
   
                    (Страсбург, 22 ноября 1995 года)
   
                              (Извлечение)
   
           КРАТКОЕ НЕОФИЦИАЛЬНОЕ ИЗЛОЖЕНИЕ ОБСТОЯТЕЛЬСТВ ДЕЛА
   
                           A. Основные факты
   
       Заявитель является подданным Великобритании.  После нескольких
   лет трудностей  в  семейной  жизни  его  жена  заявила 18 сентября
   1990 г.,  что их браку пришел  конец.  Позднее  вечером  заявитель
   заставил ее вступить с ним в сексуальные отношения против ее воли.
   Заявителя обвинили в изнасиловании,  угрозе убийства и  нападении.
   Суд над ним начался 16 апреля 1991 г.
       Месяцем раньше Суд королевской короны  в  деле  R.  против  R.
   поддержал осуждение другого мужчины за попытку изнасилования жены.
   Это  решение,  удостоверенное  апелляционным  судом,   подтвердило
   наметившийся еще раньше отказ от прецедента, сформулированного еще
   в 1736 г.  судьей сэром Мэтью Хейлом: "Муж не может быть виновен в
   насилии, совершенном им над его законной женой, ибо по их согласию
   и брачному договору жена отдана своему мужу и не может  ни  в  чем
   отказывать ему".
       В Решении апелляционного суда по делу R.  против R.  14  марта
   1991  г.  Лорд  Главный  Судья,  лорд  Лэйн,  проанализировав  ряд
   предшествующих решений по сходным  делам,  пришел  к  выводу,  что
   принцип,  сформулированный  в  1736  г.,  отражал  общее право той
   эпохи.  Однако обстоятельства существенно  изменились,  и  настало
   время, воспользовавшись гибкостью общего права, приспособить его к
   новым социальным условиям. Лорд Лэйн пришел к выводу, что эволюция
   общего права позволяет ему констатировать, что иммунитет супруга в
   случае изнасилования больше не  существует.  Вывод  Апелляционного
   суда был поддержан Решением Палаты лордов от 23 октября 1991 г.
       При рассмотрении дела заявителя S.  W.  в апреле 1991  г.  его
   адвокат  утверждал,  что  новый  прецедент,  созданный  по делу R.
   против R.,  не может быть применен,  ибо это означало бы  придание
   ему обратной силы,  что,  в частности,  противоречит статье 7 п. 1
   Конвенции. Тем не менее присяжные признали S. W. виновным, и судья
   Роуз приговорил его к пяти годам лишения свободы, заявив при этом,
   что супружеский иммунитет в случае  изнасилования  сведен  на  нет
   Судебными решениями за последние 40 лет до такой степени,  что его
   уже больше не существует,  и  что  это  изменение  в  общем  праве
   совместимо со статьей 7 Конвенции.
       Заявитель подал апелляцию,  но  отозвал  ее  после  того,  как
   Палата  лордов  поддержала  Решение  апелляционного суда в деле R.
   против R.
   
            B. Разбирательство в Комиссии по правам человека
   
       В жалобе,  поданной в Комиссию 29 марта 1992 г., утверждалось,
   что осуждение заявителя нарушает статью 7 Конвенции, так как новой
   правовой норме была придана обратная сила.  Жалоба была  объявлена
   приемлемой 14 января 1994 г.
       В своем докладе от 27 июня 1994 г.  Комиссия установила  факты
   дела и выразила мнение,  что  нарушение статьи 7 п. 1 Конвенции не
   имело места (одиннадцатью голосами против шести).
       Комиссия передала дело в Суд 9 сентября 1994 г.
   
                    ИЗВЛЕЧЕНИЕ ИЗ СУДЕБНОГО РЕШЕНИЯ
   
                             ВОПРОСЫ ПРАВА
   
            I. О предполагаемом нарушении статьи 7 Конвенции
   
       32. Заявитель  жаловался,  что осуждение за изнасилование жены
   является наказанием  с  применением  обратной  силы  в   нарушение
   статьи 7 Конвенции, которая гласит:
       "1. Никто  не  может  быть  осужден  за  какое-либо  уголовное
   преступление  на  основании совершения какого-либо действия или за
   бездействие,  которое  согласно  действовавшему   в   момент   его
   совершения  национальному  или  международному  праву  не являлось
   уголовным преступлением. Не может также налагаться наказание более
   тяжкое,   нежели   то,   которое  подлежало  применению  в  момент
   совершения уголовного преступления.
       2. Настоящая  статья не препятствует преданию суду и наказанию
   любого лица на основании совершения какого-либо  действия  или  за
   бездействие,  которое  в  момент его совершения являлось уголовным
   преступлением  в   соответствии   с   общими   принципами   права,
   признанными цивилизованными странами".
       33. Правительство и Комиссия не согласились  с  вышеизложенным
   утверждением.
   
                           A. Общие принципы
   
       34. Гарантия,    о    которой   говорит   статья 7,   является
   неотъемлемым элементом верховенства права, занимает видное место в
   системе защиты, осуществляемой Конвенцией. Это подчеркивается тем,
   что в соответствии со статьей 15 никакое  отступление  от  нее  не
   допустимо  даже  в период войны или иного чрезвычайного положения.
   Статью 7 следует толковать и применять так, как это вытекает из ее
   предмета  и  цели,  таким  образом,  чтобы  обеспечить эффективную
   защиту от произвольного преследования, осуждения и наказания.
       35. Суд  в  Решении по делу Коккинакис против Греции от 25 мая
   1993 г.  (Серия A, т. 260-A, с. 22, п. 52) указал, что статья 7 не
   ограничивается  запрещением  применения  обратной силы в уголовном
   праве во вред обвиняемому:  она также,  в  более  широком  смысле,
   говорит  о  другом принципе уголовного права nullum crimen,  nulla
   poena sine lege,  а также принципе,  согласно  которому  уголовный
   закон  не  должен  толковаться  расширительно во вред обвиняемому,
   например,  по аналогии.  Из  этих  принципов  следует,  что  любое
   преступление   должно  быть  четко  определено  в  законе,  причем
   необходимо,  чтобы каждый мог  понять  из  текста  соответствующей
   статьи  - в случае необходимости с помощью толкования,  данного ей
   судами,  какое его действие  или  бездействие  повлечет  за  собой
   уголовную ответственность.  Суд подчеркнул,  что когда речь идет о
   "законе",  то статья 7 говорит о том же понятии,  которое проходит
   через   все  статьи  Конвенции,  охватывает  как  писаное,  так  и
   неписаное право и обладает необходимыми качествами,  в  том  числе
   доступностью    и    предсказуемостью   (см.   Решение   по   делу
   Толстой-Милославский против Соединенного Королевства  от  13  июля
   1995 г. Серия A, т. 316-B, с. 71 - 72, п. 37).
       36. Однако как бы четко ни была сформулирована норма  в  любой
   системе  права,  включая  уголовное,  неизбежен  элемент судебного
   толкования.  Всегда будет существовать  необходимость  разъяснения
   неясных  моментов  и  в  адаптации к изменяющимся обстоятельствам.
   Правовая  традиция  Соединенного   Королевства,   как   и   других
   государств -  участников,  свидетельствует   о  том,  что судебная
   практика как источник права способствует  прогрессивному  развитию
   уголовного   права.   Уяснение  правил  уголовной  ответственности
   предполагает  последовательное  от  дела  к  делу  толкование   их
   судебной практикой. Чтобы оно соответствовало Конвенции, требуются
   соответствие  результатов  толкования  природе  правонарушения   и
   разумная предсказуемость решения.
   
                   B. Применение вышеупомянутых принципов
   
       37. Заявитель   утверждал,  что  общепринятый  принцип  общего
   права,  согласно которому муж не может  быть  признан  виновным  в
   изнасиловании  своей  жены,  хотя и с определенными ограничениями,
   все еще имел силу 18 сентября 1990 г., когда он совершил действия,
   которые  послужили  причиной обвинения в изнасиловании (см.  п.  8
   выше). Ряд Судебных решений до, а также после этой даты, например,
   Решение,   вынесенное   20 ноября 1990 г.  по  делу R.  против J.,
   говорит об общем  принципе  иммунитета.  Не  существовало  никаких
   сомнений в том, что на 18 сентября 1990 г. Закон 1976 г. о половых
   преступлениях не был изменен, хотя это и предполагалось.
       Во время дебатов в Палате общин о проекте,  который должен был
   стать модификацией Закона 1976 г.  о  сексуальных  правонарушениях
   (см. п. 20 выше), высказывались  различные  взгляды на супружеский
   иммунитет.  Министр рекомендовал  подождать  доклада  Комиссии  по
   реформе   уголовного  права,  и  поправка,  предлагавшая  отменить
   иммунитет,  была снята без голосования.  Названный Комитет в своем
   докладе,  представленном только в 1984 г.,  рекомендовал сохранить
   иммунитет.
       В 1988 г.,  когда рассматривались  некоторые поправки к Закону
   1976   г.,   у   Парламента   была   возможность   изъять    слово
   "неправомерный" из статьи 1  1 "a" (см.  п. 20 выше) или включить
   новую статью о супружеских сношениях, но он этого не сделал.
       17 сентября  1990 г.  Правовая комиссия рекомендовала отменить
   правило иммунитета. Однако дебатам по этому вопросу предшествовали
   решения   апелляционного   суда   и  Палаты  лордов.  Эти  решения
   модифицировали действующие нормы,  придав  им  обратное  действие.
   Этого  не произошло бы,  если бы Парламент своевременно последовал
   предложениям  Правовой комиссии.  В результате,  когда  в  1994 г.
   термин  "неправомерный"  был  исключен из статьи 1 Закона 1976 г.,
   Парламент не ограничился этим.
       38. Заявитель   также  полагал,  что,  изучая  его  жалобу  по
   статье 7  п.  1  Конвенции,  Суду  не  следует  рассматривать  его
   поведение  в свете каких-либо исключений из правила об иммунитете.
   Такие  исключения  никогда  не   принимались   во   внимание   при
   разбирательствах  в  национальных  судах.  Судья  Роуз  вынес свое
   решение,  основываясь на Решении апелляционного суда от  14  марта
   1991 г.  по делу R.  против R.,  исходя из того, что иммунитет уже
   больше не признается.  Решение судьи Оуэна от 30 июля 1990  г.  по
   делу  R.  против R.  добавило также к списку исключений молчаливое
   согласие супругов о  прекращении  половых  отношений.  Однако  это
   решение  не  было  опубликовано на 18 сентября 1990 г.  и не имело
   тогда обязательной силы. Во всяком случае из обстоятельств данного
   дела не следует, что имело место соглашение такого рода.
       39. По  мнению  заявителя,  применительно   к   данному   делу
   невозможна   ссылка  на  критерий  предвидимости,  подобный  тому,
   который  используется  при   применении   статьи   10   Конвенции.
   Апелляционный суд и Палата лордов не предусмотрели ни новый состав
   преступления,  ни  изменение  конститутивных   элементов   состава
   преступления,   квалифицируемого   как   изнасилование,  они  дали
   расширительное толкование существующему понятию,  включив  в  него
   поведение,  которое до того момента исключалось общим правом.  Они
   адаптировали закон не столько к новому виду поведения,  сколько  к
   изменению  отношения к нему в обществе.  Расширить уголовное право
   единственно на этом основании,  включив в него поведение,  которое
   ранее  считалось  правомерным,  -  это именно то,  что призвана не
   допустить статья 7 Конвенции.  Более того,  подчеркнул  заявитель,
   нельзя  точно  определить,  когда  данное  изменение произошло.  В
   сентябре 1990  г.  Правовая  комиссия  не  предвидела  возможности
   изменения судебной практики и полагала необходимым законодательный
   акт Парламента.
       40. Правительство  и Комиссия придерживались той точки зрения,
   что к сентябрю 1990  г.  уже  существовали  значительные  сомнения
   относительно  юридической  силы  супружеского  иммунитета в случае
   изнасилования.  Речь  шла  о  сфере,  где  закон   стал   объектом
   прогрессивных  изменений,  и уже существовали явные признаки того,
   что  судебная  практика  опередит  здесь  законодателя;  уже  было
   признано  равноправие  женщины  с  мужчиной в браке и вне его и ее
   право  свободно  распоряжаться  собой.  Заявитель  мог  с  помощью
   надлежащего совета юриста предусмотреть, как будет квалифицировано
   его  деяние,  которое  не  являлось,  по  его  мнению,   уголовным
   преступлением в момент его совершения.
       41. Суд отмечает,  что осуждение  заявителя  за  изнасилование
   основывалось на статутном праве,  а точнее,  на статье 1 Закона от
   1956 г.,  с  изменениями,  внесенными  в  эту  статью  в  1976  г.
   Заявитель не оспаривает тот факт, что поведение, за которое он был
   осужден,   являлось   бы   изнасилованием   по   смыслу    закона,
   применявшегося в то время,  если бы потерпевшая не была его женой.
   Его  жалоба,  основанная  на   статье   7   Конвенции,   относится
   исключительно  к  тому факту,  что в Решении от 18 апреля 1991 г.,
   осудившем заявителя  по  обвинению  в  изнасиловании,  судья  Роуз
   последовал  за  Решением  апелляционного суда от 14 марта 1991 г.,
   вынесенным в  деле  R.  против  R.,  которое  содержало  отказ  от
   иммунитета.
       42. Необходимо заметить, что основной спорный вопрос в Решении
   апелляционного суда по делу R.  против R.  относился к определению
   изнасилования в статье 1  1 "a" Закона от 1976 г.: "неправомерное
   сексуальное сношение с женщиной, которая во время сношения не дает
   на то согласия".  Вопрос заключался  в  том,  не  противоречил  ли
   "отказ"  от  супружеского  иммунитета приведенному определению,  в
   частности,  термину "неправомерное". Апелляционный суд внимательно
   рассмотрел  различные  варианты  толкования этой статьи в судебной
   практике,  включая аргумент,  что термин "неправомерное" исключает
   сношение  в  браке из определения изнасилования.  В этой связи Суд
   напоминает,  что толкование  и  применение  внутригосударственного
   права являются прерогативой национальных властей каждой страны,  и
   прежде всего судов (см.,  например,  Решение по делу Кеммаш против
   Франции (N 3) от 24 ноября 1994 г.  Серия A, т. 296-C, с. 86 - 87,
   п.  37).  Суд не видит  оснований  не  согласиться  с  заключением
   апелляционного суда,  которое было впоследствии поддержано Палатой
   лордов  (п.  12  выше),  о  том,  что  термин  "неправомерное"   в
   определении   изнасилования   не   является   определяющим   и  не
   препятствует  "устранению  фикции  общего  права,  которая   стала
   анахроничной  и  оскорбительной:  насильник  остается насильником,
   подпадающим под  действие  уголовного  права,  независимо  от  его
   отношений с жертвой" (п. 11 выше).
       43. Решение апелляционного суда и затем Палаты лордов  явилось
   лишь  продолжением  наметившейся  в  судебной  практике  тенденции
   отказаться от супружеского иммунитета,  препятствующего  судебному
   преследованию мужа за изнасилование жены.  Нет сомнений в том, что
   по закону,  каким он был на 18  сентября  1990  г.,  муж,  который
   насильно  совершил  половой акт со своей женой,  мог при различных
   обстоятельствах быть признан виновным в изнасиловании. Более того,
   благодаря  судебному  толкованию  в  уголовном  праве  наблюдалась
   очевидная   тенденция,   совместимая   с   самой    сутью    этого
   правонарушения,  рассматривать,  как правило,  такое поведение как
   подпадающее под состав изнасилования. Эта эволюция достигла к тому
   времени такой стадии, когда отказ судов от супружеского иммунитета
   уже стал разумно предсказуем (п. 36 выше).
       44. Изнасилование   настолько  очевидно  унижает  человеческое
   достоинство,  что решения апелляционного  суда  и  Палаты  лордов,
   подтверждающие, что заявитель может быть осужден за изнасилование,
   независимо от его отношений с жертвой,  не  имеют  основания  быть
   воспринятыми   как  расхождение  с  предметом  и  целью  статьи  7
   Конвенции, которая требует, чтобы никто не подвергался беззаконным
   преследованиям,  осуждениям  и санкциям (см.  п.  35 выше).  Более
   того,  отказ от неприемлемой идеи супружеского  иммунитета  против
   судебного  преследования за изнасилование своей жены соответствует
   не только цивилизованной концепции брака,  но также,  и  в  первую
   очередь,  основополагающим  целям  Конвенции,  самой сутью которой
   является уважение достоинства и свободы человека.
       45. Соответственно,  следуя Решению апелляционного суда в деле
   R.  против R.,  судья Роуз по делу заявителя вынес решение  о  его
   виновности, не противоречащее статье 7 Конвенции.
       46. Придя к  этому  заключению,  Суд  не  считает  необходимым
   расследовать,  подпадали  ли факты в деле заявителя под исключения
   из правила иммунитета,  которые  уже  рассматривались  английскими
   судами до 18 сентября 1990 г.
       47. Подводя итог сказанному,  Суд,  так же как Правительство и
   Комиссия,  находит,  что  решение  Суда короны,  согласно которому
   заявитель  не  может  ссылаться  на  иммунитет,   чтобы   избежать
   осуждения  и  наказания за изнасилование своей жены,  не привело к
   нарушению его прав, предусмотренных в статье 7 п. 1 Конвенции.
   
                         ПО ЭТИМ ОСНОВАНИЯМ СУД
   
       Постановил единогласно,  что нарушение статьи 7 п. 1 Конвенции
   не имело места.
   
       Совершено на  английском  и  французском  языках и оглашено во
   Дворце прав человека в Страсбурге 22 ноября 1995 г.
   
                                                         Председатель
                                                        Рольф РИССДАЛ
   
                                                               Грефье
                                                     Герберт ПЕТЦОЛЬД
   
   
   
   
   
   
                     EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
   
                   CASE OF S.W. v. THE UNITED KINGDOM
   
                                JUDGMENT
   
                        (Strasbourg, 22.XI.1995)
   
       In the case of S.W. v. the United Kingdom <1>,
       The European  Court  of Human Rights,  sitting,  in accordance
   with Article 43 (art.  43) of the Convention for the Protection of
   Human  Rights  and Fundamental Freedoms ("the Convention") and the
   relevant provisions of Rules of Court A <2>, as a Chamber composed
   of the following judges:
       -------------------------------
       Notes by the Registrar
       <1> The case is numbered 47/1994/494/576.  The first number is
   the  case's position on the list of cases referred to the Court in
   the relevant year (second number).  The last two numbers  indicate
   the  case's  position  on  the list of cases referred to the Court
   since  its  creation  and  on  the  list  of   the   corresponding
   originating applications to the Commission.
       <2> Rules A apply to all cases referred to  the  Court  before
   the entry into force of Protocol No. 9 (P9) and thereafter only to
   cases concerning States not bound  by  that  Protocol  (P9).  They
   correspond to the Rules that came into force on 1 January 1983, as
   amended several times subsequently.
   
       Mr R. Ryssdal, President,
       Mr F. {Golcuklu} <*>,
       Mr C. Russo,
       Mr J. De Meyer,
       Mr S.K. Martens,
       Mr F. Bigi,
       Sir John Freeland,
       Mr P. Jambrek,
       Mr U. Lohmus,
       and also of Mr H. Petzold, Registrar,
       --------------------------------
       <*> Здесь  и  далее  по  тексту  слова  на  национальном языке
   набраны латинским шрифтом и выделены фигурными скобками.
   
       Having deliberated in private on 24 June and 27 October 1995,
       Delivers the  following  judgment,  which  was  adopted on the
   last-mentioned date:
   
                               PROCEDURE
   
       1. The  case  was  referred  to  the  Court  by  the  European
   Commission of Human Rights ("the Commission") on 9 September 1994,
   within the three-month period laid down by Article 32 para.  1 and
   Article 47 (art.  32-1,  art. 47) of the Convention. It originated
   in an application (no.  20166/92) against the  United  Kingdom  of
   Great  Britain  and  Northern  Ireland  lodged with the Commission
   under Article 25 (art.  25) by Mr S.W.,  a British citizen,  on 29
   March 1992.
       The Commission's request referred to Articles 44 and 48  (art.
   44,  art.  48)  and  to the declaration whereby the United Kingdom
   recognised the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court  (Article  46)
   (art.  46).  The object of the request was to obtain a decision as
   to whether the facts  of  the  case  disclosed  a  breach  by  the
   respondent  State  of its obligations under Article 7 (art.  7) of
   the Convention.
       2. In  response to the enquiry made in accordance with Rule 33
   para.  3 (d) of Rules of Court A,  the applicant  stated  that  he
   wished  to take part in the proceedings and designated the lawyers
   who would represent him (Rule 30).
       3. On  24  September  1994 the President of the Court decided,
   under Rule  21  para.  6  and  in  the  interests  of  the  proper
   administration  of  justice,  that  a  single  Chamber  should  be
   constituted to consider both the instant case and the case of C.R.
   v. the United Kingdom <3>.
       --------------------------------
       <3> Case no. 48/1994/495/577.
   
       4. The  Chamber to be constituted for this purpose included ex
   officio  Sir  John  Freeland,  the  elected   judge   of   British
   nationality  (Article 43 of the Convention) (art.  43),  and Mr R.
   Ryssdal,  the President of the Court (Rule 21 para.  3 (b)). On 24
   September  1994,  in the presence of the Registrar,  the President
   drew by lot the names of the other seven  members,  namely  Mr  F.
   {Golcuklu}, Mr R.  Macdonald, Mr C. Russo, Mr J. De Meyer, Mr S.K.
   Martens,  Mr F.  Bigi and Mr U.  Lohmus (Article 43 in fine of the
   Convention and Rule 21 para.  4) (art.  43).  Subsequently,  Mr P.
   Jambrek,  substitute judge,  replaced Mr Macdonald, who was unable
   to take part in the further consideration of the  case  (Rules  22
   para. 1 and 24 para. 1).
       5. As President of the Chamber (Rule 21 para.  5), Mr Ryssdal,
   acting through the Registrar,  consulted the Agent of  the  United
   Kingdom Government ("the Government"), the applicant's lawyers and
   the  Delegate  of  the  Commission  on  the  organisation  of  the
   proceedings (Rules 37 para.  1 and 38). Pursuant to the order made
   in consequence, the Registrar received the applicant's memorial on
   3  April 1995 and the Government's memorial on 6 April.  On 17 May
   1995 the Secretary to the Commission informed the  Registrar  that
   the Delegate did not wish to reply in writing.
       6. On 2 June 1995 the Commission produced  various  documents,
   as requested by the Registrar on the President's instructions.
       7. In accordance with the President's  decision,  the  hearing
   took place in public in the Human Rights Building,  Strasbourg, on
   20 June 1995. The Court had held a preparatory meeting beforehand.
       There appeared before the Court:
       (a) for the Government
       Ms S. Dickson, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Agent,
       Mr A. Moses, QC, Counsel,
       Mr R. Heaton, Home Office,
       Mr J. Toon, Home Office, Advisers;
       (b) for the Commission
       Mr J. Mucha, Delegate;
       (c) for the applicant
       Mr A. Tyrell, QC,
       Mr R. Hill, Barrister-at-law, Counsel,
       Mr S. Groves, Solicitor, Adviser.
       The Court heard addresses by Mr Mucha,  Mr Tyrell, Mr Hill and
   Mr Moses.
   
                            AS TO THE FACTS
   
                I. Particular circumstances of the case
   
                   A. Events leading to charges being
                     brought against the applicant
   
       8. The  applicant is a British citizen.  His relationship with
   his wife,  whom he married in 1987,  was turbulent and came  under
   great  strain  in  1990  when  he became unemployed.  In the early
   evening of 18 September 1990, she told him that for some weeks she
   had  been  thinking  of  leaving  him  and  that  she regarded the
   marriage as over.  Prior to  that  date  they  had  been  sleeping
   separately  -  according  to  the  applicant,  for  one night,  or
   according to his wife,  for five nights.  The  applicant  did  not
   accept  that  his  wife  meant  what  she  said and they had a row
   following which he ejected her from the house,  bruising her  arm.
   She  went  to her next door neighbours and called the police,  who
   subsequently visited and spoke to both the applicant and his  wife
   separately.  Later  the  same evening she re-entered the house and
   the applicant had sexual intercourse with her.  Shortly afterwards
   she  left  the house,  having first tried to take their child with
   her. She went to the neighbours crying and distressed, complaining
   to them and to the police,  whom she telephoned, that she had been
   raped at knife-point.
       9. On  19  September 1990 the applicant was charged with rape,
   under section 1 (1) of the Sexual Offences Act  1956;  threatening
   to kill, contrary to section 16 of the Offences against the Person
   Act 1861; and assault occasioning actual bodily harm, in breach of
   section 47 of the latter Act.
   
              B. Crown Court judgment of 30 July 1990 and
               Court of Appeal judgment of 14 March 1991
                        in the case of R. v. R.
   
       10. On 30 July 1990 the defendant in another case,  R.  v. R.,
   had been sentenced to three years' imprisonment by the Crown Court
   for  attempted  rape  and  assault  occasioning actual bodily harm
   against his wife.  The trial judge,  Mr Justice Owen, had rejected
   the defendant's submission that he could not be convicted in light
   of a common law principle stated by Sir Matthew  Hale  CJ  in  his
   History of the Pleas of the Crown published in 1736:
       "But the husband cannot be guilty of rape committed by himself
   upon  his  lawful  wife,  for  by  their  matrimonial  consent and
   contract the wife hath given up herself  in  this  kind  unto  her
   husband, which she cannot retract."
       In his judgment ([1991] 1 All England  Law  Reports,  747)  Mr
   Justice  Owen  noted that it was a statement made in general terms
   at a time  when  marriage  was  indissoluble.  Hale  CJ  had  been
   expounding  the  common law as it seemed to him at that particular
   time and was doing it in a  book  and  not  with  reference  to  a
   particular set of circumstances presented to him in a prosecution.
   The bald statement had been reproduced in  the  first  edition  of
   Archbold  on Criminal Pleadings,  Evidence and Practice (1822,  p.
   259) in the following terms:  "A husband also cannot be guilty  of
   rape upon his wife."
       Mr Justice Owen further examined a series of  court  decisions
   (R. v. Clarence [1888] 22 Queen's Bench Division 23, [1886-90] All
   England Law Reports 113;  R.  v.  Clarke [1949] 2 All England  Law
   Reports 448; R. v. Miller [1954] 2 All England Law Reports 529; R.
   v.  Reid [1972] 2 All England Law  Reports  1350;  R.  v.  O'Brien
   [1974]  3  All  England Law Reports 663;  R.  v.  Steele [1976] 65
   Criminal Appeal Reports 22;  R.  v.  Roberts [1986]  Criminal  Law
   Reports 188;  see  paragraphs  22 - 25 below),  recognising that a
   wife's consent to marital intercourse was impliedly given  by  her
   at  the  time of marriage and that the consent could be revoked on
   certain conditions. He added:
       "I am  asked  to  accept  that  there  is  a presumption or an
   implied consent  by  the  wife  to  sexual  intercourse  with  her
   husband;  with that, I do not find it difficult to agree. However,
   I find it hard to ... believe that it ever was the common law that
   a  husband was in effect entitled to beat his wife into submission
   to sexual intercourse ...
       If it  was,  it is a very sad commentary on the law and a very
   sad commentary upon the judges in whose breasts the law is said to
   reside.  However, I will nevertheless accept that there is such an
   implicit consent  as  to  sexual  intercourse  which  requires  my
   consideration  as  to  whether  this  accused may be convicted for
   rape."
       On the  question of what circumstances would suffice in law to
   revoke the consent,  Mr Justice Owen noted that it may be  brought
   to an end,  firstly,  by a court order or equivalent. Secondly, he
   observed,  it was apparent from the Court of Appeal's judgment  in
   the  case of R.  v.  Steele ([1976] 65 Criminal Appeal Reports 22)
   that the implied consent could be withdrawn by  agreement  between
   the  parties.  Such an agreement could clearly be implicit;  there
   was nothing in the case-law to suggest the contrary.  Thirdly,  he
   was  of  the view that the common law recognised that a withdrawal
   of  either  party  from  cohabitation,  accompanied  by  a   clear
   indication that consent to sexual intercourse has been terminated,
   would amount to a revocation of the implicit consent. He concluded
   that  both  the  second  and  third  exceptions to the matrimonial
   immunity against prosecution for rape applied in the case.
       11. An appeal to the Court of Appeal,  Criminal Division,  was
   dismissed on 14 March 1991 ([1991] 2 All England Law Reports 257).
   Lord  Lane  noted that the general proposition of Sir Matthew Hale
   in his History of the Pleas of the Crown (1736) (see paragraph  10
   above)  that  a  man  could  not  commit  rape  upon  his wife was
   generally accepted as a correct statement of  the  common  law  at
   that epoch.  Further, Lord Lane made an analysis of previous court
   decisions,  from which it appears that in R.  v.  Clarence (1888),
   the  first reported case of this nature,  some judges of the Court
   for Crown Cases Reserved had objected to  the  principle.  In  the
   next  reported  case,  R.  v.  Clarke (1949),  the trial court had
   departed from the principle by holding that the husband's immunity
   was lost in the event of a court order directing that the wife was
   no longer bound to cohabit with him.  Almost every court  decision
   thereafter  had  made  increasingly  important  exceptions  to the
   marital immunity (see paragraph 24 below). The Court of Appeal had
   accepted  in  R.  v.  Steele  (1976)  that  the implied consent to
   intercourse could be terminated by agreement.  This was  confirmed
   by the Court of Appeal in R. v. Roberts (1986), where it held that
   the lack of a non-molestation clause  in  a  deed  of  separation,
   concluded on expiry of a non-molestation order, did not revive the
   consent to intercourse.
       Lord Lane added the following observations:
       "Ever since the decision of Byrne J in R.  v.  Clarke in 1949,
   courts  have  been  paying  lip-service  to Hale CJ's proposition,
   whilst at the same time increasing the number of  exceptions,  the
   number  of  situations  to  which  it  does  not apply.  This is a
   legitimate use of the flexibility of the common law which can  and
   should adapt itself to changing social attitudes.
       There comes a time when the changes are so great that it is no
   longer  enough to create further exceptions restricting the effect
   of the proposition,  a time when the proposition  itself  requires
   examination  to  see  whether its terms are in accord with what is
   generally regarded today as acceptable behaviour.
       ...
       It seems to us that where the common law rule no  longer  even
   remotely  represents  what  is  the  true  position  of  a wife in
   present-day society,  the duty of the court is to  take  steps  to
   alter  the  rule  if it can legitimately do so in the light of any
   relevant parliamentary enactment.  That in the end comes down to a
   consideration of the word "unlawful" in the 1976 Act."
       Lord Lane then critically examined the  different  strands  of
   interpretation of section 1 (1) (a) of the 1976 Act (see paragraph
   20 below) in the case-law,  including the argument that  the  term
   "unlawful"   excluded   intercourse   within   marriage  from  the
   definition of rape. He concluded:
       "... [W]e  do  not  consider that we are inhibited by the 1976
   Act from declaring that the husband's  immunity  as  expounded  by
   Hale  CJ no longer exists.  We take the view that the time has now
   arrived when the law should declare that a rapist remains a rapist
   subject to the criminal law, irrespective of his relationship with
   his victim.
       The remaining  and  no  less  difficult  question  is whether,
   despite that view,  this is an area where the  court  should  step
   aside  to  leave the matter to the parliamentary process.  This is
   not the creation of a new offence,  it is the removal of a  common
   law  fiction  which  has become anachronistic and offensive and we
   consider that it is our duty having reached that conclusion to act
   upon it.
       Had our decision been otherwise and had we been of the opinion
   that   Hale   CJ's  proposition  was  still  effective,  we  would
   nevertheless have ruled that where, as in the instant case, a wife
   withdraws  from  cohabitation in such a way as to make it clear to
   the husband that so far as she is concerned the marriage is at  an
   end, the husband's immunity is lost."
       12. On 23 October 1991,  on a further appeal by the  appellant
   in the above case, the House of Lords upheld the Court of Appeal's
   judgment, declaring, inter alia, that the general principle that a
   husband  cannot  rape his wife no longer formed part of the law of
   England and Wales.  It stressed that the common law was capable of
   evolving  in  the light of changing social,  economic and cultural
   developments.  Whilst Sir Matthew Hale's proposition had reflected
   the state of affairs at the time it was enunciated,  the status of
   women,  and particularly of married women,  had changed out of all
   recognition  in various ways.  Apart from property matters and the
   availability of matrimonial remedies,  one of the  most  important
   changes  had  been that marriage was in modern times regarded as a
   partnership of equals, and no longer one in which the wife must be
   the  subservient  chattel of the husband (R.  v.  R.  [1991] 4 All
   England Law Reports 481).
       13. On  31  March  1992  the  above  appellant  R.  brought an
   application (no.  20190/92)  to  the  Commission.  The  Commission
   referred his application (C.R. v. the United Kingdom) to the Court
   on the same date as the present  case  (see  paragraphs  1  and  3
   above).
   
           C. The trial of the applicant in the present case
   
       14. At  the  commencement  of his trial on 16 April 1991,  the
   applicant submitted that there was no case to answer on  the  rape
   charge.  In  the first place,  he argued that the trial judge,  Mr
   Justice Rose,  should follow the Court of Appeal's approach in the
   case  of R.  v.  Steele ([1976] 65 Criminal Appeal Reports 22) and
   should not consider himself bound by the 14 March 1991 judgment of
   that  court in R.  v.  R.  in so far as it purported to change the
   principle that a husband could not be found guilty  of  rape  upon
   his wife. Secondly, he maintained that the retrospective effect of
   the change in the law effected by R.  v.  R.  should be pronounced
   incompatible  with  Article  7  (art.  7)  of  the Convention.  He
   referred,  inter alia,  to the judgment by the Court of Justice of
   the  European  Communities  in  R.  v.  Kent  Kirk (European Court
   Reports [1984] 2689),  dealing with a penal provision in  relation
   to fishing, which was allegedly imposed retroactively.
       15. With  regard  to  the  applicant's  first  submission,  Mr
   Justice  Rose  held  on  18  April 1991 that he considered himself
   bound by the Court of Appeal's judgment in R.  v.  R.  He was  not
   persuaded  that  there  was  a conflict between the ratios of that
   decision and the judgment in R.  v. Steele. Moreover, the decision
   in R.  v.  R. was not reached in ignorance of R. v. Steele but had
   regard to the latter.
       With regard  to the applicant's second submission,  Mr Justice
   Rose observed:
       "... I  shall  assume  for the purpose of the present argument
   that the effect of Kirk is via the Treaty of Rome and the decision
   of  the  [Court  of Justice of the European Communities] to render
   Article 7 para.  1 (art.  7-1) part of English  law.  However,  it
   seems to me that the effect of Article 7 para.  2 (art. 7-2) is to
   prevent reliance by the defendant on Article 7 para. 1 (art. 7-1).
       Furthermore, ... a succession of cases ... in which the [Court
   of Justice] ...  has developed  the  principle  of  protection  of
   fundamental  rights  in  cases  concerning  economic and financial
   matters ... it seems to me in so far as they touch upon the matter
   at  all,  and  it  is accepted that they do not deal with criminal
   offences of the kind with which I am concerned,  no doubt preserve
   the fundamental right of a woman not to have non-consensual sexual
   intercourse forced upon her.
       Furthermore, the  nature  of the common law,  developing as it
   does from judicial decision to judicial decision, but being deemed
   to  be  always that which it is currently declared to be,  is such
   that if Article 7 (art. 7) is part of English law, Article 7 para.
   2  (art.  7-2)  is not incompatible with that common law approach.
   Non-consensual sexual intercourse is in English law,  as no  doubt
   it  is  in  the  legal  systems of many civilised nations,  ...  a
   criminal offence.  In so far as there was by the end of  the  19th
   Century   in   English  law  ...  a  matrimonial  exception,  that
   matrimonial exception has,  particularly over the last  30  or  40
   years,  been whittled away by judicial decision to the extent that
   ...  it no longer exists. It seems to me that to say that in these
   circumstances this defendant is in the terms of Article 7 para.  1
   (art. 7-1) at risk of conviction in relation to conduct 'which did
   not  constitute a criminal offence under national or international
   law at the time when it was committed' is or would be an abuse  of
   language.   Accordingly,  [counsel  for  the  applicant's]  second
   submission fails ... Having regard to the conclusions which I have
   reached ... there is, in my judgment, a case to answer."
       16. On 19 April 1991 the applicant was  found  guilty  by  the
   jury  of  all  three  offences  (see  paragraph  9 above).  He was
   sentenced to a total of five years' imprisonment:  five years  for
   rape,  two  years for making a threat to kill and three months for
   the offence of  assault  occasioning  actual  bodily  harm  -  the
   sentences  of  two  years  and  three months were expressed to run
   consecutively to each other but concurrently  with  the  five-year
   sentence.
       17. The applicant lodged  an  appeal  against  conviction  and
   sentence in which he repeated the submissions set out in paragraph
   14 above.
       18. In  view  of the House of Lords' ruling of 23 October 1991
   in R.  v. R. (see paragraph 12 above) the applicant was advised by
   his  lawyers  on 3 January 1992 that his appeal against conviction
   offered no prospect of success.  He therefore withdrew his  appeal
   against conviction on 15 January 1992. His appeal against sentence
   was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 30 July 1992.
   
                 II. Relevant domestic law and practice
   
                         A. The offence of rape
   
       19. The offence of rape,  at  common  law,  was  traditionally
   defined  as  unlawful  sexual intercourse with a woman without her
   consent by force,  fear or fraud.  By  section  1  of  the  Sexual
   Offences Act 1956, "it is a felony for a man to rape a woman".
       20. Section 1 (1) of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act  1976
   provides, in so far as it is material, as follows:
       "For the purposes of section 1 of the Sexual Offences Act 1956
   (which relates to rape) a man commits rape if
       - (a) he has unlawful sexual intercourse with a woman  who  at
   the time of the intercourse does not consent to it ..."
       21. On 3 November 1994 the Criminal Justice and  Public  Order
   Act   1994   replaced   the  above  provisions  by  inserting  new
   subsections to section 1 of the Sexual Offences Act 1956,  one  of
   the effects of which was to remove the word "unlawful":
       "1. (1) It is an offence for a man to rape a woman or  another
   man.
       (2) A man commits rape if - (a) he has sexual intercourse with
   a  person ...  who at the time of the intercourse does not consent
   to it ..."
   
                          B. Marital immunity
   
       22. Until the case of R.  v. R. the English courts, on the few
   occasions  when  they  were  confronted  with  the  issue  whether
   directly or indirectly,  had always recognised at least some  form
   of  immunity  attaching  to  a  husband from any charge of rape or
   attempted rape by reason of a notional  or  fictional  consent  to
   intercourse deemed to have been given by the wife on marriage. The
   proposition of Sir Matthew Hale quoted above  (see  paragraph  10)
   has been reaffirmed until recently,  for example in the case of R.
   v.  Kowalski  ([1987]  86  Criminal  Appeal  Reports  339),  which
   concerned  the  question  whether  or  not  a  wife  had impliedly
   consented to acts which if performed  against  her  consent  would
   amount to an indecent assault.  Mr Justice Ian Kennedy, giving the
   judgment of the court, stated, obiter:
       "It is clear,  well-settled and ancient law that a man cannot,
   as actor, be guilty of rape upon his wife."
       And he went on to say that that principle was
       "dependent upon the  implied  consent  to  sexual  intercourse
   which arises from the married state and which continues until that
   consent is put aside by decree nisi,  by a separation order or, in
   certain circumstances, by a separation agreement".
       In another example, Lord Justice O'Connor in the R. v. Roberts
   case ([1986] Criminal Law Reports 188) held:
       "The status of marriage involves that the woman has given  her
   consent  to  her  husband  having  intercourse with her during the
   subsistence of the marriage ...  she cannot unilaterally  withdraw
   it."
       23. However,  on 5 November 1990,  Mr Justice Simon Brown held
   in R.  v. C. ([1991] 1 All England Law Reports 755) that the whole
   concept of marital exemption in rape was misconceived:
       "Were it  not  for  the  deeply  unsatisfactory consequence of
   reaching any other conclusion on the point,  I  would  shrink,  if
   sadly,  from  adopting  this  radical view of the true position in
   law.  But adopt it I do.  Logically,  I  regard  it  as  the  only
   defensible  stance,  certainly  now  as  the law has developed and
   arrived in  the  late  twentieth  century.  In  my  judgment,  the
   position  in law today is,  as already declared in Scotland,  that
   there is no marital exemption to the law  of  rape.  That  is  the
   ruling I give."
       On the other hand,  on 20 November 1990, in R. v. J. ([1991] 1
   All England Law Reports 759) Mr Justice Rougier upheld the general
   common law rule,  considering that the effect of section 1 (1) (a)
   of  the 1976 Act was that the marital exemption embodied in Hale's
   proposition was preserved, subject to those exceptions established
   by cases decided before the Act was passed. He further stated:
       "... there is an important general principle to be  considered
   here,  and  that  is  that  the law,  especially the criminal law,
   should be clear so that a man may know where he stands in relation
   to  it.  I  am  not  being  so  fanciful  as  to suppose that this
   defendant carefully considered the authorities and took  Counsel's
   advice before behaving as alleged, but the basic principle extends
   a long way beyond the bounds of this case and  should  operate  to
   prevent  a man being convicted by means of decisions of the law ex
   post facto."
       On 15  January  1991,  Mr Justice Swinton Thomas in R.  v.  S.
   followed Rougier J,  though he considered  that  it  was  open  to
   judges to define further exceptions.
       Both Rougier and Swinton Thomas JJ stated that they  regretted
   that  section 1 (1) (a) of the 1976 Act precluded them from taking
   the same line as Simon Brown J in R. v. C.
       24. In  its Working Paper 116 "Rape within Marriage" completed
   on 17 September 1990, the Law Commission stated:
       "2.8 It  is  generally  accepted  that,  subject to exceptions
   (considered ...  below),  a husband cannot be convicted of  raping
   his  wife  ...  Indeed  there  seems to be no recorded prosecution
   before 1949 of a husband for raping his wife ...
       ...
       2.11 The immunity has given rise to a substantial body of  law
   about  the particular cases in which the exemption does not apply.
   The limits of this law are difficult to state with certainty. Much
   of  it  rests  on  first  instance decisions which have never been
   comprehensively reviewed at appellate level ..."
       The Law  Commission  identified  the following exceptions to a
   husband's immunity:
       - where a court order has been made, in particular:
       (a) where an order of the court has been made  which  provides
   that  a wife should no longer be bound to cohabit with her husband
   (R. v. Clarke [1949] 33 Criminal Appeal Reports 216);
       (b) where  there has been a decree of judicial separation or a
   decree  nisi  of  divorce  on  the  ground   that   "between   the
   pronouncement  of  decree  nisi  and  the  obtaining  of  a decree
   absolute a marriage  subsists  as  a  mere  technicality"  (R.  v.
   O'Brien [1974] 3 All England Law Reports 663);
       (c) where a court has issued  an  injunction  restraining  the
   husband  from  molesting  the  wife  or  the  husband has given an
   undertaking to the court that he will not molest her (R. v. Steele
   [1976] 65 Criminal Appeal Reports 22);
       (d) in the case of R.  v. Roberts ([1986] Criminal Law Reports
   188), the Court of Appeal found that where a non-molestation order
   of two months had been made in  favour  of  the  wife  her  deemed
   consent to intercourse did not revive on expiry of the order;
       - where no court order has been made:
       (e) Mr  Justice  Lynskey observed,  obiter,  in R.  v.  Miller
   ([1954] 2 Queen's Bench Division 282) that a wife's consent  would
   be  revoked  by  an  agreement  to  separate,  particularly  if it
   contained a non-molestation clause;
       (f) Lord Justice Geoffrey Lane stated, obiter, in R. v. Steele
   that a separation agreement with a non-cohabitation  clause  would
   have that effect.
       25. The Law Commission noted that  it  was  stated  in  R.  v.
   Miller  and endorsed by the Court of Appeal in R.  v.  Steele that
   lodging a petition for divorce would not be sufficient.
       It referred  also to the ruling by Mr Justice Owen in the case
   of R.  v. R. where an implied agreement to separate was considered
   sufficient to revoke the immunity and that, even in the absence of
   agreement,  the withdrawal  from  cohabitation  by  either  party,
   accompanied   by   a  clear  indication  that  consent  to  sexual
   intercourse had been terminated,  would  operate  to  exclude  the
   immunity.  It  found  this  view  difficult  to reconcile with the
   approach in Steele that filing a divorce  petition  was  "clearly"
   not sufficient.  The ruling in R.  v. R. appeared substantially to
   extend what had previously been thought to be the law, although it
   emphasised  that  factual  separation,  and not mere revocation of
   consent to intercourse, was necessary to remove the immunity.
       26. The  Law  Commission  pointed  out  that  its  inquiry was
   unusual in one important respect.  It  was  usual  practice,  when
   considering  the  reform  of  common  law  rules,  to consider the
   grounds expressed in  the  cases  or  other  authorities  for  the
   current  state  of  the  law,  in  order  to analyse whether those
   grounds were  well-founded.  However,  that  step  was  of  little
   assistance here, not only because there was little case-law on the
   subject but also,  and in particular,  because  there  was  little
   dispute  that  the reason set out in the authorities for the state
   of the law could not be supported (paragraph 4.1  of  the  Working
   Paper).  The  basis  of  the  law was that intercourse against the
   wife's actual will was excluded  from  the  law  of  rape  by  the
   fictional  deemed  consent  to intercourse perceived by Sir Mathew
   Hale in his dictum. This notion was not only quite artificial but,
   certainly in the modern context, was also quite anomalous. Indeed,
   it was difficult to find any current authority or commentator  who
   thought that it was even remotely supportable.  The artificial and
   anomalous nature of the marital immunity could be seen if  it  was
   reviewed  against the current law on the legal effects of marriage
   (paragraph 4.2).
       The concept of deemed consent was artificial because the legal
   consequences of marriage were  not  the  result  of  the  parties'
   mutual agreement.  Although the parties should have legal capacity
   to enter  into  the  marriage  contract  and  should  observe  the
   necessary  formalities,  they were not free to decide the terms of
   the contract; marriage was rather a status from which flow certain
   rights  or  obligations,  the contents of which were determined by
   the law from time to time.  This point had been emphasised  by  Mr
   Justice  Hawkins  in  R.  v.  Clarence  (1888) when he said:  "The
   intercourse which takes  place  between  husband  and  wife  after
   marriage is not by virtue of any special consent on her part,  but
   is mere submission to an  obligation  imposed  on  her  by  law  "
   (paragraph 4.3).
       In this connection,  the Law Commission stressed  that  "[t]he
   rights  and  duties arising from marriage have,  however,  changed
   over  the  years  as  the  law  has  adapted  to  changing  social
   conditions and values. The more modern view of marriage is that it
   is a partnership of equals" (paragraph 4.4). It then gave examples
   of such changes in the law and added:
       "4.11 This  gradual   recognition   of   mutual   rights   and
   obligations within  marriage,  described  in paragraphs 4.3 - 4.10
   above,  in our view  demonstrates  clearly  that,  whatever  other
   arguments  there  may  be in favour of the immunity,  it cannot be
   claimed to be in any way justified by the nature of, or by the law
   governing, modern marriage."
       27. The Law  Commission  made,  inter  alia,  the  provisional
   proposal  that  "the  present marital immunity be abolished in all
   cases" (paragraph 5.2 of the Working Paper).
   
                   PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION
   
       28. In his application of 29 March 1992 (no.  20166/92) to the
   Commission,  the applicant complained that, in breach of Article 7
   (art.  7) of the  Convention,  he  was  convicted  in  respect  of
   conduct, namely the rape upon his wife, which at the relevant time
   did not, so he submitted, constitute a criminal offence.
       29. The  Commission  declared the application admissible on 14
   January 1994.  In its report of 27 June 1994  (Article  31)  (art.
   31),  the  Commission expressed the opinion that there had been no
   violation of Article 7  para.  1  (art.  7-1)  of  the  Convention
   (eleven  votes to six).  The full text of the Commission's opinion
   and of the two  separate  opinions  contained  in  the  report  is
   reproduced  as  an annex to this judgment <4>.
       --------------------------------
       <4> Note  by  the Registrar:  for practical reasons this annex
   will appear only with the printed version of the judgment  (volume
   335-B of Series A of the Publications of the Court), but a copy of
   the  Commission's  report  is  obtainable   from   the   registry.
   
                  FINAL SUBMISSIONS MADE TO THE COURT
   
       30. At the hearing on 20 June 1995 the Government, as they had
   done  in their memorial,  invited the Court to find that there had
   been no violation of Article 7 (art. 7) of the Convention.
       31. On  the same occasion the applicant reiterated the request
   to the Court stated in his memorial to find that there had been  a
   breach  of  Article 7 (art.  7) and to award him just satisfaction
   under Article 50 (art. 50) of the Convention.
   
                             AS TO THE LAW
   
                           Alleged violation
                of Article 7 (art. 7) of the Convention
   
       32. The  applicant complained that his conviction and sentence
   for rape of  his  wife  constituted  retrospective  punishment  in
   breach of Article 7 (art. 7) of the Convention, which reads:
       "1. No one shall be held guilty of  any  criminal  offence  on
   account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal
   offence under national or international law at the  time  when  it
   was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one
   that  was  applicable  at  the  time  the  criminal  offence   was
   committed.
       2. This Article (art.  7) shall not prejudice  the  trial  and
   punishment  of  any  person for any act or omission which,  at the
   time when it was committed,  was criminal according to the general
   principles of law recognised by civilised nations."
       33. The Government and the Commission disagreed with the above
   contention.
   
                         A. General principles
   
       34. The guarantee enshrined in Article 7 (art. 7), which is an
   essential element of the rule of law,  occupies a prominent  place
   in  the  Convention system of protection,  as is underlined by the
   fact that no derogation from it is permissible  under  Article  15
   (art.  15) in time of war or other public emergency.  It should be
   construed and applied,  as follows from its object and purpose, in
   such  a  way  as to provide effective safeguards against arbitrary
   prosecution, conviction and punishment.
       35. Accordingly, as the Court held in its Kokkinakis v. Greece
   judgment of 25 May 1993 (Series A no.  260-A,  p.  22,  para. 52),
   Article   7   (art.   7)   is  not  confined  to  prohibiting  the
   retrospective application of the  criminal  law  to  an  accused's
   disadvantage: it also embodies, more generally, the principle that
   only the law can define a crime and prescribe  a  penalty  (nullum
   crimen, nulla poena sine lege) and the principle that the criminal
   law must not be extensively construed to an  accused's  detriment,
   for instance by analogy.  From these principles it follows that an
   offence must be clearly defined in the law.  In its aforementioned
   judgment  the Court added that this requirement is satisfied where
   the individual can know from the wording of the relevant provision
   and, if need be, with the assistance of the courts' interpretation
   of it,  what acts and omissions will make him  criminally  liable.
   The  Court  thus  indicated  that when speaking of "law" Article 7
   (art.  7) alludes to the very same concept as that  to  which  the
   Convention refers elsewhere when using that term,  a concept which
   comprises written as well as unwritten law and implies qualitative
   requirements,  notably  those  of accessibility and foreseeability
   (see, as a recent authority, the Tolstoy Miloslavsky v. the United
   Kingdom judgment of 13 July 1995, Series A no. 316-B, pp. 71 - 72,
   para. 37).
       36. However  clearly drafted a legal provision may be,  in any
   system of law,  including criminal law,  there  is  an  inevitable
   element  of  judicial interpretation.  There will always be a need
   for elucidation of doubtful points and for adaptation to  changing
   circumstances.  Indeed,  in  the  United Kingdom,  as in the other
   Convention States, the progressive development of the criminal law
   through  judicial  law-making  is  a well entrenched and necessary
   part of legal tradition.  Article 7 (art.  7)  of  the  Convention
   cannot be read as outlawing the gradual clarification of the rules
   of criminal liability through judicial interpretation from case to
   case,  provided  that the resultant development is consistent with
   the essence of the offence and could reasonably be foreseen.
   
               B. Application of the foregoing principles
   
       37. The applicant  maintained  that  the  general  common  law
   principle  that  a  husband could not be found guilty of rape upon
   his  wife,  albeit  subject  to  certain  limitations,  was  still
   effective  on 18 September 1990,  when he committed the acts which
   gave rise to the rape charge (see paragraph 8 above). A succession
   of  court decisions before and also after that date,  for instance
   on 20 November 1990 in R.  v.  J.  (see paragraph 23  above),  had
   affirmed the general principle of immunity.  It was clearly beyond
   doubt that as at 18 September 1990 no change in the law  had  been
   effected, although one was being mooted.
       When the House of Commons debated  the  Bill  for  the  Sexual
   Offences (Amendment) Act 1976 (see paragraph 20 above),  different
   views on the marital immunity were expressed. On the advice of the
   Minister  of  State to await a report of the Criminal Law Revision
   Committee, an amendment that would have abolished the immunity was
   withdrawn  and  never  voted  upon.  In its report,  which was not
   presented  until  1984,  the  Criminal  Law   Revision   Committee
   recommended  that the immunity should be maintained and that a new
   exception should be created.
       In 1988,  when considering certain amendments to the 1976 Act,
   Parliament had the opportunity to take out the word "unlawful"  in
   section  1  (1) (a) (see paragraph 20 above) or to introduce a new
   provision on marital intercourse,  but  took  no  action  in  this
   respect.
       On 17  September  1990  the   Law   Commission   provisionally
   recommended  that  the  immunity rule be abolished (see paragraphs
   26 - 27 above). However, the debate was pre-empted by the Court of
   Appeal's and the House of Lords' rulings in the case of R.  v.  R.
   (see paragraphs 11 and 12 above).  In the applicant's  submission,
   these  rulings  altered  the law retrospectively,  which would not
   have  been  the  case  had  the  Law  Commission's  proposal  been
   implemented   by  Parliament.  Consequently,  he  concluded,  when
   Parliament in 1994 removed the word "unlawful" from section  1  of
   the  1976 Act (see paragraph 21 above),  it did not merely restate
   the law as it had been in 1976.
       38. The   applicant  further  argued  that  in  examining  his
   complaint under Article 7 para.  1 (art.  7-1) of the  Convention,
   the  Court  should  not consider his conduct in relation to any of
   the exceptions to the immunity rule.  Such exceptions  were  never
   contemplated  in the national proceedings,  Mr Justice Rose having
   taken his decision in reliance on the Court of Appeal's ruling  of
   14  March  1991  in R.  v.  R.  to the effect that the immunity no
   longer existed.  Mr Justice Owen's decision of 30 July 1990 in  R.
   v.   R.,   adding   implied  agreement  to  terminate  consent  to
   intercourse to the list of exceptions, had not been reported by 18
   September 1990 and was not a binding authority.  In any event, the
   facts in the present case suggest that no such agreement existed.
       39. Should a foreseeability test akin to that under Article 10
   para.  2 (art.  10-2) apply in the instant case, the applicant was
   of the opinion that it had not been satisfied.  Although the Court
   of Appeal and the House of Lords did not create a new  offence  or
   change  the  basic  ingredients of the offence of rape,  they were
   extending an existing offence to include conduct which until  then
   was  excluded  by  the common law.  They could not be said to have
   adapted the law to a new kind of conduct but rather to a change of
   social  attitudes.  To  extend the criminal law,  solely on such a
   basis,  to conduct which was previously lawful was precisely  what
   Article  7  (art.  7)  of  the Convention was designed to prevent.
   Moreover,  the applicant stressed,  it was impossible  to  specify
   with  precision  when  the  change  in  question had occurred.  In
   September 1990, change by judicial interpretation was not foreseen
   by  the  Law  Commission,  which  considered  that a parliamentary
   enactment would be necessary.
       40. The Government and the Commission were of the view that by
   September 1990 there was significant doubt as to the  validity  of
   the alleged marital immunity for rape.  This was an area where the
   law had been subject to progressive  development  and  there  were
   strong  indications  that still wider interpretation by the courts
   of the inroads on the immunity was probable.  In particular, given
   the recognition of women's equality of status with men in marriage
   and outside it and of their autonomy over their  own  bodies,  the
   adaptation   of  the  ingredients  of  the  offence  of  rape  was
   reasonably foreseeable,  with appropriate  legal  advice,  to  the
   applicant.   He  was  not  convicted  of  conduct  which  did  not
   constitute a criminal offence at the time when it was committed.
       41. The  Court  notes that the applicant's conviction for rape
   was based on the statutory offence of rape in  section  1  of  the
   1956 Act, as further defined in section 1 (1) of the 1976 Act (see
   paragraphs 19 and 20 above).  The applicant does not dispute  that
   the conduct for which he was convicted would have constituted rape
   within  the  meaning  of  the  statutory  definition  of  rape  as
   applicable  at  the  time,  had the victim not been his wife.  His
   complaint under Article 7  (art.  7)  of  the  Convention  relates
   solely  to  the  fact  that  in deciding on 18 April 1991 that the
   applicant had a case to answer on the rape charge, Mr Justice Rose
   followed the Court of Appeal's ruling of 14 March 1991 in the case
   of R. v. R. which declared that the immunity no longer existed.
       42. It  is to be observed that a crucial issue in the judgment
   of the Court of Appeal in R.  v.  R.  (summarised at paragraph  11
   above)  related  to the definition of rape in section 1 (1) (a) of
   the 1976 Act: "unlawful sexual intercourse with a woman who at the
   time of the intercourse does not consent to it".  The question was
   whether "removal" of the marital immunity would conflict with  the
   statutory  definition  of rape,  in particular whether it would be
   prevented by the word "unlawful".  The Court of  Appeal  carefully
   examined various strands of interpretation of the provision in the
   case-law, including the argument that the term "unlawful" excluded
   intercourse  within marriage from the definition of rape.  In this
   connection,  the Court recalls that it is in the first  place  for
   the  national  authorities,  notably the courts,  to interpret and
   apply national law (see, for instance, the Kemmache v. France (no.
   3) judgment of 24 November 1994,  Series A no. 296-C, pp. 86 - 87,
   para.  37).  It sees no reason  to  disagree  with  the  Court  of
   Appeal's conclusion, which was subsequently upheld by the House of
   Lords (see paragraph 12 above),  that the word "unlawful"  in  the
   definition  of rape was merely surplusage and did not inhibit them
   from "removing a common law fiction which had become anachronistic
   and  offensive" and from declaring that "a rapist remains a rapist
   subject to the criminal law, irrespective of his relationship with
   his victim" (see paragraph 11 above).
       43. The decisions of the Court of Appeal and then the House of
   Lords  did  no  more  than continue a perceptible line of case-law
   development dismantling the immunity of a husband from prosecution
   for rape upon his wife (for a description of this development, see
   paragraphs 11 and 23 - 27 above). There was no doubt under the law
   as  it  stood on 18 September 1990 that a husband who forcibly had
   sexual intercourse with his wife could,  in various circumstances,
   be found guilty of rape. Moreover, there was an evident evolution,
   which was consistent with the very essence of the offence,  of the
   criminal law through judicial interpretation towards treating such
   conduct generally as within the scope of the offence of rape. This
   evolution  had  reached  a stage where judicial recognition of the
   absence  of  immunity  had   become   a   reasonably   foreseeable
   development of the law (see paragraph 36 above).
       44. The essentially debasing character of rape is so  manifest
   that  the  result  of the decisions of the Court of Appeal and the
   House of  Lords  -  that  the  applicant  could  be  convicted  of
   attempted rape, irrespective of his relationship with the victim -
   cannot be said to be at variance with the object  and  purpose  of
   Article 7 (art. 7) of the Convention, namely to ensure that no one
   should  be  subjected  to  arbitrary  prosecution,  conviction  or
   punishment (see paragraph 34 above). What is more, the abandonment
   of the  unacceptable  idea  of  a  husband  being  immune  against
   prosecution for rape of his wife was in conformity not only with a
   civilised concept of marriage but also,  and above all,  with  the
   fundamental  objectives  of  the  Convention,  the very essence of
   which is respect for human dignity and human freedom.
       45. Consequently, by following the Court of Appeal's ruling in
   R. v. R. in the applicant's case, Mr Justice Rose did not render a
   decision permitting a finding of guilt incompatible with Article 7
   (art. 7) of the Convention.
       46. Having reached this conclusion, the Court does not find it
   necessary to enquire into whether the  facts  in  the  applicant's
   case  were  covered by the exceptions to the immunity rule already
   made by the English courts before 18 September 1990.
       47. In   short,   the  Court,  like  the  Government  and  the
   Commission,  finds  that  the  Crown  Court's  decision  that  the
   applicant  could  not  invoke  immunity  to  escape conviction and
   sentence for rape upon his wife did not give rise to  a  violation
   of  his  rights  under  Article  7  para.  1  (art.  7-1)  of  the
   Convention.
   
                FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
   
       Holds that there has been no violation of Article  7  para.  1
   (art. 7-1) of the Convention.
   
       Done in  English  and  in  French,  and  delivered at a public
   hearing in the Human Rights Building,  Strasbourg,  on 22 November
   1995.
   
                                              Signed:    Rolv RYSSDAL
                                                            President
   
                                              Signed: Herbert PETZOLD
                                                            Registrar
   
   


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