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ПОСТАНОВЛЕНИЕ ЕВРОПЕЙСКОГО СУДА ПО ПРАВАМ ЧЕЛОВЕКА ОТ 25.02.1997 N ... ФИНДЛИ (FINDLAY) ПРОТИВ СОЕДИНЕННОГО КОРОЛЕВСТВА [РУС. (ИЗВЛЕЧЕНИЕ), АНГЛ.]

(по состоянию на 20 октября 2006 года)

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                                              [неофициальный перевод]
   
                   ЕВРОПЕЙСКИЙ СУД ПО ПРАВАМ ЧЕЛОВЕКА
   
                            СУДЕБНОЕ РЕШЕНИЕ
            ФИНДЛИ (FINDLAY) ПРОТИВ СОЕДИНЕННОГО КОРОЛЕВСТВА
   
                   (Страсбург, 25 февраля 1997 года)
   
                              (Извлечение)
   
           КРАТКОЕ НЕОФИЦИАЛЬНОЕ ИЗЛОЖЕНИЕ ОБСТОЯТЕЛЬСТВ ДЕЛА
   
                           A. Основные факты
   
       Заявитель, Александр Финдли,  родился в 1961 г.  и проживает в
   Виндзоре.  В  1980  г.  он  поступил  на службу в вооруженные силы
   Великобритании и должен был выйти в отставку в октябре или  ноябре
   1992 г.  Во время Фолклендской кампании 1982 г. он стал свидетелем
   гибели и увечья своих друзей и получил увечья сам. В последующем у
   него   были   проблемы  с  психикой  (психические  отклонения  как
   результат посттравматического стресса), которые до 1990 г. не были
   диагностированы.
       29 июля 1990 г.,  находясь в состоянии сильного опьянения,  он
   направил оружие на солдат своего подразделения, угрожая убить их и
   себя. Выстрелив дважды в направлении телевизора, он сдал пистолет,
   а затем был арестован.  В заключениях психиатров указывалось,  что
   причина инцидента связана с психическими отклонениями.
       Военное должностное  лицо  -  офицер,  имеющий  право созывать
   заседания военного трибунала,  принял в связи с данным  инцидентом
   решение  выдвинуть против г-на Финдли обвинения в совершении шести
   гражданских  и  двух  военных  правонарушений.  Созывающий  офицер
   назначил офицера - обвинителя и членов военного трибунала, который
   состоял из председателя и четырех членов;  все они были  офицерами
   более  низкого  звания,  чем созывающий офицер,  и служили под его
   командованием.  Консультант по вопросам военного судопроизводства,
   барристер,  чья  роль  заключалась  в  юридической помощи военному
   трибуналу, был назначен Службой юрисконсульта короны по военному и
   морскому праву.
       11 ноября  1991  г.  заявитель  предстал  перед  трибуналом  и
   признал себя виновным по семи обвинениям. Он был приговорен к двум
   годам тюремного заключения,  разжалован  в  рядовые  и  уволен  из
   армии.  Никаких аргументов в обоснование данного решения приведено
   не было.
       Обращения заявителя к офицеру, утверждающему решения трибунала
   (это тот  же  созывающий  офицер),  а  также  в  первую  и  вторую
   инстанцию  по  пересмотру приговора с ходатайством о его смягчении
   были отклонены.  В пересматривающей инстанции заседали не  имеющие
   юридической  квалификации армейские офицеры,  которые пользовались
   помощью Службы юрисконсульта короны по военному и морскому  праву.
   Апелляция заявителя в Высокий Суд была отклонена.
       На момент суда над г-ном  Финдли  процедура  рассмотрения  дел
   военным  трибуналом  регламентировалась  Законом  об армии 1955 г.
   Впоследствии  Законом  о  Вооруженных  силах  1996  г.  в   статус
   созывающего офицера были внесены изменения.
   
            B. Разбирательство в Комиссии по правам человека
   
       В жалобе,  поданной  в  Комиссию  28  мая  1993 г.,  заявитель
   утверждал,  что было нарушено предусмотренное статей 6  п. 1 право
   на рассмотрение   дела   независимым   и   беспристрастным  судом,
   созданным на основании закона.  Жалоба была  объявлена  приемлемой
   23 февраля 1995 г.
       В своем докладе от 5  сентября  1995  г.  Комиссия  установила
   фактические  обстоятельства дела и пришла к выводу,  что нарушение
   статьи 6 п. 1 Конвенции имело место.
   
                    ИЗВЛЕЧЕНИЕ ИЗ СУДЕБНОГО РЕШЕНИЯ
   
                             ВОПРОСЫ ПРАВА
   
                       I. Предмет разбирательства
   
                  A. Жалобы по статье 6 п. 1 Конвенции
   
       61.   В   своем   письменном  обращении  и выступлении  в Суде
   г-н Финдли   утверждал,   что   военный   трибунал   не   является
   "независимым   и  беспристрастным   судом",   что   он  не  провел
   "публичного   разбирательства   дела"   и что  он  не  был  судом,
   "созданным на основании закона".
       62. Правительство  и  представитель Комиссии отмечали во время
   слушаний,  что, поскольку два последних утверждения не содержались
   в  жалобах,  рассмотренных Комиссией,  Суд должен отказаться от их
   рассмотрения.
       63. Суд  напомнил,  что  пределы  его  компетенции обусловлены
   Решением Комиссии о приемлемости и что он не вправе  рассматривать
   новые   и  самостоятельные  жалобы,  которые  перед  Комиссией  не
   ставились (см.  inter  alia   Решение   по   делу   Сингх   против
   Соединенного  Королевства от 21 февраля 1996 г.  Reports,  1996-I,
   с. 293, п. 44).
       Г-н Финдли  в  своей  жалобе  в Комиссию,  возможно,  прямо не
   говорил  о  своем   праве   на   "публичное   разбирательство"   и
   рассмотрение дела "судом,  созданным на основании закона",  тем не
   менее он,  как представляется, затронул суть большинства связанных
   с этим проблем.  Так, в Решении Комиссии о приемлемости говорится,
   что он ссылался,  в частности,  на то  обстоятельство,  что  члены
   военного  трибунала назначаются ad hoc,  что рекомендация военного
   консультанта по поводу приговора была закрытой,  что  в  приговоре
   военного трибунала отсутствуют мотивы решения, отсутствовали они и
   при утверждении приговора офицерами, ответственными за пересмотр и
   надзорное   производство,  что  вся  процедура  обжалования  носит
   преимущественно административный характер и дело рассматривалось в
   закрытом  заседании  (см.  Решение  Комиссии о приемлемости жалобы
   N 22107/93, с. 32 - 35).
       Отсюда следует,  что речь не идет о новых и отдельных жалобах,
   и,  соответственно, Суд компетентен рассматривать эти вопросы (см.
   inter alia  и  mutatis  mutandis  Решение  по делу Джеймс и другие
   против Соединенного Королевства от 21 февраля  1986  г.  Серия  A,
   т. 98, с. 46, п. 80).
   
                    B. Жалоба по статье 25 Конвенции
                   и статье 2 Европейского соглашения
   
       64. В своем дополнительном обращении заявитель утверждал,  что
   в  переписке  с  Коллегией  солиситоров  по  вопросу,  не имевшему
   прямого  отношения  к  настоящему  делу,  генеральный  консультант
   вооруженных сил жаловался, что при рассмотрении дела г-на Финдли в
   Комиссии адвокат заявителя намекал,  что  советы,  которые  давала
   трибуналу  Служба  генерального  консультанта Вооруженных сил,  не
   были  беспристрастными.  Генеральный   консультант,   судья   Рант
   прокомментировал  это  как  "чрезвычайно  серьезные  утверждения".
   Далее в письме говорится:
       "Я хотел  бы внести полную ясность,  что на данной стадии,  не
   предвосхищая каких-либо возможных будущих действий,  я не  приношу
   формальную  жалобу  по поводу происшедшего,  поскольку дело Финдли
   будет обсуждаться в Европейском суде по правам человека в сентябре
   1996  г.  и  мне  представляется уместным отложить принятие мер до
   окончания разбирательства".
       Заявитель утверждал,  что его адвокат, представляя свои доводы
   в суде,  чувствовал себя связанным,  зная, что в будущем это может
   послужить основанием для дисциплинарного производства против него,
   в связи с чем заявитель  сослался  на  свои  права  по  статье  25
   Конвенции  и  статье  2  Европейского соглашения относительно лиц,
   участвующих в процедурах в Европейской комиссии  и  в  Европейском
   суде по правам человека.
       65. Поскольку этот вопрос  во  время  слушаний  заявителем  не
   ставился и никак не затрагивался Правительством или представителем
   Комиссии, Суд не считает нужным его рассматривать.
   
                       C. Новое законодательство
   
       66. При  письменном   и   устном   изложении   своей   позиции
   Правительство просило  Суд принять во внимание изменения,  которые
   вносит в систему военных  трибуналов  Закон  о  Вооруженных  силах
   1996 г.
       67. Суд напоминает,  что этот Закон вступил в  силу  с  апреля
   1997  г.  и  потому не подлежал применению в то время,  когда дело
   г-на  Финдли  рассматривалось  в   военном   трибунале.   Выносить
   постановление  о  законодательстве  in  abstracto в задачу Суда не
   входит,  и поэтому он не может  высказать  свою  точку  зрения  по
   поводу     совместимости    с    Конвенцией    положений    нового
   законодательства (см.  mutatis mutandis Решение по делу  Силвер  и
   другие против   Соединенного  Королевства  от  25  марта  1983  г.
   Серия A,  т.  61, с. 31, п. 79). Тем не менее он с удовлетворением
   отмечает,  что  власти Соединенного Королевства внесли изменения в
   систему военных трибуналов с  целью  обеспечить  соблюдение  своих
   обязательств по выполнению Конвенции.
   
         II. О предполагаемом нарушении статьи 6 п. 1 Конвенции
   
       68. Заявитель  утверждал,  что процедура рассмотрения его дела
   военным трибуналом не соответствовала требованиям статьи  6  п.  1
   Конвенции,  которая предусматривает (в той мере,  в какой подлежит
   применению) следующее:
       "Каждый человек   имеет   право...   при  рассмотрении  любого
   уголовного  обвинения,  предъявляемого  ему,  на  справедливое   и
   публичное  разбирательство  дела...  независимым и беспристрастным
   судом, созданным на основании закона..."
       Комиссия признала,    что   заявителю   не   было   обеспечено
   справедливое разбирательство независимым и  беспристрастным  судом
   и,   таким   образом,  имело  место  нарушение.  Правительство  не
   оспаривало этот вывод.
   
                            A. Применимость
   
       69. С точки зрения Суда, статья 6 п. 1, бесспорно, применима к
   процедуре   разбирательства   данного   дела  военным  трибуналом,
   вынесшим г-ну Финдли приговор после  того,  как  он  признал  себя
   виновным  в  отношении предъявленных ему уголовных обвинений.  Это
   мнение никем не оспаривалось (см.  Решение по делу Экле  и  другие
   против Федеративной   Республики  Германии  от  15  июля  1982  г.
   Серия A, т. 51, с. 34 - 35, п. 76 - 77).
   
                             B. Соблюдение
   
       70. Заявитель жаловался,  что  военный  трибунал  не  является
   "независимым  и беспристрастным судом",  как того требует статья 6
   п.  1,  потому что inter  alia  все  назначенные  в  него  офицеры
   находятся  в непосредственном подчинении у созывающего офицера,  и
   он  же  правомочен   возбуждать   дело.   Отсутствие   юридической
   квалификации и опыта у офицеров,  выносящих решения в военном суде
   или  пересматривающих  дела  на  последующих  стадиях,  лишает  их
   возможности действовать независимо или беспристрастно.
       Кроме того,  заявитель  утверждал,  что  не  была   обеспечена
   открытость судебного разбирательства в смысле  статьи 6 п. 1, т.к.
   рекомендации консультанта по военному судопроизводству  трибуналу,
   утверждающему  офицеру и надзорным органам носили конфиденциальный
   характер;  мотивировки   решений,   принятых   на   всех   стадиях
   разбирательства,  не  приводились;  процесс  утверждения приговора
   проходил в  административном  порядке,  приватно,  без  соблюдения
   каких-либо процессуальных гарантий.
       Наконец, заявитель утверждал,  что  рассматривавший  его  дело
   военный  трибунал  не был "судом,  созданным на основании закона",
   т.к.  нормативные акты,  регулирующие его деятельность, отличаются
   неточностью и расплывчатостью; например, в них ничего не говорится
   о порядке назначения созывающего и утверждающего офицеров.
       71. У   Правительства  не  было  замечаний  по  поводу  вывода
   Комиссии о нарушении статьи 6  п. 1 Конвенции по той причине,  что
   полномочия  созывающего офицера чрезмерно широки и члены трибунала
   находятся у него в подчинении.  Правительство просило  Суд  учесть
   изменения,  внесенные  в  систему  военных  трибуналов  Законом  о
   Вооруженных  силах  1996  г.,  который,  по  его  мнению,  снимает
   озабоченность Комиссии.
       72. Комиссия   установила,   что   созывающий   офицер   играл
   центральную  роль  в процессе обвинения,  члены военного трибунала
   были ниже его по званию и находились  под  его  командованием.  Он
   также  действовал  как  офицер,  утверждающий  вынесенные решения,
   после чего они вступали в силу.  Эти обстоятельства дают серьезные
   основания   сомневаться  в  независимости  военного  трибунала  от
   органов,  возбуждающих уголовное  преследование.  Участия  в  деле
   консультанта по   военному  судопроизводству  недостаточно,  чтобы
   развеять эти сомнения,  т.к.  он не входит в состав трибунала и не
   принимает официального участия в его заседаниях.
       Комиссия дополнительно  отметила,  что  в   составе   военного
   трибунала,    рассматривавшего    дело    Финдли,   не   было   ни
   профессиональных судей, ни дипломированных юристов, ни гражданских
   лиц,  что  он  был  создан ad hoc,  и созывающий офицер имел право
   распустить трибунал до или  во  время  суда.  Требование  принести
   присягу не является достаточной гарантией независимости.
       Соответственно Комиссия   сочла,   что   опасения    заявителя
   относительно  независимости военного трибунала объективно выглядят
   оправданными, в особенности с учетом характера и объема полномочий
   созывающего офицера,  состава трибунала и того,  что он был созван
   ad hoc. Более того, эти недостатки не компенсировались последующим
   судебным   контролем,   обеспечивающим  гарантии,  предусмотренные
   статьей 6  п. 1,  поскольку "утверждающий офицер" был тем же самым
   лицом,  что  и  созывающий  офицер,  а  в состав надзорного органа
   входили офицеры вооруженных сил. Неэффективность рассмотрения дела
   этим  органом еще более подчеркивается окружающей дело обстановкой
   секретности и отсутствием  у  г-на  Финдли  возможности  принимать
   реальное участие в процессе.
       73. Суд напоминает,  что для решения вопроса, можно ли считать
   данный суд "независимым",  следует обратить внимание inter alia на
   способ  назначения  его  членов,  сроки  пребывания  в  должности,
   существование  гарантий  от  внешнего  давления и наличие у органа
   внешних признаков независимости (см. Решение по делу Брайан против
   Соединенного Королевства от 22 ноября 1995 г.  Серия A,  т. 335-A,
   с. 15, п. 37).
       Что касается  "беспристрастности",  то у этого требования есть
   два аспекта.  Во-первых, трибунал должен быть субъективно свободен
   от личных предубеждений или пристрастий. Во-вторых, он должен быть
   объективно беспристрастен,  т.е.  должен гарантированно  исключать
   какие-либо обоснованные сомнения в этом отношении (см.  Решение по
   делу Пуллар против Соединенного Королевства от  10  июня  1996  г.
   Reports, 1996-III, с. 792, п. 30).
       Понятия независимости и  объективной  беспристрастности  тесно
   взаимосвязаны,   и  Суд  применительно  к  настоящему  делу  будет
   рассматривать их вместе.
       74. Суд отмечает,  что созывающий военный трибунал офицер, чья
   компетенция  определялась  в  соответствии  с  применявшимися в то
   время нормами,  играл значительную роль до начала слушаний по делу
   г-на Финдли.  Он решал,  какие обвинения должны быть предъявлены и
   какой тип военного трибунала  лучше  всего  подходит  для  данного
   дела.  Он созывал военный трибунал,  назначал его членов,  а также
   офицеров,  осуществляющих  обвинение  и  защиту  (см. п. 14 - 15 и
   36 - 37 выше).
       Согласно действовавшим  тогда  нормам,  в  его  задачу входила
   подготовка  для  обвинителя  и  для   консультанта   по   военному
   судопроизводству  резюме  доказательств  по  делу,  причем он имел
   право  отмечать  в  показаниях  те  из  них,  которые  могли  быть
   объявлены неприемлемыми. Он обеспечивал участие на суде свидетелей
   обвинения, а также тех свидетелей, которых "обоснованно требовала"
   защита.  Его  согласие  должно  было  предварять  возможную сделку
   обвинения с обвиняемым, в соответствии с которой последний признал
   бы себя виновным в совершении менее тяжкого преступления.
       По этим  основаниям  Суд,  как  и   Комиссия,   полагает   что
   созывающий офицер был центральной фигурой в судебном преследовании
   г-на Финдли.
       75. Таким образом,  встает вопрос,  являются ли члены военного
   трибунала  в  достаточной  степени  независимыми  от   созывающего
   офицера   и   предоставляет  ли  организация  процесса  адекватные
   гарантии беспристрастности суда.
       В этом отношении Суд разделяет озабоченность Комиссии. Следует
   отметить, что все члены военного трибунала, назначенные созывающим
   офицером,  были  ниже  его  по  званию.  Многие  из  них,  включая
   председателя,  так или иначе находились под его командованием (см.
   п. 16 выше).  Более того, полномочия созывающего офицера включали,
   хотя и в предписываемых  обстоятельствах,  возможность  распустить
   военный трибунал либо до, либо во время суда.
       76. Для веры в независимость и беспристрастность суда важны их
   внешние признаки.  Поскольку все члены военного трибунала, который
   решал дело г-на Финдли,  были ниже по званию созывающего офицера и
   находились  под  его  началом,  сомнения  г-на  Финдли  по  поводу
   независимости и беспристрастности суда объективно оправданны  (см.
   mutatis   mutandis  Решение  по  делу  Срамек  против  Австрии  от
   22 октября 1984 г. Серия A, т. 84, с. 20, п. 42).
       77. Кроме  того,  Суд  считает существенным то обстоятельство,
   что  офицер,  созывающий  трибунал,  действует   и   как   офицер,
   утверждающий  его решения.  Приговор военного трибунала вступает в
   силу лишь после такого утверждения,  причем офицер вправе изменять
   приговор так, как считает целесообразным. Это противоречит глубоко
   укоренившемуся принципу,  что право принимать обязывающие решения,
   которые  не  могут  быть  изменены несудебными властями,  является
   неотъемлемым правом самого  суда  и  представляет  собой  один  из
   компонентов  той  "независимости",  которой  требует статья 6 п. 1
   (см.  mutatis  mutandis  Решение  по  делу  Ван  де  Хурк   против
   Нидерландов от 19 апреля 1994 г. Серия A, т. 288, с. 16, п. 45).
       78. Суд согласен с Комиссией,  что эти  принципиальные  пороки
   организации  военных  трибуналов  не  устраняются  наличием  такой
   гарантии,  как участие консультанта по военному  судопроизводству,
   который  в  состав военного трибунала не входит и чьи рекомендации
   трибуналу не предаются огласке;  не  служит  гарантией  и  клятва,
   которую приносят члены военного трибунала.
       79. Недостатки,  о которых  говорилось  выше  (п. 75, 77),  не
   поддаются  исправлению при помощи процедуры последующего контроля.
   Поскольку слушания по делу заявителя касались серьезных обвинений,
   подпадающих  под  классификацию "уголовных",  согласно внутреннему
   законодательству и праву Конвенции он имел право  на  рассмотрение
   его   дела   в   суде   первой  инстанции,  который  бы  полностью
   соответствовал  требованиям  статьи 6  п. 1  (см.  Решение по делу
   Де Куббер против  Бельгии от 26 октября 1984 г.  Серия A,  т.  86,
   с. 16 - 18, п. 31 - 32).
       80. По  всем  этим  основаниям,  и  в  особенности  в  связи с
   центральной  ролью  в  организации  судопроизводства   созывающего
   офицера,  Суд  считает,  что  сомнения  г-на  Финдли  относительно
   независимости и  беспристрастности  суда,  который  занимался  его
   делом, были объективно оправданны.
       В свете вышесказанного нет необходимости рассматривать  другие
   жалобы  заявителя  на  основании  статьи  6 п. 1,  а  именно,  что
   слушания  по  делу  не  велись  "публично"  судом,  "созданным  на
   основании закона".
       Вывод: нарушение статьи 6 п. 1 Конвенции имело место.
   
                  III. Применение статьи 50 Конвенции
   
       81. Заявитель  потребовал  справедливого  возмещения  согласно
   статье 50 Конвенции, которая гласит:
       "Если Суд установит,  что решение или мера, принятые судебными
   или иными властями Высокой Договаривающейся Стороны, полностью или
   частично  противоречат  обязательствам,  вытекающим  из  настоящей
   Конвенции,  а  также  если  внутреннее  право  упомянутой  Стороны
   допускает лишь частичное возмещение последствий такого решения или
   такой  меры,  то  решением  Суда,  если в этом есть необходимость,
   предусматривается справедливое возмещение потерпевшей стороне".
   
                         A. Имущественный ущерб
   
       82. Заявитель  потребовал  компенсации,  общая  сумма  которой
   составила  440200  фунтов,  на  том  основании,  что,  если  бы не
   осуждение,  он завершил  бы  двадцатидвухлетнюю  службу  в  армии,
   получив,  возможно,  звание главного сержанта,  с правом выхода на
   пенсию по достижении 40 лет.
       83. Правительство заявило,  что признание факта нарушения само
   по  себе  является  достаточным  возмещением  или  в  субсидиарном
   порядке   ему   может   быть  присуждена  весьма  скромная  сумма.
   Во-первых,  нет  оснований  полагать,  что  заявитель  не  был  бы
   осужден, приговорен к тюремному сроку и уволен из армии после суда
   (на котором он  признал  себя  виновным),  даже  если  бы  военный
   трибунал   был   организован  иначе.  Во-вторых,  в  любом  случае
   маловероятно,  чтобы его ждала долгая карьера  в  армии,  учитывая
   психический стресс после травмы и повреждение спины, от которых он
   страдал.  Заявитель  уже  получил  100  тысяч  фунтов  в   порядке
   урегулирования его гражданского иска к Министерству обороны.
       84. Во время слушаний представитель Комиссии отметил,  что  не
   установлена   причинная   связь   между   нарушением  Конвенции  и
   предположительным материальным  ущербом,  но  отметил  также,  что
   нельзя  спекулировать  по  поводу  того,  привел бы процесс к иным
   последствиям, если бы он соответствовал требованиям статьи 6 п. 1.
       85. Суд  согласен  с тем,  что нельзя строить предположения по
   поводу  того,  какими  были  бы  последствия,  если  бы  нарушения
   Конвенции не было (см.,  например,  Решение по делу Шмауцер против
   Австрии  от 23 октября 1995 г.  Серия A,  т. 328-A, с. 16, п. 44).
   Присуждение   г-ну   Финдли   компенсации  за  материальный  ущерб
   невозможно.
   
                           B. Моральный вред
   
       86. Заявитель потребовал компенсацию в сумме 50000  английских
   фунтов  за  переживания и страдания,  вызванные разбирательством в
   военном трибунале,  и за восемь месяцев,  проведенных им в тюрьме.
   Он также потребовал отмены обвинительного приговора.
       87. Правительство указало, что отмена обвинительного приговора
   заявителя выходит за пределы полномочий настоящего Суда.
       88. Суд,  со своей стороны,  также подчеркнул,  что  не  имеет
   права  отменять  приговоры,  вынесенные  национальными судами (см.
   вышеупомянутое Решение по делу Шмауцера).
       В итоге  Суд  пришел  к выводу,  что признание факта нарушения
   само  по  себе  является  достаточной  компенсацией  заявителю  за
   моральный вред.
   
                         C. Издержки и расходы
   
       89. Заявитель  потребовал  23956 фунтов 25 пенсов в возмещение
   судебных издержек  и  расходов,  включая  1000  фунтов  на  оплату
   адвоката и 250 фунтов за составление жалобы в Высокий Суд.
       90. Правительство полагало,  что расходы заявителя  в  Высоком
   Суде  должны  быть  исключены,  а  итоговая  сумма  в 22500 фунтов
   представляется разумной.
       91. Суд  считает,  что,  принимая  во  внимание обстоятельства
   настоящего  дела,  апелляция  в  Высокий  Суд  с  целью   добиться
   устранения  нарушения была разумной.  Поэтому он принимает решение
   присудить полную оплату всех требуемых расходов за  вычетом  сумм,
   полученных в порядке судебной помощи от Совета Европы.
   
                        D. Проценты за просрочку
   
       92. Согласно   имеющейся  у  Суда  информации,  действующая  в
   Соединенном  Королевстве  процентная  ставка  на  день   вынесения
   настоящего Судебного решения составляет 8% годовых.
   
                   ПО ЭТИМ ОСНОВАНИЯМ СУД ЕДИНОГЛАСНО
   
       1. Постановил,  что  имело  место  нарушение  статьи  6  п.  1
   Конвенции;
       2. Отклонил требование об имущественном ущербе;
       3. Постановил,  что установление факта нарушения  представляет
   собой  достаточное  и  справедливое  возмещение  морального вреда,
   причиненного заявителю;
       4. Постановил, что
       a) государство  -  ответчик  должно  в  течение  трех  месяцев
   выплатить  заявителю  в  возмещение  издержек  и расходов 23956,25
   (двадцать три тысячи девятьсот пятьдесят шесть фунтов стерлингов и
   двадцать  пять  пенсов)  за  вычетом  26891  (двадцати шести тысяч
   восьмисот девяносто одного) французского  франка,  которые  должны
   быть  переведены  в  фунты  стерлингов  по обменному курсу на дату
   вынесения настоящего Судебного решения;
       b) по  истечении  вышеупомянутого трехмесячного срока и вплоть
   до погашения уплачивается простой процент из расчета 8% годовых.
   
       Совершено на английском и французском  языках  и  оглашено  во
   Дворце прав человека в Страсбурге 25 февраля 1997 г.
   
                                                         Председатель
                                                        Рольф РИССДАЛ
   
                                                               Грефье
                                                     Герберт ПЕТЦОЛЬД
   
   
   
   
   
   
       В соответствии со статьей 51  п. 2 Конвенции и статьей 53 п. 2
   Регламента  Суда  A  к  настоящему Решению прилагается совпадающее
   мнение судьи Де Мейера.
   
                   СОВПАДАЮЩЕЕ МНЕНИЕ СУДЬИ ДЕ МЕЙЕРА
   
       К данному Судебному решению,  результат которого  я  полностью
   одобряю, хотелось бы добавить одно короткое замечание.
       В приведенных  доводах  вновь  делается  ссылка  на   "внешние
   признаки" (п. 73, 76).
       Прежде всего я бы хотел отметить, что у Суда нет необходимости
   полагаться на "внешние признаки", т.к. было предъявлено достаточно
   убедительных доказательств,  позволяющих ему сделать вывод, что та
   система организации военного трибунала,  которая признала виновным
   сержанта Финдли и  вынесла  приговор  по  данному  делу,  является
   неприемлемой.
       Более того,  я бы хотел подчеркнуть,  что мы принципиально  не
   должны  ничего  решать  на  основании  "внешних  признаков"  и что
   особенно  нам  не  следует  позволять  себе  оказываться  в  плену
   произведенного  ими  впечатления при решении вопроса,  является ли
   суд независимым и беспристрастным.  Мы были не правы,  делая это в
   прошлом, и не должны делать это в будущем.
   
   
   
   
   
   
                     EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
   
                  CASE OF FINDLAY v. THE UNITED KINGDOM
   
                                JUDGMENT
   
                        (Strasbourg, 25.II.1997)
   
       In the case of Findlay v. the United Kingdom <1>,
       The European  Court  of Human Rights,  sitting,  in accordance
   with Article 43 (art.  43) of the Convention for the Protection of
   Human  Rights  and Fundamental Freedoms ("the Convention") and the
   relevant provisions of Rules of Court A <2>, as a Chamber composed
   of the following judges:
       --------------------------------
       <1> The case is numbered 110/1995/616/706. The first number is
   the case's position on the list of cases referred to the Court  in
   the  relevant year (second number).  The last two numbers indicate
   the case's position on the list of cases  referred  to  the  Court
   since   its   creation  and  on  the  list  of  the  corresponding
   originating applications to the Commission.
       <2> Rules  A  apply  to all cases referred to the Court before
   the entry into force of Protocol No.  9 (P9) (1 October 1994)  and
   thereafter  only  to  cases  concerning  States  not bound by that
   Protocol (P9).  They correspond to the Rules that came into  force
   on 1 January 1983, as amended several times subsequently.
   
       Mr R. Ryssdal, President,
       Mr J. De Meyer,
       Mrs E. Palm,
       Mr A.N. Loizou,
       Mr J.M. Morenilla,
       Sir John Freeland,
       Mr D. Gotchev,
       Mr P. Jambrek,
       Mr K. Jungwiert,
       and also of Mr H.  Petzold,  Registrar,  and Mr P.J.  Mahoney,
   Deputy Registrar,
       Having deliberated  in  private  on  27  September 1996 and 21
   January 1997,
       Delivers the  following  judgment,  which  was  adopted on the
   last-mentioned date:
   
                               PROCEDURE
   
       1. The  case  was  referred  to  the  Court  by  the  European
   Commission  of Human Rights ("the Commission") on 8 December 1995,
   within the three-month period laid down by Article 32 para.  1 and
   Article 47 of the Convention (art.  32-1,  art. 47). It originated
   in an application (no.  22107/93) against the  United  Kingdom  of
   Great  Britain  and  Northern  Ireland  lodged with the Commission
   under Article 25 (art.  25) by Mr  Alexander  Findlay,  a  British
   citizen, on 28 May 1993.
       The Commission's request referred to Articles 44 and 48  (art.
   44,  art.  48)  and  to the declaration whereby the United Kingdom
   recognised the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court  (Article  46)
   (art.  46).  The object of the request was to obtain a decision as
   to whether the facts  of  the  case  disclosed  a  breach  by  the
   respondent State of its obligations under Article 6 para. 1 of the
   Convention (art. 6-1).
       2. In  response to the enquiry made in accordance with Rule 33
   para.  3 (d) of Rules of Court A,  the applicant  stated  that  he
   wished  to  take part in the proceedings and designated the lawyer
   who would represent him (Rule 30).
       3. The  Chamber to be constituted included ex officio Sir John
   Freeland,  the elected judge of British nationality (Article 43 of
   the Convention) (art. 43), and Mr R. Ryssdal, the President of the
   Court (Rule 21 para.  4 (b)).  On 8 February 1996, in the presence
   of the Registrar, the President drew by lot the names of the other
   seven members, namely Mr J. De Meyer, Mrs E. Palm, Mr A.N. Loizou,
   Mr  J.M.  Morenilla,  Mr  D.  Gotchev,  Mr  P.  Jambrek  and Mr K.
   Jungwiert (Article 43 in  fine  of  the  Convention  and  Rule  21
   para. 5) (art. 43).
       4. As President of the Chamber (Rule 21 para.  6), Mr Ryssdal,
   acting  through  the Registrar,  consulted the Agent of the United
   Kingdom Government ("the Government"),  the applicant's lawyer and
   the  Delegate  of  the  Commission  on  the  organisation  of  the
   proceedings (Rules 37 para.  1 and 38). Pursuant to the order made
   in consequence, the Registrar received the applicant's memorial on
   28 June 1996 and the Government's memorial on 4 July 1996.
       On 29  August 1996 the President decided to admit to the Court
   file an additional memorial submitted by the applicant  which  had
   been received by the Registrar on 7 August 1996 (Rule 37 para. 1).
       5. In accordance with the President's  decision,  the  hearing
   took place in public in the Human Rights Building,  Strasbourg, on
   25 September 1996.  The  Court  had  held  a  preparatory  meeting
   beforehand.
       There appeared before the Court:
       (a) for the Government
       Ms S. Dickson, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Agent,
       Mr P. Havers QC,
       Mr J. Eadie, Barrister-at-Law, Counsel,
       Mr G. Rogers, Ministry of Defence,
       Ms J. Murnane, Ministry of Defence,
       Mr D. Woodhead, Ministry of Defence, Advisers;
       (b) for the Commission
       Mr N. Bratza, Delegate,
       (c) for the applicant
       Mr J. Mackenzie, Solicitor, Counsel,
       Mr G. Blades, Solicitor,
       Mr D. Sullivan, Solicitor, Advisers.
       The Court heard addresses  by  Mr  Bratza,  Mr  Mackenzie  and
   Mr Havers.
   
                            AS TO THE FACTS
   
                      I. Circumstances of the case
   
       6. The applicant,  Alexander Findlay, is a British citizen who
   was born in  1961  in  Kilmarnock,  Scotland,  and  now  lives  in
   Windsor, England.
       7. In 1980 he joined the British army and became a  member  of
   the  Scots Guards.  His service was due to terminate in October or
   November 1992 when he would have  received  a  resettlement  grant
   and, at the age of sixty, an army pension.
       8. In 1982 Mr Findlay took part  in  the  Falklands  campaign.
   During  the  battle of Mount Tumbledown he witnessed the death and
   mutilation of several of his friends and was  himself  injured  in
   the  wrist  by  a  mortar-shell  blast.  According  to the medical
   evidence prepared for his court martial (see paragraphs  11  -  13
   below),  as  a  result  of  these  experiences  he  suffered  from
   post-traumatic stress disorder ("PTSD"),  which manifested  itself
   by  flashbacks,  nightmares,  feelings  of  anxiety,  insomnia and
   outbursts of anger.  This disorder was not diagnosed  until  after
   the events of 29 July 1990 (see paragraph 10 below).
       9. In 1987 he sustained an injury during training for  service
   in Northern Ireland when a rope which he was climbing broke and he
   fell to the ground,  severely damaging his back.  This injury  was
   extremely  painful and affected his ability to perform his duties,
   which,  again according to the medical evidence, led him to suffer
   from feelings of stress, guilt and depression.
       10. In 1990 the applicant,  who had become  a  lance-sergeant,
   was  sent with his regiment to Northern Ireland.  On 29 July 1990,
   after a heavy drinking session, he held members of his own unit at
   pistol  point  and  threatened  to  kill  himself  and some of his
   colleagues. He fired two shots, which were not aimed at anyone and
   hit a television set,  and subsequently surrendered the pistol. He
   was then arrested.
   
                        1. The medical evidence
   
       11. On 31 July 1990 an  ex-naval  psychiatrist,  Dr  McKinnon,
   examined  Mr  Findlay  and  found  that he was responsible for his
   actions at the time of the incident.  However,  a  combination  of
   stresses  (including  his  back  injury  and  posting  to Northern
   Ireland) together with his heavy drinking on the day,  had led  to
   an  "almost  inevitable" event.  Dr McKinnon recommended "awarding
   the minimum appropriate punishment".
       Following  this  report,  the  decision  was  taken  to charge
   Mr Findlay  with  a number of offences arising out of the incident
   on 29 July (see paragraph 14 below).
       12. In order to establish that he was fit to stand  trial,  at
   the request  of  the  army  he  was  examined  on two occasions by
   Dr Blunden,  a  civilian  consultant  psychiatrist  who  had  been
   employed by the Ministry of Defence since 1980.
       In her report of  January  1991,  Dr  Blunden  confirmed  that
   Mr Findlay was fit to plead and knew what he was doing at the time
   of the incident.  However,  his chronic back problem (which caused
   him  to  be  frustrated and depressed at not being fit for duty in
   his Northern Ireland posting) together with "his  previous  combat
   stresses and a very high level of alcohol ...  combined to produce
   this dangerous behaviour".
       In her  second report,  of March 1991,  she explained that the
   applicant had reacted to the stress caused by his back problems in
   the  way  he did on 29 July 1990 because of his experiences in the
   Falklands war.  Whilst she did not clearly state that he  suffered
   from  PTSD,  she  confirmed  that  similar  patterns  of behaviour
   frequently occurred at a late stage in those who experienced  this
   disorder.  She  confirmed  that  the consumption of alcohol on the
   relevant day was a result of his condition and not a cause of it.
       13. Mr Findlay was also examined by Dr Reid, at the request of
   his (Mr Findlay's) solicitor.  Dr Reid diagnosed him as  suffering
   from PTSD as a result of his service in the Falklands.
   
                2. The composition of the court martial
   
       14. The  position  of "convening officer" (see paragraphs 36 -
   41 below) for the applicant's court martial  was  assumed  by  the
   General Officer Commanding London District, Major General Corbett.
   He remanded Mr Findlay for trial on eight charges arising  out  of
   the  incident  of 29 July 1990 and decided that he should be tried
   by general court martial.
       15. By  an order dated 31 October 1991,  the convening officer
   convened the general court  martial  and  appointed  the  military
   personnel  who  were  to  act  as  prosecuting officer,  assistant
   prosecuting officer and assistant defending officer (to  represent
   Mr  Findlay  in  addition to his solicitor) and the members of the
   court martial (see paragraph 37 below).
       16. The  court martial consisted of a president and four other
   members:
       (1) the  president,  Colonel  Godbold,  was a member of London
   District staff (under the command of the  convening  officer:  see
   paragraph  14  above).  He was appointed by name by the latter and
   was not a permanent president;
       (2) Lieutenant-Colonel  Swallow  was  a permanent president of
   courts martial,  sitting in the capacity of an ordinary member. He
   had  his  office  in  the  London  District  Headquarters.  He was
   appointed by name by the convening officer;
       (3) Captain  Tubbs  was  from  the  Coldstream Guards,  a unit
   stationed in London District.  His  reporting  chain  was  to  his
   officer   commanding,  his  commanding  officer  and  the  Brigade
   Commander,  after  which  his   report   could,   in   exceptional
   circumstances,  go to the convening officer;  he was a member of a
   footguard unit and  the  convening  officer,  as  General  Officer
   Commanding,  was  responsible  for  all  footguard  units.  He was
   appointed to the court martial by his commanding officer;
       (4) Major  Bolitho  was  from  the  Grenadier  Guards,  also a
   footguard unit stationed in London District. The convening officer
   was his second superior reporting officer. He was appointed to the
   court martial by his commanding officer;
       (5) Captain   O'Connor   was   from  the  Postal  and  Courier
   Department,  Royal Engineers (Women's Royal Army Corps),  which is
   under  the  direct  command  of  the  Ministry  of  Defence and is
   administered by the London District.  She  was  appointed  by  her
   commanding officer.
       In summary,  all of the members  of  the  court  martial  were
   subordinate  in  rank to the convening officer and served in units
   stationed within London District. None of them had legal training.
       17. The assistant prosecuting and defending officers were both
   officers from the Second Scots  Guards  stationed  in  the  London
   District  and  had  the same reporting chain as Captain Tubbs (see
   paragraph 16 (3) above).
       18. The  judge  advocate  for  the  general  court martial was
   appointed by the Judge Advocate General (see paragraphs  42  -  45
   below).  He  was a barrister and assistant judge advocate with the
   Judge Advocate General's Office.
   
                      3. The court martial hearing
   
       19. On 11  November  1991,  Mr  Findlay  appeared  before  the
   general court martial, at Regent's Park Barracks in London. He was
   represented by a solicitor.
       He pleaded  guilty  to  three  charges  of  common  assault (a
   civilian offence), two charges of conduct to the prejudice of good
   order and military discipline (a military offence) and two charges
   of threatening to kill (a civilian offence).
       20. On  2  November  1991,  his  solicitor  had made a written
   request to the prosecuting authorities to ensure the appearance of
   Dr  Blunden  at  the  court  martial  and  on  5 November 1991 the
   prosecuting officer had issued a  witness  summons  requiring  her
   attendance.  However,  the  defence was informed on the morning of
   the hearing that Dr Blunden would not  be  attending.  Mr  Findlay
   claims that her absence persuaded him to plead guilty to the above
   charges.  However, his solicitor did not request an adjournment or
   object to the hearing proceeding.
       21. The defence put  before  the  court  martial  the  medical
   reports  referred to above (paragraphs 11 - 13) and called Dr Reid
   to give evidence. The latter confirmed his view that the applicant
   suffered from PTSD,  that this had been the principal cause of his
   behaviour,  that he had not been responsible for his  actions  and
   that he was in need of counselling.  During cross-examination,  Dr
   Reid stated that this  was  the  first  time  he  had  dealt  with
   battle-related PTSD.
       The prosecution did not call any medical evidence in  rebuttal
   or  adopt  any  of  the  evidence  prepared by the army-instructed
   psychiatrists,  Drs McKinnon and Blunden (see paragraphs 11  -  13
   above).
       22. In the course of his speech in  mitigation,  Mr  Findlay's
   solicitor  urged the court martial that,  in view of the fact that
   his client had been  suffering  from  PTSD  at  the  time  of  the
   incident  and  was  extremely  unlikely to reoffend,  he should be
   allowed to complete the few remaining months of  his  service  and
   leave  the  army with his pension intact and a minimal endorsement
   on his record.
       23. Having heard the evidence and speeches,  the court martial
   retired to consider their decision on sentence, accompanied by the
   judge  advocate.  On  their return they sentenced the applicant to
   two years' imprisonment,  reduction to the rank of  guardsman  and
   dismissal from the army (which caused him to suffer a reduction in
   his pension entitlement).  No reasons were given for the  sentence
   (see paragraph 46 below).
   
           4. The confirmation of sentence and review process
   
       24. Under the Army Act 1955, the decision of the court martial
   had no effect until it was confirmed by the  "confirming  officer"
   (see  paragraph  48  below).  In  Mr Findlay's case,  as was usual
   practice,  the confirming officer  was  the  same  person  as  the
   convening  officer.  Mr  Findlay petitioned him for a reduction in
   sentence.
       Having received  advice  from  the  Judge  Advocate  General's
   Office,  the  confirming  officer  informed   the   applicant   on
   16 December 1991 that the sentence had been upheld.
       25. The applicant,  who had been under close arrest since  the
   morning  before  the  court  martial  hearing,  was  removed on 18
   November 1991 to a military prison and thereafter  to  a  civilian
   prison on 21 December 1991.
       26. He appealed by  way  of  petition  to  the  first  of  the
   "reviewing  authorities"  (see  paragraph  49  below),  the Deputy
   Director General of Personal Services,  as delegate  of  the  Army
   Board,  a  non-legally  qualified officer who obtained advice from
   the Judge Advocate General's Office.  By a letter dated 22 January
   1992,  Mr  Findlay  was  informed  that  this  petition  had  been
   rejected.
       27. He   then   petitioned   the   second   of  the  reviewing
   authorities,  a member of the Defence Council  who  also  was  not
   legally  qualified  and  who  also  received advice from the Judge
   Advocate General's Office.  This petition was rejected on 10 March
   1992.
       28. The advice given by the Judge Advocate General's Office at
   each  of  these  three  stages  of review was not disclosed to the
   applicant,  nor was he given reasons for the decisions  confirming
   his sentence and rejecting his petitions.
       29. On 10 March 1992,  the applicant applied to the Divisional
   Court  for  leave  to challenge by judicial review the validity of
   the findings of the court martial.  He claimed that  the  sentence
   imposed was excessive,  the proceedings were contrary to the rules
   of natural justice and that the judge advocate had been hostile to
   him on two occasions during the hearing.
       On 14 December 1992 the Divisional Court refused leave on  the
   basis   that  the  court  martial  had  been  conducted  fully  in
   accordance with the Army Act 1955 and there  was  no  evidence  of
   improper  conduct  or  hostility on the part of the judge advocate
   (R.  v.  General Court Martial (Regent's Park Barracks),  ex parte
   Alexander Findlay, CO/1092/92, unreported).
   
                         5. Civil proceedings
   
       30. Mr  Findlay  commenced a civil claim in negligence against
   the military authorities,  claiming damages in respect of his back
   injury  and  PTSD.  In a report dated 16 January 1994 prepared for
   these purposes,  Dr Blunden confirmed her  previous  opinion  (see
   paragraph 12 above) and clearly diagnosed PTSD.
       31. In  March  1994  the  civil  action  was  settled  by  the
   Secretary of State for Defence, who paid the applicant 100,000 GBP
   and   legal   costs,  without  any  admission  of  liability.  The
   settlement did not differentiate between the claims in respect  of
   PTSD and the back injury.
   
                 II. Relevant domestic law and practice
   
                    1. The law in force at the time
                     of Mr Findlay's court martial
   
       (a) General
       32. The law and procedures which applied  to  the  applicant's
   court  martial  were  contained  in  the  Army Act 1955 ("the 1955
   Act"),  the Rules of Procedure (Army) 1972 ("the 1972 Rules")  and
   the   Queen's   Regulations   (1975).   Since   the   Commission's
   consideration of the case, certain provisions in the 1955 Act have
   been amended by the Armed Forces Act 1996 ("the 1996 Act"),  which
   comes into force on 1 April 1997 (see paragraphs 52 - 57 below).
       33. Many  civilian  offences  are also offences under the 1955
   Act (section 70 (1)).  Although the final decision on jurisdiction
   lies with the civilian authorities, army personnel who are accused
   of such offences are usually tried  by  the  military  authorities
   unless, for example, civilians are involved in some way.
       Depending on their gravity,  charges against army law  can  be
   tried by district, field or general court martial. A court martial
   is not a standing court: it comes into existence in order to try a
   single offence or group of offences.
       34. At the time of the events in  question,  a  general  court
   martial  consisted of a president (normally a brigadier or colonel
   in the army),  appointed by name by  the  convening  officer  (see
   paragraphs 36 - 41 below),  and at least four other army officers,
   either appointed by name by  the  convening  officer  or,  at  the
   latter's request, by their commanding officer.
       35. Each  member  of  the  court  martial  had  to  swear  the
   following oath:
       "I swear by almighty God that I will well and  truly  try  the
   accused  before  the  court according to the evidence,  and that I
   will duly administer justice  according  to  the  Army  Act  1955,
   without  partiality,  favour or affection,  and I do further swear
   that I will not on any account at any time whatsoever disclose  or
   discover  the  vote  or  opinion of the president or any member of
   this court martial, unless thereunto required in the due course of
   law."
       (b) The convening officer
       36. Before the coming into force of the 1996 Act,  a convening
   officer (who had to be a field  officer  or  of  corresponding  or
   superior  rank,  in  command of a body of the regular forces or of
   the command within which the  person  to  be  tried  was  serving)
   assumed  responsibility  for  every  case  to  be  tried  by court
   martial.  He or she would decide upon the nature and detail of the
   charges to be brought and the type of court martial required,  and
   was responsible for convening the court martial.
       37. The  convening  officer  would  draw up a convening order,
   which would specify,  inter alia,  the date, place and time of the
   trial,  the  name  of  the  president and the details of the other
   members, all of whom he could appoint (see paragraph 15 above). He
   ensured  that  a  judge  advocate  (see  paragraph  43  below) was
   appointed by the Judge Advocate General's Office and, failing such
   appointment,  could appoint one.  He also appointed, or directed a
   commanding officer to appoint, the prosecuting officer.
       38. Prior   to   the   hearing,   the  convening  officer  was
   responsible for  sending  an  abstract  of  the  evidence  to  the
   prosecuting officer and to the judge advocate,  and could indicate
   the  passages  which  might  be  inadmissible.  He  procured   the
   attendance  at  trial  of  all  witnesses  to  be  called  for the
   prosecution.  When charges were withdrawn, the convening officer's
   consent  was  normally obtained,  although it was not necessary in
   all cases,  and a plea to a lesser charge could  not  be  accepted
   from the accused without it.
       39. He had also to  ensure  that  the  accused  had  a  proper
   opportunity  to  prepare  his  defence,  legal  representation  if
   required and the opportunity to contact the defence witnesses, and
   was  responsible for ordering the attendance at the hearing of all
   witnesses "reasonably requested" by the defence.
       40. The  convening  officer  could  dissolve the court martial
   either before or during the trial,  when required in the interests
   of the administration of justice (section 95 of the 1955 Act).  In
   addition,  he could comment on the "proceedings of a court martial
   which require confirmation".  Those remarks would not form part of
   the record of the proceedings and would normally  be  communicated
   in  a separate minute to the members of the court,  although in an
   exceptional case "where a more public instruction  [was]  required
   in  the interests of discipline",  they could be made known in the
   orders of the command (Queen's Regulations, paragraph 6.129).
       41. The  convening officer usually acted as confirming officer
   also (see paragraph 48 below).
       (c) The Judge Advocate General and judge advocates
       42. The current Judge Advocate General was  appointed  by  the
   Queen  in  February  1991 for five years.  He is answerable to the
   Queen and is  removable  from  office  by  her  for  inability  or
   misbehaviour.
       At the time of the events  in  question,  the  Judge  Advocate
   General  had  the  role  of  adviser to the Secretary of State for
   Defence on all matters touching and concerning the office of Judge
   Advocate  General,  including  advice  on  military  law  and  the
   procedures and conduct of the court-martial system.  He  was  also
   responsible  for advising the confirming and reviewing authorities
   following a court martial (see paragraph 49 below).
       43. Judge  advocates  are  appointed  to  the  Judge  Advocate
   General's Office by the Lord Chancellor.  They must have at  least
   seven  and  five  years  experience respectively as an advocate or
   barrister.
       44. At  the  time of the events in question,  a judge advocate
   was appointed to each court martial,  either by the Judge Advocate
   General's  Office  or  by  the  convening  officer.  He or she was
   responsible for advising the court martial on all questions of law
   and  procedure  arising  during  the  hearing and the court had to
   accept this advice unless there were weighty reasons for not doing
   so. In addition, in conjunction with the president, he was under a
   duty to ensure that the accused did not  suffer  any  disadvantage
   during the hearing. For example, if the latter pleaded guilty, the
   judge advocate had to ensure that he or she fully  understood  the
   implications  of  the  plea  and  admitted all the elements of the
   charge.  At the close of the hearing, the judge advocate would sum
   up the relevant law and evidence.
       45. Prior to the coming into force of the 1996 Act,  the judge
   advocate did not take part in the court martial's deliberations on
   conviction or acquittal, although he could advise it in private on
   general principles in relation to sentencing.  He was not a member
   of the court martial and had no vote in the decision on conviction
   or sentence.
       (d) Procedure on a guilty plea
       46. At  the  time  of  the  events  in question,  on a plea of
   guilty,  the prosecuting officer outlined the  facts  and  put  in
   evidence  any  circumstance which might have made the accused more
   susceptible to the commission of the offence.  The defence made  a
   plea  in mitigation and could call witnesses (rules 71 (3) (a) and
   71 (5) (a) of the 1972 Rules).  The members of the  court  martial
   then  retired  with  the  judge advocate to consider the sentence,
   which was pronounced in open court. There was no provision for the
   giving of reasons by the court martial for its decision.
       47. Certain types of sentence were  not  available  to  courts
   martial  at the time of the applicant's trial,  even in respect of
   civilian offences.  For example, a court martial could not suspend
   a  prison  sentence,  issue  a  probation  order  or  sentence  to
   community service.
       (e) Confirmation and post-hearing reviews
       48. Until the amendments introduced by the 1996 Act,  a  court
   martial's  findings  were  not  effective  until  confirmed  by  a
   "confirming  officer".  Prior  to  confirmation,  the   confirming
   officer  used  to  seek the advice of the Judge Advocate General's
   Office,  where a judge advocate different to the one who acted  at
   the  hearing  would  be  appointed.  The  confirming officer could
   withhold confirmation or substitute, postpone or remit in whole or
   in part any sentence.
       49. Once the sentence had been confirmed,  the defendant could
   petition  the "reviewing authorities".  These were the Queen,  the
   Defence Council (who could delegate to the  Army  Board),  or  any
   officer superior in command to the confirming officer (section 113
   of the 1955 Act).  The reviewing authorities could seek the advice
   of  the  Judge  Advocate  General's Office.  They had the power to
   quash a finding and to exercise the same powers as the  confirming
   officer  in  relation to substituting,  remitting or commuting the
   sentence.
       50. A  petitioner  was  not  informed  of  the identity of the
   confirming officer or of the reviewing authorities.  No  statutory
   or  formalised  procedures  were  laid down for the conduct of the
   post-hearing reviews and  no  reasons  were  given  for  decisions
   delivered  subsequent  to  them.  Neither the fact that advice had
   been received from the Judge Advocate  General's  Office  nor  the
   nature of that advice was disclosed.
       51. A courts martial appeal court (made up of civilian judges)
   could  hear  appeals against conviction from a court martial,  but
   there was no provision for such an appeal  against  sentence  when
   the accused pleaded guilty.
   
                      2. The Armed Forces Act 1996
   
       52. Under the 1996 Act, the role of the convening officer will
   cease to exist  and  his  functions  will  be  split  among  three
   different   bodies:  the  "higher  authorities",  the  prosecuting
   authority  and  court  administration  officers  (see  1996   Act,
   Schedule I).
       53. The higher authority,  who will be a senior officer,  will
   decide   whether  any  case  referred  to  him  by  the  accused's
   commanding officer should be dealt with summarily, referred to the
   new prosecuting authority,  or dropped.  Once the higher authority
   has  taken  this  decision,  he  or  she  will  have  no   further
   involvement in the case.
       54. The prosecuting authority  will  be  the  Services'  legal
   branches.  Following  the  higher  authority's decision to refer a
   case  to  them,  the  prosecuting  authority  will  have  absolute
   discretion, applying similar criteria as those applied in civilian
   cases by the Crown Prosecution Service to decide whether or not to
   prosecute,  what  type  of  court martial would be appropriate and
   precisely what charges should be brought.  They will then  conduct
   the prosecution (1996 Act, Schedule I, Part II).
       55. Court administration officers will be  appointed  in  each
   Service  and  will  be  independent  of  both  the  higher and the
   prosecuting authorities.  They will be responsible for making  the
   arrangements  for  courts  martial,  including arranging venue and
   timing,  ensuring that a judge advocate and  any  court  officials
   required  will be available,  securing the attendance of witnesses
   and selection of members. Officers under the command of the higher
   authority  will  not  be  selected as members of the court martial
   (1996 Act, Schedule I, Part III, section 19).
       56. Each court martial will in future include a judge advocate
   as a member.  His advice on points  of  law  will  become  rulings
   binding  on the court and he will have a vote on sentence (but not
   on conviction).  The casting vote,  if needed,  will rest with the
   president of the court martial, who will also give reasons for the
   sentence in open court.  The Judge Advocate General will no longer
   provide general legal advice to the Secretary of State for Defence
   (1996 Act, Schedule I, Part III, sections 19, 25 and 27).
       57. Findings  by  a court martial will no longer be subject to
   confirmation or revision by a confirming officer (whose role is to
   be  abolished).  A reviewing authority will be established in each
   Service to conduct a single review of each case.  Reasons will  be
   given for the decision of the reviewing authority. As part of this
   process,  post-trial advice received by  the  reviewing  authority
   from  a  judge  advocate  (who  will be different from the one who
   officiated at the court-martial) will be disclosed to the accused.
   A  right  of  appeal  against  sentence  to  the (civilian) courts
   martial appeal court will be added to the existing right of appeal
   against conviction (1996 Act, section 17 and Schedule V).
   
                   PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION
   
       58. In  his  application  to the Commission (no.  22107/93) of
   28 May 1993,  Mr Findlay made a number of complaints under Article
   6  para.  1 of the Convention (art.  6-1),  inter alia that he had
   been denied a fair hearing before the court martial  and  that  it
   was not an independent and impartial tribunal.
      59. The Commission declared the application  admissible  on  23
   February  1995.  In  its  report  of 5 September 1995 (Article 31)
   (art.  31), it expressed the unanimous opinion that there had been
   a violation of Article 6 para.  1 of the Convention (art. 6-1), in
   that the applicant was not given a fair hearing by an  independent
   and impartial tribunal, and that it was unnecessary to examine the
   further  specific  complaints  as   to   the   fairness   of   the
   court-martial  proceedings  and  the  subsequent  reviews  or  the
   reasonableness  of  the  decisions  taken  against  him  and   the
   available  sentencing  options.  The full text of the Commission's
   opinion is reproduced as an annex to this judgment <3>.
       --------------------------------
       <3> For practical reasons this annex will appear only with the
   printed  version  of  the  judgment  (in  Reports of Judgments and
   Decisions 1997-I),  but a  copy  of  the  Commission's  report  is
   obtainable from the registry.
   
                     FINAL SUBMISSIONS TO THE COURT
   
       60. At  the  hearing,  the  Government  said  that  it did not
   contest the Commission's conclusions but asked the Court  to  take
   note  of the changes to the court-martial system to be effected by
   the Armed  Forces  Act  1996  which,  they  submitted,  more  than
   satisfactorily met the Commission's concerns.
       On the same occasion,  the applicant asked the Court to find a
   violation  of Article 6 para.  1 (art.  6-1) and to award him just
   satisfaction under Article 50 of the Convention (art. 50).
   
                             AS TO THE LAW
   
                          I. Scope of the case
   
             A. The complaints concerning Article 6 para. 1
                      of the Convention (art. 6-1)
   
       61. In  his  written  and oral pleadings before the Court,  Mr
   Findlay complained that the court martial was not an  "independent
   and  impartial  tribunal",  that  it  did  not  give him a "public
   hearing" and that it was not a tribunal "established by law".
       62. The Government and the Commission's Delegate both observed
   at the hearing that since the latter two complaints had  not  been
   expressly  raised before the Commission,  the Court should decline
   to entertain them.
       63. The  Court  recalls  that the scope of its jurisdiction is
   determined by the Commission's decision on admissibility and  that
   it  has  no  power  to entertain new and separate complaints which
   were not raised before the Commission (see,  inter alia, the Singh
   v.  the  United  Kingdom judgment of 21 February 1996,  Reports of
   Judgments and Decisions 1996-I, p. 293, para. 44).
       However, while Mr Findlay in his application to the Commission
   may not expressly have invoked his rights under Article 6 para.  1
   of the Convention (art. 6-1) to a "public hearing" and a "tribunal
   established by law",  he does appear to have raised  in  substance
   most  of  the  matters  which  form the basis of his complaints in
   relation to  these  two  provisions.  Thus,  in  the  Commission's
   decision   on  admissibility,  he  is  reported  as  referring  in
   particular to the facts that the members of the court martial were
   appointed  ad hoc,  that the judge advocate's advice on sentencing
   was not disclosed,  that no reasons were given for  the  decisions
   taken  by the court-martial board and the confirming and reviewing
   officers,  and that  the  post-hearing  reviews  were  essentially
   administrative  in  nature  and  conducted  in  private  (see  the
   Commission's decision on admissibility,  application no. 22107/93,
   pp. 32 - 35).
       It follows that these are not new and separate complaints, and
   that  the  Court  has jurisdiction to consider these matters (see,
   inter alia and mutatis mutandis,  the  James  and  Others  v.  the
   United Kingdom  judgment  of  21 February 1986,  Series A no.  98,
   p. 6, para. 80).
   
        B. The complaint concerning Article 25 of the Convention
           (art. 25) and Article 2 of the European Agreement
   
       64. In  his  additional  memorial  (see paragraph 4 above) the
   applicant asserted that,  in correspondence with  the  Solicitors'
   Complaints  Bureau (a professional disciplinary body) concerning a
   matter of no relevance to the present  case,  the  Judge  Advocate
   General  had  complained  that,  during the course of Mr Findlay's
   application to the Commission,  his solicitor had made allegations
   concerning a lack of impartiality in the advice given by the Judge
   Advocate General's Office. The Judge Advocate General, Judge Rant,
   had commented: "These are extremely serious allegations ...". In a
   later letter, Judge Rant wrote:
       "I wish  to  make  it  clear  that,  at this stage and without
   prejudice to any action which  might  have  to  be  taken  in  the
   future,  I  am  making no formal complaint about the passage [from
   the applicant's submission  to  the  Commission]  quoted  in  that
   letter.  The  reason for this is that the case of Findlay is to be
   argued before the European Court of Human Rights in September 1996
   and  therefore  it is only proper for me to defer action until the
   end of those proceedings."
       The applicant  alleged  that his solicitor felt constrained in
   presenting his arguments to the Court in the knowledge  that  they
   might  subsequently form the basis of disciplinary proceedings and
   he invoked his rights under Article 25 of the Convention (art. 25)
   and  Article  2  of  the  European  Agreement  relating to Persons
   Participating in Proceedings before the  European  Commission  and
   Court of Human Rights.
       65. Since this issue was not pursued by the applicant  at  the
   hearing  or  referred  to by the Government or the Delegate of the
   Commission at any time,  the Court does not find it appropriate to
   examine it.
   
                         C. The new legislation
   
       66. In their written and oral pleadings,  the Government asked
   the Court to take note in  its  judgment  of  the  changes  to  be
   effected  in the court-martial system by the Armed Forces Act 1996
   (see paragraphs 52 - 57 above).
       67. The Court recalls that this new statute does not come into
   force until April 1997,  and thus did not apply at the time of  Mr
   Findlay's  court  martial.  It  is not the Court's task to rule on
   legislation in abstracto and it cannot therefore express a view as
   to the compatibility of the provisions of the new legislation with
   the Convention (see,  mutatis mutandis,  the Silver and Others  v.
   the United  Kingdom  judgment of 25 March 1983,  Series A no.  61,
   p. 31, para. 79). Nonetheless, it notes with satisfaction that the
   United  Kingdom authorities have made changes to the court-martial
   system with a view to ensuring the observance of their  Convention
   commitments.
   
               II. Alleged violation of Article 6 para. 1
                      of the Convention (art. 6-1)
   
       68. The applicant claimed that  his  trial  by  court  martial
   failed  to  meet  the  requirements  of  Article 6 para.  1 of the
   Convention (art. 6-1), which provides (so far as is relevant):
       "In the determination of ...  any criminal charge against him,
   everyone is entitled to a  fair  and  public  hearing  ...  by  an
   independent and impartial tribunal established by law..."
       The Commission found that there had been a violation,  in that
   the  applicant  was not given a fair hearing by an independent and
   impartial tribunal,  and  the  Government  did  not  contest  this
   conclusion.
   
                            A. Applicability
   
       69. In the view of the Court,  Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) is
   clearly applicable to the court-martial  proceedings,  since  they
   involved  the determination of Mr Findlay's sentence following his
   plea of guilty to criminal charges;  indeed,  this point  was  not
   disputed  before  it (see the Engel and Others v.  the Netherlands
   judgment of 18 June 1976,  Series A no.  22,  pp.  33 - 36, paras.
   80 - 85,  and  the  Eckle  v.  Germany  judgment  of 15 July 1982,
   Series A no. 51, pp. 34 - 35, paras. 76 - 77).
   
                             B. Compliance
   
       70. The applicant complained that the court martial was not an
   "independent  and  impartial  tribunal"  as  required by Article 6
   para.  1  (art.  6-1),  because,  inter  alia,  all  the  officers
   appointed to it were directly subordinate to the convening officer
   who  also  performed  the  role  of  prosecuting  authority   (see
   paragraphs  14  -  17  and  36  -  41  above).  The  lack of legal
   qualification or experience in the officers making  the  decisions
   either  at  the  court martial or review stages made it impossible
   for them to act in an independent or impartial manner.
       In addition,  he  asserted  that he was not afforded a "public
   hearing" within the meaning of Article 6 para.  1 (art.  6-1),  in
   that  the judge advocate's advice to the court-martial board,  the
   confirming officer and the reviewing authorities was confidential;
   no  reasons  were  given  for  the  decisions made at any of these
   stages in the proceedings;  and  the  process  of  confirming  and
   reviewing  the  verdict and sentence by the confirming officer and
   reviewing  authorities  was  carried  out   administratively,   in
   private,  with no apparent rules of procedure (see paragraphs 42 -
   46 and 48 - 51 above).
       Finally, he  claimed that his court martial was not a tribunal
   "established by law", because the statutory framework according to
   which  it proceeded was too vague and imprecise;  for example,  it
   was  silent  on  the  question  of  how  the  convening   officer,
   confirming officer and reviewing authorities were to be appointed.
       71. The Government  had  no  observations  to  make  upon  the
   Commission's conclusion that there had been a violation of Article
   6 para.  1 of the Convention (art.  6-1) by reason of the width of
   the  role  of  the  convening  officer  and his command links with
   members of the tribunal.  They asked the Court to take note of the
   changes  to  the  court-martial system to be effected by the Armed
   Forces  Act  1996  which,   in   their   submission,   more   than
   satisfactorily met the Commission's concerns.
       72. The Commission found that although the  convening  officer
   played  a central role in the prosecution of the case,  all of the
   members of the court-martial board were subordinate in rank to him
   and  under  his  overall  command.  He  also  acted  as confirming
   officer,  and the court martial's findings  had  no  effect  until
   confirmed by him.  These circumstances gave serious cause to doubt
   the independence of the tribunal from the  prosecuting  authority.
   The judge advocate's involvement was not sufficient to dispel this
   doubt,  since he was not a member of the court  martial,  did  not
   take  part  in its deliberations and gave his advice on sentencing
   in private.
       In addition,  it  noted  that Mr Findlay's court-martial board
   contained no judicial members, no legally qualified members and no
   civilians,  that  it  was  set  up on an ad hoc basis and that the
   convening officer had the power to dissolve it  either  before  or
   during  the  trial.  The  requirement  to  take  an oath was not a
   sufficient guarantee of independence.
       Accordingly, it  considered  that  the applicant's fears about
   the independence  of  the  court  martial  could  be  regarded  as
   objectively  justified,  particularly  in  view  of the nature and
   extent of the convening officer's roles,  the composition  of  the
   court  martial  and  its  ad  hoc  nature.  This  defect  was not,
   moreover,  remedied by any subsequent review by  a  judicial  body
   affording  all the guarantees required by Article 6 para.  1 (art.
   6-1),  since the confirming officer was the  same  person  as  the
   convening   officer,  and  the  reviewing  authorities  were  army
   officers,  the second of whom was superior in rank to  the  first.
   The  ineffectiveness  of  the  post-hearing  reviews  was  further
   underlined by  the  secrecy  surrounding  them  and  the  lack  of
   opportunity for Mr Findlay to participate in a meaningful way.
       73. The Court recalls that in order  to  establish  whether  a
   tribunal  can be considered as "independent",  regard must be had,
   inter alia,  to the manner of appointment of its members and their
   term  of  office,  the  existence  of  guarantees  against outside
   pressures and the question whether the body presents an appearance
   of  independence (see the Bryan v.  the United Kingdom judgment of
   22 November 1995, Series A no. 335-A, p. 15, para. 37).
       As to the question of "impartiality", there are two aspects to
   this requirement. First, the tribunal must be subjectively free of
   personal  prejudice or bias.  Secondly,  it must also be impartial
   from an objective viewpoint,  that is,  it must  offer  sufficient
   guarantees  to  exclude  any legitimate doubt in this respect (see
   the Pullar v. the United Kingdom judgment of 10 June 1996, Reports
   1996-III, p. 792, para. 30).
       The concepts of independence and  objective  impartiality  are
   closely  linked  and the Court will consider them together as they
   relate to the present case.
       74. The Court observes that the convening officer,  as was his
   responsibility under the rules applicable at the  time,  played  a
   significant  role  before  the  hearing  of Mr Findlay's case.  He
   decided which charges should be brought and which  type  of  court
   martial  was  most appropriate.  He convened the court martial and
   appointed its members and the prosecuting and  defending  officers
   (see paragraphs 14 - 15 and 36 - 37 above).
       Under the rules then in force,  he had the task of sending  an
   abstract  of the evidence to the prosecuting officer and the judge
   advocate and could indicate passages which might be  inadmissible.
   He  procured  the  attendance  at  trial  of the witnesses for the
   prosecution and those "reasonably requested" by the  defence.  His
   agreement  was  necessary  before  the  prosecuting  officer could
   accept a plea to a lesser charge from an accused and  was  usually
   sought  before  charges  were  withdrawn (see paragraphs 38 and 39
   above).
       For these  reasons the Court,  like the Commission,  considers
   that the convening officer was central to Mr Findlay's prosecution
   and closely linked to the prosecuting authorities.
       75. The question therefore arises whether the members  of  the
   court  martial  were  sufficiently  independent  of  the convening
   officer and whether the organisation of the trial offered adequate
   guarantees of impartiality.
       In this respect also the Court  shares  the  concerns  of  the
   Commission.  It  is  noteworthy  that all the members of the court
   martial,  appointed by the convening officer,  were subordinate in
   rank to him.  Many of them, including the president, were directly
   or  ultimately  under  his  command  (see  paragraph  16   above).
   Furthermore,  the  convening  officer  had  the  power,  albeit in
   prescribed circumstances,  to dissolve the  court  martial  either
   before or during the trial (see paragraph 40 above).
       76. In order to maintain confidence in  the  independence  and
   impartiality of the court, appearances may be of importance. Since
   all the members of the court martial which  decided  Mr  Findlay's
   case  were  subordinate  in rank to the convening officer and fell
   within his  chain  of  command,  Mr  Findlay's  doubts  about  the
   tribunal's  independence  and  impartiality  could  be objectively
   justified (see,  mutatis mutandis,  the Sramek v. Austria judgment
   of 22 October 1984, Series A no. 84, p. 20, para. 42).
       77. In addition,  the Court  finds  it  significant  that  the
   convening  officer also acted as "confirming officer".  Thus,  the
   decision of the court martial was not effective until ratified  by
   him,  and  he had the power to vary the sentence imposed as he saw
   fit  (see  paragraph  48  above).  This   is   contrary   to   the
   well-established  principle  that  the  power  to  give  a binding
   decision which may not be altered by a non-judicial  authority  is
   inherent  in the very notion of "tribunal" and can also be seen as
   a component of the "independence" required by Article  6  para.  1
   (art.  6-1)  (see,  mutatis  mutandis,  the  Van  de  Hurk v.  the
   Netherlands judgment of 19 April 1994,  Series A no.  288,  p. 16,
   para. 45).
       78. The Court further agrees with the  Commission  that  these
   fundamental flaws in the court-martial system were not remedied by
   the presence of safeguards,  such as the involvement of the  judge
   advocate,  who  was not himself a member of the tribunal and whose
   advice to it was not made public (see paragraphs 45 -  46  above),
   or  the  oath taken by the members of the court-martial board (see
   paragraph 35 above).
       79. Nor  could the defects referred to above (in paragraphs 75
   and 77) be corrected by any subsequent review  proceedings.  Since
   the   applicant's  hearing  was  concerned  with  serious  charges
   classified as "criminal" under both domestic and  Convention  law,
   he  was  entitled to a first-instance tribunal which fully met the
   requirements of Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) (see the De Cubber v.
   Belgium judgment of 26 October 1984, Series A no. 86, pp. 16 - 18,
   paras. 31 - 32).
       80. For all these reasons,  and in particular the central role
   played by the convening officer in the organisation of  the  court
   martial,  the  Court  considers that Mr Findlay's misgivings about
   the independence and impartiality of the tribunal which dealt with
   his case were objectively justified.
       In view of the above,  it is not necessary for it to  consider
   the   applicant's   other  complaints  under  Article  6 para.   1
   (art. 6-1),  namely that he was not afforded a "public hearing" by
   a tribunal "established by law".
       In conclusion, there has been a violation of Article 6 para. 1
   of the Convention (art. 6-1).
   
                     III. Application of Article 50
                      of the Convention (art. 50)
   
       81. The  applicant  claimed  just  satisfaction  pursuant   to
   Article 50 of the Convention (art. 50), which states:
       "If the Court finds that a decision or a measure  taken  by  a
   legal authority or any other authority of a High Contracting Party
   is completely  or  partially  in  conflict  with  the  obligations
   arising  from the ...  Convention,  and if the internal law of the
   said Party allows only partial  reparation  to  be  made  for  the
   consequences  of  this  decision  or measure,  the decision of the
   Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured
   party."
   
                          A. Pecuniary damage
   
       82. The  applicant  claimed  compensation  for  loss of income
   totalling 440,200 pounds sterling (GBP), on the basis that, had he
   not  been  convicted  and  sentenced  as  he  was,  he  would have
   completed a twenty-two year engagement  in  the  army,  eventually
   attaining  the  rank  of  Colour  Sergeant,  with entitlement to a
   pension from the age of forty.
       83. The  Government  submitted  that  a finding of a violation
   would constitute sufficient satisfaction,  or, in the alternative,
   that  only  a very modest amount should be awarded.  First,  there
   were no grounds for believing that the applicant  would  not  have
   been convicted,  sentenced to a term of imprisonment and dismissed
   from the army following his trial (at which  he  pleaded  guilty),
   even   if  the  court  martial  had  been  differently  organised.
   Secondly, it was in any case unlikely that he would have enjoyed a
   long  career  in  the  army,  in view of the post traumatic stress
   disorder and back injury from which he suffered (see paragraphs 8,
   9 and 30 above); he had already received GBP 100,000 in settlement
   of his civil claim against the Ministry of Defence,  a large  part
   of which related to loss of earning capacity.
       84. At the hearing, the Commission's Delegate observed that no
   causal  link  had  been  established  between  the  breach  of the
   Convention  complained  of  by  the  applicant  and  the   alleged
   pecuniary  damage,  and  submitted  that  it  was  not possible to
   speculate as to whether  the  proceedings  would  have  led  to  a
   different outcome had they fulfilled the requirements of Article 6
   para. 1 (art. 6-1).
       85. The  Court  agrees;  it  cannot  speculate  as to what the
   outcome of the court-martial proceedings might have been  had  the
   violation  of the Convention not occurred (see,  for example,  the
   Schmautzer v.  Austria judgment of 23 October 1995,  Series A  no.
   328-A, p. 16, para. 44). It is therefore inappropriate to award Mr
   Findlay compensation for pecuniary damage.
   
                        B. Non-pecuniary damage
   
       86. The applicant claimed compensation of GBP 50,000  for  the
   distress and suffering caused by the court-martial proceedings and
   for the eight months he spent in prison.  He also asked  that  his
   conviction be quashed.
       87. The Government pointed out that it was beyond the power of
   the Court to quash the applicant's conviction.
       88. The Court reiterates that it is impossible to speculate as
   to  what  might  have  occurred  had  there  been no breach of the
   Convention.  Furthermore,  it  has  no   jurisdiction   to   quash
   convictions pronounced by national courts (see the above-mentioned
   Schmautzer judgment, loc. cit.).
       In conclusion, the Court considers that a finding of violation
   in itself affords the  applicant  sufficient  reparation  for  the
   alleged non-pecuniary damage.
   
                         C. Costs and expenses
   
       89. The  applicant  claimed  GBP  23,956.25  legal  costs  and
   expenses,  which included GBP 1,000 solicitor's costs and GBP  250
   counsel's fees for the application before the Divisional Court.
       90. The Government expressed the view that the  costs  of  the
   application  to  the  Divisional  Court should be disallowed,  and
   submitted that a total of GBP 22,500 would be a reasonable sum.
       91. The  Court  considers  that,  in  the circumstances of the
   present case,  it was reasonable to make the  application  to  the
   Divisional Court,  in an attempt to seek redress for the violation
   of which Mr Findlay complains.  It therefore decides to  award  in
   full the costs and expenses claimed,  less the amounts received in
   legal aid from the Council of Europe which have not  already  been
   taken into account in the claim.
   
                          D. Default interest
   
       92. According  to the information available to the Court,  the
   statutory rate of interest applicable in the United Kingdom at the
   date of adoption of the present judgment is 8% per annum.
   
                FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
   
       1. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 para.  1
   of the Convention (art. 6-1);
       2. Dismisses the claim for pecuniary damage;
       3. Holds that the finding of a violation in itself constitutes
   sufficient  just satisfaction for any non-pecuniary damage alleged
   by the applicant;
       4. Holds
       (a) that the respondent State is  to  pay  to  the  applicant,
   within  three  months,  in  respect  of  costs  and expenses,  GBP
   23,956.25  (twenty-three  thousand,  nine  hundred  and  fifty-six
   pounds  sterling  and  twenty-five  pence) less 26,891 (twenty-six
   thousand,  eight hundred and  ninety-one)  French  francs,  to  be
   converted  into pounds sterling at the rate applicable on the date
   of delivery of the present judgment;
       (b) that  simple  interest  at  an annual rate of 8%  shall be
   payable from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months  until
   settlement.
   
       Done in  English  and  in  French  and  delivered  at a public
   hearing in the Human Rights Building,  Strasbourg,  on 25 February
   1997.
   
                                              Signed:    Rolv RYSSDAL
                                                            President
   
                                              Signed: Herbert PETZOLD
                                                            Registrar
   
   
   
   
   
   
       In  accordance  with  Article  51  para.  2  of the Convention
   (art. 51-2)  and  Rule  53  para.  2  of  Rules  of  Court A,  the
   concurring opinion of Mr De Meyer is annexed to this judgment.
   
                                                     Initialled: R.R.
   
                                                     Initialled: H.P.
   
                  CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE DE MEYER
   
       To this judgment, the result of which I fully approve, I would
   add a brief remark.
       Once again reference is made in its reasoning to "appearances"
   (paragraphs 73 and 76).
       First of  all,  I would observe that the Court did not need to
   rely on "appearances", since there were enough convincing elements
   to  enable  it  to  conclude that the court-martial system,  under
   which Lance-Sergeant Findlay was convicted and  sentenced  in  the
   present case, was not acceptable.
       Moreover, I  would  like  to  stress  that,  as  a  matter  of
   principle,  we  should  never  decide  anything  on  the  basis of
   "appearances",  and that  we  should,  in  particular,  not  allow
   ourselves  to be impressed by them in determining whether or not a
   court is independent and impartial. We have been wrong to do so in
   the past, and we should not do so in the future.
   
   


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