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ПОСТАНОВЛЕНИЕ ЕВРОПЕЙСКОГО СУДА ПО ПРАВАМ ЧЕЛОВЕКА ОТ 20.11.1995 ПРЕССОС КОМПАНИЯ НАВЬЕРА А. О." (PRESSOS COMPANIA NAVIERA S. A.) И ДРУГИЕ ПРОТИВ БЕЛЬГИИ [РУС. (ИЗВЛЕЧЕНИЕ), АНГЛ.]

(по состоянию на 20 октября 2006 года)

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                                               [неофициальный перевод]
   
                  ЕВРОПЕЙСКИЙ СУД ПО ПРАВАМ ЧЕЛОВЕКА
                                   
                           СУДЕБНОЕ РЕШЕНИЕ
          "ПРЕССОС КОМПАНИЯ НАВЬЕРА А. О." (PRESSOS COMPANIA
                NAVIERA S. A.) И ДРУГИЕ ПРОТИВ БЕЛЬГИИ
                                   
                   (Страсбург, 20 ноября 1995 года)
   
                             (Извлечение)
   
          КРАТКОЕ НЕОФИЦИАЛЬНОЕ ИЗЛОЖЕНИЕ ОБСТОЯТЕЛЬСТВ ДЕЛА
   
                           A. Основные факты
   
       Двадцать шесть заявителей - судовладельцы, ассоциации взаимного
   страхования   судовладельцев,  конкурсный  управляющий   судоходной
   компании.   Они   предъявили  иск  Бельгии  и   оператору   частных
   лоцманских служб в связи с авариями на судах, произошедших в  устье
   реки Шельды.
       В  Бельгии  лоцманское  сопровождение  морских  судов  является
   публичной   службой,   организованной  государством   в   интересах
   мореплавания.   Законом  от  3  ноября   1967   г.   было   введено
   обязательное присутствие на входящих в устье Шельды торговых  судах
   лоцмана,  имеющего  выданную государством официальную  лицензию.  В
   соответствии  с  этим Законом до 1983 г. лоцман рассматривался  как
   советник  капитана, он лишь ассистировал ему при проводке,  решения
   принимал  сам  капитан, и в случаях причинения вреда  в  результате
   столкновения  судов  или иных аварийных ситуаций  лоцман,  а  равно
   бельгийское  государство  не  несли имущественной  ответственности.
   Кассационный  суд  своим  Решением от 15 декабря  1983  г.  изменил
   сложившуюся  практику, установив, что судовладелец или фрахтователь
   в  этих  обстоятельствах вправе предъявить иск о возмещении  ущерба
   организатору  лоцманских услуг. Однако Закон  от  августа  1988  г.
   восстановил  прежний  порядок.  Более  того,  новому  Закону   была
   придана   обратная   сила,  и  под  его  действие   подпадали   все
   аналогичные   ситуации   за  тридцать  лет,  предшествовавших   его
   изданию.
       В   марте   1989   г.  двадцать  четыре  жалобы   о   признании
   недействительным  Закона 1988 г. были поданы в Арбитражный  суд.  5
   июля  1990 г. Арбитражный суд отклонил эти жалобы и 22 ноября  1990
   г.  еще  раз  подтвердил  свое решение. Кассационный  суд  отклонил
   жалобу по вопросам права, которая была подана одним из заявителей.
   
           B. Разбирательство в Комиссии по правам человека
   
       В  жалобе,  поданной  4  января 1991 г. в  Комиссию,  заявители
   утверждали,  что  правовой режим, установленный  Законом  1988  г.,
   нарушает  статью 1 Протокола N 1, статью 6 п. 1 Конвенции и  статью
   14  в  сочетании  со статьей 1 Протокола N 1. Комиссия  6  сентября
   1993   г.  признала  приемлемыми  жалобы  на  нарушение  статьи   1
   Протокола N 1 и статьи 6 п. 1 Конвенции.
       В  своем докладе от 4 июля 1994 г. Комиссия установила факты  и
   выразила  мнение,  что нарушения статьи 1 Протокола  N  1  не  было
   (единогласно),  но имело место нарушение статьи 6  п.  1  Конвенции
   (одиннадцать   голосов  против  шести),  за  исключением   случаев,
   касающихся второго заявителя (четырнадцать голосов против  трех)  и
   двенадцатого (шестнадцать голосов против одного).
       Комиссия  и  Правительство Бельгии передали данное дело  в  Суд
   соответственно 9 сентября и 21 октября 1994 г.
   
                    ИЗВЛЕЧЕНИЕ ИЗ СУДЕБНОГО РЕШЕНИЯ
   
                             ВОПРОСЫ ПРАВА
   
                  I. В отношении шестой заявительницы
   
       24.  Суд  отмечает, что из двадцати шести заявителей,  подавших
   дело   в  Комиссию,  двадцать  пять  были  представлены  на   Суде.
   Назначенные  заявителями адвокаты не получили никаких  распоряжений
   от  шестой  заявительницы (см. п. 1 - 2 выше). Это  обстоятельство,
   по   мнению   Суда,   свидетельствует  о  том,  что   вышеуказанная
   заявительница  более  не  намерена  поддерживать  свои   требования
   (статья 49 п. 2, второй абзац Регламента Суда A).
       Суд  не усматривает никаких оснований публичного характера  для
   продолжения рассмотрения дела шестой заявительницы, которое  сходно
   с остальными делами (статья 40 п. 4 Регламента Суда A).
       В связи с этим следует отделить дело компании "Сити корпорейшн"
   от дел остальных заявителей и прекратить его рассмотрение.
   
         II. О предполагаемом нарушении статьи 1 Протокола N 1
   
       25. Заявители критикуют Закон от 30 августа 1988 г., изменивший
   Закон об управлении морскими судами от 3 ноября 1967 г. (см.  п.  9
   и  18 выше). По их утверждению, он нарушает статью 1 Протокола N 1,
   которая гласит:
       "Каждое   физическое   или   юридическое   лицо   имеет   право
   беспрепятственно  пользоваться своим  имуществом.  Никто  не  может
   быть  лишен своего имущества, иначе как в интересах общества  и  на
   условиях,    предусмотренных   законом    и    общими    принципами
   международного права.
       Предыдущие   положения  ни  в  коей  мере  не  ущемляют   права
   государства  обеспечивать  выполнение  таких  законов,  какие   ему
   представляются   необходимыми   для   осуществления   контроля   за
   использованием  собственности в соответствии  с  общими  интересами
   или для обеспечения уплаты налогов или других сборов или штрафов".
   
              A. Предварительное возражение Правительства
   
       26.   Правительство,  как  и  ранее  в  Комиссии,  обосновывает
   неприемлемость  жалобы  тем, что не исчерпаны  внутренние  средства
   правовой  защиты.  По его мнению, первые двадцать четыре  заявителя
   должны  были  обратиться  в  суды общей  юрисдикции  с  вопросом  о
   совместимости оспариваемого Закона со статьей 1 Протокола N 1.  Это
   было  бы  нелишним наряду с обращением о признании Закона  1988  г.
   недействительным  в  Арбитражный суд,  ибо  в  компетенцию  данного
   органа  не  входят  требования, связанные с  нарушениями  отдельных
   положений  международного  права (см.  п.  19  выше).  Кроме  того,
   Решение  Арбитражного суда от 5 июля 1990 г. (см.  п.  7  выше)  не
   является  обязательным  для  обычных  судов,  которые  сами   могли
   отказаться  применять  Закон 1988 г., если  бы  они  посчитали  его
   противоречащим Конвенции.
       Не  могут  быть признаны лицами, использовавшими все внутренние
   средства   правовой  защиты,  двадцать  пятый  и  двадцать   шестой
   заявитель.  Первый не поставил перед судом вопрос о несовместимости
   Закона  1988  г. со статьей 1 Протокола N 1, не дав  таким  образом
   Кассационному суду возможности ответить на него. Второй  же  вообще
   не обжаловал Закон 1988 г.
       27.  Суд  напоминает  о  том, что статья 26  Конвенции  требует
   исчерпания  только  таких  эффективных  правовых  средств,  которые
   могут  исправить предполагаемое нарушение (см. среди прочих Решение
   по делу Кигана от 26 мая 1994 г. Серия A, т. 290, с. 17, п. 39).
       Суд  отмечает,  что в Арбитражном суде первые  двадцать  четыре
   заявителя  приводили в свете (прежних) статей 6 и 6 bis Конституции
   Бельгии   практически  те  же  доводы,  что  и  позднее  в  органах
   Конвенции;  они ссылались также на нарушение статьи  11  (в  старой
   нумерации, теперь статья 16) Конституции и статьи 1 Протокола N  1.
   Арбитражный  суд  посчитал,  что этими статьями  защищается  только
   ранее приобретенная собственность (см. п. 7 выше).
       Европейский   суд  отметил,  что  этот  вывод  позволяет   всем
   заявителям    считать,   что,   по   мнению   Арбитражного    суда,
   представленные  двадцатью четырьмя заявителями факты  не  подпадают
   под  сферу  действия  статьи 1 Протокола N 1.  Учитывая  уровень  и
   авторитет  этого суда в правовой системе Бельгии, этот вывод  может
   обречь  на  провал любую жалобу, которую заявители могли бы  подать
   (см.  mutatis mutandis Решения по делу Хаусшильдта от 24  мая  1989
   г.  Серия A, т. 154, с. 19, п. 41, и по делу "Святые монастыри"  от
   9 декабря 1994 г. Серия A, т. 301-A, с. 29, п. 51).
       Таким образом, данное возражение отклоняется.
   
                       B. Обоснование требования
   
       28.   Заявители  возражают  против  Закона  1988  г.  по   двум
   основаниям.
       Освободив организатора лоцманской службы от ответственности  за
   ошибки   его   персонала  и  ограничив  его  ответственность   лишь
   ответственностью  самого  персонала  за  эти  ошибки,   Закон,   по
   утверждению  заявителей, налагает на них чрезмерное бремя,  нарушая
   справедливое  равновесие между требованиями общественного  интереса
   и  требованиями защиты их права беспрепятственно пользоваться своим
   имуществом.  Тем  самым  нарушается второй абзац  или,  по  крайней
   мере, первая фраза статьи 1 Протокола N 1.
       Кроме того, обратная сила Закона лишает заявителей их права  на
   возмещение  причиненного  вреда,  что  противоречит  второй   фразе
   первого абзаца данной статьи.
   
              1. О наличии "имущества" в смысле статьи 1
   
       29.  По  утверждению Правительства, право требования заявителей
   не  может считаться "имуществом" в смысле статьи 1. Ни одно из  них
   не   было   установлено   решением  суда,  имеющим   преюдициальный
   характер.   Однако   это  является  условием  того,   чтобы   право
   требования  было бесспорным, действительным, подлежащим  исполнению
   и, следовательно, защищаемым статьей 1.
       Поскольку Решение Кассационного суда от 15 декабря 1983 г. было
   неожиданным  и  явно спорным (см. п. 17 выше), заявители  не  могли
   ссылаться   и  на  "законное  ожидание"  компенсации   со   стороны
   государства (см. Решение по делу "Пайн Велли девелопментс  лтд."  и
   другие  от  29 ноября 1991 г. Серия A, т. 222, с. 23, п.  51).  Это
   привело   бы   к   смешению  права  собственности   с   правом   на
   собственность.
       Комиссия в основном согласна с этим аргументом.
       30.  Заявители  подчеркивают, что по  законодательству  Бельгии
   гражданская  ответственность, право требовать возмещение  возникают
   в  принципе одновременно с причинением ущерба, при этом  суд  своим
   решением только подтверждает его наличие и определяет размер.
       Правительство    отметило,   что    понятия    "имущество"    и
   "собственность"  в  смысле  статьи  1  имеют  автономное  значение,
   которое  не  зависит от того, как они квалифицируются во внутреннем
   праве соответствующего государства.
       31. Чтобы определить, идет ли речь в данном конкретном случае о
   наличии  "имущества",  Суд  может принять  во  внимание  внутреннее
   законодательство, действующее на момент предполагаемого  нарушения,
   поскольку  у  него  нет  основания полагать, что  оно  противоречит
   предмету  и целям статьи 1 Протокола N 1. Речь идет об аквелианском
   режиме, порождающем требования о возмещении непредвиденного вреда.
       Требования такого рода могут быть имущественного характера и  в
   таковом  качестве охватываются первой фразой статьи 1  Протокола  N
   1,  которую  и надлежит применить (см. mutatis mutandis Решение  по
   делу Ван Марль и другие от 26 июня 1986 г. Серия A, т. 101, с.  13,
   п. 41).
       С  учетом  решений Кассационного суда от 5 ноября 1920  г.,  15
   декабря  1983 г. и 17 мая 1985 г. (см. п. 17 выше) заявители  могли
   "правомерно ожидать", что их требование возмещения ущерба  в  связи
   с   авариями   будет  определено  на  основании   общих   принципов
   ответственности   за   причинение  вреда  (см.   mutatis   mutandis
   вышеупомянутое  Решение по делу "Пайн Велли  девелопментс  лтд."  и
   другие).
       32.  Таковой была ситуация с делами, возникшими до 17  сентября
   1988  г.,  даты вступления в силу Закона 1988 г. (см.  п.  6  и  18
   выше).
   
                      2. О наличии вмешательства
   
       33.  Как вытекает из практики Суда, статья 1, гарантирующая  по
   существу  право собственности, содержит три разные нормы: в  первой
   норме,  выраженной в первом предложении первого  абзаца  и  имеющей
   общий    характер,   устанавливается   принцип   беспрепятственного
   пользования  имуществом;  вторая норма, зафиксированная  во  втором
   предложении    того   же   абзаца,   регулирует   случаи    лишения
   собственности, устанавливая определенные условия; в третьей  норме,
   содержащейся   во  втором  абзаце,  за  государствами   -   членами
   признается   среди  прочих  право  регламентировать   использование
   собственности в соответствии с общественными интересами.  Вторая  и
   третья   нормы,   касающиеся  частных   случаев   нарушения   права
   собственности,  должны толковаться в свете закрепленного  в  первой
   норме  принципа  (см. среди прочих вышеупомянутое Решение  по  делу
   "Святые монастыри", с. 31, п. 56).
       34.  Как  отмечает Суд, Закон 1988 г. освободил  государство  и
   прочих   организаторов  лоцманских  служб  от  ответственности   за
   действия,  за  которые  ранее они могли бы  нести  ответственность.
   Этот  Закон  явился  вмешательством в право  требования  возмещения
   ущерба,  которое  в  соответствии с действующим  внутренним  правом
   могло   быть   реализовано   до   принятия   данного   Закона,   и,
   следовательно, вмешательством в право любого лица, в  том  числе  и
   заявителей, на беспрепятственное пользование своим имуществом  (см.
   п. 31 выше).
       Поскольку  данный  Закон касается случаев, произошедших  до  17
   сентября   1988  г.  и  являющихся  предметом  данного  дела,   это
   вмешательство  рассматривается как лишение собственности  в  смысле
   второго предложения первого абзаца статьи 1.
   
                    3. Обоснованность вмешательства
   
       35.   Теперь   Суд  должен  установить,  совершалось   ли   это
   вмешательство  в "соответствии с общими интересами" и  соблюден  ли
   принцип соразмерности.
       a) О соответствии общим интересам
       36.  Оправдывая вмешательство, Правительство выдвигает три типа
   "важных  соображений,  связанных  с  интересами  общества":  защита
   финансовых    интересов   государства;   восстановление    правовой
   стабильности    в    вопросах   ответственности   и    гармонизация
   бельгийского  законодательства с законодательствами соседних  стран
   и в особенности Нидерландов.
       37.   Суд   напоминает,   что  национальные   власти   обладают
   определенной  свободой усмотрения, решая, что является "общественно
   полезным",  ибо  в  системе Конвенции они первыми  ощущают  наличие
   проблемы,    оправдывающей    в    интересах    общества    лишение
   собственности, и находят меры для разрешения.
       Кроме  того, само понятие "в интересах общества" имеет  широкое
   значение.   В  частности,  решению  принять  закон  об   отчуждении
   собственности   обычно   предшествует  рассмотрение   политических,
   экономических  и  социальных вопросов, по которым в демократическом
   государстве  могут  разумно сосуществовать  противоречивые  мнения.
   Считая   совершенно   нормальным,  что   законодатель   располагает
   большими   возможностями   для  проведения  социально-экономической
   политики,  Суд  уважает подход законодателя к проблеме  требований,
   связанных  с  "интересами общества", за исключением случаев,  когда
   оценка  законодателя  явно лишена разумных оснований  (см.  mutatis
   mutandis Решение по делу Джеймса от 21 февраля 1986 г. Серия A,  т.
   98-И, с. 32, п. 46), что совершенно не относится к данному случаю.
       в) Соразмерность вмешательства
       38.  Вмешательство в право беспрепятственно пользоваться  своим
   имуществом  предполагает "справедливое равновесие" между интересами
   общества   и   необходимостью   соблюдения   фундаментальных   прав
   человека.  Необходимость обеспечения такого равновесия  отражена  в
   структуре  статьи  1 в целом и, соответственно,  во  второй  фразе,
   которая  должна прочитываться в свете закрепленного в первой  фразе
   принципа  (см.  п.  33 выше). В частности, необходимо,  чтобы  была
   разумная соразмерность между используемыми средствами и той  целью,
   на которую направлена любая мера, лишающая лицо собственности.
       Чтобы  определить, соблюдается ли необходимое равновесие,  и  в
   частности соразмерность бремени, налагаемого на заявителя,  уместно
   принять   во  внимание  условия  компенсации,  предусмотренные   во
   внутреннем  законодательстве. При невыплате определенной  суммы,  в
   разумных  пределах  соответствующей  стоимости  имущества,  лишение
   собственности  в  принципе представляет собой серьезное  нарушение;
   невыплата  компенсации может быть оправданна  на  основе  статьи  1
   только   при  исключительных  обстоятельствах  (см.  вышеупомянутое
   Решение по делу "Святые монастыри", с. 34 - 35, п. 70 - 71).
       39. В данном случае Закон 1988 г. просто-напросто ликвидировал,
   с  обратной  силой  на  период в тридцать лет  и  без  компенсации,
   требования  по  возмещению ущерба на очень крупные  суммы,  которые
   жертвы   несчастных   случаев   могли   предъявить   Бельгии    или
   ответственным  частным  компаниям,  в  том  числе  требования,  уже
   ставшие предметом судебных процессов.
       40.  Правительство  сослалось на то, что Решение  Кассационного
   суда   от   15   декабря  1983  г.  могло  иметь   серьезнейшие   и
   непредсказуемые  последствия  для  бюджета:  во  время   подготовки
   Закона  1988 г. финансовое бремя исков, предъявленных в тот  момент
   Бельгии,   исчислялось   в  3,5  миллиарда   бельгийских   франков.
   Законодатель, по-видимому, хотел защитить государственную казну  от
   этого  бремени,  ибо  оно  явилось  результатом  столь  спорного  и
   непредсказуемого  толкования соответствующих норм законодательства,
   что   заявители   не   могли  поверить,  что  законодатель   сможет
   упорядочить  ситуацию.  Кстати, это по существу  было  подтверждено
   Арбитражным судом (см. п. 7 выше).
       Правительство подчеркнуло также существовавшую, по его  мнению,
   необходимость покончить с "правовой нестабильностью",  возникшей  в
   связи  с Решением от 15 декабря 1983 г. По его утверждению, в  1988
   г.  законодатель  был вынужден закрепить принцип, существовавший  в
   бельгийском   праве   около  ста  пятидесяти  лет   и   оказавшийся
   нарушенным вследствие спорного толкования Кассационного суда.
       И  наконец, Правительство отмечает, что Закон 1988 г. направлен
   в   то   же  время  на  гармонизацию  законодательства  Бельгии   с
   законодательством соседних стран.
       41.  Заявители  подчеркивают прежде всего, что  Закон  1988  г.
   выгоден  не  только бельгийскому государству, но  также  и  частной
   лоцманской компании, которой предъявлен ряд исков (см. п. 6  выше).
   Они  отмечают  также, что финансовые мотивы, на  которые  ссылалось
   Правительство,  не  могут  служить  оправданием  такого  серьезного
   нарушения  основных  прав  заявителей, особенно  учитывая  то,  что
   Решение  Кассационного суда от 15 декабря 1983 г.  не  только  было
   предсказуемым,  но  и вполне соответствовало Решению  по  делу  "La
   Flandria",  принятому в 1920 г. тем же судом (см. п.  17  выше).  У
   государства  было  достаточно времени для  того,  чтобы  принять  в
   соответствии  с  Конвенцией меры, которые бы учитывали  возможность
   возникновения   судебного  решения,  лишь  продолжавшего   развитие
   определенного  направления  в судебной  практике,  начало  которому
   было  положено  очень  давно. Вместо этого  государство  не  просто
   ликвидировало  с  приданием  обратной  силы  уже  имеющиеся   права
   требования,  оно  сделало это лишь в 1988  г.,  обманув  тем  самым
   ожидание  заявителей, многие из которых ждали 1986 г.,  прежде  чем
   подать в суд на государство.
       42. Суд напомнил, что в своем Решении по делу "La Flandria"  от
   5  ноября 1920 г. Кассационный суд признал, что государство и  иные
   субъекты  публичного права подпадают под действие норм  гражданской
   ответственности, возникающей из причинения вреда (см. п. 17 выше).
       С  тех пор Кассационному суду не приходилось рассматривать дел,
   связанных  с  ответственностью государства в  отношении  лоцманской
   службы, но было совершенно очевидно, что при первой возможности  он
   будет  применять в данном вопросе принципы, определенные им в общих
   чертах  в своем Решении 1920 г. Этого можно было тем более  ожидать
   в  свете заключений Государственного совета по Закону 1988  г.,  из
   которого   очевидно,  что  данный  Закон  не  отступает  от   общих
   принципов юридической ответственности (см. п. 11 - 13 выше).
       Таким  образом, Решение 1983 г. не является нарушением правовой
   стабильности.
       43. Финансовые соображения, на которые ссылалось Правительство,
   и  его  стремление  сблизить бельгийское право  с  правом  соседних
   стран  могли  оправдать  на  будущее  законодательство,  являющееся
   отступлением от общепринятых принципов ответственности.
       Однако  они  не могли оправдать придание Закону обратной  силы,
   цель  и действие которой направлены на лишение заявителей права  на
   возмещение ущерба.
       Такое  серьезное  вмешательство  в  права  заявителей  нарушает
   справедливый баланс интересов.
       44.  Таким  образом, Законом 1988 г. в той  мере,  в  какой  он
   касается  фактов,  имевших место до 17 сентября 1988  г.,  т.е.  до
   момента  его опубликования и вступления в силу, нарушена  статья  1
   Протокола N 1.
   
                    III. О предполагаемом нарушении
                        статьи 6 п. 1 Конвенции
   
       45.  Заявители  ссылаются  также на нарушение  статьи  6  п.  1
   Конвенции.
       46. Суд отмечает, что их претензии по этому вопросу совпадают с
   теми,  которые  они выдвигают в свете статьи 1  Протокола  N  1.  С
   учетом  сформулированного  выше в  п.  44  вывода  Суд  не  считает
   необходимым рассматривать их отдельно в свете статьи 6 п. 1.
   
                  IV. Применение статьи 50 Конвенции
   
       47. В соответствии со статьей 50 Конвенции,
       "Если  Суд  установит, что решение или мера, принятые судебными
   или  иными властями Высокой Договаривающейся Стороны, полностью или
   частично   противоречат  обязательствам,  вытекающим  из  настоящей
   Конвенции,  а  также  если  внутреннее  право  упомянутой   Стороны
   допускает лишь частичное возмещение последствий такого решения  или
   такой  меры,  то  решением  Суда, если в этом  есть  необходимость,
   предусматривается справедливое возмещение потерпевшей стороне".
   
                         A. Материальный ущерб
   
       48.    Заявители   требуют   полного   возмещения   совокупного
   материального  ущерба,  оцениваемого в  1598367385  (один  миллиард
   пятьсот  девяносто  восемь миллионов триста шестьдесят  семь  тысяч
   триста  восемьдесят пять) бельгийских франков. В то  же  время  они
   просят  Суд  воздержаться  от  разрешения  данного  вопроса,  чтобы
   рассмотреть   с  Правительством  возможности,  предусмотренные   во
   внутреннем законодательстве для получения компенсации.
       49.  По  этому  пункту  Правительство выразило  свое  согласие,
   подчеркнув  при  этом,  что именно судебные органы  Бельгии  должны
   прежде  всего  установить  ущерб и ответственность  по  каждому  из
   споров.
       50. Представитель Комиссии своего мнения не выразил.
       51.  При данных обстоятельствах дела Суд считает, что вопрос  к
   разбирательству   не   готов.  Именно  национальные   суды   должны
   определить,  кто  имеет  право  на обязательственные  требования  и
   какова  сумма ущерба, возникшего в результате случаев,  послуживших
   основанием  для  возбуждения данного дела (см. п.  6  выше).  Таким
   образом,  нет  необходимости  рассматривать  вопрос,  связанный   с
   материальным  ущербом,  поскольку  имеется  возможность  достижения
   договоренности  между  государством  -  ответчиком  и   заявителями
   (статья 54 п. 1 и 4 Регламента Суда A).
   
                    B. Судебные издержки и расходы
   
       52.  Кроме того, заявители требуют, чтобы им уплатили  51380253
   (пятьдесят  один миллион триста восемьдесят тысяч двести  пятьдесят
   три)  бельгийских франка в качестве возмещения судебных издержек  и
   расходов,  понесенных  ими в национальных судебных  органах  и  при
   рассмотрении дела в органах Конвенции.
       53.  По  утверждению Правительства, разбирательства в  судебных
   органах,  рассматривавших дело по существу, прямо с  Конвенцией  не
   были  связаны,  поэтому возмещения понесенных по  ним  расходов  на
   основании   статьи  50  Конвенции  требовать  нельзя.   Расходы   в
   Арбитражном  и Кассационном судах, а также в Страсбурге  связаны  с
   одинаковыми,   по  мнению  Правительства,  делами,  за   некоторыми
   незначительными исключениями, поэтому заявители могут требовать  на
   этом основании не более 2000000 бельгийских франков.
       54. Представитель Комиссии замечаний не высказал.
       55.  Суд  отмечает, что до 17 сентября 1988 г. судебные органы,
   разбиравшие  дело  по существу, не занимались вопросами  соблюдения
   прав,   гарантируемых  Конвенцией,  и  что  из  суммы  в   38017101
   бельгийский  франк,  заявленной по всем делам, которыми  занимались
   эти  суды,  более  22  миллионов истребуются в связи  с  действиями
   специального аварийного общества "Ланглуа".
       В  отношении 13363152 бельгийских франков в связи с расходами в
   Арбитражном  и Кассационном судах, а также в органах Конвенции  Суд
   отмечает, что из них 9,5 миллиона франков истребуются "Ланглуа".
       Решая  по  справедливости, Суд присуждает  8000000  бельгийских
   франков на судебные издержки и расходы.
   
                        ПО ЭТИМ ОСНОВАНИЯМ СУД
   
       1.  Отделил единогласно дело шестой заявительницы от  дел  всех
   остальных и принял решение прекратить его рассмотрение;
       2.     Отклонил    единогласно    предварительное    возражение
   Правительства;
       3.  Постановил восемью голосами против одного, что имело  место
   нарушение п. 1 Протокола N 1 к Конвенции;
       4.   Постановил  восемью  голосами  против  одного,   что   нет
   необходимости  рассматривать данное дело в  свете  статьи  6  п.  1
   Конвенции;
       5. Постановил, что государство - ответчик должно в трехмесячный
   срок  выплатить  заявителям 8000000 (восемь миллионов)  бельгийских
   франков в качестве компенсации судебных издержек и расходов;
       6.  Постановил  единогласно, что вопрос  применения  статьи  50
   Конвенции   в   связи   с  материальным  ущербом   не   готов   для
   разбирательства;
       и соответственно:
       a) отложил вопрос;
       b)  предложил  Правительству  и заявителям  представить  ему  в
   шестимесячный  срок  свои  замечания по вышеуказанному  вопросу,  в
   частности  информировать его о любой договоренности, к которой  они
   могут прийти;
       c)    приостановил   дальнейшее   разбирательство   и   поручил
   председателю  Суда  назначить сроки разбирательства,  если  в  этом
   будет необходимость.
   
       Совершено  на  французском и английском языках  и  оглашено  во
   Дворце прав человека в Страсбурге 20 ноября 1995 г.
   
                                                          Председатель
                                                         Рольф РИССДАЛ
   
                                                                Грефье
                                                      Герберт ПЕТЦОЛЬД
   
   
   
   
   
   
       В  соответствии со статьей 51 п. 2 Конвенции и статьей 53 п.  2
   Регламента  Суда  A  к  настоящему  Решению  прилагаются  отдельные
   мнения судей.
   
                 ОСОБОЕ МНЕНИЕ СУДЬИ ТОРА ВИЛЬЯЛМСОНА
   
       Я  выступил за то, что не было нарушения статьи 1 Протокола N 1
   к  Конвенции.  Как  и  большинство  членов  Суда,  я  признаю,  что
   требования  заявителей по возмещению ущерба являются  имуществом  в
   смысле  статьи  1  Протокола N 1. В то же время  я  не  согласен  с
   выводом,   сделанным   на   основе  критерия   соразмерности.   Мне
   представляется  очень важным, что морское право с  его  нормами  по
   возмещению  ущерба является такой отраслью права,  где  применяется
   множество  весьма конкретных правил. В этой области часто возникают
   споры  на очень крупные суммы, и страхование играет важнейшую роль.
   Судовладельцы    защищены    также    нормами    об    ограниченной
   ответственности.   В   принципе   нет   ничего    необычного    или
   предосудительного   в   принятии   правовых   норм,   по    которым
   ответственность    за    несоответствующую   лоцманскую    проводку
   налагается  на  судовладельцев, даже если  она  осуществляется  или
   разрешена  государством.  Следовательно, единственной  проблемой  в
   данном  случае,  связанной со статьей 1  Протокола  N  1,  является
   оговорка об обратной силе в Законе 1988 г.
       За  период  с 1896 г. по 1983 г. Кассационный суд  ни  разу  не
   выносил  решений об ответственности лоцманов. Решение по  делу  "La
   Flandria",   вынесенное   в   1920   г.,   касалось   общих    норм
   ответственности государства. Не доказано, что в тот  момент,  когда
   произошли несчастные случаи, относящиеся к данному делу, т.  е.  до
   1983   г.,   судовладельцы   могли   ссылаться   на   общую   норму
   ответственности  государства за действия лоцманов,  существующую  в
   бельгийском праве. В период с 1983 г. по 1988 г. ситуация уже  была
   иная.  Тем  не  менее необходимо было показать, что это  привело  к
   изменениям   в   страховых   оговорках  и   соответственно   лишило
   судовладельцев    возможности   предъявлять   исковые    требования
   страховым  компаниям. Этого сделано не было.  Впрочем,  принятые  в
   1988  г.  нормы  полностью  не  лишили  судовладельцев  возможности
   покрытия  их рисков другими компаниями, ибо очень часто  они  могут
   предъявить  иск  другим судовладельцам. В связи с  этим  не  совсем
   ясно,   на   каком  основании  заявители  выдвинули  требования   о
   возмещении таких огромных сумм, и еще менее ясно, почему эти  суммы
   являются столь точно определенными и такими значительными. К  этому
   можно  добавить,  по  моему  мнению,  что  в  Конвенции  невозможно
   усмотреть  общего  запрета  обратной силы  в  области  гражданского
   права.  Трудно  очертить точные рамки гарантий,  предусмотренных  в
   статье   1   Протокола  N  1,  и,  наконец,  не  определен   размер
   требований,  имевшихся  у заявителей. При  этих  обстоятельствах  я
   считаю   соответствующими  и  убедительными  доводы  Правительства,
   изложенные в п. 40 настоящего Решения. Соответственно я не  считаю,
   что  факт  принятия  национальным  законодателем  норм,  наделенных
   обратной силой, подобных тем, что промульгированы в Бельгии в  1988
   г.,   является   нарушением  Конвенции  с  точки  зрения   критерия
   соразмерности.
       Поэтому я не усматриваю нарушения статьи 1 Протокола N 1.
   
                   ОТДЕЛЬНОЕ МНЕНИЕ СУДЬИ ДЕ МЕЙЕРА
   
       По  моему  мнению, основания, которые заставили  Суд  усмотреть
   нарушение  права  заявителей  беспрепятственно  пользоваться  своим
   имуществом,  равным образом применимы и к их праву на  справедливое
   разбирательство.
       Целью  и  следствием обратной силы закона, как это говорится  в
   Решении,  было  лишение заявителей их права требования  компенсации
   <1>.  В  то  же  время  она была направлена на то,  чтобы  добиться
   отказа в исках, уже предъявленных государству и другой компании  по
   лоцманским  услугам <2>, а также в любых других  исках  по  фактам,
   имевшим место до вступления в силу нового законодательства <3>.
       В связи с этим я считаю, что нарушение статьи 6 Конвенции имело
   место в той же степени, что и статьи 1 Протокола N 1.
   --------------------------------
       <1> Пункт 43 настоящего Решения.
       <2> Это относится ко всем заявителям, кроме двенадцатого (п.  6
   Решения).
       <3> Это ситуация с двенадцатым заявителем, а частично и с пятым
   (там же).
   
   
   
   
   
   
                    EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
                                   
                 CASE OF PRESSOS COMPANIA NAVIERA S.A.
                         AND OTHERS v. BELGIUM
                                   
                               JUDGMENT
                                   
                       (Strasbourg, 20.XI.1995)
   
       In  the  case  of Pressos Compania Naviera S.A. and  Others  v.
   Belgium <1>,
       The European Court of Human Rights, sitting, in accordance with
   Article 43 (art. 43) of the Convention for the Protection of  Human
   Rights   and  Fundamental  Freedoms  ("the  Convention")  and   the
   relevant  provisions of Rules of Court <2>, as a  Chamber  composed
   of the following judges:
   --------------------------------
       Notes by the Registrar
       <1>  The case is numbered 38/1994/485/567. The first number  is
   the  case's position on the list of cases referred to the Court  in
   the  relevant  year (second number). The last two numbers  indicate
   the  case's  position on the list of cases referred  to  the  Court
   since   its   creation  and  on  the  list  of  the   corresponding
   originating applications to the Commission.
       <2> Rules A apply to all cases referred to the Court before the
   entry  into  force  of Protocol No. 9 (P9) and thereafter  only  to
   cases  concerning  States  not bound by that  Protocol  (P9).  They
   correspond to the Rules that came into force on 1 January 1983,  as
   amended several times subsequently.
   
       Mr R. Ryssdal, President,
       Mr {Thor Vilhjalmsson} <*>,
       Mr C. Russo,
       Mr J. De Meyer,
       Mr R. Pekkanen,
       Mr M.A. Lopes Rocha,
       Mr L. Wildhaber,
       Mr D. Gotchev,
       Mr U. Lohmus,
       and also of Mr H. Petzold, Registrar,
   --------------------------------
       <*> Здесь и далее по тексту слова на национальном языке набраны
   латинским шрифтом и выделены фигурными скобками.
   
       Having deliberated in private on 26 May and 28 October 1995,
       Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the last-
   mentioned date:
   
                               PROCEDURE
   
       1.  The  case  was  referred  to  the  Court  by  the  European
   Commission  of Human Rights ("the Commission") and by  the  Belgian
   Government  ("the Government") respectively on 9 September  and  21
   October  1994, within the three-month period laid down  by  Article
   32  para.  1 and Article 47 (art. 32-1, art. 47) of the Convention.
   It  originated in an application (no. 17849/91) against the Kingdom
   of  Belgium lodged with the Commission under Article 25  (art.  25)
   by  twenty-six  applicants (see paragraph 6  below)  on  4  January
   1991.
       The  Commission's request referred to Articles 44 and 48  (art.
   44,  art. 48) and to the declaration whereby Belgium recognised the
   compulsory  jurisdiction of the Court (Article 46) (art.  46);  the
   Government's application referred to Articles 44 and 48  (art.  44,
   art.  48). The object of the request and of the application was  to
   obtain  a decision as to whether the facts of the case disclosed  a
   breach  by the respondent State of its obligations under Article  6
   para. 1 (art. 6-1) of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol  No.
   1 (P1-1).
       2.  In response to the enquiry made in accordance with Rule  33
   para.  3  (d)  of  Rules of Court A, twenty-five  of  the  original
   twenty-six  applicants  before  the  Commission  stated  that  they
   wished  to take part in the proceedings and designated the  lawyers
   who would represent them (Rule 30).
       On  27  February  1995  the lawyers so designated  submitted  a
   memorial  on  behalf  of those applicants.  On  18  May  1995  they
   indicated  that  they had received no instructions from  the  sixth
   applicant.
       3.  The Chamber to be constituted included ex officio Mr J.  De
   Meyer, the elected judge of Belgian nationality (Article 43 of  the
   Convention)  (art.  43), and Mr R. Ryssdal, the  President  of  the
   Court  (Rule 21 para. 3 (b)). On 24 September 1994, in the presence
   of  the Registrar, the President drew by lot the names of the other
   seven  members, namely Mr {Thor Vilhjalmsson}, Mr N.  Valticos,  Mr
   R.  Pekkanen, Mr M.A. Lopes Rocha, Mr L. Wildhaber, Mr  D.  Gotchev
   and  Mr  U. Lohmus, (Article 43 in fine of the Convention and  Rule
   21  para.  4)  (art.  43). Subsequently, Mr  C.  Russo,  substitute
   judge,  replaced Mr Valticos, who was unable to take  part  in  the
   further  consideration of the case (Rules 22 para. 1 and  24  para.
   1).
       4.  As  President of the Chamber (Rule 21 para. 5), Mr Ryssdal,
   acting   through  the  Registrar,  consulted  the  Agent   of   the
   Government,  the  applicants'  lawyers  and  the  Delegate  of  the
   Commission on the organisation of the proceedings (Rules  37  para.
   1  and  38).  Pursuant  to  the  order  made  in  consequence,  the
   Registrar   received  the  Government's  memorial  and  applicants'
   memorial on 24 and 27 February 1995 respectively.
       5.  In  accordance with the President's decision,  the  hearing
   took  place in public in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg,  on
   22 May 1995. The Court had held a preparatory meeting beforehand.
       There appeared before the Court:
       (a) for the Government
       Mr J. Lathouwers, Deputy Adviser, Head of the Human
   Rights Section, Ministry of Justice, Agent,
       Mr J.-M. Nelissen-Grade, avocat, Counsel,
       Mr G. Michaux, avocat,
       Mr  J.  Van  de  Velde,  Head  of Administration,  Ministry  of
   Communications and Infrastructure, Advisers;
       (b) for the Commission
       Mr I. Cabral Barreto, Delegate;
       (c) for the applicants
       Mr L. Simont, avocat,
       Mr R.O. Dalcq, avocat, Counsel,
       Mr D. Lagasse, avocat,
       Mr N. Cahen, avocat, Advisers.
       The  Court heard addresses by Mr Cabral Barreto, Mr Simont,  Mr
   Dalcq  and  Mr  Nelissen-Grade,  and  also  their  answers  to  its
   questions.
   
                            AS TO THE FACTS
   
                     I. Circumstances of the case
   
            A. The casualties and their legal consequences
   
       6.  The  applicants  are shipowners, mutual shipping  insurance
   associations  and,  in one case, an insolvency administrator  whose
   ships  were  involved  in  casualties  in  Belgian  or  Netherlands
   territorial waters prior to 17 September 1988.
       As they considered that these casualties were the result of the
   negligence  of the Belgian pilots on board the ships  in  question,
   they  instituted  legal  proceedings,  some  of  them  against  the
   Belgian  State and others against a private company offering  pilot
   services.  The  current state of the proceedings in  these  various
   actions is, according to the information provided to the Court,  as
   follows:
       First  applicant:  Pressos Compania  Naviera  S.A.,  a  company
   incorporated under Greek law (ship: the Angeartic)
       11 August 1982: collision;
       24   April   1985:   judgment  of  the  court   of   Middelburg
   (Netherlands) finding the first applicant liable;
       10  June 1987: action against the Belgian State in the Brussels
   Court of First Instance to recover damages paid.
       Second  applicant: Interocean Shipping Corporation,  a  company
   incorporated under Liberian law (ship: the Oswego Freedom)
       13 December 1970: collision in Netherlands waters;
       8 November 1972 and 16 November 1974: judgments respectively of
   the  Middelburg  court  and of the Court of  Appeal  of  The  Hague
   finding the second applicant liable;
       12  December  1972:  action against the Belgian  State  in  the
   Brussels Court of First Instance to recover damages paid;
       9  March 1988: action declared unfounded on the ground that the
   pilot was not liable under Netherlands law;
       7 April 1988: appeal lodged by second applicant.
       Third   applicant:  Zephir  Shipping  Corporation,  a   company
   incorporated under Liberian law (ship: the Panachaikon)
       27 February 1971: collision;
       28  April 1977: settlement estimating the damage to be paid  by
   the third applicant at 456,798 US dollars;
       26  February  1973:  action against the Belgian  State  in  the
   Brussels Court of First Instance to recover damages paid;
       18  March  1988:  preliminary decision declaring  action  well-
   founded  by  virtue of the principle that the State was liable  for
   negligence on the part of its pilots;
       23  February  1994: judgment quashed by the Brussels  Court  of
   Appeal in the light of the Act of 30 August 1988 (see paragraph  18
   below).
       Fourth  applicant:  Cory Maritime Ltd, a  company  incorporated
   under English law (ship: the Pass of Brander)
       6 January 1983: contact causing damage to a berth when docking;
       23  July 1984: action brought against the company by the  owner
   of the berth (BASF) in the Antwerp Commercial Court;
       22  August  1984:  third-party proceedings  against  the  pilot
   company Brabo (see paragraph 9 below);
       19   June  1986:  judgment  of  the  Antwerp  Commercial  Court
   ordering:
       (1) the fourth applicant to pay damages;
       (2) the Brabo company, the defendant in the third-party action,
   to reimburse the applicant the sums paid;
       18 August 1986: appeal lodged by Brabo;
       11  February 1993: settlement by the shipowner of BASF's claim,
   without prejudice to the outcome of the proceedings pending in  the
   Antwerp Court of Appeal.
       Fifth  applicant: Malaysian International Shipping  Corporation
   Berhad,  a  company  incorporated under Malaysian  law  (ship:  the
   Bunga Kantan)
       23  November 1986: contact causing damage to the wall of a quay
   belonging to the Belgian State;
       8  August  1988:  action brought by the shipowner  against  the
   Belgian  State  in  the  Antwerp Court of  First  Instance  seeking
   reparation in respect of the damage caused to the ship;
       21  November  1988:  action brought by the Belgian  State,  the
   owner  of the quay, against the shipowner and the Brabo company  in
   the  Antwerp Court of First Instance for reparation in  respect  of
   the damage caused to the quay;
       23  November  1988:  action brought against  the  shipowner  by
   Antwerp  municipality  in the Antwerp Court of  First  Instance  to
   recover costs occasioned by the casualty.
       Sixth applicant: City Corporation, a company incorporated under
   Liberian law (see paragraph 2 above).
       Seventh,  eighth  and ninth applicants: Kukje Shipping  Company
   Ltd,  a  company incorporated under South Korean law, Mr Young  (as
   the  seventh applicant's trustee) and The London Steam-ship Owners'
   Mutual  Insurance  Association Ltd, a  company  incorporated  under
   English law (ship: the Super star)
       27 October 1985: collision;
       28  January  1986:  action brought against  applicants  in  the
   Antwerp  Court  of First Instance by the owners of the  other  ship
   involved;
       24   October  1986:  third-party  proceedings  brought  by  the
   applicants against the Belgian State;
       unspecified  date: out-of-court settlement with subrogation  of
   rights between the owners of the ships involved in the collision.
       Tenth and eleventh applicants: Ocean Car Carriers Company  Ltd,
   a  company incorporated under Liberian law, and Kansai Kisen  K.K.,
   a company incorporated under Japanese law (ship: the Cygnus Ace)
       First casualty:
       1  October  1983:  contact causing damage to a  bridge  in  the
   Antwerp docks;
       22  May  1984: action brought against the applicants by Antwerp
   municipality in the Antwerp Court of First Instance;
       21 June 1984: third-party proceedings brought by the applicants
   against the pilot company Brabo;
       26  September  1990:  third-party proceedings  brought  by  the
   applicants against the pilot.
       Second casualty:
       23 November 1984: contact causing damage to a lock;
       27  May  1987: action brought against the applicants by Antwerp
   municipality in the Antwerp Court of First Instance;
       16 June 1987: third-party proceedings brought by the applicants
   against the Belgian State;
       10 September 1991: out-of-court settlement with subrogation.
       Twelfth  applicant:  Furness Withy (Shipping)  Ltd,  a  company
   incorporated under English law (ship: the Andes)
       31 March 1988: contact causing damage to a lock;
       29  October  1990:  action  brought against  the  applicant  by
   Antwerp municipality in the Antwerp Court of First Instance;
       19  November  1990:  third-party  proceedings  brought  by  the
   applicant against the pilot company Brabo;
       14 January 1992: payment by the applicant of damages to Antwerp
   municipality and subrogation.
       Thirteenth and fourteenth applicants: M.H. Shipping Company Ltd
   and  Powell Duffryn Shipping Ltd, both companies incorporated under
   English law (ship: the Donnington)
       8 December 1984: contact causing damage to a lock;
       9  December  1985:  action brought against  the  applicants  by
   Antwerp municipality in the Antwerp Commercial Court;
       8   December  1987:  third-party  proceedings  brought  by  the
   applicants against the Belgian State;
       9  March  1989  and 31 March 1992: shipowners  ordered  to  pay
   34,841,522  Belgian francs (BEF) in the main proceedings  first  by
   the  Antwerp  Commercial Court and then by  the  Antwerp  Court  of
   Appeal;
       February and June 1992: sum in question paid by the applicants,
   which reserved their right to seek reimbursement in the event of  a
   judgment of the European Court declaring the Act of 30 August  1988
   "void".
       Fifteenth   applicant:  {Societe}  navale   chargeurs   Delmas-
   Vieljeux, a company incorporated under French law (ship: the  Marie
   Delmas)
       20 March 1985: contact causing damage to a lock;
       27  November 1986: action brought against the applicant and the
   pilot company Brabo in the Antwerp Court of First Instance;
       17 November 1992: damages paid by the applicant, which reserved
   its  rights  in  respect  of the effects of  the  judgment  of  the
   European Court.
       Sixteenth  applicant:  Merit Holdings  Corporation,  a  company
   incorporated under Liberian law (ship: the Leandros)
       26 July 1985: major damage caused to the berthing facilities of
   the Eurosilo company and to the walls of a quay of Ghent harbour;
       10  March  1986:  action brought against the applicant  by  the
   Eurosilo company in the Ghent Court of First Instance;
       18  July 1986: third-party proceedings brought by the applicant
   against the State;
       17  September 1991: in absentia ruling ordering the  shipowner,
   the  State  and  the  pilot to pay, jointly and severally,  various
   amounts;
       24 October 1991: application to have that decision set aside.
       Seventeenth  and eighteenth applicants: Petrobas Brasileiro,  a
   company  incorporated under Brazilian law, and The  United  Kingdom
   Mutual  Steam Ship Assurance Association (Bermuda) Ltd,  a  company
   incorporated under Bermudan law (ship: the Quitauna)
       30 November 1986: contact causing damage to a lock;
       27  October 1987: action brought against the applicants and the
   Belgian  State by the Roegiers company and Antwerp municipality  in
   the Antwerp Court of First Instance;
       8 June 1989: judgment of the Antwerp court;
       17  June 1991: applicants ordered to pay damages by the Antwerp
   Court of Appeal.
       Nineteenth  applicant: {Koctug Gemi Isletmeciligi}  ve  Ticaret
   A.S., a company incorporated under Turkish law (ship: the Fethiye)
       27  October  1984:  damage caused to  two  other  ships  during
   mooring manoeuvres;
       unspecified date: action brought against the applicant  in  the
   Ghent Commercial Court;
       27   October  1986:  third-party  proceedings  brought  by  the
   applicant against the Belgian State;
       14 January 1992: judgment of the Ghent Commercial Court finding
   that  the  applicant was liable and that the pilot and the  Belgian
   State were not;
       6 May and 1 September 1993: appeal lodged by the applicant.
       Twentieth  applicant:  Initial  Maritime  Corporation  S.A.,  a
   company incorporated under Liberian law (ship: the Acritas)
       21 March 1984: collision between three ships;
       14  March  1986:  action brought by the applicant  against  the
   other  shipowners  involved and the Belgian State  in  the  Antwerp
   Court of First Instance.
       Twenty-first  applicant: North River Overseas S.A.,  a  company
   incorporated under Panamanian law (ship: the Federal Huron)
       26 April 1986: collision;
       14 May 1986: action brought by the applicant against the second
   ship's  owners  and  the  Belgian State in the  Antwerp  Commercial
   Court;
       25  April  1988:  action brought by the  second  ship's  owners
   against the applicant and the Belgian State in the same court.
       Twenty-second  applicant:  Federal  Pacific  (Liberia)  Ltd,  a
   company  incorporated  under Liberian law  (ship:  the  Federal  St
   Laurent)
       29 September 1985: collision;
       4  September 1986: action brought by the applicant against  the
   second  ship's  owners and Belgian State in the  Antwerp  Court  of
   First Instance;
       10 December 1987: out-of-court settlement.
       Twenty-third  applicant:  Conbulkships  (3)  Ltd,   a   company
   incorporated under Cayman Islands law (ship: the Cast Otter)
       6 February 1987: ship ran aground;
       6  April  1987:  action  brought by the applicant  against  the
   Belgian State in the Brussels Court of First Instance.
       Twenty-fourth   applicant:  Compagnie   belge   {d'affretement}
   (Cobelfret) S.A., a company incorporated under Belgian law  (ships:
   the Belvaux and the Clervaux)
       The Belvaux:
       18 June 1979: ship ran aground;
       10 June 1986: action brought by the applicant against the State
   in the Brussels Court of First Instance.
       The Clervaux:
       5 October 1981: ship ran aground;
       10 July 1986: action brought by the applicant against the State
   in the Brussels Court of First Instance.
       Twenty-fifth   applicant:  Naviera  Uralar  S.A.,   a   company
   incorporated under Spanish law (ship: the Uralar Cuarto)
       11  December 1983: contact causing damage to a jetty in Antwerp
   harbour;
       18 July 1985: action brought against the applicant by Roegiers,
   the bailee of the jetty, in the Antwerp Court of First Instance;
       14   August  1985:  third-party  proceedings  brought  by   the
   applicant against the Belgian State;
       26  October  1988:  third-party application  dismissed  by  the
   Antwerp  Court  of Appeal on the basis of the retrospective  effect
   of the Act of 30 August 1988;
       19  April 1991: appeal on points of law dismissed by the  Court
   of Cassation (see paragraph 8 below).
       Twenty-sixth  applicant: B.P. Tanker  Company  Ltd,  a  company
   incorporated under English law (ship: the British Dragoon)
       24 January 1977: ship ran aground in the Scheldt estuary;
       21  January  1982: action brought by the applicant against  the
   Belgian State in the Brussels Court of First Instance.
       The  twenty-sixth applicant did not bring legal proceedings  to
   challenge the Act of 30 August 1988.
   
            B. Proceedings in the Court of Arbitration and
                        the Court of Cassation
   
       7.  In March 1989 twenty-four of the applicants applied to  the
   Court  of  Arbitration (Cour d'arbitrage) to have  the  Act  of  30
   August  1988 ("the 1988 Act") "amending the Act of 3 November  1967
   on  the piloting of sea-going vessels" declared void, in particular
   on  the  ground  of  its  retrospective effect  (see  paragraph  18
   below).
       The  court  dismissed the applications on 5  July  1990,  inter
   alia, for the following reasons:
       "The legislature is entitled to consider that the categories to
   whom  the impugned Act is addressed are, principally on account  of
   their  involvement  in shipping, sufficiently specific  to  warrant
   special rules concerning liability.
       In  this  instance  the legislature gave the Act  retrospective
   effect.  The  retrospective  component  of  the  special  rules  on
   liability   introduced   for  pilots  infringes   the   fundamental
   principle  of  legal certainty, according to which the  content  of
   the  law  must in principle be foreseeable and accessible  so  that
   those  subject  to the law may foresee to a reasonable  degree  the
   consequences  of a given action at the moment when that  action  is
   carried out.
       This violation of the principle is not, in the circumstances of
   the  case,  disproportionate in relation to the  general  objective
   underlying  the contested legislation. The legislature intended  to
   preserve in the legislation on pilots the rules on liability  which
   it  had not wanted to amend in 1967 and which the case-law prior to
   1983  and  legal writing inferred from section 5 of the Pilots  Act
   1967  and  sections 64 and 251 of the Shipping Act (Book II,  Title
   II,  of  the  Commercial Code). Moreover it took into  account  the
   considerable  financial implications that would result,  in  a  way
   that  could  not  have  been  foreseen,  for  the  relevant  public
   authorities from the reversal of the case-law.
       In  the  light  of  all  these considerations,  exempting  from
   liability  the  organisers  of a pilot  service  and  limiting  the
   personal  liability of pilots cannot be regarded as  a  failure  to
   comply  with  the  requirements of Articles 6  and  6  bis  of  the
   Constitution,  even  having regard to the retrospective  effect  of
   the Act in question.
       ...
       The  applicants claim that the legislation in issue  introduces
   an  unjustified distinction between, on the one hand, disputes that
   have  reached their conclusion (causae finitae), which fall outside
   the  scope of the legislation, and, on the other, pending  disputes
   (causae pendentes), which are covered by the Act.
       Attributing  retrospective effect to  a  legal  rule  means  in
   principle  that that rule applies to legal relationships that  came
   into  being and were not definitively terminated before  its  entry
   into  force;  such a rule can therefore apply only to  pending  and
   future  disputes and cannot bear in any way on disputes  that  have
   been concluded.
       According  to  a fundamental principle of our legal  system,  a
   judicial  decision may be varied only on appeal.  By  applying  the
   contested  distinction so as to limit the effect of  the  Act  with
   regard  to  the  past,  the  legislature  sought  to  respect  that
   principle  and did not therefore operate a distinction contrary  to
   Articles 6 and 6 bis of the Constitution.
       The applicants relied further on the violation of Article 11 of
   the  Constitution and of Article 1 of the First Additional Protocol
   to the European Convention on Human Rights (P1-1).
       ...
       By  amending  rules governing compensation for  damage  without
   calling  into question the existence of debts arising from judicial
   decisions,  the  legislature  did  not  introduce  any  unjustified
   distinction,  as  the protection guaranteed by the  above-mentioned
   provisions   extends  only  to  property  that  has  already   been
   acquired."
       8.   The  twenty-fifth  applicant  appealed  to  the  Court  of
   Cassation  against  the  judgment of 26 October  1988  whereby  the
   Antwerp  Court of Appeal dismissed, on the basis of the  1988  Act,
   its   third-party  application  against  the  Belgian  State   (see
   paragraph 6 above).
       On  26  January 1990 the Court of Cassation referred a question
   to  the  Court  of  Arbitration for a  preliminary  ruling  on  the
   constitutionality   of  the  1988  Act  and   in   particular   its
   retrospective effect. On 22 November 1990 that court  confirmed  in
   substance its judgment of 5 July 1990 (see paragraph 7 above).
       Accordingly, on 19 April 1991, the Court of Cassation dismissed
   the  twenty-fifth applicant's appeal on points of law.  Reproducing
   the  reply given by the Court of Arbitration to its question for  a
   preliminary  ruling, it dismissed a first submission  according  to
   which  the  retrospective  effect of the  1988  Act  infringed  the
   former  Articles 6 and 6 bis of the Constitution. It then  declared
   inadmissible  the  submission based  on  an  alleged  violation  of
   Article  1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1), after noting that the  twenty-
   fifth  applicant had not invoked that provision (P1-1) in the Court
   of  Appeal.  Finally, it rejected the submission  that,  by  taking
   effect  in respect of proceedings that were in progress,  the  1988
   Act  prevented  the  courts from deciding the disputes  as  brought
   before them, contrary to the principles of the independence of  the
   courts  and  equality  of arms between the parties.  The  Court  of
   Cassation held as follows:
       "The  task  and  duty of a judge is to apply  the  law  to  the
   dispute  before him; the fact that that is his task  and  his  duty
   has  no bearing on his independence. A retrospective law applicable
   to  pending  disputes,  even where the State  is  a  party  to  the
   dispute,  does not impair the judge's independence in carrying  out
   his  task and accomplishing his duty. Any pressure brought to  bear
   on  a  judge  by such a law is no different from the pressure  that
   all  laws exert on him. The fact that the judgment applies  such  a
   law  does not constitute a violation of the right to a fair hearing
   of the case by an independent tribunal."
   
                       II. Relevant domestic law
   
                 A. The piloting of sea-going vessels
   
       9.  In  Belgium the piloting of sea-going vessels is  a  public
   service organised by the State in the interests of shipping. It  is
   governed  by  the  Act of 3 November 1967 on the piloting  of  sea-
   going  vessels  ("the 1967 Act"). In practice  pilot  services  are
   provided  either  directly by the State itself,  for  maritime  and
   river  navigation,  or by private companies acting  under  licence,
   such  as  the Brabo company, which has a monopoly of pilot services
   within the port of Antwerp.
       10. Pursuant to the 1967 Act and the treaties concluded between
   Belgium  and the Netherlands, merchant ships that enter the Scheldt
   estuary  must  have on board a pilot with a licence issued  by  the
   Belgian  or  Netherlands authorities. However,  the  only  sanction
   that  may  be imposed on the master of a ship who fails  to  comply
   with  this  obligation is that he be required to  pay  the  pilot's
   fee, which is payable in any event.
       11. Under section 5 (1) of the 1967 Act:
       "...  piloting consists in the assistance given to the  masters
   of  sea-going  vessels by pilots appointed by  the  Minister  whose
   responsibilities include the pilot service. The pilot shall  advise
   the  master.  The latter shall be in sole command  as  regards  the
   course to be steered and the manoeuvres of the vessel."
       12.  In  relation to that provision the explanatory  memorandum
   for  the  bill  that  formed the basis of the 1967  Act  states  as
   follows:
       "Section 5 defines piloting and, accordingly, the nature of the
   role  of  the  pilot  in  this operation. It therefore  settles  an
   important   legal  question.  As  the  pilot's  role  is   one   of
   assistance,  he  does not replace the master, who remains  in  sole
   command  of the steering of his ship and its manoeuvres. The  pilot
   simply  advises  on the route to be taken. This is confirmation  of
   the  rule  which is currently in force and which is  to  be  found,
   inter  alia, in a judgment [of the Court of Cassation] of 19  March
   1896 ..."
       13.  In  its opinion on the draft, the Conseil d'Etat took  the
   view  that  the latter instrument "gave express effect to  a  long-
   standing  interpretation according to which the pilot  acts  merely
   as  the  master's adviser". As the provision in the draft initially
   read "the master has sole responsibility for steering the ship  and
   its  manoeuvres",  the  Conseil  d'Etat  suggested  that  the  word
   "responsibility"  be  replaced by the term "in  command"  since  it
   seemed  that  "the Government's intention [was] not  to  depart  in
   this provision from the general law of tort".
       14.  Section 64 of the Shipping Act (Book II, Title II, of  the
   Commercial  Code)  provides that "the  master  is  required  to  be
   present  in  person  on board his ship when  it  enters  or  leaves
   ports, harbours or rivers".
   
               B. Liability in the event of a collision
   
       15. According to section 251 of the Shipping Act:
       "...
       If  the collision is caused by the fault of one of the vessels,
   liability  to make good the damages attaches to the one  which  has
   committed the fault.
       ...
       The  liability imposed by the preceding article[s] attaches  in
   cases  where the collision is caused by the fault of a  pilot  even
   when the pilot is carried by compulsion of law."
       16.  According  to  two judgments delivered  by  the  Court  of
   Cassation respectively on 24 April 1840 (Pasicrisie, 1839  -  1840,
   I,  375)  and 19 March 1896 (Pasicrisie, 1896, I, 132),  the  pilot
   was  to  be  regarded as the agent ({prepose}) of the  master,  the
   owner  or the charterer. This meant that Article 1384 of the  Civil
   Code was applicable to him. That Article provides as follows:
       "A person shall be liable not only for the damage caused by his
   own  action,  but also for that which is caused by the  actions  of
   those  for  whom he is responsible or by things which  are  in  his
   care.
       Fathers  and mothers shall be liable for the damage  caused  by
   their minor children.
       Masters and principals shall be liable for the damage caused by
   their  servants and agents in the exercise of the duties for  which
   they are employed.
       ..."
       It followed that the State was not liable for the negligence of
   pilots.  Pilots  were  liable solely for negligent  acts  committed
   without the master's knowledge.
       17.  By  a  judgment of 15 December 1983 the Court of Cassation
   (Pasicrisie,   1983,  I,  418),  endorsing  the  opinion   of   Mrs
   Liekendael,   the  advocate  general,  brought  an  end   to   this
   situation,  holding,  inter alia, in relation  to  the  two  above-
   mentioned  paragraphs (see paragraph 15 above) of  section  251  of
   the Shipping Act:
       "It  follows from these statutory provisions that, in the event
   of  a  collision caused by the negligence of a ship, the  owner  of
   that  ship  is  required  to make good the damage  caused  by  that
   negligence to the victims of the collision. It cannot, however,  be
   inferred  either  from  section 251 of the  Shipping  Act  or  from
   section  64 of that Act, according to which the master is  required
   to  be  present in person on board his ship on entering and leaving
   ports,  harbours  and  rivers, that the  owner  is  precluded  from
   instituting  proceedings  against  third  parties,  who  may   have
   incurred  liability  under  other  statutory  provisions,   notably
   Articles 1382 or 1384 of the Civil Code.
       The  master,  who is in sole command of the ship's  course  and
   manoeuvres by virtue of section 5 of the Act of 3 November 1967  on
   the   piloting  of  sea-going  vessels,  is  not  vested  with  any
   authority  in  regard  to  the pilot who,  according  to  the  same
   provision, acts as his adviser.
       In  so far as it failed to examine whether the pilot of a  ship
   that caused the collision had been negligent, however slightly,  in
   a  way  which  had contributed to occasioning the damage  resulting
   from  that collision, and excluded, in the event that that had been
   the  case,  the  possibility  that the State  could  have  incurred
   liability,  although the pilot belonged to a service  organised  by
   the  State  and  was  under the latter's exclusive  authority,  the
   judgment lacked a proper reasoning in law."
       It  followed that the pilot could no longer be regarded as  the
   master's  agent  and his acts were therefore capable  of  incurring
   his own liability and that of the organiser of the pilot service.
       This new case-law, which was confirmed shortly afterwards by  a
   judgment  of 17 May 1985 (Pasicrisie, 1985, I, 1159), followed  the
   line  taken  in  the  "La Flandria" judgment  of  5  November  1920
   (Pasicrisie,  1920, I, 193), in which the Court  of  Cassation  had
   recognised that the State and other public-law bodies were  subject
   to the general law of tort.
       18.  By  an  Act of 30 August 1988, published in  the  Moniteur
   belge  on  17 September 1988, the legislature inserted in the  1967
   Act section 3 bis, which reads as follows:
       "para.  1.  The  organiser of a pilot service  cannot  be  held
   directly  or  indirectly liable for damage sustained or  caused  by
   the  ship  under pilotage, where such damage is the result  of  the
   negligence of the organiser himself or one of his staff  acting  in
   the   performance  of  his  duties,  irrespective  of  whether  the
   negligence in question consists of an act or omission.
       Nor  can  the organiser of a pilot service be held directly  or
   indirectly liable for damage caused by a malfunction or  defect  in
   the  equipment owned or used by the pilot service for  the  purpose
   of supplying information or instructions to the sea-going vessels.
       For   the  purposes  of  the  present  Article,  the  following
   definitions shall apply:
       1-  organiser: the public authorities and port authorities that
   organise  the  pilot  service or grant a  licence  to  operate  the
   service, together with the licensee;
       2- pilot service:
       (a)  the service which provides the master of a sea-going  ship
   with a pilot who acts as adviser to the master;
       (b)  any  service  which,  in  particular  by  means  of  radar
   observations  or  by  sounding the waters accessible  to  sea-going
   ships,  provides  information or instructions to a sea-going  ship,
   even where there is no pilot on board;
       3-  ship under pilotage: any sea-going ship which makes use  of
   the pilot service within the meaning of 2- (a) and/or (b) above.
       The  ship  shall be liable for the damage referred  to  in  the
   first paragraph.
       A  member  of staff [of the pilot service] who, by his  act  or
   omission,  caused  the damage referred to in  the  first  paragraph
   above  shall be liable only in the event of a deliberately tortious
   act or gross negligence.
       The  liability  of a member of staff for damage caused  by  his
   gross  negligence shall be limited to five hundred thousand  francs
   for  each incident giving rise to such damage. The Crown may adjust
   that amount in the light of the economic situation.
       para. 2. The foregoing subsection shall enter into force on the
   date  of  publication in the Moniteur belge. It  shall  apply  with
   retrospective effect for a period of thirty years from that date."
   
              C. Jurisdiction of the Court of Arbitration
   
       19.  By  virtue  of  Article 107 ter (as it was  formerly,  now
   Article  142)  of the Constitution and sections 1  and  26  of  the
   Special  Act  on the Court of Arbitration of 6 January  1989,  that
   court has jurisdiction to hear:
       (1)  applications to have statutes, decrees or orders  declared
   void  for breach either of the rules governing the distribution  of
   powers  between the State, the communities and the regions,  or  of
   Articles  6 and 6 bis (as they were formerly, now Articles  10  and
   11)  of the Constitution, which provide for equality before the law
   and   prohibit  discrimination  in  the  exercise  of  rights   and
   freedoms;
       (2)  requests  for preliminary rulings on questions  concerning
   the  breach  of the said rules or Articles by statutes, decrees  or
   orders.
   
                   PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION
   
       20. The applicants lodged their application with the Commission
   on  4  January  1991.  They  maintained that  the  rules  governing
   liability  introduced  by  the  Act of  30  August  1988  infringed
   Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, Article 6 para. 1 (P1-1, art. 6-1)  of
   the  Convention  and  Article 14 of the Convention  taken  together
   with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (art. 14+P1-1).
       21.  On 6 September 1993 the Commission declared the complaints
   concerning  Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and Article 6  para.  1  of
   the  Convention (P1-1, art. 6-1) admissible; it found the remainder
   of the application (no. 17849/91) inadmissible. In its report of  4
   July  1994  (Article  31) (art. 31), the Commission  expressed  the
   opinion  that there had been no violation of Article 1 of  Protocol
   No. 1 (P1-1) (unanimously), but that there had been a violation  of
   Article  6  para. 1 (art. 6-1) of the Convention (eleven  votes  to
   six),  except as regards the second (fourteen votes to  three)  and
   twelfth applicants (sixteen votes to one).
       The  full  text  of the Commission's opinion and  of  the  five
   separate  opinions  contained in the report  is  reproduced  as  an
   appendix to this judgment <3>.
   --------------------------------
       <3>  Note  by the Registrar: for practical reasons  this  annex
   will  appear only with the printed version of the judgment  (volume
   332  of  Series A of the Publications of the Court), but a copy  of
   the Commission's report is obtainable from the registry.
   
                    FINAL SUBMISSIONS TO THE COURT
   
       22. In their memorial the Government asked the Court
       "by  way  of  primary  submission, to declare  application  no.
   17849/91  inadmissible and, in the alternative, to  hold  that  the
   facts  of  the present case do not disclose any breach on the  part
   of  the  Belgian  State  of  its  obligations  under  the  European
   Convention on Human Rights."
       23. The applicants invited the Court to
       "1.  hold  that the Act of 30 August 1988 infringed  Article  6
   para. 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (art.  6-
   1, P1-1);
       2.  hold  that the Belgian State is to reimburse in respect  of
   costs and expenses the sum of BEF 51,380,253;
       3.  hold that the question of the just satisfaction owed to the
   applicants should be reserved."
   
                             AS TO THE LAW
   
                        I. The sixth applicant
   
       24.  The Court notes that of the original twenty-six applicants
   before  the Commission twenty-five were represented before it.  The
   lawyers  appointed by the applicants received no instructions  from
   the  sixth  applicant  (see paragraphs 1 and 2  above).  The  Court
   considers that this circumstance warrants the conclusion  that  the
   sixth  applicant  did not intend to pursue its  complaints  (second
   sub-paragraph of Rule 49 para. 2 of Rules of Court A).
       In addition, it discerns no public policy reason for continuing
   the   proceedings   in  respect  of  the  sixth  applicant,   whose
   complaints  are similar to those of the other applicants  (Rule  49
   para. 4).
       Accordingly,  the complaints lodged by City Corporation  should
   be  severed  from those of the other applicants and struck  out  of
   the list.
   
                  II. Alleged violation of Article 1
                       of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1)
   
       25.  The applicants' complaint was directed against the Act  of
   30  August 1988 amending the Act of 3 November 1967 on the piloting
   of   sea-going  ships  (see  paragraphs  9  and  18  above).   They
   maintained that the Act in question breached Article 1 of  Protocol
   No. 1 (P1-1), which is worded as follows:
       "Every  natural  or legal person is entitled  to  the  peaceful
   enjoyment  of  his  possessions. No one shall be  deprived  of  his
   possessions  except  in  the public interest  and  subject  to  the
   conditions  provided  for by law and by the general  principles  of
   international law.
       The  preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair
   the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary  to
   control  the  use  of  property  in  accordance  with  the  general
   interest  or  to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions
   or penalties."
   
               A. The Government's preliminary objection
   
       26.  As  they  had done before the Commission,  the  Government
   contended  that  the application was inadmissible  for  failure  to
   exhaust  domestic  remedies. In their view, the  first  twenty-four
   applicants  ought to have raised the question of the  compatibility
   of  the contested Act with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1)  also
   in  the  ordinary courts. The application to have the Act  declared
   void  lodged  with the Court of Arbitration had not  rendered  such
   proceedings superfluous, because complaints based on the  violation
   of  provisions of international law taken separately  fell  outside
   the  jurisdiction  of  that  court (see  paragraph  19  above).  It
   followed  that the Court of Arbitration's judgment of 5  July  1990
   (see  paragraph  7  above) was not binding on the ordinary  courts,
   which  could therefore have refused to apply the 1988 Act  if  they
   had found it to be in breach of the Convention.
       Nor  could  the  twenty-fifth  and twenty-sixth  applicants  be
   regarded  as  having exhausted domestic remedies. The  twenty-fifth
   applicant  had  neglected to raise before the first-instance  court
   and   the   Court   of   Appeal  the  submission   based   on   the
   incompatibility of the 1988 Act with Article 1 of  Protocol  No.  1
   (P1-1), which had made it impossible for the Court of Cassation  to
   take  cognisance thereof. The twenty-sixth applicant had not  taken
   any legal proceedings to challenge the 1988 Act.
       27. The Court reiterates that under Article 26 (art. 26) of the
   Convention  the  only remedies required to be exhausted  are  those
   that  are effective and capable of redressing the alleged violation
   (see,  among  other authorities, the Keegan v. Ireland judgment  of
   26 May 1994, Series A no. 290, p. 17, para. 39).
       It  notes that, in the Court of Arbitration, the first  twenty-
   four  applicants  relied  in  substance,  with  reference  to   the
   (former)  Articles  6  and  6 bis of the Belgian  Constitution,  on
   arguments  that  were virtually identical to those  adduced  before
   the Convention institutions and expressly invoked the violation  of
   Article   11  (as  it  was  formerly,  now  Article  16)   of   the
   Constitution and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1). The  Court  of
   Arbitration  held that the protection afforded by those  provisions
   extended  only  to  property that had already  been  acquired  (see
   paragraph 7 above).
       In  the opinion of the European Court, all the applicants  were
   entitled  to consider on the basis of that reasoning that,  in  the
   Court  of  Arbitration's view, the facts of  which  twenty-four  of
   them  had  complained before that court fell outside the  scope  of
   Article  1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1). Regard being had to  the  rank
   and  authority  of the Court of Arbitration in the judicial  system
   of  the  Kingdom of Belgium, it could, in the light of that court's
   reasoning,  be  assumed  that  any  other  remedy  of   which   the
   applicants could have availed themselves would have been  bound  to
   fail (see, mutatis mutandis, the Hauschildt v. Denmark judgment  of
   24  May  1989,  Series A no. 154, p. 19, para.  41,  and  the  Holy
   Monasteries  v. Greece judgment of 9 December 1994,  Series  A  no.
   301-A, p. 29, para. 51).
       The objection must accordingly be dismissed.
   
                      B. Merits of the complaint
   
       28.  The  applicants  complained about  the  1988  Act  in  two
   respects.
       By  exempting  the organiser of a pilot service from  liability
   for  negligence on the part of its staff and limiting the liability
   of  the  latter,  it imposed on the applicants an excessive  burden
   which  upset  the fair balance between the demands of  the  general
   interest  and the requirements of the protection of their right  to
   the  peaceful enjoyment of their possessions. Thus it infringed the
   second  paragraph  of Article 1 of Protocol No.  1  (P1-1),  or  at
   least the first sentence of the first paragraph thereof (P1-1).
       In  addition  the retrospective effect of the Act deprived  the
   applicants  of  their claims for compensation  in  respect  of  the
   damage  sustained  and therefore infringed the second  sentence  of
   the first paragraph of that Article (P1-1).
   
                  1. Whether there was a "possession"
                within the meaning of Article 1 (P1-1)
   
       29. According to the Government, the applicants' alleged claims
   could  not  be  regarded  as "possessions" within  the  meaning  of
   Article  1  (P1-1). None of them had been recognised and determined
   by  a  judicial  decision having final effect.  Yet  that  was  the
   condition  for  a  claim to be certain, current,  enforceable  and,
   accordingly, protected by Article 1 (P1-1).
       Nor,  in  view  of  the  unexpected and  manifestly  disputable
   character of the approach adopted by the Court of Cassation in  its
   judgment  of 15 December 1983 (see paragraph 17 above),  could  the
   applicants  rely  on  a "legitimate expectation"  that  they  would
   obtain   compensation  from  the  State  (see   the   Pine   Valley
   Developments  Ltd  and Others v. Ireland judgment  of  29  November
   1991,  Series A no. 222, p. 23, para. 51). That would be to confuse
   the right of property with a right to property.
       The Commission accepted this argument in substance.
       30.  The applicants pointed out that under the ordinary Belgian
   law  of  tort  a claim for damages was in principle generated  when
   the  damage occurred, as the judicial decision merely confirmed its
   existence and determined the relevant amount.
       The   Government  replied  that  the  terms  "possession"   and
   "property"  within  the  meaning  of  Article  1  (P1-1)   had   an
   autonomous  meaning  that was not dependent on the  classifications
   applicable in the domestic law of the State in question.
       31. In order to determine whether in this instance there was  a
   "possession",  the  Court may have regard to the  domestic  law  in
   force  at the time of the alleged interference, as there is nothing
   to  suggest that that law ran counter to the object and purpose  of
   Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1).
       The rules in question are rules of tort, under which claims for
   compensation come into existence as soon as the damage occurs.
       A  claim  of  this nature "constituted an asset" and  therefore
   amounted  to "a possession within the meaning of the first sentence
   of   Article  1  (P1-1).  This  provision  (P1-1)  was  accordingly
   applicable  in  the present case" (see, mutatis mutandis,  the  Van
   Marle  and  Others  v. the Netherlands judgment of  26  June  1986,
   Series A no. 101, p. 13, para. 41).
       On  the basis of the judgments of the Court of Cassation  of  5
   November  1920, 15 December 1983 and 17 May 1985 (see paragraph  17
   above),  the  applicants could argue that they  had  a  "legitimate
   expectation"  that  their claims deriving  from  the  accidents  in
   question would be determined in accordance with the general law  of
   tort  (see, mutatis mutandis, the Pine Valley Developments Ltd  and
   Others judgment cited above, loc. cit.).
       32.  That  was  the  position with regard to the  accidents  in
   issue,  which all occurred before 17 September 1988,  the  date  of
   the  entry  into  force of the 1988 Act (see paragraphs  6  and  18
   above).
   
                 2. Whether there was an interference
   
       33.  According to the Court's case-law, Article 1 (P1-1), which
   guarantees  in  substance  the right of property,  comprises  three
   distinct  rules.  The  first,  which  is  expressed  in  the  first
   sentence of the first paragraph (P1-1) and is of a general  nature,
   lays  down  the  principle of peaceful enjoyment of  property.  The
   second  rule, in the second sentence of the same paragraph  (P1-1),
   covers  deprivation  of  possessions and  subjects  it  to  certain
   conditions.  The  third, contained in the second paragraph  (P1-1),
   recognises that the Contracting States are entitled, amongst  other
   things,  to  control  the use of property in  accordance  with  the
   general  interest. The second and third rules, which are  concerned
   with  particular  instances  of  interference  with  the  right  to
   peaceful  enjoyment of property, are to be construed in  the  light
   of  the  general principle laid down in the first rule (see,  among
   other  authorities, the Holy Monasteries judgment cited  above,  p.
   31, para. 56).
       34.  The  Court notes that the 1988 Act exempted the State  and
   other  organisers  of  pilot  services  from  their  liability  for
   negligent  acts  for  which  they could have  been  answerable.  It
   resulted  in  an interference with the exercise of rights  deriving
   from  claims for damages which could have been asserted in domestic
   law  up  to  that  point  and, accordingly,  with  the  right  that
   everyone,  including each of the applicants, has  to  the  peaceful
   enjoyment of his or her possessions (see paragraph 31 above).
       In  so  far  as  that Act concerns the accidents that  occurred
   before  17  September 1988, the only ones in issue in  the  present
   proceedings,  that  interference  amounted  to  a  deprivation   of
   property  within the meaning of the second sentence  of  the  first
   paragraph of Article 1 (P1-1).
   
               3. Whether the interference was justified
   
       35.  The Court must now consider whether that interference  was
   "in  the public interest" and whether it satisfied the requirements
   of proportionality.
       (a) "In the public interest"
       36.   In  order  to  justify  the  impugned  interference,  the
   Government   put  forward  three  different  "major  considerations
   linked  to  the general interest". These were the need  to  protect
   the  State's  financial interests, the need to  re-establish  legal
   certainty  in the field of tort and the need to bring the  relevant
   Belgian  legislation into line with that of neighbouring  countries
   and notably that of the Netherlands.
       37.  The  Court recalls that the national authorities  enjoy  a
   certain  margin  of appreciation in determining  what  is  "in  the
   public  interest", because under the Convention system  it  is  for
   them  to  make  the initial assessment both of the existence  of  a
   problem  of  public concern warranting measures of  deprivation  of
   property and of the remedial action to be taken.
       Furthermore,  the  notion of "public interest"  is  necessarily
   extensive.  In particular, the decision to enact laws expropriating
   property   will   commonly  involve  consideration  of   political,
   economic  and  social  issues  on which  opinion  in  a  democratic
   society  may  reasonably  differ  widely.  The  Court,  finding  it
   natural   that  the  margin  of  appreciation  available   to   the
   legislature in implementing social and economic policies should  be
   a  wide one, will respect the legislature's judgment as to what  is
   "in  the  public  interest"  unless  that  judgment  be  manifestly
   without  reasonable  foundation (see, mutatis mutandis,  the  James
   and  Others  v.  the United Kingdom judgment of 21  February  1986,
   Series A no. 98-B, p. 32, para. 46), which is clearly not the  case
   in this instance.
       (b) Proportionality of the interference
       38.  An interference with the peaceful enjoyment of possessions
   must  strike  a "fair balance" between the demands of  the  general
   interest  of  the community and the requirements of the  protection
   of  the  individual's fundamental rights. The  concern  to  achieve
   this  balance is reflected in the structure of Article 1 (P1-1)  as
   a  whole, including therefore the second sentence, which is  to  be
   read  in the light of the general principle enunciated in the first
   sentence (see paragraph 33 above). In particular, there must  be  a
   reasonable  relationship  of  proportionality  between  the   means
   employed  and  the  aim  sought  to  be  realised  by  any  measure
   depriving a person of his possessions.
       Compensation terms under the relevant legislation are  material
   to  the  assessment  whether  the contested  measure  respects  the
   requisite   fair  balance  and,  notably,  whether  it  imposes   a
   disproportionate burden on the applicants. In this connection,  the
   taking  of property without payment of an amount reasonably related
   to   its   value   will  normally  constitute  a   disproportionate
   interference  and  a total lack of compensation can  be  considered
   justifiable   under   Article   1  (P1-1)   only   in   exceptional
   circumstances  (see,  as  the  most  recent  authority,  the   Holy
   Monasteries judgment cited above, pp. 34 - 35, paras. 70 - 71).
       39. In the present case the 1988 Act quite simply extinguished,
   with  retrospective  effect going back  thirty  years  and  without
   compensation, claims for very high damages that the victims of  the
   pilot  accidents  could have pursued against the Belgian  State  or
   against the private companies concerned, and in some cases even  in
   proceedings that were already pending.
       40.  The  Government invoked the financial implications,  which
   were  both  enormous and unforeseeable, of the Court of Cassation's
   judgment  of 15 December 1983. During preparatory work on the  1988
   Act,  the financial impact of the actions then pending against  the
   Belgian  State  had been assessed at 3.5 thousand  million  Belgian
   francs.  The  legislature had been entitled to protect  the  public
   purse  from  this expense, because it stemmed from  a  construction
   placed  on  the  relevant provisions that  was  so  disputable  and
   unforeseeable  that  the  applicants  could  not  reasonably   have
   believed that it would be endorsed by the legislature. Indeed  this
   had  been  confirmed in substance by the Court of Arbitration  (see
   paragraph 7 above).
       The  Government also stressed that it had been necessary to put
   an  end  to the "lack of legal certainty" generated by the judgment
   of  15  December 1983. In their view, the legislature in  1988  had
   had  to reaffirm a principle that had been recognised under Belgian
   law  for nearly one hundred and fifty years and had been overturned
   by  a  questionable  interpretation on the part  of  the  Court  of
   Cassation.
       Finally  the  Government contended that the 1988 Act  was  also
   intended  to bring the Belgian legislation into line with  that  of
   neighbouring countries.
       41.  The  applicants observed in the first place that the  1988
   Act  benefited  not only the Belgian State, but  also  the  private
   pilot  company that was involved in several disputes (see paragraph
   6  above). They then submitted that the financial reasons cited  by
   the  Government could not justify such a massive violation of their
   fundamental  rights, in particular in view of the  fact  that,  far
   from  being unforeseeable, the Court of Cassation's judgment of  15
   December  1983  was  entirely consistent  with  its  "La  Flandria"
   judgment of 1920 (see paragraph 17 above). The State had had  ample
   time  to take measures in conformity with the Convention so  as  to
   anticipate  a  ruling that merely developed a  particular  line  of
   case-law,  which had been initiated much earlier.  Instead  it  had
   not  only  annulled  retrospectively claims that  were  already  in
   existence,  but it had waited until 1988 before doing  so,  thereby
   aggravating  the frustration of the applicants' expectations,  many
   of  whom  had  delayed instituting proceedings  against  the  State
   until 1986 or later.
       42.   The  Court  recalls  that  the  Court  of  Cassation  had
   recognised  in its "La Flandria" judgment of 5 November  1920  that
   the  State  and  the other public-law bodies were  subject  to  the
   general law of tort (see paragraph 17 above).
       Since  then  the  Court  of Cassation had  admittedly  not  had
   occasion   to   hear  cases  relating  to  the  State's   liability
   concerning  pilot services, but it was certainly not  unforeseeable
   that   it  would  apply  to  this  type  of  case,  at  the   first
   opportunity,  the principles that it had defined in  general  terms
   in  the  judgment of 1920. This was especially true in view of  the
   fact  that  a  reading of the 1967 Act in the light of the  Conseil
   d'Etat's  opinion could reasonably support the conclusion that  the
   Act did not depart from the general law of tort (see paragraphs  11
   - 13 above).
       The 1983 judgment did not therefore undermine legal certainty.
       43.  The  financial considerations cited by the Government  and
   their  concern  to  bring Belgian law into line  with  the  law  of
   neighbouring  countries  could warrant prospective  legislation  in
   this area to derogate from the general law of tort.
       Such   considerations  could  not  justify   legislating   with
   retrospective effect with the aim and consequence of depriving  the
   applicants of their claims for compensation.
       Such a fundamental interference with the applicants' rights  is
   inconsistent  with preserving a fair balance between the  interests
   at stake.
       44.  It follows that in so far as the 1988 Act concerned events
   prior  to  17 September 1988, the date of its publication  and  its
   entry into force, it breached Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1).
   
              III. Alleged violation of Article 6 para. 1
                     (art. 6-1) of the Convention
   
       45. The applicants also complained of a violation of Article  6
   para. 1 (art. 6-1) of the Convention.
       46.  The  Court  notes that their complaints  in  this  respect
   overlap  with  those that they raised under Article 1  of  Protocol
   No.  1  (P1-1).  Having regard to its conclusion  in  paragraph  44
   above,   it  does  not  consider  it  necessary  to  examine   them
   separately under Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1).
   
                IV. Application of Article 50 (art. 50)
                           of the Convention
   
       47. Under Article 50 (art. 50) of the Convention,
       "If  the  Court finds that a decision or a measure taken  by  a
   legal  authority or any other authority of a High Contracting Party
   is  completely  or  partially  in  conflict  with  the  obligations
   arising  from the ... Convention, and if the internal  law  of  the
   said  Party  allows  only partial reparation to  be  made  for  the
   consequences  of  this decision or measure,  the  decision  of  the
   Court  shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured
   party."
   
                          A. Pecuniary damage
   
       48.  The applicants claimed full reparation for the accumulated
   pecuniary  damage,  estimated  at BEF 1,598,367,385  (one  thousand
   five  hundred  and ninety-eight million, three hundred  and  sixty-
   seven  thousand,  three  hundred and  eighty-five).  However,  they
   requested  the  Court to reserve this question in order  to  enable
   them  to  examine, if need be in concert with the  Government,  the
   possibilities for obtaining compensation under domestic law.
       49. The Government indicated their agreement on that last point
   and  stated their opinion that it was in the first instance for the
   Belgian  courts to establish the damage sustained and liability  in
   each of the disputes concerned.
       50.  The  Delegate of the Commission did not express a view  on
   this matter.
       51.  In the circumstances of the case, the Court finds that the
   question  is not ready for decision. It is indeed for the  national
   courts  to  determine the beneficiaries and amounts of the  damages
   claims  generated by the accidents that lay at the  origin  of  the
   case  (see  paragraph  6  above). It is  accordingly  necessary  to
   reserve the matter of pecuniary damage, account being taken of  the
   possibility  of  an agreement being reached between the  respondent
   State  and the applicants (see Rule 54 paras. 1 and 4 of  Rules  of
   Court A).
   
                         B. Costs and expenses
   
       52. The applicants also sought the sum of BEF 51,380,253 (fifty-
   one  million,  three hundred and eighty thousand, two  hundred  and
   fifty-three) in respect of the costs and expenses incurred  in  the
   proceedings  in  the  national courts  and  before  the  Convention
   institutions.
       53.  According to the Government, the proceedings in the first-
   instance  courts  did not concern directly the Convention  so  that
   the  relevant  costs could not be claimed under  Article  50  (art.
   50). As regards those incurred in the Court of Arbitration and  the
   Court  of  Cassation  and at Strasbourg, they  related  to  matters
   which,  in the Government's opinion, proved to be identical,  apart
   from  some minor points. The applicants were therefore not entitled
   to claim more than BEF 2,000,000 under this head.
       54. The Delegate of the Commission did not express a view.
       55.  The  Court notes that until 17 September 1988  the  rights
   guaranteed  under the Convention were not in issue  in  the  first-
   instance and appeal courts, and that, of the BEF 38,017,101  sought
   under  this  head, more than 22 million were claimed in respect  of
   the services of the firm of damage assessors, Langlois & Co.
       As  to  the BEF 13,363,152 claimed for the proceedings  in  the
   Court  of  Arbitration and the Court of Cassation  and  before  the
   Convention  institutions, the Court observes  that  more  than  9.5
   million  were sought in respect of costs and expenses for  Langlois
   &  Co. Making an assessment on an equitable basis, the Court awards
   BEF 8,000,000 for costs and expenses.
   
                     FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT
   
       1.  Severs  unanimously the sixth applicant's  complaints  from
   those  of  the other applicants and decides to strike them  out  of
   the list;
       2.   Dismisses   unanimously   the   Government's   preliminary
   objection;
       3.  Holds by eight votes to one that there has been a violation
   of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1);
       4.  Holds  by  eight votes to one that it is not  necessary  to
   examine  the  case also under Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1)  of  the
   Convention;
       5. Holds unanimously that the respondent State is to pay to the
   applicants, within three months, 8,000,000 (eight million)  Belgian
   francs in respect of costs and expenses;
       6.  Holds  unanimously that the question of the application  of
   Article 50 (art. 50) of the Convention as regards pecuniary  damage
   is not ready for decision; and
       consequently,
       (a) reserves the said question;
       (b) invites the Government and the applicants to submit, within
   the  forthcoming  six  months, their written  observations  on  the
   matter  and,  in particular, to notify the Court of  any  agreement
   they may reach;
       (c)  reserves  the  further  procedure  and  delegates  to  the
   President the power to fix the same if need be.
   
       Done  in  English  and  in French, and delivered  at  a  public
   hearing  in  the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 20  November
   1995.
   
                                                  Signed: Rolv RYSSDAL
                                                             President
   
                                               Signed: Herbert PETZOLD
                                                             Registrar
   
   
   
   
   
   
       In  accordance  with  Article 51 para. 2  (art.  51-2)  of  the
   Convention  and Rule 53 para. 2 of Rules of Court A, the  following
   separate opinions are annexed to this judgment:
       (a) dissenting opinion of Mr {Thor Vilhjalmsson};
       (b) separate opinion of Mr De Meyer.
   
                                                     Initialled: R. R.
   
                                                     Initialled: H. P.
   
            DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE {THOR VILHJALMSSON}
   
       I voted for a non-violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-
   1)  to the Convention. I agree with the majority of the Court  that
   the  claims presented by the applicants were possessions within the
   meaning  of  this provision (P1-1). On the other hand,  I  disagree
   with the conclusion drawn from applying the proportionality test.
       In my view, it is significant that maritime law - and its rules
   on   damages  -  is  a  branch  of  law  in  which  many   specific
   considerations  apply. Very high sums of money are  often  involved
   in  disputes in this field and insurance cover plays a major  role.
   Shipowners  are  also  protected by  rules  on  limited  liability.
   Generally  speaking  there  is nothing  unusual  or  oppressive  in
   promulgating  legal  rules according to  which  the  liability  for
   negligent  piloting, even if it is provided or  authorised  by  the
   State, is imposed on the shipowners. Therefore the only problem  in
   this  case  concerning Article 1 of Protocol No. 1  (P1-1)  is  the
   retroactivity clause in the 1988 Act.
       It seems that the Court of Cassation did not give any judgments
   on  the  liability of pilots from 1896 to 1983. The  "La  Flandria"
   judgment, delivered in 1920, concerned the general rules  on  State
   liability under the law of tort. It has not been shown that at  the
   time  of those of the accidents in this case that took place before
   1983,  the  shipowners could rely on a legal  rule  in  Belgium  on
   State  liability for the actions of pilots. Between 1983  and  1988
   the  situation  was  not the same. Nevertheless,  it  needs  to  be
   demonstrated  that  this led to changes in  insurance  clauses  and
   thereby  deprived the shipowners of the possibility  of  suing  the
   insurance  companies. This has not been done. The rules promulgated
   in   1988  did  not,  moreover,  deprive  the  shipowners  of   all
   possibility  of  having their losses covered by others  because  in
   many  cases  they could rely on the liability of other  shipowners.
   It  is  accordingly not clear in what way serious burdens  were  in
   fact  imposed  on  the applicants as a result of the  accidents  in
   respect of which they claim, less still that any such burdens  were
   individual  and excessive. To this it may be added, in my  opinion,
   that  a  general ban on retroactivity of measures in the  field  of
   civil  law cannot be read into our Convention. The exact limits  of
   the  guarantees set out in Article 1 of Protocol No. 1  (P1-1)  are
   difficult  to  draw  and  the  claims  in  the  possession  of  the
   applicants  had not been finally determined. In these circumstances
   I   find  the  Government's  arguments,  which  are  summarised  in
   paragraph   40   of   the   judgment,  relevant   and   convincing.
   Accordingly,  I  do  not  find  that the  fact  that  the  national
   legislature  enacted rules with retroactive effect  such  as  those
   promulgated  in  Belgium  in  1988, amounts,  on  the  basis  of  a
   proportionality test, to a violation.
       For  these reasons I find no violation of Article 1 of Protocol
   No. 1 (P1-1).
   
                  SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE DE MEYER
   
                             (Translation)
   
       In my view, the reasons which led the Court to find a violation
   of  the  applicants'  right  to  the peaceful  enjoyment  of  their
   possessions apply equally to their right to a fair trial.
       The  retrospective effect of the 1988 Act had, as is stated  in
   the  judgment, the aim and consequence of depriving the  applicants
   of  their claims for compensation <1>. But it was also intended  to
   thwart  legal  actions that had already been  brought  against  the
   State  or against another organiser of pilot services <2>, and  any
   other  claim of the same type concerning events that occurred prior
   to the entry into force of the new legislation <3>.
   --------------------------------
       <1> Paragraph 43 of the judgment.
       <2>  This was the case of all the applicants except the twelfth
   (see paragraph 6 of the judgment).
       <3>  This was the case of the twelfth applicant and, as regards
   Brabo, the fifth (see the same paragraph).
   
       I therefore consider that there has been a violation of Article
   6  (art.  6) of the Convention quite as much as there has  been  of
   Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1).
   
   

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