[неофициальный перевод]
ЕВРОПЕЙСКИЙ СУД ПО ПРАВАМ ЧЕЛОВЕКА
СУДЕБНОЕ РЕШЕНИЕ
ЭКЛЕ (ECKLE) ПРОТИВ ФЕДЕРАТИВНОЙ РЕСПУБЛИКИ ГЕРМАНИИ
(Страсбург, 15 июля 1982 года)
(Извлечение)
КРАТКОЕ НЕОФИЦИАЛЬНОЕ ИЗЛОЖЕНИЕ ОБСТОЯТЕЛЬСТВ ДЕЛА
A. Основные факты
Г-н Ганс Экле и его жена Марианна, 1926-го и 1935 г. рождения
соответственно, являются гражданами Германии.
Г-н Экле был владельцем фирмы, которая занималась поставкой в
кредит материалов и подготовкой площадок для желающих строиться.
Его жена работала на этой фирме. Деятельность фирмы в период между
1959-м и 1967 г. стала предметом трех самостоятельных уголовных
дел в Трире, Саарбрюкене и Кельне.
В 1959 г. прокуратура Трира начала расследование, подозревая
заявителя в заключении многочисленных договоров, основывавшихся на
ложных обещаниях, и в получении займов обманным путем. Суд
открылся 11 ноября 1970 г. 17 марта 1972 г. Земельный суд Трира
приговорил г-на и г-жу Экле к тюремному заключению за
мошенничество. 19 февраля 1976 г. их жалоба по вопросам права была
отклонена Верховным федеральным судом. Жалоба в Федеральный
Конституционный Суд, в том числе на длительность разбирательства,
в июне 1977 г. была отклонена как не имеющая шансов на успех.
По завершении другого расследования, которое началось в конце
1963 г., Земельный суд Саарбрюкена в октябре 1967 г. признал
заявителей виновными в мошенничестве; после того как в марте
1969 г. Верховный федеральный суд отменил приговор, в 1970-м и
1971 г. Земельный суд осудил их повторно. Новая жалоба по вопросам
права была отклонена 20 апреля 1972 г.
Наконец, прокуратура Кельна начала по аналогичным основаниям
расследование в марте 1967 г., но дело было закрыто в сентябре
1977 г. по причине незначительности приговора, который мог бы быть
вынесен, по сравнению с приговорами, уже вынесенными в двух других
судах.
В ноябре 1977 г. Земельный суд Трира по совокупности
приговоров определил г-ну Экле семь лет, и два года и восемь
месяцев для его жены. 23 апреля 1978 г. Верховный земельный суд в
Кобленце отклонил "немедленную апелляцию", поданную обоими
заявителями против Решения Земельного суда.
B. Разбирательство в Комиссии по правам человека
В основе дела лежит жалоба, направленная г-ном и г-жой Экле в
Комиссию в декабре 1977 г. Они жаловались, среди прочего, на
чрезмерную длительность разбирательств уголовных дел в Трире,
Саарбрюкене и Кельне и утверждали, что стали жертвами нарушения
права на разбирательство дела в "разумные сроки" в смысле статьи 6
п. 1 Конвенции. В мае 1979 г. Комиссия объявила ходатайства
приемлемыми в отношении длительности судебного разбирательства в
Трире и Кельне. В своем докладе от 11 декабря 1980 г. Комиссия
единогласно высказала мнение о нарушении статьи 6 п. 1.
ИЗВЛЕЧЕНИЕ ИЗ СУДЕБНОГО РЕШЕНИЯ
ВОПРОСЫ ПРАВА
63. Заявители жаловались на длительность рассмотрения их
уголовных дел в судах Трира и Кельна; они утверждали, что
разбирательство превысило "разумный срок" (статья 6 п. 1).
I. Статья 25 п. 1
64. В своей памятной записке, а впоследствии и в устных
выступлениях представители Правительства официально просили Суд не
рассматривать дело по существу. Согласно утверждениям
Правительства, заявители не могли рассматриваться в качестве жертв
в смысле статьи 25 п. 1 Конвенции, которая гласит:
"Комиссия может принимать жалобы, направленные в адрес
Генерального секретаря Совета Европы, от любого лица, любой
неправительственной организации или любой группы частных лиц,
которые утверждают, что явились жертвами нарушения одной из
Высоких Договаривающихся Сторон их прав, признанных в настоящей
Конвенции..."
Суды Германии, утверждало Правительство, фактически признали
чрезмерную длительность разбирательства: Земельный суд Трира учел
это обстоятельство при вынесении приговора; аналогично поступил и
Земельный суд Кельна, вынеся постановление о прекращении
уголовного преследования (см. п. 35 и 55 выше).
Заявители оспаривали логику этих рассуждений. Комиссия была
согласна с ним. По мнению Комиссии, суды не признавали нарушения
статьи 6; уменьшение срока наказания судом Трира, было
незначительным; отнюдь не очевидно, что Земельный суд Кельна,
вынося решение о прекращении уголовного преследования, принял во
внимание чрезмерную длительность разбирательства.
65. Суд вправе вынести решение по поводу такого рода
предварительных возражений, если государство - ответчик уже
выдвигало их перед Комиссией в той мере, в какой это позволяли их
характер и обстоятельства (см. Решение по делу Артико от 13 мая
1980 г. Серия A, т. 37, с. 12, п. 24).
Эти условия были выполнены по настоящему делу, и право на
принесение возражений не утрачено.
66. Слово "жертва" в контексте статьи 25 и данного дела
означает лицо, непосредственно пострадавшее в результате упущения,
причем нарушение возможно даже в отсутствие ущерба, который имеет
значение лишь в контексте статьи 50 (см. inter alia Решение по
делу Адольфа от 26 марта 1982 г. Серия A, т. 49, с. 17, п. 37).
Соответственно, смягчение приговора и прекращение уголовного
преследования, с учетом чрезмерной длительности разбирательства, в
принципе не лишают заинтересованное лицо статуса жертвы в смысле
статьи 25; они должны быть приняты во внимание единственно с целью
оценки размера ущерба, который предположительно был ему нанесен
(см. mutatis mutandis вышеназванное Решение по делу Рингейзена от
22 июня 1972 г. Серия A, т. 15, с. 8, п. 20 - 21; Решение по делу
Неймастера от 7 мая 1974 г. Серия A, т. 17, с. 18 - 19, п. 40).
Суд не исключает возможности изъятия из этого общего правила в
случае, когда национальные власти признали открыто либо фактически
нарушение Конвенции и предусмотрели компенсацию за это (см.
Решение Комиссии от 16 октября 1980 г. о приемлемости жалобы по
делу Шлоффер против Федеративной Республики Германии). В подобных
обстоятельствах дублирование внутригосударственного процесса
разбирательством в Комиссии и Суде вряд ли выглядит совместимым с
субсидиарным характером механизма защиты, установленного
Конвенцией. Конвенция предоставляет каждому государству -
участнику первое место в обеспечении охраняемых ею прав и свобод
(см. Решение по делу "О языках в Бельгии" от 23 июля 1968 г.
Серия A, т. 6, с. 35, п. 10 in fine; и Решение по делу Хэндисайда
от 7 декабря 1976 г. Серия A, т. 24, с. 22, п. 48). Субсидиарный
характер становится особенно очевиден применительно к
государствам, которые включили Конвенцию в свое внутреннее право и
где нормы Конвенции считаются действующими непосредственно (см.
Решение по делу Ван Дроогенбрука от 24 июня 1982 г. Серия A,
т. 50, п. 55).
67. Поскольку Конвенция интегрирована в право Федеративной
Республики Германии, ничто не препятствовало судам страны, если бы
они посчитали это уместным, вынести решение о нарушении Конвенции,
а именно статьи 6 п. 1. В распоряжении национальных судов имеются
средства, позволяющие присуждать при этом соответствующее
возмещение: согласно сложившейся практике Верховного федерального
суда при вынесении приговора судья должен принять во внимание
любое превышение "разумных сроков" разбирательства в смысле
статьи 6 п. 1 (см. Решение от 10 ноября 1971 г. "Entscheidungen
des Bundesgerichtshofes in Strafsachen". Т. 24, с. 239 - 243).
Соответственно, Суд должен установить, учитывали ли, как
утверждает Правительство, германские суды в своих решениях
нарушение статьи 6 п. 1 и предоставили ли они в связи с этим
возмещение.
68. В решениях Земельного суда Трира сказано, что
разбирательство в нем шло "необычно долгое время" (Решение от
17 марта 1972 г. п. 27 выше); было "чрезмерно длительным" (Решение
от 24 ноября 1977 г. п. 35 выше). Об этом же говорится в Решении
Верховного федерального суда от 19 февраля 1976 г. и в Решении
Верховного земельного суда Кобленца от 23 января 1978 г.
(см. п. 33 и 36 выше). Все эти решения, кроме Решения суда Трира,
ссылались на судебную практику, о которой сказано выше в п. 67.
Только суд Кобленца упоминает о статье 6 п. 1, когда говорит, что
даже с учетом этой статьи приговор, вынесенный в Трире, не
является излишне суровым.
В Решении Земельного суда Кельна от 21 сентября 1977 г. о
прекращении уголовного дела против г-на и г-жи Экле отмечается
согласие обвиняемого и сделана ссылка на формальные представления
прокуратуры (см. п. 33 выше). Последняя сослалась на указания
Верховного федерального суда о кумуляции приговоров, что и было
сделано Земельным судом Трира.
69. Из вышесказанного видно, что ни один из рассматривавших
дело судов не признал факта нарушения статьи 6 п. 1. Тем не менее
формулировки, использованные названными выше судами, могут быть
приравнены к установлению этого обстоятельства в судебном
заседании. Меньше оснований в этом отношении дает решение суда в
Кельне; оно вряд ли позволяет сделать вывод, что этот суд признал,
что длительность разбирательства является нарушением статьи 6
п. 1.
70. Даже если согласиться с тем, что названные решения
действительно признают в достаточно ясной форме несоблюдение
требования "разумных сроков", то остается вопрос - было ли
предоставлено возмещение? Были ли смягчение приговора, вынесенного
судом Трира, и прекращение уголовного дела по Решению суда Кельна
совершены в исправление того, на что была принесена рассмотренная
жалоба?
Суд отмечает, что ответ на эти вопросы тесно связан с другим
аспектом дела, а именно масштабами совершенного нарушения и
соответственно основными доводами предварительного возражения
Правительства.
II. О нарушении статьи 6 п. 1
71. Комиссия выразила мнение, что имело место нарушение
статьи 6 п. 1, которая предусматривает:
"Каждый человек имеет право при определении его гражданских
прав и обязанностей или при рассмотрении любого уголовного
обвинения, предъявляемого ему, на справедливое публичное
разбирательство дела в разумный срок независимым и беспристрастным
судом, созданным на основании закона..."
Правительство признало, что разбирательство на некоторых
стадиях было неразумно длительным.
A. Длительность разбирательства
72. В жалобе заявителя говорится, что судебный процесс в Трире
начался в ноябре 1959 г. и завершился 24 ноября 1977 г., когда суд
кумулировал вынесенные всеми приговорами наказания. В ходе
слушаний Правительство утверждало, что разбирательство шло с
7 октября 1964 г. (обыск в помещениях заявителя) до 19 февраля
1976 г. (Решение Верховного федерального суда). Комиссия
согласилась со второй датой, но, по мнению Комиссии, дату начала
разбирательства можно отнести по крайней мере к 1 января 1961 г.
По мнению заявителей и Комиссии, процесс в Кельне начался с
выдачи 25 апреля 1967 г. приказа об обыске помещений и аресте г-на
и г-жи Экле. В Суде Правительство, по-видимому, предложило
рассматривать дату исполнения данного судебного приказа, а именно
11 мая 1967 г., а не более позднюю, как это было сделано в
Комиссии, дату взятия г-на Экле под стражу (25 ноября 1969 г.).
Что касается окончания этого периода, то заявители, Правительство
и Комиссия - все согласились с датой 21 сентября 1977 г., день,
когда процесс завершился.
1. Начало периодов, которые следует принимать в расчет
73. В уголовных делах "разумный срок", о котором говорится в
статье 6 п. 1, начинает течь с момента, когда лицу "предъявлено
обвинение"; это может произойти раньше, чем дело попадет в суд
(см., например, Решение от 27 февраля 1980 г. по делу Девеера.
Серия A, т. 35, с. 22, п. 42), со дня ареста, с даты, когда
заинтересованное лицо было официально уведомлено, что против него
возбуждено уголовное дело, или с даты, когда было начато
предварительное следствие (см. вышеупомянутые Решения по делу
Вемхофа от 27 июня 1968 г.; по делу Неймастера, вынесенное в тот
же день; по делу Рингейзена от 16 июля 1971 г.). "Обвинение" для
целей статьи 6 п. 1 можно определить как официальное уведомление
лица компетентными властями, что есть основание утверждать, что им
совершено уголовное преступление.
74. Применяя эти принципы к обстоятельствам дела, Суд
полагает, что дата, предложенная заявителями в связи с
разбирательством в Трире, не является соответствующей, т.к.
представленные Правительством документы показывают, что жалоба,
поданная 28 октября 1959 г. на супругов Экле, не привела к
назначению формального расследования; ни прокуратура, ни полиция
не проводили опроса свидетелей или заявителей. Настоящее
предварительное следствие началось только в августе 1960 г., когда
в связи с обвинениями, выдвинутыми против г-на Экле, опрашивались
многочисленные свидетели (см. п. 11 - 12 выше).
Тем не менее, поскольку невозможно установить, когда
заявителям стало официально известно о следствии, Суд согласился с
мнением Комиссии и взял за точку отсчета в качестве "начала"
1 января 1961 г.
Суд не счел необходимым проводить какое-либо различие между
двумя заявителями, так как, хотя следствие и не было направлено
против г-жи Экле с самого начала, она ощущала последствия этого в
той же мере, как и ее муж.
75. Соответствующей датой начала процесса в Кельне является
дата вручения судебного приказа, изданного 25 апреля 1967 г., т.е.
11 мая 1967 г. (см. п. 72 выше).
2. Окончание периодов,
которые следует принимать в расчет
76. Что касается времени окончания, то в уголовных делах
период, на который распространяются положения статьи 6 п. 1,
охватывает все время прохождения дела, включая апелляционную
процедуру (см. Решение по делу Кенига от 28 июня 1978 г. Серия A,
т. 27, с. 33, п. 98).
77. Решением Верховного федерального суда от 19 февраля 1976
г. на суд Трира была возложена обязанность кумулировать наложенные
на г-на и г-жу Экле наказания по приговорам судов Саарбрюкена и
Трира. При этом высшая инстанция напомнила, что такая обязанность
прямо возложена на суды действующим правом (ст. 53 - 54 Уголовного
кодекса). Такое соединение приговоров не является чисто
арифметическим действием, т.к. согласно статье 54 Уголовного
кодекса судьи Трира должны были дать собственную общую оценку всех
преступлений, в совершении которых заявители были признаны
виновными и в Саарбрюкене, и в Трире, а также свою оценку личности
преступников; фактически это и было сделано в Решении от 24 ноября
1977 г. Дополнительно Земельный суд должен был учесть в качестве
смягчающего обстоятельства время, которое прошло со дня решения
высшей судебной инстанции "до окончательного решения".
Отсюда следует, что после этого решения заявители не могли
вычислить, какой срок они могли получить по окончательному
приговору. Они лишь знали, что он должен быть меньше, нежели сумма
сроков по ранее вынесенным приговорам двух земельных судов
(статья 54 п. 2 Уголовного кодекса).
Пока наказание не было окончательно определено, нельзя было
установить - отвечало ли осуждение всем требованиям обоснованности
уголовного обвинения в смысле статьи 6 п. 1. В Решении по делу
Рингейзена, уже упоминавшемуся выше, Суд посчитал окончанием
процесса дату, когда закончилось кассационное производство по делу
и при определении срока наказания было учтено все время
предварительного заключения заявителя.
Соответственно, период, подлежавший учету, завершился
23 января 1978 г., когда Верховный земельный суд Кобленца
подтвердил кумулятивный приговор, вынесенный Земельным судом
24 ноября 1978 г.
78. Процедура судебного разбирательства в Кельне была
завершена 21 сентября 1977 г., когда Земельный суд прекратил дело.
3. Вывод
79. Длительность процесса, которая рассматривалась на предмет
соответствия требованиям статьи 6 п. 1, составила, таким образом,
семнадцать лет и три недели (1 января 1961 г. - 23 января 1978 г.)
в отношении судебного процесса в Трире и десять лет четыре месяца
и десять дней в отношении процесса в Кельне (11 мая 1967 г. -
21 сентября 1977 г.).
Поскольку заявители продолжали свою противозаконную
деятельность пока шло расследование дела в Трире, Правительство
обратилось в Суд с просьбой вычесть из общей продолжительности
судебного разбирательства время, в течение которого совершались
новые правонарушения.
Суд рассматривает данный фактор как один из важных элементов
оценки "разумности сроков".
B. Разумность срока разбирательства
80. Разумность срока разбирательства должна оцениваться в
каждом случае исходя из конкретных обстоятельств. При этом Суд
должен учитывать сложность дела, поведение заявителей и поведение
судебных властей (см. вышеупомянутое Решение по делу Кенига.
Серия A, т. 27, с. 34, п. 99).
Настоящий случай затрагивает совокупность судебных процедур,
которые длились соответственно семнадцать и десять лет. Такая
продолжительность, без сомнения, является необычной и должна, по
общему правилу, рассматриваться как превосходящая "разумный срок",
о котором говорится в статье 6 п. 1 (см. вышеупомянутые Решения по
делу Неймастера, т. 8. с. 41, п. 20; по делу Кенига, с. 34,
п. 102). В подобных обстоятельствах от государства - ответчика
требуется получить объяснения.
1. Разбирательство в Трире
81. Хотя предмет следствия и судебного разбирательства в Трире
в правовом аспекте выглядит относительно просто, тем не менее дело
достаточно сложно, особенно в свете масштабов деятельности
заявителей и изобретательности, проявленной ими в разработке
методов финансирования договоров продажи. Более того,
дополнительные сложности возникли по ходу расследования в связи с
тем, что в конце 1963 г. и в течение 1964 г. был заключен еще
целый ряд договоров займа мошеннического характера.
82. Отнюдь не содействуя ускорению разбирательства, г-н и г-жа
Экле многократно прибегали к действиям, включая систематический
отвод судей, причем некоторые из этих действий можно
интерпретировать как затягивание дела и умышленную обструкцию
(см. п. 15, 20, 22, 23, 24, 25 и 32 выше).
Однако, как справедливо указала Комиссия, статья 6 не требует
от заявителей активного сотрудничества с судебными властями.
Нельзя также упрекать их в том, что они полностью использовали
средства защиты, предоставляемые внутренним законодательством. Тем
не менее их поведение представляет собой объективный факт, который
не может быть отнесен на счет государства - ответчика, и это
следует принимать во внимание, определяя, превышало ли судебное
разбирательство разумный срок в смысле статьи 6 п. 1 (см. mutatis
mutandis вышеупомянутое Решение по делу Кенига, п. 103, 105, 108 и
111, а также Решение по делу Бухольца от 6 мая 1981 г. Серия A,
т. 42, с. 18 и 22, п. 56, 63).
83. Из жалоб заявителей следовало, что длительность
разбирательства - следствие организации рассмотрения дела
судебными властями. Главным объектом их критики было то, что
судебные власти провели три самостоятельных расследования и три
судебных процесса вместо того, чтобы объединить их, а также
проводили расследования слишком многих отдельных эпизодов.
Комиссия также сочла, что длительность разбирательства следует
отнести прежде всего на счет судебных властей. По мнению Комиссии,
предварительные следствия, отзыв "обвинительного акта",
составление проекта решения Земельного суда, рассмотрение высшими
инстанциями жалоб о пересмотре дела по правовым основаниям вызвали
неоправданные задержки.
Правительство выразило свое несогласие с этим мнением.
84. Суд, как и Комиссия, пришел к выводу, что компетентные
власти не действовали с необходимым старанием и рациональностью.
Так, огромное число расследовавшихся эпизодов не могло не
сказаться на сроках предварительного следствия (п. 16 выше).
Правительство утверждало, что принцип обязательности расследования
всех уголовных преступлений, вменяемых лицу, заставлял власти
действовать именно так. Однако Суд отверг этот аргумент. Хотя
статья 154 Уголовно-процессуального уложения только в 1979 г.,
после ее изменения, допускала возможность в определенный момент
остановить расследование, само Правительство признало, что эта
реформа лишь отразила сложившуюся ранее практику. В любом случае
Правительство не вправе, когда речь идет о выполнении
обязательств, взятых им на себя в силу статьи 6, ссылаться на
недостатки своего внутреннего законодательства. Более того,
действовавший на тот период закон не препятствовал прокуратуре и
Земельному суду прекратить расследование по некоторым эпизодам
(см. п. 16 и 26 выше).
Кроме того, нелегко понять, почему в 1967 г., т.е. шесть лет
спустя после начала следствия, служба государственного обвинения
Трира, столкнувшись с новыми преступлениями, которые, как она
полагала, ей удалось раскрыть, посчитала, что существует только
один подходящий способ действовать в такой ситуации, а именно
отозвать "акт обвинения". Следует также отметить, что прошел почти
год, прежде чем в прокуратуру Кельна были переданы новые дела (там
же).
Нет и подобающего объяснения того, почему оглашенное 17 марта
1972 г. Решение суда затем почти одиннадцать месяцев оформлялось
как окончательный приговор, текст которого заявители получили
12 февраля 1973 г. Несомненно, и это было подчеркнуто
Правительством, составление решения требует анализа большой массы
документов, но одно это не может оправдать столь длительной
задержки.
Наконец, процедура кассационного обжалования тянулась почти
три года (см. п. 29 - 33 выше).
85. Правительство обратило внимание Суда на то обстоятельство,
что дело Экле было одним из первых крупных дел об экономических
преступлениях в земле Рейнланд-Пфальц. В то время власти, как
объясняло Правительство, не имели необходимого опыта и средств для
быстрой и эффективной борьбы с такого рода правонарушениями. В
дальнейшем с этой целью была принята целая серия мер
законодательного и административного характера.
Суд сознает, что специфические формы экономических
преступлений первоначально создавали судебным властям трудности,
которые сказывались на длительности уголовного преследования. Суд
не может придавать этим факторам решающее значение, поскольку
обстоятельства данного дела не являются исключительными
(см. mutatis mutandis вышеупомянутое Решение по делу Бухольца,
п. 51, 61 и 63).
86. В свете всех этих факторов Суд приходит к выводу, что
сложности расследования и поведение заявителей сами по себе не
оправдывают длительность судебной процедуры; одна из главных
причин заключается в том, как вели дело судебные власти.
87. С учетом сказанного выше в п. 86, уменьшение срока
наказания в окончательном приговоре Земельного суда не лишает
заявителей права считаться жертвами в смысле статьи 25 (см. п. 68,
70 выше). Решение Земельного суда не содержит достаточных
указаний, позволяющих оценить, в какой мере длительность судебного
разбирательства была принята во внимание в целях Конвенции.
88. Соответственно, Суд отвергает предварительное возражение
Правительства в этой части дела и приходит к выводу, что
разбирательство в Трире превысило разумный срок в нарушение
статьи 6 п. 1 Конвенции.
2. Судебное разбирательство в Кельне
89. Дело, по которому следствие и суд состоялись в Кельне,
первоначально касалось пятнадцати человек, а его разветвления
вышли за пределы страны; в деле фигурировали не только обвинения в
мошенничестве, но также злостное банкротство и уклонение от уплаты
налогов (см. п. 37 выше). Как и Комиссия, Суд счел это дело
особенно трудным и сложным.
90. Как и в Трире, г-н и г-жа Экле тормозили ход
разбирательства, подавая многочисленные заявления и апелляции,
нередко сопровождаемые просьбой о продлении сроков подачи
письменных возражений (см. п. 43, 45, 47, 48, 49, 51, 53 и 54
выше; для сравнения п. 82 выше).
91. Заявители утверждали, что одни только судебные власти
несут ответственность за проволочки. В дополнение к основаниям, о
которых уже шла речь (в п. 83), они делали упор на то, что
судебные власти не отделили обвинения в мошенничестве от обвинений
в других преступлениях.
Комиссия сочла, что на длительность разбирательства повлияло
главным образом то, как вели дело судебные власти. Она указала на
чрезмерную продолжительность следствия и в качестве примера
привела задержку с завершением доклада эксперта; она также сочла,
что начало судебного разбирательства было задержано без веских к
тому причин, и что Земельный суд вполне мог прекратить уголовное
преследование на более ранней стадии.
Правительство выразило несогласие с этим мнением.
92. Суд, как и Комиссия, пришел к выводу, что компетентные
власти не действовали с необходимой степенью старания и
рациональности. Особо следует отметить, что прошло около трех лет
между предъявлением "уголовного обвинения" (25 сентября 1973 г.,
п. 52 выше) и началом суда (16 сентября 1976 г., п. 53 выше).
В связи с последним обстоятельством Правительство сослалось на
большую загрузку в то время палат Земельного суда,
специализирующихся на экономических преступлениях; Правительство
перечислило различные меры, принятые для исправления положения.
Суд отмечает, что власти стремились сократить длительность
рассмотрения дел в Земельном суде, увеличив число
специализированных палат с двух (в 1973 г.) до шести (в 1977 г.).
Тем не менее Суд считает, что сам по себе объем работы не был
исключительным и данная ссылка Правительства не может быть
принята, хотя Суд и отдает должное принятым в Федеративной
Республике Германии мерам для более быстрой и эффективной борьбы с
экономическими преступлениями.
93. На основании всех этих принятых во внимание факторов Суд
пришел к выводу, что сложности расследования и поведение
заявителей сами по себе длительность разбирательства не объясняют:
одна из основных причин ее кроется в том, как судебные власти вели
дело.
94. Прекращение с согласия заявителей уголовного дела -
Решение Земельного суда 21 сентября 1977 г. - в принципе могло бы
помешать заявителям претендовать на статус "жертв" в смысле
статьи 25, но длительность задержек, происшедших по вине властей,
такова, что заявители этот статус не утрачивают, тем более что
решение о прекращении дела не содержит каких бы то ни было
указаний, что это было сделано с учетом вышеупомянутых задержек
(см. п. 68, 70).
95. Соответственно, Суд отклоняет предварительное возражение
Правительства относительно этой части дела и констатирует, что
разбирательство в Кельне превысило разумный срок в нарушение
статьи 6 п. 1 Конвенции.
III. Применение статьи 50
96. Адвокат заявителей заявил, что, если Суд установит
нарушение Конвенции, тогда его клиенты подадут жалобу на основании
статьи 50 о справедливом возмещении ущерба, нанесенного им
неразумной длительностью процесса, и, возможно, будут просить о
возмещении судебных издержек, однако он не определил их притязания
в количественном отношении. Правительство со своей стороны не
занимало какой-либо позиции по данному вопросу.
Соответственно, вопрос еще не готов для принятия по нему
решения. Поэтому Суд обязан оговорить это и определить дальнейшую
процедуру, учитывая возможность соглашения между государством -
ответчиком и заявителями.
ПО ЭТИМ ОСНОВАНИЯМ СУД ЕДИНОГЛАСНО
1. Признал возможным предварительное возражение Правительства,
но после рассмотрения отклонил его;
2. Постановил, что имело место нарушение статьи 6 п. 1
Конвенции;
3. Постановил, что вопрос о применении статьи 50 не готов для
вынесения по нему решения;
соответственно,
a) сделал оговорку относительно данного вопроса в целом;
b) пригласил Комиссию представить Суду в двухмесячный срок
после вынесения настоящего Решения письменные замечания Комиссии
по указанному вопросу и, в частности, уведомить Суд о мировом
соглашении, к которому могли бы прийти государство - ответчик и
заявители;
c) отложил дальнейшее рассмотрение и делегировал председателю
Палаты полномочия возобновить его, если в том возникнет
необходимость.
Совершено на английском и французском языках, причем
французский текст является аутентичным, и оглашено во Дворце прав
человека в Страсбурге 15 июля 1982 г.
Председатель
Рольф РИССДАЛ
За Грефье
Заместитель Грефье
Герберт ПЕТЦОЛЬД
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
CASE OF ECKLE v. GERMANY
JUDGMENT
(Strasbourg, 15.VII.1982)
In the Eckle case,
The European Court of Human Rights, sitting , in accordance
with Article 43 (art. 43) of the Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ("the Convention") and the
relevant provisions of the Rules of Court, as a Chamber composed
of the following judges:
Mr. R. Ryssdal, President,
Mr. {Thor Vilhjalmsson} <*>,
Mr. W. Ganshof Van Der Meersch,
Mr. D. Evrigenis,
Mr. J. Pinheiro Farinha,
Mr. L.-E. Pettiti,
Mr. R. Bernhardt,
and also Mr. M.-A. Eissen, Registrar, and Mr. H. Petzold,
Deputy Registrar,
--------------------------------
<*> Здесь и далее по тексту слова на национальном языке
набраны латинским шрифтом и выделены фигурными скобками.
Having deliberated in private on 23 and 24 March and on
23 June 1982,
Delivers the following judgment which was adopted on the
last-mentioned date:
PROCEDURE
1. The Eckle case was referred to the Court by the European
Commission of Human Rights ("the Commission"). The case originated
in an application (no. 8130/78) against the Federal Republic of
Germany lodged with the Commission on 27 December 1977 under
Article 25 (art. 25) of the Convention by two German nationals,
Mr. Hans Eckle and his wife, Marianne.
2. The Commission's request was lodged with the registry on 18
May 1981, within the period of three months laid down by Articles
32 par. 1 and 47 (art. 32-1, art. 47). It refers to Articles 44
and 48 (art. 44, art. 48) and to the declaration whereby the
Federal Republic of Germany recognised the Court's jurisdiction as
compulsory (Article 46) (art. 46). Its purpose is to obtain a
judgment on whether or not the facts of the case reveal a breach
by the respondent State of its obligations under Article 6 par. 1
(art. 6-1).
3. The Chamber of seven judges to be constituted included, as
ex officio members, Mr. R. Bernhardt, the elected judge of German
nationality (Article 43 of the Convention) (art. 43), and
Mr. G. Wiarda, President of the Court (Rule 21 par. 3 (b) of the
Rules of Court). On 30 May 1981, the President drew by lot, in the
presence of the Registrar, the names of the five other members,
namely Mr. Thor Vilhjalmsson, Mr. W. Ganshof van der Meersch, Mr.
D. Evrigenis, Mr. J. Pinheiro Farinha and Mr. L.-E. Pettiti
(Article 43 in fine of the Convention and Rule 21 par. 4)
(art. 43).
4. Mr. Wiarda assumed the office of President of the Chamber
(Rule 21 par. 5) until 17 December 1981 when he exempted himself
from sitting (Rule 24 par. 4). He was replaced by Mr. Ryssdal,
Vice-President of the Court (Rule 21 par. 3 (b) and 5).
5. Through the Registrar, the President ascertained the views
of the Agent of the Government and the Delegate of the Commission
regarding the procedure to be followed. On 15 June 1981, he
directed that the Agent should have until 30 November to file a
memorial and that the Delegate of the Commission should be
entitled to file a memorial in reply within two months from the
date of transmission of the Government's memorial to him by the
Registrar.
The Government's memorial was received at the registry on
2 December. On 3 February 1982, the Secretary to the Commission
advised the Registrar that the Delegate would present his own
observations at the hearings, and forwarded to him the
observations of the applicants' lawyer on the Government's
memorial.
6. After consulting, through the Deputy Registrar, the Agent
of the Government and the Delegate of the Commission, the
President directed on 9 February that the hearings should open on
22 March.
7. On 15 and 19 March, acting on the instructions of the
President, the Registrar asked the representatives to produce
several documents; those documents were received at the registry
on 19 and 22 March.
8. The hearings were held in public at the Human Rights
Building, Strasbourg, on 22 March. Immediately before they opened,
the Chamber held a preparatory meeting at which it gave leave to
the Agent and advocates of the Government and to the person
assisting the Delegate of the Commission to use the German
Language (Rule 27 par. 2 and 3).
There appeared before the Court:
- for the Government
Mrs. I. Maier, Ministerialdirigentin at the Federal Ministry
of Justice, Agent,
Mr. K.-R. Winkler, Oberstaatsanwalt at the Ministry of Justice
of the Land of Rhineland-Palatinate,
Mr. A. Ring, Oberstaatsanwalt at the public prosecutor's
office attached to the Trier Regional Court,
Mr. M. Willems, Erster Staatsanwalt at the public prosecutor's
office attached to the Cologne Regional Court,
Mr. B. Weckauf, Wirtschaftsreferent at the public prosecutor's
office attached to the Cologne Regional Court,
Mr. K. Kemper, Regierungsdirektor at the Federal Ministry of
Justice, Advisers;
- for the Commission
Mr. J. A. Frowein, Delegate,
Mr. T. Vogler, Professor at the University of Giessen, the
applicant's lawyer before the Commission, assisting the Delegate
(Rule 29 par. 1, second sentence, of the Rules of Court).
The Court heard addresses by Mrs. Maier for the Government and
by Mr. Frowein and Mr. Vogler for the Commission, as well as their
replies to its questions. The Government submitted several
documents during the hearings; on 30 March, they supplemented
their answer to one of the questions put at the hearings and filed
some further documents.
THE FACTS
9. In 1952 Mr. Hans Eckle, who was born in 1926, founded the
building firm of "Hans Eckle, timber, steel and building
materials" at {Puttlingen} (Saarland), and worked there with his
wife, Marianne. He subsequently set up several branches in other
places and, in particular, a branch at Schweich, near Trier, in
1958, which was transferred shortly afterwards to Wittlich, and
then in 1961 an office in Cologne. In 1962 he was employing about
120 people.
The firm's business consisted in supplying materials and,
later, building sites on credit for people who wanted to build but
had few financial resources. Such a system, which the applicant
himself called the "Eckle system", had not hitherto been used in
the building materials trade.
He covered his financial needs - from 1962 at least - by loans
from individuals, who were offered mortgages as security
(Grundschulden). In 1965, however, he began to encounter
difficulties in this regard and towards the middle of the
following year he ceased payment to his creditors of the sums due
to them. The overall total of money he owed amounted at the time
to about ten million Marks.
10. The trade practices of the applicants from 1959 to 1967
were the subject of three separate sets of prosecutions in Trier,
{Saarbrucken} and Cologne. The first and last of these are in
issue in the instant case: the applicants complain that their
duration exceeded the "reasonable time" referred to in Article 6
par. 1 (art. 6-1) of the Convention.
In a case of this kind, it is necessary to set out in detail
each stage of the impugned proceedings.
I. The Trier proceedings
1. From the opening of a preliminary investigation
to the final preferment of the "bill of indictment"
(November 1959 - 15 March 1968)
11. Acting on a complaint lodged on 28 October 1959 by a bank
at Wittlich, the public prosecutor's office began, in November
1959, a preliminary investigation (Ermittlungsverfahren) in
respect of Mr. Eckle. On 22 February 1960, after it had obtained
information from the Trier Bezirksregierung as to the existence of
maximum prices in the building materials trade and without having
questioned either the applicants or any witnesses, the
prosecutor's office stopped the investigation. Examination of the
complaint was resumed with a fresh preliminary investigation
prompted by the receipt in mid-August of a letter from the Trier
Chamber of Industry and Commerce advising the public prosecutor
that Mr. Eckle was promising to supply his clients with building
materials "at average market prices" ({handelsubliche} Preise)
whereas his prices were in fact 25 per cent higher.
In September, the investigation was suspected pending the
outcome of a civil action brought against Mr. Eckle by one of his
customers, in which the concept of "average market prices" used by
Mr. Eckle in his contracts would have to be clarified. These civil
proceedings were concluded on 30 October 1962 with a judgment of
the Koblenz Court of Appeal (Oberlandesgericht) holding that the
applicant had charged prices higher than the average market
prices, contrary to the commitments he had entered into with his
customers.
12. Forty witnesses were interviewed between 1960 and 1962,
and thirty-six witnesses in 1963.
In 1964, the competent authorities held hearings of 133
witnesses, 15 of them outside the Land of Rhineland-Palatinate.
The same year the applicant's business premises were searched and
business records ({Geschaftsunterlagen}) seized. These searches
took place firstly on 4 March on an application from the
{Saarbrucken} public prosecutor's office but in the presence of
two officials from Trier, and subsequently on 7 October on an
application from the Trier public prosecutor's office which, on 8
and 9 October, questioned Mrs. Eckle for the first time.
In 1965, 325 witnesses were heard, 106 of them outside the
Land.
13. One of the twelve public prosecutors (Staatasanwalt) at
Trier, who was in charge of the investigation, was relieved of his
other duties in January 1965 in order to allow him to devote
himself entirely to the Eckle case. At the instance of the
Minister of Justice of the Land, a special commission of five
officers from the criminal police began assisting the public
prosecutor from this date onwards so that the investigation could
be intensified. Previously, as from April 1963, a member of the
criminal police had been dealing specifically with the case.
14. On 9 September 1965, the public prosecutor's office
ordered the closure of the investigation, during which according
to undisputed information provided by the Government - 540
witnesses had testified and nearly 3,000 documents - extracts from
land registers ({Grundbucher}), contracts, bills, drafts, etc. -
had been examined. The prosecutor's office had made up 37 main
files (Hauptakten) and 300 subsidiary files (Nebenakten), to which
had been added 120 files relating to civil suits.
15. On 9 September likewise, the public prosecutor's office
informed the applicants and two former female employees of the
Eckle firm that it intended to "indict" them. They were requested
to give notice within two weeks if they wished to have, before
their committal for trial, a "final hearing" by the public
prosecutor's office ({Schlussgehor}) under Article 169 b of the
Code of Criminal Procedure (in force until 31 December 1974).
On 20 September, two counsel for Mr. Eckle asked to be allowed
to inspect the file before replying.
After a conference with them on 12 October, the public
prosecutor's office notified them on 3 November that the file
would be available to them at the secretariat until 20 November.
The legal advisers acting for Mrs. Eckle and for the two
employees did not respond. Accordingly, counsel were assigned to
them officially but were replaced in December 1965 and January
1966 by counsel instructed by the parties themselves.
In mid-December 1965, the public prosecutor's office sent Mr.
Eckle's legal representatives a copy of the main sections of the
file, as had been agreed a month earlier, and gave them until 2
February 1966 to decide whether or not they wanted a "final
hearing".
A further counsel appeared for Mr. Eckle on 1 February 1966,
and then a fourth. They too asked for an opportunity to consult
the file and for copies of certain documents in the file; in
mid-March, they were given a deadline for stating whether they
were requesting a "final hearing".
Between 13 and 15 March, the seven counsel applied for a
"final hearing" and for the original file to be made available to
each of them beforehand for a period of six months. However, they
withdrew their requests on 19 April and 9 May, respectively.
16. Once proceedings relating to the "final hearing" had thus
been concluded, the public prosecutor's office drew up the "bill
of indictment" (Anklageschrift). Drafting of this was completed on
3 August and the typescript was sent to the First Criminal Chamber
(1. Grosse Strafkammer) of the Regional Court (Landgericht) on 26
October.
The "bill of indictment", which filled four volumes and
comprised 793 pages in all, was directed against the applicants
and the two former female employees of the Eckle firm. It alleged
a total of 474 offences of fraud and extortion, listed almost 500
witnesses and mentioned more than 250 documents produced in
evidence.
Proceedings had been dropped by the public prosecutor's office
in respect of 68 cases, in 61 of them pursuant to Article 154 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure. In the version in force until the
end of 1978, this provision empowered the court (paragraph 2) and,
until a "bill of indictment" had been preferred, the public
prosecutor (paragraph 1) to take such a measure at any stage of
the proceedings if, in particular, the sentence liable to be
passed at the end of the proceedings was negligible in comparison
with one already finally ({rechtskraftig}) imposed on the accused
- or which the accused had to expect - for another offence.
17. On 23 December 1966, the public prosecutor in charge of
the case conferred with the President of the Criminal Chamber
about the duplications arising from criminal proceedings pending
in {Saarbrucken}, where the trial hearing was due to begin on
17 March 1967 (see paragraph 58 below).
18. On 16 January 1967, the public prosecutor's office
withdrew the "bill of indictment" because it had learned of other
possible offences and felt that further inquiries were necessary.
On 22 August, the Cologne public prosecutor's office, which
had openend a preliminary investigation in respect of Mr. Eckle on
21 March (see paragraph 37 below), stated its willingness to deal
with the new cases which the Trier public prosecutor's office had
begun to inquire into. As a result, the Trier public prosecutor's
office transferred these cases to Cologne on 15 March 1968 and on
the same day preferred the "bill of indictment" - unchanged in any
way - for a second time.
Between 16 January 1967 and 8 February 1968, 234 fresh cases,
of which 217 concerned the {Saarbrucken} and Trier public
prosecutor's offices, had been examined.
2. From the final preferment of the "bill of indictment"
to the beginning of the trial (Hauptverfahren)
(15 March 1968 - 28 January 1969)
19. Between 26 March and 25 May 1968, the President of the
First Criminal Chamber of the Regional Court took several steps to
ensure that the accused were represented; on the last-mentioned of
these dates, the Regional Court assigned to them four officially
appointed defence counsel.
On 30 May, the President drew the attention of the public
prosecutor's office to the fact that it had not yet offered the
accused a "final hearing" in respect of the new cases. The
prosecutor's offfice replied on 11 June, pointing out that these
cases had been transferred to Cologne (see paragraph 18 above).
On 2 July, the Regional Court asked to be sent the "bill of
indictment" drawn up by the {Saarbrucken} public prosecutor's
office (see paragraph 58 below): the Court was examining whether
the numerous offences alleged against the applicants amounted to
continuous conduct which had to be regarded as a single offence,
in which event the prior conviction at {Saarbrucken} would
preclude any further conviction. Three days later the
{Saaurbrucken} public prosecutor's office transmitted to the
Regional Court a copy of the judgment of 17 October 1967 (see
paragraph 58 below) and informed it that the files had been
forwarded to the federal public prosecutor's office
(Bundesanwaltschaft) for the purposes of the proceedings for
review on a point of law (Revisionsverfahren).
In response to a request from one of the defence counsel for
the applicants that he should be given copies of the file, the
Regional Court, declared, inter alia, on 23 July 1968 that it
remained to be decided whether the above-mentioned preferment of
the "bill of indictment" could validly stand.
On 19 August, the Regional Court sought information from the
{Saarbrucken} public prosecutor's office about the state of the
proceedings; it stressed that it needed the "bill of indictment"
it had asked for on 2 July. This was finally sent on 4 October by
the Trier public prosecutor's office, which urged at the same time
that a decision be taken on the "bill of indictment" it had itself
preferred.
On 28 January 1969, the Regional Court admitted the latter
"bill of indictment" (Zulassung der Anklage) and ordered that the
trial open ({Eroffnung} des Hauptverfahrens).
3. Proceedings before the Trier Regional Court
(28 January 1969 - 12 February 1973)
20. Counsel for Mrs. Eckle having asked on 14 February 1969
for the file to be made available to him, the Regional Court
replied on 18 February that copies would be forwarded to him. On
the same day counsel for Mr. Eckle called on the Regional Court to
quash the preferment of the "bill of indictment".
On 16 April, counsel for Mrs. Eckle urgently requested the
Regional Court not to take any action in the case before receiving
the text of the judgment delivered on 14 March 1969 by the Federal
Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof) in the matter of the
{Saarbrucken} proceedings (see paragraph 58 below). The judgment
was transmitted to the Regional Court on 29 April by the
{Saarbruuken} public prosecutor's office.
On the previous day the Regional Court had refused to issue a
warrant for the arrest of Mr. Eckle on the grounds that he was
still subject to such a warrant in the {Saarbrucken} proceedings.
On 28 May, it informed counsel for Mrs. Eckle, who on 16 April
had complained that eight files were missing, that these related
to proceedings which had been dropped.
On 2 April, one of the officially assigned defence lawyers had
asked the Court to revoke his appointment. In order to enable him
to continue to act, the Regional Court suggested to the public
prosecutor's office on 30 September that it should ask for
proceedings to be terminated in the case in which the lawyer in
question had previously appeared in another capacity. On 14
October, the public prosecutor's office made a request to this
effect, which the Regional Court granted on 17 November.
21. On 14 October 1969, the public prosecutor's office applied
for a warrant for the arrest of Mr. Eckle who had been released
from detention in relation to the {Saarbrucken} proceedings, but
the Regional Court refused the application on 17 November. On
appeal by the public prosecutor's office, the Koblenz Court of
Appeal quashed this decision on 28 January 1970 and issued a
warrant for the arrest on the applicant.
At the request of the public prosecutor's office (6 February)
the Cologne District Court (Amtsgericht) on 12 March served the
warrant on Mr. Eckle who was in detention in Cologne in respect of
the proceedings there (see paragraph 43 below). Mr. Eckle
immediately appealed against the issuing of the warrant, but the
Koblenz Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on 2 April.
22. On 20 April 1970, the President of the First Criminal
Chamber of the Trier Regional Court advised the relevant authority
that the magnitude of the Eckle case was preventing him from
handling other cases. On 1 June, he reached an agreement with his
colleague at the {Saarbrucken} Regional Court as to the dates of
the hearings to be held by their respective courts (see paragraph
58 below). On 2 July, he fixed the date of 11 November for the
opening of the trial hearing and notified defence counsel
accordingly.
On 19 October, counsel for Mrs. Eckle withdrew a statement
whereby, on 19 April 1968, he had waived his claim to certain
costs and expenses, and requested the Regional Court to appoint
him as defence counsel unconditionally. Four days later, counsel
for Mr. Eckle applied for a postponement of the hearings,
asserting that he dit not have enough time to prepare the defence.
The Regional Court rejected both applications on 27 October.
On 31 October, Mr. Eckle himself asked for the hearings to be
postponed, pleading, inter alia, Article 6 par. 3 (b) (art. 6-3-b)
of the Convention, but the Regional Court refused the request on
4 November.
23. The trial opened on 11 November. Mr. Eckle immediately
sought an adjournment, and Mrs. Eckle suspension of the
proceedings; the third defendant challenged two of the judges.
The Regional Court dismissed the challenge on 17 November. On
the same day, it excluded Mr. Eckle from the courtroom on grounds
of his behaviour before the Court and, in answer to an objection
raised by one of the co-defendants, affirmed its jurisdiction in
the case.
Two days later, it declined to grant a further application for
an adjournment which Mr. Eckle had made on 17 November. On the
same day, Mr. Eckle requested his release from detention; he and
his wife went so far as to refuse to give their particulars, and
counsel for the defence asked the Court for the author of the
"bill of indictment" to be called as a witness so that certain
points in it could be clarified.
The public prosecutor who had drawn up the "bill of
indictment" was heard on 26 November, after which all the
defendants applied for the proceedings to be terminated. Mr. Eckle
declared himself unfit to stand trial and sought a formal decision
from the Regional Court on this matter.
The "bill of indictment" and the prior order to commence the
trial hearing were read out in court on 3 December. Prior to that,
the Regional Court had ordered that prosecution in some of the
cases should be dropped. It also refused the defendant's
applications for the discontinuance or suspension of the
proceedings. On the same day, Mr. Eckle challenged three of the
judges and asked the Regional Court to postpone the hearing in
order to give him time to obtain the documents needed to support
his challenge.
On 10 December, Mr. Eckle was once more removed from the
courtroom and sentenced to one day's imprisonment for his
behaviour before the Court: he had insulted the President and
thrown paper at him. In evidence to the Regional Court, a doctor
who had examined the applicant considered him fit to stand trial,
although stating that it would be necessary to keep the applicant
under observation before being able to give a final opinion.
The Regional Court thereupon decided that Mr. Eckle should
provisionnally be placed in a psychiatric hospital with a view to
a medical report being made on him; the hearing was adjourned sine
die on 17 December.
24. The psychiatric examination was completed on 23 January
1971 and the medical report filed on 20 February. According to the
doctor, the applicant's behaviour during the hearings was not the
result of any illness.
Between 24 February and 26 March, hearings took place in the
{Saarbrucken} proceedings, which ended on the latter date with the
conviction of Mr. Eckle (see paragraph 58 below).
25. On 16 June, hearings resumed before the First Criminal
Chamber of the Trier Regional Court, the President of which had
been replaced in December 1970; the hearings continued until 17
March 1972. During the 28 days of hearings, the Regional Court
heard approximately 110 witnesses, including an expert witness,
and more than 500 documents were read out.
According to the undisputed account of the proceedings
furnished by the Government, Mr. Eckle challenged judges on twenty
occasions - sometimes twice on the same days - and his wife did so
some ten times. Furthermore, he objected to the composition of the
Regional Court, challenged two experts, introduced ten motions to
take evidence ({Beweisantrage}), requested his release from
detention ten times and suspension of the trial four times. Five
times he claimed to be unfit to stand trial and requested a
medical examination; on five occasions the Regional Court took
evidence from a doctor who, on one of these occasions, judged the
applicant to be incapable of attending court for the rest of the
day. On seven occasions Mr. Eckle was sentenced to two or three
day's imprisonment on account of his behaviour and he was eight
times removed from the courtroom for several days, notably in the
period from 18 October 1971 to 19 January 1972.
According to the same account, Mrs. Eckle for her part
submitted motions to take evidence on three occasions; she applied
three times to the Regional Court for the instructions given to
the counsel officially assigned to defend her to be withdrawn,
twice for the trial to be suspended, twice again for it to be
discontinued and on three occasions for the appointment of a
second lawyer.
26. On 23 November 1971, the Regional Court terminated the
proceedings, pursuant to Article 154 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure (see paragraph 16 above), in respect of more than 400 of
the counts in the "bill of indictment".
27. On 17 March 1972, Mr. Eckle was sentenced to imprisonment
for four years and six months, his wife to a term of eighteen
months and the two co-defendants to ten and six months
respectively. At the same time, the Regional Court discharged the
warrant for the arrest of the applicant.
The Regional Court's judgment found Mr. Eckle guilty of fraud
committed jointly with other persons to the detriment of customers
in forty-two cases and to the detriment of creditors in sixteen
cases, and of attempted fraud in one case concerning a creditor.
On two charges relating to a customer and a creditor respectively
he was acquitted. The Court terminated proceedings in three cases
because they were time-barred.
Mrs. Eckle was convicted of fraud committed jointly with other
persons in thirty-nine cases to the detriment of customers and in
sixteen cases to the detriment of creditors, and of attempted
fraud in one case involving a creditor. The Court acquitted her on
the same two counts as her husband and terminated proceedings in
six cases, including the three cases that also concerned her
husband.
According to the findings in the judgment, the conclusion of
the illegal contracts dated back to 1959-1960 in respect of the
customers and 1962-1964 in respect of the creditors.
When deciding the sentences the Regional Court took into
account, inter alia, "to the advantage of all the defendants",
"the inordinate length of time during which they had been exposed
to the drawbacks and unpleasantness of the investigation and trial
proceedings, something which was not wholly their own fault".
The judgment - which ran to 236 pages - was served on the
applicants on 12 February 1973, that is a little less than eleven
months after its delivery.
28. Whilst the trial hearing was continuing, an auxiliary
chamber (Hilfskammer) specially set up to relieve the First
Criminal Chamber dealt with all the other cases allocated to the
latter.
4. Proceedings for review on a point of law
(Revisionsverfahren) (February 1973 - 11 February 1976)
29. The four persons convicted petitioned for review on a
point of law (Revision). In this connection, between 27 February
and 8 March 1973 Mr. and Mrs. Eckle submitted several memorials to
the Federal Court of Justice, alleging various errors in law as
well as procedural irregularities.
After the counter-memorial by the Trier public prosecutor's
office had been drafted on 31 October, the file was sent to the
federal public prosecutor's office on 28 November.
30. On 4 February 1974, the federal public prosecutor's office
noticed that it was not clear from the file how eight of the cases
heard by the Regional Court had been disposed of.
When consulted on this, the Trier public prosecutor's office
pointed out that most of the obscurities arose from inaccuracies
in the minutes of the hearings, while in two cases the failure to
cease prosecution was due to inadvertence. The matter was referred
to the Trier Regional Court, which decided on 22 February and 4
March to rectify the minutes and terminate the proceedings
relating to the two cases in question. On 6 March, the Trier
public prosecutor's office returned the file, together with a
supplementary report, to the federal public prosecutor's office
and at the latter's request also forwarded the "bill of
indictment" of 19 March.
31. On 1 August 1974, the federal public prosecutor's office
requested the Trier public prosecutor's office to reply in writing
to the applicant's objections to the composition of the Regional
Court and, in particular, to produce the official statements of
the judges concerned and the charts showing the allocation of
business in 1971.
After taking - between September and December 1974 -
statements from eleven judges (some of whom were no longer in
Trier), the public prosecutor's office sent them to the federal
public prosecutor's office on 29 January 1975 together with
comments. On 21 February, it transmitted some further documents
which the federal public prosecutor's office had asked for on 4
February.
32. On 7 April 1975, the applicant's new lawyer applied for
the proceedings to be dropped as being time-barred. On 24 April,
the member of the federal public prosecutor's office dealing with
the case requested the President of the Second Devision (Senat) of
the Federal Court of Justice to set down a date for the opening of
the hearing: in his submission, the proceedings were not
time-barred.
On 2 December, the President directed that the hearing should
be held on 11 February 1976.
Mrs. Eckle's new defence counsel submitted supplementary
written pleadings on 26 February 1976; and on 4 February, one of
the two co-defendants withdrew her petition for review on a point
of law.
33. Following the hearing on 11 February, the Federal Court of
Justice dismissed the petitions on 19 February.
At the end of the judgment, the Federal Court recalled that
cumulative sentences (Gesamtstrafe) combining those passed in
Trier and in {Saarbrucken} (see paragraph 58 below) remained to be
determined. In this connection, it stated, inter alia:
"Excessive length of criminal proceedings may - and the
Regional Court did not overlook this - constitute a special
mitigating circumstance (Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in
Strafsachen, vol. 24, p. 239). When a cumulative sentence has to
be determined retrospectively, this consideration must likewise
apply to the period which has already elapsed between the hearing
before the trial court and the moment when the principle of res
judicata took effect in respect of the judgment, and which will
continue to elapse until the final decision. Attention must also
be drawn in this case to the special burden imposed on the
defendants by the dividing up of groups of cases consisting in the
repeated commission of similar offences into two sets of criminal
proceedings. The Court is not required to rule on the merits of
this allocation. It considers, however, that the spirit of the law
would be lost sight of ... if, when determining sentence, this
circumstance were not clearly (deutlich) taken into account."
5. Proceedings relating to the constitutional
complaints (24 May 1976 - 30 June 1977)
34. On 24 and 28 May 1976, Mr. and Mrs. Eckle applied to the
Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht).
Challenging the judgments of both the Federal Court of Justice and
the Trier Regional Court, they alleged a violation of sections 1,
2, 3, 19 par. 4 and 103 of the Basic Law (Grundgezetz), mainly on
account of the excessive length of the trial and of the existence
of three distinct sets of proceedings.
On 30 June 1977, a bench of three members of the
Constitutional Court decided not to hear the applications; it
judged that they did not offer sufficient prospects of success.
6. Determining cumulative sentences
(Gesamtstrafen) (24 November 1977)
35. On 24 November 1977, the Trier Regional Court fixed
cumulative sentences combining those it had pronounced itself and
those imposed by the {Saarbrucken} Regional Court (see paragraphs
27 above and 58 below). The new sentences fixed were: imprisonment
for seven years in the case of Mr. Eckle and for two years and
eight months in the case of his wife. Acting on submissions dated
19 October from the Trier public prosecutor's office, the Court
suspended for five years that part of Mr. Eckle's sentence which
was in excess of five years and eleven days, and suspended for two
years that part of Mrs. Eckle's sentence which was in excess of
one year and four months.
In the grounds given for its decision in respect of Mr. Eckle,
the Trier Regional Court repeated the above-quoted reasoning of
the Federal Court of Justice (see paragraph 33 above). It appeared
to the Court that the long duration of the criminal proceedings
should be taken into account in Mrs. Eckle's favour too.
36. On 23 January 1978, the Koblenz Court of Appeal dismissed
an "immediate appeal" (sofortige Beschwerde) entered by each of
the applicants, on 1 and 2 December respectively, against the
Regional Court's decision. The Court of Appeal held, inter alia:
"... the Criminal Chamber rightly regarded the excessive
length of the criminal proceedings and the separation of groups of
comparable cases into several acts of proceedings as a special
mitigating circumstance and it took account of this when
determining sentence (Echtscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in
Strafsachen, vol. 24, p. 239). Its dicta on this point are
comprehensive, sensible and in accordance with the principles laid
down by the Federal Court of Justice in its judgment of 19
February 1976 in the instant case ... [The Court of Appeal] too is
of the opninion that these reasons justify a cumulative sentence
of [seven years for Mr. Eckle and two years and eight months for
Mrs. Eckle]. Even having regard to Article 6 (art. 6) of the
Convention ..., this sentence does not appear to be unduly severe
(ibid, vol. 24, p. 239). Considering also the culpability (unter
{Abwagung} auch der Schuld) of the defendants, a reduction of
sentence does not seem appropriate ..."
According to the Government, Mr. and Mrs. Eckle thereupon
applied to the Federal Constitutional Court which rejected their
applications.
II. The Cologne proceedings
1. From the opening of a preliminary investigation
to the preferment of the "bill of indictment"
(21 march 1967 - 25 September 1973)
37. On 21 March 1967, the Cologne public prosecutor's office
began a preliminary investigation of Mr. Eckle, who was suspected
of having committed, inter alia, various frauds. From 29 March
onwards the investigation - which had been commenced ex officio
followig the appearance of a number of articles in the press - was
extended to cover several complaints lodged in February and March
by purchasers of building materials and persons who had made loans
to the Eckle firm.
The Cologne proceedings comprised five groups of charges in
all (see paragraph 80 of the Commission's report):
(a) They covered first of all a complex of frauds against
customers of the Eckle firm who had allegedly suffered losses
after the latter had gone bankrupt. The persons concerned in this
part of the proceedings were the applicants, the two close
collaborators who were later convicted at Trier (see paragraph 27
above), a tax consultant, two architects and a building expert.
(b) The second group concerned the "Hobby-Bau GmbH" company in
Frankfurt. The object of this company, which was founded in 1965
by two former employees of the applicants, was to carry on the
Eckle firm's business activities in the Frankfurt area. Mr. Eckle
was supposedly in control of this company; his wife had been given
power of disposal over its assets. The company had ceased payments
at the end of 1966, and in December 1967 bankruptcy proceedings
were commenced.
(c) The third group of charges was connected with Mr. Eckle's
relations with a Mr. Neubeck of Cologne and the companies he
controlled, and in particular their financial and trading
operations, with alleged transfers of property to Liechtenstein
and Switzerland, and with the bankruptcy of the Neubeck companies;
proceedings in respect of the latter were, however, severed from
the rest.
(d) The fourth group dealt with the business relations of the
Eckle firm or the Hobby-Bau GmbH company and its manager with an
accountant and two companies both called Westropa-Bauservice,
whose head offices were in Zug (Switzerland) and Munich.
(e) The fifth group related mainly to the Eckle company; the
applicants, those of their employees accused with them and other
persons were suspected of having committed either as principals,
co-principals or accessories offences of fraudulent bankruptcy and
tax evasion.
During 1967 and 1968, the investigation was widened to cover
thirteen persons other than the applicants.
38. At the request of the public prosecutor's office, the
Cologne District Court (Amtsgericht) issued a search and seizure
warrant in respect of the applicants on 25 April 1967. The police
thereupon searched the business premises of the Eckle company on
11 and 12 May. They seized four metric tons of documents which the
public prosecutor's office made available to an accountant
({Wirtschaftsprufer}) whom it had appointed as a consultant the
previous month. Also in May a special commission was set up
composed of a public prosecutor and three police officers who were
specialists in investigating economic crime; this commission
worked exclusively on the Eckle case and continued in existence
until May 1972.
According to the account of events provided by the Government,
between 1967 and 1972 the relevant authorities applied for,
authorised and, with a few exceptions, performed numerous searches
of the offices and private dwellings of the applicants and some of
their co-accused, the offices of other companies and the offices
of more than thirty-five banks; in addition, they seized a mass of
documents. In 1967: such measures were carried out on 23 May, at
{Volklingen}; on 20 and 21 July, in Cologne; on 25 July, at
{Puttlingen}; and on 24 and 25 August and 14 October, in
Frankfurt; on 30 January, at Steinau; on 6 and 7 February, in
Cologne; on 16 February, in Frankfurt; in 1968: on 29 January, in
Frankfurt; on 18 and 22 February, at Miesbach and in Munich; on 8
March, in Frankfurt; on 15 March, in {Dusseldorf} and Essen; on 15
and 16 March, in Frankfurt; from 1 to 4 April, at {Volklingen} and
in {Saarbrucken}; on 2 April in Munich; on 10 April, in Augsburg;
on 18 and 19 April, in Frankfurt; on 6 and 7 May, in {Saarbrucken}
and at Wittlich; on 15 May, in Trier; on 24 June, at Seligenstadt;
on 23 July, in Munich; on 19 September, in Kassel; from 1 to 5
October, in Munich; on 11 November, in Frankfurt; on 3 and 4
December, in Hamburg; and on 12 December, in Cologne; in 1969: on
30 January in Frankfurt and Darmstadt; on 8 April, at
{Volklingen}; on 11 and 24 April, in {Saarbrucken}; on 14 June, in
Cologne; on 24 and 26 November, at Ottweiler; on 25, 26 and 27
November, at Saarlouis and Bous; on 1 December at Bous; and on 11
December, in {Saarbrucken} and at Saarlouis; in 1970: on 6 August,
in {Saarbrucken} and at Gersweiler; and on 30 November, in
Frankfurt; in 1971: on 19 April, in {Saarbrucken}; and on 20
April, at Saarlouis; and in 1972: on 14 April, in Munich.
The appeals which the parties concerned lodged from time to
time (for example, on 31 July and 13 and 29 September 1967 and on
26 September and 14 October 1969) were dismissed, except for the
second one, which was partly allowed on 4 October 1967 by the
Cologne Regional Court.
39. The prosecutor in charge of the investigation conferred on
9 and 16 May 1967 with the criminal investigation police about
coordination of action and, on 16 May, with the consultant whom he
instructed to carry out certain tasks (Teilgutachten).
On 10 August, he requested the criminal investigation police
to question four witnesses about certain specified points, and, on
16 August, he sent further documents to the consultant.
On 22 August, he assumed responsibility for a number of cases
and agreed to the transfer of those which the Trier public
prosecutor's office had begun to inquire into (see paragraph 18
above). Seven days later, he requested the public prosecutor's
offices in Frankfurt and Offenburg to forward to him various file
of which he had copies made on 18 September.
During the months that followed, the prosecutor took over a
number of preliminary investigations which had begun elsewhere:
three of them on 10 October, 207 on 10 November, five on 11
December, two on 11 January 1968 and three on 8 February 1968.
On 15 February 1968, he asked the federal office of the
criminal investigation police (Bundeskriminalamt) to make
inquiries into a company in Switzerland and four others in
Liechtenstein which he suspected were being run by Mr. Eckle and
his fellow accused Neubeck.
On 11 and 20 June, he asked for certain inquiries to be made
by the criminal investigation police in Dudenhofen, Kassel and
other places, and circulated a letter written in May and
containing a list of questions to numerous foreign companies and
individuals residing abroad who had allegedly suffered loss.
On 20 June too, he summoned a witness in order to have him
questioned by the criminal investigation police; other witnesses
made statements on 24, 25 and 27 July.
At the request and in the presence of the public prosecutor's
office, one of the co-accused was questioned on 18 September by a
judge from the Seligenstadt District Court; another co-accused was
similarly questioned on 4 October.
40. On 29 November 1968, the public prosecutor's office
instructed the consultant it had appointed in 1967 (see paragraph
38 above) to produce an expert opinion on seven listed points,
including the history of the Hobby-Bau GmbH company and its
relations with the Westropa company. On 23 July 1969, it sent him
other documents for the purpose.
41. On 10 January and 23 July 1969, four preliminary
investigations in respect of Mr. Eckle which had been begun
notably in {Saarbrucken}, Frankfurt and Trier were transferred to
the Cologne public prosecutor's office, which on 20 February made
inquiries of the local authorities of six municipalities
concerning the purchase of land by the Hobby-Bau GmbH company and
at the same time asked for the production of the land registers of
the relevant district courts.
On 31 March and 8 July prosecutor's office heard the applicant
informally for information purposes. On 16 April and 19 June, it
summoned witnesses in {Saarbrucken} and Saarlouis for questioning;
on 18, 21 and 22 April, it advised the public prosecutor's office
in {Saarbrucken} and Koblenz of the purpose of the investigation
and of a number of inquiries made and still to be made. On 14 May,
the Trier public prosecutor's office sent to Cologne nine volumes
of the file on the proceedings in Trier; these were returned by
the Cologne office on 6 June. On 9 June, the latter asked the
presiding judges of the District Courts of Cologne and
{Volklingen} to provide it with a list of the seizures which had
been made in respect of the Eckle firm and the applicants.
In July, August and September, the public prosecutor's office
instructed the criminal investigation police in Mannheim,
{Saarbrucken}, Berlin and Hamburg to make inquiries into
life-insurance policies which Mr. Eckle had taken out with a
number of companies; sought information from an insurer in
{Saarbrucken}; obtained the opinion of the Federal Banking
Supervisory Office (Bundesaufsichtsamt {fur} Kreditwesen); and
applied for the files concerning the land register at
{Volklingen}.
42. According to the report of the Commission, from March 1967
to August 1968 statements were taken from about 832 creditors,
from the majority of some 3,500 purchasers of building materials
from the Eckle company and from a large number of other witnesses
or employees; and the Eckle company's accounts with some
twenty-five credit institutions were examined. Until October 1969
the investigation was focused on the alleged frauds committed by
the accused to the detriment of 832 creditors and 3,590 purchasers
of building materials.
43. As requested by the public prosecutor's office on
13 November 1969, the Cologne District Court issued, five days
later, a warrant for the arrest of two co-accused and Mr. Eckle.
The latter was remanded in custody on 25 November and he remained
in custody on that basis until 5 September 1970; from the next day
onwards in accordance with a decision taken by the District Court
on 1 September, he was detained on the basis of the warrant for
his arrest which the Koblenz Court of Appeal had issued on
28 January 1970 in the proceedings at Trier (see paragraph
21 above).
The applicant several times appealed unsuccessfully to the
Cologne District Court, Regional Court and Court of Appeal against
the issue of the arrest warrant on 18 November.
44. During the latter period, that is between December 1969
and September 1970, the Cologne public prosecutor's office heard
Mrs. Eckle (12 December); discussed the progress of the
proceedings with the public prosecutor's office in {Saarbrucken}
(26 January 1970) which, by mutual agreement, transferred to
Cologne an investigation in respect of one of the other persons
accused (5 March); had four witnesses summoned in {Saarbrucken}
(20 May); and set dates for the hearing of a number of people,
notably in {Saarbrucken}, Frankfurt, Ahrweiler and Hamburg (21,
22, 28 and 30 July, 26 August).
On 30 July 1970, the consultant's terms of reference were
widened, and the consultant informed the public prosecutor's
office 11 August that an expert opinion could not be produced
before mid-1971.
45. On 1 September, the Cologne District Court refused to make
available to Mr. Eckle the legal codes, books and periodicals and
the 2,000 files which he had asked for.
On 9 September, Mr. Eckle challenged a judge on the District
Court, which rejected the challenge on 21 September as no grounds
for it had been adduced. An appeal was dismissed on 4 December by
the Cologne Court of appeal - two of whose judges Mr. Eckle had
previously challenged - because he had not put forward any
supporting reasons, although the Court had twice given him extra
time to do so.
46. Continuing its investigation, the public prosecutor's
office proceeded to set dates for hearing a number of people
itself, mainly elsewhere than in Cologne, or alternatively to
request the appropriate criminal investigation police or courts to
question them (24 and 26 November 1970, 18 and 19 January, 3
February, 30 March, 6, 7, 28 and 29 April 1971); business records
of the Eckle company were examined, seized and sent to the
consultant by the prosecutor's office (12 to 14 May 1971);
requests for the production of files were made to other courts,
including the Federal Constitutional Court (24 May, 18 June, 19
July, 23 August, 29 September); information was sought from the
Cologne Court of Appeal (24 May); and the Cologne Social Security
Office was asked to make certain inquiries (18 August).
On 13 August 1971, the consultant submitted an interim report
on the Eckle company's indebtedness, insolvency and suspension of
payments.
On 21 October, a doctor transmitted to the public prosecutor's
office an expert opinion, which it had requested on 4 October, on
Mr. Eckle's fitness to stand trial.
47. On 21 November, Mr. Eckle applied, amongst other things,
for the warrant for his arrest to be revoked. The Cologne District
Court refused the application on 30 November. On appeal, the
Cologne Regional Court on 13 December 1971 and then the Cologne
Court of Appeal on 17 January 1972 upheld that decision.
Between January and April 1972, the public prosecutor's office
summoned, or caused to be summoned, a number of witnesses, Mrs.
Eckle and other accused persons so that they could make statements
(notably on 6 January 1972, 1, 17 and 28 February and 3 and 8
March) and on 22 March requested another doctor to give his
opinion on Mr. Eckle's fitness to stand trial.
From 17 March 1972, the day he was convicted in the Trier
proceedings (see paragraph 27 above), the applicant was detained
on remand under a warrant issued, and subsequently confirmed on 8
May, by the relevant Cologne court. On 2 June, the same court
decided to suspend Mr. Eckle's remand in custody to enable him to
serve the sentence passed on him on 26 March 1971 by the
{Saarbrucken} Regional Court (see paragraph 58 below). The Cologne
Regional Court dismissed appeals by Mr. Eckle on 22 June and 20
November.
48. The public prosecutor's office completed the investigation
on 10 May 1972 and on the same date dropped the prosecutions
against some of the co-accused.
It asked the Cologne Regional Court on 14 June to assign two
official defence counsel, in particular for Mr. Eckle. On 20 June,
the Court appointed one of them - Mr. Muhr to whom the public
prosecutor's office sent a copy of the files and other documents
on 14 August and 2 October - but refused Mr. Eckle's request that
it should nominate Mr. Becker, who had defended him in the trial
at Trier. An appeal by Mr. Eckle against this latter decision was
dismissed on 20 November. On the same day, the Regional Court
discharged Mr. Muhr from his duties and replaced him as official
defence counsel by the applicant's lawyer, Mr. Preyer, to whom it
had already sent the main files, among other things, on 13
November.
On 20 June, the consultant had filed his final report on the
Eckle firm; four months later he submitted one on the Hobby-Bau
GmbH company.
On 17 July, the public prosecutor's office had called on the
applicant and his fellow accused to state by 30 August whether
they wanted a "final hearing". This time-limit was extended on 31
August, and Mr. Eckle subsequently replied affirmatively on 18
September.
49. On 11 and 17 July 1972, Mr. Eckle had challenged two
judges on the Regional Court. After giving him an ultimate
deadline until 15 September to state his grounds, the Regional
Court rejected his challenges on 2 November; a subsequent appeal,
for which he was granted extra time to put forward his reasons,
was likewise dismissed on 6 April 1973.
On 14 November 1972, the Cologne District Court decided to
confirm the authorisation to serve the sentence passed on Mr.
Eckle by the {Saarbrucken} Regional Court (see paragraphs 47 above
and 58 below). An appeal lodged by Mr. Eckle on 30 November, for
which he had asked to be given until 31 January 1973 to state his
reasons, seems to have been unsuccessful.
On 12 December, the public prosecutor's office sent copies of
files to counsel for the defence for inspection.
Between November 1972 and March 1973, Mr. Eckle lodged several
other applications and appeals whose purpose is not apparent from
the same time he asked the competent authorities to grant him
extensions of time in order to formulate the grounds for his
applications.
50. On 1 March 1973, the public prosecutor's office set the
date of 13 March for the "final hearing" of Mrs. Eckle and,
pursuant to Article 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see
paragraph 16 above), dropped the charges of fraud in a number of
cases.
The hearing of Mrs. Eckle took place on the appointed day. On
the next day, Mr. Eckle, acting through his defence counsel,
waived his right to a "final hearing", but on 28 March his lawyer
applied for one, explaining that the waiver had been due to a
misunderstanding. As on the same day the prison doctor expressed
the opinion that the state of the applicant's health made him
unfit to appear, the hearing was adjourned.
51. On 29 March 1973, Mr. Eckle sought an extension of time to
submit reasons in support of a number of his appeals; lodged two
fresh appeals against decisions of the Regional Court; and
challenged the presiding judge of the Ninth Criminal Chamber. The
time-limit originally allotted to him for stating his grounds for
the challenge was to have expired on 30 April, but the Regional
Court agreed to put the deadline back to 31 May, then to 30 June,
to 31 July and, finally, to 31 August.
On 6 April 1973, Mr. Eckle applied to the District Court for
Mr. Preyer's instructions to be withdrawn and for Mr. Becker to be
assigned as official defence counsel, and asked also for three
day's leave of absence (Urlaub); these applications were refused
on 6 June. On 9 July, his defence counsel asked the District Court
to discharge the warrant for his client's arrest; the District
Court refused this request on 23 July.
On 3 September, Mr. Eckle stated that he would not agree to
attend the "final hearing" so long as Mr. Preyer remained
responsible for his defence. Mr. Preyer, however, said on 19
September that his client still wished to have such a hearing, but
wanted first of all to confer with other defence counsel. He
accordingly requested that the hearing should be postponed for
three weeks.
On 19 September too, the prosecutor concerned set down 24
September as the date for the hearing. On that date he went to the
prison where Mr. Eckle was being detained. Mr. Eckle, however,
declared that he was unfit to undergo the hearing and unwilling to
give an account of himself, whilst at the same time refusing to be
examined by a medical expert.
52. On 25 September, the public prosecutor's office preferred
the "bill of indictment" before the Cologne Regional Court after
deciding not to proceed with the charges in a large number of
individual cases.
Four people, including the applicants, were "indicted". The
applicants were charged with fraudulent bankruptcy, tax evasion
and fraud; Mr. Eckle, alone or with others, was charged with the
latter offence in 55 cases, and Mrs. Eckle, alone or together with
others, in 27 cases. The "indictment", which ran to 432 pages,
mentioned 3 experts and 143 witnesses. On 15 and 16 October, the
public prosecutor's office filed with the Regional Court 14
volumes of appendices, various subsidiary files (Beiakten) and
experts' reports.
2. From the preferment of the "bill of indictment"
to the opening of the trial (Hauptverfahren)
(25 September 1973 - 16 September 1976)
53. The presiding judge of the Sixth Criminal Chamber of the
Regional Court notified the parties concerned and their defence
counsel of the "bill of indictment" on 16 October 1973 and set a
time-limit for the submission of any comments by them. Extensions
of time were granted on several occasions, notably on 7 March
1974; a final request for extension was, however, refused by the
Regional Court on 21 June 1974.
Having once more been in detention on remand since 21 November
1973 under an arrest warrant issued by the appropriate Cologne
court, Mr. Eckle applied on 7 December for his release from
custody; he was released on 10 January 1974.
On 28 January 1974, the Regional Court transmitted the whole
of the file to the Federal Constitutional Court, which had
requested it on 16 January; the file was returned by the
Constitutional Court on 26 February.
Four days previously, Mr. Becker - of the Trier Bar - had
requested the Regional Court to appoint him officially as the
applicant's defence counsel; the Regional Court rejected this
request on 7 March.
On 19 March, 3 April and 24 and 30 May, counsel for one of the
co-accused requested, inter alia, to have parts of the file and
other documents made available to him for a short period. He also
asked for variation of a 1970 decision granting his client
conditional release, for further inquiries and for a preliminary
judicial examination (Voruntersuchung). The Court allowed at least
the penultimate application (29 May and 1 July). On 11 August, the
same lawyer submitted written pleadings, on which the consultant
commented on 12 December.
On 9 January 1975, the counsel who had made the applications
of 19 March, 3 April and 30 May 1974 discussed them with the
responsible prosecutor, after which he withdrew the application of
30 May. The file on the case, which was at the public prosecutor's
office, was returned to the Regional Court.
In a note entered in the file on 22 May, the presiding judge
of the Tenth Criminal Chamber of the Regional Court commented that
the trial would probably last for about a year.
On 21 January 1976, one of the applicant's co-accused, whose
case had been severed from theirs, applied for the return of
certain documents, but the Regional Court refused this on 10
March; between 13 March and 26 September he filed various other
applications.
On 16 September, the Regional Court opened the trial
proceedings (Hauptverfahren) in respect of the applicants and the
two other persons who had been "indicted" with them, and notified
them accordingly.
3. From the opening of the trial
(Hauptverfahren) to the end of the proceedings
(16 September 1976 - 21 September 1977)
54. On 19 October 1976, Mr. Eckle requested the Regional Court
to discharge the warrants for his arrest which had been issued by
the Cologne District Court and Regional Court (see paragraphs 43
and 53 above); these requests were refused on 3 February 1977.
Earlier, on 3 January 1977, the public prosecutor's office had
informed the Regional Court that cumulative sentences remained to
be determined combining those passed by the Regional Courts of
{Saarbrucken} and Trier, but that no decision could be taken for
the time being as the file was with the Federal Constitutional
Court for the purposes of an application lodged by Mr. Eckle.
On 31 August, the Regional Court inquired of the public
prosecutor's offices in {Saarbrucken} and Trier whether, amongst
other things, cumulative sentences had been determined in the
meantime.
55. At the request of the public prosecutor's office (14
September 1977), the Regional Court on 21 September made an order,
pursuant to Article 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see
paragraph 16 above), discontinuing the proceedings against the
applicants; the latter had consented thereto.
At the same time, the Regional Court revoked the arrest
warrants mentioned above (at paragraph 54) and directed that the
applicants should themselves meet their own expenses, while the
court costs would be borne by the State.
In accordance with the public prosecutor's submissions, the
Regional Court did not award the applicants any compensation; on
27 December 1979, it refused a subsequent request by Mr. Eckle and
this decision was upheld by the Cologne Court of Appeal on 6
February 1980.
56. Following an order for separate trials, the prosecutions
against eleven of the thirteen co-accused were discontinued during
the course of proceedings either in pursuance of Article 154 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraph 16 above) or for
lack of adequate evidence or because of the intervening death of
those concerned. The two remaining co-accused were, for their
part, sentenced by the relevant courts to various penalties
between 1970 and 1980; in their cases also, separate trial had
been ordered.
III. The {Saarbrucken} proceedings
(late 1963 - 20 April 1972)
57. The criminal prosecutions brought against Mr. and Mrs.
Eckle in {Saarbrucken} are not in issue, but they need to be
mentioned because of their bearing on the proceedings in Trier and
Cologne.
58. Towards the end of 1963, the public prosecutor's office in
{Saarbrucken} began a preliminary investigation in respect of the
applicants. They were suspected of having defrauded clients in the
Saar in transactions of the kind that were later the subject of
prosecutions in Trier and, in part, in Cologne.
After being "indicted" with others in March 1965, they were
convicted by the {Saarbrucken} Regional Court on 17 October 1967
on 99 counts of fraud: Mr. Eckle was sentenced to six years'
imprisonment and his wife to a term of three years and six months.
On petitions for review on a point of law, the Federal Court
of Justice quashed the convictions on 14 March 1969 and remitted
the case to another chamber of the Regional Court.
On 19 February 1970, after eight days of hearings, the latter
chamber sentenced Mrs. Eckle to two years' imprisonment on 74
counts of fraud. Mr. Eckle, whose trial had had to be severed from
his wife's, was convicted on 26 March 1971 after hearings that had
commenced on 24 February; the Regional Court found him guilty on
68 counts of fraud and sentenced him to four years' imprisonment.
A fresh petition for review on a point of law by the parties
concerned was dismissed by the Federal Court of Justice on 20
April 1972.
59. The sentences passed by the {Saarbrucken} Regional Court
were combined on 24 November 1977 with those imposed on 17 March
1972 by the Trier Regional Court (see paragraphs 27 and 35 above).
IV. Mr. Eckle's detention on remand
60. In the course of the proceedings against him Mr. Eckle
spent approximately five years in detention on remand. The various
courts placed reliance on a risk of his absconding and tampering
with evidence.
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION
61. In their application of 27 December 1977 to the Commission
(no. 8130/78), Mr. and Mrs. Eckle claimed that the length of the
proceedings brought in Trier, {Saarbrucken} and Cologne gave rise
to a breach of Article 6 par. 1 (art. 6-1) of the Convention. Mr.
Eckle, relying on Article 5 par. 3 (art. 5-3), complained in
addition of his detention on remand. Subsequent to the
registration of their application, Mr. and Mrs. Eckle also alleged
violation of Article 6 par. 2 (art. 6-2) on account of the refusal
to reimburse their expenses in the Cologne proceedings.
On 10 May 1979, the Commission declared the application
admissible as far as the alleged failure to observe the
"reasonable time" in the Trier and Cologne cases was concerned; it
declared the other complaints inadmissible either as being out of
time or for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies (Articles 26 and
27 par. 3), (art. 26, art. 27-3) depending upon the circumstances.
In its report of 11 December 1980 (Article 31) (art. 31), the
Commission expressed the unanimous opinion that there had been
breach of Article 6 par. 1 (art. 6-1).
FINAL SUBMISSIONS MADE TO THE COURT BY THE GOVERNMENT
62. In their memorial and at the close of the hearings held on
22 March 1982, the Government sought from the Court "a declaration
to the effect that, owing to the lack of grievance, the Court
cannot decide on the merits of the case".
AS TO THE LAW
63. The applicants complained of the length of the criminal
proceedings brought against them in Trier and Cologne; they
claimed that it had exceeded the "reasonable time" stipulated
under Article 6 par. 1 (art. 6-1).
I. Article 25 par. 1 (art. 25-1)
64. In their memorial and subsequently in their oral
pleadings, the Government formally requested the Court to hold
that, because of the lack of an existing grievance, the Court was
unable to take cognisance of the merits of the case. In the
Government's submissions, the applicants could no longer be
regarded as victims within the meaning of Article 25 par. 1 (art.
25-1) of the Convention which reads:
"The Commission may receive petitions addressed to the
Secretary General of the Council of Europe from any person,
non-governmental organisation or group of individuals claiming to
be the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting
Parties of the rights set forth in (the) Convention ..."
The German courts, so it was argued, have in effect
acknowledged the excessive length of the proceedings and have
afforded redress: the Trier Regional Court took the matter into
account when determining sentence and the Cologne Regional Court
did likewise when ordering the discontinuance of the prosecutions
(see paragraphs 35 and 55 above).
The applicants contested this line of reasoning. Neither did
it find favour with the Commission. In the view of the Commission,
the courts had not made any finding of a violation of Article 6
(art. 6); the reduction of sentence that the Trier Regional Court
had declared itself to be granting was not measurable; finally, it
was not clearly established that the Cologne Regional Court had
paid regard to the excessive length of the proceedings when
discontinuing the prosecutions.
65. The Court has jurisdiction to rule on preliminary pleas of
this kind in so far as the respondent State may have first raised
them before the Commission to the extent that their character and
the circumstances permitted (see the Artico judgment of 13 May
1980, Series A no. 37, p. 12, par. 24).
These conditions being satisfied in the present case, there is
no estoppel.
66. The word "victim", in the context of Article 25 (art. 25),
denotes the person directly affected by the act or omission which
is in issue, the existence of a violation conceivable even in the
absence of prejudice; prejudice is relevant only in the context of
Article 50 (art. 50) (see, inter alia, the Adolf judgment of 26
March 1982, Series A no. 49, p. 17, par. 37).
Consequently, mitigation of sentence and discontinuance of
prosecution granted on account of the excessive length of
proceedings do not in principle deprive the individual concerned
of his status as a victim within the meaning of Article 25 (art.
25); they are to be taken into consideration solely for the
purpose of assessing the extent of the damage he has allegedly
suffered (see, mutatis mutandis, the Ringeisen judgment of 22 June
1972, Series A no. 15, p. 8, par. 20 - 21, the Neumeister judgment
of 7 May 1974, Series A no. 17, pp. 18 - 19, par. 40, and also the
Commission's opinion in the Wemhoff case, Series B no. 5, pp. 89
and 273 - 274).
The Court does not exclude that this general rule might be
subject to an exception when the national authorities have
acknowledged either expressly or in substance, and then afforded
redress for, the breach of the Convention (see the Commission's
decision of 16 October 1980 on the admissibility of application
no. 8182/80, Schloffer v. the Federal Republic of Germany). In
such circumstances, to duplicate the domestic process with
proceedings before the Commission and the Court would appear
hardly compatible with the subsidiary character of the machinery
of protection established by the Convention. The Convention leaves
to each Contracting State, in the first place, the task of
securing the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms it enshrines
(see especially the judgment of 23 July 1968 on the merits of the
"Belgian Linguistic" case, Series A no. 6, p. 35, par. 10 in fine,
and the Handyside judgment of 7 December 1976, Series A no. 24, p.
22, par. 48). This subsidiary character is all the more pronounced
in the case of States which have incorporated the Convention into
their domestic legal order and which treat the rules of the
Convention as directly applicable (see the Van Droogenbroeck
judgment of 24 June 1982, Series A no. 50, par. 55).
67. As the Convention forms an integral part of the law of the
Federal Republic of Germany, there was nothing to prevent the
courts of the country from holding, if appropriate, that the
Convention and, in particular, Article 6 par. 1 (art. 6-1) had
been breached. The national courts also had available to them a
means of affording reparation which, in the Court's opinion, is
capable of proving suitable: according to well-established
case-law of the Federal Court of Justice, when determining
sentence the judge must take proper account of any over-stepping
of the "reasonable time" within the meaning of Article 6 par. 1
(art. 6-1) (see the judgment of 10 November 1971, Entscheidungen
des Bundesgerichtshofes in Strafsachen, vol. 24, pp. 239 - 243).
Accordingly, it has to be ascertained whether, as the
Government submitted, the German courts held that Article 6 par. 1
(art. 6-1) had been breached and, if so, whether they granted
redress.
68. In the words of the Trier Regional Court, the proceedings
before it had lasted for an "inordinate length of time" (judgment
of 17 March 1972, paragraph 27 above); they had been of "long" and
"excessive" duration (decision of 24 November 1977, paragraph 35
above). This latter description is also to be found in the
judgment of 19 February 1976 by the Federal Court of Justice and
in the judgment of 23 January 1978 by the Koblenz Court of Appeal
(see paragraphs 33 and 36 above). All these decisions, save the
judgment by the Trier Regional Court, make reference to the
case-law cited at paragraph 67. The Koblenz Court of Appeal alone
alludes to Article 6 par. 1 (art. 6-1) when stating that, even
having regard to this Article, the sentence pronounced at Trier
was not unduly severe.
The Cologne Regional Court's decision of 21 September 1977
discontinuing the criminal proceedings against Mr. and Mrs. Eckle
simply takes note of the consent of the accused and refers to the
formal submissions presented by the public prosecutor's office.
The latter had cited the reasoning enunciated by the Federal Court
in relation to the cumulative sentences to be fixed by the Trier
Regional Court (see paragraph 33 above). The prosecutor's office
had further submitted that this reasoning would apply a fortiori
in the event of fresh cumulative sentences being imposed
subsequent to a possible conviction in Cologne.
69. It is apparent from the foregoing that none of the
relevant courts expressly acknowledged the existence of a breach
of Article 6 par. 1 (art. 6-1). Nonetheless, the language employed
by the Trier Regional Court (decision of 24 November 1977), the
Federal Court of Justice and the Koblenz Court of Appeal, taken
together with the references to the Federal Court's judgment of 10
November 1971, could be taken as amounting to a finding to that
effect. Less certain in this respect is the import of the decision
by the Cologne Regional Court. Even assuming that this decision
should, as the Government contended, be read in the light of the
formal submissions presented by the public prosecutor's office, it
hardly warrants the conclusion that the Regional Court held the
length of the proceedings to be in breach of Article 6 par. 1
(art. 6-1).
70. Even if it were accepted that the relevant decisions do
acknowledge in a sufficiently clear manner the failure to observe
the "reasonable time" requirement, it would still be necessary
that redress should have been given. The issue that arises is thus
whether the mitigation of sentence granted, according to the terms
of its decision, by the Trier Regional Court and the
discontinuance of proceedings ordered by the Cologne Regional
Court remedied the matters complained of.
The Court notes, however, that this part of the Government's
case is intimately connected with another aspect of the complaint,
namely the extent of the alleged breach. Consequently, the Court
considers that it should join to the merits the preliminary plea
relied on by the Government (see, mutatis mutandis, the Airey
judgment of 9 October 1979, Series A no. 32, p. 11, par. 19).
II. The alleged breach of Article 6 PAR. 1 (art. 6-1)
71. The Commission expressed the opinion that there had been
breach of Article 6 par. 1 (art. 6-1) which provides:
"In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or
of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair
and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and
impartial tribunal established by law ..."
The Government conceded that the proceedings had, at certain
stages, been unreasonably long.
A. The length of the proceedings
72. In the applicants' submission, the Trier proceedings were
set in motion in November 1959 and came to a close on 24 November
1977 when the Regional Court fixed the cumulative sentences. At
the hearings, the Government argued that the proceedings lasted
from 7 October 1964 (searches of the applicants' premises) until
19 February 1976 (judgment by the Federal Court of Justice). The
Commission concurred with this line of thinking as to the second
date, but not as to the first: in the Commission's view, the
opening date must be traced back to at least 1 January 1961.
For the applicants and the Commission, the Cologne proceedings
commenced with the issue on 25 April 1967 of a search and seizure
warrant against Mr. and Mrs. Eckle. Before the Court, the
Government appeared to put forward the date on which this warrant
was served and executed, namely 11 May 1967, and no longer, as
they had done before the Commission, the date on which Mr. Eckle
was remanded in custody (25 November 1969). As far as the end of
the period is concerned, the applicants, the Government and the
Commission were all agreed in proposing 21 September 1977, the day
on which the proceedings were discontinued.
1. Commencement of the periods to be taken into account
73. In criminal matters, the "reasonable time" referred to in
Article 6 par. 1 (art. 6-1) begins to run as soon as a person is
"charged"; this may occur on a date prior to the case coming
before the trial court (see, for example, the Deweer judgment of
27 February 1980, Series A no. 35, p. 22, par. 42), such as the
date of arrest, the date when the person concerned was officially
notified that he would be prosecuted or the date when preliminary
investigations were opened (see the Wemhoff judgment of 27 June
1968, Series A no. 7, pp. 26-27, par. 19, the Neumeister judgment
of the same date, Series A no. 8, p. 41, par. 18, and the
Ringeisen judgment of 16 July 1971, Series A no. 13, p. 45, par.
110). "Charge", for the purposes of Article 6 par. 1 (art. 6-1),
may be defined as "the official notification given to an
individual by the competent authority of an allegation that he has
committed a criminal offence", a definition that also corresponds
to the test whether "the situation of the [suspect] has been
substantially affected" (see the above-mentioned Deweer judgment,
p. 24, par. 46).
74. Applying these principles to the facts of the case, the
Court considers that the date put forward by the applicants in
respect of the Trier proceedings cannot be the relevant one
because documents produced by the Government show that the
complaint lodged on 28 October 1959 did not lead to any formal
measures of inquiry being ordered. The public prosecutor's office
closed the file on the matter after obtaining information from the
competent administrative authorities as to the existence of
maximum prices in the building materials trade; neither the
prosecutor's office nor the police questioned witnesses or the
applicants. A true preliminary investigation was begun only in
August 1960 when numerous witnesses were interviewed in connection
with the allegations made against Mr. Eckle (see paragraphs 11 -
12 above). As the Delegate of the Commission pointed out, the
object of these interviews was not to determine whether a
preliminary investigation should be opened; the interviews
themselves formed part of the preliminary investigation.
Nevertheless, having been unable to ascertain as from what
moment the applicants officially learnt of the investigation or
began to be affected by it, the Court concurs with the opinion of
the Commission and takes as the starting point for the "time" the
date of 1 January 1961.
In this connection, the Court does not deem it necessary, as
the Government at one point seemed to have in mind, to draw any
distinction between the two applicants, for although the
investigation does not appear to have been directed against Mrs.
Eckle from the outset, she must have felt the repercussions to the
same extent as her husband.
75. The appropriate date for the commencement of the Cologne
proceedings is, on the case-law cited above, the date of service
of the warrant issued on 25 April 1967, that is 11 May 1967 (see
paragraph 72 above).
2. End of the periods to be taken into account
76. As regards the end of the "time", in criminal matters the
period governed by Article 6 par. 1 (art. 6-1) covers the whole of
the proceedings in issue, including appeal proceedings (see the
{Konig} judgment of 28 June 1978, Series A no. 27, p. 33,
par. 98).
77. In the Trier proceedings, it still remained necessary,
after the judgment of 19 February 1976 by the Federal Court of
Justice, to fix cumulative sentences combining those previously
imposed on 19 February 1970 and 26 March 1971 by the {Saarbrucken}
Regional Court and then on 17 March 1972 by the Trier Regional
Court (see paragraphs 27 and 58 above). The Federal Court had
itself drawn the Regional Court's attention to the duty of the
courts under German law (Articles 53 and 55 of the Penal Code) to
render, if need be of their own motion, a decision to this effect.
Furthermore, the determination of cumulative sentences did not
represent for the Trier judges a mere matter of mathematical
calculation, for under Article 54 of the Penal Code they were
bound to make their own overall assessment of all the offences for
which the applicants had been convicted at {Saarbrucken} and Trier
as well as their own assessment of the character of the offenders;
this, in fact, they did in their decision of 24 November 1977. In
addition, the Regional Court had to take into account by way of
mitigating circumstance, amongst other matters, the time that had
elapsed from the Federal Court's judgment "until the final
decision" (see paragraph 33 above).
It follows that after the judgment by the Federal Court of
Justice the applicants were not in a position to calculate the
size of the sentences that were to be fixed. They simply knew that
those sentences had to be less than the total of the sentences
that the two Regional Courts had, each within its respective
domain, imposed on them in respect of the various offences found
(Article 54 par. 2 of the Penal Code).
In the event of conviction, there is no "determination ... of
any criminal charge", within the meaning of Article 6 par. 1 (art.
6-1), as long as the sentence is not definitively fixed. Thus, in
the Ringeisen judgment of 16 July 1971 the Court took as the close
of the proceedings the date on which the trial court had decided,
following appeal proceedings, that the entire period spent by the
applicant in detention on remand should be reckoned as part of the
sentence (Series A no. 13, pp. 20 and 45, par. 48 and 110).
Consequently, the period to be taken into account ended on 23
January 1978 when the Koblenz Court of Appeal delivered its
judgments upholding the cumulative sentences pronounced by the
Regional Court on 24 November 1977.
78. The Cologne proceedings, for their part, came to a close
on 21 September 1977 when the Regional Court ordered
discontinuance of prosecution.
3. Conclusion
79. The length of time to be examined under Article 6 par. 1
(art. 6-1) thus amounted to seventeen years and three weeks (1
January 1961 - 23 January 1978) as regards the Trier proceedings
and ten years, four months and ten days as regards the Cologne
proceedings (11 May 1967 - 21 September 1977).
Drawing attention to the fact that the applicants had
continued their illegal activities during the course of the
investigation of the case at Trier, the Government requested the
Court to deduct from the total length of those proceedings the
periods during which the fresh offences were being committed.
The Court views this factor as simply one of the elements that
are of importance for reviewing the "reasonableness" of the
"time".
B. The reasonableness of the length of the proceedings
80. The reasonableness of the length of the proceedings must
be assessed in each instance according to the particular
circumstances. In this exercise, the Court has regard to, among
other things, the complexity of the case, the conduct of the
applicants and the conduct of the judicial authorities (see the
above-mentioned {Konig} judgment, Series A no. 27, p. 34,
par. 99).
The present case concerns sets of proceedings that endured
seventeen years and ten years respectively. Such a delay is
undoubtedly inordinate and is, as a general rule, to be regarded
as, exceeding the "reasonable time" referred to in Article 6 par.
1 (art. 6-1) (see the above-mentioned Neumeister judgment of 27
June 1968, Series A no. 8, p. 41, par. 20; see also the
above-mentioned {Konig} judgment, p. 34, par. 102). In such
circumstances, it falls to the respondent State to come forward
with explanations.
1. The Trier proceedings
81. Although the legal issues it involved appear relatively
simple, the case that was investigated and tried at Trier did
undisputedly pose serious problems especially in view of the sheer
volume of the applicants' activities and the ingenious way in
which they presented their methods of financing contracts of sale.
Moreover, further complexity was added during the course of the
inquiries since, as is stated in the judgment of the Trier
Regional Court, a number of fraudulent loan contracts were still
being concluded at the end of 1963 and in 1964.
82. Far from helping to expedite the proceedings, Mr. and Mrs.
Eckle increasingly resorted to actions - including the systematic
recourse to challenge of judges - likely to delay matters; some of
these actions could even be interpreted as illustrating a policy
of deliberate obstruction (see paragraphes 15, 20, 22, 23, 24, 25
and 32 above).
However, as the Commission rightly pointed out, Article 6
(art. 6) did not require the applicants actively to co-operate
with the judicial authorities. Neither can any reproach be
levelled against them for having made full use of the remedies
available under the domestic law. Nonetheless, their conduct
referred to above constitutes an objective fact, not capable of
being attributed to the respondent State, which is to be taken
into account when determining whether or not the proceedings
lasted longer than the reasonable time referred to in Article 6
par. 1 (art. 6-1) (see, mutatis mutandis, the above-mentioned
{Konig} judgment, pp. 35-36, 37, 38 and 40, par. 103, 105, 108 and
111, and the Buchholz judgment of 6 May 1981, Series A no. 42,
pp. 18 and 22, par. 56 and 63).
83. In the applicant's submission, the length of the
proceedings stemmed from the way in which the judicial authorities
handled the case. Their principal ground of criticism was that the
judicial authorities undertook three distinct sets of
investigation and trial proceedings instead of joining them and
carried out inquiries into too many individual cases.
The Commission likewise considered that the length of the
proceedings was primarily referable to the conduct of the judicial
authorities. In the Commission's view, the preliminary
investigations, the withdrawal of the "bill of indictment", the
drafting of the Regional Court's judgment and the hearing of the
petitions for review on a point of law occasioned unreasonable
delays.
The Government expressed disagreement with this opinion.
84. The Court, like the Commission, has come to the conclusion
that the competent authorities did not act with the necessary
diligence and expedition.
Thus, the enormous number of cases subjected to inquiry was
not without effect in prolonging the preliminary investigation
(see paragraphe 16 above). In the Government's submission, the
principle of "legality of prosecution" (the principle of
obligatory prosecution of all criminal offences), as laid down
under the law, compelled the authorities to proceed in the manner
they did. The Court, however, is not convinced by this argument.
Although Article 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which
provides for the possibility of discontinuing prosecution, was
amended only in 1979, the Government themselves conceded that this
reform embodied a practice that had been current under the
previous legislation. In any event, the Government may not, in
relation to the fulfilment of the engagements undertaken by them
by virtue of Article 6 (art. 6), seek refuge behind the possible
failings of their own domestic law. Moreover, the text in force at
the relevant time proved no obstacle to the public prosecutor's
office and the Regional Court discontinuing prosecution on certain
counts (see paragraphs 16 and 26 above).
In addition, it is not easy to understand why in 1967, thus
six years after the opening of the investigation, the Trier public
prosecutor's office, when confronted with the further offences it
believed to have discovered, should have judged there to be only
one suitable course of action, namely the withdrawal of the "bill
of indictment" (see paragraph 18 above). It should also be noted
that approximately one more year elapsed before transfer of the
fresh cases to the Cologne public procecutor's office (ibid).
Neither is there any proper explanation as to why the judgment
of 17 March 1972 was not served on the applicants until
12 February 1973 (see paragraph 27 above). Undoubtedly, as was
stressed by the Government, the drafting of the judgment required
analysing an enormous mass of documents, but that alone cannot
justify a period of almost eleven months after delivery of the
judgment.
Finally, the proceedings for review on a point of law lasted
almost three years (see paragraphs 29 - 33 above).
85. Before the Court, the Governement drew attention to the
fact that the Eckle case had been one of the first big cases of
economic crime, especially for the Land Rhineland-Palatinate. At
the relevant time the authorities, so the Government explained,
lacked the necessary experience and means to combat rapidly and
effectively this type of offence. In the meantime, a series of
legislative and administrative measures was said to have been
taken to this end.
The Court realises that initially the specific forms of
economic crime caused the judicial authorities a variety of
problems, notably in relation to the speedy and smooth conduct of
criminal proceedings. It also recognises the efforts made by the
Federal Republic of Germany in the legislative and administrative
sphere in order to deal with this mischief with the requisite
expedition. Nevertheless, the Court cannot attach a decisive
weight to these factors for its ruling on the instant case, for
the state of affairs confronting the competent authorities was not
at all exceptional (see, mutatis mutandis, the above-mentioned
Buchholz judgment, pp. 16, 20 - 21 and 22, par. 51, 61 and 63).
86. In the light of all these various factors, the Court
reaches the conclusion that the difficulties of investigation and
the behaviour of the applicants do not on their own account for
the length of the proceedings: one of the principal causes
therefor is to be found in the manner in which the judicial
authorities conducted the case.
87. Having regard to the length of the delays attributable to
the respondent State, the reduction of sentence that the Regional
Court stated it was granting to the applicants was not capable of
divesting the latter of their entitlement to claim to be victims,
within the meaning of Article 25 (art. 25) (see paragraphs 68 and
70 above): the Regional Court's decision did not contain
sufficient indications to allow an assessment of the extent to
which the length of the proceedings was being taken into account
for the purposes of the Convention.
88. Accordingly, the Court rejects the Government's
preliminary plea as regards this part of the case and concludes
that the Trier proceedings exceeded a reasonable time in breach of
Article 6 par. 1 (art. 6-1) of the Convention.
2. The Cologne proceedings
89. The case investigated and tried at Cologne concerned
fifteen persons initially and had ramifications outside the
country; it dealt with charges not only of fraud but also of
fraudulent bankruptcy and tax evasion (see paragraph 37 above).
Like the Commission, the Court considers that it was particularly
difficult and complex.
90. As at Trier, Mr. and Mrs. Eckle slowed down the progress
of the proceedings by making numerous applications and appeals,
often accompanied by requests for an extension of the time-limit
for the filing of written pleadings (see especially paragraphs 43,
45, 47, 48, 49, 51, 53 and 54 above; compare with paragraph 82
above).
91. The applicants held the judicial authorities solely
responsible for the delays. In addition to the grounds already set
out (at paragraph 83 above), they placed reliance on the fact that
the judicial authorities had not severed the fraud charges from
the charges in respect of the other offences.
The Commision attributed the length of the proceedings
principally to the manner in which the judicial authorities had
handled the case. It pointed to the excessive duration of the
inquiries and, by way of example, to the belated completion of the
expert's report; it also considered that the opening of the trial
had been delayed without good reason and that the Regional Court
could well have discontinued the prosecutions at an earlier stage.
The Government expressed disagreement with this opinion.
92. The Court, like the Commission, has come to the conclusion
that the competent authorities did not act with the necessary
diligence and expedition. It notes in particular that nearly three
years elapsed between preferment of the "bill of indictment"
(25 September 1973, paragraph 52 above) and opening of the trial
(16 September 1976, paragraph 53 above).
In this latter connection, the Government pleaded the heavy
work-load which was at the time confronting the chambers of the
Regional Court specialised in dealing with economic crime; the
Government listed various measures taken to remedy the situation.
The Court recognises that the authorities endeavoured to
reduce the backlog of pending business before the Regional Court
by increasing the number of specialised chambers from two (in
1973) to six (in 1977). The Court nonetheless considers that,
having regard to the great length of time that had elapsed, the
Regional Court's volume of work, which was nothing exceptional in
itself, cannot be relied on by the Government (compare with the
above-mentioned Buchholz judgment, Series A no. 42, pp. 16, 20-21
and 22, par. 51, 61 and 63). For the same reason, and just as in
relation to the case investigated and tried at Trier (see
paragraph 85 above), the Court does not feel able to attach a
decisive weight to the efforts, albeit meritorious, made in the
Federal Republic of Germany to combat economic crime with greater
speed and efficacy.
93. On the basis of all the various factors taken into
account, the Court reaches the conclusion that the difficulties of
investigation and the behaviour of the applicants do not on their
own account for the length of the proceedings: one of the main
causes therefor is to be found in the manner in which the judicial
authorities conducted the case.
94. The discontinuance of the prosecutions, ordered by the
Regional Court on 21 September 1977 with the consent of the
applicants, was in principle capable of affecting their
entitlement to claim to be "victims", within the meaning of
Article 25 (art. 25), but the length of the delays attributable to
the authorities was such that the applicants in no way forfeited
their status as "victims"; moreover, the discontinuance decision,
whether or not read in the light of the formal submissions
presented by the public prosecutor's office, discloses no
indication whatsoever that it had been taken having regard to the
above-mentioned delays (see paragraphs 68 and 70 above).
95. Accordingly, the Court rejects the Government's
preliminary plea as regards this part of the case and concludes
that the Cologne proceedings exceeded a reasonable time in breach
of Article 6 par. 1 (art. 6-1) of the Convention.
III. The application of Article 50 (art. 50)
96. Counsel for the applicants stated that, should the Court
find a violation of the Convention, his clients would be
submitting a claim under Article 50 (art. 50) for just
satisfaction for the prejudice suffered as a result of the
unreasonable length of the proceedings and possibly for legal
costs; he did not, however, quantify their claim. The Government,
for their part, did not take a stand on the issue.
Accordingly, although it was raised under Rule 47 bis of the
Rules of Court, the question is not yet ready for decision. The
Court is therefore obliged to reserve the matter and to fix the
further procedure, taking due account of the possibility of an
agreement between the respondent State and the applicants.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
1. Joins to the merits the preliminary plea raised by the
Government, but rejects it after an examination on the merits;
2. Holds that there has been a breach of Article 6 par. 1
(art. 6-1) of the Convention;
3. Holds that the question of the application of Article 50
(art. 50) is not ready for decision;
accordingly,
(a) reserves the whole of the said question;
(b) invites the Commission to submit to the Court, within two
months from the delivery of the present judgment, the Commission's
written observations on the said question and, in particular, to
notify the Court of any friendly settlement at which the
Government and the applicants may have arrived;
(c) reserves the further procedure and delegates to the
President of the Chamber power to fix the same if need be.
Done in English and in French, the French text being
authentic, at the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, this
fifteenth day of July one thousand nine hundred and eighty-two.
Signed: Rolv RYSSDAL
President
For the Registrar
Signed: Herbert PETZOLD
Deputy Registrar
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