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ПОСТАНОВЛЕНИЕ ОТ 15.07.2002 N ... ДЕЛО КАЛАШНИКОВ (KALASHNIKOV) ПРОТИВ РОССИИ [АНГЛ.]

(по состоянию на 20 октября 2006 года)

<<< Назад


                     EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
   
                             THIRD SECTION
   
                     CASE OF KALASHNIKOV v. RUSSIA
                       (Application no. 47095/99)
   
                                JUDGMENT
   
                        (Strasbourg, 15.VI.2002)
   
       In the case of Kalashnikov v. Russia,
       The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as
   a Chamber composed of:
       Mr  J.-P. Costa, President,
       Mr  W. Fuhrmann,
       Mr  L. Loucaides,
       Sir Nicolas Bratza,
       Mrs H.S. Greve,
       Mr  K. Traja,
       Mr  A. Kovler, judges,
       and Mrs S. Dolle, Section Registrar,
       Having deliberated in private on 18 September 2001 and 24 June
   2002,
       Delivers the following judgment,  which  was  adopted  on  the
   last-mentioned date:
   
                               PROCEDURE
   
       1. The  case  originated  in  an  application  (no.  47095/99)
   against  the  Russian  Federation  lodged  with  the  Court  under
   Article 34  of  the  Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
   and Fundamental Freedoms ("the Convention") by a Russian national,
   Valeriy  Yermilovich Kalashnikov ("the applicant"),  on 1 December
   1998.
       2. The   applicant   complained,   in  particular,  about  his
   conditions of detention,  the length  of  his  detention  and  the
   length of the criminal proceedings against him.
       3. The application was allocated to the former  Third  Section
   of  the  Court  (Rule  52 § 1 of the Rules of Court).  Within that
   Section,  the Chamber that would consider the case (Article 27 § 1
   of  the  Convention) was constituted as provided in Rule 26 § 1 of
   the Rules of Court.
       4. The applicant and the Government each filed observations on
   the admissibility and merits (Rule 54 § 3(b)). The parties replied
   in writing to each other's observations.
       5. A hearing on the admissibility and  merits  took  place  in
   public in the Human Rights Building,  Strasbourg,  on 18 September
   2001 (Rule 54 § 4).
   
   There appeared before the Court:
       (a) for the Government
       Mr P.  Laptev, Representative of the Russian Federation before
   the ECHR,
       Mr Y. Berestnev,
       Mr S. Volkovsky,
       MR S. Razumov,
       MR Y. Kalinin,                                       Advisers;
       MR K. Bahtiarov,
       MR O. Ankudinov,
       MR V. Vlasihin,                                       Experts;
       (b)  for the applicant
       Mrs K.  Moskalenko,  of  the  Moscow  International Protection
   Centre
       Mr  N. Sonkin, of the Moscow Regional Bar             Counsel,
       Mr  V. Kalashnikov,                                 Applicant.
       6. The Court heard addresses by Mr P. Laptev, Mrs K Moskalenko
   and Mr N.  Sonkin, and the replies of Mr V. Vlasihin, Mr P. Laptev
   and Mrs K.  Moskalenko to questions  from  three  judges.
       At the  Court's  request,   the   Government   had   submitted
   photographs of the cell in which the applicant was detained.  They
   also provided a video recorded film  of  the  renovated  cell  and
   nearby area,  which renovation had been made after the applicant's
   release.
       7. By a decision of 18 September 2001,  the Court declared the
   application partly admissible.
       It thereafter   considered   that  an  on-site  inspection  or
   "fact-finding mission" was not necessary,  as  it  had  sufficient
   material  in  the case-file on which to reach its conclusions.  In
   particular,  it considered that no useful purpose would be  served
   by such an exercise because the present conditions of the cell, as
   shown in the video, no longer bore any resemblance to those at the
   time   of   the   applicant's   detention,  as  confirmed  by  the
   contemporary photographs.
       8. On 1 November 2001 the Court changed the composition of its
   Sections (Rule 25 § 1),  but this case remained with  the  Chamber
   constituted within former Section III.
       9. The parties filed no further observations on the merits  of
   the application.
       10. On 28 December 2001 the applicant filed  claims  for  just
   satisfaction  under  Article  41  of the Convention,  on which the
   Government submitted comments.
   
                               THE FACTS
   
                   I.  THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
   
       11. The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Moscow. At the
   material  time  he  was the president of the North East Commercial
   Bank (Северо-Восточный Акционерный Банк).
       12. On  8  February  1995  criminal proceedings were initiated
   against the applicant,  the details of which  are  set  out  under
   sub-heading B below.  On 29 June 1995 the applicant was taken into
   custody and,  by a judgment of the Magadan City Court (Магаданский
   городской суд) of 3 August 1999,  he was convicted of embezzlement
   and sentenced to a term of imprisonment.
   
                    A.  The conditions of detention
   
       13. From 29 June 1995 to 20 October  1999  the  applicant  was
   kept  in  the  detention  facility  IZ-47/1 in the city of Magadan
   (Investigatory Isolation Ward No.  1 (СИЗО-1)). On 20 October 1999
   he  was  sent  to  serve  his  sentence,  following the City Court
   judgment of 3  August  1999,  to  the  penitentiary  establishment
   AV-261/3  in  the  village  of  Talaya.  On 9 December 1999 he was
   transferred back to the detention facility  in  Magadan  where  he
   stayed until his release on 26 June 2000.
   
       1) The applicant's submissions on the facts
   
       14. As regards the  first  period  of  his  detention  in  the
   Magadan detention facility, the applicant alleged that he had been
   kept  in a cell measuring 17 square meters  (sq. m.)  where  there
   were 8 bunk beds.  However, it nearly always held 24 inmates; only
   rarely did the number fall to 18. As there were three men to every
   bunk,  the inmates slept taking turns. The others would lie or sit
   on the floor or cardboard boxes waiting for  their  turn.  It  was
   impossible  to  sleep properly as the television was on around the
   clock and,  during the day,  there was much commotion in the cell.
   The light in the cell was never turned off.
       15. The  lavatory  pan  in  the  corner of the cell offered no
   privacy.  A partition separated it from a wash stand, but not from
   the  living  area and dining table.  The lavatory pan was elevated
   from the floor by  half  a  meter  while  the  partition  measured
   1,1 meters in height.  Therefore,  the person using the toilet was
   in the view of both his cellmates and a prison guard observing the
   inmates through a peep-hole in the door.
       The inmates  had  to  eat  their meals in the cell at a dining
   table which was only a meter away from the toilet.  The meals were
   of poor quality.
       16. The cell,  which had no ventilation, was stiflingly hot in
   summer and very cold in winter. Because of the poor quality of the
   air in the cell,  a window had to remain open all the time.  Being
   surrounded by heavy smokers,  the applicant was forced to become a
   passive smoker.  The applicant claims  that  he  was  never  given
   proper  bedding,  dishes  or kitchen utensils.  He only received a
   quilted  mattress  and   a   thin   flannel   blanket   from   the
   administration,  and had to borrow kitchenware from cell-mates who
   had received these items from relatives.
       17. The  cells  of  the  detention  facility were overrun with
   cockroaches and ants, but no attempt was made to exterminate them.
   The only sanitary precaution taken was that once a week the guards
   gave  the  inmates  a  litre  of  chloride  disinfectant  for  the
   lavatory.
       18. He contracted  a  variety  of  skin  diseases  and  fungal
   infections,  losing  his  toenails  and  some  of his fingernails.
   During the trial from 11 November 1996 to 23 April 1997  and  from
   15  April  1999 to 3 August 1999,  a recess was ordered so that he
   could be treated for scabies.
       On six  occasions  detainees,  with  tuberculosis and syphilis
   were placed in his cell and he  received  prophylactic  antibiotic
   injections.
       19. The  applicant  submitted  that  he could only take a walk
   outside his cell one hour per day and that  usually  he  was  only
   able to take a hot shower twice a month.
       20. Finally, the applicant stated that, following his transfer
   back  to  the  same  facility  on  9 December 1999,  the detention
   conditions had not materially improved.  He was not provided  with
   proper  bedding,  towels  or  kitchenware.  There was no treatment
   available for his skin disease due to a lack of proper medication.
   His  cell was still overrun with cockroaches and there had been no
   anti-infestation treatment for 5 years.  However, in March - April
   2000 the number of inmates in his 8-bed cell was reduced to 11.
   
       2) The Government's submissions on the facts
   
       21. The  Government claimed that the applicant's cell measured
   20,8 sq. m.  The applicant had a separate sleeping berth, bedding,
   kitchen utensils and access to health care.  The cell was designed
   for 8 inmates.  In connection with the general overcrowding of the
   detention facility,  each bed in  the  cells  was  used  by  2  or
   3 inmates.  In  the applicant's cell there were 11 or more inmates
   at any given time. Normally the number of inmates was 14. The beds
   were  used in turn by several prisoners on the basis of eight hour
   shifts of sleep per  prisoner.  All  inmates  were  provided  with
   wadded mattresses, cotton blankets and sheets.
       22. The  applicant's  cell  was equipped with a sanitary unit,
   including a lavatory pan and a wash stand.  The lavatory  pan  was
   situated  in  the  corner  of  the cell and was separated from the
   dwelling place by  a  partition  -  1,1  meters  high  -  ensuring
   privacy.  Such  standards  have  been  set  by  the "Directives on
   Planning and Constructing Pre-Trial Detention  Facilities  of  the
   USSR Ministry of the Interior", approved on 25 January 1971.
       The Government submitted photographs to the Court showing  the
   applicant's  cell,  which  the applicant claimed had been improved
   slightly since the beginning of his detention. The Government also
   provided a video recording of the facilities after the applicant's
   release and their major renovation.
       23. The  cell  had  windows  providing fresh air and daylight.
   There was no possibility to equip  the  cell  with  a  ventilation
   system.  In  hot weather a window of the cell door could be opened
   for better ventilation.  Inmates also had the opportunity to  have
   compact fans delivered to them by relatives.
       24. There was a television in the cell which belonged  to  the
   applicant  who  could  control  when  to  switch  it  on  or  off.
   Programmes were only transmitted during part of  the  day  in  the
   region.
       25. On 11 February 1998 an inmate in the applicant's cell  was
   diagnosed  with syphilis.  The inmate was immediately removed to a
   separate cell and underwent a complete course of treatment for the
   disease.  The  other  inmates,  including  the applicant,  who had
   shared the cell with this person,  were subjected  to  appropriate
   preventive  treatment  on  26  February  1998  and  to serological
   control measures.  This was done pursuant to  the  "Guidelines  on
   Medical  Care  for  Persons Held in Pre-Trial Detention Facilities
   and Correctional Labour Institutions of the USSR Ministry  of  the
   Interior", approved on 17 November 1989.
       In January 1999 one of the blocks in  the  detention  facility
   was  closed  for  repairs  and  the  detainees were transferred to
   vacant places in other cells.  The detainees who were moved to the
   applicant's cell stayed there for a week and some of them were ill
   with  tuberculosis.  However,  in  the  opinion  of  the   medical
   personnel, the latter did not present a danger to other inmates as
   these persons were undergoing out-patient medical treatment.
       On 2  June  1999,  an inmate who was observed to have residual
   tuberculosis was  placed  in  the  applicant's  cell.  The  inmate
   underwent  the  relapse  prevention  treatment for a period of two
   months.  As he did not suffer from tuberculosis in its open  form,
   there was no danger of its transmission to other inmates.
       The applicant underwent  repeated  fluorographic  examinations
   which showed no abnormality of his thorax.
       On 15 June 1999,  an inmate who was undergoing  treatment  for
   syphilis was placed in the applicant's cell.  Medical examinations
   performed subsequently showed negative results.  Blood tests which
   were  performed  in this connection on the applicant also revealed
   negative results.
       26. The  applicant  was systematically examined by the medical
   personnel and he received medical assistance from a dermatologist,
   therapeutist  and stomatologist.  When the applicant was diagnosed
   with different diseases  (neurocirulatory  dystonia,  scabies  and
   fungal  infection) he received immediate medical care.  There were
   recesses announced during the trial in order  to  provide  medical
   treatment for the applicant.
       27. The applicant could shower every 7 days and was  permitted
   to walk outside his cell for up to 2 hours a day.
       28. Finally,  the  Government  submitted  that,  in  order  to
   prevent the appearance of infectious diseases, pre-trial detention
   facilities take prophylactic disinfection measures to  secure  the
   timely  extermination  of pathogenic micro-organisms,  arthoropoda
   and  rodents,  pursuant   to   the   above-mentioned   ministerial
   guidelines of 1989. It was conceded, however, that the infestation
   of detention facilities with insects was a problem.
   
       3) Medical records and an expert report
   
       29. According to  the  applicant's  medical  records,  he  had
   scabies  in December 1996,  allergic dermatitis in July and August
   1997,  a fungal infection on his  feet  in  June  1999,  a  fungal
   infection on his finger nail in August 1999,  mycosis in September
   1999 and a fungal infection  on  his  feet,  hands  and  groin  in
   October  1999.  The records also state that the applicant received
   treatment for these medical conditions.
       30. A  report  by  medical  experts issued in July 1999 stated
   that the applicant was suffering from  neurocirculatory  dystonia,
   astheno-neurotic  syndrome,  chronic  gastroduodenitis,  a  fungal
   infection on his feet, hands and groin and mycosis.
   
                B. The criminal proceedings and appeals
                      against pre-trial detention
   
       31. On  8  February 1995 the applicant became a suspect in the
   embezzlement of his bank's funds and was subjected to a preventive
   measure  in  the  form of a ban on leaving a specified place.  The
   criminal case was assigned the number 48529.
       32. On   17   February  1995  he  was  formally  charged  with
   misappropriating 2,050,000 shares of another company.
       33. On  29 June 1995,  by an order of the investigator,  which
   was approved by the prosecutor,  the applicant  was  arrested  and
   placed in detention on remand on the ground that he had obstructed
   the establishment of the truth in  the  criminal  proceedings.  In
   particular,  it  was  stated  in  the  order,  with  references to
   concrete instances,  that the applicant had refused to  turn  over
   certain  bank  documents  necessary for the investigation,  he had
   brought pressure to  bear  on  witnesses  and  had  tampered  with
   documents.  The  order  also  referred  to  the seriousness of the
   offence with which the applicant was charged.
       The applicant's  detention  was  subsequently  extended by the
   competent prosecutor on unspecified dates.
       34. On 4 July 1995,  31 August 1995 and 26 September 1995, the
   applicant's defence lawyer filed  applications  for  release  from
   custody   with   the   Magadan City Court,  which rejected them on
   14 July 1995, 9 September 1995 and 4 November 1995, respectively.
       35. The   applicant  contends  that  from  August  1995  until
   November 1995 no investigative activity  took  place  as  the  two
   investigators  in  charge  of  the  case were on holiday,  and the
   person to whom the case  was  temporarily  assigned  undertook  no
   action.
       36. On 14 December 1995  the  applicant  was  charged  with  8
   additional  counts  relating  to  the  embezzlement  of his bank's
   funds.
       37. On  6  February  1996 the preliminary investigation of the
   charges against the applicant was terminated and the case was sent
   to the Magadan City Court.
       38. On 1 March 1996 the applicant filed with the City Court  a
   request   for   his   release  from custody,  which was refused on
   27 March 1996.
       39. On  the  same day the City Court decided to remit the case
   to the Magadan Regional Prosecutor for further investigation.  The
   latter  filed  an  appeal  against  the  decision with the Magadan
   Regional Court (Магаданский областной  суд)  which,  on  29  April
   1996, rejected it.
       40. Following an additional investigation as of 15  May  1996,
   the   Regional  Prosecutor  remitted the case to the City Court on
   19 June 1996.
       41. In  the meantime,  on 16 May 1996,  the applicant filed an
   application for release from custody with the City Court in  which
   he  stated  that he was being held in poor conditions and that his
   health had deteriorated.  His application for release was  refused
   on 26 May 1996.
       On 23 June  1996  the  applicant  filed  another  request  for
   release.
       42. On  11  November 1996 the City Court began its examination
   of the applicant's case.  On the same day it rejected his  request
   for release filed on 23 June 1996.
       43. At the hearing on 27 December 1996 the applicant asked the
   City  Court  to  release  him from custody on medical grounds.  He
   stated that there were 21 inmates in his cell with  just  8  beds;
   there  was no ventilation in the cell where everybody smoked;  the
   television was constantly blaring and he had  contracted  scabies.
   Upon  receiving  a medical certificate confirming the existence of
   the disease, the City Court adjourned the hearing until 14 January
   1997.  It  refused  to  release  the applicant from custody on the
   grounds of the seriousness  of  the  offence  with  which  he  was
   charged and the danger of his obstructing the establishment of the
   truth while at liberty.
       44. The  examination of the applicant's case by the City Court
   lasted until 23 April 1997.
       On 7  May  1997 the case was adjourned due to the removal from
   office of the presiding judge for improper  conduct  unrelated  to
   the applicant's case.
       45. On 15 June 1997 the applicant filed  another  request  for
   release,  referring  to  the poor conditions in which he was being
   detained.
       46. In  July 1997 the applicant's case was assigned to another
   judge who scheduled a hearing for 8 August 1997.  On that day  the
   hearing  was postponed because the defence lawyer could not attend
   for health  reasons.  The  applicant's  request  for  release  was
   rejected  on  the  grounds  of the seriousness of the offence with
   which he was  charged  and  the  danger  of  his  obstructing  the
   establishment of the truth in the criminal case.
       The applicant's further request for release from custody filed
   on 21 September 1997 was refused on 21 October 1997.
       47. On 22 October 1997 the applicant complained to the Magadan
   Regional  Court  about his case,  asking for its transfer from the
   City Court to the Regional Court. He also submitted a complaint to
   the  Supreme  Court of Russia (Верховный Суд Российской Федерации)
   which forwarded it to the Magadan Regional Court for  examination.
   By  letters of 31 October 1997 and 25 November 1997,  the Regional
   Court informed the applicant that there was no reason  for  it  to
   assume  jurisdiction  and suggested he turn to the City Court with
   any questions relating to his case.  It also  requested  the  City
   Court  to  take  measures  for  the examination of the applicant's
   case.
       48. On  21  November  1997  he  made  complaints  to different
   authorities,  in particular the Office of  the  President  of  the
   Russian Federation, the Magadan City Court, the High Qualification
   Board of Judges (Высшая квалификационная коллегия судей Российской
   Федерации)  -  a  body  dealing  with  questions  of  professional
   competence - and the Prosecutor General.  In  his  complaints,  he
   submitted,  inter  alia,  that  he  was  being  held  in appalling
   conditions without any decision on the substance of  the  charges,
   that  he  had contracted various skin diseases,  that his toenails
   had fallen off and that he was suffering from a heart condition.
       49. By letter of 5 February 1998, the president of the Magadan
   City Court informed the applicant that the court would resume  its
   consideration  of  his  case before 1 July 1998,  referring to its
   complexity and the heavy workload of the judges.
       50. On  11  February 1998 the Magadan Regional Court forwarded
   to the City Court 11 complaints made by the  applicant,  which  it
   had  received  from the Prosecutor General,  the Supreme Court and
   other authorities.
       51. On  23  February  1998  the  applicant  commenced a hunger
   strike with a view to drawing the attention of the authorities  to
   his lengthy detention and the absence of court hearings,  which he
   continued until 17 March 1998.
       52. On 1 March 1998 the applicant complained about his case to
   the Office of the President  of  Russia  and  to  a  parliamentary
   committee  of  the State Duma,  requesting their assistance in the
   transfer of his case to the Magadan Regional Court.
       53. On  3  March 1998 the Department of Justice of the Magadan
   Region,  in response to the applicant's complaint addressed to the
   Ministry of Justice of Russia, stated that the court would be able
   to deal with his case in the second half of 1998.
       54. Meanwhile,   the  applicant  lodged  a  request  with  the
   Constitutional Court (Конституционный Суд Российской Федерации) to
   review  the  constitutionality of the provisions of Articles 223-1
   and 239 of the Code of Criminal Procedure  concerning  time-limits
   for  the  start  of  trials.  By  letter  of  10  March 1998,  the
   Constitutional  Court  informed  the  applicant  that,  since  the
   impugned  provisions  did not lay down any time-limits with regard
   to the length of detention while a case is being considered by the
   courts, his request could not be considered.
       55. The applicant also complained to  the  High  Qualification
   Board  of  Judges about the delay in the consideration of his case
   which,  by letter of 30 March 1998,  asked  the  Magadan  Regional
   Court to investigate the matter.
       56. On 2 April 1998 the applicant filed a complaint  with  the
   Supreme  Court  about the delay in setting the date for his trial,
   in which he also referred to his poor conditions of  detention.  A
   copy  of  his  complaint  was  sent to other authorities.  All his
   complaints were forwarded by the  addressee  institutions  to  the
   Magadan City Court for examination.
       57. On 13 April 1998 the Magadan Regional Court  informed  the
   applicant  that the City Court had been requested to take measures
   for the consideration of his case.  It also stated that  the  case
   was  to  be  tried  by  the City Court and that the Regional Court
   could only act as a court of cassation.
       58. On  25  May  1998  the applicant filed a petition with the
   City Court asking for his case to be transferred to  the  Regional
   Court  for  trial.  By  decision  of the president of the Regional
   Court of 28 May 1998,  the applicant's case was transferred to the
   Khasynskiy  District  Court  (Хасынский  районный суд) in order to
   expedite the proceedings.
       59. On  11  June 1998 the applicant complained about the delay
   in starting court hearings to  the  High  Qualification  Board  of
   Judges.
       60. On 16 June 1998 the applicant filed a request for  release
   from custody with the Khasynskiy District Court in which he stated
   that his health had deteriorated as a result of  the  overcrowding
   and the poor conditions in his cell in the detention facility.
       On the same day,  he sent an  application  to  the  Khasynskiy
   District  Court  asking  it  to  transfer  his case to the Magadan
   Regional Court.  He submitted that the transfer of his case to the
   Khasynskiy  District Court was unlawful and that its distance from
   the city of Magadan would hamper an objective and fair examination
   of his case.
       61. On 1 July 1998 the applicant complained  to  the  Regional
   Court that the Khasynskiy District Court had not yet set a hearing
   date and asked it to speed up the proceedings.
       62. On  3  July 1998 the case was remitted to the Magadan City
   Court as the applicant had expressed  his  disagreement  with  its
   transfer to the Khasynskiy District Court.
       63. On 8 July 1998 the applicant received a  letter  from  the
   Regional  Court informing him that there were no grounds for it to
   act as a court of first instance or to assume jurisdiction in  the
   case.
       The next day the applicant requested the City Court to release
   him, referring to the poor conditions of detention.
       64. On  31  July  1998  the  applicant  complained to the High
   Qualification Board of Judges about the prolonged failure  of  the
   City  Court  to examine his case.  On 19 August 1998 his complaint
   was transmitted to the Magadan Regional Court with  a  request  to
   provide  information  both on the complaint and on the work of the
   City Court.  On 27 August 1998 the Regional  Court  forwarded  the
   applicant's complaint to the City Court.
       The applicant  also  submitted  a  complaint  to  the  Magadan
   Regional  Court  about  the  delay in starting the trial hearings,
   which on 11 August 1998 transmitted  the  complaint  to  the  City
   Court.
       65. On 7 September 1998 the applicant filed another  complaint
   with  the  High Qualification Board of Judges stating that all his
   previous complaints had been sent by the Magadan Regional Court to
   the  City Court without any measures being taken.  On 23 September
   1998 the  applicant's  complaint  was  forwarded  to  the  Magadan
   Regional  Court  with a reminder about the request for information
   on  the  reasons  for  the  prolonged  delay  in   examining   the
   applicant's case. On 7 September 1998 the applicant also submitted
   a complaint about the delay in  the  proceedings  to  the  Supreme
   Court.
       On 5 October 1998 the applicant submitted  further  complaints
   to the Regional and High Qualification Boards of Judges.
       66. On 13 November 1998 the City Court set  the  hearing  date
   for 28 January 1999.
       67. On 25 November 1998 the applicant complained to  the  High
   Qualification  Board  of Judges about the actions of the President
   of the Magadan City Court,  apparently requesting the  institution
   of  criminal  proceedings  against  him.  On  22 December 1998 the
   complaint was forwarded for examination to the  president  of  the
   Magadan  Regional  Court  with a request to submit a report to the
   competent Qualification Board in case the applicant's  allegations
   proved substantiated.
       On 16 December  1998  the  Magadan  Regional  Court  forwarded
   another complaint by the applicant to the City Court.
       68. On 18 January 1999 the applicant  submitted  to  the  City
   Court a request for release from custody.
       69. On 28 January 1999 the Magadan City Court decided to  send
   the   applicant's   case   back  to  the  prosecutor  for  further
   investigation due to the violation  of  procedural  norms  by  the
   investigative   authorities.  These  violations  consisted  of  an
   incomplete presentation of the case materials to  the  accused  at
   the end of the preliminary investigation,  as well as an imprecise
   recording of file documents.  The court  refused  the  applicant's
   request  for  release  having regard to the gravity of the charges
   against him and the danger of his obstructing the establisment  of
   the truth while at liberty. The applicant lodged an appeal against
   the refusal with the Magadan Regional Court  which,  on  15  March
   1999,  dismissed  it.  The  Regional  Court  however  revoked  the
   decision to send the case back to the investigative authorities as
   unfounded and ordered the City Court to proceed with the trial. In
   a separate decision,  issued on the same day,  it  considered  the
   lengthy  delay unjustifiable in view of the fact that the case was
   not particularly complex,  and requested the City Court to  inform
   it within one month of the measures taken.
       70. On 17 March 1999 the applicant submitted to the City Court
   another request for release from custody.
       On the same day he complained to the High Qualification  Board
   of  Judges  about  his lengthy detention without a court judgment.
   Five days later,  the applicant submitted a similar  complaint  to
   the Regional Qualification Board of Judges.
       On 5 April 1999 the applicant filed another complaint with the
   High  Qualification  Board  of Judges about the prolonged delay in
   the proceedings.
       71. On 15 April 1999 the City Court resumed its examination of
   the applicant's case.
       At the hearing on 20 April 1999 the prosecutor requested that,
   in view of the length of the applicant's detention,  a psychiatric
   evaluation  of  the applicant be carried out in order to determine
   the state of his  mental  health.  The  City  Court  granted  this
   request and adjourned the hearing until 30 April 1999.
       72. At   the   hearing   on   30   April  1999  the  applicant
   unsuccessfully applied for release from custody. He submitted that
   he  was  suffering  from  a lack of sleep.  In his cell there were
   18 inmates who had to sleep in shifts.  He further argued that  he
   could  not  obstruct the establishment of the truth in his case as
   all the investigative measures had already been taken.
       The prosecutor participating in the  hearing  asked  the  City
   Court  to  request the administration of the detention facility in
   which the applicant was being held to provide the  applicant  with
   conditions  allowing  normal  sleep  and  rest  during  the  court
   hearings.  The prosecutor further stated that he  would  submit  a
   similar  request  to  the  prosecutor  in  charge  of  supervising
   detention facilities.
       The applicant   submits   that   subsequently   the  competent
   prosecutor came to his cell, acknowledged that the conditions were
   poor,  but  stated  that  the  situation  in  other  cells  in the
   detention facility was no better and that there was  no  money  to
   improve the conditions.
       73. At the hearing on 8 June 1999 the applicant requested  his
   release.  He stated that in his cell, where there were 18 inmates,
   he could not prepare himself  adequately  to  testify  before  the
   trial  court.  He further submitted that he had contracted scabies
   twice and that his bed sheets were not  changed.  The  applicant's
   request was rejected.
       74. At the hearing on 16 June 1999 the applicant filed another
   request for release, referring to the conditions of his detention.
   He submitted that he had a fungal infection and that his body  was
   covered with sores caused by bites from bugs infesting his bed. He
   was sharing his bed with two other inmates.  Inmates could  shower
   once  every two weeks.  The atmosphere in the cell was stifling as
   everybody smoked. He was feeling unwell and suffering from a heart
   condition.  His weight had dropped from 96 kg to 67 kg. He further
   submitted that he could not obstruct the examination of  his  case
   if released.
       The City Court decided not to examine the request  because  it
   was apparently made outside the context of the hearing.
       75. On 22 June 1999 the High  Qualification  Board  of  Judges
   removed  the  president of the Magadan City Court from office,  as
   well as the president of the Regional Court and his two  deputies,
   due to the delay in examining the applicant's case.
       76. At the hearing before the City Court on 23 June 1999,  the
   applicant  stated that he was feeling unwell and that he could not
   participate.  The court  ordered  a  medical  examination  of  the
   applicant by a commission of experts in order to determine whether
   his state of health allowed him to take part  in  the  proceedings
   and whether he should be hospitalised.
       In their conclusions issued on an  unspecified  date  in  July
   1999,  the  experts  found that the applicant was suffering from a
   number of  medical  conditions  (see  paragraph  30  above).  They
   considered  that the treatment of these conditions did not require
   hospitalisation and that the the applicant  could  remain  in  the
   detention  facility.  They  also  considered  that the applicant's
   state of health allowed him to attend the court  hearings  and  to
   give testimony.
       77. At the hearing on 15 July 1999,  the  applicant  requested
   the  trial  court to release him from custody.  He stated that the
   court had nearly concluded the examination  of  the  evidence  and
   that  he  could  not obstruct the establishment of the truth.  His
   request was refused.
       78. In  another ruling issued on the same day,  the City Court
   noted that, in the period from 15 April until 15 July 1999, it had
   examined  more  than  30  applications submitted by the applicant,
   including repetetive applications on previously rejected  motions.
   It  noted that the applicant had stated that he would testify only
   if his applications  were  granted  and  considered  that  such  a
   position   amounted   to   a   deliberate  attempt  to  delay  the
   proceedings.
       79. The  City Court heard 9 of the 29 witnesses who were to be
   summoned before it.  The testimonies of 12 absent witnesses, which
   had  been given during the pre-trial investigation,  were read out
   in open court.
       80. By  a judgment of 3 August 1999,  the City Court found the
   applicant guilty on one count and acquitted  him  on  two  of  the
   counts contained in the indictment, which had preferred 9 separate
   charges. It sentenced him to 5 years and 6 months' imprisonment in
   a correctional colony with a general regime, his term running from
   29 June 1995.  The City  Court  considered  that  the  preliminary
   investigation  had been of poor quality and that the investigators
   had unjustifiably attempted to increase the number  of  counts  in
   the indictment.  It also found an infringement of procedural norms
   consisting, inter alia, of shortcomings in the presentation in due
   form  of  the relevant documents to the court.  These shortcomings
   had had to be corrected at the trial,  which had caused  a  delay.
   The  court noted that,  in the course of the investigation,  there
   had been a lack of  proper  procedural  supervision  by  those  in
   charge  of  the  investigation  and the prosecutor's office of the
   Magadan Region.
       In a  separate ruling on the same day,  the City Court decided
   to send part of the indictment  back  to  the  prosecutor  for  an
   additional  investigation.  The  applicant  appealed  against  the
   ruling to the Supreme Court,  which on 30 September 1999 found the
   decision lawful.
       81. The City Court judgment of  3  August  1999  was  open  to
   appeal  to  the Regional Court within 7 days of its pronouncement.
   The applicant did not file an appeal in cassation as he considered
   that the Regional Court had contributed to his conviction and thus
   that an appeal had no prospects of success.  On 11 August 1999 the
   judgment of the City Court entered into force.
       82. On 11 August 1999 the applicant submitted to the  director
   of  the  detention  facility  where he was being held a request to
   transfer him to the logistical services team in the same  facility
   to serve his sentence.
       83. On 25 October 1999 the applicant lodged  an  extraordinary
   appeal  with  the  President  of the Supreme Court of Russia for a
   review of the City Court judgment.  On 11 November 1999 the appeal
   was  dismissed.
       On 30 November 1999 the applicant filed another  extraordinary
   appeal with the Supreme Court, which rejected it on 9 June 2000.
       84. On   24   September   1999,  in  the  continuing  criminal
   proceedings,  the preventive custody measure was replaced by a ban
   on  leaving  a specified place.  However,  he remained in custody,
   serving his original sentence.
       85. On  29  September  1999  the  proceedings  concerning  the
   remainder of the charges were terminated on the  ground  that  the
   acts  committed  by  the  applicant  did not constitute a criminal
   offence.
       On 30  September 1999,  however,  a new charge relating to the
   misappropriation  of  property  in  his  capacity  as  the  bank's
   president was brought against the applicant.
       86. On 19 October 1999,  upon completion  of  the  preliminary
   investigation,  the  competent  prosecutor  approved  the  bill of
   indictment and sent the case to the Magadan City Court for  trial.
   The bill of indictment bore the original case no. 48529 and stated
   that the proceedings in that case had been initiated on 8 February
   1995.  The  applicant's  trial  started on 20 December 1999.  By a
   judgment of 31 March 2000 the City Court acquitted  the  applicant
   of the new charge.
       87. On 26 June 2000 the applicant  was  released  from  prison
   following an amnesty declared on 26 May 2000.
   
                       II.  RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
   
       88. A. Constitution of the Russian Federation
   
                        Point 6 (2) of Section 2
   
       "Until criminal-procedural    legislation   of   the   Russian
   Federation has been brought into line with the provisions of  this
   Constitution, the previous procedure for the arrest, detention and
   keeping in custody of persons  suspected  of  committing  a  crime
   shall apply."
       89. B. Code of Criminal Procedure
   
                 Article 11 (1): Personal inviolability
   
       "No one  may  be  arrested  otherwise  than  on the basis of a
   judicial decision or a prosecutor's order."
   
           Article 89 (1): Application of preventive measures
   
       "When there  are  sufficient  grounds  for  believing  that an
   accused person may evade an inquiry,  preliminary investigation or
   trial  or  will  obstruct  the  establishment  of  the  truth in a
   criminal case or will engage in criminal activity,  as well as  in
   order to secure the execution of a sentence, the person conducting
   the inquiry,  the investigator,  the prosecutor and the court  may
   apply  one  of the following preventive measures in respect of the
   accused:  a written undertaking not to leave a specified place,  a
   personal  guarantee  or  a guarantee by a public organisation,  or
   placement in custody."
   
           Article 92 : Order and decision on the application
                        of a preventive measure
   
       "On the   application   of   a  preventive  measure  a  person
   conducting an inquiry, an investigator and a prosecutor shall make
   a  reasoned  order,  and  a  court  shall give a reasoned decision
   specifying the criminal offence which the individual concerned  is
   suspected of having committed, as well as the grounds for choosing
   the preventive measure applied.  The order or  decision  shall  be
   notified  to  the  person concerned,  to whom at the same time the
   procedure for appealing against the application of the  preventive
   measure shall be explained.
       A copy of the order or decision  on  the  application  of  the
   preventive  measure  shall  be  immediately  handed  to the person
   concerned."
   
                    Article 96: Placement in custody
   
       "Placement in custody as a preventive measure shall be done in
   accordance  with  the  requirements  of  Article  11  of this Code
   concerning criminal  offences  for  which  the  law  prescribes  a
   penalty in the form of deprivation of freedom for a period of more
   than one year.  In exceptional cases,  this preventive measure may
   be  applied in criminal matters for which a penalty in the form of
   deprivation of freedom for a period  of  less  than  one  year  is
   prescribed by law."
   
            Article 97: Time-limits for pre-trial detention
   
       "A period of detention during the investigation of offences in
   criminal  cases  may  not  last  longer  than  two  months.   This
   time-limit  may be extended by up to three months by a district or
   municipal prosecutor ...  if it  is  impossible  to  complete  the
   investigation and there are no grounds for altering the preventive
   measure.  A further extension of up to six months from the day  of
   placement  in  custody  may  be  effected only in cases of special
   complexity by a prosecutor of a constituent part  of  the  Russian
   Federation ...
       An extension of the time-limit for such detention  beyond  six
   months  shall  be  permissible  in exceptional cases and solely in
   respect of persons accused of committing serious or  very  serious
   criminal offences. Such an extension shall be effected by a deputy
   of the Prosecutor General of the Russian  Federation  (up  to  one
   year)  and by the Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation (up
   to 18 months).
       No further  extension  of the time-limit shall be permissible,
   and the accused held in custody shall be releasable immediately.
       The documents  of a completed investigation in a criminal case
   shall be produced for consultation by the accused and his  defence
   counsel  not later than one month before the expiry of the maximum
   time-limit for remand in custody,  as  prescribed  in  the  second
   paragraph  of  the  present  Article.  In the event of the accused
   being unable to consult the case documents before  the  expiry  of
   the  maximum  time-limit  for  remand  in custody,  the Prosecutor
   General  of  the  Russian  Federation,  [or]  a  prosecutor  of  a
   constituent part of the Russian Federation ... may, not later than
   five days before the expiry of the maximum time-limit  for  remand
   in  custody,  apply  to  the  judge  of  the  "oblast",  "krai" or
   comparable court for an extension of this time-limit.
       Not later  than  five  days  from  the  day  of receipt of the
   application, the judge must take one of the following decisions:
       1. to  extend  the  time-limit for remand in custody until the
   accused and his counsel have consulted the case documents and  the
   case  has  been referred to the trial court by the prosecutor but,
   anyway, for not more than six months;
       2. to  reject  the prosecutor's application and to release the
   person concerned from custody.
       Under the same procedure, the time-limit for remand in custody
   may be extended,  if necessary,  to accede to  a  request  by  the
   accused  or  his  counsel  to pursue the preliminary investigation
   further.
       If a  court  remits  a case for further investigation when the
   time-limit for the accused's remand in custody  has  expired,  but
   the  circumstances  of  the  case preclude any modification of the
   custody measure, the time-limit for the remand in custody shall be
   extended by the prosecutor supervising the investigation for up to
   one month from the date on which the case reaches him. Any further
   extension  of  the time-limit shall take account of the time spent
   by the accused in custody before  the  referral  of  the  case  to
   court,  and  shall be effected in the manner and within the limits
   prescribed in the first and second paragraphs of this Article.
       An extension of  the  time-limit  for  remand  in  custody  in
   accordance  with  the  present  Article  is subject to appeal to a
   court and to judicial review of  its  legality  and  justification
   under  the  procedure  provided for in Articles 220.1 and 220.2 of
   the present Code."
   
               Article 101: Cancellation or modification
                        of a preventive measure
   
       "A preventive  measure shall be cancelled when it ceases to be
   necessary,  or else changed into a stricter or a milder one if the
   circumstances   of  the  case  so  require.  The  cancellation  or
   modification of a  preventive  measure  shall  be  effected  by  a
   reasoned  order  of  the  person  carrying  out  the inquiry,  the
   investigator or the prosecutor,  or by a reasoned  court  decision
   after the case has been transferred to a court.
       The cancellation or modification, by the person conducting the
   inquiry or by the investigator,  of a preventive measure chosen on
   the prosecutor's instructions shall be permissible only  with  the
   prosecutor's approval."
   
           Article 223-1: Setting a date for a court hearing
   
       "If the accused is kept in custody,  the question of setting a
   date  for  a  court  hearing must be decided no later than 14 days
   from the seizure of the court."
   
          Article 239: Time-limits for examination of the case
   
       "The examination of a case before  the  court  must  start  no
   later than 14 days from the fixing of a hearing date."
   
       90. C.  federal law on the detention on remand of suspects and
   persons accused of offences
   
       According to   Article   21  of  this  Law,  applications  and
   complaints of suspects and  accused  persons  to  State  agencies,
   bodies  of local selfgovernment and non-governmental organisations
   are sent through the administration of the detention facility.
       Applications and  complaints addressed to a public prosecutor,
   a court or other State agencies supervising  detention  facilities
   for suspects and accused persons are not subject to censorship and
   will be forwarded to the addressee in a sealed envelope  no  later
   than the next working day.
   
               III. RESERVATION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
   
       91. The instrument of ratification of the Convention deposited
   by the Russian Federation on 5 May  1998  contains  the  following
   reservation:
       "In accordance with Article 64 of the Convention,  the Russian
   Federation  declares that the provisions of Article 5 paragraphs 3
   and 4 shall not prevent ...  the temporary application, sanctioned
   by  the  second  paragraph  of  point 6 of Section Two of the 1993
   Constitution of the Russian Federation,  of the procedure for  the
   arrest,  holding  in custody and detention of persons suspected of
   having committed a criminal offence,  established  by  Article  11
   paragraph 1,  Article 89 paragraph 1,  Articles 90,  92, 96, 96-1,
   96-2,  97,  101 and 122 of the RSFSR Code of Criminal Procedure of
   27 October 1960, with subsequent amendments and additions."
   
                                THE LAW
   
          I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION
   
       92. The applicant complained about his conditions of detention
   in the Magadan detention facility IZ-47/1. He invoked Article 3 of
   the Convention, which provides:
       "No one shall  be  subjected  to  torture  or  to  inhuman  or
   degrading treatment or punishment."
       The applicant referred in particular to the  overcrowding  and
   insanitary  conditions  in his cell,  as well as the length of the
   period during which he was detained in such conditions,  which had
   an  adverse  effect  on his physical health and caused humiliation
   and suffering.
       93. The  Government  argued that the applicant's conditions of
   detention could not be regarded as torture or inhuman or degrading
   treatment. The conditions did not differ from, or at least were no
   worse than those of most detainees in Russia.  Overcrowding was  a
   problem   in   pre-trial  detention  facilities  in  general.  The
   authorities had had no intention of causing physical suffering  to
   the applicant or of harming his health.  The administration of the
   detention facility took all available measures to provide  medical
   treatment  for  those  persons  suffering  from any disease and to
   prevent the contagion of other inmates.
       94. It was acknowledged that, for economic reasons, conditions
   of detention in Russia were very unsatisfactory and fell below the
   requirements  set  for penitentiary establishments in other member
   States of the Council of  Europe.  However,  the  Government  were
   doing  their  best  to  improve conditions of detention in Russia.
   They had  adopted  a  number  of  task  programmes  aimed  at  the
   construction   of   new   pre-trial   detention   facilities,  the
   re-construction of  the  existing  ones  and  the  elimination  of
   tuberculosis   and  other  infectious  diseases  in  prisons.  The
   implementation of these programmes  would  allow  for  a  two-fold
   increase  of  space  for  prisoners  and  for  the  improvement of
   sanitary conditions in pre-trial detention facilities.
       95. The  Court  recal  ls  that,  Article  3 of the Convention
   enshrines  one  of  the  most  fundamental  values  of  democratic
   society.  It  prohibits  in  absolute  terms torture or inhuman or
   degrading   treatment   or   punishment,   irrespective   of   the
   circumstances and the victim's behaviour (see, for example, Labita
   v. Italy [GC], no 26772/95, § 119, ECHR 2000-IV).
       The Court  further  recalls  that,  according to its case-law,
   ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity if it is  to
   fall within the scope of Article 3. The assessment of this minimum
   is relative; it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such
   as the duration of the treatment,  its physical and mental effects
   and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the victim
   (see,  among other authorities,  the Ireland v. the United Kingdom
   judgment of 18 January 1978, Series A no. 25, p. 65, § 162).
       The Court has considered treatment to  be  "inhuman"  because,
   inter  alia,  is  was  premeditated,  was  applied  for hours at a
   stretch and caused either actual bodily injury or intense physical
   and  mental  suffering.  It has deemed treatment to be "degrading"
   because it was such as to arouse in the victims feeling  of  fear,
   anguish  and  inferiority capable of humiliating and debasing them
   (see,  for example,  Kudla v.  Poland [GC],  no.  30210/96,  § 92,
   ECHR 2000-XI).   In  considering  whether  a  particular  form  of
   treatment is "degrading" within the  meaning  of  Article  3,  the
   Court  will  have regard to whether its object is to humiliate and
   debase  the  person  concerned  and  whether,  as   far   as   the
   consequences  are  concerned,  it  adversely  affected  his or her
   personality in a manner incompatible  with  Article  3  (see,  for
   example,  the  Raninen  v.  Finland  judgment of 16 December 1997,
   Reports of Judgments and Decisions, 1997-VIII, pp. 2821-22, § 55).
   However,  the absence of any such purpose cannot conclusively rule
   out a finding of a violation of Article 3 (see, for example, Peers
   v.  Greece,  no. 28524/95, § 74, ECHR 2001-III). The suffering and
   humiliation involved must in any event go beyond  that  inevitable
   element of suffering or humiliation connected with a given form of
   legitimate treatment or punishment.
       Measures depriving a person of his liberty may  often  involve
   such an element. Yet it cannot be said that detention on remand in
   itself raises an issue under Article 3 of the Convention.  Nor can
   that Article be interpreted as laying down a general obligation to
   release a detainee on health grounds or to place him  in  a  civil
   hospital to enable him to obtain specific medical treatment.
       Nevertheless, under this provision the State must ensure  that
   a  person  is  detained  in  conditions  which are compatible with
   respect for his human dignity,  that the manner and method of  the
   execution  of  the  measure  do  not  subject  him  to distress or
   hardship of  an  intensity  exceeding  the  unavoidable  level  of
   suffering  inherent  in  detention  and that,  given the practical
   demands of imprisonment,  his health and well-being are adequately
   secured (see Kudla v. Poland cited above, §§ 92 - 94).
       When assessing conditions of  detention,  account  has  to  be
   taken  of  the cumulative effects of those conditions,  as well as
   the specific allegations made by  the  applicant  (see  Dougoz  v.
   Greece, no. 40907/98, § 46, ECHR 2001-II).
       96. In  the  present case,  the Court notes that the applicant
   was held in the Magadan detention facility IZ-47/1  from  29  June
   1995 to 20 October 1999, and from 9 December 1999 to 26 June 2000.
   It recalls that,  according to the generally recognised principles
   of international law, the Convention is binding on the Contracting
   States only in respect of facts occurring  after  its  entry  into
   force.  The  Convention entered into force in respect of Russia on
   5 May 1998.  However,  in assessing the effect on the applicant of
   his  conditions  of  detention,  which  were  generally  the  same
   throughout his period of detention,  both on remand and  following
   his  conviction,  the  Court  may  also have regard to the overall
   period during which he was detained, including the period prior to
   5 May 1998.
       97. The Court notes from the outset that the cell in which the
   applicant was detained measured between 17 sq. m (according to the
   applicant) and 20.8 sq. m  (according to the Government).  It  was
   equipped with bunk-beds and was designed for 8 inmates.  It may be
   questioned  whether  such  accommodation  could  be  regarded   as
   attaining  acceptable  standards.  In  this  connection  the Court
   recalls that the European Committee for the Prevention of  Torture
   and  Inhuman  or Degrading Treatment of Punishment ("the CPT") has
   set 7 sq. m  per prisoner as an approximate,  desirable  guideline
   for a detention cell (see the 2nd General Report - CPT/Inf (92) 3,
   § 43), i.e. 56 sq. m for 8 inmates.
       Despite the fact that the cell was  designed  for  8  inmates,
   according  to  the  applicant's submissions to the Court the usual
   number of inmates in his cell throughout his detention was between
   18 and 24 persons.  In his application for release from custody of
   27 December 1996,  the applicant stated that there were 21 inmates
   in  his  8-bed cell.  In a similar application of 8 June 1999,  he
   referred to 18 inmates (see 4paragraphs 43 and 73 above).
       The Court   notes   that   the  Government,  for  their  part,
   acknowledged  that,  due  to  the  general  overcrowding  of   the
   detention  facility,  each  bed  in  the  cells was used by 2 or 3
   inmates.  Meanwhile, they appear to disagree with the applicant as
   to  the  number  of inmates.  In their submission there were 11 or
   more inmates in the applicant's cell at any given  time  and  that
   normally the number of inmates was 14. However, the Government did
   not  submit  any  evidence  to  substantiate   their   contention.
   According  to the applicant,  it was only in March-April 2000 that
   the number of inmates was reduced to 11.
       The Court  does  not  find  it  necessary   to   resolve   the
   disagreement  between  the  Government  and  the applicant on this
   point.  The figures submitted suggest that  that  any  given  time
   there  was 0.9 - 1,9 sq. m  of space per inmate in the applicant's
   cell.  Thus,  in the Court's  view,  the  cell  was  continuously,
   severely  overcrowded.  This  state of affairs in itself raises an
   issue under Article 3 of the Convention.
       Moreover, on account of the acute overcrowding, the inmates in
   the applicant's cell had to sleep taking turns,  on the  basis  of
   eight-hour  shifts  of  sleep  per  prisoner.  It appears from his
   request for release from custody on 16 June  1999,  that  at  that
   time  he was sharing his bed with two other inmates (see paragraph
   74 above).  Sleeping conditions were  further  aggravated  by  the
   constant  lighting  in the cell,  as well as the general commotion
   and  noise  from  the  large  number  of  inmates.  The  resulting
   deprivation  of  sleep  must have constituted a heavy physical and
   psychological burden on the applicant.
       The Court further observes the absence of adequate ventilation
   in the applicant's cell which held an excessive number of  inmates
   and  who apparently were permitted to smoke in the cell.  Although
   the applicant was allowed outdoor activity for one or two hours  a
   day, the rest of the time he was confined to his cell, with a very
   limited space for himself and a stuffy atmosphere.
       98. The  Court  next  notes  that  the  applicant's  cell  was
   infested  with  pests   and   that   during   his   detention   no
   anti-infestation   treatment   was   effected  in  his  cell.  The
   Government conceded that infestation of detention facilities  with
   insects  was  a  problem,  and  referred  to  the 1989 ministerial
   guideline  obliging  detention  facilities  to  take  disinfection
   measures.  However,  it  does not appear that this was done in the
   applicant's cell.
       Throughout his detention the applicant contracted various skin
   diseases and fungal infections,  in particular  during  the  years
   1996, 1997 and 1999, necessitating recesses in the trial. While it
   is true that the applicant received treatment for these  diseases,
   their  recurrence  suggests  that  the very poor conditions in the
   cell facilitating their propagation remained unchanged.
       The Court also notes with grave concern that the applicant was
   detained on occasions with persons  suffering  from  syphilis  and
   tuberculosis,  although the Government stressed that contagion was
   prevented.
       99. An   additional  aspect  of  the  crammed  and  insanitary
   conditions described above was the toilet facilities.  A partition
   measuring  1,1  meters in height separated the lavatory pan in the
   corner of the cell from a wash stand next to it,  but not from the
   living  area.  There  was no screen at the entrance to the toilet.
   The applicant had thus to use the toilet in the presence of  other
   inmates  and  be  present  while  the toilet was being used by his
   cellmates.  The photographs provided  by  the  Government  show  a
   filthy, dilapidated cell and toilet area, with no real privacy.
       Whilst the   Court   notes   with   satisfaction   the   major
   improvements  that  have  apparently  been made to the area of the
   Magadan detention facility where the applicant's cell was  located
   (as  shown  in  the  video  recording  which they submitted to the
   Court),  this  does  not  detract  from  the  wholly  unacceptable
   conditions  which  the  applicant  clearly  had  to  endure at the
   material time.
       100. The  applicant's  conditions  of  detention  were  also a
   matter of concern for the trial court examining his case. In April
   and  June  1999 it requested medical expert opinions on the effect
   of the conditions of detention on his mental and  physical  health
   after nearly 4 years of detention in order to determine whether he
   was unfit to take part in the proceedings and whether he should be
   hospitalised  (see  paragraphs  71 and 76 above).  Even though the
   experts answered both questions in the negative,  the Court  notes
   their  conclusions  of  July  1999,  listing  the  various medical
   conditions   from   which    the    applicant    suffered,    i.e.
   neurocirculatory   dystonia,   asthenoneurotic  syndrome,  chronic
   gastroduodenitis,  a fungal infection on his feet, hands and groin
   and mycosis (see paragraph 30 above).
       101. The Court accepts that in the present case  there  is  no
   indication  that  there was a positive intention of humiliating or
   debasing the applicant. However, although the question whether the
   purpose  of the treatment was to humiliate or debase the victim is
   a factor to be taken into account, the absence of any such purpose
   cannot  exclude  a finding of violation of Article 3 (see Peers v.
   Greece  cited  above).  It  considers  that  the   conditions   of
   detention,  which  the applicant had to endure for approximately 4
   years and 10 months,  must have  caused  him  considerable  mental
   suffering,  diminishing his human dignity and arousing in him such
   feelings as to cause humiliation and debasement.
       102. In   the   light  of  the  above,  the  Court  finds  the
   applicant's conditions of detention,  in particular  the  severely
   overcrowded  and insanitary environment and its detrimental effect
   on the applicant's health and wellbeing,  combined with the length
   of  the  period  during  which  the applicant was detained in such
   conditions, amounted to degrading treatment.
       103. Accordingly,  there  has been a violation of Article 3 of
   the Convention.
   
        II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 § 3 OF THE CONVENTION
   
       104. The  applicant  complained  that  his  lengthy  pre-trial
   detention violated Article 5 § 3 of the Convention, which provides
   as follows:
       "Everyone arrested   or   detained   in  accordance  with  the
   provisions of paragraph  1  (c)  of  this  Article  shall  be  ...
   entitled  to  trial within a reasonable time or to release pending
   trial.  Release may be conditioned by  guarantees  to  appear  for
   trial."
   
               A.  The Government's preliminary objection
   
       105. The  Government  argued  that  the  applicant's complaint
   should be examined in the light of the Russian reservation. It was
   submitted  that  the reservation applied both to the period of the
   applicant's detention during the preliminary investigation and the
   court  proceedings.  They  referred to the text of the reservation
   and the contents of the Articles of the Code of Criminal Procedure
   cited therein.  In particular,  Articles 11, 89, 92 and 101 of the
   Code (see paragraph 89 above) conferred a power on the  courts  to
   apply  preventive custody measures at the trial stage up until the
   delivery of a judgment.
       106. The applicant submitted that the Russian reservation  was
   not  applicable  in  the  present  case as the reservation did not
   concern the length of detention on remand.  It was contended  that
   the  purpose  of  the reservation was to preserve the right of the
   prosecutor to order detention on remand and to grant extensions of
   such detention when necessary.
       107. The  Court  observes  that  the  reservation is framed to
   exclude from the scope of Article 5 §  3  of  the  Convention  the
   temporary  application  of  specific  provisions  of  the  Code of
   Criminal Procedure,  mentioned in the  text  of  the  reservation,
   concerning  the  procedure for the arrest,  holding in custody and
   detention of persons suspected  of  having  committed  a  criminal
   offence. The provisions lay down the conditions and modalities for
   the application of preventive  measures,  including  placement  in
   custody, and list the authorities competent to take the respective
   decisions.
       The Court  notes  that the reservation refers to Article 97 of
   the Code of  Criminal  Procedure  under  which  a  person  can  be
   detained  in  custody for up to 18 months during the investigation
   of criminal offences by an order of the competent prosecutor.
       Notwithstanding the  reference to the time-limits of detention
   during the  investigative  stage,  the  Court  observes  that  the
   reservation   is   concerned   with  the  procedure  for  applying
   preventive custody measures,  whereas  the  applicant's  complaint
   relates  to  the  length  of  his  detention on remand and not its
   lawfulness.
       108. The   Court  therefore  finds  that  the  reservation  in
   question does not apply in the present case.
   
                       B. Merits of the complaint
   
       1. Period to be taken into consideration
       109. It  was undisputed that the period to be considered began
   on 29 June 1995 when the applicant  was  placed  in  detention  on
   remand.
       As regards the end of  the  period  concerned,  the  applicant
   submitted  that  the  relevant  date  was 31 March 2000,  when the
   Magadan City Court issued its second judgment  in  the  case.  The
   Government  contended  that the period ended on 3 August 1999 with
   the delivery of the first judgment of the City  Court.  They  also
   maintained  that  the  Court's  examination  of  the length of the
   applicant's detention on remand should be limited  to  the  period
   from  5  May  1998,  the date on which the Convention entered into
   force in respect of Russia, until 3 August 1999.
       110. The  Court first recalls that,  in determining the length
   of detention pending trial under Article 5 § 3 of the  Convention,
   the  period  to  be taken into consideration begins on the day the
   accused is taken into custody and ends on the day when the  charge
   is  determined,  even  if  only by a court of first instance (see,
   among other authorities,  the Wemhoff v.  Germany judgment  of  27
   June 1968,  Series A no.  7, p. 23, § 9, and Labita v. Italy cited
   above, § 147). Thus, in the present case the applicant's detention
   on remand began on 29 June 1995,  when he was arrested,  and ended
   on 3 August 1999,  when he was  convicted  and  sentenced  by  the
   Magadan City Court.  The further remand on outstanding charges did
   not alter the fact that,  as of 3 August 1999,  the applicant  was
   serving  a  sentence  after  his  conviction by a competent court,
   within the meaning of Article 5 § 1 (a) of the Convention.
       The total  period  of  the  applicant's  detention  of  remand
   amounted thus to four years, one month and four days.
       111. As  the  period  before  5  May  1998  lies  outside  its
   jurisdiction ratione temporis,  the Court can  only  consider  the
   period of one year, two months and twenty-nine days, which elapsed
   between that date and the judgment of the Magadan City Court of  3
   August 1999. However, it must take into account the fact that by 5
   May 1998 the applicant, having been placed in detention on 29 June
   1995,  had  already been in custody for two years,  ten months and
   six days (see, for example, mutatis mutandis, the Mansur v. Turkey
   judgment of 8 June 1995, Series A, no. 319-B, p. 49, § 51).
       2. Reasonableness  of  the  length  of  detention
       (a) The parties' submissions
       112. The applicant maintained that it  was  not  necessary  to
   take him into custody and to keep him in detention for an extended
   period of time as there  was  no  proof  that  he  was  trying  to
   obstruct  the establishment of the truth in the case.  The reasons
   given by  the  authorities  to  justify  his  detention  were  not
   relevant or sufficient.
       He also submitted that his case was not particularly  complex,
   as  established  by  the  Magadan Regional Court on 15 March 1999.
   Three of the nine volumes of the case-file were made  up  entirely
   of  his  complaints to the various authorities.  The investigation
   involved the questioning of 29 witnesses and there were two  civil
   plaintiffs in the case.
       Finally, the applicant argued that the  proceedings  were  not
   conducted  with  due  diligence  by  the authorities.  His lengthy
   detention was occasioned by the poor quality of the investigation,
   its  unwarranted  attempts to increase the number of counts in the
   indictment and a lack of proper control over its activities by the
   supervising bodies.  In this respect,  he referred to the findings
   of the Magadan City Court on 3 August 1999 (paragraph 80 above).
       113. The   Government  pointed  out  that  the  applicant  was
   arrested on the ground that he had obstructed the investigation of
   the  truth.  They  further  regarded the period of the applicant's
   pre-trial detention as reasonable in view of the complexity of the
   case,  its  considerable  size (9 volumes) and the large number of
   witnesses and victims involved.
       (b) The Court's assessment
           (i) Principles established by the Court's case-law
       114. The  Court  recalls that the question of whether or not a
   period of detention  is  reasonable  cannot  be  assessed  in  the
   abstract.  Whether  it  is  reasonable for an accused to remain in
   detention must be examined in each case according to  its  special
   features.  Continued  detention  can  be justified in a given case
   only if there are specific indications of a genuine requirement of
   public   interest   which,   notwithstanding  the  presumption  of
   innocence,  outweighs the rule of respect for  individual  liberty
   laid  down  in  Article  5  of  the  Convention (see,  among other
   authorities, Kudla v. Poland cited above, § 110).
       It falls   in   the  first  place  to  the  national  judicial
   authorities to  ensure  that,  in  a  given  case,  the  pre-trial
   detention  of an accused person does not exceed a reasonable time.
   To this end they must,  paying due regard to the principle of  the
   presumption  of  innocence,  examine  all the facts arguing for or
   against the existence of the above-mentioned requirement of public
   interest  justifying  a departure from the rule in Article 5,  and
   must set them out in  their  decisions  on  the  applications  for
   release.  It  is  essentially on the basis of the reasons given in
   these decisions,  and any  well-documented  facts  stated  by  the
   applicant in his appeals,  that the Court is called upon to decide
   whether or not there has been a violation of Article 5 §  3  (see,
   for example, Labita v. Italy cited above, § 152).
       The persistence of a  reasonable  suspicion  that  the  person
   arrested  has committed an offence is a condition sine qua non for
   the lawfulness of the continued detention,  but  after  a  certain
   lapse of time it no longer suffices. The Court must then establish
   whether the  other  grounds  given  by  the  judicial  authorities
   continued  to  justify  the  deprivation  of  liberty.  Where such
   grounds were "relevant" and "sufficient",  the Court must also  be
   satisfied   that   the  national  authorities  displayed  "special
   diligence" in the conduct of the proceedings.  The complexity  and
   special  characteristics  of  the  investigation are factors to be
   considered in this respect (see,  for example,  the Scott v. Spain
   judgment  of  18 December 1996,  Reports 1996-VI,  pp.  2399-2400,
   § 74,  and I.A.  v.  France judgment of 23 September 1998, Reports
   1998-VII, p. 2978, § 102).
           (ii) Application of the above principles  to  the  present
       case
               (alpha) Grounds for detention
       115. During  the  period  covered  by the Court's jurisdiction
   ratione temporis the Magadan City Court,  in refusing  to  release
   the  applicant,  relied  on the gravity of the charges against him
   and the danger of his obstructing the establishment of  the  truth
   while at liberty (see paragraph 69 above). The Court observes that
   similar grounds had been cited by the City Court earlier -  on  27
   December  1996  and  8  August  1997  - to justify the applicant's
   continued detention (see paragraphs 43 and 46 above).
       It further notes that the principal reason for the decision to
   place the applicant in detention on remand on  29  June  1995  was
   that  he  had obstructed the investigation of the case by refusing
   to  turn  over  certain   bank   documents   necessary   for   the
   investigation,  he  had  brought pressure to bear on witnesses and
   had allegedly tampered with the evidence.  The decision  also  had
   regard to the gravity of the charges.
       116. The  Court  recalls  that  the  existence  of  a   strong
   suspicion  of  the  involvement  of  a person in serious offences,
   while constituting a relevant factor,  cannot alone justify a long
   period  of  pre-trial  detention (see,  for example,  the Scott v.
   Spain judgment cited above,  p.  2401, § 78). As regards the other
   ground  relied  on  by  the  Magadan  City Court in prolonging the
   applicant's  detention,  namely  the  danger  of  obstructing  the
   examination of the case, the Court notes that, unlike the order of
   the investigator of 29 June 1995,  the City Court did not  mention
   any factual circumstances underpinning its conclusions, which were
   identical both in 1996,  1997 and 1999.  There is no reference  in
   its  rulings to any factor capable of showing that the risk relied
   on actually persisted during the relevant period.
       117. The   Court   accepts  that  the  interference  with  the
   investigation,  along with the suspicion that  the  applicant  had
   committed the offences with which he was charged,  could initially
   suffice to warrant the  applicant's  detention.  However,  as  the
   proceedings  progressed  and the collection of the evidence became
   complete that ground inevitably became less relevant.
       118. In sum, the Court finds that the reasons relied on by the
   authorities  to  justify  the  applicant's   detention,   although
   relevant  and  sufficient  initially,  lost this character as time
   passed.
               (beta) Conduct of the proceedings
       119. As  regards  the  duration of the criminal investigation,
   the Court notes the findings of the domestic courts that the  case
   was  not  particularly  complex  and that the investigation of the
   case had been of poor quality  contributing  to  a  delay  in  the
   proceedings  (see paragraphs 69 and 80 above).  The Court finds no
   reason to come to a different conclusion.  It also observes  that,
   according   to   the   domestic   courts,  the  investigators  had
   unjustifiably attempted to increase the number of  counts  in  the
   indictment  (see  paragraph  80 above) - a reproach which is borne
   out by the fact that only one of  the  nine  charges  against  the
   applicant  was  found  to  be substantiated in the judgment of the
   Magadan City Court on 3 August 1999.
       120. As regards the subsequent judicial proceedings, the Court
   observes that there were significant  delays  in  the  proceedings
   before  the Magadan City Court.  The trial,  which had began on 11
   November 1996, was adjourned on 7 May 1997 due to the removal from
   office  of  the presiding judge.  It did not resume until 15 April
   1999,  although certain procedural steps were taken in July-August
   1997 (the appointment of a new judge and scheduling of a hearing),
   May and July 1998 (the transfer of the  case  to  another  court),
   November  1998  (the  scheduling of a hearing),  January and March
   1998 (decisions on the need for further investigation).
       While it  is true that the hearing scheduled for 8 August 1997
   had to be postponed on account of the absence of  the  applicant's
   lawyer  and  the applicant objected to the transfer of his case to
   another court - a move destined to expedite the proceedings -  the
   Court finds that the applicant did not substantially contribute to
   the length of the proceedings between the two trial periods, where
   there was no progress in the case.
       It is  thus  apparent  that  the  protracted  proceedings  are
   attributable neither to the complexity of the case nor the conduct
   of the applicant.  Having regard to  the  characteristics  of  the
   investigation and the substantial delays in the court proceedings,
   the Court considers that the authorities did not act with all  due
   expedition.
               (gamma) Conclusion
       121. Against  the  above background,  the Court finds that the
   period spent by the applicant in detention pending trial  exceeded
   a "reasonable time".  There has thus been a violation of Article 5
   § 3 of the Convention.
   
       III. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION
   
       122. The  applicant  complained  that  the  criminal   charges
   against  him  were  not  determined  within a reasonable time,  as
   required by Article 6 § 1 of the Convention,  the relevant part of
   which reads as follows:
       "In the determination of ...  any criminal charge against him,
   everyone is entitled to a ...  hearing within a reasonable time by
   [a] tribunal established by law."
   
                A. Period to be taken into consideration
   
       123. The  applicant submitted that the period to be taken into
   account began on 8 February 1995,  with  the  institution  of  the
   criminal proceedings against him, and ended on 31 March 2000, when
   the Magadan City Court delivered its second judgment in the case.
       The Government  contended  that  the  period  to be considered
   lasted from the  transmission  of  the  applicant's  case  to  the
   Magadan  City  Court on 6 February 1996 until the pronouncement of
   its first judgment on 3 August 1999.
       124. The  Court  recalls  that  the  period  to  be taken into
   consideration in determining the length  of  criminal  proceedings
   begins  with  the  day  on  which a person is "charged" within the
   autonomous and substantive meaning to be given to that term  (see,
   among  other authorities,  the Corigliano v.  Italy judgment of 10
   December 1982,  Series A no. 57, p. 13, § 34, and the Imbriosca v.
   Switzerland judgment of 24 November 1993, Series A no. 275, p. 13,
   § 36).  It ends  with  the  day  on  which  a  charge  is  finally
   determined or the proceedings are discontinued.
       The period under consideration in the present case thus  began
   on 8 February 1995, when the applicant became a suspect on charges
   of misappropriation.  As regards the end of the period,  the Court
   notes  that,  following  the decision to discontinue the remaining
   charges on 29 September 1999,  after the City Court judgment of  3
   August 1999,  a new charge was brought against the applicant on 30
   September 1999 on the basis of the same set of facts.  It observes
   that  the  new  charge  was part of the original criminal case no.
   48529,  which had been initiated on 8  September  1995.  In  these
   circumstances  and taking account of the timing of the new charge,
   the Court finds that the period to be considered ended on 31 March
   2000,  when  the City Court delivered its judgment determining the
   final charge.
       The period  under  consideration,  i.e.  from  8 February 1995
   until 31 March 2000,  amounted thus to a total of 5 years, 1 month
   and  23 days for,  in effect,  one level of jurisdiction,  despite
   numerous ancillary proceedings.  While  its  jurisdiction  ratione
   temporis  only covers the period after the entry into force of the
   Convention with respect to Russia on 5 May  1998,  the  Court  may
   take  into  account  the state of the proceedings existing on that
   date (see,  among other authorities,  mutatis mutandis,  the Yagci
   and Sargin v.  Turkey judgment of 8 June 1995, Series A no. 319-A,
   p. 16, § 40).
   
           B. Reasonableness of the length of the proceedings
   
       125. The Court recalls that the reasonableness of  the  length
   of  the  proceedings  is  to  be  assessed  in  the  light  of the
   particular circumstances of the case,  regard  being  had  to  the
   criteria  laid  down  in  the Court's case-law,  in particular the
   complexity of the case, the applicant's conduct and the conduct of
   the competent authorities.  On the latter point,  what is at stake
   for the applicant has also to be taken  into  consideration  (see,
   among many other authorities, Kudla v. Poland cited above, § 124).
   
                      1. The parties' submissions
   
       126. As to the complexity of the case,  the applicant referred
   to the finding of the Magadan Regional Court on 15 March 1999 that
   the  case  was  not  particularly  complex and that this could not
   justify the delays which had occurred.
       As regards  his  conduct,  the  applicant  submitted  that his
   complaints were aimed at accelerating the  proceedings.  Moreover,
   his  active  co-operation with the judiciary is not required under
   Article 6 of the Convention,  nor can his attempt to pursue  legal
   remedies be held against him.
       As to the conduct of the authorities,  the applicant  referred
   to  the  poor  quality  of  the  preliminary investigation and the
   investigative shortcomings as  established  by  the  Magadan  City
   Court  on  3  August  1999.  In  addition,  the  City Court itself
   breached domestic procedural law by failing  to  comply  with  the
   time-limits  for  the  start  of  the trial stipulated in Articles
   223-1 and 239 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.  It  was  pointed
   out  that  at  the trial the court questioned only nine witnesses.
   The applicant also referred to the removal of the judge  from  his
   case, which had nothing to do with him, and to the transfer of his
   case to the Khasynskiy District Court which proved ineffective  in
   accelerating the case.
       127. The Government acknowledged that the examination  of  the
   applicant's case lasted a long time, but submitted that the period
   was  not  unreasonable.  It  was  maintained  that   the   lengthy
   examination  of  the applicant's case was caused by its complexity
   and volume, as well as the need for its thorough and comprehensive
   investigation.
       Furthermore, the applicant contributed to the  length  of  the
   proceedings  by  filing multiple applications,  including repeated
   requests on  motions  which  had  been  previously  rejected.  The
   Government referred in this respect to the findings of the Magadan
   City Court of  15  July  1999  and  22  July  1999  where  it  was
   considered that the applicant's numerous requests filed during the
   trial amounted to a deliberate attempt to delay  the  proceedings.
   The  applicant's  petitions  for a transfer of his case to another
   court between hearings also caused delay.  It was pointed out that
   30% of the applicant's case-file was made up of his complaints and
   motions.
       The Government  also  pointed  out  that  the  period  of  the
   applicant's custody was subsumed by  the  term  of  his  sentence.
   Therefore,  the  length of the applicant's detention on remand had
   no impact on the overall period of his confinement.
       Finally, the   Government   stated   that   the    authorities
   demonstrated  a humane attitude towards the applicant by way of an
   amnesty, which released him earlier from his sentence, even though
   he  had  not  compensated  the bank and its many customers for the
   damage he had caused.
   
                       2. The Court's assessment
   
       (a) Complexity of the case
       128. The Court notes that the proceedings in issue,  in  which
   the applicant was the only defendant, concerned financial offences
   with considerable evidence,  involving the questioning of a number
   witnesses.  It observes,  however,  that from 7 May 1997, when the
   trial was adjourned,  until 15 April 1999,  when  it  resumed,  no
   investigative measures were undertaken.
       The Court observes the finding of the domestic court that  the
   case  was  not  so  complex  as  to  justify  the  delays  in  the
   proceedings (see paragraph 69 above).
       It was thus not the complexity of the case or the requirements
   of the  investigation  which  accounted  for  the  length  of  the
   proceedings.
       (b) Conduct of the applicant
       129. The  Court  notes  that  throughout  the  domestic  court
   proceedings the applicant filed numerous  requests  in  connection
   with  his  case,  both  during his trial and between hearings.  It
   recalls that Article 6 does not require a person  charged  with  a
   criminal   offence   to  co-operate  actively  with  the  judicial
   authorities (see, for example, the Dobbertin v. France judgment of
   25 February 1993, Series A no. 256-D, p. 117, § 43).
       It observes that the applicant's  applications  lodged  during
   the  trial  as  of  15 April 1999 were found by the trial court to
   have been obstructive to the examination  of  his  case.  However,
   there is no indication that during other trial periods,  i.e. from
   11 November 1996 to 7 May 1997,  and from 20 December 1999  to  31
   March  2000,  the applicant's behaviour could be said to have been
   in any way dilatory.
       As regards  the  requests  lodged  by  the  applicant  between
   hearings,  the  Court  notes  that  they  related  mainly  to  the
   prolonged  failure  of  the  trial court to examine his case.  The
   Court cannot find that these requests contributed to slowing  down
   the  proceedings,  in  particular as they remained largely without
   effect. While it is true that in order to expedite the proceedings
   the  applicant's  case  was  transferred  to  another  court,  the
   applicant cannot be criticised  for  objecting  to  it  after  the
   transfer had resulted in no progress in his case.
       The Court also notes that once,  on 8 August 1997,  a  hearing
   had  to  be  postponed  as  the  applicant's  lawyer had failed to
   appear.
       130. The  Court  considers  that,  whilst the applicant can be
   held  responsible  for  certain  delays,  his  conduct   did   not
   contribute substantially to the length of the proceedings.
       (c) Conduct of  the  national  authorities
       131. As already mentioned above, there were significant delays
   in the domestic proceedings,  which could not be explained by  the
   complexity  of  the  case  or  the  conduct  of the applicant.  In
   particular,  the case lay practically  dormant  before  the  trial
   court for nearly two years, i.e. from 7 May 1997 to 15 April 1999.
       132. The Court observes that throughout  the  proceedings  the
   applicant  was  kept in custody - a fact which required particular
   diligence on the part of the  courts  dealing  with  the  case  to
   administer justice expeditiously.
       133. The Court further notes that,  following the judgment  of
   the  Magadan  City  Court  on  3  August  1999 and the decision to
   discontinue the  remaining  charges  on  29  September  1999,  the
   authorities  brought  a  new  charge  against the applicant on the
   basis of the same set of facts,  thereby contributing even further
   to  the  length  of the proceedings,  which had already lasted for
   over four and a half years at the court of first instance.
       134. It considers that the authorities failed in their duty of
   special diligence,  particularly after the entry into force of the
   Convention on 5 May 1998.
   
                             3. Conclusion
   
       135. Having   regard   to  the  above  background,  the  Court
   considers that the length of the proceedings did not  satisfy  the
   "reasonable  time"  requirement.  Accordingly,  there  has  been a
   breach of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
   
            IV. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
   
       136.  Article  41 of the Convention provides:
       "If the  Court  finds  that  there has been a violation of the
   Convention or the Protocols thereto,  and if the internal  law  of
   the   High   Contracting   Party  concerned  allows  only  partial
   reparation to be made,  the Court shall, if necessary, afford just
   satisfaction to the injured party."
   
                          A. Pecuniary damage
   
       137. The applicant claimed damages in respect of the following
   items:
       (1) 130,599 US dollars ("USD")  for  loss  of  salary  as  the
   president of the North East Commercial Bank,  during the period of
   his detention from July 1995 until 20 April 2000;
       (2) USD  203,000 for loss of salary from another company which
   dismissed him because of his arrest;
       (3) USD  500,000  for  the  loss  of  his  company's  property
   following his arrest;
       (4) USD 8,600 for the loss of his automobile;
       (5) USD 11,734,376 for the loss of profits on shares which  he
   could not sell at their market value in 1995;
       (6) USD 436,226 for the loss  of  his  majority  shares  in  a
   factory which was declared bankrupt in 1997. His overall claim for
   pecuniary damages totalled USD 13,012,702.
       138. The Government contested these claims.
       139. The  Court  recalls   that   it   will   award   monetary
   compensation  under Article 41 only where it is satisfied that the
   loss or damage complained of was actually caused by the  violation
   it has found.
       As regards the claim under item (1),  the Court notes that the
   applicant  was  convicted  and  that  the  period of his pre-trial
   detention was deducted in  its  entirety  from  the  sentence.  It
   considers therefore that the claim cannot be entertained.
       As regards the remainder of the claims,  the  Court  considers
   that  no causal connection has been established between the damage
   alleged and the violations  it  has  found.
       The Court therefore rejects the applicant's claim  under  this
   head.
   
                        B. Non-pecuniary damage
   
       140. The   applicant   claimed  9,636,000  French  francs  for
   non-pecuniary damage.
       141. The Government submitted that the claim was excessive and
   that the  finding  of  a  violation  would  constitute  sufficient
   satisfaction.
       142. The Court considers that the length  of  the  applicant's
   detention  on  remand  in  such prison conditions,  as well as the
   length of the criminal proceedings,  must have caused him feelings
   of   frustration,   uncertainty   and   anxiety  which  cannot  be
   compensated solely by the finding of a violation.
       143. Deciding  on  an  equitable  basis,  the Court awards the
   applicant a global sum  of  5,000  euros  ("EUR")  in  respect  of
   non-pecuniary damage.
   
                         C. Costs and expenses
   
       144. The   applicant  submitted  that  his  expenses  for  the
   services rendered  by  his  lawyer  in  the  domestic  proceedings
   amounted approximately to 40,000 USD.
       145. The   Government   considered   this    claim    to    be
   unsubstantiated and excessive, given the level of lawyers' fees at
   the relevant time in  the  remote  Magadan  region.  They  further
   questioned  the  authenticity of certain documents supplied by the
   applicant.  It was also argued that  the  expenses  borne  by  the
   applicant  in the domestic proceedings should not be reimbursed as
   the applicant  was  found  guilty  and  sentenced  to  a  term  of
   imprisonment.
       146. The Court recalls that in order for costs and expenses to
   be  included in an award under Article 41,  it must be established
   that that they were actually and necessarily incurred in order  to
   prevent  or  obtain  redress  for the matter found to constitute a
   violation of the Convention and  were  reasonable  as  to  quantum
   (see,  for  example,  Nielsen  and  Johnson  v.  Norway [GC],  no.
   23118/93,  § 43, ECHR 1999-VIII). It is apparent from the material
   submitted  that the applicant incurred legal costs and expenses in
   connection with his  attempts  to  secure  his  release  on  bail.
   However,  he  only  provided partial documentary substantiation of
   the sum claimed.  Moreover, the costs incurred did not exclusively
   relate  to  the  breaches  of  Articles 3,  5 § 3 and 6 § 1 of the
   Convention.
       Making an   assessment   on  an  equitable  basis,  the  Court
   considers it reasonable to award the applicant the  sum  of  3,000
   EUR under this head.
   
                          D. Default interest
   
       147. The  Court  considers that the default interest should be
   fixed at an annual rate equal to the marginal lending rate of  the
   European Central Bank plus three percentage points.
   
                FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
   
       1. Holds  that  there has been a violation of Article 3 of the
   Convention;
       2. Holds  that  there has been a violation of Article 5 § 3 of
   the Convention;
       3. Holds  that  there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of
   the Convention;
       4.  Holds
           (a) that the respondent State  is to  pay  the  applicant,
       within  three  months  from  the  date  on  which the judgment
       becomes final according to Article 44 § 2  of  the Convention,
       the following amounts, to be converted into Russian roubles at
       the rate applicable at the date of settlement;
               (i)  5,000 EUR  (five  thousand  euros)  in respect of
           non-pecuniary damage;
               (ii) 3,000  EUR (three  thousand  euros) in respect of
           costs and expenses;
               (iii) any  tax  that  may  be  chargeable on the above
           amounts;
           (b) that simple interest at an annual  rate  equal  to the
       marginal lending rate of the European Central  Bank plus three
       percentage points shall be payable  from  the  expiry  of  the
       above-mentioned three months until settlement;
       5. Dismisses  the  remainder of the applicant's claim for just
   satisfaction.
   
       Done in English,  and notified in writing  on  15  July  2002,
   pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
   
                                                            Registrar
                                                              S.DOLLE
   
                                                            President
                                                           J.-P.COSTA
   
       In accordance  with  Article 45 § 2 of the Convention and Rule
   74 § 2 of the Rules of Court,  the separate concurring opinion  of
   Mr Kovler is annexed to this judgment.
   
                                                                  JPC
                                                                   SD
   
   
   
   
   
   
              SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE KOVLER
   
                             (Translation)
   
       In general  I  share  my  colleagues'  opinion  in  this case.
   However,  having regard to the legal  importance  of  the  Court's
   judgment, I consider it necessary to make certain remarks.
       1. The reservation made by Russia in respect of Article 5 §§ 3
   and  4  of  the  Convention  concerning the application of certain
   provisions of the RSFSR Code of Criminal Procedure of  27  October
   1960 ("CCP"),  with the subsequent amendments to the procedure for
   the detention on remand of suspects, extends also to Article 97 on
   "Custodial periods" of the CCP, mentioned in the reservation along
   with other provisions of the CCP.  I find it difficult, therefore,
   to justify the Court's conclusion in paragraph 108 of the judgment
   that the reservation  does  not  cover  part  of  the  applicant's
   pretrial detention.
       In my view,  it would have been more appropriate for the Court
   to  hold that the reservation at least extends to the period spent
   by the applicant in custody pending  the  criminal  investigation.
   Nevertheless, it should be borne in mind that a broad construction
   of the text of the reservation as it applies to Article 97 of  the
   CCP  could result in certain findings that extensions of detention
   on remand beyond the  time-limits  set  out  in  Sections  4-7  of
   Article 97 of the CCP are lawful: in cases where the defendant and
   his or her advocate cannot examine the case-file before the expiry
   of the maximum custody period,  where the defendant and his or her
   advocate request further investigations or when a court  remits  a
   case  for  further  investigations  when  the  custody  period has
   expired.
       In other words,  Russia's reservation under Article 5 §§ 3 and
   4 applies not only to the procedure for remand in custody  (which,
   by  the way,  is being drastically modified as of 1 July 2002 when
   relevant provisions of the new CCP come into force),  but also  to
   other  pre-trial  custody  periods.  In  this  connection,  it  is
   necessary to determine whether "detention on remand" includes  the
   time spent in custody after the criminal case has been transferred
   to the trial court.
       2. Russian  procedural  law distinguishes between two types of
   detention   on   remand:   preliminary   detention   pending   the
   investigation  ("за следствием") and preliminary detention pending
   trial ("за судом").  This difference is reflected in the law of 13
   June  2001 which limited to six months the maximum length of court
   proceedings in criminal cases.  However,  in paragraph 110 of  its
   judgment,  the Court,  with reference to its case-law,  considered
   that detention on remand encompasses the whole pretrial  detention
   period,  from  the  day  when the individual is taken into custody
   until the trial court's verdict.  After all, for a detainee locked
   up  in  an  overcrowded  prison  cell,  it makes little difference
   whether his or her detention  is  considered  to  be  pending  the
   investigation  or  pending  the trial,  or whether it was effected
   before or after the Convention came into force in respect  of  the
   respondent State. This difference could, however, be of importance
   for the Court,  if the Court were to accept that a State's  margin
   of   appreciation   is   relevant  to  the  determination  of  the
   reasonableness of custody periods.
       The applicant    was   remanded   in   custody   pending   the
   investigation from 29 June 1995 (the day when he  was  taken  into
   custody)   until   19   June  1996  (the  day  when  the  Regional
   Prosecutor's Office transferred  the  case  to  the  Magadan  City
   Court), i.e. eleven months and twenty-two days, which is less than
   the maximum period of eighteen months set  out  in  Section  2  of
   Article 97 of the CCP,  after which a defendant may be immediately
   released (Section 3 of Article  97  of  CCP).  This  part  of  the
   applicant's  detention  cannot  be imputed to the respondent State
   because it pre-dated the entry into force  of  the  Convention  in
   respect of Russia (incompatible ratione temporis).
       The applicant's detention pending the court proceedings lasted
   until  3  August 1999,  when the Magadan City Court gave its first
   judgment,  i.e.  three years one month and twenty-one days (as the
   Court  has  established in paragraph 110 of its judgment,  above).
   One should not forget that  the  delay  in  passing  verdict  and,
   consequently,  the  applicant's  prolonged  stay  in custody,  was
   partly attributable to the applicant's challenges  to  judges  and
   his  requests  that  the  proceedings  be conducted by a different
   court,  as well as to  the  replacement  of  advocates  and  their
   failure  to  appear,  which  facts the Court implicitly accepts at
   paragraph 130 of its judgment.  This delay totalled one  year  and
   three  months.  It  would not,  of course,  justify the procedural
   delays caused by the courts themselves,  but nonetheless creates a
   different picture of the applicant's detention pending trial.
       Finally, the remittance of the case for further  investigation
   and the delivery by the Magadan City Court on 31 March 2000 of the
   second verdict  extended  the  custody  period  by  another  seven
   months, in accordance with Section 7 of Article 97 of the CCP.
       However, in all, the applicant spent five years, one month and
   twentythree days in custody,  four years, nine months and two days
   of which were spent in Remand Centre No. 1 at Magadan. This cannot
   be  considered  to be a reasonable custody period for the purposes
   of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention,  despite the  circumstances  I
   have  mentioned above.  Pursuant to Section 8 of Article 97 of the
   CCP,  the applicant complained several times to the  courts  about
   the   lawfulness   and  validity  of  his  detention.  He  thereby
   exhausted,  as required by Article 35 § 1 of the  Convention,  all
   the domestic remedies available to him in this respect.
       3. As regards the issues under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention
   (a  fair  and public hearing within a reasonable time),  the Court
   has,  unfortunately,  in my view disregarded  the  fact  that  the
   applicant did not make use of his right to lodge an appeal against
   the verdict of 3 August 1999;  thus leaving  open  a  question  of
   exhaustion  of domestic remedies.  It is true,  however,  that the
   applicant's arguments are reinforced by the fact that this verdict
   was  not  final,  given  the further investigation and new verdict
   given on 31 March 2000.
       4. Having  regard  to the above considerations,  I consider it
   appropriate to concur with the opinion of my colleagues as to  the
   violations of Articles 3,  5 

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