[неофициальный перевод]
ЕВРОПЕЙСКИЙ СУД ПО ПРАВАМ ЧЕЛОВЕКА
СУДЕБНОЕ РЕШЕНИЕ
УИНГРОУ (WINGROVE) ПРОТИВ СОЕДИНЕННОГО КОРОЛЕВСТВА
(Страсбург, 25 ноября 1996 года)
(Извлечение)
КРАТКОЕ НЕОФИЦИАЛЬНОЕ ИЗЛОЖЕНИЕ ОБСТОЯТЕЛЬСТВ ДЕЛА
A. Основные факты
Заявитель, Найджел Уингроу 1957 г. рождения, житель Лондона,
написал сценарий и руководил созданием восемнадцатиминутного
видеофильма под названием "Видения экстаза" о жизни и
произведениях Святой Терезы Авильской, кармелитской монахини,
жившей в XVI в., которую посещали сильные экстатические видения
Иисуса Христа.
Он представил видеокассету в Британское управление
классификации фильмов для получения сертификата, который позволил
бы фильм продавать, сдавать в прокат или демонстрировать его иным
способом. 18 сентября 1989 г. управление отклонило заявку на том
основании inter alia, что данное произведение своим неприемлемым
обращением с темой святости вызовет негодование верующих и что суд
присяжных, будучи должным образом сориентирован, усмотрел бы в нем
нарушение уголовного закона, запрещающего богохульство.
Заявитель подал жалобу в надзорный Комитет по спорам в сфере
видеопродукции, оспаривая мнение управления, что его видеофильм
был чисто эротическим по своему содержанию.
6 и 7 декабря 1989 г. жалоба была рассмотрена присутствием из
пяти членов Комитета. Большинством в три голоса против двух
присутствие поддержало решение управления. Большинство посчитало,
что общая тональность и дух видеофильма непристойны, и почти не
сомневалось, что при показе фильм мог бы оскорбить чувства
верующих, которые обоснованно увидят в нем неуважение к
божественности Христа. Меньшинство, соглашаясь с тем, что многие
найдут фильм в высшей степени неприятным, тем не менее сочло
маловероятным, чтобы суд присяжных, будучи должным образом
сориентирован, вынес обвинительный приговор.
Заявителю при вынесении решения было разъяснено, что судебное
обжалование его дела бесперспективно в свете действующего
законодательства.
B. Разбирательство в Комиссии по правам человека
В жалобе в Комиссию, поданной 18 июня 1990 г., заявитель
утверждал, что была нарушена статья 10 Конвенции. Жалоба была
признана приемлемой 8 марта 1994 г. В своем докладе от 10 января
1995 г. Комиссия установила фактические обстоятельства дела и
выразила мнение, что нарушение статьи 10 имело место
(четырнадцатью голосами против двух).
ИЗВЛЕЧЕНИЕ ИЗ СУДЕБНОГО РЕШЕНИЯ
ВОПРОСЫ ПРАВА
I. О предполагаемом нарушении статьи 10 Конвенции
35. Заявитель утверждал, что было нарушено его право на свободу
слова, гарантированное статьей 10 Конвенции, которая гласит:
"1. Каждый человек имеет право на свободу выражать свое мнение.
Это право включает свободу придерживаться своего мнения и свободу
получать и распространять информацию и идеи без какого-либо
вмешательства со стороны государственных органов и независимо от
государственных границ...
2. Осуществление этих свобод, налагающее обязанности и
ответственность, может быть сопряжено с формальностями, условиями,
ограничениями или санкциями, которые установлены законом и которые
необходимы в демократическом обществе в интересах государственной
безопасности, территориальной целостности или общественного
спокойствия, в целях предотвращения беспорядков и преступлений,
для охраны здоровья и нравственности, защиты репутации или прав
других лиц, предотвращения разглашения информации, полученной
конфиденциально, или обеспечения авторитета и беспристрастности
правосудия".
36. Отказ Британского управления классификации фильмов выдать
сертификат на видеопроизведение заявителя "Видения экстаза" в
сочетании с законодательными нормами, согласно которым
распространение видеопроизведения без такого сертификата является
уголовным преступлением (см. п. 23 выше), равносилен вмешательству
со стороны государственного органа в осуществление заявителем
своего права на распространение идей. С этим согласны все
участники разбирательства.
Чтобы определить, влечет ли такое вмешательство нарушение
Конвенции, Суд должен установить, обоснованно оно или нет в свете
статьи 10 п. 2, было ли оно "предусмотрено законом", преследовало
ли "правомерную цель" и было ли оно "необходимым в демократическом
обществе".
A. Было ли вмешательство "предусмотрено законом"?
37. Заявитель считал, что нормы права, запрещающие
богохульство, сформулированы настолько неопределенно, что
необычайно трудно заранее определить, будет ли конкретная
публикация или показ правонарушением в глазах суда присяжных.
Более того, практически невозможно заранее предсказать, что решит
административный орган - Британское управление классификации
фильмов - в свете возможного исхода гипотетического судебного
преследования. В таких обстоятельствах нельзя ожидать, что и
заявитель мог предвидеть возможные результаты. Таким образом,
требование предсказуемости, которое следует из выражения
"предусмотрено законом", выполнено не было.
38. Правительство оспорило это утверждение: общей чертой
большинства правовых систем является то, что суды приходят к
различным выводам даже при применении к одинаковым обстоятельствам
одной и той же нормы. Тем не менее решение правового вопроса не
становится от этого недостижимым или непредсказуемым. С учетом
бесконечного разнообразия способов выпуска в свет "уничижительных,
бранных, грубых или нелепых материалов, касающихся господа Бога,
Иисуса Христа или Библии", право не должно стремиться детально
определить, что потенциально может прозвучать как богохульство.
39. Комиссия, отметив, что заявитель имел достаточные
возможности получить юридическую консультацию, придерживалась той
точки зрения, что он мог без особых усилий предвидеть те
ограничения, которым подвергнется его видеопроизведение.
40. Суд напомнил, что его установившаяся практика исходит из
того, что национальная "правовая норма", будь то статутное или
прецедентное право (см. inter alia Решение "Санди таймс" против
Соединенного Королевства от 26 апреля 1979 г. Серия А, т. 30, с.
30, п. 47), должна быть сформулирована с достаточной степенью
четкости, чтобы заинтересованные лица могли, получив при
необходимости юридическую консультацию по делу, предвидеть в
разумных пределах те последствия, которые способны повлечь их
действия. Закон, предоставляя широкую свободу оценки, не вступает
в противоречие с этим требованием, при условии, что пределы
усмотрения, предопределенные правомерной целью, ради которой он
издан, указаны достаточно ясно, с тем чтобы обеспечить адекватную
защиту индивида от произвольного вмешательства (см., например,
Решение по делу Толстой-Милославский против Соединенного
Королевства от 13 июля 1995 г. Серия А т. 316-B, с. 71 - 72, п.
37).
41. Суд считает, что, отказав в выдаче сертификата на
распространение видеофильма заявителя на том основании, что он
нарушал норму уголовного права, запрещающую богохульство,
Британское управление классификации фильмов действовало в рамках
своих полномочий на основании статьи 4 (1) Закона 1984 г. (см. п.
24 выше).
42. Суд признает, что такое преступление, как богохульство, в
силу своей природы не поддается точному юридическому определению.
Поэтому национальным властям должна быть предоставлена возможность
проявления гибкости при оценке того, укладываются ли
обстоятельства конкретного дела в рамки принятого определения
данного преступления (см. mutatis mutandis упомянутое в п. 40
Решение по делу Толстого-Милославского, с. 73, п. 41).
43. По-видимому, у участников разбирательства нет сомнений или
разногласий по поводу определения преступления богохульства в
английском праве, как оно сформулировано Палатой лордов в деле
Уайтхаус против "Гей ньюс лтд. энд Лемон" (см. п. 27 выше).
Ознакомившись с содержанием видеопроизведения, Суд удостоверился,
что заявитель легко мог предвидеть, получив надлежащую юридическую
консультацию, что фильм, в особенности сцены, включающие действия
с распятой фигурой Христа, мог подпасть под действие норм о
богохульстве.
Приведенный выше вывод подкрепляет решение заявителя не
обращаться в суд после того, как его адвокат разъяснил ему, что
данная присутствием Комитета по спорам правовая формула
богохульства представляла собой точное изложение действующего
права (см. mutatis mutandis Решение по делу "Открытая дверь" и
"Дублинские повитухи" против Ирландии от 29 октября 1992 г. Серия
А, т. 246, с. 27, п. 60).
44. В этих обстоятельствах нельзя сказать, что правовые нормы,
о которых идет речь, не предоставляют заявителю адекватной защиты
от произвольного вмешательства. Поэтому Суд приходит к выводу, что
оспариваемое ограничение было "предусмотрено законом".
B. Преследовало ли вмешательство правомерную цель?
45. Заявитель оспаривал утверждение Правительства, что его
видеопроизведению было отказано в выдаче сертификата для
распространения, чтобы "защитить право граждан не подвергаться
оскорблениям в своих религиозных чувствах". По его мнению, понятие
"права других лиц" в этом контексте неприменимо, ибо это право
охватывает только то, что может прямо и непосредственно оскорбить
других лиц. Оно не включает в себя гипотетическое право некоторых
верующих испытывать беспокойство от перспективы, что другие люди,
увидевшие данное видеопроизведение, будут им шокированы.
В любом случае, утверждал далее заявитель, ограничение на
распространение фильма не могло преследовать правомерной цели,
т.к. оно основывалось на дискриминационном Законе,
ограничивавшемся защитой христиан, в особенности исповедующих
англиканскую веру.
46. Правительство ссылалось на дело Институт Отто-Премингер
против Австрии (Решение от 20 сентября 1994 г. Серия А, т. 295, с.
17 - 18, п. п. 47 - 48), где Суд согласился с тем, что уважение
религиозных чувств верующих может законно побудить государство
ограничить публичный показ провокационных изображений предметов
религиозного поклонения.
47. Комиссия сочла, что нормы английского права о богохульстве
стремятся исключить такую трактовку объектов религиозного
поклонения, которая способна вызвать справедливое негодование
среди верующих христиан. Отсюда следует, что применение этих норм
к настоящему случаю было направлено на защиту права граждан не
подвергаться оскорблениям в своих религиозных чувствах.
48. Суд считает, что цель вмешательства состояла в том, чтобы
оградить религиозную тему от такой трактовки, "которая при помощи
уничижительного, бранного, оскорбительного, грубого и нелепого
тона, стиля и духа способна оскорбить тех, кто верует и
поддерживает предания и этику христианства" (см. п. 15 выше).
Такая цель, несомненно, соответствует защите "прав других лиц"
в смысле статьи 10 п. 2. Эта статья полностью созвучна статье 9,
гарантирующей религиозную свободу.
49. Была ли реальная необходимость защитить публику от риска,
связанного с показом фильма, это другой вопрос, который будет
рассмотрен ниже при оценке "необходимости" вмешательства.
50. Верно, что нормы английского права о богохульстве
распространяются только на христианскую веру. Аномалия подобного
положения дел в многоконфессиональном обществе была признана
отделением Высокого Суда в деле R. против Главного судьи, третья
сторона Чоудхари (vol. 1 All England Law Reports 206, p. 317) (см.
п. 28 выше). Однако Европейский Суд не может высказываться in
abstracto о совместимости внутреннего права с Конвенцией. Степень
защиты других религий английским правом не является вопросом,
поставленным перед Судом, который должен сосредоточить свое
внимание на данном деле (см. Решение по делу Класс и другие против
Федеративной Республики Германии от 6 сентября 1978 г. Серия А, т.
28, с. 18, п. 33).
Тот бесспорный факт, что правовые нормы о богохульстве не
регламентируют равным образом различные религии, исповедуемые в
Соединенном Королевстве, не умаляет легитимности цели,
преследуемой в имеющихся обстоятельствах.
51. Следовательно, отказ выдать сертификат на распространение
фильма "Видения экстаза" был обусловлен целью, являвшейся на
основании статьи 10 п. 2 правомерной.
C. Было ли вмешательство
"необходимым в демократическом обществе"?
52. Суд напоминает, что свобода слова является одной из
основных опор демократического общества. Однако, как специально
указывается в статье 10 п. 2, осуществление этой свободы налагает
обязанности и ответственность. В их число в контексте религиозных
убеждений может быть легитимно включена и обязанность избегать, по
мере возможности, того, что представляется другим необоснованно
оскорбительным и даже оскверняющим религиозные ценности (см.
упомянутое в п. 46 Решение по делу Института Отто-Премингер, с. 18
- 19, п. п. 47, 49).
53. Любое ограничение на свободу слова, будь то в контексте
религиозных убеждений или в каком-либо другом, будет несовместимо
со статьей 10, если оно не обусловлено inter alia необходимостью,
как того требует п. 2 данной статьи. Рассматривая вопрос, можно ли
считать ограничения прав и свобод, гарантированных Конвенцией,
"необходимыми в демократическом обществе", Суд, однако,
последовательно указывал, что государства - участники пользуются
определенным, но не неограниченным усмотрением при оценке их
целесообразности. В любом случае именно Европейскому Суду
предстоит принять окончательное решение о совместимости таких
ограничений с Конвенцией, и он выносит его, оценивая,
применительно к обстоятельствам конкретного дела, соответствовало
ли inter alia данное вмешательство "неотложной общественной
потребности" и было ли оно "соразмерно преследуемой законной
цели".
54. По мнению заявителя, не было "неотложной общественной
потребности" запрещать видеопроизведение на основании
сомнительного предположения, что оно могло бы нарушить правовые
нормы о богохульстве; в действительности преобладала общественная
потребность позволить его распространение. Более того, поскольку
адекватная защита уже предусмотрена целым арсеналом норм, законы о
богохульстве, несовместимые с европейским представлением о свободе
слова, практически являются излишними. Во всяком случае запрещать
демонстрацию видеофильма, который не содержит непристойностей,
порнографии и не выставляет Христа в ненадлежащем виде, было
несоразмерно с преследуемой законом целью.
55. Для Комиссии то обстоятельство, что "Видения экстаза"
являются короткометражным видеопроизведением, а не художественным
фильмом, означает, что его распространение носило бы более
ограниченный характер и, очевидно, не привлекло бы к нему
внимания. Комиссия пришла к тому же выводу, что и заявитель.
56. Правительство утверждало, что видеопроизведение заявителя
было недвусмысленно провокационным и непристойным изображением
объекта религиозного поклонения, что его распространение было бы в
достаточной степени публичным и широко распространенным, что оно
было бы равносильно оскорбительным и агрессивным нападкам на
религиозные убеждения христиан. При таких обстоятельствах,
отказываясь выдать классификационный сертификат на
видеопроизведение заявителя, национальные власти действовали в
рамках отведенной им сферы усмотрения.
57. Суд отмечает, что отказ выдать "Видениям экстаза"
сертификат на распространение был направлен на защиту "прав других
лиц", а конкретнее, предоставлял защиту от оскорбительных нападок
на вещи, святые в глазах христиан (см. п. 48 выше). Законы, на
которые ссылался заявитель (см. п. 54 выше) и которые преследуют
близкие, но отличные цели, не могут иметь значения в данном
контексте.
Как показывают полученные Судом материалы от amici curiae (см.
п. 5 выше), законы о богохульстве действуют в разных странах
Европы. Правда, применение этих законов становится все большей
редкостью, а несколько государств недавно вовсе отменили их. В
Соединенном Королевстве за последние семьдесят лет было возбуждено
только два судебных преследования, связанных с богохульством (см.
п. 27 выше). В пользу отмены законов о богохульстве были выдвинуты
веские аргументы, например, что такие законы могут
дискриминировать различные религии или вероучения или что правовые
механизмы неадекватны тонкой материи веры или индивидуальных
убеждений. Однако остается фактом, что пока еще нет достаточной
общей основы в правовом и социальном устройстве государств -
членов Совета Европы, чтобы сделать вывод, что система,
позволяющая государству устанавливать ограничения на
распространение тех или иных материалов на том основании, что они
представляют собой богохульство, не является сама по себе
необходимой в демократическом обществе, а следовательно,
несовместима с Конвенцией (см. mutatis mutandis упомянутое в п. 46
Решения по делу Института Отто-Премингер, с. 19, п. 49).
58. Бесспорно, что статья 10 п. 2 почти не дает возможностей
для ограничения свободы слова в сфере политических дискуссий или
обсуждения вопросов, имеющих общественный интерес (см. mutatis
mutandis среди других источников Решение по делу Лингенс против
Австрии от 8 июля 1986 г. Серия А, т. 103, с. 26, п. 42; Решение
по делу Кастеллс против Испании от 23 апреля 1992 г. Серия А, т.
236, с. 23, п. 43; и Решение по делу Торгеир Торгеирсон против
Исландии от 25 июня 1992 г. Серия А, т. 239, с. 27, п. 63).
Значительно более широкая возможность усмотрения обычно
предоставляется Договаривающимся государствам при регулировании
свободы слова, когда затрагивается личная сфера, а равно сфера
морали и особенно религии. В сфере морали и, возможно, еще даже в
большей степени в сфере религиозных убеждений не существует
общепринятой европейской концепции требований, призванных
обеспечить "защиту прав других лиц" в случае нападок на их
религиозные убеждения. То, что может всерьез оскорбить людей
определенных религиозных представлений, существенно меняется в
зависимости от места и времени, особенно в эпоху, характеризуемую
постоянно растущим числом религий и вероисповеданий. Благодаря
прямым и непрерывным контактам с общественной жизнью своих стран
государственные власти в принципе находятся в лучшем положении,
чем международный судья, в определении требований, необходимых для
защиты глубинных чувств и убеждений от оскорбительных высказываний
(см. mutatis mutandis Решение по делу Мюллер и другие против
Швейцарии от 24 мая 1988 г. Серия А, т. 133, с. 22, п. 35).
Конечно, это не исключает в конечном счете европейского
контроля, который тем более необходим, поскольку понятие
богохульства широко и изменчиво, и всегда существует риск
произвольного или чрезмерного вмешательства в осуществление
свободы слова под прикрытием действий, направленных якобы против
богохульства. В этой связи особенно важен строгий подход к
богохульству как к правонарушению, преследуемому в рамках правовых
гарантий свободы слова. Кроме того, в настоящем деле речь идет об
ограничении свободы слова в предварительном порядке, что требует
особого внимания к нему со стороны Суда (см. mutatis mutandis
Решение по делу "Обсервер" и "Гардиан" против Соединенного
Королевства от 26 ноября 1991 г. Серия А, т. 216, с. 30, п. 60).
59. Задача Суда - установить, соответствуют ли мотивы
вмешательства национальных органов власти в осуществление свободы
слова заявителем целям статьи 10 п. 2 Конвенции.
60. Суд отмечает, что английское право нормами о богохульстве
не запрещает выражения в какой-либо форме взглядов, враждебных
христианской религии. Поэтому нельзя сказать, что взгляды, которые
христианам представляются оскорбительными, обязательно попадают в
сферу его действия. Степень оскорбления религиозных чувств должна
быть значительна, как то следует из используемых судами
прилагательных "уничижительный", "поносный", "грубый", "нелепый"
применительно к материалам, являющимся в достаточной мере
агрессивными.
Высокая степень надругательства сама по себе представляет
гарантию от произвольных решений. На этом фоне и следует
рассматривать утверждения национальных властей об оправданности
принятых мер в соответствии со статьей 10 п. 2.
61. "Видения экстаза" изображают inter alia женский персонаж,
сидящий верхом на распростертом теле распятого Христа, как бы
совершая акт откровенно сексуального характера (см. п. 9 выше).
Национальные власти, используя полномочия, которые сами по себе не
являются несовместимыми с Конвенцией (см. п. 57 выше), посчитали,
что эта сцена преподана так, что "не столько подчеркивает
эротические переживания персонажей, сколько стремится вызвать
таковые у зрителей фильма, что и является основной функцией
порнографии" (см. п. 15 выше). Власти подчеркнули, что в фильме не
было сделано никаких попыток раскрыть характер персонажей; его
цель - "эротическое любование". Публичное распространение
подобного видеофильма могло бы ранить и оскорбить чувства верующих
христиан, что отвечает признакам уголовного преступления
богохульства. К этой точке зрения пришли в ходе двух этапов
разбирательства как Управление по классификации фильмов, так и
Комитет по спорам после внимательного рассмотрения представленных
заявителем доводов в защиту его произведения. Более того, у
заявителя была возможность оспорить решение Комитета по спорам в
порядке судебного контроля (см. п. 30 выше).
С учетом гарантии в виде высокого порога, который необходим,
чтобы деяние подпало под признаки преступления богохульства по
английскому праву, а также пределов усмотрения, которым пользуется
государство в данной области (см. п. 58 выше), доводы, приведенные
в обоснование принятых мер, можно рассматривать как относящиеся к
делу и достаточные для целей статьи 10 п. 2. Более того, посмотрев
фильм, Суд удостоверился, что решения национальных властей нельзя
счесть произвольными или чрезмерными.
62. Как заявитель, так и представитель Комиссии отмечали, что
короткометражное видеопроизведение охватит меньшую аудиторию, чем
полноценный художественный фильм, подобный тому, о котором шел
спор по делу Институт Отто-Премингер против Австрии (см. п. 46
выше). Риск того, что любой христианин может невольно увидеть
такой фильм, поэтому значительно уменьшался, а следовательно,
уменьшалась и необходимость налагать ограничение на его
распространение. Более того, этот риск можно было сделать еще
меньше, ограничив распространение фильма имеющими соответствующую
лицензию секс-магазинами (см. п. 23 выше). Поскольку фильм
распространялся бы на видеокассетах, имеющих описание его
содержания, то с ним бы сталкивались исключительно взрослые лица и
по своей собственной воле.
63. Суд отмечает, однако, что в силу своей природы, раз
появившись на рынке, видеопроизведения могут копироваться,
сдаваться в прокат, продаваться и просматриваться в домашних
условиях, тем самым легко ускользая от контроля властей.
В этих обстоятельствах для властей отнюдь не было неразумным
предположить, что, принимая во внимание развитие видеоиндустрии в
Соединенном Королевстве (см. п. 22 выше), фильм мог бы попасть к
тем, кого бы он оскорбил. Надпись на кассете, предупреждающая о
содержании фильма (см. п. 62 выше), лишь смягчила бы последствия,
учитывая многообразные формы распространения видеопроизведений, о
которых упоминалось выше. В любом случае, национальные власти и
здесь находятся в лучшем положении, чем Европейский Суд, чтобы
давать оценку вероятного воздействия подобного видеофильма и
трудности предохранить от знакомства с ним широкую публику.
64. Верно, что принятые властями меры равносильны полному
запрету на распространение фильма. Однако это было вполне
объяснимым следствием позиции компетентных властей, согласно
которой распространение фильма привело бы к нарушению уголовного
права. Заявитель отказался исправить или вырезать вызывавшие
возражение кадры (см. п. 13 выше). Придя к выводу, что в таком
виде содержание фильма было богохульным, власти не преступили
пределов своего усмотрения.
ПО ЭТИМ ОСНОВАНИЯМ СУД
Постановил семью голосами против двух, что нарушение статьи 10
Конвенции не имело места.
Совершено на английском и французском языках и оглашено во
Дворце прав человека в Страсбурге 25 февраля 1997 г.
Председатель
Рудольф БЕРНХАРДТ
Грефье
Герберт ПЕТЦОЛЬД
В соответствии со статьей 51 п. 2 Конвенции и статьей 53 п. 2
Регламента Суда А к настоящему Решению прилагаются отдельные
мнения судей.
СОВПАДАЮЩЕЕ МНЕНИЕ СУДЬИ БЕРНХАРДТА
Лично я не убежден, что видеофильм "Видения экстаза" следовало
запрещать путем отказа в выдаче регистрационного сертификата, и
это убеждение основывается inter alia не только на моих
впечатлениях после просмотра фильма. Суть сферы национального
усмотрения состоит в том, что, когда возможны и существуют
различные мнения, международный судья должен вмешиваться только в
том случае, если национальное решение не поддается разумному
обоснованию.
В конечном счете я голосовал вместе с большинством по следующим
причинам:
1) Предварительный контроль и классификация видеофильмов
полезны в этой чувствительной области, где возникают
многочисленные опасности, в особенности для молодых людей и прав
других лиц.
2) Подобный контроль при отказе в выдаче классификационного
сертификата требует соответствующей процедуры, позволяющей
тщательно взвешивать все вовлеченные в дело интересы. Настоящее
Судебное решение подробно излагает (п. п. 11 - 19) соображения и
доводы, обусловившие решение британских властей.
3) Что касается вопроса о том, было ли вмешательство
"необходимым в демократическом обществе", я убежден, что имеющаяся
у национальных властей сфера усмотрения весьма значительна и они
воспользовались ею в настоящем случае таким образом, который
согласно нормам Конвенции следует считать приемлемым.
СОВПАДАЮЩЕЕ МНЕНИЕ СУДЬИ ПЕТТИТИ
Я голосовал вместе с большинством, но по основаниям, которые по
своей структуре и содержанию существенно отличаются от тех, что
приводятся в Судебном решении; я не следовал логике рассуждений,
принятой в деле Института Отто-Премингер.
Первая рассмотренная проблема касалась норм английского права,
по которому богохульство является уголовно наказуемым
преступлением.
С сожалением следует признать, что предоставляемая данными
нормами защита не распространяется на другие религии. Подобный
ограничительный подход не имеет смысла в 1996 г., когда у нас есть
выработанные ООН и ЮНЕСКО соглашения о толерантности. Однако
Европейская Конвенция по правам человека, с одной стороны, не
запрещает законодательство такого типа, которое можно встретить в
ряде государств - членов, а с другой - оставляет возможность
контроля за его применением на основании статьи 14. В настоящем
деле, однако, жалоб на основании данной статьи в Европейский Суд
не поступило.
Суду пришлось решать дело на основании статьи 10. По моему
мнению, норма о богохульстве создает основу для рассмотрения дела
в свете статьи 10 п. 2 и не может автоматически оправдывать запрет
на распространение.
Статья 9 не имеет отношения к настоящему делу и не может быть
использована. Естественно, Суд совершенно справедливо строит свой
анализ на положениях статьи 10, касающихся защиты прав других лиц,
и не соединяет, как было сделано в Решении по делу Института Отто-
Премингер, статьи 9 и 10, за что его критиковали правоведы. Однако
формулировки, использованные Палатой в п. п. 50 и 53, создают, как
мне кажется, слишком уж непосредственную связь между нормами о
богохульстве и критериями, дающими правовое основание для запрета
распространения видеокассет или его ограничения.
То обстоятельство, что по этим нормам надругательство или
диффамация могут повлечь за собой уголовное преследование только в
связи со статьей 10 Европейской Конвенции (но не сами по себе),
может быть основанием для полного запрета на распространение книги
или видеофильма.
С моей точки зрения, Суду следовало ясно сказать об этом. Там,
где затрагивается свобода слова, реагирование не должно быть
автоматическим. Суду следовало, как мне представляется, изложить
те факты, которые позволили Комитету по спорам (куда заявитель
обжаловал Решение Британского управления классификации фильмов)
запретить распространение видеофильма. Я считаю, что Решение
нашего Суда было бы таким же, если бы оно было принято в
соответствии со статьей 10 п. 2, но по иному поводу, нежели
богохульство, например, по причине надругательства над символами
(что включает и светские символы, такие как национальный флаг) или
создания угрозы для общественного порядка либо его нарушения (но
не в интересах религиозного большинства населения на определенной
территории).
По моему мнению, в обоснование Решения следовало сказать не
только о религиозных вероучениях, но и о философских убеждениях.
Только в п. 53 судебного Решения упоминаются "другие" учения,
тогда как в свете статьи 10 п. 2 помимо богохульства можно
говорить и о грубых нападках на глубоко укоренившиеся чувства
других лиц, религиозные или светские идеалы. Больше всего шокирует
в проблеме Уингроу сочетание показного философствования с
совершенно не относящимся к нему непристойным и, скорее,
порнографическим видеорядом.
В данном случае использование непристойности в коммерческих
целях может оправдать наложение ограничения на основании статьи 10
п. 2; но использование символических фигур величайших мыслителей в
истории человечества (таких как Моисей, Данте или Толстой) в
сценах, которые серьезно оскорбляют глубокие чувства тех, кто
уважает их творчество, может в некоторых случаях оправдать и
судебный контроль с последующим опубликованием Решения в печати.
Но одной возможности судебного преследования недостаточно,
чтобы полный запрет стал правомерным. Такой вопрос уже поднимался
ранее: может ли нарушение норм профессионального поведения
(врачебной тайны) стать достаточным основанием для полного запрета
произведения?
Собственные доводы г-на Уингроу и содержащиеся в них
противоречия даже могли бы дополнить аргументацию Суда.
Уингроу утверждает в своей жалобе, что его творчество надо
защитить от цензуры по исключительно моральным или религиозным
основаниям. Г-н Уингроу подчеркивал, что он стремился дать
толкование трудам Святой Терезы через ее видения, что его замысел
был сродни труду Вольтера и имел антирелигиозную направленность.
Но фильм совсем другой. Г-н Уингроу не согласился даже вырезать из
него (на что он имел право как автор фильма) сцены
"квазисовокупления", которые отнюдь не были нужны даже в контексте
фильма. И действительно, он сам признал, что в его нынешнем виде
видеофильм вполне можно было бы назвать, как какой-нибудь
порнографический фильм, например "Монахини - лесбиянки".
Использование в заголовке слова "экстаз" является источником
двусмысленности как для людей, интересующихся литературными
произведениями, так и для тех, кто интересуется порнографией.
Продажа в супермаркетах видеофильмов порнографического,
непристойного характера еще более опасна, чем продажа книг, т.к.
при этом труднее обеспечить защиту населения.
Прошедшая недавно в Стокгольме всемирная конференция по защите
детей высветила губительные социальные последствия распространения
в миллионах экземпляров непристойных или порнографических
видеофильмов среди населения без малейшей попытки установления их
выходных данных. Маскировка содержания является коммерческой
техникой, которая используется для обхода запретов (например, в
видеофильмах для педофилов снимают взрослых девушек, почти
достигших совершеннолетия, а одетых как маленькие девочки).
Можно допустить, что до монтажа фильма г-на Уингроу
представлялось, что его скорее отличают литературные претензии,
чем непристойность, но его создатель предпочел умышленно не
прояснять созданной им двусмысленной ситуации. Он не обратился в
суд, хотя такая возможность была для него открыта.
Верно, что в Законе о видеозаписях 1984 г. (статья 7)
предусмотрены механизмы выдачи и использования сертификатов,
которые варьируются от полного запрета до установления ограничений
на показ и принятия мер по защите несовершеннолетних. В этом
вопросе англосаксонская судебная практика, особенно в Канаде,
изобилует определениями пограничной линии между литературой,
непристойностью и порнографией (см. Revue du Barreau du Quebec и
Revue de jurisprudence).
Большинство членов Комитета по спорам придерживались той точки
зрения, что созданные в фильме образы вели не к религиозному, а к
извращенному восприятию, и, более того, экстаз также имел
извращенный вид. Подход Комитета соответствовал подходу Палаты
лордов, для которой было главным не субъективное намерение автора,
а моральный аспект деяния. Директор Управления классификации
фильмов сказал, что управление заняло бы точно такую же позицию в
отношении фильма, выказывающего неуважение к Магомету или Будде.
Точно так же отказ был бы оправдан, если бы вместо экстаза
Святой Терезы фильм показал, например, антиклерикала Вольтера,
вступающего в интимную связь с каким-нибудь принцем или королем. В
подобном деле решение Европейского Суда было бы аналогично Решению
по делу Уингроу.
Суд был совершенно прав, строя свое решение на защите прав
других лиц во исполнение статьи 10, но, по моему мнению, он мог бы
сделать это на более широких основаниях, руководствуясь в большей
мере необходимостью защиты религиозных "или... любых иных"
убеждений, как справедливо указано в п. 53 судебного Решения.
В непростом деле нахождения баланса там, где религиозное и
философское восприятие входит в противоречие со свободой слова,
очень важно, чтобы исходные позиции и толкование Европейской
Конвенции основывались на принципах плюрализма и ценностного
подхода.
ОСОБОЕ МНЕНИЕ СУДЬИ ДЕ МЕЙЕРА
1. Это случай предварительного ограничения в чистом виде, т.е.
такая форма вмешательства, которая является, по моему мнению,
неприемлемой в области свободы слова.
То, что я написал по этому вопросу вместе с четырьмя другими
судьями по делу "Обсервер" и "Гардиан" против Соединенного
Королевства, Решение от 26 ноября 1991 г. (Серия А, т. 216, с. 46)
применимо не только к прессе, но и mutatis mutandis к другим
формам самовыражения, включая видеопроизведения.
2. Вполне правомерно возложить на поставщиков видеопроизведений
обязанность получать у некоего административного органа
сертификат, где указывалось бы, может ли соответствующее
произведение быть предложено широкой публике или только лицам,
достигшим определенного возраста, и надо ли, чтобы в последнем
случае они демонстрировались или продавались только в определенных
местах.
Конечно, любое решение такого органа нуждается в разумном
обосновании и не должно быть произвольным. При возникновении спора
оно должно подлежать судебному контролю и не препятствовать судам
принимать, в зависимости от конкретного случая, решение о том,
заслуживает ли рассматриваемое произведение или нет применения
каких-либо санкций на основании действующего законодательства.
3. Согласно системе, установленной Законом о видеозаписях 1984
г. (статья 4), Британское управление классификации фильмов и
Комитет по спорам могут решить, что некие видеопроизведения не
могут быть классифицированы в соответствии с одной из трех
существующих категорий, и могут тем самым наложить на них
абсолютный запрет ab initio.
Именно это и произошло в настоящем случае в отношении спорного
фильма. Безусловно, это заходит слишком далеко.
4. Относительно того, что уголовный закон, предусматривающий
ответственность за богохульство, мог бы быть применен к заявителю,
я хотел бы заметить, что вопрос о необходимости подобных законов
является весьма спорным.
Я хотел бы присоединиться к замечанию г-на Паттена, что для
верующих "крепость их собственных убеждений служит самой надежной
броней от насмешников и богохульников" (см. п. 29 Решения).
ОСОБОЕ МНЕНИЕ СУДЬИ ЛОМУСА
1. Я не могу согласиться с выводом большинства, что
вмешательство в осуществление права заявителя на свободу слова
было "необходимо в демократическом обществе".
2. Британское управление классификации фильмов и пять членов
присутствия Комитета по спорам сочли, что заявитель совершил бы
преступление в виде богохульства, если бы его видеопроизведение
"Видения экстаза" было распространено (см. п. 20 Решения).
3. В случаях предварительного ограничения (цензуры)
вмешательство властей в осуществление свободы слова происходит
несмотря на то, что члены общества, чьи чувства они стремятся
оградить, не просили о таком вмешательстве. Вмешательство
основывается на мнении властей, которые полагают, что они
правильно понимают те чувства, на защиту которых они претендуют.
Действительное мнение верующих остается неизвестным. Полагаю, что
по этой причине мы не можем делать вывод, что вмешательство
соответствовало "насущной общественной потребности".
5. Суд постоянно подтверждал в своих решениях, что гарантии
статьи 10 применимы не только к информации или идеям, которые
встречают благожелательный прием или рассматриваются как
безобидные, но и к тем, которые шокируют или внушают беспокойство.
Художественное впечатление нередко возникает от образов и
ситуаций, которые могут шокировать или задевать чувства человека с
определенным уровнем восприимчивости. С моей точки зрения,
создатели спорного фильма не преступили разумных пределов и не
дали оснований утверждать, что объекты религиозного поклонения
подверглись осквернению или осмеянию.
6. Большинство находит, что национальные власти имеют широкую
сферу усмотрения в области морали. В этой области "не существует
общепринятой европейской концепции требований, призванных
обеспечить "защиту прав других лиц" в случае нападок на их
религиозные убеждения" (п. 58 Решения). Суд, говоря о сфере
усмотрения, по-разному трактует статью 10. В одних случаях пределы
усмотрения широки, а в других - уже. Трудно понять, на основе
каких принципов определяются эти пределы.
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
CASE OF WINGROVE v. THE UNITED KINGDOM
JUDGMENT
(Strasbourg, 25.XI.1996)
In the case of Wingrove v. the United Kingdom <*>,
The European Court of Human Rights, sitting, in accordance with
Article 43 (art. 43) of the Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ("the Convention") and the
relevant provisions of Rules of Court A <**>, as a Chamber
composed of the following judges:
--------------------------------
Notes by the Registrar
<*> The case is numbered 19/1995/525/611. The first number is
the case's position on the list of cases referred to the Court in
the relevant year (second number). The last two numbers indicate
the case's position on the list of cases referred to the Court
since its creation and on the list of the corresponding
originating applications to the Commission.
<**> Rules A apply to all cases referred to the Court before
the entry into force of Protocol No. 9 (P9) (1 October 1994) and
thereafter only to cases concerning States not bound by that
Protocol (P9). They correspond to the Rules that came into force
on 1 January 1983, as amended several times subsequently.
Mr R. Bernhardt, President,
Mr {Thor Vilhjalmsson} <*>,
Mr L.-E. Pettiti,
Mr J. De Meyer,
Mr J.M. Morenilla,
Sir John Freeland,
Mr G. Mifsud Bonnici,
Mr D. Gotchev,
Mr U. Lohmus,
and also of Mr H. Petzold, Registrar, and Mr P.J. Mahoney,
Deputy Registrar,
--------------------------------
<*> Здесь и далее по тексту слова на национальном языке набраны
латинским шрифтом и выделены фигурными скобками.
Having deliberated in private on 29 March, 27 September and 22
October 1996,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the last-
mentioned date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case was referred to the Court by the European
Commission of Human Rights ("the Commission") on 1 March 1995 and
by the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland ("the Government") on 22 March 1995, within the
three-month period laid down by Article 32 para. 1 and Article 47
of the Convention (art. 32-1, art. 47). It originated in an
application (no. 17419/90) against the United Kingdom lodged with
the Commission under Article 25 (art. 25) by a British national,
Mr Nigel Wingrove, on 18 June 1990.
The Commission's request referred to Articles 44 and 48 (art.
44, art. 48) and to the declaration whereby the United Kingdom
recognised the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court (Article 46)
(art. 46); the Government's application referred to Article 48
(art. 48). The object of the request and of the application was to
obtain a decision as to whether the facts of the case disclosed a
breach by the respondent State of its obligations under Article 10
of the Convention (art. 10).
2. In response to the enquiry made in accordance with Rule 33
para. 3 (d) of Rules of Court A, the applicant stated that he
wished to take part in the proceedings and designated the lawyer
who would represent him (Rule 30).
3. The Chamber to be constituted included ex officio Sir John
Freeland, the elected judge of British nationality (Article 43 of
the Convention) (art. 43), and Mr R. Bernhardt, the Vice-President
of the Court (Rule 21 para. 4 (b)). On 5 May 1995, in the presence
of the Registrar, the President of the Court, Mr R. Ryssdal, drew
by lot the names of the other seven members, namely Mr L.-E.
Pettiti, Mr R. Macdonald, Mr J. De Meyer, Mr J.M. Morenilla, Mr G.
Mifsud Bonnici, Mr D. Gotchev and Mr U. Lohmus (Article 43 in fine
of the Convention and Rule 21 para. 5) (art. 43). Subsequently, Mr
{Thor Vilhjalmsson}, substitute judge, replaced Mr Macdonald, who
was unable to take part in the further consideration of the case
(Rules 22 para. 1 and 24 para. 1).
4. As President of the Chamber (Rule 21 para. 6), Mr Bernhardt,
acting through the Registrar, consulted the Agent of the
Government, the applicant's lawyer and the Delegate of the
Commission on the organisation of the proceedings (Rules 37 para.
1 and 38). Pursuant to the order made in consequence, the
Registrar received the Government's and the applicant's memorials
on 24 November 1995. The Secretary to the Commission subsequently
informed the Registrar that the Delegate did not wish to reply in
writing to the memorials filed.
5. On 17 November 1995, the President, having consulted the
Chamber, had granted leave to Rights International, a New York-
based non-governmental human rights organisation, to submit
written comments on specified aspects of the case (Rule 37 para.
2). Leave was also granted on the same date, subject to certain
conditions, to two London-based non-governmental human rights
organisations, namely Interights and Article 19, to submit joint
written comments. The comments were received between 2 and 5
January 1996. On 1 February 1996 the applicant submitted an
explanatory statement on the origins and meaning of his video
work.
6. In accordance with the President's decision, the hearing
took place in public in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on
27 March 1996. Beforehand, the Court had held a preparatory
meeting and had viewed the video recording in issue in the
presence of the applicant and his representatives.
There appeared before the Court:
(a) for the Government
Mr M.R. Eaton, Deputy Legal Adviser, Foreign and
Commonwealth Office, Agent,
Sir Derek Spencer, Solicitor-General,
Mr P. Havers QC,
Mr N. Lavender, Counsel,
Mr C. Whomersley, Legal Secretariat to the Law Officers,
Mr R. Clayton, Home Office,
Mr L. Hughes, Home Office, Advisers;
(b) for the Commission
Mr N. Bratza, Delegate;
(c) for the applicant
Mr G. Robertson, QC, Counsel,
Mr M. Stephens,
Mr P. Chinnery, Solicitors.
The Court heard addresses by Mr Bratza, Mr Robertson and Sir
Derek Spencer.
AS TO THE FACTS
I. Circumstances of the case
7. The applicant, Mr Nigel Wingrove, is a film director. He was
born in 1957 and resides in London.
8. Mr Wingrove wrote the shooting script for, and directed the
making of, a video work entitled Visions of Ecstasy. Its running
time is approximately eighteen minutes, and it contains no
dialogue, only music and moving images. According to the
applicant, the idea for the film was derived from the life and
writings of St Teresa of Avila, the sixteenth-century Carmelite
nun and founder of many convents, who experienced powerful
ecstatic visions of Jesus Christ.
9. The action of the film centres upon a youthful actress
dressed as a nun and intended to represent St Teresa. It begins
with the nun, dressed loosely in a black habit, stabbing her own
hand with a large nail and spreading her blood over her naked
breasts and clothing. In her writhing, she spills a chalice of
communion wine and proceeds to lick it up from the ground. She
loses consciousness. This sequence takes up approximately half of
the running time of the video. The second part shows St Teresa
dressed in a white habit standing with her arms held above her
head by a white cord which is suspended from above and tied around
her wrists. The near-naked form of a second female, said to
represent St Teresa's psyche, slowly crawls her way along the
ground towards her. Upon reaching St Teresa's feet, the psyche
begins to caress her feet and legs, then her midriff, then her
breasts, and finally exchanges passionate kisses with her.
Throughout this sequence, St Teresa appears to be writhing in
exquisite erotic sensation. This sequence is intercut at frequent
intervals with a second sequence in which one sees the body of
Christ, fastened to the cross which is lying upon the ground. St
Teresa first kisses the stigmata of his feet before moving up his
body and kissing or licking the gaping wound in his right side.
Then she sits astride him, seemingly naked under her habit, all
the while moving in a motion reflecting intense erotic arousal,
and kisses his lips. For a few seconds, it appears that he
responds to her kisses. This action is intercut with the
passionate kisses of the psyche already described. Finally, St
Teresa runs her hand down to the fixed hand of Christ and entwines
his fingers in hers. As she does so, the fingers of Christ seem to
curl upwards to hold with hers, whereupon the video ends.
10. Apart from the cast list which appears on the screen for a
few seconds, the viewer has no means of knowing from the film
itself that the person dressed as a nun in the video is intended
to be St Teresa or that the other woman who appears is intended to
be her psyche. No attempt is made in the video to explain its
historical background.
11. Visions of Ecstasy was submitted to the British Board of
Film Classification ("the Board"), being the authority designated
by the Home Secretary under section 4 (1) of the Video Recordings
Act 1984 ("the 1984 Act" - see paragraph 24 below) as
"the authority responsible for making arrangements
(a) for determining, for the purposes of [the] Act whether or
not video works are suitable for classification certificates to be
issued in respect of them, having special regard to the likelihood
of video works in respect of which such certificates have been
issued being viewed in the home,
(b) in the case of works which are determined in accordance
with the arrangements to be so suitable
(i) for making such other determinations as are required for
the issue of classification certificates, and
(ii) for issuing such certificates..."
12. The applicant submitted the video to the Board in order
that it might lawfully be sold, hired out or otherwise supplied to
the general public or a section thereof.
13. The Board rejected the application for a classification
certificate on 18 September 1989 in the following terms:
"Further to your application for a classification
certificate..., you are already aware that under the Video
Recordings Act 1984 the Board must determine first of all whether
or not a video work is suitable for such a certificate to be
issued to it, having special regard to the likelihood of video
works being viewed in the home. In making this judgment, the Board
must have regard to the Home Secretary's Letter of Designation in
which we are enjoined to "continue to seek to avoid classifying
works which are obscene within the meaning of the Obscene
Publications Acts 1959 and 1964 or which infringe other provisions
of the criminal law".
Amongst these provisions is the criminal law of blasphemy, as
tested recently in the House of Lords in R. v. Lemon (1979),
commonly known as the Gay News case. The definition of blasphemy
cited therein is "any contemptuous, reviling, scurrilous or
ludicrous matter relating to God, Jesus Christ or the Bible... It
is not blasphemous to speak or publish opinions hostile to the
Christian religion" if the publication is "decent and temperate".
The question is not one of the matter expressed, but of its
manner, i.e. "the tone, style and spirit", in which it is
presented.
The video work submitted by you depicts the mingling of
religious ecstasy and sexual passion, a matter which may be of
legitimate concern to the artist. It becomes subject to the law of
blasphemy, however, if the manner of its presentation is bound to
give rise to outrage at the unacceptable treatment of a sacred
subject. Because the wounded body of the crucified Christ is
presented solely as the focus of, and at certain moments a
participant in, the erotic desire of St Teresa, with no attempt to
explore the meaning of the imagery beyond engaging the viewer in
an erotic experience, it is the Board's view, and that of its
legal advisers, that a reasonable jury properly directed would
find that the work infringes the criminal law of blasphemy.
To summarise, it is not the case that the sexual imagery in
Visions of Ecstasy lies beyond the parameters of the "18"
category; it is simply that for a major proportion of the work's
duration that sexual imagery is focused on the figure of the
crucified Christ. If the male figure were not Christ, the problem
would not arise. Cuts of a fairly radical nature in the overt
expressions of sexuality between St Teresa and the Christ figure
might be practicable, but I understand that you do not wish to
attempt this course of action. In consequence, we have concluded
that it would not be suitable for a classification certificate to
be issued to this video work."
14. The applicant appealed against the Board's determination to
the Video Appeals Committee ("the VAC" - see paragraph 25 below),
established pursuant to section 4 (3) of the 1984 Act. His notice
of appeal, prepared by his legal representatives at the time,
contained the following grounds:
"(i) that the Board was wrong to conclude that the video
infringes the criminal law of blasphemy, and that a reasonable
jury properly directed would so find;
(ii) in particular, the Appellant will contend that upon a
proper understanding of the serious nature of the video as an
artistic and imaginative interpretation of the "ecstasy" or
"rapture" of the sixteenth-century Carmelite nun, St Teresa of
Avila, it would not be taken by a reasonable person as
contemptuous, reviling, scurrilous or ludicrous or otherwise
disparaging in relation to God, Jesus Christ or the Bible. The
appeal will raise the question of mixed fact and law, namely
whether publication of the video, even to a restricted degree,
would contravene the existing criminal law of blasphemy."
15. The Board submitted a formal reply to the VAC explaining
its decision in relation to its functions under section 4 of the
1984 Act:
"The Act does not expressly set out the principles to be
applied by the authority in determining whether or not a video
work is suitable for a classification certificate to be issued in
respect of it. In these circumstances, the Board has exercised its
discretion to formulate principles for classifying video works in
a manner which it believes to be both reasonable and suited to
carrying out the broad objectives of the Act. Amongst these
principles, the Board has concluded that an overriding test of
suitability for classification is the determination that the video
work in question does not infringe the criminal law. In
formulating and applying this principle, the Board has
consistently had regard to the Home Secretary's Letter of
Designation under the Video Recordings Act...
The Board has concluded on the advice of leading Counsel that
the video work in question infringes the criminal law of blasphemy
and that a reasonable jury properly directed on the law would
convict accordingly. The Board submits and is advised that in
Britain the offence of blasphemy is committed if a video work
treats a religious subject (in particular God, Jesus Christ or the
Bible) in such a manner as to be calculated (that is, bound, not
intended) to outrage those who have an understanding of, sympathy
towards and support for the Christian story and ethic, because of
the contemptuous, reviling, insulting, scurrilous or ludicrous
tone, style and spirit in which the subject is presented.
The video work under appeal purports to depict the erotic
fantasies of a character described in the credits as St Teresa of
Avila. The 14-minute second section of the video work portrays "St
Teresa" having an erotic fantasy involving the crucified figure of
Christ, and also a Lesbian erotic fantasy involving the "Psyche of
St Teresa". No attempt is made to place what is shown in any
historical, religious or dramatic context: the figures of St
Teresa and her psyche are both clearly modern in appearance and
the erotic images are accompanied by a rock music backing. The
work contains no dialogue or evidence of an interest in exploring
the psychology or even the sexuality of the character purporting
to be St Teresa of Avila. Instead, this character and her supposed
fantasies about lesbianism and the body and blood of Christ are
presented as the occasion for a series of erotic images of a kind
familiar from "soft-core" pornography.
In support of its contentions, the Board refers to an interview
given by the appellant and published in Midweek magazine on 14
September 1989. In this interview, the appellant attempts to draw
a distinction between pornography and "erotica", denying that the
video work in question is pornographic but stating that "all my
own work is actually erotica". Further on, the interviewer
comments:
"In many ways, though, Visions calls upon the standard lexicon
of lust found in down market porn: nuns, lesbianism, women tied up
(Gay Nuns in Bondage could have been an alternative title in
fact). Nigel Wingrove flashes a wicked grin. "That's right, and
I'm not denying it. I don't know what it is about nuns, it's the
same sort of thing as white stocking tops I suppose." So why does
he not consider Visions to be pornography, or at least soft porn?
"I hope it is gentler, subtler than that. I suppose most people
think pornography shows the sex act, and this doesn't."
It is clear from the appellant's own admissions that, whether
or not the video work can rightly be described as pornographic, it
is solely erotic in content, and it focuses this erotic imagery
for much of its duration on the body and blood of Christ, who is
even shown to respond to the sexual attentions of the principal
character. Moreover, the manner in which such imagery is treated
places the focus of the work less on the erotic feelings of the
character than on those of the audience, which is the primary
function of pornography whether or not it shows the sex act
explicitly. Because there is no attempt, in the Board's view, to
explore the meaning of the imagery beyond engaging the viewer in a
voyeuristic erotic experience, the Board considers that the public
distribution of such a video work would outrage and insult the
feelings of believing Christians...
...
The Board... submits that the appeal should be dismissed and
its determination upheld."
16. The applicant then made further representations to the VAC,
stating, inter alia:
"The definition of the offence of blasphemy set out in... the
reply is too wide, being significantly wider than the test
approved in the only modern authority - see Lemon & Gay News Ltd
v. Whitehouse [1979] Appeal Cases 617, per Lord Scarman at 665.
For example, there is no uniform law of blasphemy in Britain; the
last recorded prosecution for blasphemy under the law of Scotland
was in 1843 - see Thos Paterson [1843] I Brown 629. Nor is any
religious subject protected - the reviling matter must be in
relation to God, Jesus Christ or the Bible, or the formularies of
the Church of England as by law established.
In the Appellant's contention, these limitations are of the
utmost significance in this case since the video is not concerned
with anything which God or Jesus Christ did, or thought or might
have approved of. It is about the erotic visions and imaginings of
a sixteenth-century Carmelite nun - namely St Teresa of Avila. It
is quite plain that the Christ figure exists in her fantasy as the
Board expressly accepts... The scurrilous and/or erotic treatment
of religious subject matter has received the Board's
classification without attempted prosecution in recent years, e.g.
Monty Python's Life of Brian and Mr Scorsese's The Last Temptation
of Christ.
... The Board argues that the video is purely erotic or "soft-
core" pornographic, without historical, religious, dramatic or
other artistic merit. The implication is that, had it possessed
such merit the Board's decision might very well have been
otherwise. The Appellant will seek to argue and call evidence to
the effect that the video work is a serious treatment of the
subject of the ecstatic raptures of St Teresa (well chronicled in
her own works and those of commentators) from a twentieth-century
point of view.
The so-called "rock music backing" was in fact specially
commissioned from the respected composer Steven Severin, after
discussion of the Director's desired artistic and emotional
impact. The Board has based its decision upon the narrowest, most
disparaging, critical appreciation of the work. The Appellant will
contend that a very much more favourable assessment of his aims
and achievement in making Visions of Ecstasy is, at the very
least, tenable and that the Board ought not to refuse a
certificate on a mere matter of interpretation.
The Appellant takes objection to the Board's quotation... of
comments attributed to him from an article by one Rob Ryan
published in Midweek magazine 14th September 1989. The remarks are
pure hearsay so far as the Board is concerned. That aside, the
piece quoted is in large part the comments of the author of the
article. An entirely misleading impression of what the Appellant
said to the author is conveyed by the interpolation of the words
attributed to him, and by taking this passage out of context.
Above all, the Appellant disputes the key assertion by the
Board that the video work is solely erotic in content."
17. The appeal was heard by a five-member panel of the VAC
("the Panel") on 6 and 7 December 1989; oral and affidavit
evidence was submitted. By a majority of three to two, a written
decision rejecting the appeal was given on 23 December 1989. The
Panel also considered itself bound by the criteria set out in the
designation notice (see paragraph 24 below). It had difficulty,
however, in ascertaining and applying the present law of
blasphemy. It commented as follows:
"The authorities on this Common Law offence were reviewed by
the House of Lords in the case of Lemon and Gay News Ltd v.
Whitehouse which concerned a magazine called Gay News, the
readership of which consisted mainly of homosexuals although it
was on sale to the general public at some bookstalls. One edition
contained a poem entitled The Love that Dares to Speak its Name
accompanied by a drawing illustrating its subject matter.
In his judgment Lord Scarman said that it was unnecessary to
speculate whether an outraged Christian would feel provoked by the
words and illustration to commit a breach of the peace, the true
test being whether the words are calculated to outrage and insult
the Christian's religious feelings, the material in question being
contemptuous, reviling, scurrilous or ludicrous matter relating to
God, Jesus Christ or the Bible, or the formularies of the Church
of England. It should perhaps be added that the word "calculated"
should be read in the dictionary sense of "estimated" or "likely"
as it was decided that intent (other than an intent to publish) is
not an element in the offence.
In the same case Lord Diplock said that the material must be
"likely to arouse a sense of outrage among those who believe in or
respect the Christian faith".
In the present case the Board's Director... said in evidence
that the Board's view was that the video was "contemptuous of the
divinity of Christ". He added that although the Board's decision
was based upon its view that the video is blasphemous (blasphemy
being an offence which relates only to the Christian religion), it
would take just the same stance if it were asked to grant a
Certificate to a video which, for instance, was contemptuous of
Mohammed or Buddha."
18. The Panel went on to review the content of the video and
accepted that the applicant had in mind St Teresa, a nun, "who is
known to have had ecstatic visions of Christ although,
incidentally, these did not start until she was 39 years of age -
in marked contrast to the obvious youthfulness of the actress who
plays the part".
19. The Panel reached the following conclusion:
"From the writings of St Teresa herself, and the subsequent
writings of others, there seems no reason to doubt that some of
her visions were of seeing the glorified body of Christ and being
shown his wounds but, even so, it seems clear that Mr Wingrove has
taken considerable artistic licence with his subject.
Apart from the age discrepancy - a comparatively minor matter -
we were made aware of nothing which would suggest that Teresa ever
did anything to injure her hand or that any element of lesbianism
ever entered into her visions. More importantly, there seems
nothing to suggest that Teresa, in her visions, ever saw herself
as being in any bodily contact with the glorified Christ. As one
author, Mr Stephen Clissold, puts it "Teresa experienced ecstasy
as a form of prayer in which she herself played almost no part".
So, in view of the extent of the artistic licence, we think it
would be reasonable to look upon the video as centring upon any
nun of any century who, like many others down the ages, had
ecstatic visions.
There is also another reason for taking this stance: unless the
viewer happens to read the cast list which appears on the screen
for a few seconds, he or she has no means of knowing that the nun
is supposed to be St Teresa, nor that the figure of the second
woman is supposed to be her psyche. And he or she in any event may
well be unaware that Teresa was a real-life nun who had ecstatic
visions.
It is true that Mr Wingrove says that it is intended that the
sleeve or jacket for the video will provide "basic historical
information to assist the viewer", but we feel bound to regard
this as irrelevant. Firstly because it by no means follows that
every viewer will read any such description; and secondly because
the Board's and the Appeal Panel's decision must be based solely
upon the video itself, quite apart from the fact that at the time
of making a decision the sleeve or jacket is usually - as in the
present instance - not even in existence.
However, although we have thought it proper to dwell at some
length with the "St Teresa" aspect, we are of the opinion that in
practice, when considering whether or not the video is
blasphemous, it makes little or no difference whether one looks
upon the central character as being St Teresa or any other nun.
The appellant, in his written statement, lays stress upon the
undoubted fact that the whole of the second half consists of
Teresa's vision or dream. Hence he says the video says nothing
about Christ, his figure being used only as a projection of St
Teresa's mind, nor was it his intention to make that figure an
active participant in any overt sexual act.
He goes on to say "Rather the very mild responses are those of
St Teresa's conjecture: the kiss, hand clasp and ultimately the
tears of Christ. To show no response to a creation of her own mind
would be nonsense; no woman (nor man) whose deep love could cause
such visions/ecstasies would imagine the object of that love
coldly to ignore their caresses".
Although we quite appreciate the logic of this point of view,
we have reservations about the extent to which a vision or dream
sequence can affect the question of whether what is pictured or
said is blasphemous.
It would, for instance, be possible to produce a film or video
which was most extremely contemptuous, reviling, scurrilous or
ludicrous in relation to Christ, all dressed up in the context of
someone's imaginings. In such circumstances we find it hard to
envisage that, by such a simple device, it could reasonably be
said that no offence had been committed. If in our opinion the
viewer, after making proper allowance for the scene being in the
form of a dream, nevertheless reasonably feels that it would cause
a sense of outrage and insult to a Christian's feelings, the
offence would be established.
We should perhaps also deal, albeit briefly, with a further
submission made on behalf of the appellant, namely that the crime
of blasphemy may extend only to the written or spoken word and
hence that a court might rule that no film or video, and perhaps
nothing shown on television, could become the subject of such a
charge. Suffice it to say that in our view this is too unlikely to
cause it to be taken into account by the Board or a panel of the
Appeals Committee when reaching a decision.
In the opinion of a majority of the Panel the video did not, as
the appellant claims, explore St Teresa's struggles against her
visions but exploited a devotion to Christ in purely carnal terms.
Furthermore they considered that it lacked the seriousness and
depth of The Last Temptation of Christ with which Counsel for the
appellant sought to compare it.
Indeed the majority took the view that the video's message was
that the nun was moved not by religious ecstasy but rather by
sexual ecstasy, this ecstasy being of a perverse kind - full of
images of blood, sado-masochism, lesbianism (or perhaps auto-
erotism) and bondage. Although there was evidence of some element
of repressed sexuality in St Teresa's devotion to Christ, they did
not consider that this gave any ground for portraying her as
taking the initiative in indulged sexuality.
They considered the over-all tone and spirit of the video to be
indecent and had little doubt that all the above factors, coupled
with the motions of the nun whilst astride the body of Christ and
the response to her kisses and the intertwining of the fingers
would outrage the feelings of Christians, who would reasonably
look upon it as being contemptuous of the divinity of Christ.
In these circumstances the majority were satisfied that the
video is blasphemous, that a reasonable and properly directed jury
would be likely to convict and therefore that the Board was right
to refuse to grant a Certificate. Hence this appeal is accordingly
dismissed.
It should perhaps be added that the minority on the Panel,
whilst being in no doubt that many people would find the video to
be extremely distasteful, would have allowed the appeal because in
their view it is unlikely that a reasonable and properly directed
jury would convict."
20. As a result of the Board's determination, as upheld by the
Panel, the applicant would commit an offence under section 9 of
the 1984 Act (see paragraph 23 below) if he were to supply the
video in any manner, whether or not for reward.
21. The applicant received legal advice that his case was not
suitable for judicial review (see paragraphs 30-31 below) on the
grounds that the formulation of the law of blasphemy, as accepted
by the Panel, was an "accurate statement of the present law".
II. Situation of the video industry
in the United Kingdom
22. According to statistics submitted by the Government, in
1994 there were 21.5 million video-recorders in the United
Kingdom. Out of approximately 20.75 million households in the
United Kingdom, 18 million contained at least one video-recorder.
There were approximately 15,000 video outlets in the United
Kingdom. Videos were available for hire in between 4,000 and 5,000
video rental shops. They were also available for sale in 3,000
"high street" shops and in between 7,000 and 8,000 "secondary"
outlets such as supermarkets, corner shops and petrol stations.
In 1994 there were 194 million video rentals and 66 million
video purchases in the United Kingdom. It is estimated that a
further 65 million illegal copies ("pirate videos") were
distributed during that year.
III. Relevant domestic law
A. The regulation of video works
23. The Video Recordings Act 1984 ("the 1984 Act") regulates
the distribution of video works. Subject to certain exemptions, it
is an offence under section 9 (1) of that Act for a person to
supply or offer to supply a video work in respect of which no
classification certificate has been issued. Under section 7 there
are three categories of classification: works deemed suitable for
general viewing (and to which a parental guidance reference may be
added); works for which the viewing is restricted to people who
have attained a specified age; and works which may only be
supplied by licensed sex shops. The Secretary of State for the
Home Department may require that the content of certain works be
labelled (section 8). It is an offence to ignore such conditions,
for example by supplying someone under 18 years of age with an
"18" classified work (section 11).
24. Under section 4 (1) of the 1984 Act the Secretary of State
may by notice designate any person or body as the authority for
making arrangements for determining whether or not video works are
suitable for classification certificates to be issued in respect
of them (having special regard to the likelihood of certified
video works being viewed in the home). By a notice dated 26 July
1985 the British Board of Film Classification was so designated.
In the case of works which are determined in accordance with the
arrangements described above to be suitable for classification
certificates, the Board is responsible under section 4 (1) for
making arrangements for the issue of certificates and making other
determinations relating to their use. The Secretary of State's
notice enjoined the Board "to continue to seek to avoid
classifying works which are obscene within the meaning of the
Obscene Publications Acts 1959 and 1964 or which infringe other
provisions of the criminal law".
25. Pursuant to section 4 (3) of the 1984 Act arrangements were
made for the establishment of the Video Appeals Committee to
determine appeals against decisions by the Board.
B. The law of blasphemy
26. Blasphemy and blasphemous libel are common law offences
triable on indictment and punishable by fine or imprisonment.
Blasphemy consists in speaking and blasphemous libel in otherwise
publishing blasphemous matter. Libel involves a publication in a
permanent form, but that form may consist of moving pictures.
27. In the case of Whitehouse v. Gay News Ltd and Lemon [1979]
Appeal Cases 617 at 665, which concerned the law of blasphemy in
England, Lord Scarman held that the modern law of blasphemy was
correctly formulated in Article 214 of Stephen's Digest of the
Criminal Law, 9th edition (1950). This states as follows:
"Every publication is said to be blasphemous which contains any
contemptuous, reviling, scurrilous or ludicrous matter relating to
God, Jesus Christ or the Bible, or the formularies of the Church
of England as by law established. It is not blasphemous to speak
or publish opinions hostile to the Christian religion, or to deny
the existence of God, if the publication is couched in decent and
temperate language. The test to be applied is as to the manner in
which the doctrines are advocated and not to the substance of the
doctrines themselves."
The House of Lords in that case also decided that the mental
element in the offence (mens rea) did not depend upon the accused
having an intent to blaspheme. It was sufficient for the
prosecution to prove that the publication had been intentional and
that the matter published was blasphemous.
The Gay News case, which had been brought by a private
prosecutor, had been the first prosecution for blasphemy since
1922.
28. As stated above, the law of blasphemy only protects the
Christian religion and, more specifically, the established Church
of England. This was confirmed by the Divisional Court in 1991.
Ruling on an application for judicial review of a magistrate's
refusal to issue a summons for blasphemy against Salman Rushdie
and the publishers of The Satanic Verses, Lord Watkins stated:
"We have no doubt that as the law now stands it does not extend
to religions other than Christianity...
...
We think it right to say that, were it open to us to extend the
law to cover religions other than Christianity, we should refrain
from doing so. Considerations of public policy are extremely
difficult and complex. It would be virtually impossible by
judicial decision to set sufficiently clear limits to the offence,
and other problems involved are formidable." (R. v. Chief
Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Choudhury [1991] 1
All England Law Reports 306 at 318).
29. On 4 July 1989 the then Minister of State at the Home
Department, Mr John Patten, had sent a letter to a number of
influential British Muslims, in which he stated inter alia that:
"Many Muslims have argued that the law of blasphemy should be
amended to take books such as [The Satanic Verses] outside the
boundary of what is legally acceptable. We have considered their
arguments carefully and reached the conclusion that it would be
unwise for a variety of reasons to amend the law of blasphemy, not
the least the clear lack of agreement over whether the law should
be reformed or repealed.
...
... an alteration in the law could lead to a rush of litigation
which would damage relations between faiths.
I hope you can appreciate how divisive and how damaging such
litigation might be, and how inappropriate our legal mechanisms
are for dealing with matters of faith and individual belief.
Indeed, the Christian faith no longer relies on it, preferring to
recognise that the strength of their own belief is the best armour
against mockers and blasphemers."
C. The availability of judicial review as a remedy
30. Decisions by public bodies which have consequences which
affect some person or body of persons are susceptible to challenge
in the High Court on an application for judicial review. Amongst
the grounds on which such a challenge may be brought is that the
body in question misdirected itself on a point of law. The Video
Appeals Committee is such a public body because it is established
pursuant to an Act of Parliament (see paragraph 25 above).
Furthermore, its decisions affect the rights of persons who make
video works because confirmation of a decision that a video work
cannot receive a classification certificate would mean that copies
of that work could not be lawfully supplied to members of the
public.
31. On an application for judicial review a court would not
normally look at the merits of any decision made by such a body,
except where the decision was so unreasonable that no reasonable
body, properly instructed, could have reached it. However, where
the decision is based on a point of law and it is alleged that the
body has misdirected itself on that point, the decision could be
challenged by an application for judicial review. In the case of
C.C.S.U. v. Minister for the Civil Service [1984] 3 All England
Law Reports at 950, Lord Diplock, in the House of Lords,
classified under three heads the grounds on which administrative
action is subject to control by judicial review. He called the
first ground "illegality" and described it as follows:
"By "illegality" as a ground for judicial review I mean that
the decision-maker must understand correctly the law that
regulates his decision-making power and must give effect to it.
Whether he has or not is par excellence a justiciable question to
be decided, in the event of a dispute, by those persons, the
judges, by whom the judicial power of the State is exercisable."
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION
32. Mr Wingrove applied to the Commission on 18 June 1990. He
relied on Article 10 of the Convention (art. 10), complaining that
the refusal of a classification certificate for his video work
Visions of Ecstasy was in breach of his freedom of expression.
33. The Commission declared the application (no. 17419/90)
admissible on 8 March 1994. In its report of 10 January 1995
(Article 31) (art. 31), it expressed the opinion, by fourteen
votes to two, that there had been a violation of Article 10 of the
Convention (art. 10). The full text of the Commission's opinion
and of the three separate opinions contained in the report is
reproduced as an annex to this judgment <*>.
--------------------------------
Note by the Registrar
<*> For practical reasons this annex will appear only with the
printed version of the judgment (in Reports of Judgments and
Decisions 1996-V), but a copy of the Commission's report is
obtainable from the registry.
FINAL SUBMISSIONS TO THE COURT
34. In their final submissions, the Government requested the
Court to declare that the facts of the present case disclose no
violation of Article 10 of the Convention (art. 10).
The applicant, for his part, invited the Court to "produce a
judgment which declares the British blasphemy laws as unnecessary
in theory as they are in practice in any multi-cultural
democracy".
AS TO THE LAW
I. Alleged violation of Article 10
of the Convention (art. 10)
35. The applicant alleged a violation of his right to freedom
of expression, as guaranteed by Article 10 of the Convention (art.
10), which, in so far as relevant, provides:
"1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right
shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart
information and ideas without interference by public authority and
regardless of frontiers...
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it
duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities,
conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and
are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of
national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or
morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others,
for preventing the disclosure of information received in
confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of
the judiciary."
36. The refusal by the British Board of Film Classification to
grant a certificate for the applicant's video work Visions of
Ecstasy, seen in conjunction with the statutory provisions making
it a criminal offence to distribute a video work without this
certificate (see paragraph 23 above), amounted to an interference
by a public authority with the applicant's right to impart ideas.
This was common ground between the participants in the
proceedings.
To determine whether such an interference entails a violation
of the Convention, the Court must examine whether or not it was
justified under Article 10 para. 2 (art. 10-2) by reason of being
a restriction "prescribed by law", which pursued an aim that was
legitimate under that provision (art. 10-2) and was "necessary in
a democratic society".
A. Whether the interference was "prescribed by law"
37. The applicant considered that the law of blasphemy was so
uncertain that it was inordinately difficult to establish in
advance whether in the eyes of a jury a particular publication
would constitute an offence. Moreover, it was practically
impossible to know what predictions an administrative body - the
British Board of Film Classification - would make as to the
outcome of a hypothetical prosecution. In these circumstances, the
applicant could not reasonably be expected to foresee the result
of the Board's speculations. The requirement of foreseeability
which flows from the expression "prescribed by law" was therefore
not fulfilled.
38. The Government contested this claim: it was a feature
common to most laws and legal systems that tribunals may reach
different conclusions even when applying the same law to the same
facts. This did not necessarily make these laws inaccessible or
unforeseeable. Given the infinite variety of ways of publishing
"contemptuous, reviling, scurrilous or ludicrous matter relating
to God, Jesus Christ or the Bible" (see paragraph 27 above), it
would not be appropriate for the law to seek to define in detail
which images would or would not be potentially blasphemous.
39. The Commission, noting that considerable legal advice was
available to the applicant, was of the view that he could
reasonably have foreseen the restrictions to which his video work
was liable.
40. The Court reiterates that, according to its case-law, the
relevant national "law", which includes both statute and common
law (see, inter alia, the Sunday Times v. the United Kingdom (no.
1) judgment of 26 April 1979, Series A no. 30, p. 30, para. 47),
must be formulated with sufficient precision to enable those
concerned - if need be, with appropriate legal advice - to
foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the
consequences which a given action may entail. A law that confers a
discretion is not in itself inconsistent with this requirement,
provided that the scope of the discretion and the manner of its
exercise are indicated with sufficient clarity, having regard to
the legitimate aim in question, to give the individual adequate
protection against arbitrary interference (see, for instance, the
Tolstoy Miloslavsky v. the United Kingdom judgment of 13 July
1995, Series A no. 316-B, pp. 71 - 72, para. 37, and the Goodwin
v. the United Kingdom judgment of 27 March 1996, Reports of
Judgments and Decisions 1996-II, pp. 496 - 97, para. 31).
41. It is observed that, in refusing a certificate for
distribution of the applicant's video on the basis that it
infringed a provision of the criminal law of blasphemy, the
British Board of Film Classification acted within its powers under
section 4 (1) of the 1984 Act (see paragraph 24 above).
42. The Court recognises that the offence of blasphemy cannot
by its very nature lend itself to precise legal definition.
National authorities must therefore be afforded a degree of
flexibility in assessing whether the facts of a particular case
fall within the accepted definition of the offence (see, mutatis
mutandis, the Tolstoy Miloslavsky judgment cited above at
paragraph 40, p. 73, para. 41).
43. There appears to be no general uncertainty or disagreement
between those appearing before the Court as to the definition in
English law of the offence of blasphemy, as formulated by the
House of Lords in the case of Whitehouse v. Gay News Ltd and Lemon
(see paragraph 27 above). Having seen for itself the content of
the video work, the Court is satisfied that the applicant could
reasonably have foreseen with appropriate legal advice that the
film, particularly those scenes involving the crucified figure of
Christ, could fall within the scope of the offence of blasphemy.
The above conclusion is borne out by the applicant's decision
not to initiate proceedings for judicial review on the basis of
counsel's advice that the Panel's formulation of the law of
blasphemy represented an accurate statement of the law (see,
mutatis mutandis, the Open Door and Dublin Well Woman v. Ireland
judgment of 29 October 1992, Series A no. 246-A, p. 27, para. 60).
44. Against this background it cannot be said that the law in
question did not afford the applicant adequate protection against
arbitrary interference. The Court therefore concludes that the
impugned restriction was "prescribed by law".
B. Whether the interference pursued a legitimate aim
45. The applicant contested the Government's assertion that his
video work was refused a certificate for distribution in order to
"protect the right of citizens not to be offended in their
religious feelings". In his submission, the expression "rights of
others" in the present context only refers to an actual, positive
right not to be offended. It does not include a hypothetical right
held by some Christians to avoid disturbance at the prospect of
other people's viewing the video work without being shocked.
In any event - the applicant further submitted - the
restriction on the film's distribution could not pursue a
legitimate aim since it was based on a discriminatory law, limited
to the protection of Christians, and specifically, those of the
Anglican faith.
46. The Government referred to the case of Otto-Preminger-
Institut v. Austria (judgment of 20 September 1994, Series A no.
295-A, pp. 17 - 18, paras. 47 - 48) where the Court had accepted
that respect for the religious feelings of believers can move a
State legitimately to restrict the publication of provocative
portrayals of objects of religious veneration.
47. The Commission considered that the English law of blasphemy
is intended to suppress behaviour directed against objects of
religious veneration that is likely to cause justified indignation
amongst believing Christians. It follows that the application of
this law in the present case was intended to protect the right of
citizens not to be insulted in their religious feelings.
48. The Court notes at the outset that, as stated by the Board,
the aim of the interference was to protect against the treatment
of a religious subject in such a manner "as to be calculated (that
is, bound, not intended) to outrage those who have an
understanding of, sympathy towards and support for the Christian
story and ethic, because of the contemptuous, reviling, insulting,
scurrilous or ludicrous tone, style and spirit in which the
subject is presented" (see paragraph 15 above).
This is an aim which undoubtedly corresponds to that of the
protection of "the rights of others" within the meaning of
paragraph 2 of Article 10 (art. 10-2). It is also fully consonant
with the aim of the protections afforded by Article 9 (art. 9) to
religious freedom.
49. Whether or not there was a real need for protection against
exposure to the film in question is a matter which must be
addressed below when assessing the "necessity" of the
interference.
50. It is true that the English law of blasphemy only extends
to the Christian faith. Indeed the anomaly of this state of
affairs in a multidenominational society was recognised by the
Divisional Court in R. v. Chief Metropolitan Stipendiary
Magistrate, ex parte Choudhury [1991] 1 All England Law Reports
306 at 317 (see paragraph 28 above). However, it is not for the
European Court to rule in abstracto as to the compatibility of
domestic law with the Convention. The extent to which English law
protects other beliefs is not in issue before the Court which must
confine its attention to the case before it (see, for example, the
Klass and Others v. Germany judgment of 6 September 1978, Series A
no. 28, p. 18, para. 33).
The uncontested fact that the law of blasphemy does not treat
on an equal footing the different religions practised in the
United Kingdom does not detract from the legitimacy of the aim
pursued in the present context.
51. The refusal to grant a certificate for the distribution of
Visions of Ecstasy consequently had a legitimate aim under Article
10 para. 2 (art. 10-2).
C. Whether the interference was
"necessary in a democratic society"
52. The Court recalls that freedom of expression constitutes
one of the essential foundations of a democratic society. As
paragraph 2 of Article 10 (art. 10-2) expressly recognises,
however, the exercise of that freedom carries with it duties and
responsibilities. Amongst them, in the context of religious
beliefs, may legitimately be included a duty to avoid as far as
possible an expression that is, in regard to objects of
veneration, gratuitously offensive to others and profanatory (see
the Otto-Preminger-Institut judgment cited above at paragraph 46,
pp. 18 - 19, paras. 47 and 49).
53. No restriction on freedom of expression, whether in the
context of religious beliefs or in any other, can be compatible
with Article 10 (art. 10) unless it satisfies, inter alia, the
test of necessity as required by the second paragraph of that
Article (art. 10-2). In examining whether restrictions to the
rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention can be considered
"necessary in a democratic society" the Court has, however,
consistently held that the Contracting States enjoy a certain but
not unlimited margin of appreciation. It is, in any event, for the
European Court to give a final ruling on the restriction's
compatibility with the Convention and it will do so by assessing
in the circumstances of a particular case, inter alia, whether the
interference corresponded to a "pressing social need" and whether
it was "proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued" (see, mutatis
mutandis, among many other authorities, the Goodwin judgment cited
above at paragraph 40, pp. 500 - 01, para. 40).
54. According to the applicant, there was no "pressing social
need" to ban a video work on the uncertain assumption that it
would breach the law of blasphemy; indeed, the overriding social
need was to allow it to be distributed. Furthermore, since
adequate protection was already provided by a panoply of laws -
concerning, inter alia, obscenity, public order and disturbances
to places of religious worship - blasphemy laws, which are
incompatible with the European idea of freedom of expression, were
also superfluous in practice. In any event, the complete
prohibition of a video work that contained no obscenity, no
pornography and no element of vilification of Christ was
disproportionate to the aim pursued.
55. For the Commission, the fact that Visions of Ecstasy was a
short video work and not a feature film meant that its
distribution would have been more limited and less likely to
attract publicity. The Commission came to the same conclusion as
the applicant.
56. The Government contended that the applicant's video work
was clearly a provocative and indecent portrayal of an object of
religious veneration, that its distribution would have been
sufficiently public and widespread to cause offence and that it
amounted to an attack on the religious beliefs of Christians which
was insulting and offensive. In those circumstances, in refusing
to grant a classification certificate for the applicant's video
work, the national authorities only acted within their margin of
appreciation.
57. The Court observes that the refusal to grant Visions of
Ecstasy a distribution certificate was intended to protect "the
rights of others", and more specifically to provide protection
against seriously offensive attacks on matters regarded as sacred
by Christians (see paragraph 48 above). The laws to which the
applicant made reference (see paragraph 54 above) and which pursue
related but distinct aims are thus not relevant in this context.
As the observations filed by the intervenors (see paragraph 5
above) show, blasphemy legislation is still in force in various
European countries. It is true that the application of these laws
has become increasingly rare and that several States have recently
repealed them altogether. In the United Kingdom only two
ртпуегхфйпоу concerning blasphemy have been brought in the last
seventy years (see paragraph 27 above). Strong arguments have been
advanced in favour of the abolition of blasphemy laws, for
example, that such laws may discriminate against different faiths
or denominations - as put forward by the applicant - or that legal
mechanisms are inadequate to deal with matters of faith or
individual belief - as recognised by the Minister of State at the
Home Department in his letter of 4 July 1989 (see paragraph 29
above). However, the fact remains that there is as yet not
sufficient common ground in the legal and social orders of the
member States of the Council of Europe to conclude that a system
whereby a State can impose restrictions on the propagation of
material on the basis that it is blasphemous is, in itself,
unnecessary in a democratic society and thus incompatible with the
Convention (see, mutatis mutandis, the Otto-Preminger-Institut
judgment cited above at paragraph 46, p. 19, para. 49).
58. Whereas there is little scope under Article 10 para. 2 of
the Convention (art. 10-2) for restrictions on political speech or
on debate of questions of public interest (see, mutatis mutandis,
among many other authorities, the Lingens v. Austria judgment of 8
July 1986, Series A no. 103, p. 26, para. 42; the Castells v.
Spain judgment of 23 April 1992, Series A no. 236, p. 23, para.
43; and the Thorgeir Thorgeirson v. Iceland judgment of 25 June
1992, Series A no. 239, p. 27, para. 63), a wider margin of
appreciation is generally available to the Contracting States when
regulating freedom of expression in relation to matters liable to
offend intimate personal convictions within the sphere of morals
or, especially, religion. Moreover, as in the field of morals, and
perhaps to an even greater degree, there is no uniform European
conception of the requirements of "the protection of the rights of
others" in relation to attacks on their religious convictions.
What is likely to cause substantial offence to persons of a
particular religious persuasion will vary significantly from time
to time and from place to place, especially in an era
characterised by an ever growing array of faiths and
denominations. By reason of their direct and continuous contact
with the vital forces of their countries, State authorities are in
principle in a better position than the international judge to
give an opinion on the exact content of these requirements with
regard to the rights of others as well as on the "necessity" of a
"restriction" intended to protect from such material those whose
deepest feelings and convictions would be seriously offended (see,
mutatis mutandis, the {Muller} and Others v. Switzerland judgment
of 24 May 1988, Series A no. 133, p. 22, para. 35).
This does not of course exclude final European supervision.
Such supervision is all the more necessary given the breadth and
open-endedness of the notion of blasphemy and the risks of
arbitrary or excessive interferences with freedom of expression
under the guise of action taken against allegedly blasphemous
material. In this regard the scope of the offence of blasphemy and
the safeguards inherent in the legislation are especially
important. Moreover the fact that the present case involves prior
restraint calls for special scrutiny by the Court (see, mutatis
mutandis, the Observer and Guardian v. the United Kingdom judgment
of 26 November 1991, Series A no. 216, p. 30, para. 60).
59. The Court's task in this case is to determine whether the
reasons relied on by the national authorities to justify the
measures interfering with the applicant's freedom of expression
are relevant and sufficient for the purposes of Article 10 para. 2
of the Convention (art. 10-2).
60. As regards the content of the law itself, the Court
observes that the English law of blasphemy does not prohibit the
expression, in any form, of views hostile to the Christian
religion. Nor can it be said that opinions which are offensive to
Christians necessarily fall within its ambit. As the English
courts have indicated (see paragraph 27 above), it is the manner
in which views are advocated rather than the views themselves
which the law seeks to control. The extent of insult to religious
feelings must be significant, as is clear from the use by the
courts of the adjectives "contemptuous", "reviling", "scurrilous",
"ludicrous" to depict material of a sufficient degree of
offensiveness.
The high degree of profanation that must be attained
constitutes, in itself, a safeguard against arbitrariness. It is
against this background that the asserted justification under
Article 10 para. 2 (art. 10-2) in the decisions of the national
authorities must be considered.
61. Visions of Ecstasy portrays, inter alia, a female character
astride the recumbent body of the crucified Christ engaged in an
act of an overtly sexual nature (see paragraph 9 above). The
national authorities, using powers that are not themselves
incompatible with the Convention (see paragraph 57 above),
considered that the manner in which such imagery was treated
placed the focus of the work "less on the erotic feelings of the
character than on those of the audience, which is the primary
function of pornography" (see paragraph 15 above). They further
held that since no attempt was made in the film to explore the
meaning of the imagery beyond engaging the viewer in a
"voyeuristic erotic experience", the public distribution of such a
video could outrage and insult the feelings of believing
Christians and constitute the criminal offence of blasphemy. This
view was reached by both the Board of Film Classification and the
Video Appeals Committee following a careful consideration of the
arguments in defence of his work presented by the applicant in the
course of two sets of proceedings. Moreover, it was open to the
applicant to challenge the decision of the Appeals Committee in
proceedings for judicial review (see paragraph 30 above).
Bearing in mind the safeguard of the high threshold of
profanation embodied in the definition of the offence of blasphemy
under English law as well as the State's margin of appreciation in
this area (see paragraph 58 above), the reasons given to justify
the measures taken can be considered as both relevant and
sufficient for the purposes of Article 10 para. 2 (art. 10-2).
Furthermore, having viewed the film for itself, the Court is
satisfied that the decisions by the national authorities cannot be
said to be arbitrary or excessive.
62. It was submitted by both the applicant and the Delegate of
the Commission that a short experimental video work would reach a
smaller audience than a major feature film, such as the one at
issue in the Otto-Preminger-Institut case (cited above at
paragraph 46). The risk that any Christian would unwittingly view
the video was therefore substantially reduced and so was the need
to impose restrictions on its distribution. Furthermore, this risk
could have been reduced further by restricting the distribution of
the film to licensed sex shops (see paragraph 23 above). Since the
film would have been dispensed in video boxes which would have
included a description of its content, only consenting adults
would ever have been confronted with it.
63. The Court notes, however, that it is in the nature of video
works that once they become available on the market they can, in
ртбгфйге, be copied, lent, rented, sold and viewed in different
homes, thereby easily escaping any form of control by the
authorities.
In these circumstances, it was not unreasonable for the
national authorities, bearing in mind the development of the video
industry in the United Kingdom (see paragraph 22 above), to
consider that the film could have reached a public to whom it
would have caused offence. The use of a box including a warning as
to the film's content (see paragraph 62 above) would have had only
limited efficiency given the varied forms of transmission of video
works mentioned above. In any event, here too the national
authorities are in a better position than the European Court to
make an assessment as to the likely impact of such a video, taking
into account the difficulties in protecting the public.
64. It is true that the measures taken by the authorities
amounted to a complete ban on the film's distribution. However,
this was an understandable consequence of the opinion of the
competent authorities that the distribution of the video would
infringe the criminal law and of the refusal of the applicant to
amend or cut out the objectionable sequences (see paragraph 13
above). Having reached the conclusion that they did as to the
blasphemous content of the film it cannot be said that the
authorities overstepped their margin of appreciation.
D. Conclusion
65. Against this background the national authorities were
entitled to consider that the impugned measure was justified as
being necessary in a democratic society within the meaning of
paragraph 2 of Article 10 (art. 10-2). There has therefore been no
violation of Article 10 of the Convention (art. 10).
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT
Holds by seven votes to two that there has been no breach of
Article 10 of the Convention (art. 10).
Done in English and in French, and delivered at a public
hearing in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 25 November
1996.
Signed: Rudolf BERNHARDT
President
Signed: Herbert PETZOLD
Registrar
In accordance with Article 51 para. 2 of the Convention (art.
51-2) and Rule 53 para. 2 of Rules of Court A, the following
separate opinions are annexed to this judgment:
(a) concurring opinion of Mr Bernhardt;
(b) concurring opinion of Mr Pettiti;
(c) dissenting opinion of Mr De Meyer;
(d) dissenting opinion of Mr Lohmus.
Initialled: R. B.
Initialled: H. P.
CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE BERNHARDT
Personally, I am not convinced that the video film Visions of
Ecstasy should have been banned by the refusal of a classification
certificate, and this conviction is, inter alia, based on my
impression when seeing the film. But it is the essence of the
national margin of appreciation that, when different opinions are
possible and do exist, the international judge should only
intervene if the national decision cannot be reasonably justified.
I have finally voted with the majority for the following
reasons:
(1) A prior control and classification of video films is not
excluded in this most sensitive area and in view of the dangers
involved, especially for young persons and the rights of others.
(2) Such a control requires a proper procedure and a careful
weighing of the interests involved whenever a classification
certificate is refused. In this respect, the present judgment
describes in detail (paragraphs 11 - 19) the considerations and
reasons in the decisions of the British authorities.
(3) In respect of the question whether the interference was
"necessary in a democratic society", I am convinced that the
national authorities have a considerable margin of appreciation,
and they have made use of it in the present case in a manner
acceptable under Convention standards.
CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE PETTITI
(Translation)
I voted with the majority, but for reasons which are
substantially different in structure and content from those given
in the judgment; I have not followed the reasoning in the Otto-
Preminger-Institut case (judgment of 20 September 1994, Series A
no. 295-A).
The first problem considered concerned the British legislation
making blasphemy a criminal offence.
Admittedly, it is regrettable that the protection afforded by
this legislation does not apply to other religions, for such a
limitation makes no sense in 1996 now that we have the United
Nations and UNESCO instruments on tolerance. However, the European
Convention on Human Rights does not, on the one hand, prohibit
legislation of this type, which is found in a number of member
States, and, on the other hand, it leaves scope for review under
Article 14 (art. 14). In the present case no complaint had been
made to the European Court under that Article (art. 14).
The Court had to decide the case under Article 10 (art. 10). To
my mind, the law on blasphemy provides a basis for consideration
of the case under paragraph 2 of Article 10 (art. 10-2) and cannot
automatically justify a ban on distribution.
Article 9 (art. 9) is not in issue in the instant case and
cannot be invoked. Certainly the Court rightly based its analysis
under Article 10 (art. 10) on the rights of others and did not, as
it had done in the Otto-Preminger-Institut judgment combine
Articles 9 and 10 (art. 9, art. 10), morals and the rights of
others, for which it had been criticised by legal writers.
However, the wording adopted by the Chamber in paragraphs 50 and
53 creates, in my opinion, too direct a link between the law of
blasphemy and the criteria justifying a ban or restriction on the
distribution of video-cassettes.
The fact that under the legislation on blasphemy, profanation
or defamation may give rise to a prosecution does not in itself
justify, under Article 10 (art. 10) of the European Convention, a
total ban on the distribution of a book or video.
In my view, the Court ought to have made that clear. There can
be no automatic response where freedom of expression is concerned.
The Court should, I think, have set out in its reasoning the
facts that led the Video Appeals Committee - to which the
applicant appealed against the determination of the British Board
of Film Classification - to prohibit distribution of the video.
I consider that the same decision could have been reached under
paragraph 2 of Article 10 (art. 10-2) on grounds other than
blasphemy, for example the profanation of symbols, including
secular ones (the national flag) or jeopardising or prejudicing
public order (but not for the benefit of a religious majority in
the territory concerned).
The reasoning should, in my opinion have been expressed in
terms both of religious beliefs and of philosophical convictions.
It is only in paragraph 53 of the judgment that the words "any
other" are cited.
Profanation and serious attacks on the deeply held feelings of
others or on religious or secular ideals can be relied on under
Article 10 para. 2 (art. 10-2) in addition to blasphemy.
What was particularly shocking in the Wingrove case was the
combination of an ostensibly philosophical message and wholly
irrelevant obscene or pornographic images.
In this case, the use of obscenity for commercial ends may
justify restrictions under Article 10 para. 2 (art. 10-2); but the
use of a figure of symbolic value as a great thinker in the
history of mankind (such as Moses, Dante or Tolstoy) in a
portrayal which seriously offends the deeply held feelings of
those who respect their works or thought may, in some cases,
justify judicial supervision so that the public can be alerted
through the reporting of court decisions.
But the possibility of prosecution does not suffice to make a
total ban legitimate. That question has been raised recently: can
a breach of rules of professional conduct (medical
confidentiality) in itself justify a total ban on a book?
Mr Wingrove's own argument and the contradictions it contained
could even have been used to supplement the Court's reasoning.
In his application he claimed that intellectual works should be
protected against censorship on exclusively moral or religious
grounds. In an article which is not reproduced in the video Mr
Wingrove indicated that he was seeking to interpret St Teresa's
writings explaining her ecstasies. In his submission, they
amounted practically to a Voltairean work or one having anti-
religious connotations. The film is quite different. Mr Wingrove
did not even agree to cut (which he was entitled to do as the film-
maker) the "simulated copulation" scene which was quite
unnecessary, even in the context of the film. Indeed, he
acknowledged that as the video stood, it could have been called
Gay Nuns in Bondage, like a pornographic film (see the
Commission's report, decision on admissibility, p. 32).
The use of the word "ecstasy" in the title was a source of
ambiguity, as much for people interested in literary works as for
those interested in pornography. The sale in hypermarkets and
supermarkets of videos inciting pornographic or obscene behaviour
is even more dangerous than the sale of books, as it is more
difficult to ensure that the public are protected.
The recent world-wide conference in Stockholm on the protection
of children highlighted the harmful social consequences of
distributing millions of copies of obscene or pornographic videos
to the public without even minimal checking of their
identification marks. Disguising content is a commercial technique
that is used to circumvent bans (for example, videos for
paedophiles that use adolescent girls, who have only just attained
their majority, dressed up as little girls).
Admittedly, before it was edited, Mr Wingrove's film was
presented as having literary rather than obscene ambitions, but
its maker chose not to dispel the ambiguity he had created. Nor
did he seek judicial review, as it was open to him to do, of the
Video Appeals Committee's dismissal of his appeal against the
Board of Film Classification's refusal to grant a classification
certificate.
It is true that section 7 of the Video Recordings Act 1984
contains a variety of provisions regulating the grant and use of
certificates, ranging from outright bans to restrictions on
viewing, identification requirements (in sales centres and on the
cover) or measures to protect minors. On this point, British and
North American case-law, particularly in Canada, contains a wealth
of definitions of the boundaries between literature, obscenity and
pornography (see the {Revue du Barreau du Quebec} and the Supreme
Court's case-law review).
The majority of the Video Appeals Committee took the view that
the imagery led not to a religious perception, but to a perverse
one, the ecstasy being furthermore of a perverse kind. That
analysis was in conformity with the approach of the House of
Lords, which moreover did not discuss the author's intention with
respect to the moral element of the offence. The Board's Director
said that it would have taken just the same stance in respect of a
film that was contemptuous of Mohammed or Buddha.
The decision not to grant a certificate might possibly have
been justifiable and justified if, instead of St Teresa's
ecstasies, what had been in issue had been a video showing, for
example, the anti-clerical Voltaire having sexual relations with
some prince or king. In such a case, the decision of the European
Court might well have been similar to that in the Wingrove case.
The rights of others under Article 10 para. 2 (art. 10-2) cannot
be restricted solely to the protection of the rights of others in
a single category of religious believers or philosophers, or a
majority of them.
The Court was quite right to base its decision on the
protection of the rights of others pursuant to Article 10 (art.
10), but to my mind it could have done so on broader grounds,
inspired to a greater extent by the concern to protect the context
of religious beliefs "or... any other", as is rightly pointed out
in paragraph 53 of the judgment.
In the difficult balancing exercise that has to be carried out
in these situations where religious and philosophical
sensibilities are confronted by freedom of expression, it is
important that the inspiration provided by the European Convention
and its interpretation should be based both on pluralism and a
sense of values.
DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE DE MEYER
1. This was a pure case of prior restraint, a form of
interference which is, in my view, unacceptable in the field of
freedom of expression.
What I have written on that subject, with four other judges, in
the case of Observer and Guardian v. the United Kingdom <*>
applies not only to the press, but also, mutatis mutandis, to
other forms of expression, including video works.
--------------------------------
<*> Judgment of 26 November 1991, Series A no. 216, p. 46.
2. It is quite legitimate that those wishing to supply video
works be obliged to obtain from some administrative authority a
classification certificate stating whether the works concerned may
be supplied to the general public or only to persons who have
attained a specified age, and whether, in the latter case, they
are to be supplied only in certain places <*>.
--------------------------------
<*> Section 7 of the Video Recordings Act 1984.
Of course, anything so decided by such authority needs
reasonable justification and must not be arbitrary. It must, if
contested, be subject to judicial review, and it must not have the
effect of preventing the courts from deciding, as the case may be,
whether the work concerned deserves, or does not deserve, any
sanction under existing law.
3. Under the system established by the Video Recordings Act
1984 the British Board of Film Classification and the Video
Appeals Committee may determine that certain video works are not
suitable for being classified in any of its three categories <*>,
and they can thus ban them absolutely ab initio.
--------------------------------
<*> Section 4 of the Act.
This was indeed what actually happened in respect of the piece
in issue in the present case.
It certainly goes too far.
4. To the extent that the criminal law of blasphemy might have
been infringed by the applicant, I would observe that the
necessity of such laws is very much open to question.
I would rather join Mr Patten's remark that for the faithful
"the strength of their own belief is the best armour against
mockers and blasphemers" <*>.
--------------------------------
<*> See paragraph 29 of the present judgment.
DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE LOHMUS
1. I am unable to agree with the conclusion of the majority
that the interference with the applicant's right to freedom of
expression was "necessary in a democratic society".
2. The British Board of Film Classification and the five-member
panel of the VAC took the view that the applicant would commit an
offence of blasphemy if his video work Visions of Ecstasy were to
be distributed (see paragraph 20 of the judgment).
3. In cases of prior restraint (censorship) there is
interference by the authorities with freedom of expression even
though the members of the society whose feelings they seek to
protect have not called for such interference. The interference is
based on the opinion of the authorities that they understand
correctly the feelings they claim to protect. The actual opinion
of believers remains unknown. I think that this is why we cannot
conclude that the interference corresponded to a "pressing social
need".
4. The law of blasphemy only protects the Christian religion
and, more specifically, the established Church of England (see
paragraph 28 of the judgment). The aim of the interference was
therefore to protect the Christian faith alone and not other
beliefs. This in itself raises the question whether the
interference was "necessary in a democratic society".
5. As the Court has consistently held, the guarantees enshrined
in Article 10 (art. 10) apply not only to information or ideas
that are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive, but also
to those that shock or disturb. Artistic impressions are often
conveyed through images and situations which may shock or disturb
the feelings of a person of average sensitivity. In my view, the
makers of the film in issue did not exceed the reasonable limit
beyond which it can be said that objects of religious veneration
have been reviled or ridiculed.
6. The majority has found that in the field of morals the
national authorities have a wide margin of appreciation. As in
that field, "there is no uniform European conception of the
requirements of "the protection of the rights of others" in
relation to attacks on their religious convictions" (see paragraph
58 of the judgment). The Court makes distinctions within Article
10 (art. 10) when applying its doctrine on the States' margin of
appreciation. Whereas, in some cases, the margin of appreciation
applied is wide, in other cases it is more limited. However, it is
difficult to ascertain what principles determine the scope of that
margin of appreciation.
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