[неофициальный перевод]
ЕВРОПЕЙСКИЙ СУД ПО ПРАВАМ ЧЕЛОВЕКА
СУДЕБНОЕ РЕШЕНИЕ
КЕНИГ ({KONIG} <*>) ПРОТИВ ФЕДЕРАТИВНОЙ
РЕСПУБЛИКИ ГЕРМАНИИ
(Страсбург, 28 июня 1978 года)
(Извлечение)
КРАТКОЕ НЕОФИЦИАЛЬНОЕ ИЗЛОЖЕНИЕ ОБСТОЯТЕЛЬСТВ ДЕЛА
A. Основные факты
Заявитель, гражданин Германии, по профессии врач -
отоларинголог, открыл в 1960 г. в Бад-Хомбурге, земля Гессен
(ФРГ), собственную клинику; он был единственным практикующим
врачом, работающим в клинике, которой сам же руководил и где
занимался, в частности, пластической хирургией.
--------------------------------
<*> Здесь и далее по тексту слова на национальном языке набраны
латинским шрифтом и выделены фигурными скобками.
16 октября 1962 г. Региональное медицинское общество обратилось
в Медицинский суд при Административном суде Франкфурта с иском о
нарушении заявителем профессиональной этики. 9 июля 1964 г. он был
признан недостойным заниматься медицинской практикой.
Земельный суд по медицинским профессиям при Высшем земельном
административном суде отклонил апелляционную жалобу заявителя.
Последнему, в частности, вменялось: производство операций, не
связанных с его профессиональной подготовкой; неоправданные
обещания в успехе лечения, если клиент соглашается на оплату
услуг, не предусмотренных страхованием на случай болезни; выплата
денежных вознаграждений тем, кто посылал к нему клиентов;
нарушение профессиональных правил в рекламе своей клиники и др.
В 1967 г. у заявителя отозвали разрешение держать клинику, а
затем, в 1971 г., и разрешение на занятие медицинской практикой. В
1972 г. против него было возбуждено уголовное преследование за
inter alia незаконное занятие медицинской практикой.
Поданные заявителем жалобы об отмене решений об отзыве
разрешений рассматривались в компетентных административных судах с
ноября 1967 г. и c октября 1971 г. соответственно.
B. Разбирательство в Комиссии по правам человека
Жалоба была подана в Комиссию 3 июля 1973 г. и имела своим
предметом длительность разбирательства в судах жалоб заявителя,
оспаривавшего отзыв разрешений. Комиссия посчитала жалобу
приемлемой и, установив обстоятельства дела, в докладе от 14
декабря 1976 г. пришла к выводу:
десятью голосами против шести, что статья 6 п. 1 Конвенции
подлежит применению в отношении прав, за защитой которых заявитель
обратился в административные суды;
девятью голосами против шести, при одном воздержавшемся, что в
данном случае имело место нарушение статьи 6 п. 1 Конвенции.
Доклад Комиссии содержал особые мнения.
Дело было передано в Суд 28 февраля 1978 г. Правительством
Федеративной Республики Германии, а 14 марта 1977 г. - Европейской
комиссией по правам человека.
ВОПРОСЫ ПРАВА
1. О предполагаемом нарушении статьи 6 п. 1 Конвенции
85. Суд напоминает, что ни дисциплинарное преследование д-ра
Кенига, что привело к рассмотрению дела в профессиональных судах,
ни привлечение его к уголовной ответственности не являются в
данном случае предметом рассмотрения.
Заявитель жалуется на длительность рассмотрения дел,
возбужденных им в Административном суде Франкфурта в связи с
отзывом разрешения содержать клинику и заниматься медицинской
практикой (см. п. 18 выше). Он утверждает, что произошло нарушение
статьи 6 п. 1, которая предусматривает:
"Каждый человек имеет право при определении его гражданских
прав и обязанностей или при рассмотрении любого уголовного
обвинения, предъявляемого ему, на справедливое и публичное
разбирательство дела в разумный срок независимым и беспристрастным
судом, созданным на основании закона. Судебное решение объявляется
публично, однако пресса и публика могут не допускаться на судебные
заседания в течение всего процесса или его части по соображениям
морали, общественного порядка или государственной безопасности в
демократическом обществе, а также когда того требуют интересы
несовершеннолетних или для защиты частной жизни сторон, или - в
той мере, в какой это, по мнению суда, строго необходимо - при
особых обстоятельствах, когда гласность нарушала бы интересы
правосудия".
Таким образом, Суд призван решить, применима ли статья 6 п. 1 к
данному случаю, и если да, то был ли соблюден "разумный срок" в
каждом из двух судебных процессов.
a) О применимости статьи 6 п. 1 Конвенции
86. Большинство Комиссии придерживается той точки зрения, что
статья 6 п. 1 применима к правам, на соблюдении которых заявитель
настаивал перед Административным судом Франкфурта, а именно праву
управлять своей клиникой и праву заниматься медицинской практикой.
Комиссия считает, что эти права относятся к "гражданским".
Большинство Комиссии разделилось при этом на две группы, которые
пришли к одинаковому выводу при отличающейся аргументации.
Обоснованность этого мнения оспаривается Правительством.
87. Суд отмечает прежде всего неоспоримость того факта, что в
соответствии с законодательством Германии спорный вопрос, с
которым заявитель обратился в германские суды, - это спор о
"правах". Различие в точках зрения Комиссии и Правительства лишь в
том, затрагивает ли спор по настоящему делу гражданские права в
смысле статьи 6 п. 1 Конвенции.
88. Как Комиссия, так и Правительство согласны, что понятие
"гражданские права и обязанности" не может толковаться
исключительно в свете внутреннего законодательства государства -
ответчика.
Проблема толкования понятий, используемых в Конвенции, в
сравнении с их смыслом во внутреннем законодательстве уже
несколько раз возникала перед Судом. Так, он пришел к выводу, что
используемый в статье 6 п. 1 термин "обвинение" следует понимать в
"смысле настоящей Конвенции" (см. Решение по делу Неймастера от 27
июня 1968 г. Серия A, т. 8, с. 41, п. 18; см. также Решение по
делу Вемхофа от 27 июня 1968 г. Серия A, т. 7, с. 26 - 27, п. 19;
Решение по делу Рингейзена от 16 июля 1971 г. Серия A, т. 13, с.
45, п. 110; Решение по делу Энгель и другие от 8 июня 1976 г.
Серия A, т. 22, с. 34, п. 81). Суд также признал, в контексте дела
Энгель и другие автономию понятия "уголовный" в смысле статьи 6 п.
1 (см. вышеупомянутое Решение по делу Энгель и другие, с. 34, п.
81). То же самое Суд признал, хотя и имплицитно, в отношении
понятия "гражданские права и обязанности" (см. вышеупомянутое
Решение по делу Рингейзена, с. 39, п. 94).
Суд подтверждает эту позицию применительно к настоящему случаю.
Поэтому он полагает, что этот же принцип автономности применим и к
рассматриваемому вопросу; всякое иное решение может привести к
результатам, несовместимым с задачами и целью Конвенции (см.
mutatis mutandis вышеупомянутое Решение по делу Энгель и другие,
с. 34, п. 81).
89. Придя к выводу, что понятие "гражданские права и
обязанности" является автономным, Суд тем не менее не считает, что
в данном контексте законодательство государства - ответчика не
имеет значения. Будет ли право рассматриваться как гражданское в
смысле Конвенции, зависит не от его юридической квалификации во
внутреннем законодательстве, а от того, какое материальное
содержание вложено в него этим законодательством и какие
последствия оно связывает с ним. Осуществляя свою контрольную
функцию, Суд должен принимать в расчет задачи и цели как
Конвенции, так и правовых систем государств - участников (см.
mutatis mutandis вышеупомянутое Решение по делу Энгель и другие,
с. 35, п. 82).
90. Правительство представило дело так, что статья 6 п. 1
охватывает частноправовые споры в традиционном смысле, т.е. споры
между частными лицами или между частным лицом и государством в той
мере, в какой последнее действует как субъект гражданского права;
остальные споры между индивидом и государством, выступающим в
качестве носителя публичной власти, должны быть исключены из сферы
действия этой статьи.
Относительно сферы применения статьи 6 п. 1 Суд в своем Решении
по делу Рингейзена от 16 июля 1971 г. указал: "для того, чтобы
статья 6 п. 1 была применима, не обязательно, чтобы обе стороны
спора были частными лицами... Формулировки статьи 6 п. 1
значительно шире; французское выражение "споры о правах и
обязанностях гражданского характера" охватывает любое
разбирательство, результат которого имеет определяющее значение
для частных прав и обязанностей. Английский текст, где говорится
об "определении гражданских прав и обязанностей", подтверждает
такое толкование. Характер закона, на основании которого решается
данный вопрос... и органа, на который возложены полномочия по его
решению... не имеют поэтому большого значения" (с. 39, п. 94).
Если дело касается спора между лицом и публичной властью, не
имеет решающего значения, в каком качестве она выступала, как
носитель гражданских прав или публичной власти.
Соответственно, решающим для квалификации спора как спора о
гражданских правах, является сам характер права, ставшего причиной
спора.
91. Суд напомнил, что заявитель, опротестовывая в
административных судах Германии отданный компетентными властями
приказ об отзыве разрешений на содержание клиники и занятие
медицинской практикой, настаивал лишь на праве продолжать
заниматься той профессиональной деятельностью, на которую он уже
ранее имел необходимые разрешения. Если бы процедура рассмотрения
дела в административных судах завершилась успешно для него,
заявитель не получил бы новых разрешений: суды бы просто
аннулировали решения об их отзыве, принятые высокими должностными
лицами Висбадена и Дармштадта (см. статью 42 германского
Административно-процессуального кодекса).
Поэтому Суду необходимо лишь установить, носит ли право д-ра
Кенига иметь частную клинику и заниматься медицинской практикой
гражданско-правовой характер в смысле статьи 6 п. 1.
92. Суд отмечает, что в Федеративной Республике Германии
содержание частной клиники является в определенной степени
коммерческой деятельностью с целью извлечения дохода; германское
право квалифицирует ее как "промысел" ("Gewerbe"). Эта
деятельность осуществляется в частном секторе на основе договоров
между клиникой и ее пациентами и напоминает осуществление частного
права, в чем-то приближающегося к праву собственности. Частные
клиники, разумеется, находятся под контролем властей,
осуществляемым в общественных интересах для охраны здоровья. Такой
контроль в общественных интересах, как правило, осуществляется в
государствах - членах Совета Европы во всех сферах частной
профессиональной деятельности и не может сам по себе служить
основанием для вывода, что содержание частной клиники является
деятельностью в сфере публичного права. Деятельность, относимая
правом государства к частноправовой, не превращается автоматически
в публично-правовую по той причине, что на ее осуществление
выдается административное разрешение и что она осуществляется под
контролем, вплоть до отзыва разрешения, если это требуется в
интересах общественного порядка и обеспечения здоровья населения.
Суд напомнил в этом контексте дело Рингейзена, где речь шла о
контроле государственных властей за договорами купли - продажи
между частными лицами: тем не менее Суд пришел к выводу о
гражданско-правовом характере спорного права (см. вышеупомянутое
Решение с. 39, п. 94).
93. В Федеративной Республике Германии медицинские профессии
традиционно относятся к свободным профессиям; более того,
законодательство о врачебной деятельности особо подчеркивает это
(см. п. 20 выше). Медицинская профессия не относится к
государственной службе: получив разрешение, врач свободен решать,
будет ли он заниматься практикой или нет, своих пациентов он лечит
на основании договора. Конечно, помимо лечения своих пациентов
практикующий врач, по определению вышеупомянутого акта, "обязан
заботиться о здоровье населения в целом". Ответственность
медицинского сообщества перед обществом не меняет, однако,
частного характера медицинской практики; эта ответственность, хотя
и имеет большое социальное значение, является вторичной, как и в
других профессиях, чей сугубо частный характер не ставится под
сомнение.
94. В этих условиях не имеет значения, что в данном деле
компетентными властями в осуществление государственных полномочий
принимались административные меры. Не играет роли и то, что в
соответствии с правом заинтересованного государства вынесение
решений по подобным делам возложено на административные суды.
Единственное, что имеет значение, согласно статье 6 п. 1, так это
то, что предметом рассмотрения в данных делах были права частного
характера.
95. Поскольку права, затронутые решениями об отзыве разрешений
и составляющие предмет разбирательства дел в административных
судах, относятся к частным правам, Суд пришел к выводу о
применимости статьи 6 п. 1, не считая нужным отвечать на вопрос -
как соотносится понятие "гражданские права и обязанности" в смысле
этой статьи с "частными правами".
96. В Комиссии заявитель дополнительно утверждал, что
фактически ему было предъявлено "уголовное обвинение" в смысле
статьи 6 п. 1 Конвенции. Комиссия, однако, отвергла это
утверждение в своем Решении относительно приемлемости жалобы.
Суд полагает, что подобная постановка вопроса заявителем
исходит из тех же фактов, что и его утверждение о гражданско-
правовом характере его судебных дел. Соответственно, это не
отдельная жалоба, а лишь иная форма юридической аргументации. Суд
может рассмотреть любую правовую проблему, возникшую в ходе
рассмотрения переданного ему дела, изучить фактические
обстоятельства дела, представленные ему заявителем и Комиссией, и
дать им правовую оценку, если сочтет это необходимым (см. Решение
от 23 июля 1968 г. по существу дела "О языках в Бельгии". Серия A,
т. 6, с. 30, п. 1; Решение по делу Де Вильде, Оомс и Версип против
Бельгии от 18 июня 1971 г. Серия A, т. 12, с. 29, п. 49; Решение
по делу Хэндисайда от 7 декабря 1976 г. Серия A, т. 24, с. 20, п.
41; Решение от 18 января 1978 г. по делу Ирландия против
Соединенного Королевства. Серия A, т. 25, с. 63, п. 157).
Однако Суд не считает нужным выяснить, должна ли статья 6 п. 1
быть применена в данном деле в аспекте "уголовного обвинения".
Хотя статья 6 не столь требовательна в отношении гражданско-
правовых споров в сравнении с уголовными делами, это различие в
данном случае не имеет значения: на все охватываемые статьей 6
виды судебных разбирательств распространяется требование
"разумного срока", соблюдение которого германскими судами и
подлежит рассмотрению.
b) О соблюдении статьи 6 п. 1 Конвенции
97. По мнению Комиссии, продолжительность разбирательства,
инициированного заявителем, в административных судах превысила
"разумный срок", о котором говорится в статье 6 п. 1 Конвенции.
Представитель Правительства признала в Суде, что продолжительность
этих разбирательств является серьезной проблемой. Более того, она
упомянула некоторые предложения, обсуждаемые сейчас в Федеративной
Республике Германии и направленные на то, чтобы ускорить
разбирательство в административных судах. Хотя она и сомневалась в
том, можно ли говорить о нарушении Конвенции в обстоятельствах
данного дела, вопрос оценки разумности сроков она оставила на
усмотрение Суда.
98. Суд, чтобы получить возможность прийти к решению, должен
вначале уточнить период, который следует принимать в расчет в
смысле статьи 6 п. 1.
По мнению Правительства и Комиссии, исчисление срока начинается
с момента подачи жалобы в административный суд первой инстанции.
Суд не разделяет эту точку зрения. В Решении по делу Голдера от 21
февраля 1975 г. говорится: "Можно представить себе ситуацию...
когда по гражданским делам в определенных обстоятельствах
истечение срока начинается даже до обращения истца в суд" (Серия
A, т. 18, с. 15, п. 32). Такая ситуация имеет место и в деле
заявителя, он мог обратиться в компетентный суд лишь после
рассмотрения в порядке предварительного производства в
административных органах законности и целесообразности
оспариваемых административных актов (статья 68 германского
Административно-процессуального кодекса). Следовательно, в
настоящем случае разумный срок, о котором говорит статья 6 п. 1,
начинается со дня обращения д-ра Кенига в эти административные
органы.
Применительно к уголовным делам период, к которому применяется
статья 6, охватывает, по мнению Суда, все стадии судебной
процедуры, включая обжалования (см. вышеупомянутое Решение по делу
Вемхофа, с. 26 и 27, п. 18 и 20; вышеупомянутое Решение по делу
Неймастера, с. 41, п. 19; Решение по делу Делькура от 17 января
1970 г. Серия A, т. 11, с. 13 - 15, п. 25 и 26). Эта установка, с
чем согласно и Правительство, вполне применима к гражданским
делам, в отношении которых статья 6 п. 1 также требует, чтобы при
определении сроков учитывалась продолжительность рассмотрения дела
в первой инстанции, в апелляционном или кассационном порядке.
99. Разумный срок разбирательства в смысле статьи 6 п. 1
Конвенции оценивается исходя из обстоятельств дела. Изучая
разумность сроков уголовного процесса, Суд обращает внимание inter
alia на сложность дела, поведение заявителя и движение дела в
административных органах и судах (см. вышеупомянутое Решение по
делу Неймастера, с. 42 - 43, п. 20 - 21; вышеупомянутое Решение по
делу Рингейзена, с. 45, п. 110). Суд, как и заявитель, полагает,
что те же критерии применимы и в настоящем деле при рассмотрении
вопроса о том, превысила ли продолжительность процесса в
административных судах срок, о котором говорится в статье 6 п. 1.
100. Прежде чем приступить к рассмотрению данного вопроса, Суд
хочет подчеркнуть, что в его функции не входит оценка
административного судопроизводства в Германии, которая, как заявил
представитель Правительства, имеет давние традиции. По-видимому,
оно может показаться сложным по причине множества судов и средств
защиты, но Суд осведомлен, что это объясняется достойной всяческой
похвалы заботой об усилении гарантий прав личности. Только само
государство может определять, нужно ли принимать меры по упрощению
этой системы с целью выполнения требования статьи 6 п. 1
Конвенции.
i) Разбирательство по поводу отзыва разрешения на содержание
клиники
101. Разбирательство, которое началось 13 июля 1967 г. подачей
заявителем возражения на отзыв разрешения (см. п. 28 выше), все
еще не завершено: Административный апелляционный суд земли Гессен
еще не вынес решения по поводу апелляции д-ра Кенига на Решение 4-
й палаты Административного суда Франкфурта от 22 июня 1977 г.
102. Вызывает серьезную озабоченность, как и признало
Правительство, что почти десять лет и десять месяцев нет Решения
по существу дела.
Суд разделяет точку зрения Правительства, что 4-я палата
Административного суда столкнулась с большими трудностями,
разыскивая тех свидетелей, которые за это время сменили имя или
адрес (см. п. 30, 32, 35, 36, 37 и 41). Это, в частности, верно в
отношении свидетеля Ксименса, которого палата смогла заслушать
только тридцать три месяца спустя после первого вызова в суд (см.
п. 30, 32 и 35). Однако Правительство не утверждало, что данное
дело поднимало исключительно сложные вопросы факта или права.
Суд видит определенную взаимосвязь между этим судебным
разбирательством и делом, которое должно было рассматриваться во 2-
й палате этого же суда по поводу отзыва разрешения заниматься
медицинской практикой, поскольку деятельность заявителя как
руководителя клиники сливалась с его деятельности как
практикующего врача. Однако это едва ли могло вызвать затруднения.
Наоборот, 4-я палата располагает досье Регионального медицинского
суда, который 14 октября 1970 г. признал д-ра Кенига недостойным
заниматься медицинской практикой (см. п. 16 и 30 выше). По этому
вопросу Суд отмечает, что представитель Правительства полагала
желательной более четкую координацию работы двух палат.
103. С другой стороны, Правительство придало большое значение
поведению заявителя: по его мнению, д-р Кениг чуть ли не
наполовину лично ответствен за длительность разбирательства.
Правительство привело в качестве примера частые смены адвокатов,
использование различных форм обжалования, а также представление
новых доказательств на различных стадиях процесса.
Неоднократная смена адвокатов, на что д-р Кениг безусловно имел
право, сказалась на длительности процесса, т.к. разным адвокатам
неизбежно требовалось некоторое время, чтобы ознакомиться с
материалами дела. Однако задержки, упомянутые Правительством, в
совокупности не превышают нескольких месяцев (см. п. 36 и 46
выше). Суд также обратил внимание, что д-р Кениг продолжал
пользоваться услугами своего первого адвоката до 24 мая 1971 г.,
т.е. на протяжении почти четырех лет процесса (см. п. 33 выше).
Суд также считает, что некоторые задержки явились следствием
различных жалоб, поданных заявителем. Однако Суд отмечает, что все
они были сделаны после июля 1973 г., т.е. после шести лет
разбирательства, и были поданы в то время, когда д-р Кениг уже был
в течение двух лет лишен разрешения заниматься медицинской
практикой. Первая из этих жалоб, поданная министру юстиции земли
Гессен в порядке административного надзора, относится к 22 августа
1973 г. (см. п. 39 выше); только два года спустя, т.е. 10 октября
1975 г., д-р Кениг обратился - безуспешно - со второй такой же
жалобой (см. п. 46 выше). Еще до вынесения решения по первой
жалобе заявитель 19 октября 1973 г. обратился в Федеральный
Конституционный Суд с жалобой на длительность судебных
разбирательств. Наконец, еще одна жалоба дисциплинарного характера
была направлена д-ром Кенигом председателю районного суда Хагена в
апреле 1974 г., т.е. до завершения трех разбирательств в 1973 г.
(см. п. 40 выше). Очевидно, что все эти наложения не облегчали
задачи 4-й палаты, хотя только жалобы 1973 г. и 1975 г. влекли за
собой по закону приостановку в строгом смысле слова судебной
процедуры.
Суд склонен разделить точку зрения Правительства, что,
представляя новые доказательства после того, как свидетели были
заслушаны, заявитель создавал трудности в расследовании дела. Из
материалов дела следует, что после того, как суд определил состав
свидетелей и впоследствии заслушал их, д-р Кениг обратился с
просьбами о заслушивании дополнительных свидетелей 24 сентября
1970 г., 12 февраля 1973 г. и 25 августа 1974 г. (см. п. 31, 36 и
42 выше); его первая просьба была сопряжена с условием, что он
откажется от нее, если власти земли, со своей стороны, не будет
выставлять дополнительных свидетелей (см. п. 31 выше). И наконец,
хотя суд дополнил 30 марта и 16 августа 1973 г. первоначальный
список свидетелей, по-видимому, только во втором случае это
привело к новому предложению д-ра Кенига о заслушивании
свидетелей.
104. Обращая внимание на удивляющую продолжительность
разбирательства, Суд рассмотрел ведение дела 4-й палатой во всех
деталях.
Хотя Суд не может поставить палате в упрек то, что она настояла
на заслушивании г-на Ксименса, или то, что спустя три года и семь
месяцев она дополнила список свидетелей от 26 августа 1969 г., он
отмечает, как это было сделано и Комиссией, что обмен встречными
заявлениями, с которого началось разбирательство, продолжался до 2
апреля 1969 г., т.е. почти семнадцать месяцев. Помимо поиска
адресов некоторых свидетелей и просьбы в профессиональный суд о
высылке досье (см. п. 29 и 30 выше), первый шаг в расследовании
дела был сделан лишь 26 августа 1969 г., когда 4-я палата приняла
Решение о приобщении доказательств к делу (см. п. 30 выше).
Комиссия справедливо подчеркивает далее, что палата ждала
семнадцать месяцев, прежде чем обратилась к досье профессиональных
судов, несмотря на тесную взаимосвязь рассматриваемого ею дела с
процедурой отзыва разрешения на занятие медицинской практикой.
Истребование этих досье компетентными органами власти и судами,
куда обращался с жалобами заявитель, вызвало значительную потерю
времени (см. п. 30, 31, 35, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42 и 45 выше).
Следует также отметить, что 10 февраля 1975 г., т.е. по
прошествии более семи лет после обращения, 4-я палата постановила
отложить вынесение решения до получения результата рассмотрения
дела, связанного с отзывом разрешения на занятие медицинской
практикой, которое вот уже более трех лет ждало рассмотрения во 2-
й палате этого же суда (см. п. 44 и 51 выше). Это решение было
принято после того, как трижды приобщались к делу доказательства,
представленные сторонами, и показания многочисленных свидетелей.
По этому вопросу Правительство признало, что закономерны сомнения
в правильности ведения судом расследования по данному делу.
Европейский суд так и не смог обнаружить, чего именно 4-я палата,
которая в 1977 г. могла отклонить апелляционную жалобу заявителя
на основании доказательств, собранных за период с ноября 1969 г.
по август 1974 г. (см. п. 47 выше), ожидала от исхода дела,
ждавшего рассмотрения 2-й палатой. В этой связи Суд напоминает,
что процесс в этой палате был приостановлен 25 сентября 1973 г. в
ожидании результата рассмотрения уголовного дела и возобновлен
лишь 30 июня 1975 г. Суд пришел к выводу, что в этих условиях у 4-
й палаты не было достаточных причин такого ведения процесса даже
при наличии согласия заявителя (см. п. 44 и 46 выше).
105. Давая общую оценку всех этих факторов, Суд пришел к
выводу, что задержки, вызванные трудностями дела и поведением
заявителя, сами по себе не оправдывают длительность судебного
разбирательства. У Суда сложилось мнение, что главная причина
кроется в том, как велось дело. Суд установил, что у 4-й палаты
была возможность завершить процесс раньше. Учитывая, что
разбирательство началось 13 июля 1967 г. и завершилось 22 июня
1977 г., Суд пришел к выводу, что был превышен "разумный срок",
предусмотренный статьей 6 п. 1.
Правительство подчеркивало, что жалоба д-ра Кенига
приостановила исполнение Решения об отзыве разрешения содержать
клинику (см. п. 28 выше) и что эта особенность процедуры
благоприятствовала заявителю. Суд признает, что приостанавливающее
действие может повлиять на толкование понятия "разумный срок".
Однако в свете общей продолжительности разбирательства и
длительной неуверенности, в которой пребывал заявитель, Суд не
может по причине приостанавливающего действия жалобы отступить от
той оценки срока, которая им дана.
ii) Разбирательство по поводу отзыва разрешения на занятие
медицинской практикой
106. Разбирательство началось 18 мая 1971 г., когда заявитель
обжаловал отзыв выданного ему ранее разрешения заниматься
медицинской практикой. 2-я палата Административного суда
Франкфурта вынесла Решение 9 июня 1976 г., т.е. через пять лет, а
Административный апелляционный суд земли Гессен - 2 мая 1978 г.
107. Хотя продолжительность этих разбирательств не столь
велика, как длительность рассмотрения дела об отзыве разрешения
содержать клинику, ситуация не представляется Суду менее
серьезной.
Это дело было не столь сложно, как то, что рассматривалось в 4-
й палате Административного суда: 2-я палата не только столкнулась
с меньшими трудностями по вызову свидетелей, судебный процесс был
облегчен тем, что 14 октября 1970 г. Региональный медицинский суд
объявил д-ра Кенига недостойным заниматься медицинской практикой
(см. п. 16 выше).
По поводу взаимосвязи этих двух дел, на чем и строилась
аргументация Правительства, следует отметить, что это не порождало
сложностей для 2-й палаты: напротив, она могла воспользоваться
результатами 4-й палаты, разбирательство в которой шло уже почти
четыре года с момента, когда д-р Кениг оспорил отзыв разрешения
заниматься медицинской практикой.
108. Поведение д-ра Кенига в деле, рассматривавшемся 2-й
палатой, в некотором отношении отличается от его поведения в 4-й
палате.
Заявитель в первый раз сменил адвоката 12 февраля 1973 г., т.е.
после шестнадцати месяцев разбирательства (см. п. 54 выше). Он
направил две жалобы наряду с теми, в которых опротестовывались
действия 4-й палаты: первую - 22 августа 1973 г., после почти двух
лет разбирательства, вторую - 10 октября 1975 г. (см. п. 56 и 67
выше). Более того, д-р Кениг подал три жалобы на нарушение его
конституционных прав из-за длительности разбирательства: первую -
19 октября 1973 г., вторую - в апреле 1974 г., а третью - 10 июля
1975 г. (см. п. 58, 60 и 64 выше). До первой жалобы в Федеральный
Конституционный Суд он также жаловался на длительность
разбирательства двух его дел в обращении в Комиссию от 3 июля 1973
г. Относительно способа представления своих доказательств
заявитель, очевидно, действовал не так, как в отношении 4-й
палаты.
Тем не менее поведение д-ра Кенига вызывало задержки судебного
разбирательства. Суд особо отмечает, что упомянутые Правительством
задержки, которые происходили из-за смены адвокатов, выглядят в
этом деле более значительными (см. п. 54, 62 и 67 выше).
109. То, что Административный суд Франкфурта не объединил дело
об отзыве разрешения заниматься медицинской практикой с делом об
отзыве разрешения содержать клинику, безусловно, сказалось на
продолжительности процесса в нем. Более того, Суд отмечает, что
позже при апелляционном разбирательстве оба дела были поручены
одной и той же палате Административного апелляционного суда
Гессена.
110. Что касается ведения дела самой 2-й палатой, Суд отмечает,
что она была мало озабочена его продвижением.
Первое заседание для заслушивания свидетелей и сторон было
назначено только на 14 июля 1975 г. (см. п. 65 выше). Согласно
имеющимся в Суде материалам, единственными шагами, предпринятыми 2-
й палатой между 25 октября 1971 г. (дата обращения) и июлем 1975
г., были просьба от 2 ноября 1971 г. к властям земли представить
соответствующие материалы и принятое в тот же день решение о том,
что Региональное медицинское общество должно принять участие в
разбирательстве (см. п. 52 и 53 выше). Предположительно 14
сентября 1972 г. Суд предложил сторонам заключить мировое
соглашение, но менее чем через месяц д-р Кениг отверг это
предложение (см. п. 53 выше). Суд дополнительно отмечает, как это
было сделано и Комиссией, что 2-я палата выжидала более десяти
месяцев, прежде чем принять решение об участии в деле
Регионального медицинского общества, хотя именно по его обращению
началась процедура рассмотрения дел в профессиональных судах, что
привело к отзыву разрешений (см. п. 16, 27, 49 и 53 выше).
Значительные задержки в рассмотрении дела были вызваны также
тем, что материалы направлялись в административные учреждения и в
суды, куда заявитель обращался с различными жалобами (см. п. 56,
58, 62, 64, 66 и 67 выше). В этой связи Суд напоминает о своих
выводах по поводу разбирательства дела в 4-й палате (см. п. 104
выше).
Однако главная причина затянутости этого этапа заключается в
приостановке процесса, Решение о чем было принято 25 сентября 1973
г. и действовало до 30 июня 1975 г. - в ожидании окончания
уголовного дела против д-ра Кенига, возбужденного 27 июля 1972 г.
Хотя осуждение д-ра Кенига могло иметь некоторое отношение к
расследованию дела во 2-й палате, Суд отмечает, что обвинения
против заявителя относились к событиям, произошедшим после отзыва
разрешения заниматься медицинской практикой (см. п. 49, 51, 71, 72
и 78 выше). Палата несколько раз запрашивала о состоянии
уголовного дела, но не сделала своевременных выводов из полученной
информации. Суд отмечает, что 2-я палата узнала уже 16 февраля
1974 г. о том, что слушания в уголовном суде не начнутся ранее
второй половины года; 8 мая уголовный суд подтвердил, что решение
вряд ли будет вынесено ранее чем через шесть месяцев, поскольку
заявитель дал отвод одному из судей и была начата длительная
апелляционная процедура (см. п. 59 и 61 выше). Несмотря на
неопределенность, витавшую над сроками окончания уголовного
разбирательства, 2-я палата выжидала еще более года, прежде чем 30
июня 1975 г. приняла решение не ждать больше его результатов.
По мнению Суда, приостановка разбирательства дела 2-й палатой
на срок свыше двадцати одного месяца с учетом обстоятельств дела
была неоправданной.
111. При совокупной оценке различных факторов и учитывая, что
от исхода разбирательства зависела профессиональная судьба д-ра
Кенига, Суд считает, что, несмотря на задержки по вине заявителя,
расследование дела велось неоправданно медленно.
Суд принял во внимание аргументы представителя Правительства о
существовании предварительной судебной защиты. И действительно,
заявитель дважды просил, один раз в 1971 г. и один - в 1974 г., о
приостановлении отзыва разрешения заниматься медицинской практикой
(см. п. 50, 62 и 63 выше). 2-я палата, а в последующем и
Административный апелляционный суд Гессена отклонили эти жалобы
мотивированными решениями. Более того, разбирательство по поводу
второй жалобы продолжалось в целом более пятнадцати месяцев. Суд
не исключает, что подобная процедура могла сказаться на
продолжительности срока основного разбирательства, и учитывает
это. Однако ввиду отмеченных выше обстоятельств это не может
повлиять на общую оценку факторов, учитываемых Судом.
Соответственно, Суд считает, что в данном случае был превышен
"разумный срок", о котором говорит статья 6 п. 1 Конвенции.
2. О применении статьи 50 Конвенции
112. Согласно статье 50 Конвенции, если Суд установит, "что
решение или мера, принятые" какими-либо властями Договаривающегося
государства, "полностью или частично противоречат обязательствам,
вытекающим из настоящей Конвенции, а также если внутреннее право
упомянутой Стороны допускает лишь частичное возмещение последствий
такого решения или такой меры", Суд, "если в этом есть
необходимость", предусматривает "справедливое возмещение
потерпевшей стороне".
Регламент Суда уточняет, что, когда Суд "устанавливает
нарушение Конвенции, он должен в том же решении применить статью
50 Конвенции, если этот вопрос, после того как он был поставлен в
соответствии со статьей 47 bis, готов для вынесения по нему
решения; если вопрос не готов, [Суд] должен отложить его в целом
или в части и определить дальнейшую процедуру" (первое предложение
п. 3 статьи 50 в сочетании с п. 3 статьи 48).
113. На слушании 17 ноября 1977 г. Суд, действуя во исполнение
статьи 47 bis, предложил участникам представить свои замечания о
применении статьи 50 Конвенции в настоящем случае.
Из ответа г-на Бургера следует, что д-р Кениг не требует
компенсации "за весь ущерб, который он понес в результате перерыва
в его работе как практикующего врача и руководителя клиники за
период, который уже превысил десять лет". Поэтому заявитель
оставляет на усмотрение Суда оценку "любой компенсации, которой он
мог бы ожидать согласно статье 50", а также решение вопроса о том,
должна ли такая компенсация "включать издержки на ведение дела" в
Комиссии и Суде.
Представитель Правительства, со своей стороны, заявила, что она
резервирует свою позицию.
114. Суд отмечает, что заявитель не требует компенсации за весь
материальный ущерб, который он, очевидно, понес. Однако он ожидает
получить справедливое возмещение, если Суд придет к выводу, что
имело место нарушение Конвенции, не указывая в данный момент суммы
своих требований.
Информация, предоставленная заявителем по этому поводу, и
замечания представителя Правительства показывают, что вопрос о
применении статьи 50 Конвенции не готов для принятия решения;
таким образом, Суд должен отложить этот вопрос и вынести решение
относительно дальнейшей процедуры.
ПО ЭТИМ ОСНОВАНИЯМ СУД
1. Постановил пятнадцатью голосами против одного, что статья 6
п. 1 применима к судебной процедуре об отзыве у заявителя
разрешения иметь свою клинику;
2. Постановил четырнадцатью голосами против двух, что статья 6
п. 1 применима к судебной процедуре об отзыве у заявителя
разрешения на занятие медицинской практикой;
3. Постановил пятнадцатью голосами против одного, что имело
место нарушение статьи 6 п. 1 в отношении длительности судебной
процедуры об отзыве разрешения иметь свою клинику;
4. Постановил пятнадцатью голосами против одного, что имело
место нарушение статьи 6 п. 1 в отношении длительности судебной
процедуры об отзыве разрешения на занятие медицинской практикой;
5. Постановил единогласно, что вопрос о применении статьи 50 не
готов для вынесения по нему решения;
соответственно,
a) отложил вопрос о применении статьи 50;
b) пригласил представителей Комиссии передать в Суд в течение
трех месяцев после вынесения настоящего Решения возможные
требования заявителя и свои замечания по ним;
c) принял решение, что Правительство может дать ответ на эти
требования и замечания в течение двух месяцев после того, как
грефье сообщит о них Правительству;
d) отложил определение дальнейшей процедуры по этому вопросу.
Совершено на французском и английском языках, причем
французский текст является аутентичным, и оглашено во Дворце прав
человека в Страсбурге 28 июня 1978 г.
Председатель
Джорджио БАЛЛАДОРЕ ПАЛЬЕРИ
За Грефье
Герберт ПЕТЦОЛЬД
Заместитель Грефье
В соответствии со статьей 51 п. 2 Конвенции и статьей 50 п. 2
Регламента Суда к настоящему Решению прилагаются отдельные мнения
судей.
ОТДЕЛЬНОЕ МНЕНИЕ СУДЬИ ВИАРДА
Я разделяю мнение, изложенное в Решении, за одним исключением,
касающимся мотивов применения статьи 6 п. 1 Конвенции к процессу в
Административном суде Франкфурта по делу об отзыве разрешений на
содержание клиники и занятие медицинской практикой.
Согласно логике Судебного решения, спор в этих делах шел по
поводу права содержать частную клинику и заниматься медицинской
практикой; и то и другое было классифицировано как права частного
характера и на основании этого отнесены к гражданским правам в
смысле настоящей Конвенции.
Я согласен с точкой зрения, что, каким бы ни был объем понятия
гражданских прав и обязанностей в смысле Конвенции, она в любом
случае включает права и обязанности частного характера в их
традиционном смысле; однако я не считаю, что право на содержание
клиники и право на занятие медицинской практикой можно
классифицировать в качестве прав частного характера в традиционном
значении этого понятия.
По моему мнению, классификация субъективных прав зависит от
классификации норм объективного права, которые служат источником
таких субъективных прав.
По праву (объективному) Германии (субъективные) право на
содержание частной клиники и право заниматься медицинской
практикой зависят единственно от приобретения и сохранения
разрешений, требуемых для этой цели по закону; однако условия,
которые необходимо выполнить для приобретения и сохранения таких
разрешений, определены в (объективном) публичном
(административном) праве, а не в (объективном) частном праве. По
этой причине я полагаю, что эти права следует классифицировать не
как гражданские, а как публичные права.
Это не означает, что я не могу согласиться с окончательным
выводом Суда.
Согласно Решению по делу Рингейзена, вопрос о том, считать ли
спор относящимся к "гражданским правам и обязанностям", зависит не
от характера законодательства, которое регулирует вопрос, не от
характера органа власти, который наделен соответствующими
полномочиями, а от характера прав и обязанностей, для которых
исход судебного разбирательства имеет решающее значение.
По настоящему делу от исхода судебного разбирательства, которое
д-р Кениг инициировал в Административном суде Франкфурта, в
решающей степени зависело, будет ли сохранен или восстановлен его
статус собственника и управляющего частной клиникой, а также
практикующего врача и сохранен либо восстановлен целый комплекс
прав и обязанностей, сопутствующих этому статусу.
Этот комплекс прав и обязанностей носит смешанный характер.
Публичное право играет некоторую роль, но, с моей точки зрения,
область, регулируемая частным правом, преобладает. Д-р Кениг как
собственник клиники пользовался соответствующими правами. Клиника,
практика и пациенты являлись источником "благополучия", что также
носит частноправовой характер и схоже в некотором отношении с
правом собственности. С правовой точки зрения управление клиникой
и занятие профессиональной деятельностью осуществлялись
посредством заключения договоров.
Отзыв разрешений, необходимых д-ру Кенигу, чтобы продолжать
руководить клиникой и заниматься профессиональной деятельностью,
равносилен вмешательству, которое во многих отношениях лишает
ценности данный комплекс прав и обязанностей, большая часть
которого регулируется частным правом.
Предметом разбирательства в Административном суде Франкфурта
была обоснованность отзывов, лежащая в основе этого дела.
По этой причине я считаю правомерным классифицировать
рассматриваемое дело как включающее "гражданские права и
обязанности" в смысле статьи 6 п. 1 Конвенции.
ОТДЕЛЬНОЕ МНЕНИЕ СУДЬИ МАТШЕРА
A. На данный момент я не в состоянии предложить всестороннее
общее определение понятия "гражданских прав и обязанностей" в
смысле статьи 6 п. 1 Конвенции. Однако я хотел бы попытаться
объяснить причины, которые мешают мне, к моему большому сожалению,
согласиться с тем определением этого понятия, которое дал Суд,
хотя только применительно к данному делу.
Я полагаю, что в качестве исходной позиции сама формулировка
статьи 6 п. 1 не является ясной и недвусмысленной. Чтобы понять ее
значение, нужно обратиться к методам толкования, принятым в
международном праве.
Буквальное, грамматическое толкование не уведет нас далеко.
Историческим предпосылкам появления статьи 6 посвящено
множество работ. Они показывают, что извлечь из подготовительных
работ каких-то специальных и конкретных представлений о сфере
действия статьи 6 нельзя.
Позиция (высказанная в Решении по делу Рингейзена и повторенная
в п. 90 настоящего Решения), согласно которой сопоставление двух
официальных текстов может дать определенную ориентацию правильному
толкованию, никак не подтверждена содержанием Конвенции.
Телеологическое толкование, на котором, по-видимому, главным
образом строится (хотя об этом и не говорится) настоящее Решение,
ограничено самой системой Конвенции. В основе такого толкования
лежит идея, что Конвенция призвана защитить человека от власти и
предоставить ему определенные гарантии в отношении последней. Это
означает, что Конвенция подлежит применению, когда под вопрос
ставится положение индивида в отношениях с властью. Однако для
того, чтобы вывести из данного принципа конкретные выводы, надо
прежде всего доказать, что имеется некое право, которое призвана
гарантировать Конвенция; в противном случае существует опасность
выйти за пределы телеологического толкования и легкомысленно
оказаться в области законодательной политики.
Мотивация решения не доказывает, что статья 6 п. 1
распространяется на правовое положение заявителя по настоящему
делу.
Решение начинается с подтверждения принципа "автономного"
толкования терминов международной Конвенции в целом и понятия
"гражданские права и обязанности" в смысле статьи 6 п. 1 Конвенции
в частности. Это принцип, с которым я полностью согласен (хотя
должен сказать, что не считаю определение, данное Судом, свободным
от двусмысленности). С моей точки зрения, автономное толкование
означает прежде всего, что положения международной Конвенции
нельзя толковать единственно путем ссылки на тот объем, который
они имеют во внутреннем праве заинтересованных Договаривающихся
государств; скорее следует исходить, "во-первых, из целей и
системы Конвенции, а во-вторых, из общих принципов, которые
выводятся из совокупности национальных правовых систем" (Решение
Суда Европейских сообществ от 14 октября 1976 г.). Иначе говоря,
за рассматриваемыми положениями следует искать "общий
знаменатель", т.к. при отсутствии легального определения в тексте
самой Конвенции правомерно предположить, что таков смысл, который
хотели придать этим положениям Договаривающиеся государства. Этот
общий знаменатель можно найти путем сравнительного анализа
внутреннего законодательства Договаривающихся государств. Поэтому
в результате такого исследования никогда не может появиться
понятие, которое бы полностью отличалось от того, что принято в
правовых системах этих государств. С моей точки зрения, принятое
решение недостаточно учитывает это требование. Оно пришло к
выводу, что статья 6 п. 1 Конвенции применима к настоящему делу,
основываясь исключительно на двух типах доводов, которые я считаю
весьма спорными:
1. Первый из них: деятельность медика, будь он практикующим
врачом или директором частной клиники, носит частноправовой
характер, очевидно, в силу того обстоятельства, что она сводится
главным образом (с юридической точки зрения) к частноправовым
отношениям с клиентами (п. 92 и 93 Решения).
Однако этот довод, как мне кажется, смешивает особые отношения
врача с его пациентом, которые, без сомнения, сфера частного права
(если только врач, о котором идет речь, не является
государственным служащим), с его профессиональным статусом,
который независимо от того, касается ли он государственной службы
здравоохранения или частной врачебной практики, регулируется (с
теми или иными различиями) публичным правом в большинстве, если не
во всех государствах.
Таким образом, когда Суд заявляет, что профессиональное
положение врача следует классифицировать как сферу частного права
в смысле статьи 6 п. 1 Конвенции, то появляется такое понятие
"гражданских прав", которое не просто "автономно" в смысле
настоящей Конвенции, но и не имеет основы в правовых системах
подавляющего большинства Договаривающихся государств.
2. Перенося выводы из Решения по делу Рингейзена (Серия A, т.
13, с. 39, п. 94) на настоящее дело, Суд заявляет (п. 90 Решения),
что все случаи рассмотрения в судах дел, от исхода которых зависят
частные права и обязанности, должны считаться спорами о
гражданских правах в смысле статьи 6 п. 1 Конвенции. С моей точки
зрения, это слишком расплывчатое и чересчур растяжимое
утверждение, чтобы делать из него точные выводы. Что в самом деле
означает выражение "является определяющим для прав и обязанностей
частноправового характера"?
В деле Рингейзена вывод, сделанный Судом из этого утверждения,
мне кажется приемлемым и, возможно, даже оправданным, т.к. в том
случае разбирательство в Административном суде непосредственно
влияло на частноправовой договор и не имело иной цели.
В деле Кенига ситуация принципиально иная: предметом
разбирательства в административных судах были не частноправовые
отношения между д-ром Кенигом и его пациентами; судебные процессы
не были предназначены "иметь решающее значение" для таких
отношений (они оказывали на них лишь косвенное воздействие).
Рассмотрение дел в административных судах касалось только
профессионального статуса д-ра Кенига как практикующего врача и
директора частной клиники. (Аналогия между делами Кенига и
Рингейзена возможна была бы только в том случае, если бы последнее
дело касалось статуса г-на Рингейзена как агента по недвижимости,
чего не было.)
В этой связи и в противоположность тому, что, по-видимому,
является мнением Суда (п. 91 Решения), я не думаю, что (в том, что
касается статьи 6 Конвенции) можно провести различие между выдачей
и отзывом разрешения (заниматься медицинской практикой или
содержать клинику). Профессиональный статус или режим
экономической деятельности - это единое целое. Выдача и отзыв
разрешения, необходимого для того, чтобы заниматься определенной
деятельностью, являются лишь двумя конкретными сторонами такого
статуса или режима: предоставление равносильно установлению того,
что требуемые условия имеются, а отзыв - установлению того, что
они более не существуют. С точки зрения качественной оценки оба
они одинаково влияют на развитие частноправовой ситуации. У меня
не сложилось впечатление, что авторы Конвенции намеревались
подвести все дела (споры) относительно ситуаций, несомненно
регулируемых публичным правом, под статью 6 Конвенции только
потому, что исход такого дела мог бы повлиять на частноправовые
отношения лица, о котором идет речь. В любом случае в большинстве
государств - участников Конвенции разбирательства по
соответствующим делам организованы не по той формуле, которая
предусмотрена в статье 6 (решение суда, публичное разбирательство,
публичное объявление решения); это означает, согласно выводам,
сделанным в данном Решении, что все эти государства - даже
обладающие высокоразвитыми системами судопроизводства по
административным делам - оказались бы в ситуации, когда они не
соблюдают требований статьи 6 со дня ратификации ими Конвенции.
Мне представляется, что это бесспорный довод в пользу исключения
дел данного типа из сферы применения статьи 6 Конвенции.
Имеется еще одно спорное утверждение в дискуссиях относительно
сферы, на которую распространяется статья 6 п. 1. Нередко
утверждают, что лицо гораздо больше нуждается в процессуальных
гарантиях, предусматриваемых статьей 6 п. 1, в делах, где стороной
в споре являются органы власти, чем в делах, где он спорит со
своими соседями. Однако трудно предположить, что Конвенция имела
целью установить систему гарантий лишь для какого-либо одного из
этих случаев.
Я бы объяснил эту ситуацию так: история права (по крайней мере
континентального права) очень четко показывает, что принципы
устного и публичного процесса решения гражданских дел независимым
судом являются воспроизведением этих же принципов в уголовном
процессе. Когда, начиная с Французской революции 1789 г. и во
время охвативших Европу революций 1848 г., были провозглашены эти
принципы, имелся в виду только уголовный процесс. Никто не пошел
бы на баррикады, чтобы добиться устного и публичного судебного
разбирательства по гражданским делам! Единственной причиной
включения этих принципов в гражданский процесс - а нередко даже их
гарантия в конституционных нормах - было следование образцу,
принятому для рассмотрения уголовных дел. Более того, и это также
видно из опыта работы судов, важность этих принципов для
гражданских дел всегда была относительно ограничена (хотя следует
признать, что некоторые из этих принципов представляют особую
ценность для гражданского процесса).
Я думаю, что надо учитывать все это, чтобы понять, почему
авторы Конвенции не ограничили гарантии статьи 6 сферой уголовных
дел, придав им, однако, первостепенное значение, а распространили
на всю сферу компетенции судов в государствах - участниках.
Я допускаю, что такое прочтение исторических параметров
становления Конвенции ведет к относительно узкой трактовке понятия
гражданских прав, но я полагаю, что это отражает de lege lata
реальное значение и сферу действия статьи 6 п. 1.
Я не стал бы отрицать, что de lege ferenda распространение
защиты прав личности и сопутствующих процессуальных гарантий также
и на ее отношения с публичными властями является идеалом, к
которому надо стремиться, особенно с учетом постоянного роста их
вмешательств в права личности во всех областях. Признавая
обоснованность этих ожиданий, Суд, чья задача состоит в том, чтобы
обеспечить соблюдение прав, гарантируемых Конвенцией, свободен
пользоваться широким толкованием этих гарантий (что он и сделал,
справедливо, на мой взгляд, по делу Рингейзена) до тех пор, пока
такое толкование остается в рамках самой Конвенции. С другой
стороны, именно Договаривающимся государствам принадлежит право
пойти дальше, чем идет Конвенция, если они сочтут это необходимым
и согласятся внести в нее поправки.
Возможно, соображения de lege ferenda и размышления о возможных
последствиях слишком широкого толкования гражданских прав выходят
за пределы Судебного решения (или, если быть более точным, особого
мнения). Тем не менее я бы хотел сделать несколько кратких
комментариев.
У меня есть сомнения относительно полезности неизменного
использования процедуры, полностью соответствующей требованиям
статьи 6 п. 1 Конвенции, в многочисленных случаях, которые, если
продолжать следовать линии, установленной Судом в настоящем деле,
подпадали бы под квалификацию дел о "гражданских правах" (выдача
различного рода разрешений и лицензий, в той мере, в какой они
порождают гражданские права). Для некоторых из них (в особенности
для дел о профессиональных или дисциплинарных нарушениях) такого
рода процедура (публичная судебная процедура) вряд ли будет
наилучшим образом соответствовать интересам заинтересованных лиц.
Я целиком согласен, что и в этих делах справедливое решение
должно выноситься в разумные сроки в процедуре, которая дает
заинтересованным лицам все возможности отстаивать свои права, и
что решения компетентных властей (даже когда они носят
административный характер) могут быть обжалованы в независимый
орган (т.е. в суд). Однако я не вижу, почему рассматриваемая
процедура должна неизменно соответствовать всем требованиям статьи
6 п. 1 (устному и публичному разбирательству, публичному оглашению
решения).
De lege ferenda приведенные выше соображения потребуют,
наверное, внесения предложений о пересмотре статьи 6 Конвенции,
имея в виду провести следующее разграничение (что не позволяет
нынешняя диспозиция этой статьи):
a) уголовные и гражданские дела (т.е. дела, традиционно
рассматриваемые судами); право на все гарантии, предусмотренные в
статье 6;
b) судебные споры по другим вопросам (административные дела):
право на установленную законом процедуру, которая гарантирует
справедливое участие сторон, вынесение решения в разумные сроки,
право на судебное обжалование административных решений.
B. Проголосовав отрицательно по вопросам 1 и 2, было бы только
логично, если бы я также проголосовал отрицательно по вопросам 3 и
4, как они сформулированы в резолютивной части Судебного решения.
Я бы хотел ясно сказать, что я разделяю единодушную точку зрения
Суда, что в разбирательствах по делам об отзыве обоих разрешений и
на содержание клиники, и на занятие врачебной практикой был
превышен "разумный срок", о котором говорит статья 6 п. 1 (в той
мере, в какой эта статья может быть применена к настоящему
случаю).
ОТДЕЛЬНОЕ МНЕНИЕ СУДЬИ ПИНЕЙРО ФАРИНЬИ
1. Я не могу согласиться с рассуждениями Суда относительно двух
пунктов мотивировочной части Решения и п. 2 постановляющей части.
2. Будучи согласен (п. 93 Решения), что медицинская профессия в
Федеративной Республике Германии числится среди свободных
профессий традиционно; что в системе национального здравоохранения
медицинская профессия не относится к публичной службе; что врач,
который сам решает, практиковать ему или нет, предоставляет своим
пациентам лечение на основе договора; что деятельность
практикующего врача носит частный характер, я все же чувствую себя
обязанным отметить, что:
а) в соответствии с национальным законом, практикующий врач
обязан заботиться о здоровье каждого человека и общества в целом;
он занимается свободной профессией, а не ремеслом или бизнесом;
b) для того, чтобы иметь возможность практиковать на постоянной
основе, требуется разрешение, выдаваемое соответствующими
земельными службами. Это разрешение выдается по требованию, если
заинтересованный индивид:
1...
2. не признавался виновным в поведении, свидетельствующем, что
он не достоин занятия данной профессией,
3...
4...
(п. 20 Решения);
c) разрешение, которое было выдано, должно быть отозвано, если
одно из этих условий либо не было выполнено при выдаче, либо
перестало выполняться впоследствии;
d) хотя одной из целей медицинской профессии является
извлечение дохода, ее основная задача (а именно приходить на
помощь людям) бескорыстна (п. 22 Решения).
Держа в голове эти цитаты и вспоминая клятву Гиппократа,
которую приносит врач, где есть, в частности, такие слова: "Я
проведу свою жизнь и буду осуществлять свою профессию с чистыми
помыслами. Пусть, пока я храню эту клятву, мне будет дано
наслаждаться жизнью и практиковать искусство, которое уважается
всеми и во все времена. Но если я преступлю и нарушу эту клятву,
пускай иной станет моя судьба", - я должен сделать вывод о
тотальном различии между содержанием клиники (ремеслом или
бизнесом; п. 21 Решения) и занятием медицинской практикой, где
духовный элемент превалирует над материальным, т.к. "долг
достоинства, бескорыстия и независимости, которому должны
следовать члены свободной профессии, применим к врачам самым
строжайшим образом" (Ж. Саватье, цитируется по Encyclopedie
Dalloz, v. III, p. 425).
3. Относительно п. 95 Решения я не могу согласиться с точкой
зрения Суда по поводу отзыва разрешения заниматься врачебной
практикой. Однако я хотел бы подчеркнуть, что я согласен с п. 94 и
95 Решения в отношении отзыва разрешения на управление клиникой.
С моей точки зрения, право, которое затрагивается отзывом
разрешения заниматься врачебной практикой, носит публичный, а не
частный характер. Я не думаю, что в силу статьи 6 Конвенции можно
провести различие между выдачей и отзывом разрешения.
Следует напомнить, что административное разбирательство не
имело своим предметом какие-либо конкретные частноправовые
отношения между д-ром Кенигом и его пациентами, а только его общую
пригодность заниматься врачебной деятельностью.
Так как публичное право принимает во внимание не действия как
таковые, а цели, на которые они направлены, то и отзыв разрешения
заниматься медицинской практикой не был направлен на регулирование
конкретных отношений между д-ром Кенигом и его клиентами (эти
отношения являются предметом частного права), а главным образом на
охрану здоровья населения в целом, и т.к. административные власти
установили, что д-р Кениг более не выполняет некоторые требования
публичного порядка, выходящие за пределы частного права, то я бы
сказал, в отличие от Суда, что статья 6 п. 1 неприменима к
разбирательству об отзыве разрешения заниматься медицинской
практикой.
4. Я чувствую себя обязанным согласиться с решением большинства
Суда о том, что статья 6 п. 1 применима в отношении разумного
срока к разбирательству об отзыве разрешения на занятие
медицинской практикой, и проголосовал за это.
Расходясь с Судом по первому вопросу - применимости статьи 6 п.
1 Конвенции, я согласен с его окончательным решением и доводами в
его обоснование.
Однако я хотел бы отметить специально, что я проголосовал бы за
отсутствие нарушения Конвенции по причине неприменимости статьи 6
п. 1 к разбирательству о разрешении "практиковать", если бы ранее
не было принято решение о применимости.
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
CASE OF {KONIG} v. GERMANY
JUDGMENT
(Strasbourg, 28.VI.1978)
In the {Konig} case,
The European Court of Human Rights, taking its decision in
plenary session in application of Rule 48 of the Rules of Court
and composed of the following judges :
Mr. G. Balladore Pallieri, President,
Mr. G. Wiarda,
Mr. H. Mosler
Mr. M. Zekia,
Mr. P. O'Donoghue,
Mrs. H. Pedersen
Mr. {Thor Vilhjalmsson},
Mr. R. Ryssdal,
Mr. W. Ganshof van der Meersch,
Mrs. D. Bindschedler-Robert,
Mr. D. Evrigenis,
Mr. P.-H. Teitgen,
Mr. L. Liesch,
Mr. F. {Golcuklu},
Mr. F. Matscher,
Mr. J. Pinheiro Farinha,
and also Mr. M.-A. Eissen, Registrar, and Mr. H. Petzold,
Deputy Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 18 and 19 November 1977 and
from 29 to 31 May 1978,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the last-
mentioned date:
PROCEDURE
l. The {Konig} case was referred to the Court by the Government
of the Federal Republic of Germany (hereinafter called "the
Government") and by the European Commission of Human Rights
(hereinafter called "the Commission"). The case originated in an
application against the Federal Republic of Germany lodged with
the Commission on 3 July 1973 under Article 25 (art. 25) of the
Convention for the protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (hereinafter called "the Convention") by a German
citizen, Dr. Eberhard {Konig}.
2. Both the Government's application, which referred to Article
48 (art. 48) of the Convention, and the Commission's request,
which relied on Articles 44 and 48, paragraph (a) (art. 44, art.
48-a), and to which was attached the report provided for in
Article 31 (art. 31), were lodged with the registry of the Court
within the period of three months laid down in Articles 32 para. 1
and 47 (art. 32-1, art. 47) - the former on 28 February 1977, the
latter on 14 March 1977. The purpose of the application and the
request is to obtain a decision from the Court as to whether or
not the facts of the case disclose a breach by the respondent
State of its obligations under Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) of the
Convention.
3. On 23 March, the President of the Court drew by lot, in the
presence of the Deputy Registrar, the names of five of the seven
judges called upon to sit as members of the Chamber; Mr. H.
Mosler, the elected judge of German nationality, and Mr. G.
Balladore Pallieri, the President of the Court, were ex officio
members under Article 43 (art. 43) of the Convention and Rule 21
para. 3 (b) of the Rules of Court respectively. The five judges
thus designated were Mr. Zekia, Mrs. H. Pedersen, Mrs. D.
Bindschedler-Robert, Mr. D. Evrigenis and Mr. G. Lagergren
(Article 43 in fine of the Convention and Rule 21 para. 4) (art.
43).
Mr. Balladore Pallieri assumed the office of President of the
Chamber in accordance with Rule 21 para. 5.
4. The President of the Chamber ascertained, through the
Registrar, the views of the Agent of the Government and the
delegates of the Commission regarding the procedure to be
followed. By an Order of 24 March the President decided that the
Government should file a memorial within a time-limit expiring on
15 June 1977 and that the delegates of the Commission should be
entitled to file a memorial in reply within two months of receipt
of the Government's memorial.
5. At a meeting held in private on 23 April in Strasbourg, the
Chamber decided under Rule 48 to relinquish jurisdiction forthwith
in favour of the plenary Court, on the ground "that the case
raise[d] serious questions affecting the interpretation of the
Convention ...".
6. By an Order of 6 July, the President of the Court extended
until 15 July the time allowed to the Government for the filing of
their memorial. The said memorial was received at the registry on
18 July.
7. On 2 August and 5 September, the Government submitted
certain other documents; the Government had given notice of the
production of the majority of these documents in their memorial of
18 July.
8. On 20 September, the Secretary to the Commission advised the
Registrar that the delegates had elected not to file a memorial in
reply to the Government's memorial.
9. After consulting, through the Registrar, the Agent of the
Government and the delegates of the Commission, the President
directed by an Order of the same date that the oral hearings
should open on 16 November.
10. At a meeting held in private on 29 September in Luxembourg,
the Court decided that, if the Government so requested, their
agents and counsel would be authorised to address the Court in
German at the oral hearings, the Government undertaking inter alia
responsibility for the interpretation into French or English of
their pleadings and statements (Rule 27 para. 2).
The Government in fact presented such a request on 4 October.
11. On 9 November, the Government communicated certain
information to the Court and filed another document.
12. Immediately prior to the opening of the hearings, on 16
November, the Court held a preparatory meeting.
13. The oral hearings took place in public at the Human Rights
Building, Strasbourg, on 16 and 17 November.
There appeared before the Court:
- for the Government:
Mrs. I. Maier, Ministerialdirigentin at the Federal Ministry of
Justice, Agent,
Mr. J. Meyer-Ladewig, Ministerialrat at the Federal Ministry of
Justice,
Mr. H. {Stocker}, Regierungsdirektor at the Federal Ministry of
Justice, Advisers;
- for the Commission:
Mr. J.E.S. Fawcett, Principal Delegate,
Mr. G. Sperduti,
Mr. A. Frowein, Delegates,
Mr. R. Burger, who had represented the applicant before the
Commission, assisting the delegates under Rule 29 para. 1, second
sentence (on 17 November only).
The Court heard addresses by Mrs. Maier for the Government and
by Mr. Fawcett, Mr. Sperduti, Mr. Frowein and Mr. Burger for the
Commission, as well as their replies to questions put by the
Court.
14. Several documents that the Court had requested from those
appearing at the hearings were supplied on 17 November 1977 by the
Commission and on 16 January 1978 by the Government.
On 6 March and 8 May, the Government communicated certain
supplementary information and some further documents to the Court.
AS TO THE FACTS
15. The applicant, a German national born in 1918, had taken up
practice as an ear, nose and throat specialist in 1949. In 1960,
he opened at Bad Homburg (Hessen) in the Federal Republic of
Germany a clinic of which he was the owner; he was the only
medical practitioner working at the clinic which he ran and
managed himself and where he performed, in particular, plastic
surgery.
16. On 16 October 1962, proceedings against Dr. {Konig} for
unprofessional conduct were instituted by the Regional Medical
Society ({Landesarztekammer}) before the Tribunal for the Medical
Profession (Berufsgericht {fur} Heilberufe) attached to the
Frankfurt Administrative Court (Verwaltungsgericht) and he was
declared unfit to practise on 9 July 1964. The Regional Tribunal
for the Medical Profession (Landesberufsgericht {fur} Heilberufe)
attached to the Hessen Administrative Court of Appeal
(Verwaltungsgerichtshof) rejected Dr. {Konig's} appeal on 14
October 1970.
The accusations against the applicant upheld by the Regional
Tribunal including the following: having offered a beauty
specialist 20 % of his fees and one of his patients DM 100 for
each client they introduced to him; having persuaded a patient to
have treatment not covered by social security by assurances that
he would in that case be able to use more effective methods;
having refused to make out for one of his clients an account
corresponding to the fee actually paid; having, as an ear, nose
and throat specialist, performed an operation not falling within
the field in which he specialised; having had a beauty specialist
assist him during operations; having widely-publicised his
practice in the daily and weekly press; having used on his name-
plates, notepaper and prescription forms wording contrary to the
rules of the medical profession.
17. In 1967, the applicant had his authorisation to run his
clinic withdrawn and then, in 1971, his authorisation to practise.
Criminal proceedings were taken against him in 1972 for, inter
alia, the illegal practice of medicine.
Actions brought by Dr. {Konig} to challenge both of these
withdrawals have been in progress before the competent
administrative courts since November 1967 and October 1971,
respectively.
18. The applicant complains of the length of the proceedings
taken by him against the withdrawals of the authorisations; he
makes no complaint about either the disciplinary proceedings
before the professional tribunals or the criminal proceedings.
1. The medical profession in the Federal
Republic of Germany
19. In the Federal Republic of Germany, the medical profession
is governed partly by Federal law and partly by the law of the
{Lander}. The principal rules relevant for the present case are to
be found, in particular, in the Federal Medical Practitioners' Act
({Bundesarzteordnung} - hereinafter referred to as "the Federal
Act") in the version of 4 February 1970 as last amended on 2 March
1974 and 26 March 1975, the Regulations of 28 October 1970 on the
grant of the authorisation to practise medicine
(Approbationsordnung {fur Arzte} - hereinafter referred to as "the
Regulations") and the Hessen Act on the Professional Bodies and
Tribunals for Medical Practitioners, Dentists, Veterinary Surgeons
and Pharmacists (Gesetz {uber} die Berufsvertretungen und {uber}
die Berufsgerichtbarkeit der {Arzte,} {Zahnarzte}, {Tierarzte} and
Apotheker - hereinafter referred to as "the Hessen Act") in the
version of 18 April 1966.
20. According to paragraph 1 of Article 1 of the Federal Act,
the medical practitioner shall have the care of the health of each
individual and of the community as a whole. Under paragraph 2, he
exercises a liberal profession and not a trade or business.
In order to be able to practise on a permanent basis, an
authorisation issued by the appropriate services of the {Lander}
is required. (Articles 2 para. 1 and 12 of the Federal Act and
Article 35 of the Regulations). This authorisation is granted on
request if the person concerned:
"1. is German ... or is a stateless alien ...,
2. has not been guilty of behaviour showing that he is unfit or
unreliable to exercise the profession ...,
3. is not incapable of, or unsuited for, the exercise of the
... profession on account of an infirmity, of some weakness in his
mental or physical faculties, or of an addiction (Sucht),
4. after studying medicine for a minimum of six years,
including a minimum of eight months' and maximum of twelve months'
practical training in a hospital, has passed the medical
examination in a place where this Act is applicable.
..." (Article 3 para. 1 of the Federal Act).
If the application is granted, the person concerned receives a
document (Approbationsurkunde) certifying that the statutory
conditions are satisfied and adding:
"With effect from today's date, he (she) is granted
authorisation to exercise the medical profession .... Such grant
authorises the doctor to practise medicine" (Article 36 of the
Regulations and Appendix 21 thereto).
If, on the other hand, the authorisation has to be refused for
nonfulfilment of one of the conditions, the applicant or his
representative must first be given a hearing (Article 3 para. 4 of
the Federal Act.)
An authorisation that has been issued must be withdrawn if one
of those conditions either was not satisfied at the time of the
grant or ceases to be met afterwards (Article 5 of the Federal
Act).
21. Anyone wishing to run a clinic must have an authorisation
pursuant to the Trade and Business Act (Gewerbeordnung) and is
entitled thereto if he fulfils the conditions stipulated by
Article 30 para. 1 of the Act (see paragraph 27 below).
Since the management of a clinic is classified as a trade or
business, the person running it does not have to be a doctor
himself. However, he is required to take all necessary staffing
and organisational measures to ensure the treatment of patients in
his institution. He must, therefore, employ one or more doctors
responsible for the care of his clients.
The authorisation is withdrawn if it transpires either that the
documents supporting the application were incorrect or that the
requisite conditions were never, or have ceased to be, satisfied
(Article 53 of the same Act; paragraph 27 below).
22. It is not disputed that, according to German law, the right
to be authorised to practise medicine and the right to be
authorised to run a private clinic are rights conferred on the
individual by public law and protected by Article 12 of the Basic
Law which guarantees freedom to exercise a profession. Again,
exercise of the medical profession, unlike the running of a
private clinic, is not considered in the Federal Republic to be a
trade or business (see paragraph 20 above); although it also has
the purpose of providing an income, its primary aim is
disinterested, namely, rendering assistance to mankind.
Medical treatment is a matter for a private-law contract
between doctor and patient. Such a contract serves to guarantee
the free choice of a medical adviser, maintain a relationship of
trust between him and his patient and uphold professional secrecy.
However, the contract does not establish a well-defined set of
rights and obligations since it imposes on the doctor a duty to
provide basically unlimited services to anyone seeking treatment.
Moreover, the rules on the medical profession forbid its members
to advertise and even regulate in detail the size and content of
their name-plates.
Again, medical practitioners cannot fix their fees at will but
must comply with the Regulations even when not practising as
national health doctors. Minimum and maximum fees for medical
services are specified by Federal Government decrees, taking into
account the legitimate interests of practitioners and of the
persons or organisations having to pay them (Article 11 of the
Federal Act).
Those affiliated to the social security health insurance funds
- about 80% of the population - are entitled to medical treatment
according to the terms of the legislation and agreements in force.
The majority of medical practitioners are approved national health
doctors and obliged to treat members of the insurance funds. The
Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) has held
that such practitioners are not administering a public service but
fulfilling a public-law duty and, by their enrolment, are
integrated within a system of public law. (Collected Decisions of
the Constitutional Court, Vol. 11, pp 30 et seq.).
23. Medical practitioners carry out their duties under the
control, inter alia, of their societies and of the professional
tribunals, these institutions being governed by {Lander} Law.
24. Articles 1 and 2 para. 1 of the Hessen Act provide that
regional medical societies are public-law associations to which
all doctors practising in the Land belong. Practitioners who fail
to register with the competent society or to fulfil their other
obligations under its statutes may be fined (Article 7 of the
Hessen Act.)
Article 4 para. 1 of the Hessen Act gives the following
definition of each society's functions:
"1. supervision of the discharge of (its) members' professional
duties ...,
2. promotion of the further training of society members,
3. promotion of harmonious relations among society members and
settlement of any disputes, arising in the exercise of the
profession, between members or between them and third persons,
without prejudice to the jurisdiction of other authorities,
4. assisting the official health service in the performance of
its functions, ..."
The authorities and the societies must assist each other in the
fulfilment of their respective functions (Article 5 of the Hessen
Act).
The societies are under State supervision which extends to
observance of the laws and statutes. The competent Minister may
quash any decision contravening these texts (Article 16 of the
Hessen Act) and may at any time request information from the
societies concerning their affairs (Article 17 para. 1).
25. If the council of the society suspects a practitioner of
unprofessional conduct, it refers the matter to the Tribunal for
the Medical Profession (Articles 18 and 29 para. 3 of the Hessen
Act). Under Article 20 para. 1, the decision at first instance is
given by that Tribunal which is attached to the Administrative
Court for the locality and has three members, namely the
President, or his representative, and two assessors belonging to
the defendant's professional group (Article 21 para. 1).
An appeal against the Tribunal's decision may be made to the
Regional Tribunal for the Medical Profession attached to the
Hessen Administrative Court of Appeal (Articles 41 and 20 para.
2); the appellate tribunal is composed of five members, namely the
President, or his representative, two other judges of the
Administrative Court of Appeal and two assessors belonging to the
defendant's professional group (Article 21 para. 2).
The professional tribunals may impose the following penalties,
the second, third and fourth of which may be combined: warning,
reprimand, temporary suspension of the right to vote in society
proceedings, fine up to DM 10,000 and finding that the individual
is unfit to exercise the profession (Article 19 paras. 1 and 3).
The authorisation to practise is not automatically revoked as
the result of the last-mentioned finding. Although its ultimate
purpose is the individual's exclusion from the profession, it
binds neither the Regierungsprasident, who alone has power to
withdraw the authorisation, nor any courts which may be called
upon to examine the lawfulness of such a withdrawal.
26. Decisions by the {Regierungsprasident} withdrawing either
an authorisation to practise or an authorisation to run a private
clinic may be challenged before the administrative courts.
However, before the person concerned can bring the matter before
the courts, he must first have filed - unsuccessfully - an
objection (Widerspruch) with the {Regierungsprasident}.
2. The withdrawal of the authorisation to run
the clinic - proceedings before the 4th Chamber
of the Frankfurt Administrative Court
27. On 12 April 1967, at the request of the Regional Medical
Society, the Regierungsprasident in Wiesbaden withdrew the
applicant's authorisation to run his clinic, claiming that he
could not be relied on to conduct the institution properly and
lacked the diligence and knowledge required for its technical and
administrative management. The {Regierungsprasident} adverted to
an inspection of the clinic which had revealed, in November 1965,
numerous irregularities: out of thirty-four medical records,
eighteen were not maintained correctly; the training of the staff
was insufficient for the work entrusted to them; the equipment in
the treatment room left something to be desired; the instruments,
some of which were beginning to rust, were in part badly kept; the
X-ray machinery lacked safety devices. Inspectors were said to
have found in January 1967 that, amongst other things, the
operating theatre and its equipment had not been cleaned. The
{Regierungsprasident} relied also on evidence given by several
people to the effect that, between 1962 and October 1966, the
clinic had in fact been managed by a young employee who was aged
eighteen in 1962 and was unqualified. She supervised the staff and
took care of the patients and had allegedly confirmed that dog-
food was kept in the refigerator at the clinic and that the
applicant allowed men to be present in the rooms outside visiting
hours. According to her, Dr. {Konig} also made advances to her and
one of her colleagues on several occasions.
The decision of the {Regierungsprasident} was based on the
following provisions of the Trade and Business Act:
Article 30 para. 1
"A person running a private clinic, maternity home or mental
hospital requires an authorisation from the higher administrative
authority. The authorisation may be refused only:
(a) if the facts show that the said person cannot be relied on
properly to conduct and manage the institution;
..."
Article 53 para. 2
"The licences ... mentioned in [Article] 30 ... may be
withdrawn ... only:
1. ...
2. if it subsequently appears that the person running the
institution does not possess the qualifications required for the
grant of the licence ... or that the premises or technical
equipment of the institution no longer satisfy the requirements
for the grant of the authorisation.
..."
28. On 13 July 1967, the applicant filed an objection which was
rejected by the {Regierungsprasident} on 6 October. Dr. {Konig}
then appealed, on 9 November, to the Frankfurt Administrative
Court, the case being assigned on the following day of its 4th
Chamber which is competent to hear disputes relating to the law on
trade and business activities.
These appeals had the effect of suspending enforcement of the
decision complained of.
29. As early as 10 November, the court asked the
{Regierungsprasident} for his observations; it received them on 8
February 1968, after extending the time granted and sending a
reminder.
The {Regierungsprasident} was requested on 27 March to supply
further information and he submitted a written pleading on 30 May.
He indicated therein that the applicant was to undergo a
psychiatric examination whose results would be forwarded to the
court later. The court asked the {Regierungsprasident} about this
on 10 June, 25 July and 9 August; he supplemented his earlier
observations but told the court on 10 January 1969 that the
applicant had not agreed to be so examined.
On 16 January, the court asked the {Regierungsprasident} to
clarify a point in his pleading; this clarification was received
by the court on 2 April.
30. In the meantime and until January 1969, the court had tried
to obtain from, notably, the {Regierungsprasident} (10 June 1968)
and the competent local authorities (10 October), the addresses of
several persons who might be called as witnesses.
The court also endeavoured, as from 8 January 1969, to procure
files on the applicant, including those of the professional
tribunals (see paragraph 16 above).
On 26 August 1969, the court decided to hear sixteen witnesses
at sittings fixed for 25 and 26 November. For this purpose, it
tried, for example on 11 and 18 September, to obtain the addresses
of witnesses and requested the production of other files
concerning Dr. {Konig}.
On 27 November, the court fixed 2 December as the date for the
oral hearing ({mundliche} Verhandlung) and for the continuation of
the taking of evidence from the witnesses, including a certain Mr.
Xymenes who had made serious accusations against Dr. {Konig}
before the Regional Medical Society.
The court sat on 2, 8 and 12 December. It imposed fines
(Ordnungsstrafen) of DM 100 and DM 500 on Mr. Xymenes for failing
to appear.
On 3 February 1970, the court decided not to hear the appeals
(Beschwerden) made by Mr. Xymenes against these penalties on 30
December 1969 and 2 January 1970 and to transmit the file to the
Hessen Administrative Court of Appeal. On 17 February, the latter
court invited those concerned to present their observations and it
set aside the two fines on 9 and 10 March.
31. On 17 April 1970, the file was returned to the
Administrative Court which, on 14 May, informed the parties of the
state of the proceedings. It asked them to indicate as soon as
possible what evidence they proposed to put forward, pointing out
that several persons had offered to make statements on the medical
treatment given to them by the applicant. The court also stated
that, as far as it was concerned, the hearings could be resumed at
the end of June or the beginning of July since the lay judges
would be available then.
On 29 May, Dr. {Konig} indicated that he would abstain from
nominating further witnesses if the {Regierungsprasident} did
likewise. However, on 8 June, the latter named a certain number of
additional witnesses and, on 6 July, he filed with the court a
pleading dealing with the evidence taken so far.
This pleading was sent by the court on 13 July to the applicant
for his comments; on 24 September, he requested in writing that
seventy-six witnesses be heard should the court decide to hear
those mentioned by the {Regierungsprasident}.
There followed a further exchange of pleadings.
32. On 25 February 1971, the {Regierungsprasident} informed the
court that Mr. Xymenes was detained in prison at Constance and
could accordingly be served with a summons to appear.
After advising the applicant, the court wrote on 14 April to
the competent authorities in Constance to enquire whether Mr.
Xymenes was being held in the prison and, if so, for how long. The
prison replied on 27 April that the witness had been released.
33. On 29 April 1971, the judge acting as rapporteur directed
that the file be sent back to the President of the Chamber to
enable him to fix the date of the hearing, but this instruction
was not carried out, probably due to a mistake on the part of the
registry.
On 24 May, Mr. Schmidt-Leichner of Frankfurt announced that he
was no longer acting as Dr. {Konig's} lawyer.
34. The applicant, who on 26 August 1971 had asked the court to
fix the date for the hearing without delay, was told on 2
September that the file would be submitted to the President of the
Chamber immediately he returned from holiday. An order of the
court set 5 September as the date for such submission.
On 20 October, Messrs. Bossi, Breme and Ufer of Munich told the
court that they were now acting for Dr. {Konig}.
Following receipt of a letter from the Frankfurt Regional
Employment Tribunal (Landesarbeitsgericht), the file was returned
to the judge acting as rapporteur on 21 October.
35. On 29 November 1971 and 12 January 1972, the court
attempted yet again, but without success, to contact Mr. Xymenes
to discover whether he would be able to give evidence in
January/February or in February/March 1972.
On 21 February, the court fixed 28 March as the date for a
hearing to which it summoned Mr. Xymenes. He did not appear and on
29 March was fined DM 500 by the court which also ordered him to
attend a further hearing due to be held on 31 May.
Relying on a medical certificate, Mr. Xymenes on 8 April lodged
an objection against this penalty but the court dismissed the
objection and sent the file to the Hessen Administrative Court of
Appeal. On 26 April, the latter court asked the witness's doctor
to supply further details about the said certificate: it received
them on 2 May and set the fine aside on 18 May.
The file was returned on 29 May to the Administrative Court
which on the same day cancelled the hearing fixed for 31 May, on
the ground that the presence of Mr. Xymenes could not be secured.
Pursuant to an order of 7 June 1972, there was a further
hearing on 11 July. Once again, Mr. Xymenes did not appear.
On 13 July, the Court fined him DM 500. On 10 August, it
directed that the taking of evidence would continue on 19
September. On 22 August, it issued a subpoena against Mr. Xymenes
who gave evidence on 19 September.
36. At the conclusion of this last sitting, the court granted
the parties the faculty of submitting, by 15 October, their
written observations on the result of the examination of
witnesses. Dr. {Konig} took advantage of this on 13 October.
On 14 November, other lawyers informed the court that they had
been instructed by the applicant and requested it to await their
written pleading. This document, which arrived on 12 February
1973, commented on the evidence already obtained, repeated the
earlier applications for evidence to be taken and made new
applications therefor. On the same day, Mr. Demme announced that
he was Dr. {Konig's} new lawyer. The court transmitted the
pleading to the {Regierungsprasident} on 22 February.
In the meantime, on 30 January, the court had requested Dr.
{Konig} to produce his records on two of his former patients.
Having received only photocopies of the documents in question, the
court renewed its request on 22 February and tried to trace a
further witness.
37. On 30 March 1973, the court supplemented its order of 26
August 1969 (see paragraph 30 above) and fixed 17 April as the
date for the continuation of the taking of evidence and for the
oral hearing. At the close of its sitting on 17 April, it
indicated that it would give a decision on 8 May.
However, after trying to obtain witnesses' addresses and taking
cognisance, on 18 April, of another written pleading from the
applicant, the court on 2 May adjourned sine die the date for
delivery of its decision; at the same time and also subsequently,
it requested Dr. {Konig} to supply further information, which was
received on 14 May and 9 July. Between these dates, the court also
had researches made for the addresses of several witnesses.
The parties supplemented their pleadings on 26 and 30 July
1973.
38. On 16 August 1973, the court decided that there should be a
second additional enquiry and, in particular, the hearing of five
new witnesses. On the next day, it sent the file to the Bad
Kissingen District Court (Amtsgericht) for it to hear one of those
witnesses; on 20 August, it directed that the three others should
be heard on 21 September but, on 22 August, postponed this to 5
October at Dr. {Konig's} request. When the file came back from Bad
Kissingen, the court on 19 September asked the Altena District
Court to hear another witness.
39. Previously, on 22 August, the applicant had filed with the
Hessen Minister of Justice a disciplinary complaint
(Dienstaufsichtsbeschwerde) in which he also declared that he
challenged "the Frankfurt Administrative Court". For this reason,
on 3 October, the court cancelled the hearing due to take place
two days later.
On 4 October, the 3rd Chamber of the Administrative Court,
which appeared to have jurisdiction in the matter, asked Dr.
{Konig} to specify which of the judges he was challenging,
pointing out that it was not possible to challenge all the members
of a Chamber.
The applicant replied on 19 October that his claim was limited
to the judge of the 4th Chamber acting as rapporteur and that he
objected to certain wording used by the latter in the letters
rogatory sent on 19 September to the Altena District Court.
On the same day, Mr. Schilling, acting on behalf of Dr.
{Konig}, complained about the length of the proceedings to the
Federal Constitutional Court. The Administrative Court was invited
on 31 October to present its observations and it did so on 9
November, transmitting the file to the Constitutional Court on 15
November. The latter, by a decision of 28 November, refused to
hear the complaint on the ground that it did not offer sufficient
prospects of success.
Following the return of the file on 10 December, the
Administrative Court on 8 January 1974 upheld the challenge
against the judge acting as rapporteur.
40. The file was then transmitted by the Administrative Court
to the Hessen Minister of Justice to enable him to give a decision
on the disciplinary complaint; he received the file on 14 January
1974 and returned it on 8 March. On 22 March, the court sent the
file to the Hagen public prosecutor's department
(Staatsanwaltschaft) as requested by it and by the President of
the Regional Court (Landgericht) of the same town, who needed it
in order to examine another disciplinary complaint by Dr. {Konig}.
41. On 26 April 1974, the applicant asked the Administrative
Court not to hear a witness who it was contemplated should be
summoned. This request was repeated on 28 May but rejected on 6
June by the court which decided to hold a hearing on 30 July.
Only some of the witnesses appeared on that day. One was heard
at home on 14 August and another gave evidence in writing.
On 14 August, the file was sent to the Hessen Minister of
Justice for the purposes of the proceedings instituted by Dr.
{Konig} on 3 July 1973 before the Commission. On this occasion,
the President of the 4th Chamber made known his observations on
the outcome of the court's enquiry; he was of the opinion that the
partly contradictory statements of the witnesses did not allow a
firm conclusion to be drawn on the applicant's activities as
manager of the clinic; accordingly, the question arose whether his
conduct as a medical practitioner also had to be taken into
account; however, it was not for the 4th Chamber to rule on the
complaints against Dr. {Konig} in this last-mentioned capacity
since they were the object of proceedings pending before the 2nd
Chamber.
42. On 25 August, the applicant submitted observations on the
statements made by one witness and applied for seven further
witnesses to be heard. A copy of this pleading, which the court
had requested from him on 28 August, was sent on 5 September to
the {Regierungsprasident} who replied on 7 October.
The Hessen Minister of Justice returned the file to the
Administrative Court on 28 October.
43. The court had previously been advised that in July the
applicant had entrusted his case to another lawyer, Mr. Unruh. The
latter returned the brief on 26 November and his successor Mr.
Heldmann, who had given notice on 18 October 1974 that he was
acting for Dr. {Konig}, did likewise on 21 February 1975.
44. On 10 February 1975, the President of the 4th Chamber had a
meeting with the applicant who stated that he had let the clinic
premises for use as an old people's home and would re-open the
clinic - in association with a surgeon - only after being
authorised to practise again. Furthermore, he agreed that priority
be given to the proceedings, pending before the 2nd Chamber,
concerning the exercise by him of his profession.
45. The file was sent on 5 May to the Hessen Minister of
Justice for the purpose of the Commission proceedings. It was
returned to the court on 26 June and then communicated on 4 July
to Dr. {Konig's} new lawyer, Mr. Cartus of Karlsruhe, who on 16
April had indicated that he had been instructed. The Court had
allowed him two weeks to consult the file and, on 11 July,
extended this period to 8 August.
However, on 18 July, Dr. {Konig} informed the court that he had
withdrawn Mr. Cartus' instructions and requested that he be asked
to return the file which Dr. {Konig} wished to study himself. The
court communicated on 21 July with the lawyer who returned the
file on 29 July.
On 1, 4 and 11 August, the applicant and his new lawyer, Mr.
Mattern, who acted for him from 22 July to 14 August, requested
the court to send them certain documents, including verbatim
records of evidence, two of which were despatched to them on 18
August.
From 11 to 23 September, the file was with Mr. Unruh who, since
11 September, had once again been entrusted with Dr. {Konig's}
case.
46. On 6 November 1975, there was added to the file a second
challenge lodged by the applicant with the Hessen Minister of
Justice on 10 October (see also paragraph 67 below).
On 2 December, the President of the Chamber wrote to Dr.
{Konig} to enquire whether his intention was to challenge the
members of the Chamber on the ground of bias and, if so, which
members.
As regards the duration of the proceedings, the President
remarked:
"I wish to point out that we have repeatedly talked about the
expediency of continuing the proceedings concerning the
authorisation to run a clinic and pending before the 4th Chamber.
On those occasions you agreed with me that it was necessary first
of all to await the conclusion of the proceedings relative to the
authorisation to practise medicine because they had to be regarded
as having priority. You also mentioned that you would not re-open
your clinic before that date although in law you would be entitled
to do so. Should you have changed your mind, please let me know."
Dr. {Konig's} lawyer replied on 8 December that the claim
related primarily to the President of the 2nd Chamber and the
manner in which the last hearing before that Chamber had been
conducted. He requested the court not to decide, for the time
being, whether his client was challenging the 4th Chamber.
On the subject of the duration of the proceedings, the lawyer
declared:
"The question of the conclusion of the proceedings concerning
the authorisation to practise medicine has at present priority
because in those proceedings immediate enforcement of the
administrative decision has been ordered. It is known that there
is no order for immediate enforcement of the decision to withdraw
the authorisation to run the clinic; consequently, as regards the
last two sentences in your letter of 2 December 1975, there is at
present no need for the 4th Chamber of the Frankfurt-on-Main
Administrative Court to give an early decision."
The applicant withdrew Mr. Unruh's instructions on 25 April
1976.
47. The proceedings before the 4th Chamber accordingly remained
suspended and were resumed only after the 2nd Chamber had
delivered judgment on 9 June 1976.
Hearings, which originally had been arranged for 17 May 1977
and were then postponed at the applicant's request, took place in
June.
On 22 June 1977, the 4th Chamber dismissed the applicant's
appeal against the withdrawal of the authorisation to run his
clinic. Its judgment was based on the evidence taken during the
hearing of seventeen witnesses between November 1969 and August
1974.
Dr. {Konig} appealed to the Hessen Administrative Court of
Appeal where the case is still pending before the Chamber (Senat)
which, on 2 May 1978, ruled on his appeal against the judgment of
the 2nd Chamber of the Administrative Court (see paragraph 69
below).
Another lawyer, Mr. Hofferbert of Frankfurt, is representing
the applicant before the Administrative Court of Appeal.
48. According to statistics supplied by the Government, purely
by way of indication, concerning the action before the 4th
Chamber, 1,149 days of the proceedings are attributable to
measures taken by the court, 1,725 to measures taken by the
applicant and his lawyers and 555 to measures taken by third
parties, including the defendant administrative authorities, the
professional bodies and the witnesses.
3. The withdrawal of the authorisation
to practise medicine - proceedings before the 2nd
Chamber of the Frankfurt Administrative Court
49. On 12 May 1971, the {Regierungsprasident} in Darmstadt
withdrew the applicant's authorisation to practise medicine and
directed that this decision should have immediate effect (Article
80 para. 2, sub-paragraph no. 4, of the Code of Administrative
Procedure - Verwaltungsgerichtsordnung). On the basis of the
findings made by the professional tribunals in 1964 and 1970 (see
paragraph 16 above), the {Regierungsprasident} considered that Dr.
{Konig} had behaved in a manner which disclosed his professional
unfitness and his failure to meet medical ethical standards. The
{Regierungsprasident} was acting in pursuance of the following
provisions of the Federal Act:
Article 5 para. 2
"The authorisation to practise medicine shall be withdrawn if
one of the requirements of Article 3 para. 1, first sentence, sub-
paragraph no. 2, ceases to be satisfied."
Article 3 para. 1
"The authorisation to practise medicine shall be granted on
request provided the applicant:
1. ...
2. has not been guilty of behaviour showing that he is unfit or
unreliable to exercise the profession ..."
50. On 1 June 1971, at the request of the applicant and in
order to allow him to refer his patients to other practitioners,
the Frankfurt Administrative Court restored the suspensive effect
of the objection against the decision of the
{Regierungsprasident}, but only until 30 June. The appeal lodged
by Dr. {Konig} against this ruling was dismissed by the Hessen
Administrative Court of Appeal on 6 July.
51. After the {Regierungsprasident} had rejected on 17
September 1971 the objection filed by the applicant on 18 May
against the withdrawal decision, the latter appealed to the
Darmstadt Administrative Court on 20 October 1971. For reasons of
jurisdiction, this court on 25 October referred the case to the
Frankfurt Administrative Court where it was assigned to the 2nd
Chamber which is responsible, inter alia, for questions relating
to the law on the medical profession.
52. On 2 November 1971, the Frankfurt Administrative Court
notified the {Regierungsprasident} of the appeal, requesting his
comments and production of the files kept by his services.
The written pleading of the {Regierungsprasident} was filed on
24 January 1972 and communicated to the applicant's lawyer two
days later. After being asked by the court on 24 April whether he
intended to submit a reply, the lawyer made an application for the
time-limit to be extended until the end of May.
The reply in question was filed on 26 June and sent to the
{Regierungsprasident} for comment. Following the receipt on 11
July of a voluminous supplementary pleading from the applicant's
lawyer, the {Regierungsprasident} on 27 July sought an extension
until mid-October of the time-limit expiring on 30 July; on 11
August, the court gave leave for the expiry date to be deferred,
but only until 15 September.
53. On 5 September 1972, the court ordered that the Regional
Medical Society be joined (Beiladung) to the proceedings. On 14
September 1972, after requesting the parties and the Regional
Medical Society to furnish certain explanations and after calling
for the production of certain criminal files, the court proposed a
friendly settlement of the case. The suggestion was that Dr.
{Konig} would cease to practise as a self-employed physician and
to run his clinic, whilst the {Regierungsprasident} would restore
his authorisation to exercise his profession subject to certain
conditions. The applicant rejected this proposal on 12 October.
The court advised the {Regierungsprasident} of this four days
later, reminding him at the same time about the submission of his
comments.
54. Those comments were received by the court on 16 January
1973; a written pleading from the Regional Medical Society was
filed on 16 February.
Dr. {Konig} had changed lawyers on 12 February (see paragraph
36 above). His new adviser, Mr. Demme, inspected the court's file,
returning it on 14 March; on 2 May, he also returned the files of
the administrative authorities which the court had at his request
sent to him on 20 March. On 7 May, he submitted a written pleading
which the the court communicated for comment to the
{Regierungsprasident} and the Regional Medical Society.
55. On 5 May and 6 August 1973, the court asked the Frankfurt
District Court and public prosecutor's department for information
as to the state of criminal proceedings instituted against the
applicant on 27 July 1972 (see paragraph 71 below).
On 9 August, the public prosecutor's department advised the
court that, following a hearing held in the meantime, those
proceedings had been stayed because further witnesses and experts
were to be summoned.
56. On 14 September 1973, the President of the Administrative
Court of Appeal sent a copy of the disciplinary complaint of 22
August to the 2nd Chamber which Dr. {Konig} had mentioned when
challenging "the Frankfurt Administrative Court" (see paragraph 39
above).
The file was passed to the 3rd Chamber for it to rule on the
challenge. Together with the file were communicated declarations
made by the members of the 2nd Chamber; in particular, the judge
acting as rapporteur indicated that the 2nd Chamber wished to
await the result of the criminal proceedings in view of their
importance for the question at issue before it.
On 8 October, the 3rd Chamber rejected the challenge on the
ground that the applicant had failed to show prima facie the
existence of justificatory reasons. As soon as this decision had
become final, the file was returned, on 26 October, to the 2nd
Chamber.
57. The court had decided on 25 September 1973 to suspend its
proceedings to await the outcome of the criminal proceedings
instituted against the applicant (see paragraph 71 below) as it
considered that the latter proceedings were of importance for the
action pending before it (Article 94 of the Code of Administrative
Procedure).
58. On 19 October 1973, Dr. {Konig} had complained to the
Constitutional Court of the length of the proceedings pending
before the 2nd and 4th Chambers (see paragraph 39 above). Having
been requested by the Constitutional Court on 31 October to submit
his observations, the President of the 2nd Chamber replied on 6
November that the Chamber proposed to defer its judgment until the
close of the criminal proceedings.
The Constitutional Court decided on 28 November not to allow
the appeal. It observed, inter alia, that, in refusing to fix a
date for the hearing as long as it did not know the result of the
criminal proceedings, the 2nd Chamber had - up to that time -
properly exercised its discretion in the matter. The nine volumes
of the case file had been forwarded to the Constitutional Court on
19 November; they were sent back to the Administrative Court on 10
December.
59. On 16 February 1974, the Frankfurt District Court informed
the 2nd Chamber that, in the criminal proceedings, detailed expert
opinions still had to be obtained and that the trial would not
take place before the second half of the year.
On 26 March, the 2nd Chamber asked the District Court to
confirm that the applicant remained charged, inter alia, with
having continued to practise notwithstanding the withdrawal of the
necessary authorisation.
60. On a further application by Dr. {Konig}, the Constitutional
Court on 11 April 1974 asked the 2nd Chamber for a supplementary
report on the state of the proceedings and, in view of their
duration, for an indication whether he could not be granted some
concessions as regards the immediate enforcement of the
withdrawal.
The President of the 2nd Chamber replied on the same day. She
emphasised that any modification of the decision not to stay such
immediate enforcement would endanger the health of the applicant's
patients if the accusations against him proved to be founded. The
Chamber did not consider that it could take this risk.
Furthermore, judicial experience in no way bore out the opinion
that the accusation that Dr. {Konig} had continued to perform
operations could be verified more swiftly by the Chamber than by
the District Court, but with the same degree of reliability.
On 30 May, the Constitutional Court decided not to hear the
complaint on the ground that it did not offer sufficient prospects
of success. The Administrative Court received a copy of this
decision on 6 June.
61. Previously, on 25 April 1974, the latter court had informed
the applicant that it maintained its decision to await the outcome
of the criminal proceedings.
On 8 May, the District Court had confirmed to the 2nd Chamber
(see paragraph 59 above) that Dr. {Konig} remained charged with
having continued to practise after the withdrawal of his
authorisation; it had added that a decision within the next six
months was hardly likely since the applicant had challenged one of
the judges and extensive appellate proceedings were in progress.
62. On 11 July 1974, Dr. {Konig}, pleading the length of the
proceedings, requested the Administrative Court to restore the
suspensive effect of his appeal against the withdrawal decision.
However, the file was sent to the Hessen Minister of Justice
who had asked for it on 29 July for the purposes of the Commission
proceedings; it was returned to the court on 24 October after the
Government's observations on admissibility had been filed in
Strasbourg.
Between 11 July and 24 October, the applicant had changed his
advisers twice (see paragraph 43 above); until 16 December the
file was retained for consultation by Mr. Heldmann, the second of
the lawyers so appointed.
63. On 3 January 1975, the 2nd Chamber rejected the request of
11 July 1974. Dr. {Konig}, who had withdrawn instructions from his
lawyer (see paragraph 43 above), at once appealed in person to the
Hessen Administrative Court of Appeal but it dismissed the
application on 4 November. The court, relying on the statements
made by witnesses during the proceedings before the 2nd Chamber,
took the view that, if the applicant were authorised to practise,
he might endanger any clients who consulted him. Dr. {Konig} had
previously attacked the decision of the 2nd Chamber before the
Federal Constitutional Court which, on account of non-exhaustion
of remedies, had declined to hear his application.
64. After the return of the file to the Administrative Court on
26 June 1975, the President of the 2nd Chamber and the judge
acting as rapporteur agreed on 30 June, in order to expedite
matters, not to wait any longer for the result of the criminal
proceedings or of the action before the Administrative Court of
Appeal. They contemplated holding hearings on 3 September.
The judge acting as rapporteur made, also on 30 June, enquiries
of the District Court about the state of those criminal
proceedings.
On 10 July 1975, the Constitutional Court decided not to hear a
further complaint filed on Dr. {Konig's} behalf by Mr. von
Stackelberg and objecting, inter alia, to the dilatory nature of
the proceedings. It considered, amongst other things, that the
special features of the case, from both a factual and a legal
point of view, and the applicant's unfitness to practise, which
had been conclusively found by the Regional Tribunal for the
Medical Profession, justified the 2nd Chamber's awaiting the
decision in the criminal proceedings and maintaining the immediate
effect of the withdrawal of the authorisation. The court added
that, furthermore, nothing prevented Dr. {Konig} from seeking,
principally on the ground of the length of the proceedings,
restoration of the suspensive effect of the appeal against the
said withdrawal.
65. On 14 July 1975, the 2nd Chamber decided that on 2 and 3
September there would be a sitting devoted to the hearing of
evidence and of argument. The parties were informed of this
decision two days later.
On 28 and 31 July, the Chamber had researches made for the
addresses of some witnesses. On 14 August, it was advised that Mr
Mattern, the lawyer instructed by Dr. {Konig} on 22 July (see
paragraph 45 above), was no longer acting for him. Six days later,
the applicant filed a pleading, the {Regierungsprasident} having
submitted one on 14 August.
66. The hearing did take place on 2 and 3 September 1975. After
hearing six witnesses, the court directed that there should be a
further sitting on 12 November, but it cancelled this on 14
October as the file was with the Hessen Administrative Court of
Appeal which had to rule on the appeal of 3 January (see paragraph
63 above).
67. Dr. {Konig}, in a letter of 10 October received on 13
October by the Hessen Ministry of Justice, had sought the transfer
to another court of the actions pending before the 2nd and 4th
Chambers whose judges, he alleged, could "no longer be described
as impartial".
The letter was sent on 16 October by the Minister to the
Frankfurt Administrative Court and was put before the 2nd and 4th
Chambers on 6 November (see also paragraph 46 above).
On 13 November, the President of the 2nd Chamber wrote to the
applicant to enquire whether a formal challenge was being made;
the lawyer, Mr. Unruh, who from 11 September 1975 to 25 April 1976
once again acted for Dr. {Konig} (see paragraphs 45 and 46 above),
replied on 6 December that his client was challenging the
President herself. He also asked to be allowed to consult the
file; this was held at his disposal at the registry until 13
January 1976 but he did not go to collect it there.
On the last-mentioned date, the file was sent to the Hessen
Ministry of Justice for the purposes of the proceedings pending
before the Commission. It came back on 17 February to the court
which, on 5 March, rejected the challenge.
68. On 15 April 1976, the 2nd Chamber decided that it would
hear further witnesses on 12 May.
On 28 April, it refused an adjournment requested on 24 April by
Dr. {Konig's} lawyer and emphasised that his client had insisted
on the urgency of a decision.
Having been told by the applicant on the following day that
there would be hearings in the criminal case on 12 May, the
Chamber agreed on 6 May to postpone its own sitting until 9 June.
On 1 June, the applicant sought a further adjournment,
maintaining that on 9 June he had to prepare for the hearings
which were to resume in the criminal court on the next day. The
2nd Chamber, having found that he had had sufficient time for
preparation, refused the request on 9 June.
69. On 9 June 1976, after hearing witnesses, the court
dismissed Dr. {Konig's} appeal against the withdrawal of his
authorisation to practise medicine. Its judgment was based on the
statements of eight persons heard by it in 1975, most of whom had
already given evidence about the same facts before the 4th
Chamber, and was communicated on 3 August to the applicant, whose
laywer lodged an appeal on 11 August.
On 13 August, the court sent the file to the Hessen
Administrative Court of Appeal which, by judgment of 2 May 1978,
dismissed the appeal; this judgment has not yet become final.
70. According to statistics supplied by the Government, purely
by way of indication, concerning the action before the 2nd
Chamber, 569 days of the proceedings are attributable to measures
taken by the court, 841 to measures taken by the applicant and his
lawyers and 311 to measures taken by third parties, including the
defendant administrative authorities, the professional bodies and
the witnesses.
4. The criminal proceedings against the applicant
71. The criminal proceedings against the applicant are not in
issue but should be mentioned because of their effect on the
action before the 2nd Chamber of the Frankfurt Administrative
Court which had postponed its decision pending their outcome (see
paragraphs 55 - 61 and 64 above).
The criminal proceedings originated in a complaint against Dr.
{Konig} relative to the illegal practice of medicine, causing
bodily harm and committing fraud, which the {Regierungsprasident}
in Darmstadt had lodged on 27 July 1972 with the Frankfurt public
prosecutor's department.
72. The applicant, who on 10 August 1972 had refused to be
questioned by the police, was charged on 11 September before the
Frankfurt District Court, sitting as a lay magistrates' court
({Schoffengericht}). The indictment (Anklageschrift) alleged that,
between September 1971 and the beginning of June 1972, he had
continued to practise despite the withdrawal of the requisite
authorisation (continuing breach of the Federal Medical
Practitioners' Act), that he had thereby perpetrated frauds
(Article 263 of the Penal Code) and that he had caused, in one
case, serious bodily harm (Articles 223 and 223 (a) of the Penal
Code).
73. At the close of its sitting on 17 April 1973, the court
ordered numerous enquiries. A psychiatrist and a psychologist gave
their opinion on one of the alleged victims; he was the only
alleged victim called by the public prosecutor's department as a
witness and had intervened ({Nebenklager}) in the proceedings on
13 November 1972 in order to claim damages.
74. On 14 February 1974, the court decided that, if by 20 April
Dr. {Konig} had not himself submitted an expert opinion on the
state of his mental health, he should be examined by a
psychiatrist.
On 1 March, the applicant lodged an objection against this
decision and that of 17 April 1973. On 14 March, he stated that he
was challenging the President of the lay magistrates' court; after
a judge had refused this plea on 6 May, both he and the President
were challenged by Dr. {Konig} on 15 May.
On 26 May, the District Court dismissed the objection and the
challenge and directed that the private expert opinion be
submitted not later than 1 August.
75. Two days later, Dr. {Konig} repeated his objection of 1
March and at the same time lodged a disciplinary complaint against
the President of the lay magistrates' court. The Frankfurt
Regional Court dismissed the objection on 10 June 1974; the
documents do not disclose the result of the disciplinary
complaint.
76. On 29 June, Dr. {Konig} challenged the expert nominated by
the court and proposed two others. He supplemented this
application on 3 July and appealed to the Federal Constitutional
Court against the decisions of 14 February and 26 May. On the next
day, he requested the District Court to suspend enforcement of the
first decision until the Constitutional Court had given its
ruling. On 16 July, the District Court declined to do so and, nine
days later, it received a copy of the Constitutional Court's
decision rejecting the appeal of 3 July.
On 7 August, the court dismissed an application by Dr. {Konig}
for a further psychiatric examination of the party claiming
damages.
77. On 15 August 1974, the District Court, considering that the
potential penalty exceeded that which it had competence to impose,
relinquished jurisdiction in favour of the Frankfurt Regional
Court.
Under the then Article 24 para. 2 of the Constitution of the
Courts Act (Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz), a District Court could
"impose neither a penalty of imprisonment for more than three
years nor detention for reasons of security
(Sicherungsverwahrung)".
78. On 10 October, the 18th Criminal Chamber (Strafkammer) of
the Regional Court, to which the case had been assigned, directed
that the trial (Hauptverhandlung) should take place on 4, 6 and 11
December. On 25 October, it joined to the pending proceedings a
further charge, preferred by the public prosecutor's department on
7 August, alleging that Dr. {Konig} had practised on 17 July 1972
in Bad Homburg despite the withdrawal of the requisite
authorisation and had caused his patient bodily harm. As the
applicant had not appeared, the court on 4 December issued a
warrant for his arrest and adjourned the trial sine die.
79. On 1 January 1975, the case was assigned to the 1st Chamber
which, however, was composed of the same judges as the 18th
Chamber in 1974.
On 2 January, the 1st Chamber ordered that several witnesses be
examined on letters rogatory. Witnesses were heard in February and
March by the Koblenz, Ahrensburg and {Dusseldorf} District Courts.
On 24 March, the Chamber revoked the warrant issued on 4
December.
On 15 May, the Vice-President of the Chamber directed that the
trial should take place in mid-January 1976; at the same time he
ordered that a witness be interrogated again by the Ahrensburg
District Court.
80. On 20 June 1975, the Presidential Council of the Regional
Court relieved the 1st Chamber of all matters it had to decide as
a court of first instance, with effect from 23 June. The
proceedings pending against Dr. {Konig} were transferred to the
13th Chamber.
The President of the latter Chamber received the case file on
10 July. On 8 August, he postponed the trial until 3, 5, 10 and 12
February 1976; these dates he cancelled on 13 October 1975 for the
reason that the Chamber was obliged to deal with another
substantial case.
81. On 1 January 1976, all first-instance cases beginning with
the letter "K", including the applicant's, were passed to the 25th
Chamber of the Regional Court in accordance with the 1976
arrangements for the allocation of cases.
The trial opened before the 25th Chamber on 5 May. On 24
September, after twenty-three days of sittings, the Chamber
ordered the discontinuance of the proceedings (Einstellung des
Verfahrens) under Article 153 (a) of the Code of Criminal
Procedure.
The Chamber's decision reveals that Dr. {Konig's} fault was
regarded as very slight. As he had undertaken to pay DM 8,000 to
the party claiming damages and DM 20,000 to the Treasury, the
Chamber considered that there was no longer any public interest in
the proceedings being pursued further. The Chamber noted that the
applicant had paid over the amounts in question during the actual
hearing and specified that its decision to discontinue the
proceedings was final.
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION
82. In the application which he lodged with the Commission on 3
July 1973, Dr. {Konig} complained of the dilatory nature of the
proceedings before the Frankfurt Administrative Court and claimed
that he was the victim of a violation of Article 6 (art. 6) of the
Convention.
The Commission declared the application admissible on 27 May
1975.
83. In its report of 14 December 1976, the Commission expressed
the opinion:
- by ten votes to six, that Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) of the
Convention was applicable to the rights claimed by the applicant
before the administrative courts;
- by nine votes to six, with one abstention, that in the
instant case there was a violation of Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1)
of the Convention.
The report contains various separate opinions.
FINAL SUBMISSIONS MADE TO THE COURT
84. In her memorial of 18 July 1977, the Agent of the
Government submitted as follows:
"I would ... at this stage limit my request to asking the Court
to hold
that Article 6 para. 1, first sentence (art. 6-1), of the
Convention is not applicable to the administrative court
proceedings brought by the applicant against the withdrawal of the
authorisation to practise medicine and against the withdrawal of
the authorisation to run a private clinic and that the Federal
Republic of Germany has accordingly not violated the Convention in
the said proceedings".
At the oral hearing on 16 November 1977, the Agent of the
Government requested the Court to hold
"that the Federal Republic of Germany has not violated Article
6 (art. 6) of the Convention".
AS TO THE LAW
1. On the alleged violation of Article 6
para. 1 (art. 6-1) of the Convention
85. The Court recalls that neither the disciplinary proceedings
against Dr. {Konig} - which in the event took place before the
professional tribunals - nor the criminal proceedings instituted
against him are in issue in the present case (see paragraph 18
above).
The applicant complains of the length of the actions he brought
before the Frankfurt Administrative Court (see paragraph 18
above). He alleges that there has been a violation of Article 6
para. 1 (art. 6-1) of the Convention which provides:
"In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of
any criminal charges against him, everyone is entitled to a fair
and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and
impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be
pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from
all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order
or national security in a democratic society, where the interests
of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties
so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of
the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice
the interests of justice."
The Court has therefore to decide whether Article 6 para. 1
(art. 6-1) is applicable in the present case and, if so, whether
the criterion of a "reasonable time" appearing in that Article
(art. 6-1) was respected in each of the two sets of judicial
proceedings concerned.
(a) On the applicability of Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) of the
Convention
86. The majority of the Commission is of the opinion that
Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) is applicable to the rights claimed
by the applicant before the Frankfurt Administrative Court, namely
the right to run his clinic and the right to exercise his
profession of medical practitioner; it considers these rights to
be "civil". The majority is divided into two groups which reach
the same conclusion, albeit for different reasons.
The correctness of this opinion is disputed by the Government.
87. The Court notes at the outset that, as is not contested,
under the legislation of the State concerned the actions brought
by the applicant before the German courts concern "rights". The
difference of view between Commission and Government relates only
to the question whether the present case involves disputes
("contestations") over civil rights within the meaning of Article
6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) of the Convention.
88. Both the Commission and the Government agree that the
concept of "civil rights and obligations" cannot be interpreted
solely by reference to the domestic law of the respondent State.
The problem of the "autonomy" of the meaning of the expressions
used in the Convention, compared with their meaning in domestic
law, has already been raised before the Court on several
occasions. Thus, it has decided that the word "charge" appearing
in Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) has to be understood "within the
meaning of the Convention" (Neumeister judgment of 27 June 1968,
Series A no. 8, p. 41, para. 18, as compared with the second sub-
paragraph on p. 28 and the first sub-paragraph on p. 35; see also
Wemhoff judgment of 27 June 1968, Series A no. 7, pp. 26 - 27,
para. 19; Ringeisen judgment of 16 July 1971, Series A no. 13, p.
45 para. 110; Engel and others judgment of 8 June 1976, Series A
no. 22, p. 34 para. 81). The Court has also recognised, in the
context of the case of Engel and others, the "autonomy" of the
concept of "criminal" within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1
(art. 6-1) (above-mentioned Engel and others judgment, p. 34,
para. 81). Again, the Court has already acknowledged, implicitly,
that the concept of "civil rights and obligations" is autonomous
(above-mentioned Ringeisen judgment, p. 39, para. 94).
The Court confirms this case-law on the present occasion.
Hence, it considers that the same principle of autonomy applies to
the concept in question; any other solution might lead to results
incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention (see,
mutatis mutandis, the above-mentioned Engel and others judgment,
p. 34, para. 81).
89. Whilst the Court thus concludes that the concept of "civil
rights and obligations" is autonomous, it nevertheless does not
consider that, in this context, the legislation of the State
concerned is without importance. Whether or not a right is to be
regarded as civil within the meaning of this expression in the
Convention must be determined by reference to the substantive
content and effects of the right - and not its legal
classification - under the domestic law of the State concerned. In
the exercise of its supervisory functions, the Court must also
take account of the object and purpose of the Convention and of
the national legal systems of the other Contracting States (see,
mutatis mutandis, the above-mentioned Engel and others judgment,
p. 35, para. 82).
90. The Government submit that Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1)
covers private-law disputes in the traditional sense, that is
disputes between individuals or between an individual and the
State to the extent that the latter had been acting as a private
person, subject to private law; amongst other things, disputes
between an individual and the State acting in its sovereign
capacity would be excluded from the ambit of that Article (art. 6-
1).
As regards the field of application of Article 6 para. 1 (art.
6-1), the Court held in its Ringeisen judgment of 16 July 1971
that "for Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) to be applicable to a case
("contestation") it is not necessary that both parties to the
proceedings should be private persons .... The wording of Article
6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) is far wider; the French expression
"contestations sur (des) droits et obligations de {caractere}
civil" covers all proceedings the result of which is decisive for
private rights and obligations. The English text, "determination
of ... civil rights and obligations", confirms this
interpretation. The character of the legislation which governs how
the matter is to be determined ... and that of the authority which
is invested with jurisdiction in the matter ... are therefore of
little consequence" (Series A no. 13, p. 39, para. 94).
If the case concerns a dispute between an individual and a
public authority, whether the latter had acted as a private person
or in its sovereign capacity is therefore not conclusive.
Accordingly, in ascertaining whether a case ("contestation")
concerns the determination of a civil right, only the character of
the right at issue is relevant.
91. The Court recalls firstly that the applicant's appeals
before the German administrative courts do not concern the right
to be authorised to run a clinic and to be authorised to exercise
the medical profession (see paragraphs 20, 21, 28 and 51 above):
in challenging the withdrawal of his authorisations ordered by the
competent authorities, Dr. {Konig} is claiming the right to
continue his professional activities for which he had obtained the
necessary authorisations. If the proceedings before the
administrative courts were successful, the applicant would not be
granted new authorisations: the Court would simply annul the
withdrawal decisions taken by the {Regierungsprasidenten} in
Wiesbaden and Darmstadt (see Article 42 of the German Code of
Administrative Procedure).
Therefore, it remains to be ascertained whether Dr. {Konig's}
right to continue to run a private clinic and his right to
continue to exercise the medical profession are civil rights
within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1).
92. The Court notes that, in the Federal Republic of Germany,
the running of a private clinic is in certain respects a
commercial activity carried on with a view to profit, classified
by German law as a "Gewerbe". This activity is carried on in the
private sector through the conclusion of contracts between the
clinic and its patients and resembles the exercise of a private
right in some ways akin to the right of property. Private clinics
are certainly subject to supervision effected by the authorities
in the public interest in order, inter alia, to protect health;
supervision in the public interest, which moreover exists as a
general rule for all private professional activities in the member
States of the Council of Europe, cannot of itself lead to the
conclusion that the running of a private clinic is a public-law
activity. An activity presenting, under the law of the State
concerned, the character of a private activity cannot
automatically be converted into a public-law activity by reason of
the fact that it is subject to administrative authorisations and
supervision, including if appropriate the withdrawal of
authorisations, provided for by law in the interests of public
order and public health. The Court recalls in this context the
Ringeisen case in which supervision by the public authorities
concerned a contract for sale between private individuals: the
Court nonetheless concluded that the right at issue had a civil
character (above-mentioned judgment, p. 39, para. 94).
93. The medical profession counts, in the Federal Republic of
Germany, among the traditional liberal professions; moreover,
Article 1 para. 2 of the Federal Act expressly so provides (see
paragraph 20 above). Even under the national health scheme, the
medical profession is not a public service: once authorised, the
doctor is free to practise or not, and he provides treatment for
his patients on the basis of a contract made with them. Of course,
besides treating his patients, the medical practitioner, in the
words of the above-mentioned Act, "has the care of the health of
the community as a whole". This responsibility, which the medical
profession bears towards society at large, does not, however,
alter the private character of the medical practitioner's
activity: whilst of great importance from the social point of
view, that responsibility is accessory to his activity and its
equivalent is to be found in other professions whose nature is
undeniably private.
94. In these conditions, it is of little consequence that here
the cases concern administrative measures taken by the competent
bodies in the exercise of public authority. Neither does it appear
pertinent that, under the law of the State concerned, it is for
administrative courts to give the decision on these cases and to
do so in proceedings which leave to the court the responsibility
for the investigation and for the conduct of the trial. All that
is relevant under Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) of the Convention
is the fact that the object of the cases in question is the
determination of rights of a private nature.
95. Since it thus considers the rights affected by the
withdrawal decisions and forming the object of the cases before
the administrative courts to be private rights, the Court
concludes that Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) is applicable, without
it being necessary in the present case to decide whether the
concept of "civil rights and obligations" within the meaning of
that provision extends beyond those rights which have a private
nature.
96. Before the Commission, the applicant claimed, in the
alternative, that, in view of the nature of the complaints which
led to the decisions he contests, he is in reality faced with a
"criminal charge" within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-
1) of the Convention. In its report, the Commission recalled that
it had rejected this claim in its decision on the admissibility of
the application.
The Court notes first of all that this claim by the applicant
related to the same facts as his contention that the actions
before the German courts concerned civil rights. This was
accordingly not a separate complaint but a formal submission or a
mere legal argument. However, once a case is duly referred to it,
the Court may take cognisance of every question of law arising in
the course of the proceedings and concerning facts submitted to
its examination by a Contracting State or by the Commission.
Master of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts,
the Court is empowered to examine them, if it deems it necessary
and if need be ex officio, in the light of the Convention as a
whole (see, inter alia, the judgment of 23 July 1968 on the merits
of the "Belgian Linguistic" case, Series A no. 6, p. 30, para. 1;
the De Wilde, Ooms and Versyp judgment of 18 June 1971, Series A
no. 12, p. 29, para. 49; the Handyside judgment of 7 December
1976, Series A no. 24, p. 20, para. 41; the judgment of 18 January
1978 in the case of Ireland v. the United Kingdom, Series A no.
25, p. 63, para. 157).
However, the Court does not consider that it has to examine
whether in this case paragraph 1 of Article 6 (art. 6-1) is also
relevant under the "criminal charge" head. For, although the
requirements of Article 6 (art. 6) as regards cases
("contestations") concerning civil rights are less onerous than
they are for criminal charges, this difference is of no
consequence here: all proceedings covered by Article 6 (art. 6)
are subject to the requirement of a "reasonable time", whose
observance by the German courts remains to be examined.
(b) On the observance of Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) of the
Convention
97. According to the Commission, the duration of the
proceedings instituted by the applicant before the administrative
courts exceeded the "reasonable time" stipulated by Article 6
para. 1 (art. 6-1) of the Convention. Before the Court, the Agent
of the Government conceded that the length of those proceedings
was a serious matter. She referred, moreover, to certain proposals
under discussion in the Federal Republic of Germany designed to
accelerate the procedure before the administrative courts.
Although she questions whether, in the circumstances of the case,
it is possible to speak of a violation of the Convention, she
leaves it to the Court to assess whether the duration of the
proceedings was reasonable.
98. In order to be able to arrive at a decision, the Court must
first specify the period to be taken into account in the
application of Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1).
According to the Government and the Commission, time starts to
run from the date of the filing of the appeals with the
Administrative Court of first instance. The Court does not share
this view. As the Court stated in its Golder judgment of 21
February 1975, "it is conceivable ... that in civil matters the
reasonable time may begin to run, in certain circumstances, even
before the issue of the writ commencing proceedings before the
court to which the plaintiff submits the dispute" (Series A no.
18, p. 15, para. 32). This is the situation in the applicant's
case, since he could not seise the competent court before having
the lawfulness and the expediency of the impugned administrative
acts examined in preliminary proceedings (Vorverfahren) before the
administrative authority (Article 68 of the German Code of
Administrative Procedure). Consequently, in the present case, the
reasonable time stipulated by Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) starts
to run on the day on which Dr. {Konig} lodged an objection against
the withdrawals of his authorisations.
As regards the period to which Article 6 (art. 6) is
applicable, the Court has held that in criminal matters this
period covers the whole of the proceedings in question, including
appeal proceedings (above-mentioned Wemhoff judgment, pp. 26 and
27, paras. 18 and 20; above-mentioned Neumeister judgment, p. 41,
para. 19; Delcourt judgment of 17 January 1970, Series A no. 11,
pp. 13 - 15, paras. 25 and 26). The position - as, moreover, the
Government concede - is no different in the case of disputes
("contestations") over civil rights and obligations for which
Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) likewise requires that there be - at
first instance, on appeal or in cassation - a determination.
99. The reasonableness of the duration of proceedings covered
by Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) of the Convention must be assessed
in each case according to its circumstances. When enquiring into
the reasonableness of the duration of criminal proceedings, the
Court has had regard, inter alia, to the complexity of the case,
to the applicant's conduct and to the manner in which the matter
was dealt with by the administrative and judicial authorities
(above-mentioned Neumeister judgment, pp. 42-43, paras. 20 - 21;
above-mentioned Ringeisen judgment, p. 45, para. 110). The Court,
like those appearing before it, considers that the same criteria
must serve in the present case as the basis for its examination of
the question whether the duration of the proceedings before the
administrative courts exceeded the reasonable time stipulated by
Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1).
100. Before embarking upon this examination, the Court wishes
to emphasise that it is not its function to express an opinion on
the German system of procedure before administrative courts which,
as the Agent of the Government stated, enjoys a long tradition.
Admittedly, the present system may appear complex on account of
the number of courts and remedies but the Court is not unaware
that the explanation for this situation is to be found in the
eminently praiseworthy concern to reinforce the guarantees of
individual rights. Should these efforts result in a procedural
maze, it is for the State alone to draw the conclusions and, if
need be, to simplify the system with a view to complying with
Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) of the Convention.
(i) The proceedings relative to the withdrawal of the
authorisation to run the clinic
101. These proceedings, which began on 13 July 1967 when the
applicant filed an objection against the withdrawal of the
authorisation (see paragraph 28 above), have still not been
concluded: the Hessen Administrative Court of Appeal has not yet
ruled on Dr. {Konig's} appeal against the judgment of 22 June 1977
of the 4th Chamber of the Frankfurt Administrative Court.
102. It is clearly a matter for serious concern - as the
Government moreover admit - that more than ten years and ten
months have elapsed without a decision on the merits of the case
and that it was necessary to wait for almost ten years for the
judgment at first instance.
It is true - and on this point the Court shares the
Government's opinion - that the 4th Chamber of the Administrative
Court encountered great difficulties in tracing witnesses several
of whom had in the meantime changed name or address (see
paragraphs 30, 32, 35, 36, 37 and 41 above). This applied
particularly to the witness Xymenes whom the Chamber was not able
to hear until thirty-three months after the first summons (see
paragraphs 30, 32 and 35 above). However, the Government in no way
pleaded that the case raised exceptionally complex issues of fact
or of law.
The Court appreciates that there was a certain interrelation
between this action and the action - pending before the 2nd
Chamber of the same court - relative to the withdrawal of the
authorisation to practise, since the applicant's activities as
manager of a clinic were, to a large extent, indistinguishable
from his activities as a medical practitioner. However, this can
scarcely have caused complications. On the contrary, the 4th
Chamber had at its disposal the file of the Regional Tribunal for
the Medical Profession which, on 14 October 1970, had declared Dr.
{Konig} unfit to practise (see paragraphs 16 and 30 above). On
this point the Court notes that the Agent of the Government
herself is of the opinion that better co-ordination between the
two Chambers would have been desirable.
103. On the other hand, the Government laid great weight on the
applicant's behaviour during the proceedings: in their view, Dr.
{Konig} is personally responsible for about half of the length of
the proceedings because of the way in which he organised the
conduct of his case. The Government cited especially the frequent
changes of lawyer, the juxtaposition of various appeals and the
fresh proposals of evidence at different stages.
The repeated changing of lawyers - which was certainly within
Dr. {Konig's} rights - had repercussions on the progress of the
proceedings since the different lawyers inevitably needed some
time to acquaint themselves with the file. It must be borne in
mind that in fact the delays mentioned by the Government do not
total more than a few months (see paragraphs 36 and 45 above). The
Court also observes that Dr. {Konig} did not discharge his first
lawyer until 24 May 1971, that is after nearly four years of
procedure (see paragraph 33 above).
The Court likewise considers that some delays necessarily
resulted from the applicant's various appeals and the overlapping
of proceedings which they occasioned. However, the Court notes
that all those appeals were made after the month of July 1973,
that is after six years of procedure and at a time when Dr.
{Konig} had already been deprived for two years of the
authorisation to practise. In fact, the first of the two
challenges - which, like the second, was included in a
disciplinary complaint and, what is more, was upheld - dates from
22 August 1973 (see paragraph 39 above); it was not until two
years later, that is, on 10 October 1975, that Dr. {Konig} made -
unsuccessfully - the second challenge (see paragraph 46 above).
Nevertheless, even before the decision on the first challenge, the
applicant had, on 19 October 1973, filed with the Federal
Constitutional Court an appeal against the length of the
proceedings of which he had also complained as early as 3 July in
his application to the Commission (see paragraphs 1, 39 and 41
above). Finally, another disciplinary complaint was filed by Dr.
{Konig} with the President of the Hagen District Court in April
1974, that is, before the three 1973 proceedings were terminated
(see paragraph 40 above). Obviously this overlapping did not make
the 4th Chamber's task any easier, although only the challenges of
1973 and 1975 gave rise, in law, to an interruption of its
proceedings in the strict sense.
The Court is also inclined to share the Government's view that,
by tendering fresh evidence after witnesses had been heard, the
applicant put difficulties in the way of the investigation of the
case. The evidence before the Court reveals that, after the order
of 26 August 1969, the hearing of further witnesses was requested
by Dr. {Konig} on 24 September 1970, 12 February 1973 and 25
August 1974 (see paragraphs 31, 36 and 42 above); his first
request was subject to the proviso that he would abandon it if the
{Regierungsprasident} for his part put forward no further
witnesses (see paragraph 31 above). Finally, although the Court
supplemented its order of 26 August 1969 on 30 March and 16 August
1973, only the second of these decisions seems to have led to a
fresh proposal of evidence from Dr. {Konig} (see paragraphs 37, 38
and 42 above).
104. Having regard to the suprising length of the proceedings,
the Court has examined each detail of the 4th Chamber's conduct of
the case.
Although the Court cannot reproach the Chamber for having
insisted on hearing Mr. Xymenes or for having supplemented, after
three years and seven months, its order of 26 August 1969, it
notes, as did the Commission, that the exchange of pleadings with
which the proceedings opened continued until 2 April 1969, that
is, for nearly seventeen months. Apart from the researches for the
addresses of certain witnesses and the request made to the
professional tribunals for their files (see paragraphs 29 and 30
above), the first step in the investigation was not taken until 26
August 1969 when the 4th Chamber made its order on the evidence to
be adduced (see paragraph 30 above). The Commission rightly
stresses, furthermore, that the Chamber waited for seventeen
months before calling for the professional tribunals' files
despite the interrelation of the action before it and the action
relative to the withdrawal of the authorisation to practise.
Again, the despatch of the file to the authorities and courts
to which the applicant had made his various appeals caused
appreciable losses of time (see paragraphs 30, 31, 35, 38, 39, 40,
41, 42 and 45 above). To the extent that it was necessary for the
competent authority to have the complete file at its disposal, it
would have been desirable to consider the possibility of having a
copy made.
It must also be observed that the 4th Chamber decided on 10
February 1975, that is, more than seven years after being seised
of the case, to postpone its judgment until the outcome of the
action relative to the withdrawal of the authorisation to practise
which had been pending for more than three years before the 2nd
Chamber of the same court (see paragraphs 44 and 51 above). This
decision was taken after three orders had been made concerning the
evidence to be adduced by the parties and after the hearing of
numerous witnesses. On this point, the Government admitted that,
with the benefit of hindsight, doubts could arise as to whether
the court properly conducted the enquiry. In fact, the European
Court is unable to discern what the 4th Chamber, which in 1977 was
able to dismiss the applicant's appeal on the basis of evidence
taken between November 1969 and August 1974 (see paragraph 47
above), was expecting from the outcome of the proceedings pending
before the 2nd Chamber. In this connection, the Court recalls that
the latter proceedings had been suspended on 25 September 1973 to
await the outcome of the criminal proceedings and were not resumed
until 30 June 1975. The Court concludes that, in these
circumstances, the 4th Chamber did not have sufficient reason for
prolonging the proceedings in this way, even if account is taken
of the applicant's consent (see paragraphs 44 and 46 above).
105. In an overall assessment of the various factors, the Court
concludes that the delays occasioned by the difficulties in the
investigation and by the applicant's behaviour do not of
themselves justify the length of the proceedings. Without
attaching decisive importance to any one step taken by the 4th
Chamber rather than to another, the Court is in fact of the
opinion that the principal reason for the length of the
proceedings is to be found in the conduct of the case. The Court
finds that it would have been possible for the 4th Chamber to
bring the proceedings to an end at an earlier date. Taking into
account the fact that the proceedings began on 13 July 1967 and
ended on 22 June 1977, the Court concludes that the "reasonable
time" stipulated by Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) was exceeded.
The Government stressed that Dr. {Konig's} appeal had the
effect of suspending enforcement of the withdrawal of the
authorisation to run his clinic (see paragraph 28 above) and that
this feature of the proceedings might have been to his advantage.
The Court recognises that this suspensive effect may have a
bearing on the interpretation of the concept of "reasonable time".
However, in view of the total duration of the proceedings and the
prolonged uncertainty in which the applicant found himself, the
Court cannot depart, on the ground of the appeal's suspensive
effect, from the assessment at which it has arrived above.
(ii) The proceedings relative to the withdrawal of the
authorisation to practise
106. These proceedings began on 18 May 1971 when the applicant
lodged his objection against the withdrawal of the authorisation
to practise. The 2nd Chamber of the Frankfurt Administrative Court
gave judgment on 9 June 1976, that is after more than five years
of proceedings, and the Hessen Administrative Court of Appeal on 2
May 1978.
107. Although the length of these particular proceedings is not
as great as that of the action relative to the withdrawal of the
authorisation to run the clinic, it does not appear to the Court
to be less serious.
This action seems less complex than the action before the 4th
Chamber of the Administrative Court: not only did the 2nd Chamber
encounter fewer difficulties as regards the hearing of the
witnesses summoned, but also the enquiry was facilitated by the
fact that, as early as 14 October 1970, the Regional Tribunal for
the Medical Profession had declared Dr. {Konig} unfit to practise
(see paragraph 16 above).
As for the interrelation of the two actions, on which the
Government relied, it should be noted that this could not have
created any complications for the 2nd Chamber: on the contrary, it
was able to profit from the results of the investigation conducted
by the 4th Chamber whose proceedings had already been in progress
for almost four years when Dr. {Konig} challenged the withdrawal
of the authorisation to practise.
108. Dr. {Konig's} behaviour in the action before the 2nd
Chamber differs from his behaviour before the 4th Chamber in but a
few respects.
The Court notes to begin with that the applicant changed lawyer
for the first time on 12 February 1973, that is after sixteen
months of procedure (see paragraph 54 above). Again, he filed two
challenges which, together with those directed against the 4th
Chamber, were included in disciplinary complaints - the first on
22 August 1973 after about two years of procedure, the second on
10 October 1975 (see paragraphs 56 and 67 above). Furthermore, Dr.
{Konig} made three constitutional appeals against the length of
the proceedings, the first on 19 October 1973, the second probably
in April 1974 and the third on 10 July 1975 (see paragraphs 58, 60
and 64 above). Before the first appeal to the Federal
Constitutional Court, he had also complained of the length of the
two actions in his application of 3 July 1973 to the Commission.
As for the manner of tendering his evidence, the applicant does
not seem to have proceeded in the same way as he did before the
4th Chamber.
Nevertheless, Dr. {Konig's} behaviour certainly caused delays.
The Court notes, in particular, that the delays mentioned by the
Government as attributable to the changes of lawyer seem more
important in this action (see paragraphs 54, 62 and 67 above).
109. As regards the procedure followed by the Frankfurt
Administrative Court, failure to join the case relative to the
withdrawal of the authorisation to practise and the case relative
to the withdrawal of the authorisation to run the clinic certainly
prolonged the two actions. The Court observes, moreover, that, in
the appellate proceedings, the two cases were assigned to the same
Chamber of the Hessen Administrative Court of Appeal.
110. Turning next to the conduct of the case by the 2nd Chamber
itself, the Court notes that the Chamber was little concerned to
advance the proceedings.
The first sitting, for the hearing of witnesses and of
argument, was not fixed until 14 July 1975 (see paragraph 65
above). According to the evidence before the Court, the only steps
in the investigation taken by the 2nd Chamber between 25 October
1971, when it was seised, and July 1975 were the request of 2
November 1971 to the {Regierungsprasident} to submit the relevant
files, the order of 5 September 1972 calling for the production of
certain criminal files and the decision of the same date that the
Regional Medical Society be joined to the proceedings (see
paragraphs 52 and 53 above). Admittedly, on 14 September 1972 the
court suggested a friendly settlement of the dispute but less than
a month later Dr. {Konig} rejected this proposal (see paragraph 53
above). In addition, the Court notes, as did the Commission, that
the 2nd Chamber waited more than 10 months before deciding to join
the Regional Medical Society whose requests nevertheless had set
the professional tribunals' proceedings in motion and led to the
withdrawal of the authorisations (see paragraphs 16, 27, 49 and 53
above).
Again, considerable delays were caused by the despatch of the
file to the authorities and courts to which the applicant had made
his various appeals (see paragraphs 56, 58, 62, 64, 66 and 67
above). On this point, the Court refers to its findings in
connection with the proceedings before the 4th Chamber (see
paragraph 104 above).
However, the principal cause of the length of this action is
its suspension - decided on 25 September 1973 and maintained until
30 June 1975 - for the purpose of awaiting the outcome of the
criminal proceedings taken against Dr. {Konig} as early as 27 July
1972.
Although Dr. {Konig's} conviction might have had some relevance
for the investigation of the case pending before the 2nd Chamber,
the Court notes that the charges against the applicant referred to
events which occurred perhaps in part before the decision of the
{Regierungsprasident} on the objection but in any event after the
withdrawal of the authorisation to practise (see paragraphs 49,
51, 71, 72 and 78 above). Again, although the 2nd Chamber enquired
on several occasions about the state of the criminal proceedings,
it did not draw in due time the conclusions from the information
given to it. In fact, the Court observes that the 2nd Chamber knew
as early as 16 February 1974 that the hearings before the criminal
court could not be held before the second half of the year; on 8
May, the latter court had indicated that judgment could hardly be
given within six months, since the applicant had challenged one of
the judges and extensive appellate proceedings had been instituted
(see paragraphs 59 and 61 above). Despite the uncertainties
overshadowing the criminal proceedings, the 2nd Chamber still
delayed for more than a year before deciding, on 30 June 1975, not
to await their outcome any longer.
In the Court's opinion, the 2nd Chamber's suspension of its
proceedings for more than twenty-one months was not justified in
the circumstances of the case.
111. In an overall assessment of the various factors and taking
into account what was at stake in the proceedings, namely, Dr.
{Konig's} whole professional livelihood, the Court considers that,
notwithstanding the delays attributable to the applicant's
behaviour, the investigation of the case was not conducted with
the necessary expedition.
The Court has borne in mind the arguments which the Agent of
the Government based on what she referred to as interim judicial
protection (einstweiliger Rechtsschutz). In fact, the applicant
twice requested, once in 1971 and once in 1974, restoration of the
suspensive effect of his appeal against the withdrawal of the
authorisation to practise (see paragraphs 50, 62 and 63 above).
The 2nd Chamber and subsequently the Hessen Administrative Court
of Appeal rejected these requests in reasoned decisions which
touched on the merits of the case, the proceedings concerning the
second request having, moreover, lasted more than fifteen months
in all. The Court does not exclude the possibility that the
existence of such a procedure may have an incidence on the
assessment of the duration of the principal proceedings. However,
in view of the circumstances noted above, the existence of that
procedure cannot in the present case affect the overall assessment
of the factors taken into account by the Court.
Accordingly, the Court considers that in this case the
"reasonable time" stipulated by Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) of
the Convention was exceeded.
2. On the application of Article 50 (art. 50)
of the Convention
112. Under Article 50 (art. 50) of the Convention, if the Court
finds "that a decision or a measure taken" by any authority of a
Contracting State "is completely or partially in conflict with the
obligations arising from the ... Convention, and if the internal
law of the said [State] allows only partial reparation to be made
for the consequences of this decision or measure", the Court
"shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured
party".
The Rules of Court specify that when the Court "finds that
there is a breach of the Convention, it shall give in the same
judgment a decision on the application of Article 50 (art. 50) of
the Convention if that question, after being raised under Rule 47
bis, is ready for decision; if the question is not ready for
decision, the [Court] shall reserve it in whole or in part and
shall fix the further procedure" (Rule 50 para. 3, first sentence,
read in conjunction with Rule 48 para. 3).
113. At the hearing on 17 November 1977, the Court, acting in
pursuance of Rule 47 bis, invited those appearing before it to
present their observations on the question of the application of
Article 50 (art. 50) of the Convention in the present case.
Mr Burger's reply reveals that Dr. {Konig} is not claiming
compensation "for all the damage he had suffered, as the result of
interruption of his work as a medical practitioner and operator of
a clinic for a period that already exceeds ten years". In point of
fact, the applicant leaves to the Court the assessment of "any
compensation that he might expect under Article 50 (art. 50)" and
also the question whether such compensation should "include the
costs of [the] proceedings" before the Commission and the Court.
The Agent of the Government, for her part, declared that she
reserved her position.
114. The Court notes that the applicant does not claim
compensation for all the material damage allegedly suffered;
however, he expects to be granted just satisfaction if the Court
concludes that there has been a breach of the Convention, without
for the moment indicating the amount of his claim.
The information supplied by the applicant on this point and the
observations of the Agent of the Government show that the question
of the application of Article 50 (art. 50) of the Convention is
not ready for decision; the Court must therefore reserve the
question and give a decision on the further procedure relative
thereto.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT
1. holds by fifteen votes to one that Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-
1) is applicable to the proceedings relative to the withdrawal of
the applicant's authorisation to run his clinic;
2. holds by fourteen votes to two that Article 6 para. 1 (art.
6-1) is applicable to the proceedings relative to the withdrawal
of the applicant's authorisation to practise;
3. holds by fifteen votes to one that there has been a
violation of Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) as regards the duration
of the proceedings relative to the withdrawal of the authorisation
to run the clinic;
4. holds by fifteen votes to one that there has been a
violation of Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) as regards the duration
of the proceedings relative to the withdrawal of the authorisation
to practise;
5. holds unanimously that the question of the application of
Article 50 (art. 50) is not ready for decision;
accordingly,
(a) reserves the whole of the question of the application of
Article 50 (art. 50);
(b) invites the Commission's delegates to transmit to the
Court, within three months from the delivery of this judgment,
such claims as may be presented by the applicant and any
observations which the delegates may have thereon;
(c) decides that the Government shall have the right to reply
to such claims and observations within two months from the date on
which the Registrar shall have communicated them to the
Government;
(d) reserves the further procedure to be followed on this
question.
Done in French and English, the French text being authentic, at
the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, this twenty-eighth day of
June, one thousand nine hundred and seventy-eight.
Signed: Giorgio BALLADORE PALLIERI
President
On behalf of the Registrar
Signed: Herbert PETZOLD
Deputy Registrar
The separate opinions of the following judges are annexed to
the present judgment in accordance with Article 51 para. 2 (art.
51-2) of the Convention and Rule 50 para. 2 of the Rules of Court:
Mr. Wiarda;
Mr. Matscher;
Mr. Pinheiro Farinha.
Initialled: G. B. P.
Initialled: H. P.
SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE WIARDA
(Translation)
I share the opinion set out in the judgment, with the sole
exception of the reasons concerning the application of Article 6
para. 1 (art. 6-1) of the Convention to the proceedings before the
Frankfurt Administrative Court relating to the withdrawal of the
authorisations to run a clinic and to practise medicine.
According to the reasoning in the judgment, the rights at issue
in these actions were the right to continue to run a private
clinic and the right to continue to practise medicine; these two
rights are classified as rights of a private nature and thus as
civil rights within the meaning of the Convention.
I agree with the view that, whatever scope the concept of civil
rights and obligations within the meaning of the Convention may
have, it in any event includes rights and obligations of a private
nature in the traditional sense; however, I do not consider that
the right to run a clinic and the right to practise medicine can
be classified as rights of a private nature within the traditional
meaning of that concept.
In my opinion, the classification of a subjective right depends
on the classification of the rules of the objective law in which
that subjective right has its source.
In German (objective) law, the (subjective) right to run a
private clinic and the (subjective) right to practise medicine
depend solely on obtaining and conserving the authorisations
required by law for this purpose; however, the conditions which
must be fulfilled to obtain and conserve such authorisations are
found in (objective) public (administrative) law, not in
(objective) private law. For this reason, I believe that these
rights should be classified not as civil but as public rights.
This does not mean that I cannot agree with the Court's
conclusion.
According to the Ringeisen judgment, the question whether a
case ("contestation") is to be considered as a case relating to
"civil rights and obligations" depends neither on the character of
the legislation which governs how the matter is to be determined
nor on the character of the authority invested with jurisdiction,
but on the character of the rights and obligations for which the
result of the proceedings is decisive.
In the present case, the result of the proceedings instituted
by Dr. {Konig} before the Frankfurt Administrative Court was
decisive for the conservation or the restoration of his status as
owner and manager of a private clinic and as a medical
practitioner, and for the conservation or the restoration of the
complex of rights and obligations attaching to such status.
This complex of rights and obligations was mixed in character.
Public law played a part (Gewerbeordnung, {Bundesarzteordnung}),
but, in my view, the area governed by private law predominated.
Dr. {Konig} owned his clinic and his practice and was exercising
his rights of property in the use which he made of them. The
clinic, the pactice and his patients represented an element of
"goodwill" which likewise was in the nature of a private right
similar, in some respects, to the right of property. From the
legal point of view, the running of the clinic and the exercise of
his profession were carried on through the conclusion of
contracts.
The withdrawal of the authorisations needed by Dr. {Konig} to
continue running his clinic and exercising his profession amounted
to an interference that in many respects deprived this complex of
rights and obligations - for the greater part governed by private
law - of the value which they represented.
It was the justification for the withdrawals that was at stake
in the proceedings before the Frankfurt Administrative Court which
underlie the present case.
For this reason, I believe, that it is legitimate to classify
the cases ("contestations") in issue as cases involving "civil
rights and obligations" within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1
(art. 6-1) of the Convention.
SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE MATSCHER
(Translation)
A. I am not, for the time being, in a position to furnish an
abstract, comprehensive definition of the concept of "civil rights
and obligations" within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-
1) of the Convention. I should like, however, to try to explain
the reasons which prevent me, to my great regret, from accepting
the definition of this concept which the Court has just given,
even though it limited itself to the requirements of the present
judgment.
I think that one must start by noting that the wording of
Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) is not clear and unequivocal. To
arrive at its meaning, recourse must be had to the methods of
interpretation recognised in international law.
Literal, grammatical interpretation does not take us very far.
There is an abundance of writings on the historical background
to Article 6 (art. 6). They show us that no very specific and
exact ideas on the scope of this provision emerge from the travaux
{preparatoires.}
The materials on the Convention do not, I believe, support the
view (already expressed in the Ringeisen judgment and repeated in
paragraph 90 of the present judgment) that a comparison of the two
official texts may point to interpretation in a particular
direction.
The teleological interpretation on which the judgment appears
to be principally based (although this is not stated in explicit
terms) is limited by the Convention system. The basic idea behind
such an interpretation is that the Convention is chiefly intended
to protect the individual against the authorities and to provide
him with certain guarantees {vis-a-vis} the latter. This means
that the Convention should apply whenever the individual's
position {vis-a-vis} the authorities is in question. However, to
draw specific conclusions from this principle, one must above all
demonstrate that a right which the Convention was intended to
guarantee in a certain way is involved - otherwise, there is a
danger of going beyond teleological interpretation and venturing
into the field of legislative policy.
The reasoning in the judgment does not demonstrate that the
applicant's legal position in the present case is also covered by
Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) of the Convention.
The judgment starts by reaffirming the principle of
"autonomous" interpretation of the terms of international
conventions in general and of the concept of "civil rights and
obligations" within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) of
the Convention in particular. This is a principle with which I am
wholly in agreement (even though I must say that I do not regard
the Court's definition of it as wholly unambiguous). In my view,
autonomous interpretation means, above all, that the provisions of
international conventions must not be interpreted solely by
reference to the meaning and scope which they possess in the
domestic law of the contracting State concerned, but that
reference must be made, "first, to the objectives and scheme of
the Convention and, secondly, to the general principles which stem
from the corpus of the national legal systems" (judgment of the
Court of Justice of the European Communities, 14 October 1976,
(Reports) 1976, p. 1552). Putting it differently, one must look
for the "common denominator" behind the provisions in question,
since it is legitimate to suppose - in the absence of any legal
definition in the Convention itself - that such is the meaning
which the Contracting States wished these provisions to have. This
"common denominator" can be found through a comparative analysis
of the domestic law of the Contracting States. This being so, the
result of such an investigation can never be a concept which is
totally at variance with the legal systems of the State concerned.
In my view, however, the judgment does not take sufficient account
of this requirement. It arrives at its conclusion - that Article 6
para. 1 (art. 6-1) of the Convention is applicable to the case
which forms the subject of the present application - only by
reliance on two types of assertion, both of which I regard as
highly questionable:
1. The activities of a doctor, whether as practitioner or as
director of a private clinic, are said to have a "private-law"
character, apparently by virtue of the fact that these activities
chiefly amount (from the legal point of view) to the maintenance
of private-law relationships with his clients (paragraphs 92 and
93 of the judgment).
However, this argument seems to me to confuse the special
relationship between a doctor and his patients, which is
undeniably a matter of private law (insofar as the doctor
concerned is not a civil servant), with his professional status
which - regardless of whether the State medical service or private
practice is concerned - is regulated (each type to a varying
extent) by public law in most, if not all, States.
Thus, when the Court states that the doctor's professional
situation is to be classified as a civil right within the meaning
of Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) of the Convention, it is creating
a concept of "civil right" which is not merely "autonomous" within
the meaning of the Convention, but which has no foundation in the
legal systems of the vast majority of Contracting States.
2. When transposing the conclusions reached in the Ringeisen
judgment (Series A no. 13, p. 39, para. 94) to the present case,
the Court states (paragraph 90 of the judgment) that "all
proceedings the result of which is decisive for private rights and
obligations" should themselves be regarded as cases concerning
civil rights within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) of
the Convention. This, in my view, is an assertion too vague, too
elastic, to permit the drawing of any exact conclusions. What does
the phrase "is decisive for private rights and obligations"
actually mean?
In the Ringeisen case, the conclusion drawn by the Court from
this assertion seems to me acceptable and, possibly, even
justified since, in that case, the administrative proceedings bore
directly on what was undeniably a private-law contract and had no
other object.
The situation in the {Konig} case is fundamentally different:
the object of the administrative proceedings was not one or more
specific private-law relationships between Dr. {Konig} and his
patients; the proceedings were not intended to "be decisive" for
these relationships (on which they had only an indirect bearing).
The administrative proceedings in question were solely concerned
with Dr. {Konig's} professional situation as a practitioner and as
the director of a private clinic. (There would only have been an
analogy between the {Konig} and the Ringeisen cases if the latter
had been concerned with Mr. Ringeisen's status as an estate agent
- which it was not).
In this connection, and contrary to what would seem to be the
Court's opinion (paragraph 91 of the judgment), I do not believe,
either, that a distinction can be made (as far as Article 6 of the
Convention is concerned) (art. 6) between the grant and the
withdrawal of an authorisation (to practise medicine or to manage
a clinic). Professional status or the legal system governing a
gainful activity form an indissoluble whole. The grant and the
withdrawal of the authorisation needed to practise or carry on the
activity are merely two particular aspects of such status or
system: the grant amounts to a finding that the requisite
conditions exist and the withdrawal, on the other hand, to a
finding that they have ceased to exist. From a qualitative
standpoint, both have the same bearing on private-law situations.
In conclusion, it is not my impression that the authors of the
Convention intended to bring all cases ("contestations") relating
to undoubted public-law situations under Article 6 (art. 6) of the
Convention, simply by reason of the fact that the outcome of such
a case might affect the private-law relationships of the person in
question. In any event, in the majority of the Convention States,
the relevant proceedings are not organised in the manner envisaged
in Article 6 (art. 6) (decision by a tribunal, public hearing,
judgment pronounced publicly); this means, according to the
conclusions reached in this judgment, that all these States - even
when they possess a highly developed system for administrative
proceedings - would be in a position that did not comply with
Article 6 (art. 6) from the very moment that they ratified the
Convention. This seems to me a clear argument in favour of
excluding this type of case from the ambit of Article 6 (art. 6)
of the Convention.
There is still one objection which has to be refuted: when the
scope of Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) of the Convention is
discussed, it is often argued that the individual has more need of
the procedural guarantees provided by Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1)
in the case of disputes with the authorities than in the case of
disputes with his neighbours: one cannot therefore suppose that
the Convention was intended to establish a system of guarantees
specifically for the latter, but not for the former.
I would explain this situation as follows: the history of law
(at least, of continental law) shows very clearly that the
principles of oral proceedings, publicity and judgment by an
independent tribunal in civil matters are merely a corollary of
these same principles in criminal cases. When a demand was raised,
starting with the French Revolution in 1789 and during the
European revolutions of 1848, for legal proceedings which
respected these principles, criminal proceedings alone were
envisaged. No one would have manned the barricades to secure oral,
public proceedings in civil cases! The only reason for introducing
these principles for civil cases also - and sometimes even
guaranteeing them in constitutional charters - was to follow the
pattern adopted for criminal proceedings. Furthermore - and this
is also borne out by experience with judicial tribunals - the
importance of these principles has always been relatively limited
in civil cases (though it must be admitted that some of these
principles, in particular, are of value for civil procedure).
I think that this is the general standpoint which we must adopt
to understand why the authors of the Convention, too, whilst
retaining for the guarantees of Article 6 (art. 6) their primary
purpose, did not restrict those guarantees to criminal cases but
extended them to all cases which were generally regarded in most
Contracting States as coming within the competence of the courts.
I admit that this consideration of the Convention's historical
dimension leads to a relatively narrow concept of "civil rights",
but I believe that it reflects the meaning and scope of Article 6
para. 1 (art. 6-1), de lege lata.
Nor would I deny that, from the de lege ferenda standpoint, an
extension of the protection of the individual's rights and of the
related procedural guarantees, also {vis-a-vis} the public
authorities, is an ideal which should be pursued, especially in
view of the latter's constantly increasing encroachment in all
areas. Recognising the validity of this aspiration, the Court,
whose task is to ensure respect of the rights guaranteed by the
Convention, is free to employ even a broad interpretation of these
guarantees (this it did, rightly in my view, in the Ringeisen
case), as long as such interpretation remains covered by the
Convention itself. On the other hand, it is for the Contracting
States to go further than the Convention if they find this
necessary and if they agree on an amendment thereto.
Perhaps it is also going beyond the function of a judgment (or,
to be more exact, a separate opinion) to raise de lege ferenda
considerations and to speculate on the possible consequences of an
overbroad interpretation of the concept of civil rights. I should
like, nonetheless, to make a few brief comments.
I have doubts as to the utility of invariably using a procedure
which fully matched the requirements of Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-
1) of the Convention in many of the cases which would qualify as
"civil law" cases if the line laid down by the Court in the
present instance were followed (those concerned with
authorisations or concessions of all kinds, insofar as the latter
have a bearing on private-law situations). For some of them
(particularly professional and disciplinary cases), a procedure of
this kind (public and necessarily conducted before a court) would,
perhaps, hardly be in the best interests of the persons concerned.
I fully agree that, in these cases too, fair judgment must be
given within a reasonable time, following a procedure which gives
the person concerned every possibility of asserting his rights and
that the decision of the competent authority (when it is
administrative in character) should be subjected to review by an
independent body (that is, to review by a court). I entirely fail
to see however, why the procedure in question should invariably
meet all the other requirements of Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1)
(oral and public proceedings, public pronouncement of judgment).
De lege ferenda, the above considerations would seem to suggest
the need for a revision of Article 6 (art. 6) of the Convention
which would draw the following distinction (which is not possible
under Article 6 as it stands) (art. 6):
(a) criminal and civil cases (i.e. cases traditionally heard by
the courts): entitlement to all the guarantees provided for in
Article 6 (art. 6);
(b) disputes on other matters (administrative cases):
entitlement to a procedure determined by law and guaranteeing a
fair hearing of the parties, judgment within a reasonable time,
right to judicial review of the administrative decision.
B. Having given a negative vote on questions 1 and 2, it was
only logical that I should also give a negative vote on questions
3 and 4, as formulated in the operative provisions of the
judgment. I should like, however, to make it clear that I share
the Court's unanimous view that, in the case both of the
proceedings relating to the withdrawal of the authorisation to run
the clinic and of the proceedings relating to the withdrawal of
the authorisation to practise, the "reasonable time" referred to
in Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) was exceeded (insofar as this
provision might have been applicable in the present case).
SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE PINHEIRO FARINHA
(Translation)
1. I find myself in disagreement with the Court's reasoning as
regards two paragraphs in the judgment and item 2 of the operative
provisions.
2. With regard to paragraph 93 of the judgment, while I agree
that the medical profession counts among the traditional liberal
professions in the Federal Republic of Germany; that, even under
the national health scheme, the medical profession is not a public
service; that the doctor, who is free to practise or not, provides
treatment for his patients on the basis of a contract; and that
the medical practitioner's activity has a private character, I
still feel obliged to point out that:
(a) according to paragraph 1 of Article 1 of the Federal Act,
the medical practitioner shall have the care of the health of each
individual and of the community as a whole; under paragraph 2, he
exercises a liberal profession and not a trade or business
(paragraph 20 of the judgment);
(b) in order to be able to practise on a permanent basis, an
authorisation issued by the appropriate services of the {Lander}
is required (Articles 2 para. 1 and 12 of the Federal Act, Article
35 of the Regulations). This authorisation is granted on request
if the person concerned:
1. ...
2. has not been guilty of behaviour showing that he is unfit or
unreliable to exercise the profession,
3. ...
4. ...
(paragraph 20 of the judgment);
(c) an authorisation that has been issued must be withdrawn if
one of those conditions either was not satisfied at the time of
the grant or ceases to be met afterwards (Article 5 of the Federal
Act; paragraph 20 of the judgment);
(d) although the medical profession also has the purpose of
providing an income, its primary aim is disinterested, namely
rendering assistance to mankind (paragraph 22 of the judgment).
Bearing these quotations in mind and remembering the
Hippocratic Oath, which includes a promise by the doctor that:
"With purity and with holiness I will pass my life and practise my
art ... While I continue to keep this oath unviolated, may it be
granted to me to enjoy life and the practice of the art, respected
by all men, in all times. But should I trespass and violate this
oath, may the reverse be my lot!" - I am bound to conclude that
there is a total difference between, firstly, the running of a
clinic (a trade or business; paragraph 21 of the judgment) and,
secondly, exercise of the medical profession, in which the
spiritual element takes precedence over the material element,
since "the duties of dignity, disinterestedness and independence
which members of the liberal professions must observe apply very
strictly to doctors" (J. Savatier, La profession {liberale,} Etude
juridique et pratique, Paris, L.G.D.J., 1947, quoted in the
{Encyclopedie} Dalloz, III, 425).
3. With regard to paragraph 95 of the judgment, I cannot agree
with the Court in its view of the decision to withdraw the
authorisation to practise. I should like to point out that I agree
with paragraph 94 and 95 on the decision to withdraw the
authorisation to run the clinic.
In my view, the right called in question by the withdrawal of
the authorisation to practise is a public, and not a civil, right.
I do not believe that a distinction can be made, under Article
6 (art. 6) of the Convention, between the grant and the withdrawal
of an authorisation.
It must be remembered that the administrative proceedings were
not concerned directly with one or more specific private-law
relationships between Dr. {Konig} and his patients, but with his
general suitability to practise as a doctor.
Since public law is not concerned with actions but only with
the aims which the person in question claims to be pursuing (G.
Balladore Pallieri, La doctrine de l'Etat, volume II - Portuguese
edition, page 213), since the withdrawal of the authorisation to
practise was not intended to regulate specific relationships
between Dr. {Konig} and his clients - the latter being a matter
for private law - but chiefly to safeguard the health of the
community as a whole, and since the administrative authorities
found that Dr. {Konig} no longer fulfilled certain conditions of
public order, lying outside the scope of private law, I would say,
unlike the Court, that Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) is not
applicable to the proceedings relating to the withdrawal of the
authorisation to practise.
4. I feel obliged to accept the decision of the majority of the
Court that Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) is applicable to the
proceedings relating to the withdrawal of the authorisation to
practise, and to vote on its application with regard to the
duration of the proceedings.
Disagreeing with the Court on the first question - the
applicability of Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) of the Convention -,
I agree with the final decision and the arguments used to support
it.
I would, however, like to indicate expressly that I would have
voted for non-violation of the Convention, on the ground of non-
applicability of Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) to the proceedings
relating to the authorisation to "practise", if there had not been
a prior decision on applicability.
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