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ПОСТАНОВЛЕНИЕ ЕВРОПЕЙСКОГО СУДА ПО ПРАВАМ ЧЕЛОВЕКА ОТ 25.05.1998 СОЦИАЛИСТИЧЕСКАЯ ПАРТИЯ И ДРУГИЕ ПРОТИВ ТУРЦИИ [РУС. (ИЗВЛЕЧЕНИЕ), АНГЛ.]

(по состоянию на 20 октября 2006 года)

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                                               [неофициальный перевод]
   
                  ЕВРОПЕЙСКИЙ СУД ПО ПРАВАМ ЧЕЛОВЕКА
                                   
                           СУДЕБНОЕ РЕШЕНИЕ
            СОЦИАЛИСТИЧЕСКАЯ ПАРТИЯ И ДРУГИЕ ПРОТИВ ТУРЦИИ
                                   
                     (Страсбург, 25 мая 1998 года)
   
                             (Извлечение)
   
          КРАТКОЕ НЕОФИЦИАЛЬНОЕ ИЗЛОЖЕНИЕ ОБСТОЯТЕЛЬСТВ ДЕЛА
   
                           A. Основные факты
   
       Социалистическая партия (СП), первый заявитель, была основана 1
   февраля   1988   г.  и  распущена  в  октябре  1992   г.   Решением
   Конституционного Суда. Г-н Илхан Кирит и г-н Догу Перинчек,  второй
   и  третий  заявители,  были соответственно председателем  и  бывшим
   председателем партии. Они проживают в Стамбуле.
       15  февраля  1988  г., через две недели после основания  партии
   Генеральный  прокурор обратился в Конституционный Суд с требованием
   о  ее роспуске, утверждая со ссылками на программу партии, что  она
   стремится установить в стране диктатуру пролетариата.
       8  декабря того же года Конституционный Суд отклонил запрос как
   необоснованный:   по   его   мнению,  политические   цели   партии,
   сформулированные в программе, не противоречили Конституции.
       14  ноября  1991 г. Генеральный прокурор вторично  обратился  в
   Конституционный  Суд.  Ссылаясь на публикации  СП  и  заявления  ее
   руководителей,  в  том  числе во время  избирательной  кампании  по
   выборам   в  Парламент,  он  утверждал,  что  деятельность   партии
   направлена  на  подрыв  территориальной целостности  государства  и
   единства  нации, что является нарушением пяти статей Конституции  и
   трех статей Закона N 2820 (О политических партиях).
       В  своем  Решении от 10 июля 1992 г., опубликованном 25 октября
   1992  г.,  Конституционный Суд объявил о роспуске СП. Это  повлекло
   за   собой  ipso  jure  конфискацию  и  передачу  имущества  СП   в
   Казначейство и запрещение ее руководителям занимать любой  подобный
   пост в будущем.
   
           B. Разбирательство в Комиссии по правам человека
   
       В  жалобе  заявителя в Комиссию, поданной 31 декабря  1992  г.,
   утверждалось, что были нарушены несколько статей Конвенции - 6,  9,
   10,  11,  взятые  отдельно и в сочетании со  статьей  14,  а  также
   статьи  1  и  3  Протокола  N  1.  Жалоба  была  признана  частично
   приемлемой.
       В  своем докладе от 26 ноября 1996 г. Комиссия установила факты
   и единогласно пришла к выводу, что:
       a) имело место нарушение статьи 11 Конвенции,
       b) не было нарушения статьи 6 п. 1 Конвенции;
       c) нет отдельного вопроса по статьям 9 и 10 Конвенции;
       d)  нет  необходимости рассматривать отдельно, имело  ли  место
   нарушение статей 14 и 18 Конвенции и статей 1 и 3 Протокола N 1.
       Комиссия передала дело в Суд 27 января 1997.
   
                    ИЗВЛЕЧЕНИЕ ИЗ СУДЕБНОГО РЕШЕНИЯ
   
                             ВОПРОСЫ ПРАВА
   
           I. О предполагаемом нарушении статьи 11 Конвенции
   
       24.  Заявители утверждали, что роспуск Социалистической  партии
   (СП)  и  запрет  ее руководителям занимать подобные посты  в  любой
   другой   политической   партии  нарушили  их   право   на   свободу
   ассоциаций,    гарантируемое   статьей   11   Конвенции,    которая
   предусматривает:
       "1. Каждый человек имеет право на свободу мирных собраний и  на
   свободу    ассоциации   с   другими,   включая   право    создавать
   профессиональные  союзы  и  вступать в  таковые  для  защиты  своих
   интересов.
       2.  Осуществление  этих прав не подлежит никаким  ограничениям,
   кроме  тех,  которые  установлены законом и  которые  необходимы  в
   демократическом  обществе в интересах государственной  безопасности
   и  общественного спокойствия, в целях предотвращения беспорядков  и
   преступлений,  охраны здоровья и нравственности или защиты  прав  и
   свобод  других  лиц.  Настоящая  статья  не  препятствует  введению
   законных  ограничений на осуществление этих прав лицами,  входящими
   в  состав  вооруженных  сил, полиции или  административных  органов
   государства".
   
                       A. Применимость статьи 11
   
                          1. Аргументы сторон
   
       a) Заявители
       Заявители   утверждали  что  политические  партии,  несомненно,
   подпадают под действие статьи 11.
       b) Правительство
       26. В своем Меморандуме Правительство утверждало, что статья 11
   ни  в коем случае не применима к политическим партиям. Если в своем
   уставе  и  программе  партия  подвергает  нападкам  конституционный
   строй  государства, Суд должен объявить, что Конвенция не применима
   ratione materiae, или применить статью 17.
       27.  Деятельность СП явно свидетельствует о том,  что  ее  цели
   несовместимы   с   фундаментальными   конституционными   принципами
   Турции.   Из   ее  заявления  очевидно,  что  партия  признает   за
   гражданами  курдского  происхождения статус "нации"  и  "народа"  и
   право  на  "образование отдельного государства", что она  выступала
   за  учреждение  федерации,  не исключая даже  создания  федеральных
   образований, имеющих право открывать консульства в других  странах.
   Поскольку  это  было равнозначно тому, чтобы ставить  под  сомнение
   саму   основу   государства,   Конституционный   Суд   должен   был
   рассмотреть  конституционность такой  политической  цели.  Выполняя
   эту    задачу,    он    следовал   линии,   намеченной    Решениями
   Конституционного Суда Германии от 31 октября 1991 г. о праве лиц  с
   иностранным   гражданством  принимать  участие  в  голосовании   на
   выборах  в  местные органы и Конституционного Совета Франции  от  9
   мая 1991 г. о статусе Корсики.
       Во   время   разбирательства  Правительство   утверждало,   что
   государства  -  участники  Конвенции  не  имели  никогда  намерения
   поставить  под  контроль органов Совета Европы свои конституционные
   институты, и в особенности принципы, которые они рассматривали  как
   необходимые  условия их существования. По этой причине политическая
   партия  типа  СП,  поставившая  эти  институты  или  принципы   под
   сомнение,   не   может  требовать  применения  Конвенции   или   ее
   Протоколов,  поскольку предмет спора в настоящем  деле  не  свобода
   ассоциаций, но право на самоопределение, которое не входит в  сферу
   действия Конвенции.
       В  крайнем  случае в отношении СП следует применить  статью  17
   Конвенции,  поскольку  партия  стремилась  оправдать  использование
   насилия  и возбудить ненависть к турецкому государству, а  также  к
   неправомерному   разделению  всего  народа  на  два  противостоящих
   лагеря.  Выполняя  эту задачу, СП говорила тем  же  языком,  что  и
   Рабочая  партия Курдистана (РПК); СП не отмежевалась ни  от  одного
   из  методов  последней.  Конституционный  Суд  в  своем  Решении  о
   роспуске   СП  отметил,  что  деятельность  партии  подпадает   под
   действие статьи 17 Конвенции.
       c) Комиссия
       28.  Комиссия  выразила  мнение, что  в  тексте  статьи  11  не
   содержится  ничего,  что ограничивало бы сферу ее  действия  особой
   формой  ассоциации  или  группы или предполагало  бы,  что  она  не
   распространяется   на   политические   партии.    Напротив,    если
   рассматривать   статью   11  как  юридическую   гарантию,   которая
   обеспечивает    надлежащее    функционирование    демократии,    то
   политические  партии  представляют одну  из  наиболее  важных  форм
   ассоциации,  защиту  которых  она  предусматривает.  В  этой  связи
   Комиссия  упомянула целый ряд решений, в которых она рассмотрела  в
   соответствии  со  статьей  11  различные  ограничения  деятельности
   политических  партий  и  даже  роспуск  таких  партий,  тем   самым
   подтверждая,  что  статья 11 применяется к  этому  типу  ассоциаций
   (см.  дело  Коммунистической  партии  Германии,  жалоба  N  250/57,
   Annuaire, т. 1 с. 225; Греческое дело, Annuaire, т. 12, с. 170,  п.
   392;  дело  Франция,  Норвегия, Дания, Швеция и  Нидерланды  против
   Турции, жалоба N 9940-9944/82. D.R. 35, с. 143).
       Во  время  разбирательства в Суде представитель Комиссии  также
   заявил,  что  не было необходимости применять статью 17  Конвенции,
   поскольку   ни   программа  СП,  ни  заявления,   сделанные   г-ном
   Перинчеком  и  ставшие  предметом  судебного  разбирательства,   не
   указывали  на  то,  что  речь  шла  о  ликвидации  прав  и  свобод,
   защищаемых Конвенцией.
   
                            2. Оценка Суда
   
       29.  В  своем  Решении  по  делу Объединенная  коммунистическая
   партия  Турции  и  другие против Турции от 30 января  1998  г.  Суд
   указал,   что   политические   партии  представляют   собой   форму
   ассоциации,  жизненно необходимую для надлежащего  функционирования
   демократии, и что ввиду важности демократии в системе Конвенции  не
   может   быть  сомнения,  что  политические  партии  подпадают   под
   действие  статьи 11. С другой стороны, Суд отметил, что ассоциация,
   в  том  числе  политическая партия, не может  быть  лишена  защиты,
   предоставляемой   Конвенцией,  лишь   потому,   что   ее   действия
   расцениваются    национальными   органами   власти    как    подрыв
   конституционных    основ   государства   и    требуют    применения
   запретительных  мер.  Суд не видит никакого основания  в  настоящем
   деле, чтобы прийти к другому заключению.
       Что  касается  применения  статьи 17,  Суд  обратится  к  этому
   вопросу позже (см. п. 53 ниже).
   
                        B. Соблюдение статьи 11
   
                       1. Наличие вмешательства
   
       30.   Все   заявители  подтвердили,  что  роспуск  СП   являлся
   вмешательством  в их право на свободу ассоциаций. Такое  же  мнение
   сложилось и у Суда.
   
                 2. Было ли вмешательство оправданным
   
       31.  Вмешательство является нарушением статьи 11, если  оно  не
   "предусмотрено  законом", не преследует одну или более  правомерных
   целей  согласно п. 2 и "необходимо в демократическом обществе"  для
   достижения этих целей.
       a) "Предусмотрено законом"
       32.  Все сошлись во мнении, что ограничение было "предусмотрено
   законом",  поскольку  оспариваемые  Решения  Конституционного  Суда
   основывались  на статье 2, статье 3 п. 1, статье  6,  статье  10  и
   статье 14 п. 1 и бывшей статье 68 Конституции, а также статьях  78,
   81 и 96 (3) Закона N 2820 о политических партиях.
       b) Правомерная цель
       33.  Правительство  утверждало,  что  ограничение  преследовало
   целый    ряд   правомерных   целей:   обеспечение   государственной
   безопасности,    общественного   спокойствия   и    территориальной
   целостности и защиты прав и свобод других лиц. Если Суд  признал  в
   Судебном  решении  по  делу Хаджианастассиу  против  Греции  от  16
   декабря   1992   г.   (Серия  A,  т.  252),   что   государственной
   безопасности может нанести вред даже отдельный случай шпионажа,  то
   тем  более  обоснован такой вывод применительно к настоящему  делу,
   где  угрозе подвергается само существование государства - участника
   Конвенции.
       34.  Заявители  отметили, что прокуратура ни  на  какой  стадии
   процедуры   в   Конституционном   Суде   не   ссылалась    ни    на
   государственную безопасность, ни на общественное спокойствие.
       Комиссия  полагала,  что запрещение деятельности,  которая,  по
   мнению  властей,  могла  бы  привести к  краху  государства  или  к
   разделу  его  территории,  можно  считать  направленным  на  защиту
   "национальной безопасности" и территориальной целостности.
       36.  Суд  считает, что роспуск СП преследовал по  крайней  мере
   одну  из  "правомерных целей", изложенных в статье  11,  -  "защита
   национальной безопасности".
       c) "Необходимо в демократическом обществе"
       i) Аргументы сторон
       1) Заявители
       37.    Заявители    утверждали,    что    в    плюралистической
   демократической  парламентской  системе  люди  должны  иметь  право
   выражать  свое  мнение относительно курдской проблемы  и  путей  ее
   решения.   СП   была  политической  партией,  которая  пользовалась
   поддержкой  части общественного мнения, и должна была  иметь  право
   претендовать на власть.
       У  СП  не  было  никакого  сходства с Коммунистической  партией
   Германии,   которая   была  в  свое  время  запрещена   Федеральным
   Конституционным  Судом Германии (обращение N 250/57,  Annuaire,  т.
   1,  с.  225).  Иначе Конституционный Суд Турции не  отклонил  бы  8
   декабря 1988 г. первое обращение о роспуске СП (см. п. 10 выше).  В
   том   Решении  Конституционный  Суд  констатировал,  что  устав   и
   программа партии находятся в соответствии с Конституцией и что  она
   является   частью   демократической  системы  страны   и   отрицает
   терроризм.
       СП  никогда не предпринимала незаконных действий, и лучшее тому
   доказательство  то,  что  бывший в то время  ее  председателем  г-н
   Перинчек  стал  теперь председателем другой политической  партии  -
   Рабочей   партии,  которая  ведет  свою  работу  вполне   законными
   методами.
       СП  всегда считала, что Турция должна быть единым государством.
   Федеральная  система,  которую она предлагала  в  качестве  решения
   курдской   проблемы,  не  нарушила  бы  государственного  единства.
   Германия и Швейцария являются федеративными государствами, и  никто
   не  усматривал  в  этом  статусе программу разделения  страны.  Что
   касается  Турции, федеративное устройство обеспечило бы ее  гораздо
   более стабильное развитие.
       2) Правительство
       38.   Правительство  утверждало,  что  любое   сходство   между
   настоящим  делом  и  делом  Объединенной  коммунистической   партии
   Турции  (ОКПТ) было бы лишь внешним; единственное реальное сходство
   заключалось  в  том,  что  обе партии  были  распущены  по  Решению
   Конституционного  Суда. В случае ОКПТ задача Конституционного  Суда
   состояла  в том, чтобы определить, соблюдают ли программа  и  устав
   партии  Конституцию и Закон о политических партиях. В  деле  СП,  с
   другой  стороны,  как ясно объяснил в своем Решении Конституционный
   Суд,  он должен был определить, соответствовала ли деятельность  СП
   ее учредительным документам.
       После  первого рассмотрения вопроса о конституционности  партии
   (см.  п.  9  -  10  выше) появились новые факты и доказательства  о
   деятельности  СП,  которые Комиссия в отличие  от  Конституционного
   Суда не приняла во внимание. Они свидетельствуют, что с 1990 г.,  и
   в  особенности в 1991 г., СП в своей деятельности полностью  отошла
   от  своего  первоначального подхода, отраженного в ее учредительных
   документах,   и   занялась   подрывом  фундаментальных   концепций,
   которыми   руководствовалась  Республика  Турция   с   момента   ее
   образования.
       Такой  отход был особенно заметен в речах, позже опубликованных
   в   партийных  изданиях,  произнесенных  председателем   СП   г-ном
   Перинчеком  на  собраниях,  съездах  и  политических  митингах.  Он
   использовал сильный, энергичный и провокационный язык, очернял  все
   другие  политические  партии  и  пытался  отстаивать  использование
   насилия   и   террористических  методов,  призывая   к   восстанию,
   используя  inter  alia  выражение "Ayaga  kalk",  которое  означает
   "поднимайтесь".  Конституционный  Суд  исходя  из  этого  пришел  к
   выводу,  что  речи  и методы СП были совершенно несовместимы  с  ее
   призывами к братству и равенству.
       39. Ссылаясь на анализ ситуации в Турции, сделанный Судом в его
   Решении  по делу Зана против Турции от 25 ноября 1997 г.  (Reports,
   1997-VII),  Правительство заявило, что в 1990 и 1991 гг.  произошло
   вопиющее   увеличение   террористической   деятельности,    которая
   повлекла  гибель  тысяч людей и не щадила ни женщин,  ни  детей.  В
   такой  обстановке  заявления  известного  политического  лидера  не
   могли   не   усугубить  насилие  и  ненависть.  К   этой   ситуации
   неприменимы  судебные  прецеденты,  устанавливающие,  что   свобода
   выражения   мнения   распространяется  и  на   заявления,   которые
   оскорбляют,  шокируют или вызывают раздражение.  В  настоящем  деле
   речь   идет   не   о   политических  дебатах  по   политическим   и
   экономическим  проблемам,  представляющим  интерес  для  страны   в
   целом,  а о подстрекательстве к участию в кровопролитном и жестоком
   конфликте  между двумя частями населения, которое пользовалось  без
   какой-либо    дискриминации   всеми   правами    и    привилегиями,
   сформулированными в Конституции и Законе.
       В  этой  связи Правительство ссылалось, как и в деле  ОКПТ,  на
   практику  Комиссии,  согласно которой, если вмешательство  в  право
   преследует    правомерную   цель   защиты    публичного    порядка,
   территориальной    целостности,    общественного    интереса    или
   демократии,    Конвенция   не   требует,   чтобы   риск    насилия,
   оправдывающий   вмешательство,   был   реальным,   актуальным   или
   неизбежным.
       Оспаривая  необходимость вмешательства, что является  предметом
   рассмотрения    в   настоящем   деле,   неуместно   ссылаться    на
   оправдательные  приговоры  в отношении г-на  Перинчека,  вынесенные
   судами  государственной безопасности. Это два разных вида судебного
   разбирательства,  каждое  из  которых  преследует  отличные   цели:
   первый  -  уголовное судопроизводство, когда Суд выносит решение  о
   личной    ответственности    лиц,    второй    -    конституционное
   судопроизводство,  похожее  на то, что имеет  место  в  Европейском
   суде,   когда   единственной  рассматриваемой  проблемой   является
   совместимость  политической  партии  с  Конституцией,  что  требует
   применения других критериев.
       3) Комиссия
       40.  Комиссия полагала, что роспуск СП не был необходимостью  в
   условиях  демократического общества. Она отметила, что г-н Перинчек
   ранее  подвергался преследованию в судах по уголовным делам по  тем
   же   обвинениям,  которые  фигурируют  в  настоящем  деле,  но  был
   оправдан.  Комиссия  пришла к выводу, что даже  в  глазах  турецких
   судебных  властей данные публикации не содержали ничего, что  имело
   целью   побудить   экстремистские   или   террористические   группы
   разрушить  конституционный  строй  государства  или  образовать   с
   применением силы курдское государство.
       Комиссия  также  отметила, что СП стремилась  достигнуть  своих
   политических  целей, используя исключительно законные средства;  не
   было  доказано  какое-либо намерение СП посягать  на  демократию  и
   плюрализм  в  Турции или на основные права человека,  пропагандируя
   расовую дискриминацию.
       ii) Оценка Суда
       41.  Суд напомнил, что, несмотря на ее автономную роль и особую
   сферу  применения, статья 11 должна также рассматриваться  в  свете
   статьи  10.  Защита мнений и свободы выражать их -  одна  из  целей
   свободы  собрания и создания ассоциации, как сказано в  статье  11.
   Это  в  еще большей степени относится к политическим партиям  ввиду
   их   существенной  роли  в  обеспечении  плюрализма   и   успешного
   функционирования демократии.
       Суд много раз подчеркивал, не может быть никакой демократии без
   плюрализма. Именно по этой причине свобода выражения своего  мнения
   (статья  10)  с  оговорками п. 2 охватывает не только  "информацию"
   или    "идею",    которые   воспринимаются   благожелательно    или
   расцениваются как неоскорбительные или маловажные, но также  и  те,
   которые  оскорбляют,  шокируют или вызывают раздражение.  Поскольку
   деятельность политических партий является коллективной  реализацией
   свободы  выражения мнений, уже сам этот факт дает им  право  искать
   защиту  статей 10 и 11 Конвенции (см. среди других упомянутое  выше
   Судебное  решение  по  делу  Объединенной  коммунистической  партии
   Турции, п. 42 - 43).
       42.  Что  касается настоящего дела, необходимо в первую очередь
   отметить  -  что в своем Решении от 10 июля 1992 г. Конституционный
   Суд   исходил   из  того,  что  он  уже  не  должен  рассматривать,
   соответствовали ли программа и устав СП требованиям закона, а  лишь
   не  нарушала ли ее политическая деятельность установленные  законом
   запреты.  Принимая  решение о роспуске партии, Конституционный  Суд
   основывался  на публичных заявлениях г-на Перинчека - некоторые  из
   них  в письменной форме, - которые Суд рассматривал как новые факты
   и  свидетельства  о  деятельности  СП  (см.  п.  15  выше).  Отсюда
   вытекает, что Суд может ограничиться изучением этих заявлений.
       43.  Конституционный  Суд отметил, что,  делая  различие  между
   двумя  нациями  -  курдами и турками, г-н Перинчек  утверждал,  что
   наличие  национальных меньшинств в Турции в конечном  счете  должно
   привести  к  созданию  курдо-турецкой федерации  в  ущерб  единству
   турецкой   нации  и  территориальной  целостности  государства.   В
   области   идеологии  СП  была  противницей  национализма  Ататюрка,
   важнейшего   принципа,  на  котором  зиждется  Республика   Турция.
   Несмотря   на   использование  других  методов,  цель  политической
   деятельности  СП была аналогична цели террористических организаций.
   Поскольку  СП  боролась за сепаратизм и восстание, ее  роспуск  был
   оправдан (см. п. 15 выше).
       44.  С  учетом  этих факторов Суд должен был в  первую  очередь
   рассмотреть  суть заявлений по спорному вопросу и затем определить,
   оправдан ли роспуск СП.
       В  отношении  первой проблемы Суд напомнил, что  при  этом  его
   задача   состоит  не  в  том,  чтобы  подменять  собой   юрисдикцию
   национальных  органов власти, а в том, чтобы  рассмотреть  в  свете
   статьи  11  те  решения,  которые  они  вынесли,  осуществляя  свои
   полномочия.  Выполняя  эту задачу, Суд должен  был  убедиться,  что
   национальные  органы  власти  основывались  в  своих  решениях   на
   приемлемой  оценке относящихся к делу фактов (см. mutatis  mutandis
   упомянутое    выше   Судебное   решение   по   делу    Объединенная
   коммунистическая партия против Турции, п. 47).
       45.  Суд  и  ранее утверждал, что одной из основных характерных
   черт  демократии  является возможность, которую она  открывает  для
   решения  проблем страны через диалог, не прибегая к  насилию,  даже
   когда  этот  диалог вызывает раздражение. Демократия  процветает  в
   условиях  свободы выражения мнений. С этой точки  зрения  не  может
   быть  никакого оправдания созданию препятствий политической  группе
   исключительно   потому,  что  она  стремится   обсуждать   публично
   ситуацию,  затрагивающую часть населения государства, и участвовать
   в     политической     жизни    страны,    чтобы,    руководствуясь
   демократическими правилами, найти решения, способные  удовлетворить
   каждого заинтересованного человека (см. там же, п. 57).
       46.  Проанализировав заявления г-на Перинчека, Суд не  нашел  в
   них   ничего,   что   могло  бы  рассматриваться   как   призыв   к
   использованию насилия, восстанию или любой другой форме  отказа  от
   демократических  принципов. Напротив, он в ряде случаев  подчеркнул
   необходимость  политической реформы, проводимой  в  соответствии  с
   демократическими  нормами, путем выборов и референдумов.  В  то  же
   самое  время  он высказывался против "прежней культуры  преклонения
   перед   насилием  и  предостерегал  от  силового  решения   проблем
   межнационального и социального характера" (см. п. 13 выше).
       Во  время  разбирательства представитель Правительства  заявил,
   что   г-н  Перинчек  "оправдывал  использование  насильственных   и
   террористических  методов", в частности  заявляя:  "Курды  проявили
   себя  в  борьбе обедневших крестьян, связав их судьбу  [со  своей].
   Объединив  тысячи людей в городах и провинциях, курды показали,  на
   что  они  способны, и сломили барьеры страха". Более того, призывая
   присутствующих  "взращивать мужество, а не арбузы",  г-н  Перинчек,
   по  утверждению  Правительства, "побуждал их  прекратить  всю  свою
   деятельность и заняться разрушением общественного строя".  Наконец,
   его  фраза "курдский народ поднимается" была истолкована как призыв
   к восстанию.
       Хотя  Суд  признал,  что  эти фразы были  адресованы  гражданам
   курдского  происхождения, побуждали их к  сплочению  и  отстаиванию
   политических   требований,  он  не  обнаружил  в  них   какого-либо
   подстрекательства    к    применению    насилия    или    нарушению
   демократических  принципов.  В этом отношении  относящиеся  к  делу
   заявления  почти  не  отличались от заявлений  других  политических
   групп, существующих в других странах Совета Европы.
       47. Конституционный Суд также подверг критике г-на Перинчека за
   то,  что  он  в своих речах проводил различие между двумя  нациями,
   курдской  и  турецкой,  и  выступал за решение  проблем  меньшинств
   учреждением  курдско-турецкой федерации в ущерб  единству  турецкой
   нации  и территориальной целостности государства. В конечном  счете
   СП отстаивала идеи сепаратизма.
       Суд  отметил,  что  в  совокупности  эти  заявления  составляли
   политическую  программу, основной целью которой было  учреждение  в
   соответствии с демократическими принципами федеральной  системы,  в
   которой  турки  и  курды  имели  бы  равное  представительство   на
   добровольной  основе. Конечно, возникал вопрос  о  праве  "курдской
   нации"  на  самоопределение и ее праве на "отделение";  однако  эти
   слова,  употребленные в контексте заявлений, не поощряют  отделение
   от   Турции,  а  стремятся  скорее  подчеркнуть,  что  предложенная
   федеральная  система  не может возникнуть без свободно  выраженного
   согласия курдов через референдум.
       По  мнению  Суда,  тот  факт, что такая политическая  программа
   оценивается   как  несовместимая  с  существующими   принципами   и
   структурами  турецкого государства, не делает  ее  несовместимой  с
   принципами  демократии. Сущность демократии в том, чтобы  позволить
   выдвигать  и  обсуждать разнообразные политические программы,  даже
   те,  которые  подвергают  сомнению тот порядок,  согласно  которому
   организовано  в настоящее время государство, при условии,  что  они
   не наносят ущерба самой демократии.
       48.   Не   исключено,   как   и   в   случае   с   Объединенной
   коммунистической  партией  Турции (см. вышеупомянутое  Решение,  с.
   27,  п.  58),  что за данными заявлениями могли скрываться  цели  и
   намерения,  отличные  от  тех,  которые  провозглашались  публично.
   Однако в отсутствие конкретных действий, ставящих под сомнение  то,
   что   заявлял   г-н   Перинчек,  не  следует  подвергать   сомнению
   искренность   его  слов.  СП  была,  таким  образом,  наказана   за
   поведение,  относящееся  исключительно  к  осуществлению  права  на
   свободу выражения своего мнения.
       49.  Суд  также отметил, что г-н Перинчек был оправдан в  судах
   государственной   безопасности,   где   он   подвергся    судебному
   преследованию по поводу тех же самых заявлений (см. п. 11 выше).  В
   связи  с этим Правительство тогда подчеркнуло, что данные два  вида
   разбирательства  совершенно различны, одно сводилось  к  применению
   уголовного  права,  другое - к применению  конституционного  права.
   Суд  обращает  внимание лишь на то, что турецкие суды разошлись  во
   мнении относительно смысла утверждений г-на Перинчека.
       Важно  определить, можно ли в свете вышеупомянутых  соображений
   рассматривать   роспуск  СП  как  необходимый   в   демократическом
   обществе,  т.е.  отвечал ли он "насущной социальной потребности"  и
   был  ли  он  "соразмерен правомерно преследуемой цели"  (см.  среди
   многих  других источников и mutatis mutandis Решение по  делу  Фогт
   против  Германии от 26 сентября 1995 г. Серия A, т. 323,  с.  25  -
   26, п. 52).
       50.  Суд  напоминает,  что, учитывая важную  роль  политических
   партий  в  успешном функционировании демократии (см. вышеупомянутое
   Судебное  решение  по  делу  Объединенной  коммунистической  партии
   Турции,  п.  25), исключения, изложенные в статье 11,  в  отношении
   политических  партий должны подвергаться узкому толкованию;  только
   убедительные  и  веские  причины могут оправдывать  ограничения  на
   свободу   ассоциаций.   Определяя,  существует   ли   необходимость
   ограничений  по  смыслу  статьи 11 п. 2,  государства  -  участники
   обладают  лишь ограниченным пределом усмотрения, осуществляемого  в
   условиях   строгого   контроля  со  стороны  европейских   органов,
   охватывающего  как правовые нормы, так и решения по их  применению,
   включая  те,  которые выносят независимые суды (см.  вышеупомянутое
   Решение  по  делу Объединенной коммунистической партии  Турции,  п.
   46).
       51.  Суд отметил, что рассматриваемое судебное вмешательство  в
   свободу  выражения мнения было радикальным: Решение о  роспуске  СП
   вступало в силу немедленно и было окончательным, ее имущество  было
   передано  ipso  jure  Казначейству  и  ее  руководителям,  в  число
   которых  во время роспуска партии г-н Перинчек по общему  признанию
   не  входил  (см. п. 14 выше), было запрещено продолжать  заниматься
   некоторыми  видами  политической деятельности. Столь  суровые  меры
   могут применяться лишь в наиболее серьезных случаях.
       52.  Суд уже отметил, что у него не сложилось впечатления,  что
   заявления   г-на   Перинчека,   хотя   и   критические   по   своей
   направленности   и   содержащие  большое   количество   требований,
   подвергали   сомнению   необходимость   следовать   демократическим
   принципам  и  правилам. Суд готов принять во внимание обстановку  в
   стране,  особенно трудности, связанные с предотвращением терроризма
   (см.  Решение  по делу Объединенная коммунистическая партия  против
   Турции, с. 27, п. 59). Однако в настоящем деле не установлено,  как
   рассматриваемые    утверждения,   автор    которых    заявляет    о
   приверженности   демократии  и  неприятии   насилия,   могут   быть
   ответственны за проблему терроризма в стране.
       53.   В   свете   упомянутых  выше  выводов  нет  необходимости
   обращаться  к статье 17; заявления не содержат ничего,  что  давало
   бы  основание  для  вывода, что их автор,  пренебрегая  Конвенцией,
   занялся  разрушительной деятельностью в отношении  прав  и  свобод,
   предусмотренных  Конвенцией  (см. mutatis  mutandis  вышеупомянутое
   Решение   по  делу  Объединенная  коммунистическая  партия   против
   Турции, с. 27, п. 60).
       54.  Таким  образом,  Решение о роспуске СП  было  несоразмерно
   преследуемой   цели   и  следовательно  не   было   необходимым   в
   демократическом  обществе.  Из  этого  следует,  что  имело   место
   нарушение статьи 11 Конвенции.
   
                    II. О предполагаемом нарушении
                    статей 9, 10, 14 и 18 Конвенции
   
       55.  Заявители  также  утверждали, что  имели  место  нарушения
   статей  9, 10, 14 и 18 Конвенции. Поскольку их жалобы касаются  тех
   же самых фактов, Суд не счел нужным рассматривать их отдельно.
   
                    III. О предполагаемом нарушении
                      статей 1 и 3 Протокола N 1
   
       56.  Заявители далее утверждали, что последствия роспуска СП  -
   ее  имущество  было  конфисковано и  передано  Казначейству,  и  ее
   руководителям  было  запрещено  принимать  участие  в   выборах   -
   повлекло  за  собой нарушение статей 1 и 3 Протокола N  1,  которые
   предусматривают:
   
                               Статья 1
   
       "Каждое   физическое   или   юридическое   лицо   имеет   право
   беспрепятственно  пользоваться своим  имуществом.  Никто  не  может
   быть  лишен своего имущества, иначе как в интересах общества  и  на
   условиях,    предусмотренных   законом    и    общими    принципами
   международного права.
       Предыдущие   положения  ни  в  коей  мере  не  ущемляют   права
   государства  обеспечивать  выполнение  таких  законов,  какие   ему
   представляются   необходимыми   для   осуществления   контроля   за
   использованием  собственности в соответствии  с  общими  интересами
   или для обеспечения уплаты налогов или других сборов или штрафов".
   
                               Статья 3
   
       "Высокие   Договаривающиеся  Стороны  обязуются   проводить   с
   разумной  периодичностью свободные выборы путем тайного голосования
   в  таких условиях, которые обеспечивали бы свободное волеизъявление
   народа при выборе законодательной власти".
       57. Суд обратил внимание на то, что меры, на которые жаловались
   заявители,  были  побочным результатом роспуска  СП,  который,  как
   постановил   Суд,   был   осуществлен  в   нарушение   статьи   11,
   следовательно,   нет   необходимости   рассматривать   эти   жалобы
   отдельно.
   
        IV. О предполагаемом нарушении статьи 6 п. 1 Конвенции
   
       58.   Наконец,  заявители  жаловались,  что  вместо  проведения
   публичного  разбирательства Конституционный Суд заслушал  дело  при
   закрытых  дверях; они не имели доступа к судебному досье и  полному
   стенографическому   отчету  слушания.   Они   полагали,   что   это
   составляет нарушение статьи 6 п. 1 Конвенции.
       59.  Правительство и Комиссия считают, что статья  6  п.  1  не
   применима к обстоятельствам дела.
       60.  На  основании  своего  заключения относительно  соблюдения
   статьи  11  Суд  полагает, что нет необходимости рассматривать  эту
   жалобу.
   
                   V. Применение статьи 50 Конвенции
   
       61. Статья 50 Конвенции предусматривает:
       "Если  Суд  установит, что решение или мера, принятые судебными
   или  иными властями Высокой Договаривающейся Стороны, полностью или
   частично   противоречат  обязательствам,  вытекающим  из  настоящей
   Конвенции,  а  также  если  внутреннее  право  упомянутой   Стороны
   допускает лишь частичное возмещение последствий такого решения  или
   такой  меры,  то  решением  Суда, если в этом  есть  необходимость,
   предусматривается справедливое возмещение потерпевшей стороне".
   
                  A. Аннулирование решения о роспуске
   
       62.  Заявители  прежде всего ходатайствовали  об  аннулировании
   Решения  Конституционного Суда от 10 июля 1992 г.  о  роспуске  СП.
   Они  также добивались "статуса признанной политической партии " для
   СП.
       63.  Суд констатировал, что он не правомочен согласно Конвенции
   принимать  такие меры (см. mutatis mutandis Решение по  делу  Саиди
   против Франции от 20 сентября 1993 г. Серия A, т. 261-C, с. 57,  п.
   47).
   
                     B. Ущерб, издержки и расходы
   
       64.  Что касается возмещения материального ущерба, то заявители
   потребовали 1500000 долларов США: 1000000 в пользу СП и  по  250000
   г-ну  Догу  Перинчеку и г-ну Илхану Кириту. Они  также  потребовали
   6000000 долларов США в качестве возмещения морального вреда.
       В  поддержку  своих требований они подчеркнули,  что  СП  имела
   более  400  отделений  по  всей  Турции,  все  ее  имущество   было
   конфисковано;  она  имела право выставлять кандидатов  на  выборах,
   принимала  в  них  участие и на момент роспуска  была  единственной
   существующей  левой социалистической партией. Согласно  заявителям,
   тысячам   людей,  которые  помогли  создать  СП,  просуществовавшую
   четыре  года, и руководителям этой партии был причинен существенный
   моральный вред и финансовые убытки.
       Заявители также требовали "компенсации всех затрат, которые они
   понесли  в  связи  с  делом".  При  разбирательстве  в  Суде,   они
   объяснили,   что   гонорар   и  затраты  308   адвокатов,   которые
   представляли  СП только в Конституционном Суде, составили  сумму  в
   1955800  французских  франков.  Что  касается  затрат  в  связи   с
   представительством  заявителей  в  учреждениях  Конвенции,  то  они
   составили сумму в 300000 французских франков.
       65.  Правительство заняло принципиальную позицию, что в  данном
   случае  никакая компенсация не должна выплачиваться. В субсидиарном
   порядке  оно полагало требования заявителей непомерными. Во  втором
   субсидиарном  порядке оно утверждало, что нарушение  статьи  11  не
   дает заявителям права требовать индивидуального возмещения.
       Относительно  возмещения предполагаемого  материального  ущерба
   Правительство  утверждало,  что  не  существует  никакой  причинной
   связи  между  ним  и  роспуском СП, что политические  партии  и  их
   руководителей  нельзя  приравнивать к коммерческим  предприятиям  и
   что  в  любом случае их требования не подтверждены никакими точными
   расчетами.
       Что  касается  требований  относительно  возмещения  морального
   вреда,   то  Правительство  полагало,  что  они  заслуживали   "еще
   меньшего  доверия",  т.к. они не только непомерны,  но  и  включали
   требование   о   возмещении  морального  ущерба,   предположительно
   причиненного непосредственно СП.
       Наконец,  что  касается  требований  о  возмещении  издержек  и
   расходов, Правительство сочло их недостаточно уточненными.
       66. Представитель Комиссии утверждал, что требования заявителей
   носят   весьма  общий  и  гипотетический  характер  и  недостаточно
   обоснованны для их удовлетворения в соответствии со статьей 50.
       67.  Суд  обратил внимание на то, что заявители не  представили
   никаких   доказательств   по  обоснованию   своих   требований   на
   значительные   суммы   в  виде  возмещения  материального   ущерба,
   издержек  и  расходов. Отсюда вытекает, что он не может  поддержать
   эти  требования  (см.  mutatis mutandis Решение  по  делу  "Прессос
   Компания  Навьера А.О." и другие против Бельгии от 3 июля  1997  г.
   Reports,  1997-IV,  с.  1299,  п.  24).  Однако  он  отметил,   что
   заявители  получили 57187 французских франков от  Совета  Европы  в
   качестве судебной помощи.
       Что касается возмещения морального вреда, то Суд отметил, что в
   отличие  от  ОКПТ  устав  и  программа  СП  не  вызвали  возражений
   Конституционного  Суда, и партия осуществляла свою  деятельность  в
   течение  четырех  лет  до ее роспуска по Решению  этого  суда.  Г-н
   Перинчек  и  г-н  Кирит  поэтому не понесли никакого  определенного
   морального  ущерба. Основывая свой расчет на праве  справедливости,
   Суд оценивает сумму ущерба в 50000 французских франков каждому.
   
                       C. Проценты за просрочку
   
       68.   Согласно  информации,  имеющейся  у  Суда,  установленная
   законом   процентная  ставка,  существующая  во  Франции  на   дату
   принятия настоящего Решения, составляет 3,36% в год.
   
                  ПО ЭТИМ ОСНОВАНИЯМ СУД ЕДИНОГЛАСНО
   
       1. Постановил, что имело место нарушение статьи 11 Конвенции;
       2.  Постановил,  что  нет необходимости исследовать,  имело  ли
   место  нарушение статьи 6 п. 1, статей 9, 10, 14 и 18  Конвенции  и
   статей 1 и 3 Протокола N 1;
       3. Постановил:
       a) что государство - ответчик должно выплатить г-ну Перинчеку и
   г-ну  Кириту в течение трех месяцев общую сумму в 50000  (пятьдесят
   тысяч)  французских  франков  каждому  в  качестве  возмещения   за
   моральный вред, которая должна быть конвертирована в турецкие  лиры
   по курсу на день платежа; и
       b)  что  к  указанной  сумме прибавляются простые  проценты  по
   ставке  в  3,36%  годовых с момента истечения  вышеупомянутых  трех
   месяцев до совершения платежа;
       4. Отклонил остальные требования справедливого возмещения.
   
       Совершено  на  английском и французском языках  и  оглашено  во
   Дворце прав человека в Страсбурге 25 мая 1998 г.
   
                                                          Председатель
                                                     Рудольф БЕРНХАРДТ
   
                                                                Грефье
                                                      Герберт ПЕТЦОЛЬД
   
   
   
   
   
   
                    EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
                                   
             CASE OF SOCIALIST PARTY AND OTHERS v. TURKEY
                                   
                             JUDGMENT <*>
                                   
                        (Strasbourg, 25.V.1998)
   
       In the case of Socialist Party and Others v. Turkey <1>,
   --------------------------------
       <*>  The  present  judgment is subject  to  editorial  revision
   before  its reproduction in final form in Reports of Judgments  and
   Decisions  1998.  These reports are obtainable from  the  publisher
   Carl  Heymanns Verlag KG (Luxemburger Strasse 449, D-50939 {Koln}),
   who  will  also arrange for their distribution in association  with
   the agents for certain countries as listed overleaf.
   
       The European Court of Human Rights, sitting, in accordance with
   Rule  51  of  Rules of Court A <2>, as a Grand Chamber composed  of
   the following judges:
   --------------------------------
       Notes by the Registrar
       <1> The case is numbered 20/1997/804/1007. The first number  is
   the  case's position on the list of cases referred to the Court  in
   the  relevant  year (second number). The last two numbers  indicate
   the  case's  position on the list of cases referred  to  the  Court
   since   its   creation  and  on  the  list  of  the   corresponding
   originating applications to the Commission.
       <2>  Rules of Court A apply to all cases referred to the  Court
   before the entry into force of Protocol No. 9 (1 October 1994)  and
   thereafter  only  to  cases concerning States  not  bound  by  that
   Protocol.  They correspond to the Rules that came into force  on  1
   January 1983, as amended several times subsequently.
   
       Mr R. Bernhardt, President,
       Mr {F. Golcuklu} <*>,
       Mr F. Matscher,
       Mr C. Russo,
       Mr N. Valticos,
       Mrs E. Palm,
       Mr I. Foighel,
       Mr R. Pekkanen,
       Mr A.N. Loizou,
       Mr J.M. Morenilla,
       Sir John Freeland,
       Mr A.B. Baka,
       Mr M.A. Lopes Rocha,
       Mr L. Wildhaber,
       Mr J. Makarczyk,
       Mr {P. Kuris},
       Mr {U. Lohmus},
       Mr P. Van dijk,
       and  also  of  Mr H. Petzold, Registrar, and Mr  P.J.  Mahoney,
   Deputy Registrar,
   --------------------------------
       <*> Здесь и далее по тексту слова на национальном языке набраны
   латинским шрифтом и выделены фигурными скобками.
   
       Having deliberated in private on 26 February and 25 April 1998,
       Delivers  the  following judgment, which  was  adopted  on  the
   lastmentioned date:
   
                               PROCEDURE   
       1.  The  case  was  referred  to  the  Court  by  the  European
   Commission  of Human Rights ("the Commission") on 27 January  1997,
   within  the  three-month period laid down by Article  32  з  1  and
   Article  47  of the Convention for the Protection of  Human  Rights
   and  Fundamental Freedoms ("the Convention"). It originated  in  an
   application  (no. 21237/93) against the Republic of  Turkey  lodged
   with  the  Commission  under Article 25 by a political  party,  the
   Socialist Party, and two Turkish nationals, Mr {Dogu Perincek}  and
   Mr {Ilhan Kirit}, on 31 December 1992.
       The Commission's request referred to Articles 44 and 48 (a)  of
   the  Convention and to Rule 32 of Rules of Court A. The  object  of
   the  request  was to obtain a decision as to whether the  facts  of
   the  case  disclosed  a  breach  by the  respondent  State  of  its
   obligations under Article 6 з 1 and Articles 9, 10, 11, 14  and  18
   of the Convention, and Articles 1 and 3 of Protocol No. 1.
       2. In response to the enquiry made in accordance with Rule 33 з
   3  (d), the applicants stated that they wished to take part in  the
   proceedings  and  designated the lawyers who would  represent  them
   (Rule 30).
       3. On 30 January 1997 the President of the Court decided in the
   interests of the proper administration of justice that the  present
   case  should be heard by the Chamber constituted on 29 October 1996
   to  consider  the  case of United Communist  Party  of  Turkey  and
   Others  v.  Turkey  <3>  (Rule 21 з 7). That  Chamber  included  ex
   officio  Mr {F. Golcuklu}, the elected judge of Turkish nationality
   (Article  43  of the Convention), and Mr R. Ryssdal, the  President
   of  the  Court  (Rule 21 з 4 (b)). The other seven  members,  whose
   names had been drawn by lot in the presence of the Registrar,  were
   Mr  B.  Walsh,  Mr C. Russo, Mr I. Foighel, Mr A.N. Loizou,  Mr  J.
   Makarczyk, Mr {P. Kuris} and Mr P. van Dijk (Article 43 in fine  of
   the Convention and Rule 21 з 5).
   --------------------------------
       <3> Case no. 133/1996/752/951.
   
       4.  On  28  August  1997  the  Chamber  decided  to  relinquish
   jurisdiction forthwith in favour of a Grand Chamber (Rule 51).  The
   Grand  Chamber  to be constituted included ex officio  Mr  Ryssdal,
   the  President  of  the  Court, and  Mr  R.  Bernhardt,  the  Vice-
   President,  together with the members and the four  substitutes  of
   the  original Chamber, the latter being Mr A.B. Baka, Mr M.A. Lopes
   Rocha,  Mr  R. Pekkanen and Mr R. Macdonald (Rule 51 з  2  (a)  and
   (b)).  On  the  same  day the President, in  the  presence  of  the
   Registrar,  drew  by lot the names of the seven  additional  judges
   needed to complete the Grand Chamber, namely Mr F. Matscher, Mr  N.
   Valticos, Mrs E. Palm, Mr J.M. Morenilla, Sir John Freeland, Mr  L.
   Wildhaber  and  Mr {U. Lohmus} (Rule 51 з 2 (c)).  Subsequently  Mr
   Ryssdal, Mr Walsh and Mr Macdonald were unable to take part in  the
   further  consideration of the case (Rules 24 з 1 and 51  з  3).  Mr
   Ryssdal's place as President of the Grand Chamber was taken  by  Mr
   Bernhardt (Rules 21 з 6 and 51 з 6).
       5.  As President of the Chamber Mr Ryssdal, acting through  the
   Registrar, had consulted the Agent of the Turkish Government  ("the
   Government"),  the  applicants' lawyers and  the  Delegate  of  the
   Commission  on the organisation of the proceedings (Rules  37  з  1
   and  38).  Pursuant to the order made in consequence, the Registrar
   received the applicants' and the Government's memorials on 1 and  3
   October  1997  respectively. 6. In accordance with the  President's
   decision,  the  hearing took place in public in  the  Human  Rights
   Building,  Strasbourg, on 25 February 1998. The Court  had  held  a
   preparatory meeting beforehand.
       There appeared before the Court:
       (a) for the Government
       Mrs {D. Akcay},
       Mr {M. Ozmen}, Co-Agents,
       Mr A. Kaya,
       Mrs {M. Gulsen},
       Ms {A. Emuler},
       Ms {A. Gunyakti}, Advisers;
       (b) for the Commission
       Mr G. Ress, Delegate;
       (c) for the applicants
       Mr {D. Perincek}, Applicant,
       Mr A. Kalan and
       Mr M. Cengiz, both of the Ankara Bar, Counsel.
       The Court heard addresses by Mr Ress, Mr {Perincek}, Mr Cengiz,
   Mr Kalan and Mrs {Akcay}.
   
                            AS TO THE FACTS
   
                   I. The circumstances of the case
   
       7.  The Socialist Party ("the SP"), the first applicant, was  a
   political  party  that  was dissolved by the  Constitutional  Court
   (see  paragraph 15 below). Mr {Ilhan Kirit} and Mr {Dogu Perincek},
   the  second  and third applicants, were respectively  Chairman  and
   former Chairman of the SP. They live in Istanbul.
       8.  The SP was formed on 1 February 1988. On the same day,  its
   constitution  and  programme  were  submitted  to  the  office   of
   Principal  State Counsel at the Court of Cassation  for  assessment
   of  their compatibility with the Constitution and Law no.  2820  on
   the   regulation  of  political  parties  ("Law  no.  2820"  -  see
   paragraphs 16 and 17 below).
   
           A. First application to have the Socialist Party
             dissolved and the prosecution of its leaders
   
       9.  On 15 February 1988, when the SP was preparing to take part
   in  a  general  election, Principal State Counsel at the  Court  of
   Cassation    ("Principal   State   Counsel")   applied    to    the
   Constitutional  Court for an order dissolving the  SP.  Relying  in
   particular on passages from its programme, he accused the party  of
   having  sought  to  establish the domination of the  working  class
   with  a  view  to  establishing a dictatorship of  the  proletariat
   (Articles  6,  10 and 14 and former Article 68 of the  Constitution
   and sections 78 and 101(a) of Law no. 2820).
       10. In a judgment of 8 December 1988, published in the Official
   Gazette  of  16  May 1989, the Constitutional Court  dismissed  the
   application  as  unfounded,  as it considered  that  the  political
   objectives  stated  in  the SP's programme  did  not  infringe  the
   Constitution.
       11.  Criminal  proceedings were then brought  in  the  National
   Security  Courts against some of the leaders of the  SP,  including
   Mr  {Perincek}.  They were accused of spreading harmful  propaganda
   in  favour  of the domination of one social class over the  others,
   contrary  to  Article  142 of the Turkish Criminal  Code,  as  then
   worded  (see  paragraph  18  below).  The  allegation  against   Mr
   {Perincek} was based in particular on speeches he had made  at  two
   public  meetings on 10 February 1990 at {Diyabakir}  and  21  March
   1990  at  Van  and on an article that had appeared in  a  political
   journal  on  4  March 1990, that is to say before his  election  as
   Chairman of the SP on 6 July 1991. Following the repeal of  Article
   142  of  the  Criminal Code by Law no. 3713 of 12 April  1991  (the
   Prevention  of Terrorism Act), the accused were all acquitted.  The
   SP  later  published  the speeches in question  under  the  titles:
   "{Serhildan  cagrilari}-1,  {Kawa  atesi  yakti}"  and  "{Serhildan
   cagrilari}-2,  {Karpuz  degil  cesaret  ekin}"  (see  paragraph  13
   below).
       12.  On 26 August 1991 the High Electoral Committee - which had
   responsibility under the Constitution for ensuring the fairness  of
   elections  -  decided  that  the SP satisfied  all  the  conditions
   necessary to take part in the general election of 20 October  1991.
   The party consequently ran an election campaign.
   
                   B. Second application to have the
                       Socialist Party dissolved
   
       13.  On 14 November 1991 Principal State Counsel applied to the
   Constitutional Court for a second time for an order dissolving  the
   SP. He accused the party of having carried on activities likely  to
   undermine the territorial integrity of the State and the  unity  of
   the  nation contrary to Articles 3, 4, 14 and 66 and former Article
   68  of the Constitution, and sections 78, 81 and 101(b) of Law  no.
   2820.
       In  support of his application, Principal State Counsel  relied
   in  particular  on  the following extracts from the  SP's  election
   publications  and  from oral statements made by  its  Chairman,  Mr
   {Perincek}, at public meetings and on television.
   
             1. Extracts from Socialist Party publications
   
       a)  "{Serhildan  cagrilari}-1, {Kawa atesi yakti}"  ("Calls  to
   stand up - no. 1, Kawa <4> has lit the fire")
   --------------------------------
       <4> A mythological hero.
   
       "...  Dear  friends,  ...  the second dynamic  is  the  Kurdish
   dynamic.  It  is  the call for equality and freedom,  [it  is]  the
   Kurds'  claim  to  rights as a nation. It is  a  request  that  the
   rights which the Turks enjoy ... be granted to the Kurds also.
       At  the  beginning  of the century, a war of  independence  was
   waged  ...  in  circumstances in which  imperialists  occupied  the
   country  and  Turks and Kurds depended on one another  and  had  to
   unite  and fight, side by side. The Amasya Protocol provided:  "The
   homeland  is  composed of the lands where the Turks and  the  Kurds
   live."  At  the  Erzurum  and Sivas Congresses,  oral  and  written
   declarations   were   made  recognising  the  ethnic   social   and
   geographical rights of Kurds ... once the war was over and the  men
   had  hung up their weapons, an official ideology developed  ...  as
   though  there  was  no  longer  any  need  for  people  from  Urfa,
   {Diyarbakir} or Malatya to fight ... Under that official  ideology,
   there  was no longer any room for Kurds. There were no more  Kurds.
   Henceforth, only Turks existed..." (pages 7 - 8)
       b) "{Serhildan cagrilari}-2, Karpuz degil cesaret ekin" ("Calls
   to stand up - no. 2, sow courage, not watermelons")
       "...  they  can make this country ... a homeland  of  cultures,
   brotherhood, workers, [a homeland] where there is voluntary  unity,
   where  nations  freely decide on their future and freely  unite  if
   they  so  wish ... Long live brotherhood between Turks  and  Kurds!
   Long live the Turkish and Kurdish peoples!" (page 31)
       c)  "{Cozum-4,  Kurt  sorunu}" ("Solution no.  4,  the  Kurdish
   problem")
       "...  The collapse started where the regime was most tyrannical
   and  most  vulnerable. The [political] parties of  the  status  quo
   failed to the east of the Euphrates... [They] are no longer  to  be
   seen in the lands where the Kurdish people live ... (page 3)
       Why  have  the parties of the status quo disappeared  from  the
   Kurdish   provincesi?  Because  they  are  nationalists...  Turkish
   nationalism  has  become bankrupt in the lands  where  the  Kurdish
   problem  will  be  resolved.  Turkish  nationalism  has  drawn  its
   borders.  It has divided Anatolia into two parts, situated  to  the
   east  and west of the Euphrates. Turkish nationalism and its regime
   are  in  the process of drowning in the Euphrates. That is what  is
   known as a bankrupt regime. (page 4)
       ...  After the mountains, the State also lost the villages  and
   towns.  That  is  why it counts directly on deterring  the  masses.
   State  terror  seeks to establish a new regime in Turkey,  starting
   from the east ... (page 10)
       The  State pays village guards and special forces ... which  it
   feeds  to kill Kurds through the taxes it collects from the people.
   The  cost  of the bullets fired at Kurds, of petrol used in  cross-
   border operations ..., in short, the cost of [this] special war  is
   borne  by the people ... To bring inflation and ... poverty  to  an
   end, a peaceful solution must be found to the Kurdish problem.  The
   Kurdish  problem is at the same time a Turkish problem  ...  Living
   freely,  in brotherhood, heart to heart, in peace and harmony  with
   the  Kurdish people is a need ... for the Turkish people ...  Turks
   and  Kurds  are but one people. No Turk will be entitled  to  enter
   paradise  if  a single Kurd [still] remains in hell. The  Socialist
   Party  is  determined to fight until the last Kurd  is  saved  from
   hell. (pages 11 - 13)
       The  Socialist Party is present on both sides of the Euphrates.
   It  is  the  party  of  brotherhood between Kurds  and  Turks.  The
   Socialist Party's determination in the face of the Kurdish  problem
   has  been demonstrated by its fight to combat State pressure on the
   Kurdish  nation  ...,  its  shared  destiny  in  the  poor  Kurdish
   peasants'  fight  for survival ..., the fact that it  has  overcome
   the  barrier of fear by holding meetings with thousands  of  people
   in  the  Kurdish villages and towns and has explained  the  Kurdish
   problem  to working people throughout Turkey ... Our party  imparts
   this  awareness.  It  sees  a solution in  the  common  destiny  of
   peoples  and  their  combat. To remedy  the  Kurdish  problem,  the
   Socialist  Party  has courage, ... a cause and a programme.  (pages
   15 - 16)
       The  Kurdish nation has a full and unconditional right to self-
   determination. It may, if it wishes, create a separate  State.  The
   interest  of  the  proletariat lies in the  establishment,  through
   democratic  popular  revolution, of a voluntary  union  founded  on
   absolute  equality of rights and freedoms. The right to secede  is,
   at all times, an essential condition of that voluntary union.
       Whether or not people live together depends on the free will of
   nations. So that that will can be expressed, a referendum  must  be
   organised  in  the Kurdish provinces. During the referendum,  those
   who  are  in  favour  of secession must also be allowed  freely  to
   express their views.
       Under  current historical conditions, a solution favourable  to
   the  workers of both nations lies in a democratic federal republic,
   to  which  the two federated States adhere on an equal footing.  In
   the  federation, power will be exercised through popular assemblies
   elected  democratically by districts, towns, federated  States  and
   the federal State, beginning with the neighbourhoods and villages.
       The  prefectures and sub-prefectures, State governments and the
   federal   government  will  be  the  executive  bodies   of   those
   assemblies and accountable to them.
       The   popular  federal  assembly  will  be  composed   of   two
   assemblies...  the  assembly of the members of parliament  and  the
   assembly of the nations.
       The assembly of the members of parliament will be elected in  a
   general  election with one member of parliament elected by a  given
   number of citizens.
       The  assembly of nations will be constituted by an equal number
   of members elected from each of the two federated States.
       Legislation  will  be enacted on a majority  vote  in  the  two
   assemblies.
       Legislation which is rejected by one of the assemblies will not
   come  into force. The Employment Code, and the Criminal, Civil  and
   Procedural  Codes will apply throughout the country and be  adopted
   by the federal bodies.
       In  those  districts and provinces of each State where minority
   groups  are  in the majority, regional self-determination  will  be
   permitted if the people so desire.
       The federal Constitution will be the common Constitution of the
   two  nations. It will come into force as soon it has been accepted,
   by  referendum,  by  a majority in each of the  two  nations.  Each
   State   will   also   have  its  own  Constitution.   The   federal
   Constitution  will cover an increasing number of  matters,  to  the
   extent that the federated republics consent thereto.
       The  flag and national anthem of the federal republic  will  be
   the  same  for Turks and Kurds. Each federated State will have  its
   own  flag  and anthem. The federation shall not have  a  name  that
   refers to only one of the nations.
       Defence of the country, issues of war and peace, and entry into
   representative  treaties in international  relations  will  be  the
   responsibility of the federal bodies.
       Each  federated State will [however] be entitled  to  establish
   direct  commercial  and cultural relations with  foreign  countries
   and to open consulates.
       At  each  level of government, power will lie solely  with  the
   popular  assemblies and the local authorities accountable to  them.
   The  prefecture,  sub-prefectures, security forces and  gendarmerie
   established  under  the  current [central] government  outside  the
   scope  of  the  proposed administrative system will  be  abolished.
   This  democratic administrative system will also guarantee national
   equality and freedom.
       Local  security  forces will receive their  orders  from  local
   government  authorities and be accountable to local assemblies.  In
   the  villages,  security  forces will be composed  of  local  young
   people, who will receive instructions from village committees.
       Seigniory,  dependence on the head of a clan  or  any  form  of
   medieval  relation that is incompatible with brotherhood or  social
   development  shall  be  abolished  by  an  agrarian  reform  to  be
   undertaken  by the mobilisation of farmers under the  direction  of
   the village committees.
       In  order  that regional inequalities that have been aggravated
   by  the  market  economy may be removed, the federal republic  will
   increase  its  share of investment in regions that are economically
   underdeveloped.  It  will  therefore  guarantee  and  develop   the
   economic basis of the union.
       With  respect  to  the  economy, a federal  system  of  uniform
   statistics will be used.
       The  freedom  and  right of each nation and  each  national  or
   religious  minority  to develop its language  and  culture  and  to
   pursue political and associative activities will be guaranteed.
       The  official  languages  will be  Turkish  and  Kurdish.  Each
   federated  republic  will  have its own language  as  its  official
   language. Decisions of the federal bodies will be drafted  in  both
   languages.  From primary school to university and in  all  cultural
   institutions, means of education, research and communication,  such
   as  journalism,  publishing, radio and television,  etc.,  will  be
   provided in both languages.
       The  democratic culture of the Kurdish nation will be  able  to
   develop  through  the  removal  of the  pressures  that  have  been
   exerted  on  it  up till now. Those in power will strive  for  free
   democratic  cultural  exchange  with  Turks  and  Kurds  in   other
   countries  and  an international culture common to all  nations  of
   the world to flourish in a pluralist and active environment.
       All  bodies  in  power  will endeavour [on  the  one  hand]  to
   eradicate,  with all its foundations, the former culture  idolising
   violence and advocating the use of force to solve problems  between
   nations and in society and [on the other hand] to spread among  the
   people   an  internationalist  proletarian  culture  that  respects
   mankind and despises violence.
       Against  the  fundamentalist nationalist culture  according  to
   which the history of the lands in which we live began with the  war
   of  Malazgirt  and against all other forms of nationalism  will  be
   developed   an   internationalist,  universal,   humanitarian   and
   democratic  culture that will seek new cultural  sources,  enriched
   by   the  contribution  of  different  peoples  stemming  from  the
   historic  depths of our country, and will draw on those  resources.
   Original  names  will  no longer be changed  as  they  reflect  the
   wealth  of  our  country's universal culture; every place  will  be
   called by its known, established name." (pages 16 - 20)
   
                  2. Oral statements by the Chairman
                        of the Socialist Party
   
       (a) At the opening ceremony of the Socialist Party Congress (24
   - 25 August 1991)
       "The Socialist Party is the last bridge between the Kurdish and
   Turkish  people... The current status quo has failed  with  respect
   to  the  Kurdish problem and its deafening collapse  can  be  heard
   from  here...  What is the only possible solution? ...  This  issue
   can  only be resolved by respecting the wish of the Kurdish  people
   ...  the real remedy lies with the Kurdish people. We will ask  the
   Kurds:   "What  do  you  want?"  ...  if,  conversely,  they   seek
   secession,  we  will  respect  their  wish.  We  will  organise   a
   referendum.  We  will  ask the Kurdish people ...,  everyone,  from
   Hakkari  to Antep: "Do you want to create a separate State  in  our
   land  or  not?"  The  Socialist Party prefers unification:  Who  is
   inciting secession? Oppression [is]. The oppression of the  Kurdish
   people  by the Turkish State. We will defend unification by putting
   an  end  to  that  oppression  and that  will  be  proof  of  [our]
   acceptance  of  the  Kurdish people's will... The  Socialist  Party
   will defend the union of the two peoples within the federation  and
   the  joint [exercise] of power... The Socialist Party is  the  last
   bridge  between  the Kurdish and Turkish people... No  party  other
   than the Socialist Party has shared the Kurds' destiny, taken up  a
   position  against  the Turkish State or is able  to  maintain  that
   position."
       (b) During a television programme on 11 October 1991
       "... Let us now define [what they call] internal security. That
   is  the  Kurdish  problem.  If you put  it  in  terms  of  internal
   security  ...,  you  will have recourse to the  gendarmes.  If  the
   problem  is seen as a Kurdish one, you will resolve it by democracy
   and   freedom.  In  fact,  it  is  the  present  regime  that   has
   transformed  the  Euphrates into a border...  It  was  an  economic
   border...  Then,  they  made the Euphrates a political  border  ...
   and,  lastly, an ideological one... Turkish nationalism has drowned
   in  the  Euphrates; it cannot cross it ... because nationalism  has
   no  place in these lands... There is a Turkish problem but  also  a
   Kurdish  problem  ...  a  fraternal solution  will  come  from  the
   Socialist  Party.  The [other] five parties have become  separatist
   ...  because they were nationalist. We offer a fraternal  solution,
   a federation. The Kurdish nation should be given the right to self-
   determination.  That  is how the right conditions  for  unification
   will  come  about... Union cannot be achieved through  force.  Your
   solutions  have failed. You will see, the Socialist Party  solution
   will prevail."
       (c) At a public meeting in Ankara on 13 October 1991
       "... we will put a stop to the special war being [waged] in the
   east  ...  we  will  end it by replacing it  with  a  programme  of
   brotherhood  between  Kurds  and  Turks  ...  and,  lastly,  on   a
   structural  level,  a federation in which both nations  are  on  an
   equal  footing... They say that they are troubled by the fact  that
   the  Euphrates is a border. Who made the Euphrates a  border?  They
   did!  ... Free, voluntary union on an equal footing of the  Kurdish
   and  Turkish nations within a federation, provided that the Kurdish
   nation  consents  and  so  decides as master  of  its  destiny  and
   accepts  it...  that  is  the solution proposed  by  the  Socialist
   Party. The two peoples, two nations are obliged [to accept]..."
       (d) During a television programme on 13 October 1991
       "... Because the Kurds of the village of Botan are standing  up
   they  are  in  the process of becoming their own masters...  Is  it
   you,  the  status  quo, that has forbidden  the  use  of  the  name
   "Kurd"?  The Kurdish people are standing up; they are becoming  the
   centre  of the debate; through their acts, they are imposing  their
   identity  and  celebrating the Newroz ... The oppressed  Kurds  are
   establishing their Constitution, making laws."
   --------------------------------
       <5>  Name  given  to traditional New Year celebrations  in  the
   Middle East.
   
       (e) At a public meeting at {Sirnak} on 16 October 1991
       "...  The Socialist Party says that the Kurdish problem  cannot
   be   resolved  by  soldiers  or  bullets.  The  solution  lies   in
   independence  ...  in  equality. The Kurdish  and  Turkish  nations
   should  have the same rights. The Kurdish and Turkish nations  will
   form  a popular republic ... and then one of them will survive  and
   the   other  be  oppressed;  that  is  indefensible...  It  is  the
   Socialist  Party  that is with the oppressed Kurdish  people...  By
   standing  up,  the  Kurdish people have begun  to  demonstrate  the
   combat  they have been waging for years... The Kurdish people  will
   bring  about a new revolution... The oppressed Kurdish  people  ...
   are  coming to join the Socialist Party... Long live the awakening!
   Long live our people!"
       (f) At a public meeting at Van on 17 October 1991
       "...  Turkish  nationalism has drowned in the Euphrates...  The
   State  has  oppressed the Kurdish people to the  point  of  erasing
   their  name,  even  of  prohibiting  its  use;  but  bans  come  to
   nothing... The Kurdish reality is there and is asserting  itself...
   Turks  and Kurds remain brothers; there can be no brotherhood where
   there is slavery; there can be no brotherhood if one is master  and
   the  other  slave;  everyone should be  equal  and  have  the  same
   rights...  There can be no hope if Turks and Kurds do not  unite...
   This  equation should be noted down somewhere... the Turkish people
   plus  the  oppressed Kurdish people equals democracy,  independence
   and freedom... Long live Kurdistan! ..."
       Relying  on an audiovisual recording of the latter meeting,  Mr
   {Perincek}   nevertheless  denied,  at   a   hearing   before   the
   Constitutional Court on 12 May 1992, that he had uttered  the  last
   sentence.
   
                 C. Dissolution of the Socialist Party
   
       14. On 28 November 1991 the Constitutional Court sent Principal
   State   Counsel's  application  to  the  SP,  whose  counsel  filed
   preliminary  written  observations on  29  January  1992  and  full
   observations  on  30 March 1992, in which they  first  requested  a
   hearing  or,  at the very least, leave to make further  submissions
   orally.  The  Constitutional Court acceded to  the  latter  request
   only  and  heard the party Chairman, Mr {Perincek}, on 12 May,  who
   had ceased to be Chairman of the party a short time before.
       Before   the  Constitutional  Court  the  SP's  representatives
   firstly  contested the constitutionality of certain  provisions  of
   Law  no.  2820 on which Principal State Counsel relied.  They  also
   argued  that the court should not admit the SP's publications  (see
   paragraph 13 above) in evidence against that party. They said  that
   two  of  the  publications were copies  of  a  speech  made  by  Mr
   {Perincek}  before his election as party Chairman on 6  July  1991;
   furthermore,  they  had  been examined  by  the  National  Security
   Courts  and  found  not  to contravene the law  (see  paragraph  11
   above).
       The  party  representatives went on to  point  out  that  on  8
   December  1988  the  Constitutional Court had dismissed  the  first
   application to have the SP dissolved on the basis of its  programme
   (see  paragraph 10 above). They maintained that the court would  be
   contradicting  itself if it now decided to dissolve the  SP  purely
   because  of  Mr {Perincek's} oral statements, which,  in  the  case
   before  the court, were merely reiterations of paragraph 31 of  the
   programme,  which  had already been reviewed by the  Constitutional
   Court.  They  noted, lastly, that since the enactment  of  Law  no.
   3713  (the  Prevention of Terrorism Act) which had, in  particular,
   repealed  Article  142  of  the Criminal  Code  (see  paragraph  18
   below),  it  was  no  longer illegal to carry  on  Marxist-Leninist
   activities;  in  their  submission,  if  one  political  party  was
   treated  differently  from  the others,  the  aim  pursued  by  the
   Turkish legislature would be defeated.
       15. Pursuant to section 101 of Law no. 2820, the Constitutional
   Court  made  an  order  on 10 July 1992 dissolving  the  SP,  which
   entailed  ipso jure the liquidation of the party and  the  transfer
   of  its  assets to the Treasury, in accordance with section 107  of
   that  Law.  The order was published in the Official Gazette  on  25
   October  1992. As a consequence, the founders and managers  of  the
   party  were  banned  from  holding  similar  office  in  any  other
   political  body  (former  Article 69  of  the  Constitution  -  see
   paragraph 16 below).
       In  its  judgment the Constitutional Court noted at the  outset
   that  the  impugned  publications of  the  SP  bore  the  name  and
   signature  of its Chairman, Mr {Perincek}, who was also the  person
   who  had made the oral statements on television. Those publications
   and  statements accordingly also bound the SP and consequently were
   admissible as relevant evidence under section 101 of Law no. 2820.
       The  Constitutional Court did not consider that either  its  or
   the National Security Courts' earlier judgments (see paragraphs  10
   -  11 above) in any way affected its examination of the case before
   it,  which concerned the political activities of the party, not  of
   its  leaders. Moreover, it could not accept that the  fact  that  a
   provision of the Criminal Code making it an offence to behave in  a
   certain way had been repealed meant that similar conduct no  longer
   constituted a valid ground for dissolution under Law no. 2820.
       The  Constitutional Court observed that unlike the  issue  that
   had  been decided in its judgment of 8 December 1988, the  one  now
   before  it  was based on new facts and evidence and thus gave  rise
   to  a  different question in law. It no longer had to be determined
   whether   the  programme  and  constitution  of  the  SP  were   in
   conformity   with  the  law,  but  solely  whether  its   political
   activities were caught by the relevant prohibitions.
       In  reaching  its  decision on the merits,  the  Constitutional
   Court  noted,  inter alia, that the SP referred  in  its  political
   message  to  two  nations... the Kurdish  nation  and  the  Turkish
   nation.  But  it could not be accepted that there were two  nations
   within  the  Republic  of  Turkey, whose citizens,  whatever  their
   ethnic  origin, had Turkish nationality. In reality, the statements
   made  by  the  SP  concerning Kurdish national and cultural  rights
   were   intended   to   create  minorities  and,   ultimately,   the
   establishment of a Kurdish-Turkish federation, to the detriment  of
   the  unity  of the Turkish nation and the territorial integrity  of
   the Turkish State.
       Like  all  nationals of foreign descent, nationals  of  Kurdish
   origin  could  freely express their identity, but the  Constitution
   and  the  law  precluded them from forming a  separate  nation  and
   State.  The  SP  was  ideologically opposed to the  nationalism  of
   Ataturk, which was the most fundamental principle underpinning  the
   Republic of Turkey.
       The  SP's political activity was also incompatible in aim  with
   Articles  11  and  17 of the European Convention on  Human  Rights,
   since   it   was   similar  to  that  of  terrorist  organisations,
   notwithstanding a difference in the means employed.
       In  short,  objectives which, like those of the SP,  encouraged
   separatism  and  incited a socially integrated community  to  fight
   for   the   creation  of  an  independent  federated   State   were
   unacceptable and justified dissolution of the party concerned.
   
                       II. Relevant domestic law
   
                          A. The Constitution
   
       16.  The  relevant  provisions  of  the  Constitution  read  as
   follows:
   
                               Article 2
   
       "The  Republic  of Turkey is a democratic, secular  and  social
   State  based  on the rule of law, respectful of human rights  in  a
   spirit  of social peace, national solidarity and justice,  adhering
   to  the  nationalism  of {Ataturk} and resting on  the  fundamental
   principles set out in the Preamble."
   
                             Article 3 з 1
   
       "The  State  of Turkey shall constitute with its territory  and
   nation,  an  indivisible  whole. The  official  language  shall  be
   Turkish."
   
                               Article 4
   
       "No  amendment  may  be made or proposed to the  provisions  of
   Article 1 of the Constitution providing that the State shall  be  a
   Republic,   the   provisions   of   Article   2   concerning    the
   characteristics of the Republic or the provisions of Article 3."
   
                               Article 6
   
       "Sovereignty  shall reside unconditionally and unreservedly  in
   the nation.
       ...
       Sovereign   power   shall  not  under  any   circumstances   be
   transferred to an individual, a group or a social class..."
   
                            Article 10 з 1
   
       "All  individuals  shall be equal before the  law  without  any
   distinction  based  on  language,  race,  colour,  sex,   political
   opinion,  philosophical belief, religion, membership of a religious
   sect or other similar grounds."
   
                            Article 14 з 1
   
       "None   of  the  rights  and  freedoms  referred  to   in   the
   Constitution  shall  be exercised with a view  to  undermining  the
   territorial  integrity of the State and the unity  of  the  nation,
   jeopardising  the  existence  of the  Turkish  State  or  Republic,
   abolishing fundamental rights and freedoms, placing the control  of
   the  State  in the hands of a single individual or group,  ensuring
   the  domination  of  one  social class over other  social  classes,
   introducing  discrimination  on  the  grounds  of  language,  race,
   religion or membership of a religious sect, or establishing by  any
   other  means a political system based on any of the above  concepts
   and opinions."
   
                            Article 66 з 1
   
       "Everyone linked to the Turkish State by nationality  shall  be
   Turkish."
   
                          (Former) Article 68
   
       "...
       No  political party shall be formed which aims to  advocate  or
   establish the domination of one social class or group, or any  form
   of dictatorship..."
   
                          (Former) Article 69
   
       "Political  parties shall not engage in activities  other  than
   those  referred to in their constitutions and programmes, nor shall
   they  disregard  the restrictions laid down by Article  14  of  the
   Constitution, on pain of permanent dissolution.
       ...
       The  decisions and internal running of political parties  shall
   not be contrary to democratic principles.
       ...
       Immediately  a  political  party  is  formed,  Principal  State
   Counsel  shall verify as a matter of priority that its constitution
   and  programme and the legal position of its founding  members  are
   consistent  with  the Constitution and the laws  of  the  land.  He
   shall also monitor its activities.
       Political parties may be dissolved by the Constitutional Court,
   on an application by Principal State Counsel.
       Founding  members and managers, at whatever level, of political
   parties  which  have  been  permanently dissolved  may  not  become
   founding  members,  managers or financial controllers  of  any  new
   political party..."
   
        B. Law no. 2820 on the regulation of political parties
   
       17.  The  relevant provisions of Law no. 2820 on the regulation
   of political parties read as follows:
   
                              Section 78
   
       "Political parties
       (a) shall not aim, strive or incite third parties to
       change  the  republican  form of the  Turkish  State;  the  ...
   provisions  concerning  the  absolute  integrity  of  the   Turkish
   State's  territory, the absolute unity of its nation, its  official
   language,  its flag or its national anthem; ... the principle  that
   sovereignty  resides  unconditionally  and  unreservedly   in   the
   Turkish  nation; ... the provision that sovereign power  cannot  be
   transferred to an individual, a group or a social class...;
       jeopardise  the  existence of the Turkish State  and  Republic,
   abolish  fundamental rights and freedoms, introduce  discrimination
   on  grounds of language, race, colour, religion or membership of  a
   religious  sect, or establish, by any means, a system of government
   based on any such notion or concept.
       ...
       (c)  shall not aim to defend or establish the domination of one
   social class over the other social classes or the domination  of  a
   community  or  the  setting up of any form  of  dictatorship;  they
   shall not carry on activities in pursuit of such aims..."
   
                              Section 80
   
       "Political parties shall not aim to change the principle of the
   unitary  State on which the Turkish Republic is founded, nor  carry
   on activities in pursuit of such an aim."
   
                              Section 81
   
       "Political parties shall not
       (a) assert that there exist within the territory of the Turkish
   Republic  any national minorities based on differences relating  to
   national  or  religious culture, membership of  a  religious  sect,
   race or language; or
       (b)  aim to destroy national unity by proposing, on the pretext
   of  protecting,  promoting or disseminating a non-Turkish  language
   or  culture,  to create minorities on the territory of the  Turkish
   Republic or to engage in similar activities..."
   
                            Section 90 (1)
   
       "The   constitution,  programme  and  activities  of  political
   parties may not contravene the Constitution or this Law."
   
                              Section 101
   
       "The  Constitutional  Court shall dissolve  a  political  party
   whose
       (a) constitution or programme ... is contrary to the provisions
   of Chapter 4 of this Law;
       (b)  membership, central committee or executive  committee  ...
   take  a decision, issue a circular or make a statement ... contrary
   to  the provisions of Chapter 4 of this Law ..., or whose Chairman,
   Vice-Chairman  or  General  Secretary makes  any  written  or  oral
   statement contrary to those provisions...
       (c)   representative   appointed  ...  by  the   administrative
   committee  ...,  makes oral statements on radio or television  that
   are contrary to the provisions ... of this Law..."
   
                            Section 107 (1)
   
       "All the assets of political parties dissolved by order of  the
   Constitutional Court shall be transferred to the Treasury."
       Chapter  4  of  the Law, which is referred to in  section  101,
   includes in particular section 90(1), which is reproduced above.
   
                         C. The Criminal Code
   
       18.  At  the  material time Article 142 of  the  Criminal  Code
   provided:
       "Harmful propaganda
       1. A person who by any means whatsoever spreads propaganda with
   a  view to establishing the domination of one social class over the
   others,  annihilating a social class, overturning  the  fundamental
   social  or  economic order established in Turkey or destroying  the
   entire  political  or  judicial  order  of  the  State  shall,   on
   conviction,  be  liable to a term of imprisonment of  between  five
   and ten years.
       2.  A person who by any means whatsoever spreads propaganda  in
   favour  of  the State's being governed by an individual  or  social
   group  to  the detriment of republicanism or democratic  principles
   shall,  on  conviction,  be liable to a  term  of  imprisonment  of
   between five and ten years.
       3.  Any  person who by any means whatsoever spreads  propaganda
   inspired  by  racist theories aimed at abolishing in  whole  or  in
   part  public-law  rights  as  guaranteed  by  the  Constitution  or
   undermining   or   eliminating  patriotic   sentiment   shall,   on
   conviction,  be  liable to a term of imprisonment of  between  five
   and ten years.
       ..."
   
                   PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION
   
       19.  The  applicants applied to the Commission on  31  December
   1992.  They  maintained  that the dissolution  of  the  SP  by  the
   Constitutional Court had infringed:
       (i)  Article  6 зз 1 and 2 and Articles 9, 10, and  11  of  the
   Convention,  taken individually and together with Articles  14  and
   (in the case of Articles 9, 10 and 11) 18 of the Convention;
       (ii) Articles 1 and 3 of Protocol No. 1.
       20.  On  6  December 1994 the Commission declared the complaint
   under  Article  6  з  2  of  the Convention  inadmissible  and  the
   remainder of the application (no. 21237/93) admissible.
       21.  In  its  report  of  26 November  1996  (Article  31),  it
   expressed the unanimous opinion that there had been a violation  of
   Article  11 of the Convention but no violation of Article  6  з  1,
   that  no  separate issue arose under Articles 9 and 10 and that  it
   was   unnecessary  to  consider  separately  the  complaints  under
   Articles  14  and  18 of the Convention and Articles  1  and  3  of
   Protocol  No.  1.  The  full text of the  Commission's  opinion  is
   reproduced as an annex to this judgment <6>.
   --------------------------------
       <6>  Note  by the Registrar. For practical reasons  this  annex
   will  appear  only  with the printed version of  the  judgment  (in
   Reports  of  Judgments  and Decisions 1998),  but  a  copy  of  the
   Commission's report is obtainable from the registry.
   
                    FINAL SUBMISSIONS TO THE COURT
   
       22.  In their memorial, the Government "... asked the Court  to
   declare that there had been no violation of Articles 6, 9, 10,  11,
   14  or  18 of the Convention or of Articles 1 or 3 of Protocol  No.
   1".
       23.  The applicants asked the Court to hold that there had been
   a  breach of the rights guaranteed by the aforementioned provisions
   of the Convention and Protocol No. 1.
   
                             AS TO THE LAW
   
         I. Alleged violation of Article 11 of the Convention
   
       24.  The applicants maintained that the fact that the Socialist
   Party  ("the  SP") had been dissolved and its leaders  banned  from
   holding  similar office in any other political party had  infringed
   their right to freedom of association, as guaranteed by Article  11
   of the Convention, which provides:
       "1.  Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and
   to  freedom of association with others, including the right to form
   and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests.
       2.  No  restrictions shall be placed on the exercise  of  these
   rights  other than such as are prescribed by law and are  necessary
   in  a  democratic society in the interests of national security  or
   public  safety,  for the prevention of disorder or crime,  for  the
   protection of health or morals or for the protection of the  rights
   and  freedoms  of  others.  This  Article  shall  not  prevent  the
   imposition  of lawful restrictions on the exercise of these  rights
   by   members  of  the  armed  forces,  of  the  police  or  of  the
   administration of the State."
   
                    A. Applicability of Article 11
   
          1. Submissions of those appearing before the Court
   
       (a) The applicants
       25.  The  applicants maintained that there was  no  doubt  that
   political parties came within the ambit of Article 11.
       (b) The Government
       26. In their memorial the Government submitted that Article  11
   did  not  in  any event apply to political parties.  Where  in  its
   constitution   or   programme   a   party   attacked   a    State's
   constitutional  order, the Court should declare the  Convention  to
   be inapplicable ratione materiae or apply Article 17.
       27. The SP had intended through its activities unambiguously to
   break  with Turkey's fundamental constitutional principles. It  was
   apparent  from  what  the SP said that the  party  considered  that
   citizens  of  Kurdish origin had "nation" and "people"  status  and
   the  right  to  "found  a separate State", that  it  advocated  the
   setting  up  of  a  federation,  without  moreover  excluding   the
   creation  of other federated bodies entitled to open consulates  in
   other countries. As that amounted to challenging the very basis  of
   the   State,  the  Constitutional  Court  had  had  to  review  the
   constitutionality  of  that political aim.  In  so  doing,  it  had
   followed the line taken by the German Constitutional Court  in  its
   judgment  of  31 October 1991 on the right of foreign nationals  to
   vote  in  local elections and by the French Constitutional  Council
   in its decision of 9 May 1991 on the status of Corsica.
       In  the  Government's  submission, the States  Parties  to  the
   Convention  had at no stage intended to submit their constitutional
   institutions,  and in particular the principles they considered  to
   be  the  essential conditions of their existence, to review by  the
   Strasbourg  institutions. For that reason, where a political  party
   such  as  the  SP had called those institutions or principles  into
   question,  it could not seek application of the Convention  or  its
   Protocols,  since  it was not the SP's freedom of association  that
   was  in  issue  in  the  present  case,  but  the  right  to  self-
   determination,  which  did  not come  within  the  compass  of  the
   Convention.
       At  the  very  least,  Article 17 of the Convention  should  be
   applied in respect of the SP since the party sought to justify  the
   use  of violence and to promote hatred of the Turkish State and the
   wrongful  division of an entire people into two opposing camps.  In
   so  doing, the SP had said the same things as the Workers' Party of
   Kurdistan  ("the PKK"), without distancing itself from any  of  the
   latter's  methods. Moreover, the Constitutional Court had,  in  its
   judgment  ordering  the  dissolution of  the  SP,  recognised  that
   Article  17  was relevant in the case of the SP and concluded  that
   the party's activities were covered by that provision.
       (c) The Commission
       28. The Commission expressed the opinion that there was nothing
   in  the  wording of Article 11 to limit its scope to  a  particular
   form  of  association or group or to suggest that it did not  apply
   to   political  parties.  On  the  contrary,  if  Article  11   was
   considered  to  be  a  legal  safeguard  that  ensured  the  proper
   functioning  of democracy, political parties were one of  the  most
   important  forms  of association it protected. In that  connection,
   the  Commission referred to a number of decisions in which  it  had
   examined,  under Article 11, various restrictions on the activities
   of  political  parties and even the dissolution  of  such  parties,
   thereby  implicitly accepting that Article 11 applied to that  type
   of  association  (see the German Communist Party case,  application
   no.  250/57,  Yearbook 1, p. 225; the Greek case, Yearbook  12,  p.
   170,   з   392;  the  France,  Norway,  Denmark,  Sweden  and   the
   Netherlands   v.  Turkey  case,  applications  nos.   9940-9944/82,
   Decisions and Reports 35, p. 143).
       At  the hearing before the Court the Delegate of the Commission
   also  said  that  it  was unnecessary to apply Article  17  of  the
   Convention,  since  neither the SP's programme nor  the  statements
   made  by  Mr {Perincek} that were in issue indicated that they  had
   sought  to  destroy  the  rights  and  freedoms  protected  by  the
   Convention.
   
                       2. The Court's assessment
   
       29.  In  its judgment in the case of United Communist Party  of
   Turkey  and Others v. Turkey, the Court held that political parties
   are  a  form of association essential to the proper functioning  of
   democracy  and that in view of the importance of democracy  in  the
   Convention  system,  there can be no doubt that  political  parties
   come  within the scope of Article 11. The Court noted on the  other
   hand  that  an  association, including a political  party,  is  not
   excluded  from  the  protection afforded by the  Convention  simply
   because its activities are regarded by the national authorities  as
   undermining the constitutional structures of the State and  calling
   for  the imposition of restrictions (see the United Communist Party
   of  Turkey  and  Others  v. Turkey judgment  of  30  January  1998,
   Reports  of Judgments and Decisions 1998-I, p. 17, зз 25  and  27).
   The  Court sees no reason to come to a different conclusion in  the
   instant case.
       As  to the application of Article 17, the Court will deal  with
   it  after  considering the question of compliance with  Article  11
   (see paragraph 53 below).
   
                     B. Compliance with Article 11
   
                 1. Whether there was an interference
   
       30.  All those appearing before the Court acknowledged that the
   SP's   dissolution  amounted  to  an  interference  in  the   three
   applicants'  right  to freedom of association.  That  is  also  the
   Court's view.
   
               2. Whether the interference was justified
   
       31. Such an interference will constitute a breach of Article 11
   unless  it  was "prescribed by law", pursued one or more legitimate
   aims  under paragraph 2 and was "necessary in a democratic society"
   for the achievement of those aims.
       (a) "Prescribed by law"
       32.  It was common ground that the interference was "prescribed
   by  law", as the measures ordered by the Constitutional Court  were
   based  on  Articles  2, 3 з 1, 6, 10 з 1 and  14  з  1  and  former
   Article  68  of the Constitution and sections 78, 81 and  96(3)  of
   Law   no.  2820  on  the  regulation  of  political  parties   (see
   paragraphs 16 - 17 above).
       (b) Legitimate aim
       33.  The Government maintained that the interference pursued  a
   number  of  legitimate  aims: ensuring  national  security,  public
   safety  and  territorial integrity and protecting  the  rights  and
   freedoms  of others. If the Court had accepted, as it had  done  in
   the  Hadjianastassiou  v.  Greece  judgment  of  16  December  1992
   (Series  A no. 252), that an isolated case of espionage could  harm
   national  security,  there  was all the  more  reason  to  reach  a
   similar  conclusion  where,  as  in  the  instant  case,  the  very
   existence of a State Party to the Convention was threatened.
       34.  The  applicants  observed that before  the  Constitutional
   Court  Principal  State Counsel had at no stage  relied  on  either
   national security or public safety.
       35.  The  Commission  considered  that  prohibiting  activities
   which,  in the authorities' view, were likely to cause the collapse
   of  the State or the division of its territory could be said to  be
   intended to protect "national security" and territorial integrity.
       36.  The Court considers that the dissolution of the SP pursued
   at  least  one  of the legitimate aims set out in Article  11:  the
   protection of "national security".
       (c) "Necessary in a democratic society"
       i. Submissions of those appearing before the Court
       (alpha) The applicants
       37.  The  applicants  said that in a pluralist  democratic  and
   parliamentary  system,  people should have  the  right  to  express
   their opinion on the Kurdish problem and on how to resolve it.  The
   SP  was  a political party supported by a sector of public  opinion
   which should have had the right to accede to power.
       The  SP bore no resemblance to the German Communist Party  that
   had   been   dissolved   at  the  time  by   the   German   Federal
   Constitutional  Court (see application no. 250/57, Yearbook  1,  p.
   225).  Otherwise, the Turkish Constitutional Court would  not  have
   dismissed, on 8 December 1988, the first application for the SP  to
   be  dissolved  (see  paragraph  10 above).  In  that  decision  the
   Constitutional  Court  had  found  the  party's  constitution   and
   programme  to be in accordance with the Constitution  and  that  it
   was  part  of  the country's democratic system and clearly  opposed
   terrorism.
       The  SP  had never acted unlawfully and the best proof of  that
   was  that  its  then Chairman, Mr {Perincek}, was now  Chairman  of
   another  political party, the Workers' Party, and  carried  on  his
   work quite lawfully.
       The  SP had always defended the union of the Turkish State. The
   federal  system  it proposed as a solution to the  Kurdish  problem
   would  not  prevent  State  unity.  Germany  and  Switzerland  were
   federations  and  no one saw in that status a programme  to  divide
   those  countries. As for Turkey, federation would, on the contrary,
   afford a much more reliable solution for the future.
       (beta) The Government
       38. In the Government's submission, any resemblance between the
   present  case  and  that of the United Communist  Party  of  Turkey
   ("the  TBKP")  was  in appearances only, the sole  real  similarity
   lying  in the fact that both parties had been dissolved by an order
   of   the  Constitutional  Court.  In  the  case  of  the  TBKP  the
   Constitutional Court's task had been to assess whether the  party's
   programme and constitution complied with the Constitution  and  the
   Law  on the regulation of political parties. In the case of the  SP
   on  the  other  hand  -  as the Constitutional  Court  had  clearly
   explained  in  its judgment - the court had had to  assess  whether
   the  SP's  activities subsequent to its formation  were  consistent
   with those documents.
       After  the  first review of the constitutionality of the  party
   (see  paragraphs 9 - 10 above), new facts and evidence had come  to
   light  concerning the SP's activities, which the Commission, unlike
   the  Constitutional  Court, had failed to take into  account.  They
   showed  that  from  1990,  and  in particular  in  1991,  the  SP's
   activities  had  shifted radically away from its  initial  approach
   reflected  in its constitutive documents and were directed  towards
   the  disruption of the fundamental concepts which have inspired the
   Republic of Turkey since its formation.
       The shift was to be seen in particular in the speeches made  by
   the  SP's  Chairman,  Mr  {Perincek}, at  meetings,  congresses  or
   political  rallies,  some  of which were  later  published  by  the
   party.  He  had used violent, aggressive and provocative  language,
   denigrated all the other political parties and sought to  vindicate
   the  use  of  violence  and terrorist methods  by  calling  for  an
   uprising  through  the use, inter alia, of the  expression  "{Ayaga
   kalk}",   which   meant   "stand  up".  The  Constitutional   Court
   consequently  found that the language and methods of  the  SP  were
   not at all consistent with its calls for brotherhood and equality.
       39.  Referring  to  the Court's analysis of  the  situation  in
   Turkey  in  its  judgment  in the case of  Zana  v.  Turkey  of  25
   November 1997 (Reports 1997-VII), the Government said that in  1990
   and  1991  there  had  been an intolerable  increase  in  terrorist
   activity  that  had  caused  thousands of  deaths  and  had  spared
   neither   women   nor  children.  Against  that   background,   the
   declarations  of  a  well-known  political  leader  were  bound  to
   aggravate the violence and hatred. In such cases, the authority  to
   the  effect  that freedom of expression also applied to  statements
   that  offended,  shocked or disturbed bore  no  relevance.  In  the
   present  case, the Court was not concerned with a political  debate
   on  political and economic issues of interest to the whole country,
   but  with  incitement  to  join  a bloody  and  murderous  conflict
   between  two sections of the population which enjoyed, without  any
   discrimination,  all  the  rights  and  liberties  defined  by  the
   Constitution and statute.
       In  that connection, the Government referred, as they had  done
   in  the  TBKP case (see the judgment cited above, pp. 23  -  24,  з
   49),  to  the  Commission's case-law whereby  if  the  interference
   pursued  as  a  legitimate  aim  the protection  of  public  order,
   territorial  integrity,  the  public  interest  or  democracy,  the
   Convention  institutions did not require that the risk of  violence
   justifying the interference should be real, current or imminent.
       Nor  was  it  at  all  relevant  to  rely  on  Mr  {Perincek's}
   acquittals before the National Security Courts in order to  contest
   the  necessity  of  the  interference in issue,  as  two  types  of
   proceedings,  pursuing  entirely different aims,  were  involved...
   the  first type was criminal proceedings, in which the court  ruled
   on  an  individual's personal responsibility, whereas in the second
   type  of  proceedings - constitutional proceedings, such  as  those
   impugned  before the Court - the sole issue was whether a political
   party  was  compatible  with the Convention and  that  necessitated
   applying different criteria.
       (gamma) The Commission
       40. The Commission considered that the SP's dissolution had not
   been   necessary  in  a  democratic  society.  It  noted  that   Mr
   {Perincek}  had  previously been prosecuted in the criminal  courts
   for  making  statements to the same effect as  those  made  in  the
   present  case, but had been acquitted of the charges  against  him.
   The  Commission  inferred  that even in the  eyes  of  the  Turkish
   judicial  authorities, the publications did  not  contain  anything
   intended to encourage extremist or terrorist groups to destroy  the
   constitutional  order  of the State or to  found  a  Kurdish  State
   through the use of force.
       The  Commission also observed that the SP had sought to achieve
   its  political aims solely through lawful means and that it had not
   been  shown  that  the  SP  had  had any  intention  of  destroying
   Turkey's   democratic  and  pluralist  order   or   had   advocated
   infringing   fundamental   human   rights   by   promoting   racial
   discrimination.
       ii. The Court's assessment
       41.  The  Court reiterates that notwithstanding its  autonomous
   role and particular sphere of application, Article 11 must also  be
   considered  in the light of Article 10. The protection of  opinions
   and  the  freedom to express them is one of the objectives  of  the
   freedoms  of  assembly and association as enshrined in Article  11.
   That  applies all the more in relation to political parties in view
   of  their  essential  role  in ensuring pluralism  and  the  proper
   functioning of democracy.
       As  the  Court  has  emphasised many times,  there  can  be  no
   democracy without pluralism. It is for that reason that freedom  of
   expression  as  enshrined in Article 10 is applicable,  subject  to
   paragraph  2,  not  only  to  "information"  or  "ideas"  that  are
   favourably  received or regarded as inoffensive or as a  matter  of
   indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or disturb.  The
   fact  that  their activities form part of a collective exercise  of
   freedom of expression in itself entitles political parties to  seek
   the  protection  of  Articles 10 and 11 of  the  Convention.  (see,
   among  other authorities, the United Communist Party of Turkey  and
   Others judgment cited above, pp. 20 - 21, зз 42 - 43).
       42.  In  the  instant case it must first be noted that  in  its
   judgment  of  10 July 1992 the Constitutional Court  held  that  on
   that  occasion  it  no  longer had to  consider  whether  the  SP's
   programme  and  constitution  were lawful,  but  only  whether  its
   political  activities  contravened the statutory  prohibitions.  In
   dissolving  the party, the Constitutional Court had had  regard  to
   public  statements  - some of them in written form  -  made  by  Mr
   {Perincek}  which  it  considered  to  constitute  new  facts   and
   evidence  that  were  binding on the SP (see paragraph  15  above).
   Consequently,  the  Court  may confine itself  to  examining  those
   statements.
       43.  The Constitutional Court noted that, by distinguishing two
   nations  -  the  Kurdish  nation  and  the  Turkish  nation  -   Mr
   {Perincek}  had advocated the creation of minorities within  Turkey
   and,   ultimately,   the   establishment   of   a   Kurdish-Turkish
   federation,  to  the detriment of the unity of the  Turkish  nation
   and   the   territorial  integrity  of  the  State.  The   SP   was
   ideologically  opposed to the nationalism of {Ataturk},  which  was
   the  most  fundamental  principle  underpinning  the  Republic   of
   Turkey.  Although different methods were used, the aim of the  SP's
   political  activity was similar to that of terrorist organisations.
   As  the  SP  promoted  separatism and revolt  its  dissolution  was
   justified (see paragraph 15 above).
       44.  In  the  light  of these factors, the Court  must  firstly
   consider  the content of the statements in issue and then determine
   whether they justified the dissolution of the SP.
       With  regard to the first issue the Court reiterates that  when
   it  carries out its scrutiny, its task is not to substitute its own
   view  for  that of the relevant national authorities but rather  to
   review  under  Article  11  the decisions  they  delivered  in  the
   exercise  of  their  discretion. In so  doing,  the  Court  has  to
   satisfy  itself that the national authorities based their decisions
   on  an  acceptable assessment of the relevant facts  (see,  mutatis
   mutandis, the United Communist Party of Turkey and Others  judgment
   cited above, p. 22, з 47).
       45.  Further,  the Court has previously held that  one  of  the
   principal  characteristics  of  democracy  is  the  possibility  it
   offers  of resolving a country's problems through dialogue, without
   recourse  to  violence,  even  when  they  are  irksome.  Democracy
   thrives  on  freedom of expression. From that point of view,  there
   can  be  no  justification for hindering a political  group  solely
   because it seeks to debate in public the situation of part  of  the
   State's population and to take part in the nation's political  life
   in  order to find, according to democratic rules, solutions capable
   of  satisfying  everyone concerned (see the United Communist  Party
   of Turkey and Others judgment cited above, p. 27, з 57).
       46. Having analysed Mr {Perincek's} statements, the Court finds
   nothing  in  them  that can be considered a call  for  the  use  of
   violence,  an uprising or any other form of rejection of democratic
   principles.  On the contrary, he stressed on a number of  occasions
   the  need  to  achieve the proposed political reform in  accordance
   with  democratic  rules,  through the ballot  box  and  by  holding
   referenda.  At  the  same time, he spoke out  against  "the  former
   culture  idolising  violence and advocating the  use  of  force  to
   solve  problems between nations and in society" (see  paragraph  13
   above).
       At  the  hearing  the Agent for the Government stated  that  Mr
   {Perincek}  had  "justified  the  use  of  violent  and   terrorist
   methods"  by  saying  in particular: "The Kurd has  proved  himself
   through  the fight of impoverished peasants by linking its  destiny
   [to  theirs]. By holding meetings with thousands of people  in  the
   towns  and  provinces, the Kurd had proved himself and broken  down
   the barriers of fear." Furthermore, by calling on those present  to
   "sow  courage, rather than watermelons", Mr {Perincek} had, in  the
   Government's  submission, "exhorted them  to  stop  all  activities
   other  than the destruction of order". Lastly, by using the  phrase
   "The  Kurdish  people are standing up" he had called upon  them  to
   revolt.
       While  the  Court accepts that these phrases were  directed  at
   citizens  of Kurdish origin and constituted an invitation  to  them
   to  rally together and assert certain political claims, it finds no
   trace  of  any incitement to use violence or infringe the rules  of
   democracy.  In  that regard, the relevant statements were  scarcely
   any  different from those made by other political groups that  were
   active in other countries of the Council of Europe.
       47.  The Constitutional Court had also criticised Mr {Perincek}
   for  having  drawn a distinction between two nations,  the  Kurdish
   nation  and  the  Turkish nation, in his speeches  and  of  thereby
   pleading in favour of creating minorities and the establishment  of
   a  Kurdish-Turkish federation, to the detriment of the unity of the
   Turkish  nation  and  the  territorial  integrity  of  the   State.
   Ultimately, the SP had advocated separatism.
       The Court notes that, read together, the statements put forward
   a   political   programme  with  the  essential   aim   being   the
   establishment, in accordance with democratic rules,  of  a  federal
   system  in which Turks and Kurds would be represented on  an  equal
   footing and on a voluntary basis. Admittedly, reference is made  to
   the  right  to self-determination of the "Kurdish nation"  and  its
   right  to  "secede"; however, read in their context, the statements
   using  these words do not encourage secession from Turkey but  seek
   rather  to stress that the proposed federal system could  not  come
   about  without  the Kurds' freely given consent,  which  should  be
   expressed through a referendum.
       In  the  Court's view, the fact that such a political programme
   is   considered  incompatible  with  the  current  principles   and
   structures of the Turkish State does not make it incompatible  with
   the  rules of democracy. It is of the essence of democracy to allow
   diverse  political  programmes to be  proposed  and  debated,  even
   those  that  call  into  question the  way  a  State  is  currently
   organised, provided that they do not harm democracy itself.
       48.  It  is true here too that, as was the case with  the  TBKP
   (see  the  United  Communist Party of Turkey  and  Others  judgment
   cited  above,  p.  27,  з  58), it cannot be  ruled  out  that  the
   statements  in issue concealed objectives and intentions  different
   from  the  ones  proclaimed in public. In the absence  of  concrete
   actions  belying  Mr  {Perincek's}  sincerity  in  what  he   said,
   however,  that  sincerity should not be doubted. The  SP  was  thus
   penalised  for conduct relating solely to the exercise  of  freedom
   of expression.
       49.  The  Court also notes that Mr {Perincek} was acquitted  in
   the  National  Security  Courts where he  had  been  prosecuted  in
   respect  of the same statements (see paragraph 11 above).  In  that
   connection   the  Government  stressed  that  the  two   types   of
   proceedings   were   entirely   different,   one   concerning   the
   application   of  criminal  law,  the  other  the  application   of
   constitutional law. The Court merely notes that the Turkish  courts
   had   divergent   views  as  to  the  effect  of  Mr   {Perincek's}
   statements.
       It  is now important to determine whether, in the light of  the
   above  considerations, the SP's dissolution can  be  considered  to
   have  been  necessary  in  a democratic society,  that  is  to  say
   whether  it met a "pressing social need" and was "proportionate  to
   the  legitimate aim pursued" (see, among many other authorities and
   mutatis  mutandis,  the Vogt v. Germany judgment  of  26  September
   1995, Series A no. 323, pp. 25 - 26, з 52).
       50.  The  Court reiterates that, having regard to the essential
   role  of  political parties in the proper functioning of  democracy
   (see  the  United  Communist Party of Turkey  and  Others  judgment
   cited  above,  p. 17, з 25), the exceptions set out in  Article  11
   are,  where  political  parties  are  concerned,  to  be  construed
   strictly;  only  convincing  and  compelling  reasons  can  justify
   restrictions   on   such  parties'  freedom  of   association.   In
   determining whether a necessity within the meaning of Article 11  з
   2  exists,  the  Contracting States have only a limited  margin  of
   appreciation,  which  goes  hand in  hand  with  rigorous  European
   supervision  embracing both the law and the decisions applying  it,
   including  those  given  by  independent  courts  (see  the  United
   Communist Party of Turkey and Others judgment cited above,  p.  22,
   з 46).
       51.  The  Court observes that the interference in question  was
   radical...  the  SP  was  dissolved with  immediate  and  permanent
   effect,  its  assets were liquidated and transferred ipso  jure  to
   the  Treasury and its leaders - who admittedly did not  include  Mr
   {Perincek} when the party was dissolved (see paragraph 14 above)  -
   were  banned from carrying on certain similar political activities.
   Measures  as  severe  as  those may only be  applied  in  the  most
   serious cases.
       52.   The   Court  has  already  noted  that  Mr   {Perincek's}
   statements, though critical and full of demands, did not appear  to
   it  to  call  into question the need for compliance with democratic
   principles and rules.
       The  Court  is prepared to take into account the background  of
   cases  before  it, in particular the difficulties  associated  with
   the  prevention  of  terrorism (see, among other  authorities,  the
   United  Communist Party of Turkey and Others judgment cited  above,
   p.  27,  з  59).  In the present case, however,  it  has  not  been
   established  how,  in spite of the fact that in making  them  their
   author declared attachment to democracy and expressed rejection  of
   violence, the statements in issue could be considered to have  been
   in  any  way responsible for the problems which terrorism poses  in
   Turkey.
       53. In view of the findings referred to above, there is no need
   either  to bring Article 17 into play, as nothing in the statements
   warrants  the conclusion that their author relied on the Convention
   to  engage in activity or perform acts aimed at the destruction  of
   any  of  the  rights  and freedoms set forth in  it  (see,  mutatis
   mutandis, the United Communist Party of Turkey and Others  judgment
   cited above, p. 27, з 60).
       54.   In   conclusion,   the  dissolution   of   the   SP   was
   disproportionate  to  the aim pursued and consequently  unnecessary
   in  a  democratic  society.  It  follows  that  there  has  been  a
   violation of Article 11 of the Convention.
   
             II. Alleged violations of Articles 9, 10, 14
                       and 18 of the Convention
   
       55. The applicants also maintained that there had been breaches
   of  Articles  9,  10,  14  and  18  of  the  Convention.  As  their
   complaints  relate  to  the  same  facts  the  Court  considers  it
   unnecessary to examine them separately.
   
              III. Alleged violations of Articles 1 and 3
                           of Protocol no. 1
   
       56.  The applicants further submitted that the effects  of  the
   SP's  dissolution - its assets were confiscated and transferred  to
   the  Treasury,  and  its leaders were banned from  taking  part  in
   elections  - entailed a breach of Articles 1 and 3 of Protocol  No.
   1, which provide:
   
                               Article 1
   
       "Every  natural  or legal person is entitled  to  the  peaceful
   enjoyment  of  his  possessions. No one shall be  deprived  of  his
   possessions  except  in  the public interest  and  subject  to  the
   conditions  provided  for by law and by the general  principles  of
   international law.
       The  preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair
   the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary  to
   control  the  use  of  property  in  accordance  with  the  general
   interest  or  to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions
   or penalties."
   
                               Article 3
   
       "The  High Contracting Parties undertake to hold free elections
   at  reasonable  intervals by secret ballot, under conditions  which
   will  ensure  the free expression of the opinion of the  people  in
   the choice of the legislature."
       57.  The  Court notes that the measures complained  of  by  the
   applicants  were incidental effects of the SP's dissolution,  which
   the  Court  has  held to amount to a breach of Article  11.  It  is
   consequently unnecessary to consider those complaints separately.
   
                IV. Alleged violation of Article 6 з 1
                           of the Convention
   
       58. Lastly, the applicants complained that instead of holding a
   public  hearing, the Constitutional Court had heard them merely  in
   camera  and  that they had not had access to the case file  or  the
   verbatim  record of the hearing. They considered that that amounted
   to a breach of Article 6 з 1 of the Convention.
       59.  Neither the Government nor the Commission considered  that
   Article 6 з 1 was applicable on the facts of the case.
       60.  In  view  of  its  conclusion concerning  compliance  with
   Article  11, the Court considers that it is unnecessary to  examine
   this complaint.
   
            V. Application of Article 50 of the Convention
   
       61. Article 50 of the Convention provides:
       "If  the  Court finds that a decision or a measure taken  by  a
   legal  authority or any other authority of a High Contracting Party
   is  completely  or  partially  in  conflict  with  the  obligations
   arising  from the ... Convention, and if the internal  law  of  the
   said  Party  allows  only partial reparation to  be  made  for  the
   consequences  of  this decision or measure,  the  decision  of  the
   Court  shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured
   party."
   
               A. Annulment of the order for dissolution
   
       62.  The  applicants  firstly requested the  annulment  of  the
   Constitutional  Court's order of 10 July 1992  dissolving  the  SP.
   They also sought "recognised political-party status" for the SP.
       63.  The  Court  holds  that it has no jurisdiction  under  the
   Convention  to  order  these measures (see, mutatis  mutandis,  the
   Saidi  v. France judgment of 20 September 1993, Series A no. 261-C,
   p. 57, з 47).
   
                   B. Damage and costs and expenses
   
       64.  In  respect  of  pecuniary damage the  applicants  claimed
   1,500,000  US  dollars (USD): USD 1,000,000  for  the  SP  and  USD
   250,000  each  for  Mr {Dogu Perincek} and Mr {Ilhan  Kirit}.  They
   sought   USD  6,000,000  for  nonpecuniary  damage,  that  is   USD
   2,000,000 for each applicant.
       In  support of their claims they stressed that the SP  had  had
   more  than  400  offices spread over the whole of Turkey,  all  its
   assets  had been seized, it had had the right to present candidates
   at  the elections, had taken part in the elections and was the only
   left-wing  socialist  party in existence  when  it  was  dissolved.
   According  to  the  applicants, the thousands  of  people  who  had
   helped  to  form  the  SP - which had been active  for  four  years
   before  its  dissolution  -  and the  leaders  of  that  party  had
   sustained substantial nonpecuniary damage and financial loss.
       The  applicants also sought "reimbursement of all the costs  to
   which  the  case had given rise". At the hearing before the  Court,
   they  explained that the fees and costs of the 308 lawyers who  had
   represented the SP before the Constitutional Court alone  had  come
   to   1,955,800  French  francs  (FRF).  As  to  the  costs  of  the
   applicants'  representation  before  the  Convention  institutions,
   they had come to FRF 300,000.
       65.  As its main submission, the Government considered that  no
   compensation  was  payable in this case. In the  alternative,  they
   considered  the  applicants'  claims  exorbitant.  In  the  further
   alternative, they argued that a violation of Article 11 only  could
   not   confer   on   the  applicants  a  right  to  be   compensated
   individually.
       As  to  the  alleged pecuniary damage, the Government  affirmed
   that  it  had  no  causal  link  with the  SP's  dissolution,  that
   political  parties  and their leaders could  not  be  equated  with
   commercial  undertakings  and  that  in  any  event  there  was  no
   supporting accounting evidence for the claims.
       As  for  the  claims  in respect of non-pecuniary  damage,  the
   Government considered them to be "even more unreliable"  since  not
   only  were  they  exorbitant but they included  a  claim  for  non-
   pecuniary damage allegedly sustained by the SP itself.
       Lastly,  as  regards  the claims for costs  and  expenses,  the
   Government found them to be insufficiently detailed.
       66.   The  Delegate  of  the  Commission  submitted  that   the
   applicants'  presentation - which was very general and hypothetical
   -  was  insufficient to allow their claims under Article 50  to  be
   upheld.
       67.  The Court notes that the applicants have not furnished any
   evidence  in  support  of  their claims  for  substantial  sums  in
   respect  of  pecuniary damage and costs and expenses. Consequently,
   it  cannot uphold those claims (see, mutatis mutandis, the  Pressos
   Compania  Naviera  S.A. and Others v. Belgium judgment  of  3  July
   1997  (Article  50), Reports 1997-IV, p. 1299,  з  24).  It  notes,
   however, that the applicants received FRF 57,187 in legal aid  paid
   by the Council of Europe.
       As  to  non-pecuniary damage, the Court notes that, unlike  the
   TBKP,  the  SP's  constitution and programme were approved  by  the
   Constitutional  Court  and  the party was  active  for  four  years
   before  being  dissolved  by  it.  Mr  {Perincek}  and  Mr  {Kirit}
   therefore  sustained  definite  non-pecuniary  damage.  Making  its
   assessment  on an equitable basis, the Court assesses  that  damage
   at FRF 50,000 each.
   
                          C. Default interest
   
       68.  According to the information available to the  Court,  the
   statutory  rate  of interest applicable in France at  the  date  of
   adoption of the present judgment is 3.36% per annum.
   
               FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
   
       1.  Holds that there has been a violation of Article 11 of  the
   Convention;
       2.  Holds that it is unnecessary to determine whether there has
   been  a  violation  of Articles 6 з 1, 9, 10,  14  and  18  of  the
   Convention and Articles 1 and 3 of Protocol No. 1;
       3. Holds
       (a)  that the respondent State is to pay Mr {Perincek}  and  Mr
   {Kirit},  within  three  months,  a  total  sum  of  50,000  (fifty
   thousand)  French  francs each in respect of non-pecuniary  damage,
   to  be  converted into Turkish liras at the rate applicable at  the
   date of payment;
       (b)  that  simple interest at an annual rate of 3.36% shall  be
   payable  on  that sum from the expiry of the above-mentioned  three
   months until settlement;
       4.  Dismisses the remainder of the claim for just satisfaction.
   Done  in  English and in French, and delivered at a public  hearing
   in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 25 May 1998.
   
                                              Signed: Rudolf BERNHARDT
                                                             President
   
                                               Signed: Herbert PETZOLD
                                                             Registrar
   
   

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