[неофициальный перевод]
ЕВРОПЕЙСКИЙ СУД ПО ПРАВАМ ЧЕЛОВЕКА
СУДЕБНОЕ РЕШЕНИЕ
ОЛССОН (OLSSON) ПРОТИВ ШВЕЦИИ
(Страсбург, 24 марта 1988 года)
(Извлечение)
КРАТКОЕ НЕОФИЦИАЛЬНОЕ ИЗЛОЖЕНИЕ ОБСТОЯТЕЛЬСТВ ДЕЛА
A. Основные факты
Во время относящихся к делу событий заявители, супруги
г-н Стиг Олссон и г-жа Гун Олссон, граждане Швеции, проживали в
Гетеборге. У них было трое детей, рожденных в браке, - Стивен,
Хелена и Томас, соответственно в 1971, 1976 и 1979 гг.
Окружной Совет по социальным проблемам N 6 г. Гетеборга в
январе 1980 г. решил, что детей следует взять под наблюдение и
изучить социальное положение семьи, а в августе 1980 г. над детьми
был установлен временный надзор. В представленном докладе о
социальном положении семьи содержался вывод, что развитие детей
находится под угрозой, поскольку они живут в неблагоприятной
обстановке, их родители неспособны удовлетворить потребности детей
в уходе, воспитании и защите, и 16 сентября Совет решил передать
детей на государственное попечение.
Это решение было впоследствии подтверждено окружным
административным судом; обращение заявителей в апелляционный
административный суд было отклонено, и им было отказано в подаче
жалобы в Верховный административный суд.
В результате Решения от сентября 1980 г.:
Стивен был помещен в школу-интернат в Гетеборге, руководимую
Советом по делам детей с замедленным умственным развитием, а через
некоторое время - в приемную семью, проживавшую примерно в ста
километрах от дома заявителей в Гетеборге. Он оставался там более
двух лет, а затем был переведен в детский дом, управляемый тем же
Советом, примерно в восьмидесяти километрах севернее Гетеборга.
Хелена и Томас были направлены в разные приемные семьи, дома
которых находились на расстоянии около ста километров друг от
друга и примерно шестиста километров к северо-востоку от
Гетеборга.
В июне 1982 г. Совет отклонил просьбу заявителей отменить
принятые меры; их последующие жалобы в период с 1983 г. по 1986 г.
также остались без последствий. Все это время начиная с конца
1980 г. доступ родителей к детям был ограничен.
Лишь 16 февраля 1987 г. апелляционный административный суд
принял Решение о воссоединении Стивена с его родителями, что и
было сделано. Верховный административный суд 18 июня 1987 г.
принял аналогичное Решение в отношении Хелены и Томаса, оговорив
это, однако, в соответствии с Законом 1980 г. о передаче детей на
государственное попечение, некоторыми условиями и прежде всего
состоянием детей. На этом основании с июня 1987 г. Совет запретил
заявителям впредь, до последующего уведомления, забирать Хелену и
Томаса из приемных семей; неоднократные обращения заявителей с
просьбой отменить это решение встретили отказ, и Решение суда было
выполнено только через три года.
B. Разбирательство в Комиссии по правам человека
В жалобе, поданной в Комиссию 10 июня 1983 г., заявители
утверждали, что Решения, разлучившие их с детьми, нарушили
статью 8 Конвенции, а также ее статьи 3, 6, 13, 14 и статью 2
Протокола N 1. Жалоба была признана приемлемой 15 мая 1985 г.
В своем докладе от 2 декабря 1986 г. Комиссия установила факты
и выразила мнение, что:
- решения об установлении государственного попечения над
детьми заявителей в сочетании с их помещением в разные приемные
семьи, проживавшие на далеком расстоянии от места жительства
заявителей, явились нарушением статьи 8 Конвенции (восемь голосов
против пяти);
- нарушение статей 3, 6, 13 или 14 Конвенции или статьи 2
Протокола N 1 не имело места (единогласно).
Дело было передано в Суд Комиссией 13 марта 1987 г. и Шведским
Правительством 13 апреля 1987 г.
ИЗВЛЕЧЕНИЕ ИЗ СУДЕБНОГО РЕШЕНИЯ
ВОПРОСЫ ПРАВА
I. О предмете судебного разбирательства
54. В своих жалобах заявители указали на ряд предполагаемых
нарушений Конвенции, являющихся следствием, во-первых, шведского
законодательства о правовом положении детей и, во-вторых, шведской
судебной практики.
Суд напоминает, что при разбирательстве дела на основе жалобы,
поданной в соответствии со статьей 25 Конвенции, он вынужден
ограничиться, насколько возможно, рассмотрением конкретного дела
(см. Решение по делу Ф. против Швейцарии от 18 декабря 1987 г.
Серия A, т. 128, с. 16, п. 31). Соответственно, задача Суда
заключается не в оценке шведского права и практики его применения
in abstracto, а в том, чтобы определить, привело ли его применение
в случае г-на и г-жи Олссон к нарушению Конвенции.
55. Во время слушания в Суде Правительство заявило, что в
своем докладе Комиссия вышла за рамки принятого ею Решения о
приемлемости от 15 мая 1985 г., рассмотрев ряд мер, которые не
были тщательно изучены или в отношении которых - на указанную выше
дату - не были исчерпаны внутренние средства правовой защиты.
Соответственно, по мнению Правительства, Суд не должен
рассматривать, во-первых, меры относительно посещения заявителями
своих детей, принятые Советом 21 октября 1980 г., 10 августа
1982 г., 2 августа 1983 г., 6 декабря 1983 г. и 30 октября
1984 г., а также Решения окружного административного суда от
17 ноября 1982 г., во-вторых, Решения, принятые Советом 6 декабря
1983 г. и 30 октября 1984 г. и касающиеся отклонения прошений
заявителей об отмене попечения (см. п. 30 и 31 выше).
В ответ Комиссия заявила, что она следовала своей обычной
практике рассматривать факты дела такими, каковы они были на
момент составления доклада, и что в то время, когда данное дело
рассматривалось в Комиссии, Правительство не выдвигало аргумента о
неисчерпании внутренних средств правовой защиты в отношении
вышеуказанных Решений.
56. Суд отмечает, что все вышеуказанные Решения были приняты
раньше, чем состоялись заседания Комиссии по вопросу о
приемлемости и существе дела (15 мая 1985 г.). В этих
обстоятельствах ничто не мешало Правительству выдвинуть возражение
о неисчерпанности внутренних средств правовой защиты (см. Решение
по делу Боцано от 18 декабря 1986 г. Серия A, т. 111, с. 19,
п. 44). Более того, вопросы относительно права заявителей посещать
своих детей и их прошений об отмене государственного попечения
были затронуты на этом заседании.
Кроме того, статья 47 Регламента Суда предусматривает, что
"сторона, желающая выдвинуть предварительное возражение, должна
подать официальное заявление с изложением этого возражения и его
обоснованием не позднее того момента, когда эта сторона
информирует Председателя о своем намерении не представлять
памятной записки". Такой документ по существу дела не был
представлен, равно как и вышеуказанное заявление было выдвинуто
лишь на заседании Суда. Поэтому заявление Правительства должно
быть отклонено как опоздавшее.
Решение Комиссии о признании жалобы приемлемой определяет
рамка рассмотрения дела Судом. Однако в интересах экономии
процесса он может принимать во внимание и другие факты, если они
представляют собой продолжение фактов, лежащих в основе жалоб,
признанных приемлемыми (см. Решение по делу Уикса от 2 марта
1987 г. Серия A, т. 114, с. 21, п. 37). По мнению Суда,
вышеуказанные меры можно рассматривать как подпадающие под эту
категорию, и, следовательно, приняв их во внимание, Комиссия
действовала должным образом.
57. С другой стороны, Решения 1987 г. относительно запрета на
возврат Хелены и Томаса из приемных семей (см. п. 32 выше)
являются предметом дополнительной жалобы, которую г-н и
г-жа Олссон подали в Комиссию 23 октября 1987 г. Никакие новые
вопросы, поднятые в этой жалобе, не могут быть разрешены Судом в
настоящем Решении (см. Решение по делу Шведского профсоюза
машинистов от 6 февраля 1976 г. Серия A, т. 20, с. 13, п. 34, и
вышеупомянутое Решение по делу Уикса).
II. О предполагаемом нарушении статьи 8 Конвенции
A. Введение
58. Заявители утверждали, что решение властей взять детей под
попечение, способ осуществления этого решения и отказ властей
отменить попечение привели к нарушению статьи 8 Конвенции, которая
гласит:
"1. Каждый человек имеет право на уважение его личной и
семейной жизни, неприкосновенности его жилища и тайны
корреспонденции.
2. Не допускается вмешательство со стороны государственных
органов в осуществление этого права, за исключением вмешательства,
предусмотренного законом и необходимого в демократическом обществе
в интересах государственной безопасности и общественного
спокойствия, экономического благосостояния страны, в целях
предотвращения беспорядков или преступлений, для охраны здоровья
или нравственности или защиты прав и свобод других лиц".
Нарушение оспаривалось Правительством, но было признано
большинством членов Комиссии.
59. Для родителей и детей быть вместе - это основа семейной
жизни; более того, естественные семейные отношения не прекращаются
ввиду того, что ребенок взят под государственное попечение
(см. Решение по делу W. против Соединенного Королевства от 8 июля
1987 г. Серия A, т. 121, с. 27, п. 59). Из вышесказанного следует,
и это не оспаривалось Правительством, что обсуждаемые меры
фактически означали вмешательство в осуществление права заявителей
на уважение их семейной жизни.
Подобное вмешательство означает нарушение статьи 8, если оно
не было предусмотрено законом и не имело цель или цели, которые
являются правомерными в соответствии со статьей 8 п. 2, и было
"необходимо в демократическом обществе" для осуществления
указанной цели или целей (там же, с. 27, п. 60 "a").
B. "Предусмотрено законом"
60. Заявители не отрицали, что власти действовали в
соответствии со шведским законом. Однако они утверждали, что
власти приняли меры не "в соответствии с правом" по смыслу
статьи 8, поскольку законодательством не были установлены
ограничения на применение дискреционных полномочий и закон был
сформулирован столь неопределенно, что результаты его применения
оказались непредсказуемыми.
Правительство оспаривало это утверждение, с чем не согласилась
Комиссия.
61. Среди требований, которые Суд определил как вытекающие из
фразы "предусмотрено законом", имеются следующие:
a) Какая-либо норма не может считаться "законом", если она не
сформулирована с достаточной точностью так, чтобы гражданин
самостоятельно или, если понадобится, с профессиональной помощью
мог предвидеть с долей вероятности, которая может считаться
разумной в данных обстоятельствах, последствия, которые может
повлечь за собой конкретное действие. Однако опыт показывает, что
абсолютная точность недостижима и что необходимость избегать
чрезмерной жесткости формулировок и следовать за изменяющимися
обстоятельствами ведет к тому, что многие законы неизбежно
изложены в терминах, которые в большей или меньшей степени
являются неопределенными (см., например, Решение по делу "Санди
таймс" от 26 апреля 1979 г. Серия A, т. 30, с. 31, п. 49).
b) Фраза "предусмотрено законом" не просто отсылает к
внутреннему праву, но имеет в виду и качество закона, требуя,
чтобы последний соответствовал принципу верховенства права. Таким
образом, подразумевается, что во внутреннем праве должны
существовать определенные меры защиты против произвольного
вмешательства публичных властей в осуществление прав, охраняемых
inter alia п. 1 статьи 8 (см. Решение по делу Мэлоуна от 2 августа
1984 г. Серия A, т. 82, с. 32, п. 67).
c) Закон, который предусматривает дискреционные полномочия,
сам по себе не является несовместимым с требованиями
предсказуемости при условии, что дискреционные полномочия и способ
их осуществления указаны с достаточной ясностью для того, чтобы с
учетом правомерности цели указанных мер обеспечить индивиду
адекватную защиту от произвольного вмешательства властей
(см. Решение по делу Гиллоу от 24 ноября 1986 г. Серия A, т. 109,
с. 21, п. 51).
62. Шведский закон, применимый к данному делу, является, по
общему признанию, весьма неопределенным по своей терминологии и
предоставляет довольно широкие пределы усмотрения, в особенности в
отношении проведения в жизнь решений по делам об установлении
государственного попечения. В частности, он предусматривает
возможность вмешательства властей в случае, если здоровье или
развитие ребенка находятся под угрозой или в опасности, не требуя
представления доказательства реального вреда (см. п. 35, 37 выше).
С другой стороны, обстоятельства, требующие взятия ребенка под
государственное попечение и осуществления такого решения настолько
разнообразны, что едва ли возможен закон, предусматривающий все
случаи. Если бы в своем праве действовать власти были ограничены
случаями конкретного причинения вреда, это безосновательно снизило
бы эффективность необходимой ребенку защиты. К тому же гарантии
против произвольного вмешательства обеспечиваются тем, что
осуществление почти всех предусмотренных законом полномочий или
поручено, или подконтрольно административным судам на нескольких
уровнях. Это относится и к учреждению попечения над ребенком,
отказу снять его и большинству шагов по исполнению соответствующих
решений (см. п. 44, 45, 50 выше). Учитывая эти гарантии, объем
дискреционных полномочий, предоставленных законом властям,
представляется Суду весьма разумным и приемлемым для целей
статьи 8.
63. Таким образом, Суд пришел к заключению, что указанное
вмешательство властей было "предусмотрено законом".
C. Правомерная цель
64. Заявители утверждали, что из всех целей, перечисленных в
п. 2 статьи 8, только "охрана здоровья или нравственности" могли
бы оправдать решение установить попечение над их детьми, но
здоровью или нравственности последних реально ничто не угрожало на
момент принятия решения.
Комиссия, с другой стороны, сочла, что эти решения были
приняты в интересах детей и имели законную цель охраны их здоровья
или нравственности, а также защиты "прав и свобод других лиц".
65. По мнению Суда, соответствующее шведское законодательство
было принято с целью защиты детей, и ничто не дает оснований
предполагать, что в данном случае оно было использовано с какой-то
иной целью. Таким образом, вышеуказанное вмешательство, призванное
обеспечить нормальное развитие Стивена, Хелены и Томаса, отвечает
правомерным целям п. 2 статьи 8, что и признано Комиссией.
D. "Необходимо в демократическом обществе"
66. Заявители утверждали, что обсуждаемые меры не могут
рассматриваться как "необходимые в демократическом обществе". Это
утверждение оспаривалось Правительством, но было принято
большинством Комиссии.
1. Введение
67. В соответствии со сложившейся практикой Суда, понятие
необходимости подразумевает, что вмешательство соответствует
какой-либо насущной общественной потребности и что оно соразмерно
преследуемой правомерной цели. При определении того, является ли
вмешательство "необходимым в демократическом обществе", Суд
учитывает, что за государствами - участниками Конвенции остается
определенная свобода усмотрения (см. среди многих источников
вышеупомянутое Решение по делу W. против Соединенного Королевства.
Серия A, т. 121, с. 27, п. 60 "b" и "d").
68. Во время слушания дела в Суде имела место продолжительная
дискуссия по вопросу о том, какую позицию должны занять органы
Конвенции в решении спорного вопроса о "необходимости".
Представитель Комиссии суммировала подход большинства ее
членов следующим образом: "оставаться... в пределах решений
национальных судов и после их детального изучения сделать вывод,
свидетельствует ли (их) содержание... о наличии достаточных
оснований для учреждения над ребенком государственного попечения".
Она кратко сформулировала подход меньшинства членов Комиссии к
данному вопросу таким образом: необходимо "оставаться в пределах
решений национальных судов и убедиться, что их мотивация говорит о
том, что эти решения не основывались на обстоятельствах дела или
что были использованы нормы и критерии, неприемлемые для
установления государственного попечения". По существу вопрос
состоит в том, правильно ли национальный суд определил
"необходимость". Правительство предпочло точку зрения меньшинства,
добавив, что национальным властям предоставлено широкое поле
усмотрения и нет оснований считать, что их решения были приняты
недобросовестно, без должной осторожности и разумных оснований.
Подход, которого последовательно придерживался Суд и от
которого нет оснований отступить и в данном случае, несколько
отличается от точек зрения, изложенных выше. Прежде всего его
контроль не ограничивается установлением того, осуществляет ли
государство - ответчик свое дискреционное право разумно, осторожно
и добросовестно (см. inter alia вышеупомянутое Решение по делу
"Санди таймс". Серия A, т. 30, с. 36, п. 59). Далее, осуществляя
свою надзорную юрисдикцию, Суд не может ограничиться рассмотрением
оспариваемых решений как таковых, вне контекста данного дела в
целом; должно быть установлено, являются ли мотивы, приведенные
для обоснования рассматриваемого вмешательства, "относящимися к
делу и достаточными" (см. среди других источников mutatis mutandis
Решение по делу Лингенса от 8 июля 1986 г. Серия A, т. 103,
с. 25 - 26, п. 40).
69. Вывод, что имело место нарушение статьи 8, большинство
Комиссии основывало на решениях об установлении попечения над
детьми заявителей и помещении их в разные приемные семьи далеко от
места жительства заявителей. В этом отношении Суд разделяет точку
зрения Правительства, что эти вопросы должны рассматриваться в
отдельности, т. к. факторы и соображения, относящиеся к оценке их
необходимости, могут быть различными.
2. Установление над детьми попечения и отказ отменить его
70. Заявители утверждали, что не было никакой необходимости
устанавливать попечение над их детьми; они заявляли inter alia,
что не было каких-либо конкретных фактов, свидетельствующих о том,
что дети были в опасности. Поэтому отсутствовали веские причины,
оправдывающие эти решения властей, а также не существовало никаких
обоснованных мотивов для отказа в их просьбе отменить режим
попечения.
Правительство оспаривало эти утверждения. Большинство Комиссии
не было убеждено, что фактическое положение дел было настолько
угрожающим, чтобы оправдать попечение над детьми; в то же время
Комиссия отметила: "понятно, почему попечение не было отменено".
71. Прежде чем перейти к вопросу по существу, следует
остановиться на некоторых исходных положениях. В своем
вышеупомянутом Решении по делу W. против Соединенного Королевства
Суд решил, что статья 8 имплицитно содержит некоторые
процессуальные требования, в частности, что при рассмотрении таких
дел родители "должны играть в процессе принятия решений достаточно
большую роль, чтобы обеспечить защиту своих интересов" (Серия A,
т. 121, с. 26, п. 64).
Суд согласен с Комиссией, что это требование было выполнено в
отношении самих решений об установлении попечения. Г-н и
г-жа Олссон принимали участие в ряде совещаний, на которых
рассматривалось их дело, и присутствовали на заседаниях,
предшествовавших Решениям Совета от 16 сентября 1980 г., где
обсуждался вопрос об учреждении попечения над их детьми, и от
1 июля 1982 г., где Олссонам было отказано в отмене режима
попечения (см. п. 10, 11, 12, 27 выше). Они также участвовали в
слушании дела в окружном административном суде и апелляционном
административном суде и были представлены своим адвокатом на всех
стадиях судебного разбирательства.
a) Установление попечения
72. В своем Решении от 30 декабря 1980 г. (см. п. 13 выше)
окружной административный суд выдвинул следующие основания для
утверждения Решения Совета от 16 сентября 1980 г. об установлении
попечения над детьми:
a) в течение нескольких лет дети жили дома в неблагоприятной
обстановке, поскольку родители оказались неспособны удовлетворить
потребности детей в заботе, поощрении, контроле;
b) Стивен и Томас заметно отставали в умственном развитии, а
все трое детей - в овладении речью;
c) существовал серьезный риск того, что если бы Хелена
осталась в родительском доме, она могла бы остановиться в своем
развитии;
d) предупредительные меры, которые принимались в течение ряда
лет, оказались безуспешными;
e) здоровье и развитие детей оказались под угрозой в
результате неспособности родителей окружить их необходимой заботой
и дать им образование.
Совершенно очевидно, что эти основания имеют "прямое
отношение" к решению взять детей на государственное попечение.
Однако раскол семьи - серьезное вмешательство государства.
Подобный шаг должен быть обоснован достаточно твердыми и вескими
соображениями в интересах ребенка; как правильно отмечает
Комиссия, недостаточно, чтобы попечение лишь улучшило материальное
положение ребенка. Для того чтобы определить, можно ли считать
вышеуказанные основания "достаточными" для целей статьи 8, Суд
должен рассматривать дело в совокупности (см. п. 68 выше), и
особенно обстоятельства, предшествовавшие принятию решения.
73. До принятия Советом Решения о попечении от 16 сентября
1980 г. ряд различных учреждений по социальным вопросам независимо
друг от друга занимался делами семьи Олссон; они скоординировали
свои действия в 1979 г., после чего группа врачей - психиатров
следила за прохождением дела (см. п. 9 выше). Принимались
различные меры с целью помочь семье, и было проведено несколько
специальных совещаний, где обсуждался этот вопрос (см. п. 9, 10,
11 выше). Поэтому нельзя сказать, что государственные органы
вмешались в это дело, не обладая адекватной информацией о его
обстоятельствах.
Решение Совета было основано на обстоятельном докладе,
подготовленном социальными службами после того, как дети были
взяты под временный надзор для изучения их положения. Доклад
содержал вывод, что развитие детей находилось под угрозой,
поскольку они жили в неблагоприятной обстановке по причине
неспособности их родителей удовлетворять их потребности в заботе,
поощрении и контроле (см. п. 12 выше). В свою очередь выводы этого
доклада были подтверждены заявлениями целого ряда лиц, хорошо
знакомых с обстоятельствами рассматриваемого дела, и медицинским
докладом, подписанным не только доктором Босеус, но также и
психологом Хеленой Фагерберг-Мосс. Оба они входили в группу,
находившуюся в контакте с семьей, а Х. Фагерберг-Мосс и до
создания группы встречалась с Хеленой и Томасом, чтобы определить
уровень их развития, а также посещала дом заявителей.
В медицинском докладе указывалось, что сами заявители
числились людьми, отстающими в умственном развитии; последующее
обследование показало, что у них были средние умственные
способности (см. п. 9, 12 выше). Однако, как указал апелляционный
административный суд в своем Решении от 16 февраля 1987 г.
(см. п. 31 выше):
"Насколько это следует из решения учредить попечение над
детьми Олссонов, главным основанием для этого была не
предполагаемая умственная отсталость г-на и г-жи Олссон.
Основанием для принудительного вмешательства доклад назвал
"неспособность родителей обеспечить детям удовлетворительный
уровень заботы и воспитания", например, ввиду очевидного
отставания Стивена в умственном развитии и отставания всех троих
детей в овладении речью".
Как отметило меньшинство Комиссии, Решение окружного
административного суда от 30 декабря 1980 г. не было основано
исключительно на документации, имевшейся в распоряжении Совета.
Суд провел предварительное слушание дела, на котором г-жа Олссон и
дети были представлены адвокатом, а д-р Босеус была заслушана в
качестве эксперта (см. п. 13 выше); таким образом, суд имел
хорошую возможность сформировать свое собственное мнение о данном
деле. Более того, это Решение рассматривалось как в апелляционном
административном суде, так и в Верховном административном суде, но
они оставили его без изменений (см. п. 14 и 15 выше).
74. В свете всего вышеизложенного Суд пришел к выводу, что
оспариваемое решение было подкреплено "достаточными" основаниями и
что, учитывая предоставленные им границы усмотрения, шведские
власти имели разумные основания считать, что было необходимо взять
детей на попечение, особенно вследствие того, что предварительные
меры оказались безрезультатными.
b) Отказ отменить попечение
75. В своем Решении от 17 ноября 1982 г. (см. п. 28 выше)
окружной административный суд выдвинул следующие основания для
утверждения Решения Совета от 1 июля 1982 г., отказавшего
заявителям в отмене попечения над их детьми:
a) по возвращении в свою приемную семью после посещения
родителей Стивен испытывал различного рода беспокойство и вновь
стал плохо себя вести, его поездка к родителям 28 июня 1982 г.
имела для него неблагоприятные последствия;
b) заявителям было трудно взаимодействовать с приемной семьей
Стивена и Советом;
c) заявители по-прежнему не осознавали свою неспособность
обеспечить детям удовлетворительный уход и дать образование,
поэтому существовало опасение, что отмена попечения означала бы
большой риск для здоровья и развития детей.
В данном случае эти основания вполне "уместны" для решения
оставить детей под попечением. Однако вопрос, являются ли они
"достаточными", требует дальнейшего тщательного рассмотрения.
76. Следует напомнить, что отказ Совета отменить попечение,
был основан на докладах, составленных социальными службами, в
которых делался вывод, что родители в тот период времени были не
способны предоставить детям необходимую поддержку и стимулировать
их развитие (см. п. 27 выше). Эти доклады были в свою очередь
поддержаны мнениями лиц, хорошо знакомых с обстоятельствами дела,
включая психолога Хелену Фагерберг-Мосс. И самое главное, решение
окружного административного суда так же, как и решение
апелляционного административного суда, утвердившего это решение,
было основано не только на письменных доказательствах, но также на
результатах слушания дела в присутствии заявителей. И это решение
апелляционного административного суда не было отменено (см. п. 29
выше).
Можно было бы подумать, что благоприятное развитие детей, пока
они находились под попечением, и особенно явное улучшение и
стабилизация положения заявителей к 1982 г. (оба эти факта
отмечены в Решении окружного административного суда) говорили
против дальнейшего нахождения детей под попечением. Однако Суд
считает, что решение не отменять его оправданно, поскольку
улучшение обстановки, вызвавшее вопрос об отмене, нельзя с
разумным основанием оценить как стабильное; было бы явно не в
интересах данного ребенка, если бы он был сначала возвращен к
родителям, а затем вскоре снова взят на попечение.
77. В свете всего вышеизложенного, Суд пришел к заключению,
что в 1982 г. шведские власти имели "достаточные" основания
считать, что решения об установлении попечения должны оставаться в
силе. Не было также установлено, что и впоследствии ситуация
изменилась и решения оставались в силе вплоть до их окончательной
отмены в разное время в первой половине 1987 г. (см. п. 30, 31
выше).
3. Исполнение решений об установлении попечения
78. По мнению заявителей, выполнение оспариваемых решений
также привело к нарушению статьи 8. Они ссылались inter alia на
то, что дети были помещены в разные приемные семьи, находившиеся
на большом расстоянии друг от друга и дома их родителей; на
ограничения на посещения детей и условия таких посещений, а также
на условия жизни детей в семьях, в которые они были помещены.
79. Оспаривая это, Правительство утверждало, что меры,
относящиеся к помещению детей в приемные семьи, были приняты
добросовестно, что они не были неразумными и были оправданы
особыми обстоятельствами. Оно ссылалось, в частности, на следующие
факторы: опасения, что родители могли бы забрать детей, как
поступили ранее в отношении Стивена (см. п. 17 выше); желание
избежать слишком долгого пребывания детей в детских домах, а также
ограниченное число подходящих приемных семей; особые потребности
Стивена, что привело к помещению его в семью Эк, с которой он уже
был знаком, причем его последующий перевод объяснялся
исключительно конфликтами между его естественными родителями и
воспитателями (см. п. 17 выше). Правительство выразило мнение,
что, учитывая склонность Хелены "брать на себя слишком большую
ответственность за своего брата Томаса" (см. п. 12 выше) и особые
потребности этих двух детей, было бы нереалистично или
"психологически неуместно" помещать их в одну и ту же приемную
семью. Правительство также сослалось на возникшие в последний
момент трудности и невозможность выполнить первоначальное
намерение направить этих двоих детей в одну и ту же деревню
(см. п. 19 выше).
Далее Правительство заявило, что враждебное отношение г-на и
г-жи Олссон к воспитателям Стивена в приемной семье, а также
предпринятая ими ранее попытка забрать его из этой семьи
оправдывали первоначальные и последующие ограничения на их доступ
к Хелене и Томасу (см. п. 24 выше). Оно также отметило, что
заявители в любом случае не воспользовались полностью правом на
посещение всех своих троих детей.
80. Суд, так же как и Комиссия, считает, что достоверно не
установлено, что качество жизни детей в семьях, куда они были
направлены, не было удовлетворительным. Поэтому жалоба заявителей
в этой связи должна быть отклонена.
81. Что касается остальных аспектов исполнения решений, то Суд
хотел бы прежде всего отметить, что вопрос об усыновлении детей
вообще, похоже, не возникал. Решения о попечении представляли
собой временную меру, которая должна быть отменена, как только
позволят обстоятельства, и любые меры по проведению в жизнь этих
решений должны были бы соответствовать конечной цели воссоединения
семьи Олссонов.
В действительности шаги, предпринятые шведскими властями,
противоречили этой цели. Узы между членами семьи и перспективы их
успешного воссоединения волей-неволей ослабляются, если возникают
препятствия, мешающие их свободному и регулярному общению. Сам
факт помещения Хелены и Томаса на таком большом расстоянии от
родителей и Стивена (см. п. 18 выше) должен был неблагоприятно
сказаться на возможности контактов между ними. Ситуация еще больше
осложнилась ограничениями, наложенными властями на доступ
родителей к своим детям; хотя эти ограничения были до некоторой
степени оправданы отношением заявителей к приемным семьям их детей
(см. п. 26 выше). Нельзя исключить, что безуспешность попыток
установить гармоничные отношения была частично вызвана большим
расстоянием между членами семьи. Правда, между Хеленой и Томасом
поддерживались регулярные контакты, но основания, выдвинутые
Правительством, по которым они не были помещены в одну семью
(см. п. 79 выше), не представляются убедительными. Правда также и
то, что Стивен нуждался в особом уходе, но этого недостаточно,
чтобы оправдать то большое расстояние, которое его отделяло от
двух других детей.
Апелляционный административный суд в своем Решении от
16 февраля 1987 г. (см. п. 31 выше) прокомментировал ситуацию,
касающуюся доступа заявителей к Хелене и Томасу:
"Конечно, не только Олссоны повинны в том, что возникли
чрезвычайно плохие отношения между ними, с одной стороны, и
Хеленой, Томасом и их соответствующими приемными семьями, с
другой. Однако апелляционный административный суд считает
странным, что негативное отношение родителей детей к приемным
семьям привело к тому, что Олссоны не видели своих младших детей
более двух лет и даже не проявляли какого-либо особого интереса к
общению с ними по телефону. Даже если и существовали некоторые
трудности, препятствовавшие Совету по социальным проблемам помочь
установить между семьями лучшие отношения благодаря, например,
действиям представителя родителей и собственной позиции детей, тем
не менее хотелось бы, чтобы Совет проявил большую активность и,
например, не ограничивал родителей правом посещать детей лишь один
раз в три месяца".
82. Нет никаких оснований предполагать, что шведские власти не
действовали добросовестно. Однако этого мало, чтобы считать
какие-либо меры "достаточными" в смысле Конвенции (см. п. 68
выше); в этой связи необходимо применить объективный критерий.
Изучение аргументов Правительства дает основание считать, что
решения властей были частично продиктованы трудностями
административного характера; но в такой основополагающей сфере,
как уважение семейной жизни, подобного рода соображения должны
играть более чем второстепенную роль.
83. В заключение, принимая во внимание вышеизложенное, следует
констатировать, что меры, принятые для исполнения решений, не были
подкреплены "достаточными" основаниями (несмотря на нежелание
сотрудничать со стороны заявителей), позволяющими считать их
соразмерными преследуемой правомерной цели. Они не являлись
соответственно, несмотря на предоставленную национальным властям
свободу усмотрения, "необходимыми в демократическом обществе".
E. Общий вывод
84. Суммируя все сказанное, можно сделать вывод, что именно
исполнение решений об установлении попечения, а не сами эти
решения или их сохранение в силе, нарушает статью 8.
III. О предполагаемом нарушении статьи 3 Конвенции
85. Заявители утверждали, что они явились жертвами нарушения
статьи 3 Конвенции, которая гласит:
"Никто не должен подвергаться пыткам и бесчеловечному или
унижающему достоинство обращению или наказанию".
По их мнению, они подверглись "бесчеловечному обращению" в
результате:
a) того, что у них отобрали детей без достаточных на то
оснований;
b) частых переездов Стивена из одного дома в другой, плохого к
нему отношения в семье и его помещения в интернат, руководимый
Советом по делам умственно отсталых (см. п. 17 выше);
c) присутствия полиции, к помощи которой прибегли, когда
однажды Стивена и Томаса забирали из родительского дома.
Правительство оспаривало эти утверждения.
86. Комиссия сочла, что она уже рассмотрела в своем докладе, в
контексте статьи 8, существенные спорные вопросы, поднятые в
пункте "a", и что не возникает отдельного вопроса по статье 3. Суд
придерживается того же мнения.
Суд также одобрил (п. 80 выше) вывод Комиссии о том, что
заявления о плохом обращении со Стивеном не были обоснованны. Что
касается других вопросов, на которые ссылаются г-н и г-жа Олссон в
пунктах "b" и "c", то они, по мнению Суда, не могут
рассматриваться как "негуманное обращение".
87. Поэтому нарушение статьи 3 не имело места.
IV. О предполагаемом нарушении статьи 6 Конвенции
88. Г-н и г-жа Олссон заявили, что им не предоставили
возможность "справедливого разбирательства" во время слушания дела
в национальных судебных инстанциях и, следовательно, они явились
жертвами нарушения статьи 6 Конвенции, которая гласит:
"Каждый человек имеет право при определении его гражданских
прав и обязанностей... на справедливое... разбирательство...
судом..."
Кроме жалоб по поводу шведской судебной практики (см. п. 54
выше), заявители ссылались на то, что суды придавали слишком
большое значение свидетельствам д-ра Босеус, выступившей в
качестве эксперта (хотя она являлась экспертом Совета), а также на
то, как эти свидетельства воспринимались в суде; в более широком
плане заявители ссылались на якобы неспособность судов навести
должные справки о психическом здоровье заявителей и об их
способности заботиться о своих детях.
Эти утверждения были оспорены Правительством и отвергнуты
Комиссией.
89. Д-р Босеус была заслушана окружным административным судом
дважды: в первый раз 18 декабря 1980 г. в качестве эксперта
(см. п. 13 выше) и второй - 4 ноября 1982 г. в качестве свидетеля,
вызванного по просьбе адвоката заявителей (см. п. 28 выше).
Как врач, она была одной из тех, кто подписал медицинское
заключение, на котором частично основывалось Решение Совета от
16 сентября 1980 г. (см. п. 12 выше). В деле подобного рода было
вполне разумным заслушать ее как эксперта в 1980 г., поскольку она
была широко осведомлена об обстоятельствах дела. Ее участие в
судебном разбирательстве могло быть поставлено под сомнение, если
бы было установлено (а это не тот случай), что заявителям не дали
возможности подвергнуть ее перекрестному допросу или привлечь
контрэксперта с тем, чтобы опровергнуть ее показания.
Жалоба относительно того, как были приняты судом показания
д-ра Босеус, относится к слушаниям 1982 г. Однако Суд не убежден,
что примеры, приводившиеся заявителями: присутствие г-жи Босеус в
зале суда до того, как она начала давать показания, тот факт, что
окружной административный суд якобы не напомнил ей о ее
обязанности говорить правду и не настоял, чтобы она ответила на
некоторые вопросы, - достаточны для того, чтобы утверждать, что
разбирательство дела было несправедливым.
90. Что касается общих утверждений заявителей о нарушении
статьи 6, то следует напомнить, что они были представлены в судах
своим адвокатом и имели возможность предъявить такие материалы или
аргументы, которые считали целесообразными. Единственным
исключением был отказ апелляционного административного суда
удовлетворить их просьбу заслушать д-ра Босеус в качестве
свидетеля на заседании суда в 1982 г. (см. п. 29 выше); однако к
тому времени она уже была заслушана окружным административным
судом.
Рассмотрев национальную судебную процедуру в целом, Суд не
находит ничего, что позволяло бы сделать вывод, что она была
несправедливой и что шведские суды не провели данное дело должным
образом.
91. Поэтому нарушение статьи 6 не имело места.
V. О предполагаемом нарушении статьи 14
в сочетании со статьей 8
92. Заявители утверждали, что вмешательство, повлекшее
нарушение их прав, было основано не на объективных данных, а на их
"социальном происхождении", и, следовательно, они являются
жертвами дискриминации, что противоречит статье 14 Конвенции в
сочетании со статьей 8. Первая из них гласит:
"Пользование правами и свободами, признанными в настоящей
Конвенции, должно быть обеспечено без какой-либо дискриминации по
признаку пола, расы, цвета кожи, языка, религии, политических или
иных убеждений, национального или социального происхождения,
принадлежности к национальным меньшинствам, имущественного
положения, рождения или любым иным обстоятельствам".
Комиссия не нашла ничего в материалах дела, что могло бы
подтвердить это заявление, которое было оспорено Правительством.
93. Суд разделяет мнение Комиссии и поэтому отклоняет данную
жалобу.
VI. О предполагаемом нарушении статьи 2 Протокола N 1
94. Заявители утверждали, что имело место нарушение второго
предложения статьи 2 Протокола N 1 Конвенции, которая гласит:
"Никому не может быть отказано в праве на образование.
Государство при осуществлении любых функций, которые оно принимает
на себя в области образования и обучения, уважает право родителей
обеспечивать, чтобы такие образование и обучение соответствовали
их собственным религиозным и философским убеждениям".
Заявители доказывали, что нарушение имело место, так как:
a) Томас был помещен в семью, которая принадлежала к
определенной религиозной конфессии. Члены приемной семьи брали его
с собой в церковь (см. п. 20 выше), в то время как заявители не
хотели, чтобы их дети получали религиозное воспитание;
b) помещение детей в приемные семьи вдали от родителей и без
консультаций с ними относительно выбора приемных семей лишило
Олссонов возможности оказывать влияние на образование собственных
детей.
Правительство оспаривало эти утверждения. Комиссия отвергла
первое и не выразила какого-либо мнения относительного второго.
95. Суд согласен с Комиссией, что сам факт государственного
попечения над детьми не служил основанием для утраты заявителями
всех своих прав по статье 2 Протокола N 1.
Однако Суд отмечает, как это сделала ранее Комиссия, что хотя
г-н и г-жа Олссон называют себя атеистами, они не покидали
шведскую церковь (см. п. 8 выше) и нет никаких серьезных указаний
на то, что они были особенно заинтересованы (за исключением
довольно поздней стадии прохождения дела) в воспитании своих детей
в атеистическом духе.
Г-н и г-жа Олссон также ничем не дали понять, что то общее
образование, которое получали их дети, пока они находились под
попечением, фактически чем-либо отличалось от того, которое они
сами желали бы для них.
96. В этих обстоятельствах не усматривается какого-либо
нарушения статьи 2 Протокола N 1.
VII. О предполагаемом нарушении статьи 13 Конвенции
в сочетании со статей 2 Протокола N 1
97. Заявители утверждали, что у них не было никакого правового
средства против нарушения статьи 2 Протокола N 1, которое состояло
в том, что они не могли воспрепятствовать религиозному воспитанию
Томаса. Поэтому они стали жертвами нарушения статьи 13 Конвенции,
которая гласит:
"Каждый человек, чьи права и свободы, признанные в настоящей
Конвенции, нарушены, имеет право на эффективные средства правовой
защиты перед государственным органом даже в том случае, если такое
нарушение совершено лицами, действовавшими в официальном
качестве".
98. Суд выражает согласие с Комиссией и Правительством в том,
что вышеуказанное утверждение заявителей должно быть отвергнуто.
Не говоря уже о возможности обратиться в окружной административный
совет, любой родитель мог после вступления в силу Закона 1980 г.
обжаловать в окружной административный суд решение, принятое
Советом по социальным проблемам о помещении детей в приемные семьи
(см. п. 50 in fine выше). И до этой даты, и после вопрос о
религиозном воспитании детей мог бы быть поднят и рассмотрен,
когда заявители требовали отмены попечения (см. п. 49 in fine
выше). Нет ничего, что позволило бы говорить, что эти
неиспользованные средства правовой защиты не были бы
"эффективными" по смыслу статьи 13.
VIII. Применение статьи 50 Конвенции
99. В соответствии со статьей 50 Конвенции,
"Если Суд установит, что решение или мера, принятые судебными
или иными властями Высокой Договаривающейся Стороны, полностью или
частично противоречат обязательствам, вытекающим из настоящей
Конвенции, а также если внутреннее право упомянутой Стороны
допускает лишь частичное возмещение последствий такого решения или
такой меры, то решением Суда, если в этом есть необходимость,
предусматривается справедливое возмещение потерпевшей стороне".
Заявители потребовали в соответствии с этой статьей возмещения
морального вреда в сумме 30 млн. шведских крон, а также возмещения
судебных издержек и расходов в сумме 884500 шведских крон. Первая
сумма должна быть выплачена (если только Суд не распорядится
выплатить ее только заявителям) им и их детям в пяти равных долях.
A. Вред
100. В судебном заседании Правительство, резервируя свою
позицию, дало тем не менее понять, что оно считает сумму для
возмещения ущерба чрезмерной. Представитель Комиссии также
придерживалась того мнения, что затребованная сумма несоразмерно
велика; она сочла, что сумма в 300000 шведских крон была бы
разумной и справедливой.
101. Суд считает, что, несмотря на оговорку Правительства,
этот вопрос готов для вынесения решения (статья 53 п. 1 Регламента
Суда). Прежде всего Суд отмечает, что не может принять требование,
содержащееся в прошении, поданном заявителями 27 июля 1987 г., о
справедливом возмещении ущерба детям; в данном разбирательстве
заявителями являются только г-н и г-жа Олссон.
102. Нарушение статьи 8, установленное Судом в данном деле,
было вызвано исключительно методами проведения в жизнь решений о
попечении (см. п. 84 выше). Это означает, что у заявителей
отсутствует право на справедливое возмещение в связи с самими
этими решениями. Речь может идти лишь о вреде, который они могли
понести по причине разлучения детей, помещения Хелены и Томаса на
большом расстоянии друг от друга и дома родителей и в связи с
ограничениями на посещение детей.
По мнению Суда, нет никакого сомнения в том, что эти
обстоятельства создали для г-на и г-жи Олссон значительные
неудобства и прежде всего вызвали у них серьезную тревогу и
причинили страдания. Регулярные и частые контакты с детьми были в
значительной степени затруднены, и возможности для всей семьи
собраться вместе были минимальными. И подобное положение, с
плачевными последствиями для семьи заявителей, продолжалось в
течение целых семи лет.
Эти факторы не поддаются точным количественным оценкам. Делая
такую оценку на основе справедливости, как того требует статья 50,
Суд присуждает совместно г-ну и г-же Олссон по этому пункту сумму
в 200000 шведских крон.
B. Судебные издержки и расходы
103. Требование заявителей о возмещении судебных издержек и
расходов в сумме 884500 шведских крон было составлено на основании
следующих расчетов:
a) 630700 шведских крон за работу их адвоката в течение
901 часа (700 шведских крон в час) при прохождении дела в
национальных инстанциях и 14600 шведских крон за связанные с этим
расходы;
b) 234500 шведских крон за работу в течение 335 часов (по тому
же тарифу) при прохождении дела в Комиссии и Суде и 4700 шведских
крон за связанные с этим расходы.
Правительство оспаривало эти требования в нескольких
отношениях, доказывая, в частности, что: смета, составленная
заявителями о выплаченных гонорарах и расходах, которые они
понесли во время разбирательства в национальных судах, не была
достаточно точной. Искомая сумма частично относилась к работе над
вопросами, которые не были существенны для рассмотрения дела в
органах Конвенции в Страсбурге, и частично - к работе, которая не
была необходима. Почасовая оплата, хотя и приемлема при
разбирательстве дела в Страсбурге, является чрезмерной при
рассмотрении дела в национальных судах; и указанное время, которое
потратил адвокат заявителей в процессе прохождения дела в
Страсбурге, превысило все разумные пределы. Правительство выразило
готовность выплатить общую сумму компенсации в 290000 шведских
крон в качестве гонорара адвокатам и 12800 шведских крон за
судебные расходы при условии пропорционального сокращения тех
требований со стороны г-на и г-жи Олссон, которые Суд не
подтвердит.
Представитель Комиссии нашла сумму возмещения, затребованную
заявителями, чрезвычайно высокой, она согласилась со многими
замечаниями Правительства и сочла, что суммы, предложенные
заявителям, могут стать исходным пунктом оценки Суда.
104. В соответствии со статьей 50 возмещение может быть
присуждено в отношении тех издержек и расходов, которые
a) были необходимы и действительно были понесены потерпевшей
стороной для того, чтобы добиться через национальную судебную
систему предотвращения или исправления какого-либо нарушения
закона, что должно быть подтверждено Комиссией, а затем Судом с
тем, чтобы исправить положение;
b) были бы разумными в отношении размеров (см. среди многих
источников Решение по делу Фельдбрюгге от 27 июля 1987 г. Серия A,
т. 124-A, с. 9, п. 14).
105. a) Суд установил, что ни само решение об учреждении
попечения, ни отказ отменить его не привели к нарушению статьи 8
(см. п. 84 выше). Следовательно, в той мере - весьма
значительной, - в какой шаги, предпринятые заявителями при
рассмотрении дела в национальных инстанциях, относились к данным
вопросам, в отличие от проведения в жизнь решений о попечении,
возмещению в соответствии со статьей 50 в отношении расходов и
издержек не подлежат. Более того, некоторые искомые суммы,
например, те, которые относятся к контактам адвоката заявителей с
журналистами, чтобы привлечь внимание к данному делу в Швеции и за
рубежом и к расследованию убийства, якобы совершенного в детском
доме, куда был помещен Стивен, не могут считаться "необходимыми".
Другие расходы касались вопросов, находящихся за рамками
рассматриваемого Судом дела, таких, как запрет забрать Хелену и
Томаса из домов их приемных семей (см. п. 57 выше).
b) Что касается издержек и расходов, относящихся к
разбирательству дела в Страсбурге, то Правительство не отрицало,
что заявители приняли на себя обязательство заплатить некоторые
суммы дополнительно к тем, которые были покрыты ими за счет
судебной помощи, полученной от Совета Европы (см. inter alia
Решение по делу Инце от 28 октября 1987 г. Серия A, т. 126, с. 22,
п. 56). Суд тем не менее разделяет мнение Правительства, что
затребованная сумма является чрезмерной. Он также согласен, что
присуждаемая сумма должна отражать тот факт, что некоторые из
весьма серьезных жалоб заявителей не были удовлетворены
(см. Решение по делу Джонстон и другие от 18 декабря 1986 г.
Серия A, т. 112, с. 39, п. 86).
106. Принимая во внимание все вышеуказанные факторы, а также
соответствующие выплаты, в порядке судебной помощи произведенные
Советом Европы, и делая оценку расходов на основе принципа
справедливости, Суд считает, что г-н и г-жа Олссон вместе имеют
право на компенсацию судебных издержек в сумме 150000 шведских
крон.
ПО ЭТИМ ОСНОВАНИЯМ СУД
1. Отклонил единогласно возражение Правительства относительно
предмета судебного разбирательства;
2. Постановил десятью голосами против пяти, что решение об
учреждении попечения над детьми и сохранение его в силе не явилось
нарушением статьи 8 Конвенции;
3. Постановил двенадцатью голосами против трех, что имело
место нарушение статьи 8 в результате применения методов, которыми
исполнялось указанное Решение;
4. Постановил единогласно, что нарушение статьи 6 Конвенции не
имело места;
5. Постановил единогласно, что нарушение статьи 3 Конвенции,
статьи 14 Конвенции в сочетании со статьей 8, статьи 2
Протокола N 1, статьи 13 Конвенции в сочетании с указанной
статьей 2 не имело места;
6. Постановил единогласно обязать Швецию возместить заявителям
моральный вред в сумме 200000 (двести тысяч) шведских крон и
судебные издержки и расходы в сумме 150000 (сто пятьдесят тысяч)
шведских крон (на двоих);
7. Отклонил единогласно требование о справедливом возмещении
остальной суммы.
Совершено на английском и французском языках и оглашено во
Дворце прав человека в Страсбурге 24 марта 1988 г.
Председатель
Рольф РИССДАЛ
Грефье
Марк-Андре ЭЙССЕН
В соответствии со статьей 51 п. 2 Конвенции и статьей 52 п. 2
Регламента Суда к настоящему Решению прилагаются отдельные мнения
судей.
СОВМЕСТНОЕ ЧАСТИЧНО ОСОБОЕ МНЕНИЕ СУДЕЙ РИССДАЛА,
ТОРА ВИЛЬЯЛМСОНА И ГЕЛЬКЮКЛЮ
Что касается предполагаемого нарушения статьи 8 Конвенции, то
мы можем поддержать постановление Суда лишь частично.
I. Введение
Отделение детей от родителей ввиду принятого государственными
органами решения о взятии их на попечение представляет собой
серьезное вмешательство государственных органов в семейную жизнь.
В этом смысле очень важно защитить родителей и детей от
произвольного вмешательства. Соответствующее государство должно
быть способным продемонстрировать, что взгляды и интересы
родителей были должным образом учтены и что весь процесс принятия
решений построен таким образом, чтобы гарантировать, что
принимаемые меры необходимы для защиты интересов детей.
Важной чертой соответствующего шведского законодательства
является возможность судебного разбирательства в административных
судах, и в компетенции этих судов подробно рассмотреть вопрос о
том, следует ли брать детей на попечение и каким образом это
решение должно исполняться.
Установлено, что задолго до событий, приведших к возникновению
данного дела, различные социальные учреждения серьезно занимались
проблемами семьи Олссон. Применялись методы семейной терапии, но
безуспешно. Согласно исследованию фактов и обстоятельств,
проведенному окружным Советом по социальным проблемам и
компетентными национальными судебными органами, родители были не в
состоянии удовлетворительно заниматься воспитанием детей, что в
августе - сентябре 1980 г. привело к возникновению своего рода
чрезвычайной ситуации, в результате которой Совет решил, что
необходимо взять детей на попечение.
II. Решение об установлении попечения
Мы разделяем мнение Суда, что это решение и сохранение его в
силе до 1987 г. не означает нарушения статьи 8 Конвенции по
основаниям, указанным соответственно в п. 71 - 74 и 75 - 77
Решения. В этом контексте мы хотели бы подчеркнуть два факта:
во-первых, Решение Совета от 16 сентября 1980 г. было подтверждено
хорошо мотивированными Решениями окружного административного суда
(30 декабря 1980 г.) и апелляционного административного суда
(8 июля 1981 г.); во-вторых, последующий отказ Совета отменить
попечение был подтвержден убедительно обоснованными Решениями
окружного административного суда (17 ноября 1982 г.) и
апелляционного административного суда (28 декабря 1982 г.).
III. Исполнение решений
Пункт 78 Решения Суда констатирует, что заявители жаловались
на
i) помещение детей в разные дома и на большом расстоянии друг
от друга и родителей;
ii) особые условия и ограничения на посещение детей в приемных
семьях; и
iii) условия жизни в них.
Прежде всего мы хотели бы подчеркнуть, как это сделал сам Суд,
что нет ничего, дающего основание предположить, что шведские
власти не действовали добросовестно при исполнении решений.
Что касается последней жалобы, указанной выше, то здесь мы
разделяем мнение Суда, что у него нет свидетельств,
подтверждающих, что качество заботы, предоставленной детям в
приемных семьях, было неудовлетворительным. Соответственно, эта
жалоба должна быть отклонена.
Что касается жалобы относительно того, что Хелена и Томас были
переданы в семьи, проживающие далеко от Гетеборга, то мы хотели бы
отметить прежде всего, что когда решение, как это было в данном
случае, рассматривается в качестве временной меры, то обычно
считается желательным помещать детей в приемные семьи, недалеко от
дома родителей. Однако ввиду поведения г-на и г-жи Олссон осенью
1980 г., когда они вывезли и спрятали Стивена, было вполне
разумным решение Совета, что Хелена и Томас не могут быть переданы
в приемные семьи в районе Гетеборга. Представляется весьма
неудачным, что они были помещены в приемные семьи на таком большом
расстоянии от Гетеборга, но было довольно трудно найти приемных
родителей, способных и желающих удовлетворить специфические
потребности этих двух детей. По нашему мнению, точка зрения Совета
о нецелесообразности передачи их обоих в одну и ту же семью должна
быть принята. Более того, мы с удовлетворением отмечаем, что Совет
действительно старался поместить их в семьи, проживающие в одной и
той же деревне, но это стало невозможным, поскольку одна из
отобранных семей в конце концов отказалась принять у себя ребенка.
В любом случае, национальные власти должны обладать широким полем
усмотрения в этом отношении, поскольку соответствующее решение
должно быть основано на всесторонней оценке целого ряда фактов,
включая наличие подходящих приемных семей и потребностей детей,
взятых под опеку.
Что касается ограничений на посещение детей, то следует
заметить, что окружной административный суд подтвердил их в двух
случаях и что после его Решения от 30 октября 1985 г. г-н и
г-жа Олссон отозвали свою жалобу по этому поводу при последующем
разбирательстве в апелляционном административном суде (см. п. 24
Решения Суда). Более того, они не использовали полностью свое
право на посещение детей, и, что касается контактов с детьми в
целом, все поведение заявителей во многом свидетельствовало о
нежелании сотрудничать с приемными семьями и организациями,
занимающимися социальными вопросами (см. п. 25, 26 Решения Суда).
Учитывая особые обстоятельства данного дела и учитывая пределы
усмотрения, предоставленного национальным компетентным органам, мы
пришли к выводу, что меры, принятые во исполнение решения о
попечении, могут с достаточным основанием считаться необходимыми и
соразмерными преследуемой легитимной цели и, следовательно, они не
привели к нарушению статьи 8 Конвенции.
ОТДЕЛЬНОЕ МНЕНИЕ СУДЕЙ ПИНЕЙРО ФАРИНЬИ, ПЕТТИТИ, УОЛША,
РУССО И ДЕ МЕЙЕРА
Мы придерживаемся того мнения, что как сами спорные решения,
так и их исполнение, явились неоправданным посягательством на
права заявителей, гарантирующие уважение их семейной жизни.
Мы считаем, что нельзя принять тот факт, что дети могут быть
изъяты у родителей без предварительного Судебного решения, за
исключением чрезвычайных обстоятельств.
Более того, мы считаем, что в данном деле не было доказано,
что такие меры были действительно "необходимыми в демократическом
обществе".
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
CASE OF OLSSON v. SWEDEN
JUDGMENT
(Strasbourg, 24.III.1988)
In the Olsson case <1>,
--------------------------------
<1> Note by the Registrar: The case is numbered
2/1987/125/176. The second figure indicates the year in which the
case was referred to the Court and the first figure its place on
the list of cases referred in that year; the last two figures
indicate, respectively, the case's order on the list of cases and
of originating applications (to the Commission) referred to the
Court since its creation.
The European Court of Human Rights, taking its decision in
plenary session in pursuance of Rule 50 of the Rules of Court and
composed of the following judges:
Mr. R. Ryssdal, President,
Mr. J. Cremona,
Mr. {Thor Vilhjalmsson} <*>,
Mr. G. Lagergren,
Mr. F. {Golcuklu},
Mr. F. Matscher,
Mr. J. Pinheiro Farinha,
Mr. L.-E. Pettiti,
Mr. B. Walsh,
Sir Vincent Evans,
Mr. R. Macdonald,
Mr. C. Russo,
Mr. R. Bernhardt,
Mr. A. Spielmann,
Mr. J. De Meyer,
--------------------------------
<*> Здесь и далее по тексту слова на национальном языке
набраны латинским шрифтом и выделены фигурными скобками.
and also of Mr. M.-A. Eissen, Registrar, and Mr. H. Petzold,
Deputy Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 23 September 1987 and
25 February 1988,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the
last-mentioned date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case was referred to the Court by the European
Commission of Human Rights ("the Commission") on 13 March 1987 and
by the Government of the Kingdom of Sweden ("the Government") on
13 April 1987, within the three-month period laid down by Article
32 з 1 and Article 47 (art. 32-1, art. 47) of the Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ("the
Convention"). The case originated in an application (no. 10465/83)
against the Kingdom of Sweden lodged with the Commission on
10 June 1983 under Article 25 (art. 25) by two Swedish citizens,
Mr. Stig and Mrs. Gun Olsson.
The Commission's request referred to Articles 44 and 48 (art.
44, art. 48) and to the declaration whereby Sweden recognised the
compulsory jurisdiction of the Court (Article 46) (art. 46); its
purpose was to obtain a decision as to whether the facts of the
case disclosed a breach by the respondent State of its obligations
under Articles 3, 6, 8, 13 and 14 (art. 3, art. 6, art. 8,
art. 13, art. 14) of the Convention and Article 2 of Protocol
No. 1 (P1-2). The Government's application sought the Court's
ruling on the interpretation of Article 8 (art. 8) of the
Convention in relation to those facts.
2. In response to the inquiry made in accordance with
Rule 33 з 3 (d) of the Rules of Court, the applicants stated that
they wished to take part in the proceedings pending before the
Court and designated the lawyer who would represent them
(Rule 30).
3. The Chamber of seven judges to be constituted included, as
ex officio members, Mr. G. Lagergren, the elected judge of Swedish
nationality (Article 43 of the Convention) (art. 43), and
Mr. R. Ryssdal, the President of the Court (Rule 21 з 3 (b)). On
23 April 1987, the President drew by lot, in the presence of the
Registrar, the names of the five other members, namely Mr. {Thor}
{Vilhjalmsson}, Mrs. D. Bindschedler-Robert, Mr. R. Macdonald,
Mr. R. Bernhardt and Mr. J.A. Carrillo Salcedo (Article 43 in fine
of the Convention and Rule 21 з 4) (art. 43).
4. On 25 June 1987, the Chamber decided under Rule 50 to
relinquish jurisdiction forthwith in favour of the plenary Court.
5. Having consulted, through the Registrar, the Agent of the
Government, the Commission's Delegate and the applicants' lawyer
regarding the need for a written procedure, the President of the
Court decided, on 2 July 1987, that it was not necessary for
memorials to be filed (Rule 37 з 1) and directed that the oral
proceedings should open on 21 September 1987 (Rule 38).
6. The hearing was held in public in the Human Rights
Building, Strasbourg, on the appointed day. The Court had held a
preparatory meeting immediately beforehand.
There appeared before the Court:
(a) for the Government
Mr. H. Corell, Ambassador, Under-Secretary for Legal and
Consular Affairs, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Agent,
Mr. K. Rundqvist, Under-Secretary for Legal Affairs, Ministry
of Health and Social Affairs,
Mr. P. Boqvist, Legal Adviser, Ministry for Foreign Affairs,
Mrs. A.-M. Holmstedt, Legal Adviser, Gothenburg Municipality,
Advisers;
(b) for the Commission
Mrs. G.H. Thune, Delegate;
(c) for the applicants
Mrs. S. Westerberg, lawyer, Counsel.
The Court heard addresses by Mr. Corell for the Government, by
Mrs. Thune for the Commission and by Mrs. Westerberg for the
applicants, as well as their replies to the questions put by the
Court and its President.
7. On 27 July 1987, the applicants had lodged their claims for
just satisfaction under Article 50 (Rule 49), which they
supplemented with further particulars on 19 October. Written
comments on those claims were received from the Government on
7 September and 23 November 1987 and from the Commission on
15 December 1987.
On 3 September and 16 November 1987, the Government, either on
their own initiative or at the Court's request, filed various
documents.
AS TO THE FACTS
I. Particular circumstances of the case
A. Background
8. The applicants, Mr. Stig and Mrs. Gun Olsson, who are
husband and wife, were born in 1941 and 1944 respectively. They
are Swedish citizens and live in Gothenburg in Sweden. The case
concerns three children of the marriage, namely Stefan, born in
June 1971, Helena, born in December 1976, and Thomas, born in
January 1979 (hereinafter together referred to as "the children").
The applicants and the children belong to the Church of Sweden;
the applicants' membership is purely nominal, as they describe
themselves as atheists.
9. In their youth, both Mr. and Mrs. Olsson had spent some
time at Stretered, a home for the mentally retarded. However, an
examination by a psychologist in 1982 revealed that they then had
an average level of intelligence. Other children of theirs had
been in social care and Stefan has been subject to various forms
of special education since 1975, when he was registered with the
Social Welfare Administration for the Handicapped by reason of his
being mentally retarded.
Prior to the events giving rise to the present case, a number
of different social authorities had been individually involved
with the family; they co-ordinated their activities from 1979
onwards. Mr. Olsson - who is in receipt of a disability pension -
and Mrs. Olsson were both given certain additional social
assistance between 1971 and 1976. They stated that they lived
apart on two occasions, the first time for three months and the
second for eight months. From May 1977 to December 1979, they were
provided with the support of a home-therapist, and a psychiatric
team was in touch with the family as from 1979. It appears that
the applicants had difficulty in co-operating with the social
authorities.
B. Taking of the children into public care
and related judicial proceedings
10. The family's situation was discussed by representatives of
the various social authorities concerned at case conferences held
on 26 October 1979, 29 November 1979 and 10 January 1980. The
applicants were present on the last occasion, when different
preventive measures for the children were agreed upon. According
to the Government, nothing came of this agreement because the
applicants abandoned it.
On 22 January 1980, Social District Council No. 6 in
Gothenburg ("the Council") decided, pursuant to sections 25(a) and
26(4) of the Child Welfare Act 1960 ({barnavardslagen} 1960:97 -
"the 1960 Act"; see paragraphs 35 and 43 below), that the children
should be placed under supervision in view of their parents'
inability to satisfy their need for care and supervision.
11. Further case conferences, at which the applicants were
present, were held on 13 March and 29 May 1980. On 22 August, at
which time the parents were living apart, the Chairman of the
Council decided, pursuant to section 30 of the 1960 Act (see
paragraph 43 below), that the children should be provisionally
taken into care so that their situation could be investigated.
This decision, which had been prompted by the fact that Stefan and
Helena had been found cycling around and unable to make their way
home, was confirmed on 26 August by the Council after a meeting on
the same day at which the applicants were present and made oral
submissions.
12. On 16 September 1980, the Council decided, at a meeting at
which the applicants were present and had an opportunity to submit
their views, that the children should be taken into care, pursuant
to sections 25(a) and 29 of the 1960 Act (see paragraphs 35 and 43
below). This decision was based, inter alia, on a report compiled
by the social administration and dated 11 September 1980, which
was produced at the meeting. The report reviewed the family
history and background; recorded the applicants' opposition to the
children's being taken into care; concluded that the latter's
development was in danger since they were living in an environment
which was unsatisfactory due to their parents' inability to
satisfy their need for care, stimulation and supervision; noted
that preventive measures had been taken, but with no result; and
recommended the taking into care. Appended to the report were
statements from Stefan's former teacher, from Child Welfare Clinic
No. 60 (concerning Helena and Thomas) and from the home where the
children had been placed for investigation, together with a
medical report dated 12 September 1980 and issued by Children's
Psychiatric Clinic 2B at a hospital ({Ostra} sjukhuset") in
Gothenburg. The medical report was signed by chief doctor
Elisabeth Bosaeus, a consultant at the above-mentioned home, and
by Helena Fagerberg-Moss, a psychologist, both of whom were
members of the team that was in touch with the family. It read as
follows (translation from the Swedish):
"The above-mentioned children have been assessed at the
children's psychiatric clinic at {Ostra} sjukhuset on 10 September
1980. Both parents have been summoned to separate doctor's
discussions but have not appeared. The family has been known at
the children's psychiatric clinic since October 1979, when the
social worker requested observation and an assessment of the
development of Thomas following his admittance to that clinic for
pneumonia and an investigation for urinary infection. After
referral from the doctor responsible, the assessment of Thomas'
development was made on 5 October 1979 by a psychologist, Helena
Fagerberg-Moss. This psychologist and welfare officer (kurator)
Birgitta {Steen} thereafter participated in conferences at social
welfare office no. 6 on 26 October and 29 November 1979 with all
those involved in the case, concerning the supportive measures the
family had received previously and for the planning of further
measures. Social welfare office conferences, together with the
parents, also took place on 10 January 1980, at which an
application for a day-centre placement for Thomas and Helena was
decided upon, and on 13 March and 29 May 1980, at which a holiday
in a summer home or camp was planned for Helena and Stefan. During
a home visit on 25 March 1980, Helena was also the subject of an
assessment of her development by the psychologist Helena
Fagerberg-Moss. Thomas was also the subject of a new assessment of
his development on 11 September 1980. During Thomas' stay at the
hospital, welfare officer Birgitta {Steen} had contact with the
parents. I have taken note of the investigation report of 18
January 1980, with proposals concerning supervision, and the
report of 26 August 1980, with proposals concerning a care order.
I have also taken note of the children's medical files. On 10
September 1980, Kerstin Lindsten, welfare officer at the school
for retarded children, provided certain information by telephone
concerning Stefan.
It appears from the medical file that at the age of four
months Stefan was admitted to the Gothenburg children's hospital
for assessment of his development and already at that stage he was
found to be considerably retarded. At the age of six months he was
retarded by two months. During a new test at the age of three
years he was found to be at the developmental level of a 15 to 20
month old child. The psychologist Barbro Wikman considered him at
that time to be passive, afraid and cautious. He was withdrawn and
was most significantly retarded as regards his linguistic
development. He was considered to be in great need of stimulation
and the psychologist questioned whether there were sufficient
opportunities for this in his home environment. He could not feed
himself, could not run properly and he was not accustomed to
playing with other children. According to the file, the parents
were "not interested in taking him to a special play-centre". On
4 May 1976, it was noted that he never had cooked food, could not
construct sentences, did not play outside, cried easily, could
feed himself but did it rarely, and seemed pale and lethargic.
Stefan now attends the third year in a school for the retarded. It
appears that he is one of the weakest pupils. At the beginning of
his time at this school, the home conditions appeared to be
acceptable since the family had a home-therapist. Subsequently,
however, there were alarming reports that Stefan ran around
outside and was often taken care of by the police. He could not
control his urine and bowels, was teased by his friends because he
smelled badly, and he was even undressed by them, according to the
school welfare officer Kerstin Lindsten. Food problems have also
occurred, according to the school nurse. Stefan mostly ate only
sandwiches. The boy is short-sighted and needs to wear glasses,
but he does not do so. Since the parents have also had
difficulties in supervising and caring for Stefan, different ways
of placing him have been discussed. A placement in an educational
home appeared to be a good solution, but the parents withdrew at
the last moment. Placement in a foster home has also been
proposed, but the father reacted with depressive symptoms and kept
the boy at home and away from school.
During a medical assessment on 10 September 1980 Stefan gave
the impression of being very retarded in his development but, in
addition, he was cut off in his personal contacts, did not hear
questions, did not treat play material in an adequate manner and
seemed to have a limited concentration and attention span. His
behaviour was clumsy. He could not write his own name and, when
drawing with a pencil, he folded the paper at an angle of 90-. He
did not wear his glasses.
During a development assessment in her home on 25 March 1980,
carried out by Helena Fagerberg-Moss, Helena Olsson attained a
level comparable to that expected of her age. During a visit to
the children's welfare clinic, however, Helena was considered
passive, looked afraid and had an undeveloped use of language. She
has been going to a clinic since September 1979 for stomach
problems, but this has not led to any measure being taken. During
an assessment on 10 September 1980 she was shy when there were
several persons in the same room, did not say anything and behaved
as a mother towards Thomas, giving him toys and embracing him now
and then. The same behaviour has been noted at the children's
home.
Thomas' development has been assessed on 5 October 1979 and
11 September 1980 by Helena Fagerberg-Moss. During the first
assessment he was somewhat below the level of development which
was expected and was also somewhat passive and withdrawn in his
contacts. During the second assessment he was seriously quiet,
cautious and his face was without expression. His development was
four to six months behind. His language (at the age of 20 months)
corresponded to a degree of development of a six to eight month
old child. He became clearly stimulated by play and test material
and seemed to have development potential. He gave a clear
impression that he had not received sufficient stimulation at
home. In the medical file it has been noted in August 1979 that
the mother's way of feeding Thomas was clearly abnormal. She held
the feeding bottle at a distance and, even after having been asked
to pick him up, there was no natural close contact. At the
children's home it has been observed that the father still treats
Thomas as a baby.
In summary, Stefan, Helena and Thomas are three children whose
parents have been registered as being retarded. The father has
retired early. In addition, the parents' inter-relations are bad.
They have separated for a long period and are now separated again.
The family has moved four times in two and a half years. Stefan
and Thomas show clear signs of backwardness, probably of different
origins. Furthermore, there is a lack of care for the children on
the part of the parents, and the children's behaviour is
disturbed. Stefan has had enuresis and encopresis, feeding
difficulties, social difficulties with other children and has
shown vagrancy tendencies. His special need of clean clothes,
glasses (he is myopic), and extra care and stimulation because of
his backwardness, has not been met by his parents. The linguistic
development of all the children is retarded. Such backwardness is
the most frequent sign of under-stimulation. Helena, who is of
average intelligence, is inclined to take too great a
responsibility for her brother Thomas. Thomas has not had any
opportunity of adequate training either physically or
psychologically.
Since measures taken up to now in the form of a
home-therapist, day-care nursery-home placement, supervision, etc.
have not improved the situation, we recommend that Stefan, Helena
and Thomas be taken into care and be given foster homes."
The applicants alleged that, before this medical report was
prepared, Dr. Bosaeus had never met them and had never visited
their home. They also complained of the fact that she did not
herself examine the children until 10 September 1980, after they
had been placed in care for investigation on 22 August 1980; at
that time they were in a state of shock as a result of violent
police action on their removal from their home and of their
completely new environment. It appears, however, that the
psychologist Helena Fagerberg-Moss assessed Thomas on 5 October
1979 and had visited the parents' home on 25 March 1980, when she
assessed the development of Helena.
13. Since the applicants did not consent to the Council's
decision of 16 September 1980, the matter was submitted, pursuant
to section 24 of the 1960 Act (see paragraph 44 below), to the
County Administrative Court ({lansratten}) at Gothenburg. It held
a hearing on 18 December 1980, at which Mrs. Olsson was
represented by a lawyer under the Legal Aid Act
({rattshjalpslagen}) and the children by official counsel
(offentligt {bitrade}); Dr. Bosaeus was heard as an expert.
By judgment of 30 December 1980, the County Administrative
Court confirmed the Council's decision. It stated (translation
from the Swedish):
"It appears from the investigation of the case that the
children, Stefan, Helena and Thomas, who all place specially high
demands on those who care for them, have for several years been
living in an unsatisfactory home environment as a result of the
parents' inability to satisfy the children's need of care,
stimulation and supervision.
Stefan and Thomas disclose a clear retardation in their
development and all three children are backward in language
development.
According to Dr. Bosaeus, who issued a medical report on
12 September 1980 and was heard as an expert in the oral
proceedings, there is a great risk that Helena will develop
negatively if she stays in the parents' home. It is therefore as
important to place her in a foster home as it is for Stefan and
Thomas. Dr. Bosaeus has accordingly recommended taking the three
children into care.
Preventive measures with a home-therapist have been tried for
several years and supervision has been arranged without any
resulting improvement.
It must therefore be considered as proved that the health and
development of the children are jeopardised as a result of the
parents' present inability to give them satisfactory care and
education.
The decision submitted is therefore compatible with the
provisions in section 25(a) and section 29 of the 1960 Act."
14. Mrs. Olsson appealed to the Administrative Court of Appeal
in Gothenburg ({kammarratten}; see paragraph 50 below); her
husband concurred in the appeal. The Council and official counsel
for the children moved that the appeal be rejected. The
Administrative Court of Appeal held a hearing and then, on 8 July
1981, confirmed the judgment of the County Administrative Court.
However, one of the three judges and one of the two laymen sitting
in the Court of Appeal, whilst agreeing with the taking of Helena
into care, dissented as regards Stefan and Thomas.
15. Mrs. Olsson sought to appeal to the Supreme Administrative
Court ({regeringsratten}; see paragraph 50 below), but on
27 August 1981 it refused her leave to appeal.
C. Implementation of the care decisions
1. Placement of the children
16. On 22 August 1980, following the decision of the Chairman
of the Council (see paragraph 11 above), the children were placed
in a children's home in Gothenburg for an investigation of their
situation. They remained there until their subsequent placement in
separate homes, as described below.
(a) Stefan
17. Around 1 October 1980, the applicants removed Stefan from
the children's home and hid him for approximately one month. He
was then placed in an educational home in Gothenburg run by the
Board for the Retarded, but his parents again took him away and
hid him for about two months.
As from 28 February 1981, Stefan was placed, with the
assistance of the police, with a foster family of the name of Ek -
where he had previously spent some summers - at Tibro,
approximately 100 kilometers from the applicants' home.
By decision of 28 June 1983, prompted by conflicts between the
natural and the foster parents, the Council moved Stefan to a
children's home, Viggen, at {Vanersborg}, which was run by the
Board for the Retarded and situated about 80 kilometers to the
north of Gothenburg.
(b) Helena and Thomas
18. Helena and Thomas were placed in separate foster homes -
Helena with the Larsson family at {Nasaker}, in the vicinity of
the town of Hudiksvall, on 21 October 1980 and Thomas with the
{Backius} family at {Maraker}, south of {Soderhamn}, on
10 November 1980. These localities, which lie to the north-east of
Gothenburg, are about 100 kilometers from each other. The
distances by road from Hudiksvall and {Soderhamn} to Gothenburg
are 637 and 590 kilometers, respectively (see M.KAK, Bilatlas,
Sverige, 1981).
19. The Government stated that the original intention had been
to place Helena and Thomas with separate families in the same
village, but that this had proved impossible at the last minute.
They added that the Larsson and {Backius} families were in
continuous contact, gave each other much support and met, together
with Helena and Thomas, approximately every six weeks.
20. Thomas' foster parents and their own children are members
of the Church of Sweden and attended church with him - regularly,
according to the applicants, or two or three times a year,
according to the foster parents.
2. Restrictions on the applicants' access to the children
21. Since the children were taken into care, their parents'
access to them has been the subject of various decisions,
including the following.
(a) Stefan
22. Stefan spent some three to four weeks with his parents in
the summer of 1982. However, on 10 August 1982 the Council
decided, pursuant to section 16(1) of the 1980 Act (see paragraph
48 below), to limit their access to him to one visit every six
weeks. They appealed to the County Administrative Court, but on
17 November 1982 it confirmed the restrictions (see paragraph 28
below).
23. After 22 April 1984, Mr. and Mrs. Olsson were allowed to
see Stefan every week, mostly at their home. He spent some weeks
with them in the summer of 1986.
(b) Helena and Thomas
24. On 21 October 1980, the Council decided to ban access by
the applicants to Helena and Thomas at their foster homes, in
accordance with section 41 of the 1960 Act (see paragraph 48
below), and to prohibit disclosure of their whereabouts. However,
the applicants were allowed to meet the children elsewhere, every
second month. The decision was designed to protect the children's
chances of settling down and was prompted by the fact that Stefan
had previously been removed from his home and hidden by his
parents (see paragraph 17 above).
The foregoing restriction was lifted in September 1981, but in
February 1983 the Council decided, having regard to the attitude
of confrontation adopted by the applicants towards the foster
parents, to confine the former's contacts with Helena and Thomas
to one visit at the foster homes every third month. This new
restriction was confirmed by the County Administrative Court, on
appeal, on 25 March 1983 and again by the Council in decisions of
2 August 1983, 6 December 1983 and 30 October 1984. On 3 October
1985, the County Administrative Court dismissed an appeal by the
applicants against the last-mentioned decision; they withdrew
their appeal on this point in subsequent proceedings before the
Administrative Court of Appeal (see paragraph 31 below) and the
restriction therefore continued in force for the remainder of the
period during which these children were in public care.
25. According to Mr. and Mrs. Olsson, Helena and Thomas were
permitted to visit the family home only once - in 1982 - whilst
they were in care, for a few hours and under the strict
supervision of the foster mothers and one or two social workers.
The applicants added that they were allowed to visit these
children only a couple of times a year, under the supervision of
social workers, teachers or foster parents; it appears that as
time went by they tended to avoid such visits, which they
considered humiliating, notably on account of the visiting
conditions.
The material before the Court reveals that Mr. and/or
Mrs. Olsson saw Helena and Thomas in March 1981 at a neutral place
in Gothenburg; in September 1981 at their foster homes; in
December 1981 at Stefan's foster home; and just before Easter 1982
at Helena's foster home. The Commission's report contains a more
general statement to the effect that the applicants met the two
younger children "three times a year during the first years". The
applicants do not appear to have paid any visits to them between
June 1984 and the spring of 1987.
3. Attitude of the applicants
26. Before the Commission, the Government referred to problems
that had arisen as regards co-operation between the applicants on
the one hand and the children's foster parents and the social
authorities on the other (see paragraphs 100, 101, 109, 110 and
111 of the Commission's report). The applicants' submissions to
the Commission on this point are summarised as follows:
"That the applicants would co-operate with the social workers
is completely unthinkable. The action of these social workers is
completely in conflict with the applicants' own understanding of
how children and adults and family members and others ought to
show respect and consideration. ... It must be added that if the
applicants were to co-operate with the foster parents and the
social workers they would risk passing on to their children the
totally wrong impression that the separation of children and
parents and the placement of the children in foster homes had
occurred with the consent of the applicants. This would be
completely disastrous to the self-respect of the applicants'
children if they had the wrong impression that their natural
parents did not wish them to be at home with them." (ibid.,
paragraph 80 in fine)
D. Requests for termination of care
27. Following a request by the applicants for termination of
the care of the children, a meeting was held on 1 June 1982 at the
Council's office, at which the applicants, their lawyer and
official counsel for the children were present.
On the same day, the Council rejected the request. It based
its decision on reports compiled by the social administration and
dated 24, 25 and 26 May 1982, which concluded that the parents
were then incapable of giving the children the necessary support
and encouragement. Annexed to the reports were statements from the
psychologist Helena Fagerberg-Moss, social workers and a school
teacher, indicating that the children had made satisfactory
progress since being taken into care.
28. The applicants thereupon appealed to the County
Administrative Court. It held a hearing on 4 November 1982, at
which the applicants were present and assisted by a lawyer; the
Council was represented by a lawyer and two social workers and the
children by official counsel. Dr. Bosaeus and a social expert from
the County Administrative Board ({lansstyrelsen}; see paragraph 41
below) gave evidence - the former at the request of the
applicants' lawyer - and various written opinions from a
psychologist, a welfare officer, a school teacher of Stefan and
his school doctor were read out. The President of the Court also
summarised the documents on which the Council's decision had been
based.
The applicants submitted that the medical report of
12 September 1980 (see paragraph 12 above) contained clearly false
information, by affirming that they were mentally retarded, and
did not indicate any concrete facts showing that the children
would have been in danger if they had continued to live with their
parents. The Council, for its part, asserted that its refusal to
terminate care had been based not on the applicants' being
mentally retarded but on their inability to satisfy the children's
need for care, stimulation and supervision.
In its judgment of 17 November 1982, the County Administrative
Court, in addition to confirming the restrictions on parental
access to Stefan (see paragraph 22 above), held as follows
(translation from the Swedish):
"The facts of the case show that the children suffered to a
greater or lesser extent from different types of disturbance when
they were taken into care. Stefan was disturbed in his development
at a level comparable to special lower class. Following the
placement in a foster home, his social abilities have improved and
his language development has accelerated. His incontinence has to
a large extent disappeared. In the special lower school Stefan has
developed favourably having regard to his abilities. As regards
Helena and Thomas, they have developed favourably in the foster
homes. The assessment of these two children's psychological
development undertaken in the spring of 1982 shows that the
previous delays and disturbances have now been caught up or have
disappeared, and that their development is now completely at the
same level as that to be expected for their age.
As far as the applicants are concerned, their circumstances
seem to have stabilised in recent times. Thus, the couple moved
from Angered in January 1981 and since then have been living in a
more child-adapted environment in the community of Ale. The
dispute which prevailed in the marriage at the time when the
children were taken into care has been overcome, and it seems now
as if the relations between the applicants are better. Following a
request from their representative, the applicants have been
examined by psychologist Gudrun Olsson from Gothenburg. This
investigation shows that both applicants have an average level of
intelligence.
Under section 5 of the 1980 Act [see paragraph 49 below], the
decisive issue in determining whether care under the Act in
question should be terminated is whether it is no longer
necessary. Facts such as the apparent improvement and stabilising
of the applicants' situation and the children's favourable
development in their foster homes are an argument in favour of the
termination of care. However, there are several circumstances
militating in the opposite direction. Stefan, who during 1982 has
had several permissions to visit the parents' home, has been
disturbed in various ways upon his return to the foster home and
has relapsed into his previous negative behaviour. Stefan's return
trip to the foster home on 28 June 1982 does not seem to have been
well planned and it developed in an unfortunate way for him. In
addition, the applicants have so far had difficulties in
co-operating in a satisfactory manner with Stefan's foster home
and the Social Council. In making an assessment of all the facts
of the case, the Court finds that the applicants still show a lack
of comprehension and ability to give the children satisfactory
care and education. It must therefore be feared that a termination
of care under the Act can at present involve great risks for the
health and development of the children. Care is therefore to
continue and the appeal is rejected."
29. The applicants then appealed to the Administrative Court
of Appeal. After a hearing on 20 December 1982, at which they were
present and assisted by counsel, the appeal was dismissed on 28
December 1982. The applicants had unsuccessfully requested that
Dr. Bosaeus be called as a witness at the hearing.
Mr. and Mrs. Olsson sought to appeal to the Supreme
Administrative Court, but on 11 March 1983 it refused them leave
to appeal.
30. A fresh request by the applicants to the Council for
termination of the care of the children was refused on 6 December
1983.
31. On 30 October 1984 and 17 September 1985, the Council
rejected further requests by the applicants for termination of the
care of Helena and Thomas and of Stefan, respectively; on the
first of these dates it also declined to lift the restriction on
visits to Helena and Thomas (see paragraph 24 above). Appeals by
the parents against these decisions were dismissed by the County
Administrative Court on 3 October 1985 and 3 February 1986,
respectively.
The applicants thereupon appealed to the Administrative Court
of Appeal, which joined the two cases. After holding a hearing at
which Mr. and Mrs. Olsson were present and gave evidence, the
Administrative Court of Appeal, by judgment of 16 February 1987,
directed that the public care of Stefan be terminated: it took
into consideration his recent positive development, his parents'
increased understanding of his needs and their agreement that he
should complete his current term of schooling at {Vanersborg} (see
paragraph 17 above). However, the appeal concerning Helena and
Thomas - the scope of which was confined by Mr. and Mrs. Olsson
themselves at the hearing to the care issue, to the exclusion of
the access issue - was dismissed. The Administrative Court of
Appeal's opinion that the public care of these two children should
continue was based primarily on the fact that the applicants were
unable to understand and satisfy the special needs arising in
connection with re-uniting parents and children after so long a
period of separation.
Following an appeal by the parents, the Supreme Administrative
Court, by judgment of 18 June 1987, directed that the public care
of Helena and Thomas should terminate, there being no sufficiently
serious circumstances to warrant its continuation. The Supreme
Administrative Court pointed out that the question to be
determined in deciding whether care should be discontinued
pursuant to section 5 of the 1980 Act (see paragraph 49 below) was
whether there was still a need for care. The problems associated
with the removal of a child from a foster home and its possible
detrimental effects on him and with his reunification with his
natural parents - on which the Administrative Court of Appeal had
relied - were matters to be considered not under section 5 but in
separate proceedings, namely an investigation under section 28 of
the Social Services Act 1980 ({socialtjanstlagen} 1980:620). The
latter section empowers a Social District Council to prohibit, for
a certain period of time or until further notice, the removal from
a foster home of a minor who is not or is no longer in public
care, if there is thereby a risk, which is not of a minor nature,
of harming his physical or mental health.
32. Stefan is now reunited with his parents.
However, on 23 June 1987 the Council, acting pursuant to
section 28 of the Social Services Act 1980, prohibited them until
further notice from removing Helena and Thomas from their
respective foster homes. An application by Mr. and Mrs. Olsson for
the interim suspension of this prohibition was refused by the
County Administrative Court on 25 June 1987; this decision was
confirmed by the Administrative Court of Appeal on 2 July 1987
and, on 17 August 1987, the Supreme Administrative Court refused
leave to appeal. On 3 November 1987, the County Administrative
Court rejected on the merits the applicants' appeal against the
prohibition; it expressed the opinion that "a prohibition against
removal should not be valid for too long a period" and that "a
precondition for the rescission of the prohibition ... is that
efforts should be made to improve contacts between the parents and
children, both through Mr. and Mrs. Olsson and through the Social
District Council". According to information supplied to the
European Court by the Government on 16 November 1987, an appeal by
the applicants to the Administrative Court of Appeal against this
judgment was then pending; in the meantime, they remained free to
visit Helena and Thomas at the foster homes.
II. Relevant domestic law
A. Introduction
33. According to Swedish child-welfare legislation, each
municipality is responsible for promoting the favourable
development of children and young persons by taking, if necessary,
supportive or preventive measures (see paragraph 43 below). It may
also take a child into care and place him in a foster home, a
children's home or another suitable institution.
The legislation divides measures of the latter kind into two
categories: the first concerns "voluntary care", enabling a parent
to place his child into the care of a local authority; the second
provides for "compulsory care", by establishing machinery whereby
a local authority can obtain a court decision or order committing
a child to its care. It was recourse to this machinery that was in
issue in the present case.
34. Decisions concerning the applicants' children were taken
under the 1960 Act and under the Act containing Special Provisions
on the Care of Young Persons 1980 (lag 1980: 621 med {sarskilda}
{bestammelser} om {vard} av unga - "the 1980 Act"). The 1980 Act
complements the Social Services Act 1980, which deals with
voluntary care; on entering into force on 1 January 1982, they
together replaced the 1960 Act. In general, decisions taken under
the 1960 Act which were still in force on 31 December 1981 were
considered to be decisions taken under the 1980 Act.
B. Conditions for compulsory care
1. Under the 1960 Act
35. Under section 25(a) of the 1960 Act, the competent local
authority in child-care matters - the Child Welfare Board
({barnavardsnamnden}) or, in Stockholm and Gothenburg, the Social
District Council - was obliged to intervene (translation from the
Swedish):
"[if] a person, not yet eighteen years of age, is maltreated
in his home or otherwise treated there in a manner endangering his
bodily or mental health, or if his development is jeopardised by
the unfitness of his parents or other guardians responsible for
his upbringing, or by their inability to raise the child."
Section 25(b) of the 1960 Act (which was not applied in the
present case) provided that the local authority also had to
intervene if a minor needed corrective measures because of his
criminal, immoral or otherwise asocial behaviour.
36. As regards section 25(a), the preparatory work to the 1960
Act stated, inter alia, the following (translation from the
Swedish):
"In the future too, an important reason for intervention must
be that a minor is exposed to physical maltreatment. The specific
reference to this in the text of the statute seems to some extent
to obscure the importance of the fact that children and young
persons must also be protected from other kinds of treatment which
may be harmful to their bodily or mental health. For this reason,
the Bill instead makes it a prerequisite for intervention that the
minor is being maltreated in his home or that he is otherwise
treated there in such a way as to endanger his bodily or mental
health. This amendment in relation to the law now in force does
not aim at bringing about any material change. Reasons for
intervention, except for physical maltreatment, may be such as are
given as examples in the preparatory work to the legislation now
in force: for instance, that a child, who is perhaps being cared
for with great tenderness, is all the same continuously exposed to
mortal danger owing to his mother's mental illness, or that an
infant is being cared for by a mother who is suffering from
tuberculosis in a contagious state. Further examples may be that
the minor is obliged to do work that is unreasonably hard
considering his age or his strength, that he does not get enough
to eat and is for that reason clearly undernourished, or that his
home environment is marked by a considerable lack of hygiene.
According to the practice that has been applied hitherto, it
should also be possible to intervene in those instances where the
parents - perhaps because of their religious convictions - omit to
give the child the medical care and treatment that he needs. Among
the cases where children are exposed to mental injury or danger
may be mentioned the one where parents - with evident symptoms of
mental abnormalities or of pathological attitudes - bring up their
children in a way, as the committee puts it, that includes a kind
of spiritual error and which often in the end causes their
personality to develop in an undesirable way. When such upbringing
has the result that the child's mental health is endangered, it
comes under the section now dealt with.
For an intervention under section [25(a)] of the 1960 Act to
be permitted, there must be a danger of the child's becoming a
misfit because of his parents' vicious way of life or their
negligence or inability to educate the child. The provision in
question thus concerns abnormalities in the parents or in their
capacity to educate; it lays down that those abnormalities should
be such as to endanger the child's social development. Parents and
other custodians should be treated on equal terms in this respect.
Otherwise only amendments of a formal nature seem to be required.
Thus, it is suggested that the words "vicious" and "negligence" be
replaced by the expression "unsuitability as custodians", which
seems more appropriate in this context. Obviously, the scope of
this expression is somewhat wider than the one currently in use.
Apart from "vicious" and "negligent" custodians, it thus also
covers those suffering from serious mental abnormalities. There
seems to be no reason to object to this enlargement of the field
of application of this rule. Society should be entitled to
intervene as soon as there is a danger of a young person's
unfavourable social development owing to shortcomings in the
custodian. Since the notion of "misfit", as the committee has
found, should be excluded from this legislation, the intervention
of the Child Welfare Board has instead been made subject to the
prerequisite that the development of the young person is in
jeopardy. This means that intervention shall take place whenever
needed to prevent such abnormalities of behaviour as are indicated
under section [25(a)]. It should be pointed out that, just as is
the case under the law now in force, an intervention does not
require that there have so far been any signs of maladaptation in
the young person in question." (Reproduced in NJA II - Nytt
Juridiskt Arkiv, "Journal for Legislation" - 1960, pp. 456 et
seq.)
2. Under the 1980 Act
37. Conditions for compulsory care under the 1980 Act are set
out in section 1, which reads (translation from the Swedish):
"Care is to be provided pursuant to this Act for persons under
eighteen years of age if it may be presumed that the necessary
care cannot be given to the young person with the consent of the
person or persons having custody of him and, in the case of a
young person aged fifteen or more, with the consent of the young
person.
Care is to be provided for a young person if:
1. lack of care for him or any other condition in the home
entails a danger to his health or development; or
2. the young person is seriously endangering his health or
development by abuse of habit-forming agents, criminal behaviour
or any other comparable behaviour.
..."
38. The following are extracts from the preparatory work to
the 1980 Act, as reproduced in NJA II 1980, pp. 545 et seq.
(translation from the Swedish).
The Parliamentary Standing Committee on Social Questions
stated:
"An important point of departure for the reform of the social
services is that salient features in the handling of individual
cases should be respect for liberty and the right of the
individual to decide about his own life. The aim of the social
services should be to co-operate with the client as far as
possible, in order to make him take part in decisions as to the
planning of treatment and make him co-operate actively in carrying
it out. The social services should offer help and support, but not
take over the individual's responsibility for his own life.
Personal initiative and responsibility must be made part of care
and treatment. In this manner the social services may work more
actively in a preventive way, and the opportunity to achieve more
long-lasting results will be improved.
This fundamental principle of the new legislation has been
laid down in section 9 of the Social Services Bill, which
stipulates that the measures taken by the Social Council in regard
to any individual person should be conceived and carried out in
co-operation with the person concerned. Consequently, all social
services' opportunities to use coercive measures on adults have
been abolished. It is true that, regarding young people and
children, the possibility of providing care outside their home
contrary to the wishes of the young person or his parents is
retained. In this field too, the reform means, however, that the
right of the individual to be a party to those decisions that
concern his own fate is more strongly stressed. The individual
should be able to turn to the social services confidently and ask
for help, without risking undesired effects in the form of various
coercive measures.
At the same time there is unanimity in considering that in
certain cases society must be able to use coercive measures
against an individual, whenever this is needed to avoid an
immediate risk to somebody's life or health."
The Minister of Health and Social Affairs stated:
"Section 1, second paragraph, point 1, indicates that one
ground for measures on the part of society is that lack of care
for a young person in his home or some other situation in his home
constitutes a danger to his health or development. This rule
refers to situations where the young person does not receive
sufficient care in his home or is exposed to treatment in his home
that means there is a danger to his mental or physical health or
to his social development. By the word "home" is to be understood
the home of the parents, as well as any other home where the young
person is residing permanently. Under this description come, inter
alia, cases where the young person is subject to maltreatment in
his home. Even a slight degree of maltreatment must be supposed to
cause danger to the health or development of the young person. If,
in such a case, the parents oppose such measures as the Social
Council may consider necessary to assure the protection of the
young person, application of the law may come into focus. In case
there has been maltreatment of a more serious kind, the young
person should as a matter of course be provided with care outside
his home, at least for some time.
As with the 1960 Act, this provision may also be applied in
those instances where the parents intend to place the young person
in an environment that will endanger his health or his
development, or where they do not prevent him from being in such
an environment.
This section thus embraces all those situations where the
child is being exposed to physical maltreatment or negligent care.
This legislation may also be applicable if parents endanger the
mental health of a child by their personal characteristics. If the
child's mental health or development is being endangered because
of parental behaviour - for instance, by way of continuously
recurring scenes at home owing to abuse of alcohol or narcotics -
or because of the mental abnormality or state of the parents, it
should be possible to provide care for the child under this Act.
...
The Act is primarily aimed at enabling the social services to
provide for the young person's need of care. It is the current
need of care, and what can be done at the moment and in the future
to see to it that this need is met, that will govern the measures
taken by the Social Council. As I have pointed out in my general
statement concerning this Bill, this legislation can, however, not
be used to provide for society's need for protection. It is a
different matter that, in those instances where a young person
needs to be taken into care according to this Act, this measure
will also have the effect of protecting society.
The Social Council is to take appropriate measures as soon as
it considers that a situation such as has been indicated in the
second paragraph under points 1 and 2 arises. It may, for
instance, have come to the knowledge of the Council that a child
is being exposed to unsuitable treatment or even to actual danger
at home. During an inquiry the situation may appear to be such
that the child ought to be provided with care outside his home.
The Council should then in the first place try to meet the need
for care by reaching an understanding with the parents. In case
the parents and the Council cannot reach an agreement as to the
question of how the child should be cared for, the Council must
turn to the County Administrative Court to obtain a decision on
care under the Act, with an inherent authorisation permitting the
Council to make decisions regarding the way in which the care
should be implemented."
C. Organisation and administration of child care
39. The Child Welfare Board was empowered to exercise
functions and make decisions in child-welfare matters within a
municipality (sections 1 and 2 of the 1960 Act). In doing so, it
had to give particular attention to minors who were exposed to the
risk of unfavourable development due to their physical and mental
health, home and family conditions and other circumstances
(section 3). The Board was composed of lay members who were
assisted by social workers.
40. Since the 1980 social-services legislation entered into
force, the functions of the Child Welfare Boards have been taken
over by Social Councils, which are composed in the same way as the
former Boards but are responsible for social welfare in general.
The tasks of the Social Council may, as is the case in
Gothenburg, be performed by two or more Social District Councils,
each being responsible for a designated area. In child-care
matters, a District Council has the same powers and duties as a
Social Council.
41. As were the Child Welfare Boards, the Social Councils are
under the supervision and control of the County Administrative
Board and the National Board of Health and Welfare
(socialstyrelsen).
D. Care decisions
42. Child Welfare Boards sought and received information about
ill-treatment of children or their unsatisfactory living
conditions through various officials having frequent contacts with
children, such as social workers, doctors, nurses and teachers.
Matters of this kind could also be reported to the Boards by
private citizens. Upon receipt of such information, a Board had to
undertake, without delay, a comprehensive investigation, including
interviews, medical examinations and visits to the child's home.
43. If the Board found that the child's situation corresponded
to that described in section 25 of the 1960 Act (see paragraph 35
above), it had, before resorting to care, to endeavour to remedy
the matter by preventive measures ({forebyggande atgarder}). These
could consist of one or more of the following steps: advice,
material support, admonition or warning, orders pertaining to the
child's living conditions, or supervision (section 26). If such
measures proved insufficient or were considered pointless, the
Board had to place the child in care (section 29).
However, a child had to be taken provisionally into care for
investigation (without the need for prior preventive measures) if
there was a probable cause for intervention under section 25 and
if there would otherwise be a risk of deterioration in his
situation. Such a decision was valid for a maximum period of four
weeks (section 30).
In urgent situations where the decision of the Board under
section 29 or 30 could not be awaited, section 11 of the 1960 Act
empowered the Chairman of the Board to take interim action alone.
If he did so, he had to convene a meeting of the Board within ten
days in order that a decision be taken in the matter.
44. Further procedural requirements for placing a child in
care under section 29 or 30 of the 1960 Act were set out in
section 24; in particular, the decision had to be notified without
delay to the parents concerned. If they disagreed, the matter had
to be referred for review to the County Administrative Court
within ten days.
45. Under the 1980 Act, if a Social Council considers that
certain action is necessary, it has to apply to the County
Administrative Court for a decision; unlike Child Welfare Boards
under the 1960 Act, it cannot take the decision itself.
In urgent cases, however, the Council or its Chairman may
place a child in care as a provisional measure; such a step must
be referred within a week to the County Administrative Court, for
decision within the following week.
E. Implementation of care decisions
46. When a care decision has been taken, the Social Council
(formerly the Child Welfare Board) has to implement it, by
attending to the practical details of such matters as where to
place the child and what education and other treatment to give him
(sections 35 - 36 and 38 - 41 of the 1960 Act and sections 11 - 16
of the 1980 Act).
1. Requirements as to placement
47. The 1960 Act provided that a child who had been taken into
care was entitled to good care and upbringing as well as the
education that was necessary in the light of his personal capacity
and other circumstances. The child had preferably to be placed in
a foster home or, if that was not possible, in a suitable
institution, such as a children's home or school (sections 35 and
36). The Child Welfare Board had to supervise the care and the
development of the child and, if necessary, take decisions
concerning his or her personal affairs (sections 39 and 41).
During the course of the preparatory work to the 1980 Act, the
Parliamentary Standing Committee on Social Questions stressed that
it was essential for the development of the child that the parents
had regular contacts with him; this was also of decisive
importance so as to ensure that his return to his original home
could be effected smoothly. In fact, section 11 of the 1980 Act
provides that he may be allowed, after a period, to return to live
there, if it appears that such a course is the best in order to
further the aims of the care decision.
2. Regulation of the parents' right of access
48. The 1960 Act provided that the Child Welfare Board could
regulate a parent's right of access to his child in care to the
extent that it found this reasonable in the light of the aims of
the care decision, the upbringing of the child or other
circumstances (section 41).
Under the 1980 Act, restrictions on access can be imposed by
the Social Council, in so far as this is necessary for the
purposes of the care decision (section 16). Unlike the 1960 Act,
the 1980 Act expressly empowers the authority concerned to refuse
to disclose the child's whereabouts.
F. Reconsideration and termination of compulsory care
49. Under section 42(1) of the 1960 Act, compulsory care had
to be discontinued as soon as the aims of the care decision had
been achieved. The corresponding rule in the 1980 Act provides
that the Social Council shall terminate care when it is no longer
necessary (section 5, first paragraph). The preparatory work to
this provision, as reproduced in the Government's Bill (1979/80:1,
p. 587), stated (translation from the Swedish):
"It follows that an important task of the Council is to see to
it that ... care does not continue for longer than is necessary in
the circumstances. Care is to be discontinued as soon as there is
no longer any need for the special prerogatives granted to the
Council by the Act. It is true that it is part of the custodian's
responsibility resting with the Council to pay close attention to
the care provided by other people on the Council's behalf.
However, against the background of, inter alia, the way the 1960
Act is today applied, it has been considered important that the
supervisory duties of the Council are clearly laid down in the
text of the [new] Act."
Section 41 of the Social Services Ordinance 1981
({socialtjanst} - {forordningen} 1981:750) lays down that a care
decision based on unsatisfactory conditions in the child's home
must be reconsidered by the Social Council regularly and at least
once a year.
Both before and after the entry into force of the 1980 Act, a
parent could, under the general principles of Swedish
administrative law, at any time request that the compulsory care
of his child be terminated.
G. Appeals
50. Decisions of the County Administrative Court that a child
be taken into care might (under the 1960 Act) or may (under the
1980 Act) be the subject of an appeal to the Administrative Court
of Appeal and, with leave, to the Supreme Administrative Court.
A parent could or can also appeal to the County Administrative
Court (and then to the Administrative Court of Appeal and, with
leave, to the Supreme Administrative Court) against:
(a) refusals by a Child Welfare Board or a Social Council to
terminate care ordered under the 1960 or the 1980 Act (see
paragraph 49 in fine above);
(b) decisions taken by a Child Welfare Board under the 1960
Act relating, inter alia, to the visiting rights of the parents;
(c) decisions taken by a Social Council under the 1980 Act as
to where the care should commence; to change a placement decision;
regulating the parents' right of access; and not to disclose the
child's whereabouts to them (section 20 of the 1980 Act).
According to the Government, the 1960 Act did not entitle a
parent to appeal to the County Administrative Court against a
placement decision as such, but the 1980 Act does. The Government
maintained, however, that the applicants could at any time have
raised before the County Administrative Board (see paragraph 41
above) - with the possibility of a subsequent appeal to the
Administrative Court of Appeal and thence to the Supreme
Administrative Court - a plea that, as a result of their placement
and contrary to the requirements of the 1960 Act, the children
were not receiving proper care and education.
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION
51. In their application of 10 June 1983 to the Commission
(no. 10465/83), Mr. and Mrs. Olsson alleged that the care decision
and the subsequent placement of the children constituted a breach
of Article 8 (art. 8) of the Convention. They also invoked
Articles 3, 6, 13 and 14 (art. 3, art. 6, art. 13, art. 14), as
well as Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-2), and complained that,
contrary to Article 25 (art. 25) of the Convention, the exercise
of their right to petition the Commission had been hindered.
52. On 15 May 1985, the Commission declared the application
admissible, but decided to take no action with respect to the
complaint under Article 25 (art. 25).
In its report adopted on 2 December 1986 (Article 31)
(art. 31), the Commission expressed the opinion that:
(a) the care decisions concerning the applicants' children in
combination with their placement in separate foster homes and far
away from the applicants constituted a violation of Article 8
(art. 8) of the Convention (eight votes to five);
(b) there had been no violation of Articles 3, 6, 13 or 14
(art. 3, art. 6, art. 13, art. 14) of the Convention or of
Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-2) (unanimous).
The full text of the Commission's opinion and of the partly
dissenting opinion contained in the report is reproduced as an
annex to the present judgment.
FINAL SUBMISSIONS MADE TO THE COURT BY THE GOVERNMENT
53. At the hearing on 21 September 1987, the Government
requested the Court to hold "that there has been no violation of
the Convention in the present case".
AS TO THE LAW
I. Scope of the issues before the Court
54. In the course of their submissions, the applicants made a
number of general complaints concerning the alleged
incompatibility with the Convention of, firstly, Swedish
child-care law and, secondly, the practice of the Swedish courts.
The Court recalls that in proceedings originating in an
application lodged under Article 25 (art. 25) of the Convention it
has to confine itself, as far as possible, to an examination of
the concrete case before it (see, as the most recent authority,
the F v. Switzerland judgment of 18 December 1987, Series A
no. 128, p. 16, з 31). Its task is accordingly not to review the
aforesaid law and practice in abstracto, but to determine whether
the manner in which they were applied to or affected Mr. and Mrs.
Olsson gave rise to a violation of the Convention.
55. At the Court's hearing, the Government contended that in
its report the Commission had gone beyond the limits of its
admissibility decision of 15 May 1985 by considering a number of
decisions not examined therein or in respect of which domestic
remedies had not been exhausted at that date. In their submission,
the Court should not deal with the decisions in question, which
were: firstly, those taken by the Council on 21 October 1980,
10 August 1982, 2 August 1983, 6 December 1983 and 30 October 1984
and by the County Administrative Court on 17 November 1982, in so
far as they related to visits by the applicants to the children
(see paragraphs 22 and 24 above); and secondly, those taken by the
Council on 6 December 1983 and 30 October 1984, refusing the
applicants' requests for termination of care (see paragraphs 30 -
31 above).
The Commission replied that it had followed its constant
practice of considering the facts of the case as they stood at the
time of the establishment of its report and that, during the
course of its proceedings, the Government had not pleaded a
failure to exhaust domestic remedies in respect of any of the said
decisions.
56. The Court observes that all those decisions pre-dated the
Commission's hearing on the admissibility and merits of the case
(15 May 1985) and that in the circumstances there was nothing to
prevent the Government from raising a plea of non-exhaustion at
that time (see, as the most recent authority, the Bozano judgment
of 18 December 1986, Series A no. 111, p. 19, з 44). Furthermore,
the questions of the applicants' visiting rights and of the
requests for discontinuance of care were referred to during that
hearing.
In addition, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court provides that "a
Party wishing to raise a preliminary objection must file a
statement setting out the objection and the grounds therefor not
later than the time when that Party informs the President of its
intention not to submit a memorial ...". In the present case -
where no memorials on the merits were lodged (see paragraph 5
above) - the Government filed no such statement and raised their
plea solely at the Court's hearing. It must therefore be rejected
as out of time.
Furthermore, whilst the Court's jurisdiction in contentious
matters is determined by the Commission's decision declaring the
originating application admissible, it is competent, in the
interests of the economy of the procedure, to take into account
facts occurring during the course of the proceedings in so far as
they constitute a continuation of the facts underlying the
complaints declared admissible (see, as the most recent authority,
the Weeks judgment of 2 March 1987, Series A no. 114, p. 21,
з 37). In the Court's view, the decisions in question can be
regarded as falling into this category and the Commission acted
properly in taking them into account.
57. On the other hand, the 1987 decisions concerning the
prohibition on the removal of Helena and Thomas from their
respective foster homes (see paragraph 32 above) are the subject
of a further application which Mr. and Mrs. Olsson lodged with the
Commission on 23 October 1987. Any new question raised therein
cannot be settled by the Court in the present judgment (see the
Swedish Engine Drivers' Union judgment of 6 February 1976, Series
A no. 20, p. 13, з 34, and the above-mentioned Weeks judgment,
loc. cit.).
II. Alleged violation of Article 8 (art. 8)
of the Convention
A. Introduction
58. The applicants asserted that the decision to take the
children into care, the manner in which it had been implemented
and the refusals to terminate care had given rise to violations of
Article 8 (art. 8) of the Convention, which reads as follows:
"1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and
family life, his home and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with
the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with
the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests
of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of
the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the
protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the
rights and freedoms of others."
This allegation was contested by the Government, but accepted
by a majority of the Commission.
59. The mutual enjoyment by parent and child of each other's
company constitutes a fundamental element of family life;
furthermore, the natural family relationship is not terminated by
reason of the fact that the child is taken into public care (see
the W v. the United Kingdom judgment of 8 July 1987, Series A
no. 121, p. 27, з 59). It follows - and this was not contested by
the Government - that the measures at issue amounted to
interferences with the applicants' right to respect for their
family life.
Such an interference entails a violation of Article 8 (art. 8)
unless it was "in accordance with the law", had an aim or aims
that is or are legitimate under Article 8 з 2 (art. 8-2) and was
"necessary in a democratic society" for the aforesaid aim or aims
(ibid., p. 27, з 60 (a)).
B. "In accordance with the law"
60. The applicants did not deny that the authorities had acted
in accordance with Swedish law. However, they alleged that the
measures taken were not "in accordance with the law" within the
meaning of Article 8 (art. 8), notably because the relevant
legislation set no limits on the discretion which it conferred and
was drafted in terms so vague that its results were unforeseeable.
The Government contested this claim, which was not accepted by
the Commission.
61. Requirements which the Court has identified as flowing
from the phrase "in accordance with the law" include the
following.
(a) A norm cannot be regarded as a "law" unless it is
formulated with sufficient precision to enable the citizen - if
need be, with appropriate advice - to foresee, to a degree that is
reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences which a given
action may entail; however, experience shows that absolute
precision is unattainable and the need to avoid excessive rigidity
and to keep pace with changing circumstances means that many laws
are inevitably couched in terms which, to a greater or lesser
extent, are vague (see, for example, the Sunday Times judgment of
26 April 1979, Series A no. 30, p. 31, з 49).
(b) The phrase "in accordance with the law" does not merely
refer back to domestic law but also relates to the quality of the
law, requiring it to be compatible with the rule of law; it thus
implies that there must be a measure of protection in domestic law
against arbitrary interferences by public authorities with the
rights safeguarded by, inter alia, paragraph 1 of Article 8
(art. 8-1) (see the Malone judgment of 2 August 1984, Series A
no. 82, p. 32, з 67).
(c) A law which confers a discretion is not in itself
inconsistent with the requirement of foreseeability, provided that
the scope of the discretion and the manner of its exercise are
indicated with sufficient clarity, having regard to the legitimate
aim of the measure in question, to give the individual adequate
protection against arbitrary interference (see the Gillow judgment
of 24 November 1986, Series A no. 109, p. 21, з 51).
62. The Swedish legislation applied in the present case is
admittedly rather general in terms and confers a wide measure of
discretion, especially as regards the implementation of care
decisions. In particular, it provides for intervention by the
authorities where a child's health or development is jeopardised
or in danger, without requiring proof of actual harm to him (see
paragraphs 35 and 37 above).
On the other hand, the circumstances in which it may be
necessary to take a child into public care and in which a care
decision may fall to be implemented are so variable that it would
scarcely be possible to formulate a law to cover every
eventuality. To confine the authorities' entitlement to act to
cases where actual harm to the child has already occurred might
well unduly reduce the effectiveness of the protection which he
requires. Moreover, in interpreting and applying the legislation,
the relevant preparatory work (see paragraphs 36 and 38 above)
provides guidance as to the exercise of the discretion it confers.
Again, safeguards against arbitrary interference are provided by
the fact that the exercise of nearly all the statutory powers is
either entrusted to or is subject to review by the administrative
courts at several levels; this is true of the taking of a child
into care, a refusal to terminate care and most steps taken in the
implementation of care decisions (see paragraphs 44, 45 and 50
above). Taking these safeguards into consideration, the scope of
the discretion conferred on the authorities by the laws in
question appears to the Court to be reasonable and acceptable for
the purposes of Article 8 (art. 8).
63. The Court thus concludes that the interferences in
question were "in accordance with the law".
C. Legitimate aim
64. The applicants submitted that, of the aims listed in
paragraph 2 of Article 8 (art. 8-2), only the "protection of
health or morals" could have justified the decision to take the
children into care, but that their health or morals were not in
fact endangered when it was adopted.
The Commission, on the other hand, considered that the
decisions concerning the care and the placement of the children
were taken in their interests and had the legitimate aims of
protecting health or morals and protecting the "rights and
freedoms of others".
65. In the Court's view, the relevant Swedish legislation is
clearly designed to protect children and there is nothing to
suggest that it was applied in the present case for any other
purpose. The interferences in question - intended as they were to
safeguard the development of Stefan, Helena and Thomas - therefore
had, for the purposes of paragraph 2 of Article 8 (art. 8-2), the
legitimate aims attributed to them by the Commission.
D. "Necessary in a democratic society"
66. The applicants maintained that the measures at issue could
not be regarded as "necessary in a democratic society". This
submission was contested by the Government, but accepted by a
majority of the Commission.
1. Introduction
67. According to the Court's established case-law, the notion
of necessity implies that the interference corresponds to a
pressing social need and, in particular, that it is proportionate
to the legitimate aim pursued; in determining whether an
interference is "necessary in a democratic society", the Court
will take into account that a margin of appreciation is left to
the Contracting States (see, amongst many authorities, the
above-mentioned W v. the United Kingdom judgment, Series A
no. 121, p. 27, з 60 (b) and (d)).
68. There was considerable discussion during the hearing
before the Court as to the approach to be adopted by the
Convention institutions in resolving the necessity issue.
The Commission's Delegate summarised the approach taken by the
majority of the Commission as being: "to stay ... within the
judgments of the domestic courts and, after making a detailed
study of the relevant judgments, conclude whether or not [their]
contents ... reveal sufficient reasons for taking a child into
public care." She summarised the minority's approach as being: "to
stay within the judgments of the domestic courts and to examine
whether the reasons [therein] seem to indicate that [they] have
based themselves on irrelevant circumstances or that they have
applied unacceptable criteria or standards for the justification
of a public-care order. In essence the question is whether the
national court has misjudged the necessity." The Government
favoured the minority's approach, adding that a wide margin of
appreciation should be afforded to the national authorities so
long as there was no reason to believe that the decisions were not
taken in good faith, with due care and in a reasonable manner.
The approach which the Court has consistently adopted - and
from which it sees no reason to depart on the present occasion -
differs somewhat from those described above. In the first place,
its review is not limited to ascertaining whether a respondent
State exercised its discretion reasonably, carefully and in good
faith (see, inter alia, the above-mentioned Sunday Times judgment,
Series A no. 30, p. 36, з 59). In the second place, in exercising
its supervisory jurisdiction, the Court cannot confine itself to
considering the impugned decisions in isolation, but must look at
them in the light of the case as a whole; it must determine
whether the reasons adduced to justify the interferences at issue
are "relevant and sufficient" (see, amongst other authorities,
mutatis mutandis, the Lingens judgment of 8 July 1986, Series A
no. 103, pp. 25 - 26, з 40).
69. In concluding that there had been a violation of Article 8
(art. 8), the majority of the Commission based itself on the care
decisions concerning the applicants' children in combination with
the placement of the children in separate foster homes and far
away from the applicants.
In this respect, the Court shares the view of the Government
that these are matters which should be examined separately: the
factors and considerations which are relevant to an assessment of
their necessity may not be the same.
2. The taking of the children into care
and the refusals to terminate care
70. The applicants contended that it was not necessary to take
the children into and maintain them in care; they alleged, inter
alia, that no concrete facts had been established showing that the
children were in danger, that there were no substantiated reasons
justifying the taking into care and that there were no valid
motives for refusing the requests for termination of care.
The Government contested this allegation. The majority of the
Commission, on the other hand, was not convinced that the factual
basis was so grave as to justify the taking into care, although it
did observe that it was "understandable that the care order was
not lifted".
71. Before turning to the substance of this issue, it is
convenient to deal with an initial point. In its above-mentioned
W v. the United Kingdom judgment, the Court held that certain
procedural requirements were implicit in Article 8 (art. 8): as
regards decisions in child-care matters, the parents must "have
been involved in the decision-making process, seen as a whole, to
a degree sufficient to provide them with the requisite protection
of their interests" (Series A no. 121, p. 29, з 64).
The Court agrees with the Commission that this requirement was
satisfied as regards the care decisions themselves. Mr. and Mrs.
Olsson attended a number of case conferences and were present at
the meetings which preceded the Council's decision of 16 September
1980 to take the children into care and its decision of 1 June
1982 not to terminate care (see paragraphs 10, 11, 12 and 27
above). They also attended hearings before the County
Administrative Court and the Administrative Court of Appeal.
Furthermore, they were legally represented during all the relevant
judicial proceedings.
(a) The taking into care
72. In its judgment of 30 December 1980 (see paragraph 13
above), the County Administrative Court set out the following
reasons for confirming the Council's decision of 16 September 1980
to take the children into care:
(a) the children had for several years been living in an
unsatisfactory home environment as a result of the parents'
inability to satisfy the children's need of care, stimulation and
supervision;
(b) Stefan and Thomas disclosed a clear retardation in their
development and all three children were backward in language
development;
(c) there was a great risk that Helena would develop
negatively if she stayed in the parents' home;
(d) preventive measures had been tried for several years, but
without any resulting improvement;
(e) the health and development of the children were
jeopardised as a result of the parents' present inability to give
them satisfactory care and education.
These reasons are clearly "relevant" to a decision to take a
child into public care. However, it is an interference of a very
serious order to split up a family. Such a step must be supported
by sufficiently sound and weighty considerations in the interests
of the child; as the Commission rightly observed, it is not enough
that the child would be better off if placed in care. In order to
determine whether the foregoing reasons can be considered
"sufficient" for the purposes of Article 8 (art. 8), the Court
must have regard to the case as a whole (see paragraph 68 above)
and notably to the circumstances in which the decision was taken.
73. Prior to the Council's care decision of 16 September 1980,
a number of different social authorities had been individually
involved with the Olsson family; they had co-ordinated their
activities in 1979, from which time a psychiatric team had
followed the case (see paragraph 9 above). Various measures had
been taken with a view to assisting the family and a number of
case conferences had been held (see paragraphs 9, 10 and 11
above). It cannot therefore be said that the authorities
intervened without adequate knowledge of the background.
The Council's decision was based on a substantial report,
compiled by the social administration after the children had been
placed in care for investigation, which concluded that their
development was in danger since they were living in an environment
which was unsatisfactory due to their parents' inability to
satisfy their need for care, stimulation and supervision (see
paragraph 12 above). That report was in turn supported by a number
of statements from persons well acquainted with the case,
including a medical report signed not only by Dr. Bosaeus but also
by a psychologist, Helena Fagerberg-Moss; both were members of a
team which was in touch with the family and the latter had, before
the decision to place the children in care for investigation was
taken, seen Helena and Thomas in order to assess their development
and also visited the applicants' home (ibid.).
It is true that the medical report referred to the applicants'
having been registered as retarded, whereas a subsequent
examination revealed that they were of average intelligence (see
paragraphs 9 and 12 above). However, as the Administrative Court
of Appeal stated in its judgment of 16 February 1987 (see
paragraph 31 above):
"As far as can be ascertained from the decision to take the
Olsson children into care, the primary reason for this action was
not any alleged mental retardation on the part of Mr. and Mrs.
Olsson. The main reason cited in support of forced intervention
was instead the parents' "inability to give the children
satisfactory care and upbringing" - in view of Stefan's obviously
retarded development, for instance, and the retarded linguistic
development of all the children."
In addition, as the minority of the Commission pointed out,
the County Administrative Court's judgment of 30 December 1980 was
not founded solely on the documentation that had been before the
Council. It had previously held a hearing, at which Mrs. Olsson
and the children were represented and Dr. Bosaeus was heard as an
expert (see paragraph 13 above), and it thus had the benefit of
its own personal impression of the case. This was, moreover, a
judgment which was referred on appeal to both the Administrative
Court of Appeal and the Supreme Administrative Court, without
being reversed (see paragraphs 14 and 15 above).
74. In the light of the foregoing, the Court has come to the
conclusion that the impugned decision was supported by
"sufficient" reasons and that, having regard to their margin of
appreciation, the Swedish authorities were reasonably entitled to
think that it was necessary to take the children into care,
especially since preventive measures had proved unsuccessful.
(b) The refusals to terminate care
75. In its judgment of 17 November 1982 (see paragraph 28
above), the County Administrative Court set out the following
reasons for confirming the Council's decision of 1 June 1982 to
refuse the applicants' request for termination of the care of the
children:
(a) on returning to his foster home after visits to his
parents, Stefan had been disturbed in various ways and had
relapsed into his previous negative behaviour; his return trip on
28 June 1982 had developed in an unfortunate way for him;
(b) the applicants had had difficulties in co-operating with
Stefan's foster home and the Council;
(c) the applicants still showed a lack of comprehension and
ability to give the children satisfactory care and education, so
that it had to be feared that termination of care could at that
time involve great risks for their health and development.
Here again, these reasons are clearly "relevant" to a decision
to maintain a child in care. However, whether they were
"sufficient" in the present case calls for further scrutiny.
76. It has to be recalled that the Council's refusal to
terminate care was based on reports compiled by the social
administration which concluded that the parents were at the time
incapable of giving the children the necessary support and
encouragement (see paragraph 27 above). These reports were in turn
supported by statements from persons well acquainted with the
case, including the psychologist, Helena Fagerberg-Moss (ibid.).
Above all, on this occasion as well, the County Administrative
Court's judgment - like that of the Administrative Court of Appeal
which confirmed it - was founded not only on written material but
also on a hearing in the presence of the applicants (see
paragraphs 28 and 29 above). And again, the judgment of the
Administrative Court of Appeal was not reversed (see paragraph 29
above).
It could be thought that the children's favourable development
whilst in care and especially the apparent improvement and
stabilising by 1982 of the applicants' situation - both of which
were recorded in the County Administrative Court's judgment -
militated against continuation of care. However, the Court
considers that it is justifiable not to terminate public care
unless the improvement in the circumstances that occasioned it
appears with reasonable certainty to be stable; it would clearly
be contrary to the interests of the child concerned to be restored
to his parents, only to be taken into care again shortly
afterwards.
77. In the light of the foregoing, the Court has come to the
conclusion that in 1982 the Swedish authorities had "sufficient"
reasons for thinking that it was necessary for the care decision
to remain in force. Neither has it been established that a
different situation obtained when they subsequently maintained the
care decision until its final reversal on different dates in the
first half of 1987 (see paragraphs 30 and 31 above).
3. The implementation of the care decision
78. According to the applicants, the implementation of the
care decision also gave rise to a violation of Article 8 (art. 8).
They relied, inter alia, on the placement of the children
separately and at a long distance from each other and their
parents, on the restrictions on and the conditions of visits and
on the conditions in the homes where the children were placed.
79. In contesting this claim, the Government argued that the
measures relating to the placement of the children had been taken
in good faith, were not unreasonable and were justified by the
special circumstances. They adverted in particular to the
following matters: the fear that the parents might remove the
children, as they had previously done with Stefan (see paragraph
17 above); the desire to avoid keeping the children in
institutions for too long, coupled with the limited supply of
suitable foster homes; the special needs of Stefan, which led to
his being placed with the Ek family whom he already knew, his
subsequent move having been motivated solely by conflicts between
the natural and the foster parents (see paragraph 17 above); the
view that, having regard to Helena's inclination "to take too
great a responsibility for her brother Thomas" (see paragraph 12
above) and to the special needs of these two children, it would
not have been realistic or "psychologically appropriate" to place
them in the same foster home; and the last-minute impossibility of
fulfilling the original intention to place these two children in
the same village (see paragraph 19 above).
The Government further submitted that the applicants' previous
removal of Stefan from his home and their attitude of
confrontation towards the foster parents, respectively, justified
the initial and the later restrictions on their access to Helena
and Thomas (see paragraph 24 above). They added that Mr. and Mrs.
Olsson had in any event not made full use of their entitlement to
visit all three children.
80. The Court finds, like the Commission, that it is not
established that the quality of the care given to the children in
the homes where they were placed was not satisfactory. The
applicants' complaint on this score must therefore be rejected.
81. As for the remaining aspects of the implementation of the
care decision, the Court would first observe that there appears to
have been no question of the children's being adopted. The care
decision should therefore have been regarded as a temporary
measure, to be discontinued as soon as circumstances permitted,
and any measures of implementation should have been consistent
with the ultimate aim of reuniting the Olsson family.
In point of fact, the steps taken by the Swedish authorities
ran counter to such an aim. The ties between members of a family
and the prospects of their successful reunification will perforce
be weakened if impediments are placed in the way of their having
easy and regular access to each other. Yet the very placement of
Helena and Thomas at so great a distance from their parents and
from Stefan (see paragraph 18 above) must have adversely affected
the possibility of contacts between them. This situation was
compounded by the restrictions imposed by the authorities on
parental access; whilst those restrictions may to a certain extent
have been warranted by the applicants' attitude towards the foster
families (see paragraph 26 above), it is not to be excluded that
the failure to establish a harmonious relationship was partly due
to the distances involved. It is true that regular contacts were
maintained between Helena and Thomas, but the reasons given by the
Government for not placing them together (see paragraph 79 above)
are not convincing. It is also true that Stefan had special needs,
but this is not sufficient to justify the distance that separated
him from the other two children.
The Administrative Court of Appeal, in its judgment of
16 February 1987 (see paragraph 31 above), itself commented as
follows on the applicants' access to Helena and Thomas:
"Of course, the extremely bad relations between Mr. and Mrs.
Olsson on the one hand and Helena and Thomas and their respective
foster parents on the other hand are not due only to the Olssons.
However, the Administrative Court of Appeal considers it strange
that the parents' negative attitude to the foster parents resulted
in their not meeting the youngest children for over two years, nor
even showing any particular interest in talking to the children on
the telephone, for instance. Even if there has been some
difficulty for the social council to assist in establishing better
relations - due to the action of the parents' representative, for
instance, and the children's own attitude - it would have been
desirable for the social council to have been more active and not,
for instance, to have limited the right of access to once every
three months."
82. There is nothing to suggest that the Swedish authorities
did not act in good faith in implementing the care decision.
However, this does not suffice to render a measure "necessary" in
Convention terms (see paragraph 68 above): an objective standard
has to be applied in this connection. Examination of the
Government's arguments suggests that it was partly administrative
difficulties that prompted the authorities' decisions; yet, in so
fundamental an area as respect for family life, such
considerations cannot be allowed to play more than a secondary
role.
83. In conclusion, in the respects indicated above and despite
the applicants' unco-operative attitude (see paragraph 26 above),
the measures taken in implementation of the care decision were not
supported by "sufficient" reasons justifying them as proportionate
to the legitimate aim pursued. They were therefore,
notwithstanding the domestic authorities' margin of appreciation,
not "necessary in a democratic society".
E. Overall conclusion
84. To sum up, the implementation of the care decision, but
not that decision itself or its maintenance in force, gave rise to
a breach of Article 8 (art. 8).
III. Alleged violation of Article 3 (art. 3)
of the Convention
85. The applicants alleged that they had been victims of a
violation of Article 3 (art. 3) of the Convention, which provides:
"No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment."
In their view, there had been "inhuman treatment" as a result
of:
(a) the taking away of the children without sufficient reason;
(b) the frequent moving of Stefan from one home to another,
his ill-treatment at the hands of the Ek family and his placement
in an institution run by the Board for the Retarded (see
paragraph 17 above);
(c) the manner in which, on one occasion, Stefan and Thomas
had been removed, with police assistance, from the applicants'
home.
The Government contested these claims.
86. The Commission considered that it had already dealt in its
report, in the context of Article 8 (art. 8), with the essential
issues raised by point (a) and that no separate issue arose under
Article 3 (art. 3). The Court is of the same opinion.
The Court has also already endorsed, in paragraph 80 above,
the Commission's finding that the allegation of ill-treatment of
Stefan was not substantiated. As regards the other matters relied
on by Mr. and Mrs. Olsson in points (b) and (c), these did not, in
the Court's view, constitute "inhuman treatment".
87. There has therefore been no breach of Article 3 (art. 3).
IV. Alleged violation of Article 6 (art. 6)
of the Convention
88. The applicants submitted that they had not received a
"fair hearing" in the domestic judicial proceedings and had
accordingly been victims of a breach of Article 6 (art. 6) of the
Convention, which, so far as is relevant, provides:
"In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ...,
everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal
..."
Apart from the complaints as to the practice of the Swedish
courts (see paragraph 54 above), reliance was placed on their
having heard Dr. Bosaeus as an expert although she had been the
Council's expert, the manner in which they took her evidence and,
more generally, their alleged failure to make proper enquiries
about the applicants' mental health and ability to care for the
children.
These claims were contested by the Government and rejected by
the Commission.
89. Dr. Bosaeus was heard by the County Administrative Court
on two occasions: firstly, on 18 December 1980, as an expert (see
paragraph 13 above); secondly, on 4 November 1982, as a witness
called at the request of the applicants' lawyer (see paragraph 28
above).
This doctor was one of the co-signatories of the medical
report on which the Council's care decision of 16 September 1980
had been partly based (see paragraph 12 above). In a case of this
kind, it was reasonable that, with her extensive knowledge of the
background, she should have been heard as an expert in 1980. This
could have rendered the proceedings unfair only if it were
established - which is not the case - that the applicants had been
prevented from cross-examining her or calling a counter-expert to
rebut her testimony.
The complaint concerning the manner in which Dr. Bosaeus'
evidence was taken relates to the 1982 hearing. However, the Court
is not satisfied that the matters cited by the applicants - her
presence in the court-room before she gave evidence and the County
Administrative Court's alleged failure both to remind her of her
obligation to tell the truth and to insist that she answered
certain questions - are sufficient to show that the proceedings
were not fair.
90. As for the applicants' more general allegation, they were
at all times represented by a lawyer and were able to submit such
material and arguments as they saw fit. The only exception was the
Administrative Court of Appeal's refusal to accept their request
that Dr. Bosaeus be heard as a witness at its hearing in 1982 (see
paragraph 29 above); however, she had already been heard in the
County Administrative Court.
Viewing the domestic judicial proceedings as a whole, the
Court finds no material to support a conclusion that they were not
fair or that the Swedish courts failed to make due and proper
enquiries.
91. There was therefore no breach of Article 6 (art. 6).
V. Alleged violation of Article 14 of the Convention,
taken together with Article 8 (art. 14+8)
92. The applicants asserted that the interferences with their
rights had been based not on objective grounds but on their
"social origin" and that they had therefore been victims of
discrimination contrary to Article 14 of the Convention, taken
together with Article 8 (art. 14+8). The former provision reads as
follows:
"The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in [the]
Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground
such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other
opinion, national or social origin, association with a national
minority, property, birth or other status."
The Commission found nothing in the case-file to substantiate
this allegation, which was contested by the Government.
93. The Court shares the view of the Commission and therefore
rejects this claim.
VI. Alleged violation of Article 2 of Protocol
No. 1 (P1-2)
94. The applicants submitted that there had been a violation
of the second sentence of Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-2) to
the Convention, which reads:
"In the exercise of any functions which it assumes in relation
to education and to teaching, the State shall respect the right of
parents to ensure such education and teaching in conformity with
their own religious and philosophical convictions."
They argued that the violation had arisen because:
(a) Thomas had been placed in a family who belonged to a
religious denomination and attended church with him (see
paragraph 20 above), whereas they did not wish their children to
receive a religious upbringing;
(b) the placement of the children so far away from the parents
and without consultation as to the choice of foster home deprived
the latter of the possibility of influencing the former's
education.
The Government contested these claims. The Commission rejected
the first and expressed no view on the second.
95. The Court agrees with the Commission that the fact that
the children were taken into public care did not cause the
applicants to lose all their rights under Article 2 of Protocol
No. 1 (P1-2).
It notes, however, as did the Commission, that Mr. and Mrs.
Olsson, though describing themselves as atheists, have not left
the Church of Sweden (see paragraph 8 above) and that there is no
serious indication of their being particularly concerned, except
at a rather late stage, with giving the children a non-religious
upbringing.
Neither have Mr. and Mrs. Olsson shown that in practice the
general education of the children whilst in public care diverged
from what they would have wished.
96. In these circumstances, no violation of Article 2 of
Protocol No. 1 (P1-2) has been established.
VII. Alleged violation of Article 13 of the Convention,
taken together with Article 2 of Protocol No. 1
(art. 13+P1-2)
97. The applicants contended that, since no remedy was
available to them in respect of the breach of Article 2 of
Protocol No. 1 (P1-2) allegedly resulting from Thomas' being given
a religious upbringing, they were victims of a breach of
Article 13 (art. 13) of the Convention, which provides:
"Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the]
Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a
national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been
committed by persons acting in an official capacity."
98. The Court agrees with the Commission and the Government
that this claim has to be rejected. Leaving aside the possibility
of seeking redress before the County Administrative Board, a
parent could, after the entry into force of the 1980 Act, appeal
to the County Administrative Court against a placement decision
taken by a Social Council (see paragraph 50 in fine above). Both
before and after that time, the question of a child's religious
upbringing could have been raised and examined in a request for
termination of care (see paragraph 49 in fine above). There is
nothing to suggest that these remedies, which were apparently not
utilised by the applicants as regards Thomas' upbringing, would
not have been "effective", within the meaning of Article 13
(art. 13).
VIII. Application of Article 50 (art. 50)
of the Convention
99. Under Article 50 (art. 50) of the Convention,
"If the Court finds that a decision or a measure taken by a
legal authority or any other authority of a High Contracting Party
is completely or partially in conflict with the obligations
arising from the ... Convention, and if the internal law of the
said Party allows only partial reparation to be made for the
consequences of this decision or measure, the decision of the
Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured
party."
The applicants claimed under this provision 30,000,000 Swedish
crowns (SEK) for non-pecuniary damage, together with reimbursement
of legal fees and expenses in the sum of 884,500 SEK. The
first-mentioned amount was, unless the Court could order payment
to the applicants only, to be paid to them and the children in
five equal shares.
A. Damage
100. At the Court's hearing, the Government, whilst reserving
their position, indicated that they considered the claim for
damage to be excessive. The Commission's Delegate also found the
amount claimed to be out of proportion; she suggested that a
figure of 300,000 SEK would be reasonable and equitable.
101. The Court considers that, notwithstanding the
Government's reservation, this question is ready for decision
(Rule 53 з 1 of the Rules of Court). It would first observe that
it cannot accept the request, contained in the claims filed by the
applicants on 27 July 1987, for an award of just satisfaction to
the children: it is only Mr. and Mrs. Olsson who are applicants in
the present proceedings.
102. The violation of Article 8 (art. 8) of the Convention
found by the Court in the instant case arose solely from the
manner in which the care decision was implemented (see paragraph
84 above). It follows that the applicants are not entitled to just
satisfaction for that decision and the taking away of the children
as such, but only for the prejudice which they may have suffered
on account of the separation of the children from each other, the
placement of Helena and Thomas at a long distance from the
applicants' home and the restrictions on visits.
There can be no doubt, in the Court's view, that these matters
caused Mr. and Mrs. Olsson considerable inconvenience and, above
all, substantial anxiety and distress. Regular and frequent
contacts with the children were greatly impeded and the
possibilities for the whole family to meet together were minimal.
And this situation, with its deleterious effects on the
applicants' family life, endured for some seven years.
These various factors do not readily lend themselves to
precise quantification. Making an assessment on an equitable
basis, as is required by Article 50 (art. 50), the Court awards
Mr. and Mrs. Olsson together the sum of 200,000 SEK under this
head.
B. Legal fees and expenses
103. The applicants' claim for legal fees and expenses,
totalling 884,500 SEK, was made up of the following items:
(a) 630,700 SEK for 901 hours' work by their lawyer (at 700
SEK per hour) in the domestic proceedings and 14,600 SEK for
related expenses;
(b) 234,500 SEK for 335 hours' work (at the same rate) in the
proceedings before the Commission and the Court and 4,700 SEK for
related expenses.
The Government contested this claim in several respects,
arguing in particular that: the applicants' statement of the fees
and expenses they had incurred in the domestic proceedings was
insufficiently precise to permit of anything other than an
equitable assessment; the amounts sought in respect of those
proceedings related partly to work on questions that were not
material to the case before the Strasbourg institutions and partly
to work that was unnecessary; the hourly rate charged, though
acceptable for the Strasbourg proceedings, was excessive for the
domestic proceedings; and the time spent by the applicants' lawyer
on the Strasbourg proceedings exceeded what was reasonable. The
Government were willing to pay total sums of 290,000 SEK for fees
and 12,800 SEK for expenses, subject to a pro rata reduction in
respect of such allegations pursued by Mr. and Mrs. Olsson before
the Court as it might not sustain.
The Commission's Delegate found the amounts claimed to be very
high; she shared many of the observations made by the Government
and considered that the sums they proposed constituted a
reasonable basis for the Court's assessment.
104. An award may be made under Article 50 (art. 50) in
respect of costs and expenses that
(a) were actually and necessarily incurred by the injured
party in order to seek, through the domestic legal system,
prevention or rectification of a violation, to have the same
established by the Commission and later by the Court and to obtain
redress therefor; and
(b) are reasonable as to quantum (see, amongst many
authorities, the Feldbrugge judgment of 27 July 1987, Series A
no. 124-A, p. 9, з 14).
105. (a) The Court has found that neither the care decision
itself nor its maintenance in force gave rise to a breach of
Article 8 (art. 8) (see paragraph 84 above). Accordingly, to the
extent - which was considerable - that the steps taken by the
applicants in the domestic proceedings related to these matters,
as distinct from the implementation of the care decision, no award
can be made under Article 50 (art. 50) in respect of the fees and
expenses involved. Furthermore, some of the costs claimed - for
example, those relating to contacts by the applicants' lawyer with
journalists for publicity in Sweden and abroad and to her
investigation of a murder allegedly committed in the children's
home where Stefan was placed - cannot be regarded as "necessarily
incurred". Again, others concerned issues falling outside the
scope of the case before the Court, such as the prohibition on the
removal of Helena and Thomas from their foster homes (see
paragraph 57 above).
(b) As regards the fees and expenses referable to the
Strasbourg proceedings, the Government did not contest that the
applicants had incurred liability to pay sums additional to those
covered by the legal aid which they had received from the Council
of Europe (see, inter alia, the Inze judgment of 28 October 1987,
Series A no. 126, p. 22, з 56). The Court, however, shares the
Government's view that the amount claimed is excessive. It also
agrees that the sum to be awarded should reflect the fact that
some substantial complaints by the applicants remained
unsuccessful (see, as the most recent authority, the Johnston and
Others judgment of 18 December 1986, Series A no. 112,
p. 33, з 86).
106. Taking into account the above factors and also the
relevant legal aid payments made by the Council of Europe and
making an assessment on an equitable basis, the Court considers
that Mr. and Mrs. Olsson are together entitled to be reimbursed,
for legal fees and expenses, the sum of 150,000 SEK.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT
1. Rejects unanimously the Government's plea concerning the
scope of the case;
2. Holds by ten votes to five that the decision to take the
children into care and its maintenance in force did not give rise
to a violation of Article 8 (art. 8) of the Convention;
3. Holds by twelve votes to three that there has been a
violation of Article 8 (art. 8) on account of the manner in which
the said decision was implemented;
4. Holds unanimously that there has been no violation of
Article 6 (art. 6) of the Convention;
5. Holds unanimously that there has been no violation of
Article 3 (art. 3) of the Convention, of Article 14 of the
Convention, taken together with Article 8 (art. 14+8), of
Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-2), or of Article 13 of the
Convention, taken together with the said Article 2 (art. 13+P1-2);
6. Holds unanimously that Sweden is to pay to the applicants
together, for non-pecuniary damage, 200,000 (two hundred thousand)
Swedish crowns and, for legal fees and expenses, 150,000 (one
hundred and fifty thousand) Swedish crowns;
7. Rejects unanimously the remainder of the claim for just
satisfaction.
Done in English and in French, and delivered at a public
hearing in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 24 March
1988.
Signed: Rolv RYSSDAL
President
Signed: {Marc-Andre} EISSEN
Registrar
In accordance with Article 51 з 2 (art. 51-2) of the
Convention and Rule 52 з 2 of the Rules of Court, the following
separate opinions are annexed to the present judgment:
(a) joint partly dissenting opinion of Mr. Ryssdal, Mr. {Thor}
{Vilhjalmsson} and Mr. {Golcuklu};
(b) opinion of Mr. Pinheiro Farinha, Mr. Pettiti, Mr. Walsh,
Mr. Russo and Mr. De Meyer.
Initialled: R.R.
Initialled: M.-A.E.
JOINT PARTLY DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGES RYSSDAL,
{THOR VILHJALMSSON}, AND {GOLCUKLU}
As to the alleged violation of Article 8 (art. 8) of the
Convention, we can subscribe only in part to the finding of the
Court.
I. Introduction
The separation of children from their parents through a care
decision taken by a State authority is certainly a serious
interference with family life. In this respect it is important to
protect parents and children against arbitrary intervention. The
State concerned must be able to demonstrate that the views and
interests of the parents have been duly taken into account and
that the whole decision-making process is such as to ensure that
the measures adopted are necessary to safeguard the children's
interests.
An important feature of the relevant Swedish legislation is
the possibility of judicial proceedings before the administrative
courts and the competence of those courts to examine fully whether
children should be taken into care and how a care decision should
be implemented.
It is established that different social authorities had been
involved with the Olsson family to a considerable extent prior to
the events giving rise to the present case. There had been
continuing and intensive contacts, including contacts with Mr. and
Mrs. Olsson. Home-therapy had been tried without success.
According to the examination of the facts and evidence conducted
by the Social District Council and the competent domestic courts,
the parents were not able to deal satisfactorily with the
children, and in August-September 1980 the latter's needs created
some kind of an emergency situation with the result that the
Council considered it necessary to take them into care.
II. The care decision
We agree with the Court that the decision to take the children
into care and its maintenance in force until 1987 did not give
rise to a violation of Article 8 (art. 8) of the Convention, for
the reasons given in paragraphs 71 - 74 and 75 - 77, respectively,
of the judgment. In this context we would emphasise two facts:
firstly, the Council's decision of 16 September 1980 was confirmed
by adequately reasoned judgments of the County Administrative
Court (30 December 1980) and of the Administrative Court of Appeal
(8 July 1981); secondly, the Council's subsequent refusal to
terminate care was confirmed by adequately reasoned judgments of
the County Administrative Court (17 November 1982) and of the
Administrative Court of Appeal (28 December 1982).
III. The implementation of the care decision
Paragraph 78 of the Court's judgment states that the
applicants complained of
(i) the placement of the children separately and at a long
distance from each other and their parents;
(ii) the restrictions on and the conditions of visits; and
(iii) the conditions in the homes where the children were
placed.
First of all we would like to stress - as the Court has also
done - that there is nothing to suggest that the Swedish
authorities did not act in good faith in implementing the care
decision.
As to the last of the complaints listed above, we agree with
the Court that it is not established that the quality of the care
given to the children in the homes where they were placed was not
satisfactory. This complaint must accordingly be rejected.
As to the complaint about the placement, which mainly concerns
the placement of Helena and Thomas far away from Gothenburg, we
would first say that when a care decision - as in the present
case - is to be regarded as a temporary measure, it is generally
desirable to place the children in foster homes that are not far
away from their parents' home. However, in view of Mr. and Mrs.
Olsson's conduct in the autumn of 1980 - their removal and hiding
of Stefan -, it was quite reasonable for the Council to consider
that Helena and Thomas could not be placed in foster homes in the
Gothenburg region. It seems unfortunate that they were placed at
so great a distance from Gothenburg, but it may have been
difficult to find foster parents able and willing to satisfy the
special needs of these two children. In our opinion, the Council's
view that it was not appropriate to place both of them in the same
foster home has to be accepted. Moreover, we are satisfied that
the Council did really try to place them in the same village, but
that this became impossible because one of the chosen families in
the end declined to receive the child. In any event, the national
authorities must enjoy a considerable discretion in this respect,
since the decision on such a matter has to be based on an overall
appraisal of a number of facts, including the availability of
suitable foster homes and the needs of the children taken into
care.
As to the restrictions on visits, it should be mentioned that
the County Administrative Court confirmed them on two occasions
and that, after its decision of 3 October 1985, Mr. and Mrs.
Olsson withdrew their appeal on this point in subsequent
proceedings before the Administrative Court of Appeal (see
paragraph 24 of the European Court's judgment). Moreover, they did
not make full use of their entitlement to visit in accordance with
the decisions taken and, on the subject of contacts with the
children, their whole attitude seems to have been rather negative
as regards co-operation with the foster parents and the social
authorities (see paragraphs 25 and 26 of the judgment).
In the particular circumstances of the case and taking into
account the domestic authorities' margin of appreciation, we have
come to the conclusion that the measures taken in implementation
of the care decision could reasonably be considered necessary and
proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued, and that they
accordingly did not give rise to a violation of Article 8 (art. 8)
of the Convention.
SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGES PINHEIRO FARINHA, PETTITI,
WALSH, RUSSO AND DE MEYER
We take the view that the decisions at issue themselves, as
well as their implementation, unjustifiably interfered with the
right of the applicants to respect for their family life.
We feel that it cannot be accepted that children can be taken
away from their parents without a prior judicial decision, save in
cases of emergency.
Moreover, we believe that it has not been shown that in the
present case such a measure was really "necessary in a democratic
society".
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