[неофициальный перевод]
ЕВРОПЕЙСКИЙ СУД ПО ПРАВАМ ЧЕЛОВЕКА
СУДЕБНОЕ РЕШЕНИЕ
БЕРРЕХАБ (BERREHAB) ПРОТИВ НИДЕРЛАНДОВ
(Страсбург, 21 июня 1988 года)
(Извлечение)
КРАТКОЕ НЕОФИЦИАЛЬНОЕ ИЗЛОЖЕНИЕ ОБСТОЯТЕЛЬСТВ ДЕЛА
A. Основные факты
В 1977 г. г-н Абдулла Беррехаб, гражданин Марокко, заключил
брак с г-жой Соней Костер, гражданкой Нидерландов. Их дочь
Ребекка, также гражданка Нидерландов, родилась в 1979 г. В связи с
тем, что родители Ребекки расторгли брак незадолго до ее рождения,
власти Нидерландов отказались возобновить г-ну Беррехабу вид на
жительство, предоставленный ранее в соответствии с Законом об
иностранцах от 13 января 1965 г., и в 1984 г., после того как он
проиграл процесс в Государственном совете, выслали его из
Нидерландов. Г-н Беррехаб и его дочь обратились с жалобой на
последствия этих двух решений властей для их семейной жизни.
В 1985 г. г-н Беррехаб и г-жа Костер повторно вступили в брак.
На основании этого г-ну Беррехабу было разрешено находиться в
Нидерландах "для проживания с голландской женой и возможности
работать в течение этого времени".
B. Разбирательство в Комиссии по правам человека
В жалобе, поданной в Комиссию 14 ноября 1983 г., заявитель и
его бывшая жена, действуя от своего собственного имени и в
качестве опекуна дочери, утверждали, что высылка г-на Беррехаба
явилась актом, унижающим человеческое достоинство в смысле
статьи 3 Конвенции, а также нарушением статьи 8. Жалоба была
признана частично приемлемой 8 марта 1985 г.
Не сумев добиться мирового соглашения, Комиссия 7 октября
1986 г. подготовила доклад, в котором установила факты и пришла к
выводу о нарушении статьи 8 (одиннадцатью голосами против двух).
Комиссия не усмотрела нарушения статьи 3 Конвенции (единогласно).
ИЗВЛЕЧЕНИЕ ИЗ СУДЕБНОГО РЕШЕНИЯ
ВОПРОСЫ ПРАВА
I. О предполагаемом нарушении статьи 8
19. В соответствии с утверждением заявителей отказ от
предоставления г-ну Беррехабу нового вида на жительство после
расторжения брака и, как результат, постановление о высылке его из
страны являются нарушением статьи 8 Конвенции, которая гласит:
"1. Каждый человек имеет право на уважение его личной и
семейной жизни, неприкосновенности его жилища и тайны
корреспонденции.
2. Не допускается вмешательство со стороны государственных
органов в осуществление этого права, за исключением вмешательства,
предусмотренного законом и необходимого в демократическом обществе
в интересах государственной безопасности и общественного
спокойствия, экономического благосостояния страны, в целях
предотвращения беспорядков или преступлений, для охраны здоровья
или нравственности или защиты прав и свобод других лиц".
Правительство оспорило это утверждение, однако Комиссия с ним
согласилась.
A. Применимость статьи 8
20. Заявители утверждают, что возможность применения статьи 8
в части "права на уважение... личной и семейной жизни" не
предполагает постоянного совместного проживания. Осуществление
отцом права встречаться со своим ребенком и его участие в расходах
на образование ребенка являются достаточным основанием для
установления факта семейной жизни.
Правительство не согласилось с таким выводом, однако Комиссия
приняла его.
21. Суд также не рассматривает совместное проживание как sine
qua non семейной жизни родителей и малолетних детей. Суд считает,
что отношения между супругами, возникшие вследствие законного и
подлинного брака, подобные отношениям между супругами Беррехаб,
должны рассматриваться как "семейная жизнь" (см. Решение по делу
Абдулазиза, Кабалиса и Балкандали от 28 мая 1985 г. Серия A,
т. 94, с. 32, п. 62). Из понятия семьи, на котором основывается
статья 8, следует, что ребенок, рожденный от подобного союза,
является iрso jure его участником. Следовательно, с момента
рождения ребенка и в силу самого этого факта между ребенком и его
родителями возникают отношения, подпадающие под понятие "семейная
жизнь", даже если родители не живут вместе.
Конечно, последующие события могут нарушить такие отношения,
однако в данном конкретном случае все обстояло иначе.
Действительно, г-н Беррехаб и г-жа Костер, расторгнувшие брак, не
жили вместе во время рождения дочери и не возобновили совместное
проживание после этого. Тем не менее факт, что до высылки из
Нидерландов г-н Беррехаб виделся с дочерью четыре раза в неделю,
причем каждая встреча длилась по нескольку часов. Частота и
регулярность свиданий с дочерью (см. п. 9 in fine выше)
доказывают, что г-н Беррехаб придавал им очень большое значение.
Поэтому Суд не может согласиться с тем, что между заявителями была
прекращена "семейная жизнь".
B. Соблюдение статьи 8
1. Статья 8 п. 1
22. По утверждению заявителей, отказ от предоставления
г-ну Беррехабу нового вида на жительство после расторжения брака и
последовавшая за этим высылка его из Нидерландов являются
нарушением права на уважение семейной жизни заявителей, особенно с
учетом расстояния между Нидерландами и Марокко, а также финансовых
трудностей, возникших у г-на Беррехаба в связи с высылкой на
родину.
Правительство заявляет, что ничто не препятствует
осуществлению г-ном Беррехабом своего права на общение с дочерью,
если он будет приезжать из Марокко в Нидерланды по временной визе.
23. Как и Комиссия, Суд признает, что в данном конкретном деле
такая возможность существовала разве что теоретически. Более того,
виза г-ну Беррехабу была выдана только после первоначального
отказа (см. п. 12 выше). Таким образом, оба рассматриваемых
обстоятельства в действительности не давали заявителям возможности
регулярно встречаться друг с другом, хотя такие встречи были
существенно необходимыми для малолетнего ребенка. Соответственно,
действия властей являются нарушением права, гарантированного
статьей 8 п. 1, и должны рассматриваться в контексте п. 2 этой
статьи.
2. Статья 8 п. 2
a) "Предусмотрено законом"
24. Суд констатирует, и это было заявлено Правительством и
Комиссией, что принятые властями меры основаны на Законе 1965 г.
Заявители этого не оспаривали.
b) Правомерная цель
25. По утверждению заявителей, вмешательство властей не
преследовало ни одну из правомерных целей, указанных в п. 2
статьи 8 Конвенции. В частности, оно не служило "экономическому
благосостоянию страны", поскольку лишало г-на Беррехаба
возможности продолжать оказывать материальную помощь своей дочери
в деле ее воспитания и получения образования.
Правительство считает, что высылка г-на Беррехаба из
Нидерландов была необходима в интересах поддержания общественного
порядка, и утверждает, что таким образом был достигнут весьма
существенный баланс между различными интересами.
Комиссия отмечает, что оспариваемые решения властей
соответствуют иммиграционной политике Нидерландов и поэтому могут
рассматриваться как принятые ради достижения законных целей, таких
как предотвращение беспорядков и защита прав и свобод других лиц.
26. Суд пришел к аналогичному заключению. Однако Суд указал на
то, что преследуемая Правительством правомерная цель заключалась
именно в сохранении экономического благосостояния страны в смысле
статьи 8 п. 2 Конвенции, а не в предотвращении беспорядков.
Правительство действительно было обеспокоено необходимостью
регулирования рынка труда в связи с ростом населения страны.
c) "Необходимо в демократическом обществе"
27. Заявители утверждают, что рассматриваемые действия властей
не могут считаться "необходимыми в демократическом обществе".
Правительство отклонило этот довод, однако Комиссия
согласилась с ним. Комиссия придерживается того мнения, что
вмешательство властей, на которое жалуются заявители, было
несоразмерным: власти не смогли обеспечить надлежащий баланс между
интересом заявителей поддерживать контакты и общаться и общим
интересом защиты публичного порядка.
28. При определении того, являлось ли такое вмешательство
"необходимым в демократическом обществе", Суд принимает во
внимание пределы усмотрения, которые оставлены за Высокими
Договаривающимися Сторонами (см., в частности, Решение по делу W.
против Соединенного Королевства от 8 июля 1987 г. Серия A,
т. 121-A, с. 27, п. 60 "b" и "d", и Решение по делу Олссон от
24 марта 1988 г. Серия A, т. 130, с. 31 - 32, п. 67).
В этой связи Суд согласен с тем, что Конвенция в принципе не
запрещает Высоким Договаривающимся Сторонам регулировать вопросы
въезда в страну и сроки пребывания в ней иностранцев. Однако
согласно сложившейся судебной практике (см. inter alia
вышеупомянутые Судебные решения), "необходимость" вмешательства
должна основываться на насущной потребности общества и быть
соразмерной правомерной цели.
29. Призванный контролировать соблюдение этого последнего
условия, Суд отмечает, что в его функции не входит оценивать
иммиграционную политику Нидерландов. Он не оспаривает право страны
устанавливать порядок проживания в ней иностранцев. Суд должен
проанализировать лишь вмешательство, являющееся предметом жалобы.
Он должен рассмотреть его не только в плане иммиграции и
проживания в стране иностранцев, но также и с учетом наличия у
заявителей взаимного интереса продолжить свои отношения. Как
отметил Кассационный суд Нидерландов (см. п. 16 выше),
преследуемые властями правомерные цели должны быть сопоставлены со
степенью серьезности вмешательства в право заявителей на уважение
их семейной жизни.
Относительно преследуемых властями целей необходимо
подчеркнуть, что данное дело касается не иностранца, пытающегося
въехать в Нидерланды впервые, но человека, жившего в стране на
законных основаниях в течение ряда лет, имевшего там дом и работу
и к которому у Правительства не было претензий. Более того,
г-н Беррехаб создал в Нидерландах семью. Он вступил в брак с
гражданкой Нидерландов, и от этого брака родился ребенок.
Относительно степени вмешательства властей необходимо
отметить, что между г-ном Беррехабом и его дочерью в течение
нескольких лет существовали очень тесные отношения (см. п. 9, 21
выше). В этой связи отказ в выдаче ему нового вида на жительство и
последующая высылка из страны грозили разрывом этих отношений.
Последствия вмешательства властей были весьма серьезными в связи с
тем, что Ребекке необходимо было постоянное общение с отцом,
особенно учитывая ее весьма юный возраст.
Исходя из конкретных обстоятельств, Суд считает, что не был
достигнут надлежащий баланс между интересами сторон и что по этой
причине отсутствовала соразмерность между примененными властями
мерами и преследуемыми правомерными целями. В силу этого Суд не
может признать действия властей необходимыми в демократическом
обществе. Таким образом, Суд приходит к заключению, что имело
место нарушение статьи 8.
II. О предполагаемом нарушении статьи 3
30. Заявители утверждают, что отказ властей предоставить
г-ну Беррехабу новый вид на жительство после расторжения брака и
его последующая высылка из Нидерландов являются нарушением
статьи 3 Конвенции, которая гласит:
"Никто не должен подвергаться пыткам и бесчеловечному или
унижающему достоинство обращению или наказанию".
По утверждению Правительства, в жалобах заявителей не
содержится информации о нарушении властями данной нормы права.
По мнению Комиссии, факты дела не свидетельствуют о том, что
кто-либо из заявителей подвергся страданиям в той степени, какая
соответствовала бы понятию "бесчеловечного" или "унижающего
достоинство" обращения.
31. Суд разделяет эту точку зрения и не усматривает нарушения
статьи 3 Конвенции.
III. Применение статьи 50
32. Статья 50 Конвенции гласит:
"Если Суд установит, что решение или мера, принятые судебными
или иными властями Высокой Договаривающейся Стороны, полностью или
частично противоречат обязательствам, вытекающим из настоящей
Конвенции, а также если внутреннее право упомянутой Стороны
допускает лишь частичное возмещение последствий такого решения или
такой меры, то решением Суда, если в этом есть необходимость,
предусматривается справедливое возмещение потерпевшей стороне".
Заявители, которым в Комиссии и Суде была предоставлена
судебная помощь, не ставили вопроса о компенсации судебных
издержек и расходов. Однако они требовали возмещения ущерба за
понесенные ими финансовые убытки, а именно: неполучение
г-ном Беррехабом заработной платы (31429,56 гульдена) с апреля
1983 г. по май 1985 г. в результате его увольнения с работы после
отказа в выдаче нового вида на жительство и отсутствия возможности
найти работу у себя на родине в Марокко, а также 4700 гульденов -
стоимость поездки Ребекки Беррехаб и ее матери в Марокко в июле
1984 г. и г-на Беррехаба в Нидерланды в мае 1985 г. (см. п. 12,
выше). Заявители также претендуют на возмещение (без указания
конкретного размера) за понесенный моральный вред, связанный с их
вынужденной разлукой.
33. Правительство не видит причинной связи между действиями
властей и ущербом, на возмещение которого претендуют заявители.
Комиссия согласилась с этим мнением в отношении неполучения
г-ном Беррехабом заработной платы, однако посчитала оправданной
частичную компенсацию транспортных расходов. Было также признано,
что г-н Беррехаб и Ребекка понесли убытки, не выражаемые в
денежном исчислении. По данному вопросу Правительство не высказало
своей позиции.
34. Суд разделяет точку зрения Комиссии. С учетом требования
статьи 50 о справедливой компенсации Суд выносит Решение о выплате
заявителям 20000 гульденов.
ПО ЭТИМ ОСНОВАНИЯМ СУД
1. Постановил шестью голосами против одного, что была нарушена
статья 8 Конвенции;
2. Постановил единогласно, что статья 3 Конвенции не была
нарушена;
3. Постановил единогласно, что Нидерланды обязаны выплатить
заявителям 20000 (двадцать тысяч) голландских гульденов в качестве
справедливой компенсации;
4. Отклонил единогласно остальные требования о справедливом
возмещении ущерба.
Совершено на английском и французском языках и оглашено во
Дворце прав человека в Страсбурге 21 июня 1988 г.
Председатель
Рольф РИССДАЛ
Грефье
Марк-Андре ЭЙССЕН
В соответствии со статьей 51 п. 2 Конвенции и статьей 52 п. 2
Регламента Суда к настоящему Решению прилагается особое мнение
г-на Тора Вильялмсона.
ОСОБОЕ МНЕНИЕ СУДЬИ ТОРА ВИЛЬЯЛМСОНА
К сожалению, не могу согласиться с моими коллегами,
признавшими нарушение статьи 8 Конвенции в данном деле. Я могу
подписаться под Решением Суда, за исключением пункта 29. В связи с
этим нет необходимости касаться вопросов, где я разделяю мнение
большинства членов Суда, а именно в том, что заявители вели
семейную жизнь, что к первому заявителю г-ну Абдулле Беррехабу
власти применили Закон об иностранцах 1965 г. и другие
соответствующие правовые положения, а также в том, что
законодательство преследует правомерные цели. Остается еще вопрос
о том, являлось ли вмешательство властей "необходимым в
демократическом обществе". Как я уже указал, у меня нет замечаний
по позиции Суда в данном вопросе, которая изложена в п. 28
Решения. Что касается окончательного вывода о том, была ли
нарушена статья 8 Конвенции, то в этой связи хотелось бы высказать
следующие соображения.
Политика Нидерландов в рассмотренных нами вопросах изложена в
обстоятельных правовых документах, которые входят составной частью
в Закон 1965 г. и поправки к нему и основаны на положениях этого
Закона и поправок к нему. Поправки вносились в Закон по мере
накопления опыта. При этом власти стремились предоставить
иностранным гражданам, связанным семейными узами с гражданами
Нидерландов, возможность проживания в Нидерландах. Как было
сказано выше, эти нормы преследуют правомерные цели. Можно
добавить, что вопросы иммиграции и проживания иностранцев
представляются очень важными, и, безусловно, введение здесь
определенных ограничений неизбежно. В общем и целом в данной сфере
деятельности Правительство при разработке своей политики и
правовых норм должно располагать широкими пределами усмотрения.
Именно с таким подходом должны соотноситься права, изложенные
в п. 1 статьи 8 Конвенции. Перед нами два заявителя - отец и его
дочь. Нидерланды должен был покинуть отец, и именно он вошел в
правовые отношения с властями страны. Как указано в Решении Суда,
он и мать его дочери вступили в брак, который, однако, был уже
расторгнут к моменту рождения ребенка. Родители уже не жили
вместе. Мать и первый заявитель договорились о том, что отец будет
часто и регулярно видеться со своей дочерью. Мы должны допустить,
что г-н Беррехаб так и поступал в течение рассматриваемого периода
времени. В дополнение к этому, он был официально назначен
соопекуном своей дочери. Несмотря на их отношения, которые носили
характер семейной жизни, я тем не менее считаю, что, поскольку в
рассмотренный период времени заявители не жили вместе и родители
ребенка не состояли в браке, права первого заявителя не
перевешивали интересы государства - ответчика, признанные за
государством статьей 8 п. 2. Этот вывод подкрепляется тем фактом,
что отношения между двумя заявителями не были полностью прекращены
после того, как первый заявитель покинул Нидерланды.
Что касается соблюдения прав второго заявителя (дочери), то
мне представляется, что эти права не принимались во внимание
властями Нидерландов, занятыми выяснением отношений с первым
заявителем. По моему мнению, этот факт сам по себе не является
нарушением статьи 8 Конвенции. Я придерживаюсь той точки зрения,
что Суд должен давать отдельную оценку правам и интересам каждого
заявителя независимо друг от друга. Следует принять во внимание,
что второй заявитель был еще ребенком, когда ее отец был вынужден
покинуть Нидерланды. Ее семейная жизнь с отцом проходила в
ограниченных рамках договоренности между родителями. Мнение
ребенка едва ли принималось в расчет в вопросах ее взаимоотношений
с отцом. При этом государство - ответчик, со своей стороны, не
могло изменить существующее положение дел путем какого бы то ни
было позитивного действия. Таким образом, положение ребенка было
весьма уязвимым и неопределенным. Я считаю, что этот факт является
в данном деле аргументом в пользу государства - ответчика. С
учетом описанной выше ситуации в семье я пришел к выводу о том,
что положение с обеспечением прав только одного второго заявителя
или с обеспечением совокупных прав обоих заявителей не
свидетельствует о нарушениях статьи 8 Конвенции.
Следует отметить, что в соответствии со сложившейся практикой
работы Суда, при голосовании по вопросам, содержащимся в статье 50
Конвенции, я исходил из того, что в данном деле имело место
нарушение статьи 8, т.е. придерживался решения большинства.
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
CASE OF BERREHAB v. THE NETHERLANDS
JUDGMENT
(Strasbourg, 21.VI.1988)
In the Berrehab case <1>,
--------------------------------
<1> Note by the Registrar: The case is numbered
3/1987/126/177. The second figure indicates the year in which the
case was referred to the Court and the first figure its place on
the list of cases referred in that year; the last two figures
indicate, respectively, the case's order on the list of cases and
of originating applications (to the Commission) referred to the
Court since its creation.
The European Court of Human Rights, sitting, in accordance
with Article 43 (art. 43) of the Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ("the Convention") and the
relevant provisions of the Rules of Court, as a Chamber composed
of the following judges:
Mr. R. Ryssdal, President,
Mr. {Thor Vilhjalmsson} <*>,
Mr. G. Lagergren,
Mr. C. Russo,
Mr. A. Spielmann,
Mr. J. De Meyer,
Mr. S.K. Martens, ad hoc judge,
and also of Mr. M.-A. Eissen, Registrar, and Mr. H. Petzold,
Deputy Registrar,
--------------------------------
<*> Здесь и далее по тексту слова на национальном языке
набраны латинским шрифтом и выделены фигурными скобками.
Having deliberated in private on 26 February and 28 May 1988,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the
last-mentioned date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case was referred to the Court by the European
Commission of Human Rights ("the Commission") and by the
Netherlands Government ("the Government") on 13 March and 10 April
1987 respectively, within the three-month period laid down in
Article 32 § 1 and Article 47 (art. 32-1, art. 47) of the
Convention. It originated in an application (no. 10730/84) against
the Kingdom of the Netherlands lodged with the Commission under
Article 25 (art. 25) by a Moroccan national, Abdellah Berrehab, a
Netherlands national, Sonja Koster, and their daughter Rebecca
Berrehab, likewise of Netherlands nationality, on 14 November
1983. "The applicants" hereinafter means only Abdellah and Rebecca
Berrehab, as the Commission declared Sonja Koster's complaints
inadmissible (see paragraph 18 below).
The Commission's request referred to Articles 44 and 48
(art. 44, art. 48) and to the declaration whereby the Netherlands
Government recognised the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court
(Article 46) (art. 46); the Government's application referred to
Articles 45, 47 and 48 (art. 45, art. 47, art. 48). Both sought a
decision from the Court as to whether the facts of the case
disclosed a breach by the respondent State of its obligations
under Articles 3 and 8 (art. 3, art. 8).
2. In response to the enquiry made in accordance with
Rule 33 § 3 (d) of the Rules of Court, the applicants stated that
they wished to take part in the proceedings pending before the
Court and designated the lawyer who would represent them
(Rule 30).
3. The Chamber of seven judges to be constituted included ex
officio Mr. A.M. Donner, the elected judge of Netherlands
nationality (Article 43 of the Convention) (art. 43), and Mr.
R. Ryssdal, the President of the Court (Rule 21 § 3 (b)). On
23 May 1987, in the presence of the Registrar, the President drew
by lot the names of the other five members, namely Mr.
{Thor Vilhjalmsson}, Mr. G. Lagergren, Mr. C. Russo, Mr. A.
Spielmann and Mr. J. De Meyer (Article 43 in fine of the
Convention and Rule 21 § 4) (art. 43). In December 1987, as Mr.
Donner was unable to attend, the Government appointed Mr. S.K.
Martens, Vice-President of the Netherlands Court of Cassation
(Hoge Raad), to sit as an ad hoc judge (Rules 23 § 1 and 24 § 1).
4. Mr. Ryssdal assumed the office of President of the Chamber
(Rule 21 § 5) and consulted - through the Registrar - the Agent of
the Government, the Delegate of the Commission and the lawyer for
the applicants on the need for a written procedure (Rule 37 § 1).
In accordance with the order made in consequence on 31 July 1987,
the registry received:
(a) on 3 November, the memorials of the Government and of the
applicants;
(b) on 26 October, the applicants' claims for just
satisfaction (Article 50 of the Convention) (art. 50), which they
supplemented in January 1988.
In a letter of 23 November, the Secretary to the Commission
informed the Registrar that the Delegate would submit his
observations at the hearing.
5. Having consulted - through the Registrar - the persons due
to appear before the Court, the President directed on 24 November
that the oral proceedings should commence on 23 February 1988
(Rule 38).
6. The hearing was held in public in the Human Rights
Building, Strasbourg, on the appointed day. The Court had held a
preparatory meeting immediately beforehand.
There appeared before the Court:
(a) for the Government
Miss D.S. Van Heukelom, Assistant Legal Adviser, Ministry for
Foreign Affairs, Agent,
Mr. J.L. De Wijkerslooth de Weerdesteijn, Landsadvocaat,
Counsel;
(b) for the Commission
Mr. H. Schermers, Delegate;
(c) for the applicants
Mr. C.N.A.M. Claassen, advocaat, Counsel.
The Court heard addresses by Mr. De Wijkerslooth de
Weerdesteijn for the Government, Mr. Schermers for the Commission
and Mr. Claassen for the applicants, as well as their replies to
its questions.
At the hearing the Commission produced various documents at
the Registrar's request on the President's instructions. By a
letter of 19 April 1988, the Government supplemented their reply
to a question posed by the Court.
AS TO THE FACTS
I. The circumstances of the case
7. Mr. Berrehab, a Moroccan citizen born in Morocco in 1952,
was permanently resident in Amsterdam at the time when he applied
to the Commission.
His daughter Rebecca, who was born in Amsterdam on 22 August
1979, has Netherlands nationality. She is represented by her
guardian, viz. her mother, Mrs. Koster, who is likewise a
Netherlands national.
8. After marrying Mrs. Koster on 7 October 1977, Mr. Berrehab
sought permission to stay in the Netherlands where he had been for
some time already. The Ministry of Justice granted him permission
on 25 January 1978 "for the sole purpose of enabling him to live
with his Dutch wife", and then renewed it until 8 December 1979.
From November 1977 Mr. Berrehab worked for a self-service
shop. On 9 March 1978, a work permit was issued to him under the
Aliens (Work Permits) Act 1964 (replaced since 1 November 1979 by
the Employment of Aliens Act). This permit was renewed on
18 October 1979. From April 1981 to April 1983 Mr. Berrehab was
employed by a cleaning firm.
9. On 8 February 1979, his wife sued for divorce. The
Amsterdam Regional Court (Arrondissementsrechtbank) granted the
divorce on 9 May 1979 on the ground of the irretrievable breakdown
of the marriage, which was dissolved by registration of the
decision in the Civil Registry of Amsterdam on 15 August 1979. By
an order of 26 November 1979, the Amsterdam Regional Court
appointed Mrs. Koster guardian of her daughter, Rebecca, who had
been born in the meantime, and appointed the girl's father as an
auxiliary guardian (toeziende voogd). On 5 February 1980, it
ordered the latter to pay the Child Welfare Council 140 guilders a
month as a contribution to the cost of maintaining and educating
his daughter.
When Rebecca was born, her father and Mrs. Koster agreed to
ensure that the child had frequent, regular contacts with her
father. On 27 February 1984, they had a notary legalise an
agreement between them as to arrangements for these contacts and
certify that over the previous two years Mr. Berrehab had seen his
daughter four times a week for several hours each time.
10. On 7 December 1979, Mr. Berrehab made an application for
renewal of his residence permit. The head of the Amsterdam police
refused the application on the same day, stating that it would be
contrary to the public interest to renew the permit, regard being
had to the fact that Mr. Berrehab had been allowed to remain in
the Netherlands for the sole purpose of living with his Dutch
wife, which condition was no longer fulfilled on account of the
divorce.
By letter of 26 December 1979, Mr. Berrehab asked the Minister
of Justice to review this decision. He pointed out among other
things that he needed an "independent" residence permit in order
to fulfil his moral and legal obligations as a father. He said he
had sufficient means of subsistence and that he was in a position
to bear part of the costs of Rebecca's upbringing and education.
11. The Minister did not reply within the statutory period of
three months, which under Netherlands law constituted an implied
rejection of the request.
Mr. Berrehab consequently appealed, on 23 April 1980, to the
Litigation Division (Afdeling Rechtspraak) of the Raad van State.
He stated that he could not see how the grant to him of a
residence permit could be prejudicial to the national interest,
particularly since he was under various legal obligations as a
father and he had been able to support himself since 1977 by
working. At the hearing on 14 March 1983, he claimed that the
impugned decision infringed Article 8 § 1 (art. 8-1) of the
Convention on the ground that it prevented him from remaining in
contact with his daughter whom he saw regularly four times a week.
The Raad van State dismissed his appeal on 9 May 1983. It
recalled in the first place that, under section 11(5) of the
Aliens Act of 13 January 1965 (Vreemdelingenwet - "the 1965 Act"),
renewal of a residence permit could be refused in the public
interest. As the Minister of State for Justice had pointed out,
Mr. Berrehab no longer satisfied the condition upon which the
grant of his residence permit depended; consequently, the refusal
appealed against could be justified under section 11(5). As for
Mr. Berrehab's obligations to his daughter, the Raad van State
held that the fulfilment thereof did not serve any vital national
interest and that those obligations subsisted independently of his
place of residence. It added that four meetings a week were not
sufficient to constitute family life within the meaning of Article
8 (art. 8) of the Convention and that the impugned decision would,
moreover, not necessarily entail a break in relations between the
child and her father, as the latter could remain in contact with
his daughter by agreement with his ex-wife.
12. On 30 March 1983, Mr. Berrehab was dismissed by his
employer with effect from 15 April. He was, furthermore, arrested
on 28 December 1983 for the purpose of his deportation. He made an
urgent application (kort geding) to the presiding judge of the
Amsterdam Regional Court, but withdrew it shortly after the
execution of the impugned deportation order on 5 January 1984; on
18 January, the presiding judge accordingly held that there was no
ground on which to give a decision.
In 1984, Rebecca and her mother spent two months with Mr.
Berrehab and his family in Morocco. On 28 August 1984, Mr.
Berrehab applied to the Netherlands Embassy in Rabat for a
three-month residence permit. After an initial refusal he obtained
a visa valid for one month, for the purpose of enabling him to
exercise his rights of access. Accordingly, he went to the
Netherlands on 27 May 1985 where he requested an extension of his
visa until the following 27 August. His request having been turned
down on 6 June, he lodged an appeal with the Raad van State,
accompanied by an urgent application. Hearing the latter
application, the President of the Litigation Division decided, on
20 June, that the applicant should be treated - subject to a
condition which is not relevant to this judgment - as if he had
been granted a visa valid until 27 August.
13. On 14 August 1985, Mr. Berrehab remarried Mrs. Koster in
Amsterdam. On 9 December 1985, the Ministry of Justice granted him
permission (which he had sought on 29 August) to reside in the
Netherlands "for the purpose of living with his Dutch wife and
working during that time".
II. The relevant legislation, practice and case-law
A. The general context of Netherlands
immigration policy
14. The Netherlands authorities pursue a restrictive
immigration policy. The authorities, however, permit exceptions
prompted, inter alia, by the wish to honour the obligations
flowing from the Convention, by the country's economic well-being
and by humanitarian considerations, including the reuniting of
families.
The entry requirements and the grounds on which aliens may be
expelled are laid down primarily in the 1965 Act and its
implementing regulations. In addition to these legal provisions,
there is the "Circular on Aliens" (Vreemdelingencirculaire), which
is a body of directives drawn up and published by the Ministry of
Justice.
The right to stay is therefore governed in principle by
sections 8 - 11 of the Act. A prolonged stay requires the
authorisation of the Minister of Justice or a body acting under
his control. A refusal to grant an authorisation must be
accompanied by a statement of the reasons on which it is based. An
appeal lies to the Minister of Justice and then, if need be, to
the Raad van State. An application is usually granted - normally
for one year - only if the individual's presence serves an
essential national interest or if there are compelling
humanitarian grounds.
Foreigners married to a Netherlands national fall into the
latter category; they may obtain a residence permit "in order to
live with their spouse" in the Netherlands and, if appropriate,
"in order to work there during that time".
B. Changes in this policy
15. This policy, however, has changed over the years.
Foreigners coming to live with their husbands or their wives were
initially granted resident status and a conditional residence
permit. That status was forfeited if the marriage in respect of
which it was granted was dissolved, in which case the foreigner
had to leave the country.
In order to enhance the position of foreigners lawfully
established in the Netherlands, the Minister of State for Justice
felt it necessary to soften the line followed in this respect.
Under the terms of the "Vreemdelingencirculaire" (Chapter B 19,
paragraph 4.3), foreigners who had been married for more than
three years and had lived with their spouses in the Netherlands
for at least three years prior to the dissolution of their
marriage were enabled to apply for an "independent" residence
permit; the underlying idea was that after that length of time
they would have forged sufficient links with the country for it to
be unnecessary to make their status subject to conditions.
It was subsequently thought advisable to make further changes
in the regulations in favour of this category of foreigner. The
requirement of three years' marriage was retained but the
requisite period of residence was reduced to one year. The purpose
of this relaxation was to improve the often precarious position of
divorced women, particularly those of Mediterranean origin; it was
felt that they ought to be permitted to stay in the Netherlands
with a status independent of that of their former husbands.
This policy was later refined still further, when it was
decided that even where the aforementioned conditions were not
met, overriding humanitarian considerations might justify the
grant to a foreigner of authorisation to remain on Netherlands
territory on an independent residence permit, for example if he
had close links with the Netherlands or with a person resident
there. According to the Government, this was an exceptional
measure that was rarely applied.
C. Case-law
16. As far as the Netherlands case-law on aliens is concerned,
a distinction must be drawn between the courts hearing urgent
applications - the civil courts up to and including the Court of
Cassation at last instance - and the court conducting a full
examination of the merits of the case, namely the Litigation
Division of the Raad van State.
While the Court of Cassation in its decisions in other fields,
such as the right of access, had already favoured a fairly broad
conception of "family life" (see in particular the leading case
decided on 22 February 1985, in Nederlandse Jurisprudentie, 1986,
no. 3), the Litigation Division of the Raad van State had tended
to take a narrower view. Its decision in the instant case is fully
in line with that tradition. Several of its most recent decisions,
however, suggest that it is going to adopt the principle laid down
in a Court of Cassation judgment of 12 December 1986 concerning
aliens, from which it emerges that cohabitation is not a sine qua
non of "family life" for the purposes of Article 8 (art. 8) of the
Convention (Nederlandse Jurisprudentie, 1988, no. 188).
The Court of Cassation recently had before it a case similar
to the present one. A court of appeal, hearing an urgent
application, had held that where a foreigner threatened with
expulsion pleads the right to respect for his own and his child's
family life, the onus is on him to show that the minor's interest
is sufficiently important to outweigh the State's interest. On
appeal, the Court of Cassation quashed the decision on 18 December
1987 (Rechtspraak van de Week, 1988, no. 9). It fell to be decided
whether "family life" existed between the alien and his child, and
the Court of Cassation began by emphasising that the child was a
legitimate one. It went on:
"For the duration of the marriage, there existed between Garti
and his son a relationship that amounted to family life within the
meaning of Article 8 (art. 8) of the ... Convention .... Neither
the cessation of cohabitation nor the divorce ended that
relationship. It must also be noted that, as Garti claimed and as
the Court of Appeal apparently regarded as having been
established, Garti and his son remained in close touch after the
cessation of cohabitation."
The decision was quashed on the ground, inter alia, that the
appeal court had lost sight of the fact that:
"if, in such a case, the expulsion of a foreigner must be
regarded as an interference with his right to respect for family
life within the meaning of Article 8 (art. 8) ..., the sole means
of determining whether that interference is justified or may be
justified is to weigh, in the light of the facts of the case and
the policy directives (beleidsregels) in force, the seriousness of
the interference with the right of the foreigner concerned and his
minor child to respect for their family life against the interests
served by those policy directives, and in so doing one may, in
order to assess the seriousness of the interference, have regard
notably to the length of time during which those concerned have
lived together, to the nature and degree of intensity of the
contacts maintained after cohabitation came to an end and to
whether it is the parent or the child who is threatened with
expulsion".
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION
17. In their application of 14 November 1983 to the Commission
(no. 10730/84), Mr. Berrehab and his ex-wife Mrs. Koster, the
latter acting in her own name and as guardian of their under-age
daughter Rebecca, alleged that Mr. Berrehab's deportation amounted
- in respect of each of them, and more particularly for the
daughter - to treatment that was inhuman and therefore contrary to
Article 3 (art. 3) of the Convention. In their submission, the
deportation was also an unjustified infringement of the right to
respect for their private and family life, as guaranteed in
Article 8 (art. 8).
18. On 8 March 1985, the Commission declared Mrs. Koster's
complaints inadmissible, but Mr. Berrehab's and Rebecca's
complaints were declared admissible.
In its report of 7 October 1986 (made under Article 31)
(art. 31), the Commission concluded that there had been a
violation of Article 8 (art. 8) (by eleven votes to two) but not
of Article 3 (art. 3) (unanimously). The full text of the
Commission's opinion and of the dissenting opinion contained in
the report is reproduced as an annex to this judgment.
AS TO THE LAW
I. Alleged violation of Article 8 (art. 8)
19. In the applicants' submission, the refusal to grant a new
residence permit after the divorce and the resulting expulsion
order infringed Article 8 (art. 8) of the Convention, which
provides:
"1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and
family life, his home and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with
the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with
the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests
of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of
the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the
protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the
rights and freedoms of others."
The Government disputed this submission but the Commission
accepted it.
A. Applicability of Article 8 (art. 8)
20. The applicants asserted that the applicability of
Article 8 (art. 8) in respect of the words "right to respect for
... private and family life" did not presuppose permanent
cohabitation. The exercise of a father's right of access to his
child and his contributing to the cost of education were also
factors sufficient to constitute family life.
The Government challenged that analysis, whereas the
Commission agreed with it.
21. The Court likewise does not see cohabitation as a sine qua
non of family life between parents and minor children. It has held
that the relationship created between the spouses by a lawful and
genuine marriage - such as that contracted by Mr. and Mrs.
Berrehab - has to be regarded as "family life" (see the Abdulaziz,
Cabales and Balkandali judgment of 28 May 1985, Series A no. 94,
p. 32, § 62). It follows from the concept of family on which
Article 8 (art. 8) is based that a child born of such a union is
ipso jure part of that relationship; hence, from the moment of the
child's birth and by the very fact of it, there exists between him
and his parents a bond amounting to "family life", even if the
parents are not then living together.
Subsequent events, of course, may break that tie, but this was
not so in the instant case. Certainly Mr. Berrehab and Mrs.
Koster, who had divorced, were no longer living together at the
time of Rebecca's birth and did not resume cohabitation
afterwards. That does not alter the fact that, until his expulsion
from the Netherlands, Mr. Berrehab saw his daughter four times a
week for several hours at a time; the frequency and regularity of
his meetings with her (see paragraph 9 in fine above) prove that
he valued them very greatly. It cannot therefore be maintained
that the ties of "family life" between them had been broken.
B. Compliance with Article 8 (art. 8)
1. Paragraph 1 of Article 8 (art. 8-1)
22. In the applicants' submission, the refusal to grant Mr.
Berrehab a new residence permit after the divorce and his
resulting expulsion amounted to interferences with the right to
respect for their family life, given the distance between the
Netherlands and Morocco and the financial problems entailed by Mr.
Berrehab's enforced return to his home country.
The Government replied that nothing prevented Mr. Berrehab
from exercising his right of access by travelling from Morocco to
the Netherlands on a temporary visa.
23. Like the Commission, the Court recognises that this
possibility was a somewhat theoretical one in the circumstances of
the case; moreover, Mr. Berrehab was given such a visa only after
an initial refusal (see paragraph 12 above). The two disputed
measures thus in practice prevented the applicants from
maintaining regular contacts with each other, although such
contacts were essential as the child was very young. The measures
accordingly amounted to interferences with the exercise of a right
secured in paragraph 1 of Article 8 (art. 8-1) and fall to be
considered under paragraph 2 (art. 8-2).
2. Paragraph 2 of Article 8 (art. 8-2)
(a) "In accordance with the law"
24. The Court finds that, as was submitted by the Government
and the Commission, the measures in question were based on the
1965 Act; and indeed, the applicants did not dispute that.
(b) Legitimate aim
25. In the applicants' submission, the impugned interferences
did not pursue any of the legitimate aims listed in Article 8 § 2
(art. 8-2); in particular, they did not promote the "economic
well-being of the country", because they prevented Mr. Berrehab
from continuing to contribute to the costs of maintaining and
educating his daughter.
The Government considered that Mr. Berrehab's expulsion was
necessary in the interests of public order, and they claimed that
a balance had been very substantially achieved between the various
interests involved.
The Commission noted that the disputed decisions were
consistent with Dutch immigration-control policy and could
therefore be regarded as having been taken for legitimate purposes
such as the prevention of disorder and the protection of the
rights and freedoms of others.
26. The Court has reached the same conclusion. It points out,
however, that the legitimate aim pursued was the preservation of
the country's economic well-being within the meaning of paragraph
2 of Article 8 (art. 8-2) rather than the prevention of disorder:
the Government were in fact concerned, because of the population
density, to regulate the labour market.
(c) "Necessary in a democratic society"
27. The applicants claimed that the impugned measures could
not be considered "necessary in a democratic society".
The Government rejected this argument, but the Commission
accepted it, being of the view that the interferences complained
of were disproportionate as the authorities had not achieved a
proper balance between the applicants' interest in maintaining
their contacts and the general interest calling for the prevention
of disorder.
28. In determining whether an interference was "necessary in a
democratic society", the Court makes allowance for the margin of
appreciation that is left to the Contracting States (see in
particular the W v. the United Kingdom judgment of 8 July 1987,
Series A no. 121-A, p. 27, § 60 (b) and (d), and the Olsson
judgment of 24 March 1988, Series A no. 130, pp. 31 - 32, § 67).
In this connection, it accepts that the Convention does not in
principle prohibit the Contracting States from regulating the
entry and length of stay of aliens. According to the Court's
established case-law (see, inter alia, the judgments previously
cited), however, "necessity" implies that the interference
corresponds to a pressing social need and, in particular, that it
is proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.
29. Having to ascertain whether this latter condition was
satisfied in the instant case, the Court observes, firstly, that
its function is not to pass judgment on the Netherlands'
immigration and residence policy as such. It has only to examine
the interferences complained of, and it must do this not solely
from the point of view of immigration and residence, but also with
regard to the applicants' mutual interest in continuing their
relations. As the Netherlands Court of Cassation also noted (see
paragraph 16 above), the legitimate aim pursued has to be weighed
against the seriousness of the interference with the applicants'
right to respect for their family life.
As to the aim pursued, it must be emphasised that the instant
case did not concern an alien seeking admission to the Netherlands
for the first time but a person who had already lawfully lived
there for several years, who had a home and a job there, and
against whom the Government did not claim to have any complaint.
Furthermore, Mr. Berrehab already had real family ties there - he
had married a Dutch woman, and a child had been born of the
marriage.
As to the extent of the interference, it is to be noted that
there had been very close ties between Mr. Berrehab and his
daughter for several years (see paragraphs 9 and 21 above) and
that the refusal of an independent residence permit and the
ensuing expulsion threatened to break those ties. That effect of
the interferences in issue was the more serious as Rebecca needed
to remain in contact with her father, seeing especially that she
was very young.
Having regard to these particular circumstances, the Court
considers that a proper balance was not achieved between the
interests involved and that there was therefore a disproportion
between the means employed and the legitimate aim pursued. That
being so, the Court cannot consider the disputed measures as being
necessary in a democratic society. It thus concludes that there
was a violation of Article 8 (art. 8).
II. Alleged violation of Article 3 (art. 3)
30. The applicants maintained that the refusal to grant Mr.
Berrehab a new residence permit after the divorce and his
resulting deportation infringed Article 3 (art. 3), which
provides:
"No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment."
In the Government's submission, the applicants' complaints
disclosed no problem under this provision.
In the Commission's view, the facts of the case did not show
that either of the applicants underwent suffering of a degree
corresponding to the concepts of "inhuman" or "degrading"
treatment.
31. The Court shares this view and finds that there has been
no violation of Article 3 (art. 3).
III. Application of Article 50 (art. 50)
32. By Article 50 (art. 50) of the Convention,
"If the Court finds that a decision or a measure taken by a
legal authority or any other authority of a High Contracting Party
is completely or partially in conflict with the obligations
arising from the ... Convention, and if the internal law of the
said Party allows only partial reparation to be made for the
consequences of this decision or measure, the decision of the
Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured
party."
The applicants, who had legal aid for the proceedings before
the Commission and the Court, did not seek reimbursement of costs
and expenses. They did, on the other hand, claim financial
compensation for twofold pecuniary damage: loss of earnings
(31,429.56 guilders) allegedly suffered by Mr. Berrehab from April
1983 to May 1985 by reason both of the dismissal from his job
following the refusal to issue him with a new residence permit and
of the impossibility of finding work in his home country; and the
cost (4,700 guilders) of the journey made by Rebecca Berrehab and
her mother to Morocco in July 1984 and by Mr. Berrehab to the
Netherlands in May 1985 (see paragraph 12 above). The applicants
also sought an unspecified amount of compensation for the mental
suffering caused by their separation.
33. In the Government's submission, no causal link had been
established between the disputed measures and the alleged
pecuniary damage. The Commission accepted that argument with
respect to the loss of earnings, but considered that partial
compensation for the travel expenses was justified. It also
recognised that Mr. Berrehab and Rebecca had sustained
non-pecuniary damage; the Government did not express any view on
that point.
34. The Court shares the view of the Commission. Taking its
decision on an equitable basis, as required by Article 50
(art. 50), it awards the applicants the sum of 20,000 guilders.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT
1. Holds by six votes to one that there has been a violation
of Article 8 (art. 8);
2. Holds unanimously that there has been no violation of
Article 3 (art. 3);
3. Holds unanimously that the Netherlands is to pay to the
applicants 20,000 (twenty thousand) Dutch guilders by way of just
satisfaction;
4. Rejects unanimously the remainder of the claim for just
satisfaction.
Done in English and in French, and delivered at a public
hearing in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 21 June 1988.
Signed: Rolv RYSSDAL
President
Signed: {Marc-Andre} EISSEN
Registrar
In accordance with Article 51 § 2 (art. 51-2) of the
Convention and Rule 52 § 2 of the Rules of Court, the dissenting
opinion of Mr. {Thor Vilhjalmsson} is annexed to this judgment.
Initialled: R.R.
Initialled: M.-A.E.
DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE {THOR VILHJALMSSON}
To my regret, I have not been able to agree with my colleagues
who have found a violation of Article 8 (art. 8) of the Convention
in this case. I can agree with the judgment with the sole
exception of paragraph 29. It is therefore not necessary for me to
elaborate on the issues where I share the opinion of the majority
of the Court, namely that there was family life between the
applicants, that the first applicant, Mr. Abdellah Berrehab, was
treated in accordance with the Aliens Act 1965 and other
applicable rules and that the legislation pursues a legitimate
aim. There remains the question of whether the interference
complained of was "necessary in a democratic society". As already
indicated, I have no comments to make on what is stated on this
point in paragraph 28 of the judgment. As to the final assessment
of whether or not there was a violation of Article 8 (art. 8), I
would make the following observations.
The policy of the Netherlands in the field at issue here is
set out in detailed rules found in or based on the 1965 Act, as
amended. The amendments have been made in the light of experience
and there has been a tendency to enable persons of foreign
nationality who have certain family ties with Netherlands citizens
to take up residence in the Netherlands. As already indicated, the
rules pursue a legitimate aim. It may be added that the problem of
immigration and residence of foreigners is a very important issue
and there is no doubt that restrictions are unavoidable. Generally
speaking, in this field the Government must have a wide margin of
appreciation when formulating their policy and the necessary legal
rules.
Against this have to be weighed the rights embodied in the
first paragraph of Article 8 (art. 8-1). There are two applicants,
the father and his daughter. It was the father who had to leave
the Netherlands and who had dealings with that country's
authorities. As stated in the judgment, he and the mother of his
daughter had been married to each other, but they had been
divorced by the time their child was born. They did not live
together. The mother and the first applicant agreed that he should
see his daughter frequently and regularly and it must be assumed
that he did so during the relevant period. He was also formally
appointed an auxiliary guardian of his daughter. Notwithstanding
their contacts, which constituted family life, I nevertheless
find, taking into account the circumstances that the applicants
did not live in the same home and that the parents of the child
were not married to each other at the relevant time, that on
balance the first applicant's rights did not outweigh the
respondent State's interests recognised in paragraph 2 of
Article 8 (art. 8-2). This conclusion is supported by the fact
that the contacts between the two applicants were not completely
terminated after the first applicant left the Netherlands.
As to the rights of the second applicant, the daughter, it
seems that they were not considered by the Netherlands authorities
who dealt with the first applicant's case. That in itself did not,
in my opinion, give rise to a violation of Article 8 (art. 8). I
take the view that the Court must assess the competing rights and
interests independently. It should be noted that the second
applicant was a young girl when her father had to leave the
Netherlands. The family life she had enjoyed with him was limited
to what he had agreed with the mother. The child had hardly any
voice on the scope of her contacts with her father and the
respondent State could not alter that situation by any positive
action on its part. Thus, her situation was very precarious. In my
opinion, this is an argument in favour of the respondent State's
position in this case. Taking into account the family situation
already described, I have come to the conclusion that neither the
rights of the second applicant, taken alone, or the combined
rights of the two applicants can lead to a finding of a breach of
Article 8 (art. 8).
It should be mentioned that I have, in accordance with the
practice in this Court, voted on the question of Article 50
(art. 50) on the basis that there was a violation of Article 8
(art. 8) as decided by the majority.
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