[неофициальный перевод]
ЕВРОПЕЙСКИЙ СУД ПО ПРАВАМ ЧЕЛОВЕКА
СУДЕБНОЕ РЕШЕНИЕ
ЛУТЦ (LUTZ) ПРОТИВ ФЕДЕРАТИВНОЙ РЕСПУБЛИКИ ГЕРМАНИИ
(Страсбург, 25 августа 1987 года)
(Извлечение)
КРАТКОЕ НЕОФИЦИАЛЬНОЕ ИЗЛОЖЕНИЕ ОБСТОЯТЕЛЬСТВ ДЕЛА
A. Основные факты
За серьезное нарушение правил дорожного движения г-н Лутц,
1959 г. рождения, гражданин ФРГ был привлечен к судебной
ответственности. Однако 24 августа 1981 г. участковый суд
Хейлброна прекратил производство по его делу в связи с истечением
срока давности, но отказался возложить на Казначейство оплату
понесенных им издержек и расходов на том основании, что, как видно
из материалов дела, "обвиняемый, скорее всего, был бы осужден за
нарушение Правил дорожного движения". 25 сентября Земельный суд
Хейлброна отклонил апелляцию г-на Лутца, указав, что участковый
суд был прав, "оставив спорные расходы на заявителе, так как если
бы не истек срок давности, обвиняемый почти наверняка был бы
осужден". Жалоба г-на Лутца в Федеральный Конституционный Суд
также была безуспешной.
B. Разбирательство в Комиссии по правам человека
В жалобе, поданной в Комиссию 14 июня 1982 г., заявитель
утверждал, что были нарушены статья 6 п. 2 Конвенции (презумпция
невиновности), а также статья 6 п. 1 ("разумный срок"
разбирательства). Жалоба была объявлена частично приемлемой 9 июля
1985 г.
В своем докладе от 18 октября 1985 г. Комиссия семью голосами
против пяти выразила мнение, что имело место нарушение
статьи 6 п. 2.
Комиссия передала данное дело в Суд 28 января 1986 г.
ИЗВЛЕЧЕНИЕ ИЗ СУДЕБНОГО РЕШЕНИЯ
ВОПРОСЫ ПРАВА
48. Г-н Лутц обжаловал доводы, приведенные в обоснование
судебных решений, которыми ему было отказано в возмещении
понесенных им издержек и расходов. Он утверждал, что была нарушена
презумпция невиновности - принцип, содержащийся в п. 2 статьи 6
Конвенции, которая гласит:
"Каждый человек, обвиняемый в совершении уголовного
преступления, считается невиновным до тех пор, пока его виновность
не будет установлена законным порядком".
Правительство оспаривало утверждения заявителя; оно считало,
что статья 6 п. 2 не подлежит применению в этом деле и, во всяком
случае, нарушения этой статьи не было.
Комиссия приняла противоположную точку зрения.
I. О предварительном возражении Правительства
49. После того как процесс по делу об "административном
правонарушении" г-на Лутца был прекращен, все судебные издержки и
расходы были возложены на него на том основании, что в случае
продолжения процесса он, вероятнее всего, и даже почти наверняка,
был бы осужден. Заявитель видит в этом нарушение статьи 6 п. 2.
По мнению Суда, об этой ситуации нельзя сказать, что она
находится "скорее всего за пределами Конвенции" (см. Решение от
9 февраля 1967 г. по делу "О языках в Бельгии". Серия A, т. 5,
с. 18). Суду надлежит разрешить в соответствии со статьей 45,
может ли это дело быть решено на основании статьи 6 п. 2. Однако
это вопрос по существу дела, который не может быть решен в порядке
рассмотрения предварительного условия (см. Решение по делу Козика
от 28 августа 1986 г. Серия A, т. 105, с. 19, п. 32).
II. О предполагаемом нарушении статьи 6 п. 2
A. О применимости статьи 6 п. 2
50. По мнению Правительства, статья 6 п. 2 не подлежит
применению к данному случаю, потому что заявителю не было
"предъявлено уголовное обвинение". После того как Законом
1968 / 1975 г., был "декриминализирован" ряд правонарушений,
включая дорожно-транспортные, г-н Лутц обвинялся лишь в совершении
"административного правонарушения". По утверждению Правительства,
такое правонарушение отличается от уголовного как по своим
правовым последствиям и характеристикам, так и по процедуре
рассмотрения.
По мнению Правительства, Решение Суда от 21 февраля 1984 г. по
делу Озтюрка (Серия A, т. 73), сходного по обстоятельствам с
данным делом (нарушение правил дорожного движения), не носит по
отношению к данному делу прецедентного характера. Заявитель,
г-н Лутц, напротив, ссылался на Решение по делу Озтюрка в
подтверждение своей позиции.
Комиссия посчитала, что оба дела сходны по обстоятельствам, и
выводы Суда по делу Озтюрка значимы и для рассматриваемого дела.
51. Суд прежде всего констатирует, что г-н Лутц, как и
г-н Озтюрк, должен нести ответственность за нарушение требований
статьей 1 2 и статьей 49 1 Правил дорожного движения. По
германскому праву, это не уголовное преступление, а
"административное правонарушение". Соответственно возникает
вопрос, имеет ли это различие решающее значение для целей
Конвенции.
52. В деле Озтюрка Суд посчитал, что заявитель был
"обвиняемым" в смысле статьи 6 п. 3. При этом, правда, решался
вопрос о предоставлении заявителю бесплатной помощи переводчика.
Однако Суд соотнес его с пунктом 1 статьи 6, а также с первой
вводной фразой пункта 3 той же статьи. Исходя из того, что пункт 1
статьи 6 содержит основную норму, частными случаями которой
являются п. 2 и 3, Суд подтвердил "автономность" понятия
"уголовное обвинение" в смысле статьи 6 и пришел к выводу, что
нарушение, инкриминируемое г-ну Озтюрку, носило "уголовный
характер" (см. вышеупомянутое Решение, с. 18 и 21, п. 50 и 54).
Суд исходит из той идеи, что "уголовное обвинение",
"обвиняемый в совершении уголовного преступления" и "обвиняемый" -
термины, использованные в трех пунктах статьи 6, говорят об одной
и той же ситуации. Суд и ранее выражал аналогичную позицию, правда
в деле, уголовный характер которого никто не ставил под сомнение
(см. Решения по делу Адольфа от 26 марта 1982 г. Серия A, т. 49,
с. 15, п. 30, и по делу Минелли от 25 марта 1983 г. Серия A,
т. 62, с. 15, п. 27). Правительство не возражало против того, что
термин "обвиняемый" имеет одинаковый смысл во всех трех пунктах
статьи 6 и должен толковаться соответствующим образом.
53. Проблема, поднятая в настоящем случае, в целом такая же,
что уже была разрешена в Судебном решении от 21 февраля 1984 г.
Суд не видит оснований отходить от этого Решения, тем более что
Правительство, Комиссия и адвокат заявителя повторяют доводы,
которые выдвигались в деле Озтюрка.
54. В деле Озтюрка, определяя относится ли "административное
правонарушение" заявителя к "уголовному обвинению", Суд сослался
на критерии, сформулированные им в Решении от 8 июня 1976 г. по
делу Энгель и другие (Серия A, т. 22, с. 34 - 35, п. 82). Он
суммировал их следующим образом:
"Первый вопрос, который надо выяснить, отнесен ли в правовой
системе государства - ответчика текст, говорящий о данном
правонарушении, к уголовному праву; далее определить природу
правонарушения и, наконец, характер и степень суровости наказания,
которое рискует понести заинтересованное лицо, и все это в свете
предмета и цели статьи 6 и обычного значения, используемых в ней
терминов (см. Решение по делу Озтюрка. Серия A, т. 73, с. 18,
п. 50).
Действуя в соответствии с этими принципами, Суд пришел к
выводу, что рассмотренное тогда правонарушение носило характер
"уголовного" в целях и свете статьи 6 (там же, с. 20, п. 53).
Эти соображения применимы к данному делу.
55. Правительство критикует Решение по делу Озтюрка в том, что
в нем не учтены вид и степень суровости санкции, которая могла
быть применима к заявителю. В этом оно видит отличие от дела
Энгель и другие от 8 июля 1976 г.
Суд считает, что два критерия, использованные в этом деле,
альтернативны, а не комулятивны. Для того чтобы статья 6
применялась достаточно, требуется чтобы рассматриваемое нарушение
было с точки зрения Конвенции "уголовным" по своей природе или
подвергало заинтересованное лицо риску понести наказание, которое
по своему характеру и степени тяжести могло быть приравнено к
"уголовному" (см. также Решение по делу Кэмпбелла и Фелла от
28 июня 1984 г. Серия A, т. 80, с. 35 - 38, п. 69 - 73).
56. Правительство утверждает также, что по истечении срока
давности, что окончательно констатировано 24 августа 1981 г.
участковым судом Хейлброна, статья 6 п. 2 перестала действовать,
поскольку "осуждение заявителя стало невозможным".
В еще большей степени чем Комиссия, Суд не согласен с этой
позицией. Давность прекратила уголовное преследование, но имеется
Судебное решение от 24 августа 1981 г., которое устанавливает это
(п. 16 выше) и одновременно определяет в соответствии со
статьями 464 и 467 Уголовно-Процессуального уложения в сочетании
со статьей 46 Закона об административных правонарушениях, кто
несет судебные издержки. Без решения этого вопроса процедура не
может быть прекращена. Статья 464 Уголовно-Процессуального
уложения четко говорит об этом.
57. Таким образом, статья 6 п. 2 подлежит применению к данному
случаю. Однако отсюда не следует, что подход к данному вопросу
права Германии - или другой страны - ставится под сомнение.
Учитывая большое количество незначительных правонарушений - в
особенности правил дорожного движения, - характер которых не столь
опасен, чтобы подвергать нарушителей уголовному наказанию,
государства - участники имеют веские основания для введения такой
системы, которая разгружает их суды от большинства подобных дел.
Преследования и наказания за незначительные правонарушения в
административном порядке не противоречат Конвенции, при условии,
что заинтересованные лица могут обжаловать вынесенное против них
решение в Суд, где действуют гарантии, предусмотренные статьей 6.
B. Соблюдение статьи 6 п. 2
58. Заявитель указал, что выдвинутые против него обвинения не
рассматривались в Суде согласно предписанной законом процедуре. Он
утверждал, что в обосновании решения об издержках и расходах
явственно присутствует признание его виновным, что равнозначно
"замаскированному осуждению".
По мнению Правительства, отказ Суда дать предписание
Казначейству взять на себя судебные издержки и расходы г-на Лутца
не может рассматриваться как мера, которая по своим последствиям
может стать равносильной наказанию. Обоснование, приведенное в
решениях, на которые жалуется заявитель, не содержит скрытого
признания вины обвиняемого: суды использовали формулу "состоял под
подозрением" с единственной целью вынесения справедливого решения
относительно оплаты издержек и расходов. Кроме того, в случаях
когда дело прекращено, Конвенция не обязывает государство
возместить лицу, "обвиненному в совершении уголовного
преступления", какие-либо понесенные им убытки. Вопрос о
несоответствии Конвенции мотивировочной части решения не имеет
смысла, если ей соответствует его постановляющая часть, которая
только и имеет окончательный и обязательный для исполнения
характер.
Комиссия, так же как и заявитель, считает, что имело место
нарушение статьи 6 п. 2, т.к. мотивировка, на которую жалуется
заявитель, легко может быть понята в том смысле, что заявитель не
только остается под подозрением в совершении правонарушения, но и
виновен в нем.
59. Суд прежде всего согласен с Комиссией и Правительством в
том, что ни статья 6 п. 2, ни какое-либо иное положение Конвенции
не дают лицу, "обвиняемому в совершении уголовного преступления",
права на возмещение его расходов в случае, если его дело
прекращено. Отказ возместить г-ну Лутцу его издержки и расходы сам
по себе не нарушает презумпцию невиновности, тем более что адвокат
заявителя, отвечая на вопрос председательствующего в суде,
подтвердил, что его клиент оспаривает не отказ, а единственно его
мотивировку.
60. Тем не менее решение об отказе "обвиняемому" в возмещении
его издержек и расходов вследствие прекращения судебного дела
может повлечь постановку вопроса о соответствии статье 6 п. 2 в
том случае, если мотивировочная часть, которая не может быть
отделена от постановляющей, по существу приближается к
установлению вины обвиняемого без предварительного доказательства
ее в установленном законом порядке.
61. По германскому законодательству (Уголовно-Процессуальное
уложение, статья 467), если уголовное дело прекращено судом,
последний может вынести решение, предписывающее Казначейству
возместить расходы и издержки обвиняемого. Применяя эту норму,
суды пользуются определенной степенью усмотрения, основываются на
справедливости и среди учитываемых обстоятельств обязаны принимать
во внимание inter alia тяжесть падавшего на заинтересованное лицо
подозрения.
62. Обосновывая свое решение не оплачивать издержки и расходы
г-на Лутца, участковый суд Хейлброна отметил, что "как явствует из
материалов дела, обвиняемый, вероятнее всего, был бы осужден".
Отклоняя апелляцию заявителя, Земельный суд указал среди прочего,
что если бы не истечение срока давности, то обвиняемый "почти
наверняка был бы признан виновным". По мнению Федерального
Конституционного Суда, "основания для Судебного решения об
издержках по оспариваемым решениям... справедливо сведены к
установлению того обстоятельства, что обвиняемый скорее всего был
бы признан виновным".
Таким образом, немецкие суды указали, как этого и требовала
логика решения, что серьезные подозрения относительно г-на Лутца
по-прежнему существуют. Даже если использованные для этого
формулировки кажутся нечеткими и недостаточными, тем не менее по
существу они оставляют резонные основания подозревать заявителя в
совершении правонарушения (статья 5 п. 1 "c"). При этом суды
основывались на имеющихся доказательствах, в частности показаниях
самого заявителя. Решения этих судов отличны от схожих решений, с
которыми Суд столкнулся в деле Минелли (25 марта 1983 г. Серия A,
т. 62, с. 8 - 12).
63. В деле Минелли швейцарские суды возложили на обвиняемого
часть судебных издержек и, более того, обязали его возместить
расходы частным обвинителям, что вполне может быть оценено как
наказание. В отличие от этого отказ от оплаты издержек и расходов
г-на Лутца не приближается к наказанию или к мере, равносильной
наказанию. Тем более что г-ну Лутцу не пришлось нести собственно
судебных издержек; речь идет о его личных издержках и расходах.
Германские суды, действуя на основе справедливости и считая, что
подозрение в отношении заявителя продолжает существовать, не
налагают на него каких-либо санкций, а лишь отказываются отдать
приказ об оплате из государственных фондов его издержек и
расходов. Как Суд уже указывал, Конвенция - и, в частности,
статья 6 п. 2 - не обязывает Договаривающиеся государства
возместить лицу, "обвиненному в совершении уголовного
преступления", его убытки, если уголовное преследование было
прекращено.
64. Таким образом, решение участкового суда Хейлброна,
подтвержденное Земельным судом и Федеральным конституционным
Судом, не нарушает презумпцию невиновности, гарантированную
заявителю согласно статье 6, п. 2.
ПО ЭТИМ ОСНОВАНИЯМ СУД
1. Отверг единогласно предварительное возражение о том, что
жалоба не подпадает под действие Конвенции;
2. Постановил четырнадцатью голосами против трех, что статья 6
п. 2 подлежит в данном случае применению;
3. Постановил шестнадцатью голосами против одного, что
нарушение этой статьи не имело места.
Совершено на английском и французском языках и оглашено во
Дворце прав человека в Страсбурге 25 августа 1987 г.
Председатель
Рольф РИССДАЛ
Грефье
Марк-Андре ЭЙССЕН
В соответствии со статьей 51 п. 2 Конвенции и статьей 52 п. 2
Регламента Суда к настоящему Решению прилагаются заявление г-на
Тора Вильялмсона и особые мнения судей.
ЗАЯВЛЕНИЕ СУДЬИ ТОРА ВИЛЬЯЛМСОНА
По этому делу я голосовал иначе, чем по делу Озтюрка. Это
изменение подсказано решением большинства по данному делу.
ОСОБОЕ МНЕНИЕ СУДЬИ КРЕМОНА
Соглашаясь с Решением в той части, где оно отклоняет
предварительное возражение Правительства о применимости статьи 6
п. 2 Конвенции, я сожалею, что не могу поступить так же в
отношении другого вопроса и, как большинство Комиссии, считаю, что
имело место нарушение этой статьи.
Для того, чтобы внести ясность по поводу некоторых аспектов, я
бы хотел предварительно отметить следующее:
1. Во-первых, я согласен с решением, что ни статья 6 п. 2, ни
какая-либо другая норма Конвенции не дают лицу, обвиняемому в
совершении уголовного преступления, права на возмещение его
расходов, если процесс против него прекращен, и что отказ
внутренних судов в таком возмещении не нарушает презумпции
невиновности (п. 59 Решения).
2. Во-вторых, я также согласен с тем, что решение об отказе в
таком возмещении вследствие прекращения дела может, однако,
повлечь вопрос в рамках статьи 6 п. 2, в том случае, если его
мотивировочная часть, которую нельзя отделить от постановляющей,
по существу приближается к констатации вины обвиняемого без
предварительного доказательства ее в установленном порядке и, в
частности, без предоставления лицу возможности воспользоваться
своим правом на защиту (п. 60 Решения).
Я полагаю, что решение Суда об отсутствии нарушения основано
на двух моментах:
a) оспариваемые решения внутренних судов описывают только
"состояние подозрения" и не касаются установления вины
(п. 62 Решения);
b) отказ судов от возмещения заявителю его издержек и расходов
не означает наказания или меры, равносильной наказанию
(п. 63 Решения).
Что касается первого пункта, то ясно, что элемент подозрения
присутствует в силу самого факта предъявления лицу уголовного
обвинения; это обязательный момент механизма уголовного
преследования. Сама Конвенция, говоря о случаях, когда лицо может
быть лишено свободы, упоминает "законный арест или задержание
лица, произведенное с тем, чтобы оно предстало перед компетентным
судебным органом по обоснованному подозрению в совершении
правонарушения" (статья 5 п. 1 "c").
Однако в настоящем деле четкие и недвусмысленные формулировки,
использованные судами в своих определениях, идут гораздо дальше.
В самом деле, в решении участкового суда Хейлброна о
прекращении производства, которым заявителю одновременно отказано
в возмещении его издержек и расходов недвусмысленным образом
говорится, что "как следует из материалов дела, обвиняемый, скорее
всего, был бы осужден". Более того, Земельный суд Хейлброна,
отклонив апелляцию заявителя, отметил, и вновь в недвусмысленных
выражениях, что если бы уголовное преследование не было прекращено
в связи с истечением срока давности, то "обвиняемый почти
наверняка был бы признан виновным в совершении правонарушения". В
обоснование своего решения суд сослался на то, что заявитель
признал в полиции некоторые факты. Решение Федерального
Конституционного Суда нисколько не изменило ситуацию.
Таким образом, по моему мнению, создалась ситуация, о которой
говорится в п. 60 Решения (см. выше). И действительно, перед нами
судебные решения о прекращении уголовного дела, которыми
отказывается или подтверждается отказ возместить обвиняемому его
издержки и расходы, где мотивировочная часть (которую нельзя
отделить от постановляющей) по существу приближается к констатации
вины обвиняемого без предварительного доказательства ее в
установленном порядке и, в частности, без предоставления ему
возможности воспользоваться своим правом на защиту.
Как и большинство Комиссии, я нахожу, что приведенная выше
позиция судов вполне может быть понята так, что обвиняемый
фактически виновен в совершении уголовно наказуемого деяния. Так
обычно и понимаются формулировки типа этой. Когда речь идет о
таком основополагающем принципе, как презумпция невиновности,
важно не возможное намерение, с которым те или иные слова были
высказаны в судебных решениях, а реальный смысл этих слов для
широкой публики. Решающее значение имеет созданное таким образом
впечатление, что суды действительно считают лицо виновным. В
результате происходит то, что, с моей точки зрения, выглядит как
вынесение суррогата обвинительного приговора без возможности
воспользоваться гарантией, предоставляемой статьей 6 п. 2.
Впрочем, формулировки обвинительного характера в данном деле
по существу мало чем отличаются от тех, что послужили причиной
дела Минелли, где Суд признал нарушение этой гарантии. Была
предпринята попытка провести различие между тем и этим делом с
помощью конструкции "наказания в содержании решения", и это
позволяет мне обратиться ко второму пункту обоснования вывода об
отсутствии нарушения.
Относительно вопроса об отсутствии наказания или меры, которую
можно считать ему равносильной, я хотел бы сказать, что их
отсутствие ни в коей мере не делает мои выводы необоснованными.
Принцип презумпции невиновности может быть нарушен и без
применения наказания. Презумпция сопровождает обвиняемого в
совершении уголовного преступления в течение всего процесса,
вплоть до приговора. Этот важнейший принцип современного
уголовного процесса оказался бы малозначимым, если бы сфера его
действия охватывала лишь дела, завершающиеся наказанием, или,
используя фразеологию Судебного решения, мерой ему равнозначной.
Наказание обычно является только заключительной стадией уголовного
преследования, а современное уголовное право предусматривает
возможность вынесения обвинительного приговора без наказания или
меры ему равнозначной (например, английская система "полного
освобождения от наказания").
Решающим является не факт наложения наказания, а судебное
признание вины заявителя, и по данному делу формулировки,
использованные в судебных решениях, влекут именно такой вывод.
Поэтому я нахожу, что имело место нарушение статьи 6 п. 2
Конвенции.
СОВМЕСТНОЕ ОСОБОЕ МНЕНИЕ
СУДЕЙ БИНДШЕДЛЕР-РОБЕРТ, МАТШЕРА И БЕРНХАРДТА
О ПРИМЕНИМОСТИ СТАТЬИ 6
По основаниям, указанным в особых мнениях, которые мы выразили
по делу Озтюрка, мы, к сожалению, не можем подписаться под
Решением Суда; мы продолжаем придерживаться той точки зрения, что
в делах подобного рода статья 6 Конвенции не применима.
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
CASE OF LUTZ v. GERMANY
JUDGMENT
(Strasbourg, 25.VIII.1987)
In the Lutz case <1>,
--------------------------------
<1> Note by the Registrar: The case is numbered
8/1986/106/154. The second figure indicates the year in which the
case was referred to the Court and the first figure its place on
the list of cases referred in that year; the last two figures
indicate, respectively, the case's order on the list of cases and
of originating applications (to the Commission) referred to the
Court since its creation.
The European Court of Human Rights, taking its decision in
plenary session pursuant to Rule 50 of the Rules of Court and
composed of the following judges:
Mr. R. Ryssdal, President,
Mr. J. Cremona,
Mr. {Thor Vilhjalmsson} <*>,
Mrs. D. Bindschedler-Robert,
Mr. G. Lagergren,
Mr. {F. Golcuklu,}
Mr. F. Matscher,
Mr. J. Pinheiro Farinha,
Mr. L.-E. Pettiti,
Sir Vincent Evans,
Mr. R. Macdonald,
Mr. C. Russo,
Mr. R. Bernhardt,
Mr. J. Gersing,
Mr. A. Spielmann,
Mr. J. De Meyer,
Mr. N. Valticos,
and also of Mr. M.-A. Eissen, Registrar, and Mr. H. Petzold,
Deputy Registrar,
--------------------------------
<*> Здесь и далее по тексту слова на национальном языке
набраны латинским шрифтом и выделены фигурными скобками.
Having deliberated in private on 26 February and 24 June 1987,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the
last-mentioned date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case was referred to the Court by the European
Commission of Human Rights ("the Commission") on 28 January 1986,
within the three-month period laid down by Article 32 1 and
Article 47 (art. 32-1, art. 47) of the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ("the
Convention"). It originated in an application (no. 9912/82)
against the Federal Republic of Germany lodged with the Commission
under Article 25 (art. 25) by a national of that State,
Mr. Uli Lutz, on 14 June 1982.
The Commission's request referred to Articles 44 and 48
(art. 44, art. 48) and to the declaration whereby the Federal
Republic of Germany recognised the compulsory jurisdiction of the
Court (Article 46) (art. 46). The purpose of the request was to
obtain a decision as to whether or not the facts of the case
disclosed a breach by the respondent State of its obligations
under Article 6 2 (art. 6-2).
2. In response to the enquiry made in accordance with Rule 33
3 (d) of the Rules of Court, Mr. Lutz stated that he wished to
take part in the proceedings pending before the Court and
designated the lawyer who would represent him (Rule 30).
3. On 28 January 1986, the President of the Court decided that
in the interests of the proper administration of justice this case
and the Englert and {Nolkenbockhoff} cases should be considered by
the same Chamber (Rule 21 6).
The Chamber of seven judges to be constituted included, as ex
officio members, Mr. R. Bernhardt, the elected judge of German
nationality (Article 43 of the Convention) (art. 43), and
Mr. R. Ryssdal, the President of the Court (Rule 21 3 (b)). On
19 March 1986, in the presence of the Registrar, the President
drew by lot the names of the other five members, namely
Mr. F. Matscher, Mr. J. Pinheiro Farinha, Mr. L.-E. Pettiti,
Sir Vincent Evans and Mr. R. Macdonald (Article 43 in fine of the
Convention and Rule 21 4) (art. 43).
4. After assuming the office of President of the Chamber
(Rule 21 5), Mr. Ryssdal consulted - through the Deputy
Registrar - the Agent of the German Government ("the Government"),
the Delegate of the Commission and the lawyer for the applicant on
the need for a written procedure. On 2 April, he directed that the
Agent and the applicant's lawyer should have until 1 July 1986 to
file memorials and that the Delegate should be entitled to reply
in writing within two months (Rule 37 1). At the same time, he
gave the applicant's lawyer leave to use the German language in
the proceedings (Rule 27 3).
The President twice extended the first of these time-limits -
on 3 July until 31 October, and on 10 November until 21 November
1986.
5. The Government's memorial was lodged with the registry on
13 November 1986. The applicant informed the Registrar on the same
day that he would not be filing a memorial.
6. On 29 November, the Chamber decided to relinquish
jurisdiction forthwith in favour of the plenary Court (Rule 50).
7. On 15 December, the Secretary to the Commission informed
the Registrar that the Delegate would submit his observations at
the hearing.
8. The next day, having consulted - through the Deputy
Registrar - the Agent of the Government, the Delegate of the
Commission and the lawyer for the applicant, the President
directed that the oral proceedings should open on 23 February 1987
(Rule 38). On 6 February, he granted the members of the
Government's delegation leave to speak in German (Rule 27 2).
9. The hearing was held in public in the Human Rights
Building, Strasbourg, on the appointed day. The Court had held a
preparatory meeting immediately beforehand.
There appeared before the Court:
- for the Government
Mrs. I. Maier, Ministerialdirigentin, Federal Ministry of
Justice, Agent,
Mr. P.-G. {Potz}, Ministerialdirigent, Federal Ministry of
Justice,
Mr. H. {Stocker}, Ministerialrat, Federal Ministry of Justice,
Mr. E. {Gohler}, Ministerialrat, Federal Ministry of Justice,
Advisers;
- for the Commission
Mr. A. Weitzel, Delegate;
- for the applicant
Mr. N. Wingerter, Rechtsanwalt,
Mr. V. Hohbach, Rechtsanwalt, Counsel.
The Court heard addresses by Mrs. Maier for the Government, by
Mr. Weitzel for the Commission and by Mr. Wingerter and
Mr. Hohbach for the applicant, as well as their replies to its
questions.
10. On various dates between 3 February and 11 May 1987, the
Commission, the Government and the applicant produced a number of
documents either at the Court's request or of their own motion.
AS TO THE FACTS
I. Particular circumstances of the case
11. Mr. Uli Lutz, a German national born in 1959, lives in
Heilbronn-Horkheim.
12. On 10 October 1980, he was riding a motor cycle and was
involved in a road accident. According to the police report
(Verkehrs-Ordnungswidrigkeiten-Anzeige), he had attempted to
overtake a car, although the traffic situation was unclear
(unklare Verkehrslage). The result had been a collision which
caused damage to both vehicles.
When he was questioned, the applicant made the following
statement:
"At about 4.30 p.m. today, I was driving southwards along
Hohenloher Strasse, Heilbronn-Horkheim.
Near the junction with Amsterdamer Strasse, I noticed a red
car - which had its left indicator flashing - about to pull away
from the kerb.
I was about to overtake on the left of this vehicle when it
not only moved forward onto the road but turned further to the
left in order to make a U-turn.
[It] was making its U-turn and was on the point of moving into
the opposite carriageway (Gegenfahrspur) when I was still about
ten yards behind it. As I was not expecting it to make a U-turn, I
was intending to overtake it on the left.
By the time I realised that this was no longer possible, I had
already moved over quite far to the left and I tried to brake but
could not avoid colliding with the car, which by now was at right
angles to the flow of traffic.
I was wearing a crash helmet when the accident occurred; I was
not injured."
13. On 9 December 1980, on the basis of the police report, the
Heilbronn Police Authority (Amt {fur offentliche} Ordnung) imposed
on Mr. Lutz a fine (Geldbusse) of DM 125, to which were added
costs of DM 14, for "joint responsibility for a road accident due
to overtaking in an unclear traffic situation such that a
collision was caused with another road-user".
The decision was based on section 24 of the Road Traffic Act
(Strassenverkehrsgesetz - see paragraph 38 below) and Regulations
1(2), 5 and 49 of the Road Traffic Regulations
(Strassenverkehrs-Ordnung). Regulation 1(2) reads:
"All road-users have a duty to conduct themselves in such a
manner as not to harm or jeopardise others or inconvenience or
annoy them more than may be inevitable in the circumstances."
Regulation 5 provides that motorists must overtake on the left
(paragraph 1), that they may overtake only if they can see that
they will not thereby interfere with oncoming traffic (paragraph
2) and that no overtaking is allowed in an unclear traffic
situation (paragraph 3(1)).
By Regulation 49(1)(1) and 49(5), it is a "regulatory offence"
(Ordnungswidrigkeit) to contravene Regulations 1(2) and 5(1)
to (3); under section 24(2) of the Road Traffic Act, such an
offence is punishable by a fine.
14. The driver of the car was likewise fined for a "regulatory
offence".
15. Two days later, Mr. Lutz, who was represented by
Mr. Wingerter, lodged an objection (Einspruch) against the
decision of 9 December 1980. The appropriate authority in
Heilbronn forwarded the objection to the public prosecutor's
office on 23 January 1981, and the latter transmitted it to the
Heilbronn District Court (Amtsgericht) on 5 February.
On 24 July 1981, the court informed the applicant that it
intended to discontinue the proceedings as they were time-barred
and order costs against the Treasury (Staatskasse), while the
applicant would have to bear his own necessary costs and expenses
(notwendige Auslagen).
On 12 August, Mr. Wingerter replied that his client naturally
agreed to the stay of proceedings, but not to an order requiring
him to bear his own necessary costs and expenses; and he referred
among other things to "the presumption of innocence, secured in
the Convention on Human Rights".
16. On 24 August 1981, the District Court stayed the
proceedings on the ground that they were time-barred. Its decision
read as follows:
"In the "regulatory offence" matter (Bussgeldsache)
against ... Uli Lutz
concerning a breach of the Road Traffic Regulations,
...
the proceedings shall be stayed.
The costs of the proceedings shall be borne by the Treasury.
The defendant shall bear his own necessary costs and expenses.
Reasons:
On 9 December 1980, the Heilbronn Police Authority took a
decision to impose a fine (Bussgeldbescheid) on the defendant for
a breach of the Road Traffic Regulations. The defendant appealed
against this decision. By an order made on 27 January 1981, the
public prosecutor's office in Heilbronn forwarded the case to the
Heilbronn District Court for a decision. After the case had been
submitted, prosecution of the "regulatory offence" became
time-barred under section 26(4) of the Road Traffic Act. The
proceedings must therefore be stayed by reason of there being a
technical bar to prosecution (Verfolgungshindernis), in accordance
with Article 206a of the Code of Criminal Procedure, taken
together with section 46 of the Act on "regulatory offences"
(Gesetz {uber} Ordnungswidrigkeiten) [see paragraph 19 below].
The decision on costs is based on Article 467 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, taken together with section 46 of the Act on
"regulatory offences".
In accordance with Article 467 2 [sic], second sentence, of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, taken together with section 46 of
the Act on "regulatory offences", the court declines to order the
Treasury to bear the defendant's necessary costs and expenses. As
the file stands, the defendant would most probably have been
convicted of an offence against the Road Traffic Regulations (Nach
Lage der Akten {ware} der Betroffene mit hoher Wahrscheinlichkeit
wegen eines Verstosses gegen die StVO verurteilt worden). That
being so, it would be unjust (unbillig to award his necessary
costs and expenses against the Treasury."
17. On 10 September 1981, the applicant challenged this
decision in so far as he had been ordered to bear his own costs
and expenses.
On 25 September, the Heilbronn Regional Court (Landgericht)
dismissed the appeal (sofortige Beschwerde) as being unfounded.
The court held that Article 6 2 (art. 6-2) of the Convention
did not apply to the case. As it had already explained at length
in an earlier decision, Article 6 (art. 6) protected the
individual only from possible hazards in civil or criminal trials.
This was clear beyond a peradventure from the wording of the
provision itself. There was no reason to give Article 6 2
(art. 6-2) a broad interpretation such as would extend its
application to other proceedings. The Article (art. 6-2)
consequently could not apply to proceedings in connection with
"regulatory offences", as these had been excluded from the
category of criminal offences, and procedure relating to them was
quite distinct from criminal procedure. On the basis that
Article 6 2 (art. 6-2) was not applicable, the District Court
had therefore been right to order the defendant to bear his own
necessary costs and expenses (under Article 467 3, second
sentence, sub-paragraph 2, of the Code of Criminal Procedure)
because had the prosecution not been statute-barred, "the
defendant would almost certainly (mit {annahernder} Sicherheit)
have been found guilty of an offence". He had himself admitted to
the police that he was not expecting the car which was moving out
to the left onto the road in front of him to make a U-turn; and
that he had consequently attempted to overtake it but had been
unable to avoid a collision despite his efforts to brake. Mr. Lutz
had thus broken the basic rule in Regulation 1(2) of the Road
Traffic Regulations and, in particular, had disregarded his duty
under Regulation 5(3)(1) not to overtake where the traffic
situation was unclear. The court held that in such circumstances
it would have been unjust to award the defendant's necessary costs
and expenses against the Treasury, especially as the prosecution
had become time-barred only during the course of the court
proceedings, so that until that moment the defendant was rightly
being proceeded against.
18. Mr. Lutz then applied to the Federal Constitutional Court
(Bundesverfassungsgericht), but on 2 February 1982 a bench of
three of that court's judges refused to entertain the application,
holding that it had insufficient prospects of success.
In the Constitutional Court's view, the decisions of the
District Court and the Regional Court did not offend the
presumption of innocence, which was founded on the principle of
the rule of law and was embodied in Article 6 2 (art. 6-2) of
the Convention. However strong the suspicions, the presumption of
innocence precluded taking measures against a defendant
(Beschuldigter) that amounted in effect to a penalty (Strafe) in
anticipation of a penalty (im Vorgriff auf die Strafe). This rule
was not infringed where the necessary costs and expenses of a
party who had been proceeded against in respect of a "regulatory
offence" were not awarded against the Treasury in the event of the
proceedings being discontinued. The judgment continued:
"The decision not to order the Treasury to pay the costs and
expenses of the party concerned obviously cannot be regarded as a
punishment (Bestrafung) or even be equated with such. Furthermore,
the decision as to costs and expenses pursuant to Article 467 3,
sub-paragraph 2, of the Code of Criminal Procedure and
section 46(1) of the Act on "regulatory offences" does not make
any finding that the person concerned is guilty: it derives merely
from the suspicion falling on him, which had given rise to his
being prosecuted for a "regulatory offence". The reasons for the
order as to costs in the impugned decisions are therefore rightly
confined to the finding that the defendant would most probably
have been found guilty."
II. Relevant domestic law
A. Act on "regulatory offences"
19. The subject of "regulatory offences" is governed by the
Act of 24 May 1968 on "regulatory offences" (Gesetz {uber}
Ordnungswidrigkeiten), in its version of 1 January 1975 ("the
1968/1975 Act"). The purpose of this legislation was to remove
petty offences from the sphere of the criminal law. Included in
this category were contraventions of the Road Traffic Act. Under
section 21 of the Road Traffic Act (in its old version),
commission of such contraventions had given rise to liability to a
fine (Geldstrafe) or imprisonment (Haft). Section 3(6) of the Act
of 24 May 1968 ({Einfuhrungsgesetz} zum Gesetz {uber}
Ordnungswidrigkeiten) classified them as "Ordnungswidrigkeiten"
and henceforth made them punishable only by fines (Geldbussen) not
deemed to be criminal by the legislature.
The 1968/1975 Act had been preceded in the Federal Republic by
the Act of 25 March 1952 on "regulatory offences" and, to a
certain extent, the Economic Crime Act of 26 July 1949
(Wirtschaftsstrafgesetz). It was most recently amended by a
statute of 7 July 1986, which entered into force on 1 April 1987.
1. General provisions
20. Section 1(1) of the 1968/1975 Act defines a "regulatory
offence" as an unlawful (rechtswidrig) and reprehensible
(vorwerfbar) act, contravening a legal provision which makes
offenders liable to a fine. The fine cannot be less than DM 5 or,
as a general rule, more than DM 1,000 (section 17(1)). The amount
of the fine is fixed in each case by reference to the seriousness
of the offence, the degree of misconduct attributable to the
offender and, save for minor ({geringfugig}) offences, the
offender's financial circumstances (section 17(3)).
If the act constitutes both a "regulatory" and a criminal
offence, only the criminal law is applicable; however, if no
criminal penalty (Strafe) is imposed, the act may be punished as a
"regulatory offence" (section 21).
2. The prosecuting authorities
21. "Regulatory offences" are to be dealt with by the
administrative authorities ({Verwaltungsbehorde}) designated by
law, save in so far as the 1968/1975 Act confers the power of
prosecution of such offences on the public prosecutor and the
trial and punishment of them on the courts (sections 35 and 36).
Where an act has come before him as a criminal matter, the public
prosecutor may also treat the act as a "regulatory offence"
(section 40).
22. The administrative authorities will remit the matter to
the public prosecutor if there is reason to suppose that a
criminal offence has been committed; he will refer the matter back
to them if he does not take proceedings (section 41). In the case
of a "regulatory offence" having a close connection with a
criminal offence in respect of which the public prosecutor has
instituted proceedings, the prosecutor may extend the criminal
proceedings to cover the "regulatory offence" as long as the
administrative authorities have not fixed any fine (section 42).
The public prosecutor's decision to treat or not to treat an
act as a criminal offence is binding on the administrative
authorities (section 44).
3. Procedure in general
23. Subject to the exceptions laid down in the 1968/1975 Act,
the provisions of the ordinary law governing criminal procedure -
in particular the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Judicature Act
(Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz) and the Juvenile Courts Act
(Jugendgerichtsgesetz) - are applicable by analogy ({sinngemass})
to the procedure in respect of "regulatory offences"
(section 46(1)). The prosecuting authorities (see paragraph 21
above) have the same rights and duties as the public prosecutor in
a criminal matter unless the 1968/1975 Act itself states otherwise
(section 46(2)). Nevertheless, a number of measures permissible in
criminal matters cannot be ordered in respect of "regulatory
offences", notably arrest, interim police custody ({vorlaufige}
Festnahme) and seizure of mail or telegrams (section 46(3)). The
taking of blood samples and other minor measures within the
meaning of Article 81(a) 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
remain possible.
24. The prosecution of "regulatory offences" lies within the
discretion ({pflichtgemasses} Ermessen) of the competent
authority, which may terminate the prosecution at any time while
the case is pending before it (section 47(1)).
Once the case has been brought before a court (see paragraphs
29 - 30 below), power to direct a stay of proceedings rests with
the court; any such decision requires the agreement of the public
prosecutor and is final (section 47(2)).
25. As regards the judicial stage (if any) of the proceedings
(see paragraphs 30 - 32 below), section 46(7) of the 1968/1975 Act
vests jurisdiction in divisions (Abteilungen) of the district
courts and in chambers (Kammern/Senate) of the regional courts, of
the courts of appeal (Oberlandesgerichte) and of the Federal Court
of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof).
4. Preliminary procedure
26. Investigations (Erforschung) into "regulatory offences"
are a matter for the police authorities. In this connection, the
police authorities enjoy a discretion ({pflichtgemasses}
Ermessen); save in so far as the 1968/1975 Act provides otherwise,
they have the same rights and duties as in the investigation of
criminal offences (section 53(1)).
27. Prior to any decision being taken, the person concerned
(Betroffener) has to be given the opportunity of commenting, to
the competent authorities, on the allegation made against him
(section 55).
In the case of a minor offence, the administrative authorities
may give the person concerned a warning (Verwarnung) and impose on
him an admonitory fine (Verwarnungsgeld); save for any exception
laid down under the applicable law, the amount of an admonitory
fine ranged from DM 5 to 40 at the relevant time, and since 1
April 1987 has ranged from DM 5 to 75 (section 56(1)). However,
sanctions of this kind are possible only if the person concerned
consents and pays the fine on the spot or within one week
(section 56(2)).
28. If necessary, the administrative authorities will
officially designate a lawyer to act for the person concerned in
the proceedings before them (section 60).
Measures taken by the administrative authorities during the
preliminary procedure can in principle be challenged before the
courts (section 62).
5. Administrative decision imposing a fine
29. Save in so far as the 1968/1975 Act provides otherwise -
as in the case of the matter being settled by payment of an
admonitory fine -, a "regulatory offence" is punishable by an
administrative decision imposing a fine (Bussgeldbescheid;
section 65).
The person concerned may lodge an objection (Einspruch) within
a period which on 1 April 1987 was increased from one week to two
weeks (section 67). Unless they withdraw their decision, the
administrative authorities will then forward the file to the
public prosecutor, who will submit it to the competent District
Court and thereupon assume the function of prosecuting authority
(sections 68 and 69).
6. Judicial stage (if any) of the procedure
30. Under section 71, if the District Court finds the
objection admissible (section 70) it will, unless the 1968/1975
Act states otherwise, examine the objection in accordance with the
provisions applicable to an objection against an order of summary
punishment (Strafbefehl): in principle, it will hold a hearing and
deliver a judgment (Urteil) which may impose a heavier sentence
(Article 411 of the Code of Criminal Procedure).
However, the District Court's ruling may take the form of an
order (Beschluss) if the court considers that a hearing is not
necessary and provided the public prosecutor or the person
concerned does not object (section 72(1)). In that event, it may,
inter alia, acquit the person concerned, settle the amount of a
fine or terminate the prosecution, but it cannot increase the
penalty (section 72(2), now renumbered (3)).
31. The person concerned has the option of attending the
hearing but is not bound to do so unless the District Court so
directs (section 73(1) and (2)); he may be represented by a lawyer
(section 73(4)).
The public prosecutor's office may be represented at the
hearing; if the District Court considers the presence of an
official from that office to be appropriate, it will inform the
latter accordingly (section 75(1)).
The District Court will give the administrative authorities
the opportunity to set out the matters which, in their view, are
of importance for the decision to be given; they may address the
Court at the hearing, if they so wish (section 76(1)).
32. Subject to certain conditions, section 79 allows an appeal
on points of law (Rechtsbeschwerde) to be brought against a
judgment or an order issued pursuant to section 72; save in so far
as the 1968/1975 Act states otherwise, in determining the appeal
the court concerned will follow, by analogy, the provisions of the
Code of Criminal Procedure relating to review proceedings
(Revision).
7. Administrative procedure and criminal procedure
33. The administrative authorities' classification of an act
as a "regulatory offence" is not binding on the court ruling on
the objection; however, it can apply the criminal law only if the
person concerned has been informed of the change of classification
and been enabled to prepare his defence (section 81(1)). Once this
condition has been satisfied, either by the court of its own
motion or at the public prosecutor's request, the person concerned
acquires the formal status of an accused (Angeklagter;
section 81(2)) and the subsequent proceedings fall outside the
scope of the 1968/1975 Act (section 81(3)).
8. Enforcement of decisions imposing a fine
34. A decision imposing a fine is enforceable once it has
become final (sections 89 and 84). Unless the 1968/1975 Act states
otherwise, enforcement of a decision taken by the administrative
authorities is governed by the Federal Act or the Land Act, as the
case may be, on enforcement in administrative matters
(Verwaltungs-Vollstreckungsgesetze) (section 90(1)). When the
decision is one taken by a court, certain relevant provisions of,
inter alia, the Code of Criminal Procedure are applicable
(section 91).
35. If, without having established (dargetan) his inability to
pay, the person concerned has not paid the fine in due time, the
court may, at the request of the administrative authorities or,
where the fine was imposed by a court decision, of its own motion,
order coercive imprisonment (Erzwingungshaft - section 96(1)). The
resultant detention does not replace payment of the fine in the
manner of an Ersatzfreiheitsstrafe under the criminal law, but is
intended to compel payment. The period of detention may not exceed
six weeks for one fine and three months for several fines
(section 96(3)). Implementation of the detention order is
governed, inter alia, by the Code of Criminal Procedure
(section 97).
9. Costs
36. As far as the costs of the administrative procedure are
concerned, the competent authorities apply by analogy certain
provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure (section 105).
37. Under section 109 - likewise amended with effect from 1
April 1987 -, the person concerned has to bear the costs of the
court proceedings if he withdraws his objection or if the
competent court rejects it.
For the rest, the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure
regarding payment of the costs of proceedings and of parties'
necessary costs and expenses apply by analogy (Article 464 et seq.
of the Code of Criminal Procedure and section 46 of the 1968/1975
Act).
By the terms of Article 464 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
any judgment, order of summary punishment or decision terminating
a set of proceedings must determine who is to pay the costs of the
proceedings (paragraph 1); the judgment or decision in which the
proceedings culminate shall state who is to bear the necessary
costs and expenses (paragraph 2).
Paragraph 1 and paragraph 3, second sentence, sub-paragraph 2,
of Article 467 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which were
applied in the instant case pursuant to section 46 of the
1968/1975 Act, provide:
"1. If the defendant (Angeschuldigter) is acquitted or if
committal for trial (Hauptverfahren) is refused or if the
proceedings against him are discontinued, the costs of the
proceedings and the defendant's necessary costs and expenses shall
be borne by the Treasury.
...
3. ... The court may decline to award the defendant's
necessary costs and expenses against the Treasury where the
defendant
...
(2) has avoided conviction merely because of a technical bar
to the proceedings (Verfahrenshindernis)."
Inasmuch as the law does not make the reimbursement of
necessary costs and expenses mandatory, the courts decide the
issue on an equitable basis and have a degree of discretion in the
matter.
B. Road traffic fines
38. The Road Traffic Act, the Road Traffic Regulations and the
Road Traffic Licence and Vehicle Conformity Regulations
(Strassenverkehrs-Zulassungs-Ordnung) contain lists of "regulatory
offences" punishable by a fine (section 24 of the Road Traffic
Act).
Section 24 of the Road Traffic Act provides:
"1. It shall be a "regulatory offence" wilfully or negligently
({vorsatzlich} oder {fahrlassig}) to contravene a provision in a
statutory instrument (Rechtsverordnung) made pursuant to
section 6(1) or in an order (Anordnung) made pursuant to such a
statutory instrument if the statutory instrument concerned refers
to the present provision ... in respect of a given offence. Such
reference shall not be required where the provision of the
statutory instrument was made before 1 January 1969.
2. A "regulatory offence" is punishable by a fine."
The Road Traffic Regulations, which were applied in the
instant case, were contained in one of the statutory instruments
issued under section 6(1) of the Road Traffic Act.
39. In the case of a "regulatory offence" committed in gross
(grob) and persistent (beharrlich) violation of the duties
incumbent on a driver, the administrative authorities or, where an
objection has been lodged, the court may at the same time
disqualify the person concerned from holding a driving licence
(Fahrverbot) for a period of one to three months (section 25 of
the Road Traffic Act).
40. The {Lander} have co-operated to adopt rules
(Verwaltungs-vorschriften) establishing a uniform scale of fines
(Bussgeldkatalog) for the various road traffic "regulatory
offences"; legally, these rules are binding on the administrative
authorities empowered to impose fines but not on the courts.
Section 26(a) of the Road Traffic Act, which was inserted into
the Act on 28 December 1982 but has not yet been implemented,
provides that the Minister of Transport shall issue such rules
with the agreement of the Bundesrat and in the form of a statutory
instrument (Rechtsverordnung).
41. Under section 28 of the Road Traffic Act, a fine imposed
for contravention of road traffic regulations may in some
specified cases be entered in a central traffic register
(Verkehrszentralregister) if it exceeds a certain amount (DM 39 at
the time of the events in issue, DM 79 as from 1 July 1982); on
the other hand, no mention of it is included in the criminal
records (Bundeszentralregister). The entry must be expunged after
a maximum of two years, unless further entries have been made in
the meantime (section 29).
Only certain authorities have access to the register, notably
for the purposes of a criminal prosecution or a prosecution for a
road traffic "regulatory offence" (section 30).
42. At the time of the events in issue, by virtue of
section 26(3) of the Road Traffic Act, the limitation period for
the "regulatory offences" specified in section 24 of the Act was
three months; since 1 April 1987, it has been three months in
respect of the proceedings before an administrative authority and
six months as from the date of the decision taken by that
authority.
43. According to the unchallenged statements of the
Government, the 1968/1975 Act in practice plays a particularly
important role in road traffic cases, and approximately 90 per
cent of fines imposed relate to road traffic offences.
In Bavaria, which the Government said could be taken as
representative of the Federal Republic, there were 1,141,221
decisions imposing a fine in 1985. The percentage of fines of over
DM 200 and DM 500 was only 1.3 and 0.1 respectively, as compared
with 8.8 for fines of DM 120 to 200, 15 for fines of DM 80 to 119,
22.3 for fines of DM 41 to 79 and 52.5 for fines of DM 5 to 40.
Of the 1,199,802 road traffic offences recorded in 1986,
infringements of waiting and parking prohibitions accounted for
49.7 per cent.
C. Case-law of the Federal Constitutional Court relating to
the presumption of innocence (judgment - Beschluss - of 26 March
1987)
44. The scope of the principle of the presumption of innocence
in the context of discontinuance of criminal proceedings has
recently been clarified by the Federal Constitutional Court. By a
judgment delivered on 26 March 1987, the Federal Constitutional
Court quashed, as contravening the principle, two decisions by
district courts and one decision by a regional court whereby the
courts, having held the guilt of the defendants to be
insignificant (gering), had stayed the private prosecutions
brought against them but had awarded the costs of the proceedings
against the defendants, including the costs and expenses of the
complainants (cases 2 Bvr 589/79, 2 Bvr 740/81 and 2 Bvr 284/85,
{Europaische} Grundrechte-Zeitschrift 1987, pp. 203 - 209).
The Constitutional Court held it to be inconsistent with the
presumption of innocence to speak in the reasons given for a
discontinuance decision of a defendant's guilt or to base an order
as to costs and expenses on the supposition (Annahme) that a
defendant has been guilty of an offence if the trial has not
reached the stage at which the verdict can be given
(Schuldspruchreife). It pointed out that the principle of the
presumption of innocence derived from the principle of the rule of
law, and it also referred to Article 6 2 (art. 6-2) of the
Convention. The Convention did not have the status of
constitutional law in the Federal Republic, but regard should be
had to it and to the case-law of the European Court of Human
Rights in interpreting the principles and fundamental rights
enshrined in the Basic Law (Grundgesetz).
Reaffirming its case-law, the Constitutional Court reiterated
that, by virtue of the principle of the presumption of innocence,
no measures amounting in effect to a penalty may be taken against
a defendant without his guilt having been established beforehand
at a proper trial and no defendant may be treated as guilty. The
Court added that this principle requires that guilt be proved
according to law before it can be held against the person
concerned. A finding of guilt will accordingly not be legitimate
for this purpose unless it is pronounced at the close of a trial
which has reached the stage at which a verdict can be given.
Citing the Minelli judgment of 25 March 1983 (Series A
no. 62), the Constitutional Court ruled that a decision
discontinuing criminal proceedings may offend the presumption of
innocence if it contains in its reasoning a finding of the
defendant's guilt without that guilt having been proved according
to law. On the other hand, nothing precluded a court from making
findings in such a decision as to the defendant's guilt and
ordering him to pay the necessary costs and expenses of the
complainants as well as the costs of the proceedings if it had
held a hearing enabling it to reach a verdict
(Entscheidungsreife).
On the basis of these considerations, the Constitutional Court
quashed three of the five decisions challenged but dismissed the
application in the first of the three cases concerned, as the
defence had made the closing address after a trial.
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION
45. In his application of 14 June 1982 to the Commission
(no. 9912/82), Mr. Lutz relied on Article 6 1 and 2 (art. 6-1,
art. 6-2) of the Convention, contending that the District Court
had not dealt with his case within a "reasonable time" and that
the decision as to costs offended the principle of the presumption
of innocence, the reasons for it being tantamount to a "conviction
in disguise".
46. On 9 July 1985, the Commission declared the application
inadmissible in respect of the complaint under Article 6 1
(art. 6-1) (as manifestly ill-founded) and declared it admissible
as to the rest.
In its report of 18 October 1985 (made under Article 31)
(art. 31), it expressed the opinion, by seven votes to five, that
there had been a breach of Article 6 2 (art. 6-2). The full text
of its report and of the three separate opinions contained in the
report is reproduced as an annex to the present judgment.
FINAL SUBMISSIONS TO THE COURT BY THE GOVERNMENT
47. In their memorial of 13 November 1986, the Government
requested the Court to hold that:
"Article 6 2 (art. 6-2) of the European Convention on Human
Rights is not applicable in the present case and that the Court
cannot deal with this case by reason of its incompatibility with
the provisions of the Convention;
alternatively,
that the Federal Republic of Germany has not violated
Article 6 2 (art. 6-2) of the European Convention on Human
Rights."
The Government reiterated their submissions at the hearing on
23 February 1987.
AS TO THE LAW
48. Mr. Lutz complained of the reasons - and of one sentence
in them in particular - given for the decisions whereby the German
courts refused to order reimbursement of his necessary costs and
expenses. He claimed that they offended the principle of the
presumption of innocence enshrined in Article 6 2 (art. 6-2) of
the Convention, which provides:
"Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed
innocent until proved guilty according to law."
The Government disputed this contention, being of the view
that Article 6 2 (art. 6-2) was inapplicable and that the
application was accordingly incompatible with the provisions of
the Convention; in the alternative, they submitted that there had
been no breach of Article 6 2 (art. 6-2).
The Commission took the opposite view.
I. The Government's preliminary objection
49. After the proceedings in respect of a "regulatory offence"
had been stayed, Mr. Lutz had to bear his own necessary costs and
expenses on the ground that if the proceedings had continued, he
would "most probably" or "almost certainly" have been convicted;
he claimed that a breach of Article 6 2 (art. 6-2) of the
Convention resulted.
Such a complaint is not "clearly outside the provisions of the
Convention" (see the judgment of 9 February 1967 in the "Belgian
Linguistic" case, Series A no. 5, p. 18); it relates to the
Convention's interpretation and application (Article 45)
(art. 45). In order to reach a decision, the Court will have to
determine whether Article 6 2 (art. 6-2) can be relied on in
respect of the decisions complained of. For the Court this is a
question going to the merits, which it cannot try merely as a
preliminary issue (see, as the most recent authority, the Kosiek
judgment of 28 August 1986, Series A no. 105, p. 19, 32).
II. Alleged violation of Article 6 2 (art. 6-2)
A. Applicability of Article 6 2 (art. 6-2)
50. In the Government's submission, Article 6 2 (art. 6-2)
had no application in the instant case, because the applicant was
not "charged with a criminal offence". Under the legislation of
1968/1975, which "decriminalised" petty offences, including road
traffic offences in particular, the charges against Mr. Lutz
constituted merely a "regulatory offence" (Ordnungswidrigkeit).
Such an offence, the Government claimed, differed from a criminal
offence both in its legal characteristics and consequences and in
the procedure to be followed. The judgment delivered by the Court
on 21 February 1984 in the {Ozturk} case was confined to the issue
of the free assistance of an interpreter (Article 6 3 (e))
(art. 6-3-e) in the circumstances of that applicant and had not,
the Government maintained, in any way already decided the
applicability of Article 6 2 (art. 6-2) to the present case.
In Mr. Lutz's submission, on the contrary, its applicability
emerged clearly from that judgment.
The Commission agreed: the two cases were similar as to the
facts, and the reasoning in that decision was likewise valid in
respect of the guarantee in Article 6 2 (art. 6-2).
51. The Court notes firstly that Mr. Lutz - like Mr. {Ozturk}
- had to answer for a breach of the requirements of, inter alia,
Regulations 1(2) and 49(1)(1) of the Road Traffic Regulations (see
paragraph 13 above and the {Ozturk} judgment of 21 February 1984,
Series A no. 73, p. 9, 11). In German law, this was not a
criminal offence (Straftat) but a "regulatory offence". The
question accordingly arises whether this classification is
decisive for the purposes of the Convention.
52. In the {Ozturk} case the Court held that the applicant was
"charged with a criminal offence" within the meaning of Article 6
3 (art. 6-3). Admittedly, the only point it was determining was
whether sub-paragraph (e) (art. 6-3-e) gave the applicant a right
to the free assistance of an interpreter in the domestic
proceedings complained of. However, with regard to the
introductory sentence of paragraph 3 (art. 6-3), the Court
referred to paragraph 1 of the same Article (art. 6-1), the reason
being that it had consistently held paragraph 1 (art. 6-1) to
embody the basic rule of which paragraphs 2 and 3 (art. 6-2,
art. 6-3) represented specific applications (see the {Ozturk}
judgment previously cited, p. 17, 47). After affirming the
"autonomy" of the concept of "criminal" in Article 6 (art. 6), the
Court concluded that the contravention with which Mr. {Ozturk} was
charged "was criminal" for the purposes of that Article (art. 6)
(ibid., pp. 18 and 21, 50 and 54).
The Court thus proceeded on the basis that in using the terms
"criminal charge" (accusation en {matiare penale}) and "charged
with a criminal offence" ({accuse, accuse} d'une infraction) the
three paragraphs of Article 6 (art. 6-1, art. 6-2, art. 6-3)
referred to identical situations. It had previously adopted a
similar approach to Article 6 2 (art. 6-2), albeit in a context
that was undeniably a criminal one under the domestic law (see the
Adolf judgment of 26 March 1982, Series A no. 49, p. 15, 30, and
the Minelli judgment of 25 March 1983, Series A no. 62, p. 15,
27). The Government, moreover, have accepted that the words
"charged with a criminal offence" have the same meaning in all
three paragraphs (art. 6-1, art. 6-2, art. 6-3) and must be
interpreted accordingly.
53. The issue raised in the present case is therefore broadly
the same as the one already decided in the judgment of 21 February
1984. The Court sees no reason to depart from that decision,
especially as the Government, the Commission and counsel for the
applicant reiterated, or else referred to, the arguments they had
put forward in the {Ozturk} case.
54. In order to determine whether the "regulatory offence"
committed by Mr. {Ozturk} was a "criminal" one, the Court referred
to the criteria adopted in its judgment of 8 June 1976 in the case
of Engel and Others (Series A no. 22, pp. 34 - 35, 82). It
summarised them as follows:
"The first matter to be ascertained is whether or not the text
defining the offence in issue belongs, according to the legal
system of the respondent State, to criminal law; next, the nature
of the offence and, finally, the nature and degree of severity of
the penalty that the person concerned risked incurring must be
examined, having regard to the object and purpose of Article 6
(art. 6), to the ordinary meaning of the terms of that Article
(art. 6) and to the laws of the Contracting States." ({Ozturk}
judgment, Series A no. 73, p. 18, 50)
Having proceeded according to those principles, it concluded
that the general character of the legal provision contravened by
Mr. {Ozturk} and the purpose of the penalty, which was both
deterrent and punitive, sufficed to show that the offence in
question was, for the purposes of Article 6 (art. 6), criminal in
nature (ibid., p. 20, 53). It held that there was consequently
no need to examine Mr. {Ozturk's} contravention "also in the light
of the final criterion stated ...", for "the relative lack of
seriousness of the penalty at stake ... cannot divest an offence
of its inherently criminal character" (ibid., p. 21, 54).
These considerations apply in the instant case too.
55. The Government appeared, in fact, to be criticising the
{Ozturk} judgment for not having considered the nature and degree
of severity of the penalty that the person concerned risked
incurring. They claimed that it thereby differed from the Engel
and Others judgment of 8 June 1976.
The Court points out that the second and third criteria
adopted in the judgments in the Engel and Others case and the
{Ozturk} case are alternative and not cumulative ones: for Article
6 (art. 6) to apply in virtue of the words "criminal charge", it
suffices that the offence in question should by its nature be
"criminal" from the point of view of the Convention, as in the
instant case, or should have made the person concerned liable to a
sanction which, in its nature and degree of severity, belongs in
general to the "criminal" sphere (see also the Campbell and Fell
judgment of 28 June 1984, Series A no. 80, pp. 35 - 38,
69 - 73).
56. The Government also argued that once the statutory
limitation period had expired, as it was held to have done in the
Heilbronn District Court's final ruling of 24 August 1981,
Article 6 2 (art. 6-2) ceased to apply because it was no longer
possible to convict the applicant.
The Court cannot agree with the Government on this point, any
more than the Commission could. No doubt the proceedings against
the applicant had become time-barred, but that fact was given
judicial recognition by the decision of 24 August 1981 (see
paragraph 16 above). This decision also settled the question of
costs, as required under Articles 464 and 467 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure taken together with section 46 of the Act on
"regulatory offences", and left the applicant to bear his own
necessary costs and expenses. Apportionment of the costs was a
consequence and necessary concomitant of the stay of proceedings
(Article 464 of the Code of Criminal Procedure - see paragraph 37
above; see also, mutatis mutandis, the Minelli judgment previously
cited, Series A no. 62, p. 16, 30). The operative provisions of
the decision clearly confirmed this: after an initial ruling that
the proceedings were to be stayed, the other two dealt with the
costs of the proceedings and the applicant's own necessary costs
and expenses.
57. Article 6 2 (art. 6-2) therefore applied in the instant
case; the Federal Constitutional Court indeed mentioned this
provision in its judgment of 2 February 1982 (see paragraph 18
above). However, it must be reiterated (see the {Ozturk} judgment
previously cited, Series A no. 73, pp. 21 - 22, 56) that it in
no way follows that the very principle of the system adopted in
the matter by the German legislature - and in legislation
elsewhere - is being put in question. Having regard to the large
number of minor offences - notably in relation to road traffic -
which are not so discreditable that the offenders deserve the
stigma of a criminal penalty, a Contracting State may have good
reasons for introducing a system which relieves its courts of the
task of dealing with the great majority of them. Conferring the
prosecution and punishment of minor offences on administrative
authorities is not inconsistent with the Convention, provided that
the person concerned is able to bring any decision thus made
against him before a tribunal that does afford the safeguards of
Article 6 (art. 6).
B. Compliance with Article 6 2 (art. 6-2)
58. The applicant pointed out that he had never had a hearing
before a court in respect of the charges against him, and
consequently no determination had been made of those charges under
a procedure prescribed by law. He claimed that the reasons given
in the decisions as to costs and expenses manifestly contained a
finding of guilt and thus amounted to a "conviction in disguise".
In the Government's submission, the refusal to order the
Treasury to bear Mr. Lutz's necessary costs and expenses did not
amount to a penalty or a measure which in its effects could be
equated with a penalty. The reasoning given in the decisions
complained of did not contain any implied assessment of the
defendant's guilt: the courts were describing a "state of
suspicion" with the sole aim of reaching a fair decision as to the
payment of costs. Furthermore, where a prosecution was
discontinued, the Convention did not oblige the Contracting States
to indemnify a person "charged with a criminal offence" for any
detriment he might have suffered. The impugned decisions could not
be contrary to the Convention on account of their supporting
reasoning if their operative provisions - which alone acquired
final, binding effect - were in conformity with it.
The Commission considered, like the applicant, that there had
been a breach of Article 6 2 (art. 6-2), as the reasoning
complained of could very well be understood as suggesting that the
applicant not only remained under suspicion of having committed
the offence but was guilty of it.
59. The Court points out, first of all, like the Commission
and the Government, that neither Article 6 2 (art. 6-2) nor any
other provision of the Convention gives a person "charged with a
criminal offence" a right to reimbursement of his costs where
proceedings taken against him are discontinued. The refusal to
reimburse Mr. Lutz for his necessary costs and expenses
accordingly does not in itself offend the presumption of innocence
(see, mutatis mutandis, the Minelli judgment previously cited,
Series A no. 62, p. 17, 34 - 35). Counsel for the applicant
moreover stated, in reply to a question from the President, that
his client was not challenging that refusal but solely the reasons
given for it.
60. Nevertheless, a decision refusing reimbursement of an
accused's necessary costs and expenses following termination of
proceedings may raise an issue under Article 6 2 (art. 6-2) if
supporting reasoning which cannot be dissociated from the
operative provisions (see the same judgment, p. 18, 38) amounts
in substance to a determination of the accused's guilt without his
having previously been proved guilty according to law and, in
particular, without his having had an opportunity to exercise the
rights of the defence (ibid., 37).
61. The refusal complained of by Mr. Lutz was based on
Article 467 3, second sentence, sub-paragraph 2, of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, which was applied in the instant case by
virtue of section 46 of the 1968/1975 Act (see paragraphs 16 - 18
and 37 above). This provision sets forth one of the exceptions to
the rule in German law that, where criminal proceedings are
discontinued, the necessary costs and expenses of the person
"charged with a criminal offence" are to be awarded against the
Treasury (Article 467 1). Applying the provision means that the
relevant courts, which decide the matter on an equitable basis and
have a degree of discretion, are under an obligation to take into
account, inter alia, the weight of the suspicion still falling on
the person concerned.
62. In justification of its decision not to order the Treasury
to pay Mr. Lutz's costs and expenses the Heilbronn District Court
noted that "as the file [stood], the defendant would most probably
have been convicted" (see paragraph 16 above). When dismissing the
applicant's appeal, the Regional Court held, among other things,
that had the prosecution not been statute-barred, the defendant
"would almost certainly have been found guilty of an offence" (see
paragraph 17 above). For the Federal Constitutional Court, "the
reasons for the order as to costs in the impugned decisions are
... rightly confined to the finding that the defendant would most
probably have been found guilty" (see paragraph 18 above).
The German courts thereby meant to indicate, as they were
required to do for the purposes of the decision, that there were
still strong suspicions concerning Mr. Lutz. Even if the terms
used may appear ambiguous and unsatisfactory, the courts confined
themselves in substance to noting the existence of "reasonable
suspicion" that the defendant had "committed an offence"
(Article 5 1 (c) of the Convention) (art. 5-1-c). On the basis
of the evidence, in particular the applicant's earlier statements
(see paragraphs 12, 16 and 17 above), the decisions described a
"state of suspicion" and did not contain any finding of guilt. In
this respect they contrast with the more substantial, detailed
decisions which the Court considered in the Minelli case (see the
judgment previously cited, Series A no. 62, pp. 8 - 10, 12 -
14, and pp. 11 - 12, 16) and also with the decisions set aside
by the Federal Constitutional Court on 26 March 1987 (see
paragraph 44 above).
63. Moreover, the refusal to order the Treasury to pay
Mr. Lutz's necessary costs and expenses does not amount to a
penalty or a measure that can be equated with a penalty. In this
respect too, the instant case very clearly differs from the
Minelli case, as also from the cases decided by the Federal
Constitutional Court on 26 March 1987 (see paragraph 44 above).
The Swiss courts had directed that Mr. Minelli should bear part of
the costs of the proceedings and had ordered him to pay the
private prosecutors compensation in respect of their expenses (see
the judgment previously cited, ibid.), thus treating him as
guilty. Nothing comparable occurred in the instant case: Mr. Lutz
did not have to bear the costs of the proceedings but only his own
costs and expenses. The German courts, acting on an equitable
basis and having regard to the strong suspicions which seemed to
them to exist concerning him, did not impose any sanction on him
but merely refused to order that his necessary costs and expenses
should be paid out of public funds. And, as the Court has already
pointed out, the Convention - more particularly Article 6 2
(art. 6-2) - does not oblige the Contracting States, where a
prosecution has been discontinued, to indemnify a person "charged
with a criminal offence" for any detriment he may have suffered.
64. In conclusion, the decision of the Heilbronn District
Court, which was upheld by the Regional Court and the Federal
Constitutional Court, did not offend the presumption of innocence
guaranteed to the applicant under Article 6 2 (art. 6-2).
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT
1. Rejects unanimously the objection that the application is
incompatible with the provisions of the Convention;
2. Holds by fourteen votes to three that Article 6 2
(art. 6-2) applies in the instant case;
3. Holds by sixteen votes to one that there has been no breach
of this Article (art. 6-2).
Done in English and in French and delivered at a public
hearing in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 25 August
1987.
Signed: Rolv RYSSDAL
President
Signed: {Marc-Andre} EISSEN
Registrar
A declaration by Mr. {Thor Vilhjalmsson} and, in accordance
with Article 51 2 (art. 51-2) of the Convention and Rule 52 2
of the Rules of Court, the separate opinions of the following
judges are annexed to this judgment:
- dissenting opinion of Mr. Cremona;
- joint dissenting opinion of Mrs. Bindschedler-Robert,
Mr. Matscher and Mr. Bernhardt.
Initialled: R.R.
Initialled: M.-A. E.
DECLARATION BY JUDGE {THOR VILHJALMSSON}
My vote in this case reflects a change from my vote in the
{Ozturk} case. This change is prompted by the majority decision in
that case.
DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE CREMONA
Whilst agreeing with the judgment as to the rejection of the
Government's preliminary objection and as to the applicability of
Article 6 2 (art. 6-2) of the Convention in the instant case, I
regret I cannot do the same as to the question of compliance with
that provision, and in fact, like the majority of the Commission,
I find a violation of it.
In order to clear the ground at once of certain matters, I
would premise the following:
1. Firstly, I concur with the judgment that neither Article 6
2 (art. 6-2) nor any other provision of the Convention gives a
person charged with a criminal offence a right to reimbursement of
his costs where proceedings against him are discontinued, and that
the domestic courts' refusal to order such reimbursement to the
applicant does not therefore in itself offend the presumption of
innocence (paragraph 59 of the judgment).
2. Secondly, I also concur with the judgment that a decision
refusing such reimbursement following a stay of proceedings may,
however, raise an issue under Article 6 2 (art. 6-2) if
supporting reasoning which cannot be dissociated from the
operative provisions amounts in substance to a determination
(constat) of the accused's guilt (which I understand in the sense
of an assessment thereof) without his having previously been
proved guilty according to law and in particular without his
having had an opportunity to exercise his defence rights
(paragraph 60 of the judgment).
Having premised that, I consider that the conclusion of
non-violation in this judgment rests essentially on two points:
(a) that the contested judicial pronouncements of the domestic
courts described only "a state of suspicion" and did not involve a
finding of guilt (paragraph 62 of the judgment), and
(b) that the courts' refusal to order reimbursement of the
accused's necessary costs and expenses did not amount to a penalty
or a measure which could be equated with a penalty (paragraph 63
of the judgment).
As to the first point, clearly an element of suspicion is
inherent in the very fact that a person is criminally charged, but
that is of course inseparable from the essential machinery of the
criminal trial itself. Indeed, among the cases where a person may
be deprived of his liberty, provided this is done in accordance
with a procedure prescribed by law, the Convention itself mentions
"the lawful arrest and detention of a person effected for the
purpose of bringing him before the competent authority on
reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence" (Article 5
1 (c)) (art. 5-1-c).
In the present case, however, the clear and explicit wording
used by the courts in their judicial decisions concerning the
applicant, who was charged with a criminal offence, goes much
further than that.
In fact, the decision of the Heilbronn District Court, in
staying the proceedings against the applicant and concurrently
refusing to order reimbursement of his costs and expenses under
the applicable domestic legislation, stated, in terms which,
unlike my colleagues, I find unambiguous, that "as the file
[stood], the defendant would most probably have been convicted".
Moreover, the Regional Court in Heilbronn, in dismissing the
applicant's appeal, stated, again in unambiguous terms, that had
the prosecution not been statute-barred, "the defendant would
almost certainly have been found guilty of an offence". That court
also supported its decision by referring to the applicant's
admission of certain facts to the police. The decision of the
group of three judges of the Federal Constitutional Court in no
way altered the situation.
Thus, in my view, what happened in the instant case is the
materialisation of the situation envisaged in paragraph 60 of the
judgment (see above). Indeed, we have here judicial decisions
discontinuing proceedings for an offence and refusing, or
confirming refusal of, reimbursement of the accused's costs and
expenses, the supporting reasoning of which (which cannot be
dissociated from the operative provisions) amounts in substance to
a determination (constat) of the accused's guilt (which, as
already stated, I understand in the sense of an assessment
thereof) without his having been previously proved guilty
according to law and in particular without his having had an
opportunity to exercise his defence rights.
Like the majority of the Commission, I find that the above
reasoning of the aforesaid courts is perfectly capable of being
understood as meaning that the accused was in fact guilty of a
criminal offence. Indeed this is the ordinary meaning conveyed by
the wording actually used, and when it comes to such a basic
principle as that of the presumption of innocence, what really
matters is not the possible intent with which certain words were
uttered in judicial decisions concerning the accused, but the
actual meaning of those words to the public at large. What is
decisive is that at the end of the day one is left with the
impression that the courts did consider that the applicant was in
fact guilty. The net result is in my view a surrogate conviction
of the accused without the benefit of the protection afforded by
Article 6 2 (art. 6-2).
Incidentally, the offending wording at the centre of this case
is not substantially dissimilar from that which was at the centre
of the Minelli case, in which this Court did find a violation of
that provision. An attempt has been made to distinguish the two
cases on the basis of a "punishment content", and this brings me
to the second point on which the finding of non-violation in the
present judgment relies.
As to this question of the absence of a penalty or a measure
which can be equated with one, I would say that of course the
application of such penalty or measure would have reinforced my
conclusion, but absence thereof in no way invalidates it. The
principle of the presumption of innocence can be violated
independently of the application of such penalty or measure. That
presumption accompanies a person charged with a criminal offence
throughout the whole trial until conviction. Indeed this cardinal
principle of the modern criminal trial would have been lamentably
improvident if its scope had to be confined to the non-application
of a penalty or, to use again the wording of the judgment, a
measure which can be equated with one. Punishment is usually only
the last stage in the unfolding of a criminal trial and modern
criminal legislation also envisages convictions without punishment
or a measure which can be equated with it (cf. for instance in the
British system "absolute discharge").
What is decisive for the present purpose is not the
non-application of punishment, but the fact of a judicial
assessment of the applicant's guilt, and in the instant case it is
this that the wording of the judicial decisions in question in
fact entails.
I therefore find a violation of Article 6 2 (art. 6-2) of
the Convention.
JOINT DISSENTING OPINION
OF JUDGES BINDSCHEDLER-ROBERT, MATSCHER AND
BERNHARDT ON THE APPLICABILITY
OF ARTICLE 6 (art. 6)
(Translation)
For the reasons indicated in the dissenting opinions we
expressed in the {Ozturk} case, we are unfortunately not able to
endorse the judgment of the Court; we continue to take the view
that in a case of this kind Article 6 (art. 6) of the Convention
is not applicable.
|
