[неофициальный перевод]
ЕВРОПЕЙСКИЙ СУД ПО ПРАВАМ ЧЕЛОВЕКА
СУДЕБНОЕ РЕШЕНИЕ
НИМИТЦ (NIEMIETZ) ПРОТИВ ГЕРМАНИИ
(Страсбург, 16 декабря 1992 года)
(Извлечение)
КРАТКОЕ НЕОФИЦИАЛЬНОЕ ИЗЛОЖЕНИЕ ОБСТОЯТЕЛЬСТВ ДЕЛА
A. Основные факты
М. Нимитц, гражданин ФРГ, по профессии адвокат, житель
г. Фрайбурга на Бризгау. В течение нескольких лет был
председателем местной политической партии "Bunte liste", в составе
которой действовала антиклерикальная рабочая группа.
9 декабря 1985 г. на имя судьи районного суда во Фрайзинге из
почтового отделения Фрайбурга по факсу было отправлено от имени
указанной антиклерикальной рабочей группы письмо, касающееся
уголовного дела, находящегося на рассмотрении в этом суде. Под ним
стояла подпись "Клаус Вегнер", как оказалось, вымышленная. Письмо
содержало угрозы в адрес судьи, обвиняя его в проклерикальной
позиции. Против Клауса Вегнера было возбуждено уголовное дело.
Поскольку почта для "Bunte liste" направлялась на абонентский ящик
в почтовом отделении, а затем до 1985 г. пересылалась в офис
заявителя, 8 августа 1996 г. был выдан ордер на обыск inter alia
офиса заявителя с целью найти и изъять любые документы,
раскрывающие личность Клауса Вегнера. Обыск был произведен
13 ноября 1986 г., но ничего не дал. Поскольку Клаус Вегнер так и
не был найден, уголовное дело против него было впоследствии
прекращено.
В свою очередь господин Нимитц обратился с жалобой на
основании статьи 304 Уголовно-процессуального кодекса на
незаконность произведенного у него обыска.
27 марта 1987 г. 1-й Земельный суд Мюнхена объявил жалобу
заявителя неприемлемой на том основании, что обыск уже был
произведен и отсутствует правовой интерес в признании ордера на
обыск незаконным. Федеральный Конституционный Суд отказался
принять жалобу заявителя о незаконности ордера на обыск и решения
Земельного суда. Поданная им жалоба была 18 августа 1987 г.
отклонена, поскольку не имела достаточных шансов на успех.
B. Разбирательство в Комиссии по правам человека
В жалобе, поданной в Комиссию 15 февраля 1988 г., заявитель
утверждал, что было нарушено право на уважение его жилища и
корреспонденции (статья 8 Конвенции), а также статья 1
Протокола N 1 и статья 13, поскольку он оказался лишенным
внутренних средств правовой защиты. Жалоба была признана частично
приемлемой 5 апреля 1990 года.
В своем докладе от 29 мая 1991 г. Комиссия установила
обстоятельства дела и единогласно пришла к выводу, что имело место
нарушение статьи 8 Конвенции и что нет отдельного спорного вопроса
по статье 1 Протокола N 1.
Комиссия передала дело в Суд 17 июля 1991 года.
ИЗВЛЕЧЕНИЕ ИЗ СУДЕБНОГО РЕШЕНИЯ
ВОПРОСЫ ПРАВА
I. О предполагаемом нарушении статьи 8 Конвенции
26. Господин Нимитц утверждал, что обыск его адвокатской
конторы привел к нарушению статьи 8 Конвенции, которая гласит:
"1. Каждый человек имеет право на уважение его личной и
семейной жизни, неприкосновенности его жилища и тайны
корреспонденции.
2. Не допускается вмешательство государственных органов в
осуществление этого права за исключением вмешательства,
предусмотренного законом и необходимого в демократическом обществе
в интересах государственной безопасности и общественного
спокойствия, экономического благосостояния страны, в целях
предотвращения беспорядков или преступлений, для охраны здоровья
или нравственности или защиты прав и свобод других лиц".
Комиссия согласилась с этим, поскольку произошло неоправданное
вмешательство в личную жизнь заявителя и его жилище.
A. Было ли "вмешательство"?
27. Оспаривая заключение Комиссии, Правительство утверждало,
что статья 8 не предоставляет защиты от обыска в адвокатской
конторе; Конвенция проводит четкую грань между личной жизнью и
жилищем, с одной стороны, и профессиональной и деловой жизнью и
служебными помещениями, с другой стороны.
28. Придя к заключению, что имело место вмешательство в
"личную жизнь" и "жилище" г-на Нимитца, Комиссия, по мнению
Правительства, придала особое значение доверительным отношениям
между адвокатом и клиентом. Суд разделяет сомнения Правительства в
том, может ли этот фактор служить критерием для определения объема
гарантии, предоставляемой статьей 8. Профессиональная и деловая
активность могут всегда включать в большей или меньшей степени
элемент конфиденциальности; если такой критерий будет признан, это
приведет к многим трудностям при проведении демаркационной линии.
29. Суд не считает возможным или необходимым дать
исчерпывающее определение понятию "личная жизнь". Было бы слишком
строго ограничить ее интимным кругом, где каждый может жить своей
собственной личной жизнью, как он предпочитает, и тем самым
полностью исключить внешний мир из этого круга. Уважение личной
жизни должно также включать до некоторой степени право
устанавливать и развивать отношения с другими людьми.
Более того, кажется, нет принципиальных оснований, чтобы такое
понимание "личной жизни" исключало деятельность профессионального
и делового характера; именно в своей работе большинство людей
имеют значительное, если не наибольшее, количество шансов
развивать отношения с внешним миром. Эта точка зрения
подтверждается тем фактом, как уже было справедливо отмечено
Комиссией, что не всегда возможно четко разграничить, какая
деятельность человека составляет часть его профессиональной или
деловой жизни. Таким образом, особенно в случае, когда человек
имеет гуманитарную профессию, его работа в таком контексте может
стать неотъемлемой частью его жизни до такой степени, что
становится невозможным определить, в качестве кого он действует в
данный момент времени.
Лишение человека защиты по статье 8 на том основании, что
мера, против которой подана жалоба, относится к профессиональной
деятельности, как предлагает Правительство, в данном случае
рискует привести к неравенству, поскольку такая защита могла бы
остаться доступной лишь для того, чья профессиональная и
непрофессиональная деятельность настолько тесно переплетены, что
нет никакой возможности их разграничить. Ранее Суд не проводил
разграничения такого рода: он полагал, что имело место
вмешательство в личную жизнь, когда, например, прослушивались
телефонные разговоры, и деловые, и личные (см. Решение по делу
Ювиг против Франции от 24 апреля 1990 г. Серия A, т. 176-B, с. 41,
п. 8 и с. 52, п. 25); и когда обыск был связан исключительно с
деловой активностью, Суд не полагался только на это обстоятельство
как обоснование для исключения применимости статьи 8 (см. Решение
по делу Чаппел против Соединенного Королевства от 30 марта 1989 г.
Серия A, т. 152-A, с. 12 - 13, п. 26 и с. 21 - 22, п. 51).
30. Что касается слова "жилище" ("home" в английском тексте),
Суд отмечает, что в некоторых государствах - участниках, а именно
в Германии (см. п. 18 выше), оно распространяется на служебные
помещения. Более того, такое толкование полностью созвучно
французскому варианту текста, т.к. слово "domicile" имеет даже
более широкое значение, чем "home", и может распространяться на
деловой офис типа адвокатского.
Не всегда можно провести четкое разграничение также и потому,
что вести деятельность, которую можно отнести к профессиональной
или деловой, можно с таким же успехом и со своего места
жительства, и наоборот, можно заниматься делами, которые не
относятся к профессиональной сфере, в офисе или коммерческих
служебных помещениях. Узкое толкование слов "home" и "domicile"
может привести к такой же опасности неравенства, как и узкое
понимание "личной жизни" (см. п. 29 выше).
31. Если говорить в общем, толкование слов "личная жизнь" и
"жилище", как охватывающих некоторую профессиональную и деловую
активность или служебные помещения, было бы более созвучно с
предметом и целью статьи 8, а именно с защитой отдельных лиц от
своевольного вмешательства властей (см., например, Решение по делу
Маркс против Бельгии от 13 июня 1979 г. Серия A, т. 31, с. 15,
п. 31). Такое толкование не будет особенно стеснять
Договаривающиеся государства, т.к. они сохранят свое право на
"вмешательство" в той степени, которую позволяет статья 8 п. 2;
это право могло бы стать более широким, когда это касается
профессиональной и деловой активности или служебных помещений.
32. К вышеприведенным общим рассуждениям, оспаривающим мнение,
что статья 8 неприменима, необходимо добавить еще один фактор,
который относится к конкретным обстоятельствам дела. Ордер,
выданный участковым судом Мюнхена, предписывал провести обыск,
чтобы найти и изъять "документы", раскрывающие личность Клауса
Вегнера (см. п. 10 выше). Те, кто проводил обыск, просмотрели
четыре шкафа - картотеки с данными, имеющими отношение к клиентам,
а также шесть личных досье (см. п. 11 выше); их действия должны
были волей-неволей охватывать как "корреспонденцию", так и другие
материалы, которые можно считать подпадающими под это понятие в
смысле статьи 8. В этой связи достаточно отметить, что в этой
статье, в отличие от слова "жизнь", отсутствует прилагательное при
слове "корреспонденция". В ряде дел (см., например, Решения по
делу Шонненбергер и Дурмаз против Швейцарии от 20 июня 1988 г.
Серия A, т. 137, и по делу Кэмпбелл против Соединенного
Королевства от 25 марта 1992 г. Серия A, т. 233) Суд даже не
рассматривал возможность неприменения статьи 8 потому, что
корреспонденция имела профессиональный характер.
34. Все вышесказанное дает основание Суду признать, что обыск
в офисе заявителя представляет собой нарушение его прав по
статье 8.
B. Было ли вмешательство "предусмотрено законом"?
4. Заявитель утверждал, что данное вмешательство не было
"предусмотрено законом", т.к. оно было основано на подозрениях, а
не на фактах и, таким образом, не отвечало требованиям статьи 103
Уголовно-процессуального кодекса (см. п. 19 выше); кроме того, оно
стремилось обойти правовые нормы, защищающие профессиональную
тайну.
35. Суд согласен с мнением Комиссии и Правительства, что эта
аргументация должна быть отвергнута. Он отмечает, что и
1-й Земельный суд Мюнхена и Федеральный Конституционный Суд нашли
обыск законным в смысле статьи 103 вышеназванного Кодекса
(см. п. 15 - 16 и 19 выше), и Суд не видит основания высказывать
отличное от этих судов мнение.
C. Преследовало ли данное вмешательство
правомерные цели?
36. Подобно Комиссии Суд признает, что вмешательство
преследовало правомерные цели в смысле статьи 8 п. 2, а именно
предотвращение преступления и защита прав других лиц, в частности,
чести судьи, которому было адресовано письмо.
D. Было ли вмешательство
"необходимо в демократическом обществе"?
37. По этому вопросу Суд склоняется к мнению, что по
основаниям, приведенным участковым судом Мюнхена, это
вмешательство можно считать таковым (см. п. 10 выше). Суд не
считает необходимым продолжать рассмотрение этого вопроса, т.к. он
уже пришел к выводу, с которым согласились заявитель и Комиссия,
что оспариваемая мера была не соразмерна ее целям.
Совершенно справедливо, что правонарушение, в связи с которым
был произведен обыск, представляет собой не только оскорбление, но
также и попытку оказать давление на судью. Однако ордер содержал
слишком общие предписания найти и изъять, без каких-либо
ограничений, "документы", раскрывающие личность автора
оскорбительного письма; этот факт имеет особое значение, поскольку
обыск адвокатской конторы не сопровождается специальными
процедурными гарантиями, такими как присутствие независимых
наблюдателей. Более того, принимая во внимание природу
рассмотренных материалов, очевидно, что обыск посягал на
профессиональную тайну в той степени, которая не соответствует
данным обстоятельствам; в связи с этим необходимо напомнить, что
посягательство на профессиональную тайну адвоката может иметь
последствия при отправлении правосудия и тем самым нарушать права,
гарантируемые статьей 6 Конвенции. В добавление к этому,
сопутствующая огласка могла оказать негативное воздействие на
профессиональную репутацию заявителя в глазах как его клиентов,
так и общественности в целом.
E. Вывод
38. Таким образом, Суд считает, что имело место нарушение
статьи 8.
II. О предполагаемом нарушении статьи 1 Протокола N 1
39. Г-н Нимитц также утверждал, что, нанося ущерб его
репутации как адвоката, обыск представлял собой нарушение статьи 1
Протокола N 1, которая предусматривает:
"Каждое физическое или юридическое лицо имеет право
беспрепятственно пользоваться своим имуществом. Никто не может
быть лишен своего имущества иначе как в интересах общества и на
условиях, предусмотренных законом и общими принципами
международного права.
Предыдущие положения ни в коей мере не ущемляют права
государства обеспечивать выполнение таких законов, какие ему
представляются необходимыми для осуществления контроля за
использованием собственности в соответствии с общими интересами
или для обеспечения уплаты налогов или других сборов или штрафов".
40. Суд уже учел в свете статьи 8 потенциальное воздействие
обыска на профессиональную репутацию заявителя (см. п. 37 выше),
Суд соглашается с Комиссией, что нет поэтому необходимости
рассматривать вопрос в свете статьи 1 Протокола N 1.
III. Применение статьи 50 Конвенции
41. Статья 50 Конвенции гласит:
"Если Суд установит, что решение или мера, принятые судебными
или иными властями Высокой Договаривающейся Стороны, полностью или
частично противоречат обязательствам, вытекающим из настоящей
Конвенции, а также если внутреннее право упомянутой Стороны
допускает лишь частичное возмещение последствий такого решения или
такой меры, то решением Суда, если в этом есть необходимость,
предусматривается справедливое возмещение потерпевшей стороне".
42. В письме, полученном 16 декабря 1991 г. (см. п. 4 выше),
заявитель просил, чтобы Суд, принимая во внимание, в частности,
ущерб, причиненный его адвокатской репутации, предоставил ему
компенсацию по статье 50 в том виде и в том объеме, который Суд
определит по своему усмотрению.
43. Суд не может согласиться с этой просьбой.
Заявитель не доказал, что нарушение статьи 8 причинило ему
материальный ущерб. Если в определенной мере оно могло вызвать
моральный вред, то Суд считает, так же как и представитель
Комиссии, что констатация нарушения сама по себе является
достаточным справедливым возмещением. Хотя г-н Нимитц утверждал на
слушаниях, что его просьба включает судебные расходы и издержки в
Германии и Страсбурге, он не представил никаких конкретных
обоснований этих расходов.
ПО ЭТИМ ОСНОВАНИЯМ СУД ЕДИНОГЛАСНО
1. Постановил, что имело место нарушение статьи 8 Конвенции;
2. Постановил, что не возникает отдельной спорной проблемы по
статье 1 Протокола N 1;
3. Отклонил требование заявителя о справедливом возмещении.
Совершено на английском и французском языках и оглашено во
Дворце прав человека в Страсбурге 16 декабря 1992 г.
Председатель
Рольф РИССДАЛ
Грефье
Марк-Андре ЭЙССЕН
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
CASE OF NIEMIETZ v. GERMANY
JUDGMENT
(Strasbourg, 16.XII.1992)
In the case of Niemietz v. Germany <1>,
The European Court of Human Rights, sitting, in accordance
with Article 43 (art. 43) of the Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ("the Convention") <2> and
the relevant provisions of the Rules of Court, as a Chamber
composed of the following judges:
--------------------------------
Notes by the Registrar
<1> The case is numbered 72/1991/324/396. The first number is
the case's position on the list of cases referred to the Court in
the relevant year (second number). The last two numbers indicate
the case's position on the list of cases referred to the Court
since its creation and on the list of the corresponding
originating applications to the Commission.
<2> As amended by Article 11 of Protocol No. 8 (P8-11), which
came into force on 1 January 1990.
Mr R. Ryssdal, President,
Mr R. Bernhardt,
Mr L.-E. Pettiti,
Mr B. Walsh,
Mr C. Russo,
Mr A. Spielmann,
Mr N. Valticos,
Mr A.N. Loizou,
Sir John Freeland,
and also of Mr M.-A. Eissen, Registrar, and Mr H. Petzold,
Deputy Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 29 May and 23 November 1992,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the
last-mentioned date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case was referred to the Court by the European
Commission of Human Rights ("the Commission") on 12 July 1991,
within the three-month period laid down by Article 32 para. 1 and
Article 47 (art. 32-1, art. 47) of the Convention. It originated
in an application (no. 13710/88) against the Federal Republic of
Germany lodged with the Commission under Article 25 (art. 25) on
15 February 1988 by a German citizen, Mr Gottfried Niemietz, who
is a lawyer.
The Commission's request referred to Articles 44 and 48
(art. 44, art. 48) and to the declaration whereby Germany
recognised the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court (Article 46)
(art. 46). The object of the request was to obtain a decision as
to whether the facts of the case disclosed a breach by the
respondent State of its obligations under Article 8 (art. 8) of
the Convention.
2. In response to the enquiry made in accordance with Rule 33
para. 3 (d) of the Rules of Court, the applicant stated that he
wished to take part in the proceedings and sought leave, which was
granted by the President of the Court, to present his own case
(Rule 30) and to use the German language (Rule 27 para. 3).
3. The Chamber to be constituted included ex officio Mr R.
Bernhardt, the elected judge of German nationality (Article 43 of
the Convention) (art. 43), and Mr R. Ryssdal, the President of the
Court (Rule 21 para. 3 (b)). On 29 August 1991 the President drew
by lot, in the presence of the Registrar, the names of the other
seven members, namely Mr J. Cremona, Mr L.-E. Pettiti, Mr
C. Russo, Mr A. Spielmann, Mr N. Valticos, Mr A.N. Loizou and Sir
John Freeland (Article 43 in fine of the Convention and Rule 21
para. 4) (art. 43). Subsequently, Mr B. Walsh, substitute judge,
replaced Mr Cremona, whose term of office had expired and whose
successor at the Court had taken up his duties before the hearing
(Rules 2 para. 3 and 22 para. 1).
4. Mr Ryssdal assumed the office of President of the Chamber
(Rule 21 para. 5) and, through the Deputy Registrar, consulted the
Agent of the German Government ("the Government"), the Delegate of
the Commission and the applicant on the organisation of the
procedure (Rules 37 para. 1 and 38). In accordance with the order
made in consequence, the Registrar received, on 16 December 1991,
the applicant's claims under Article 50 (art. 50) of the
Convention and, on 23 December, the Government's memorial. By
letter of 4 March 1992, the Secretary to the Commission informed
the Registrar that the Delegate would submit his observations at
the hearing.
On 2 April the Commission filed a number of documents which
the Registrar had sought from it on the President's instructions.
A further document was filed by the applicant on 20 May.
5. As directed by the President, the hearing took place in
public in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 26 May 1992.
The Court had held a preparatory meeting beforehand and the
President had, on 4 May, granted the members of the Government's
delegation leave to use the German language (Rule 27 para. 2).
There appeared before the Court:
(a) for the Government
Mr J. Meyer-Ladewig, Ministerialdirigent, Federal Ministry of
Justice, Agent,
Ms E. Chwolik-Lanfermann, Richterin am Oberlandesgericht,
Federal Ministry of Justice, Adviser;
(b) for the Commission
Mr A. Weitzel, Delegate;
(c) the applicant, Mr G. Niemietz, in person.
The Court heard addresses by Mr Meyer-Ladewig for the
Government, by Mr Weitzel for the Commission and by the applicant,
as well as replies to its questions.
AS TO THE FACTS
I. The particular circumstances of the case
6. Mr Niemietz lives in Freiburg im Breisgau, Germany, where
he practises as a lawyer (Rechtsanwalt).
7. On 9 December 1985 a letter was sent by telefax from the
Freiburg post office to Judge Miosga of the Freising District
Court (Amtsgericht). It related to criminal proceedings for
insulting behaviour (Beleidigung) pending before that court
against Mr J., an employer who refused to deduct from his
employees' salaries and pay over to the tax office the Church tax
to which they were liable. The letter bore the signature of one
Klaus Wegner - possibly a fictitious person -, followed by the
words "on behalf of the Anti-clerical Working Group
(Antiklerikaler Arbeitskreis) of the Freiburg Bunte Liste
(multi-coloured group)" and a post-office box number. It read as
follows:
"On 10.12.1985 the trial against Mr [J.] will take place
before you. We, the Anti-clerical Working Group of the Freiburg
Bunte Liste, protest most strongly about these proceedings.
In the FRG, the Church, on the basis of the Hitler concordat
and in violation of the State's duty to maintain neutrality,
enjoys most extensive privileges. As a result, every non-Christian
citizen of this State has to suffer disadvantages and daily
annoyance. Among other things, the FRG is the only State which
acts as Church-tax collector. It requires employers, whether they
be Christians or not, to pay over Church tax for their Christian
employees and thus relieve the Church of financial administrative
work. [J.] has, for years, courageously and consistently refused
to support the financing of the Church in this way and has made an
appropriate arrangement whereby the Church tax of his Christian
employees is paid without his own involvement.
This attempt - in a State which counts the separation of State
and Church among its basic principles - to insist upon just such a
separation has not only exposed [J.] to persistent vexation and
interferences on the part of State authorities, culminating in the
tax office employing coercive measures, such as attachment, to
collect from him Church tax which his employees had already paid a
long time previously. It has in addition involved him - when he
called these underhand methods by their name - in the present
proceedings for alleged insulting behaviour.
Were it your task as the competent judge to conduct an
unbiased examination of this "case of insulting behaviour", then
it must be said that you have not only failed to carry out this
task, but also abused your office in order to try - by means which
give a warning and a reminder of the darkest chapters of German
legal history - to break the backbone of an unloved opponent of
the Church. It was with extreme indignation that we learned of the
compulsory psychiatric examination which was conducted on your
instructions, and to which [J.] has had to submit in the meantime.
We shall use every avenue open to us, in particular our
international contacts, to bring to public notice this action of
yours, which is incompatible with the principles of a democratic
State subscribing to the rule of law.
We shall follow the further course of the proceedings against
[J.] and expect you to abandon the path of terrorisation which you
have embarked upon, and to reach the only decision appropriate in
this case - an acquittal."
8. The applicant had, as a city councillor, been chairman for
some years of the Freiburg Bunte Liste, which is a local political
party. He had also played a particularly committed role in,
although he had never been a member of, its Anti-clerical Working
Group, which sought to curtail the influence of the Church.
Until the end of 1985 certain of the mail for the Bunte Liste,
which had as its address for correspondence only the post-office
box number that had been given in the letter to Judge Miosga, had
been delivered to the office ({Burogemeinschaft} <*>) of the
applicant and a colleague of his; the latter had also been active
on behalf of the party and had acted for it professionally.
--------------------------------
<*> Здесь и далее по тексту слова на национальном языке
набраны латинским шрифтом и выделены фигурными скобками.
9. On 13 January 1986 the Director of the Munich I Regional
Court (Landgericht) requested the Munich public prosecutor's
office (Staatsanwaltschaft) to institute criminal proceedings
against Klaus Wegner for the offence of insulting behaviour,
contrary to Article 185 of the Criminal Code. Attempts to serve a
summons on him were unsuccessful. The applicant's colleague
refused to give any information about Klaus Wegner or his
whereabouts and other attempts to identify him failed.
10. In the context of the above-mentioned proceedings the
Munich District Court issued, on 8 August 1986, a warrant to
search the law office of the applicant and his colleague and the
homes of Ms D. and Ms G. The warrant read as follows:
"Preliminary investigations against Klaus Wegner concerning
Article 185 of the Criminal Code
Decision
The search of the following residential and business premises
for documents which reveal the identity of "Klaus Wegener" [sic]
and the seizure of such documents is ordered.
1. Office premises shared by the lawyers Gottfried Niemietz
and ...,
2. Home (including adjoining rooms and cars) of Ms [D.] ...,
3. Home (including adjoining rooms and cars) of Ms [G.]
Reasons
On 9 December 1985 a letter insulting Judge Miosga of the
Freising District Court was sent by telefax from the Freiburg post
office. It was sent by the Anti-clerical Working Group of the
Freiburg Bunte Liste. The letter was signed by one Klaus Wegener.
Until now it has not been possible to identify the signatory.
The Freiburg Bunte Liste could not be contacted by mail otherwise
than through a box number. Until the end of 1985 such mail was
forwarded to the office of Niemietz and ..., and since the start
of 1986 to Ms [D.]. It has therefore to be assumed that documents
throwing light on the identity of Klaus Wegener can be found at
the premises of the above-mentioned persons.
Furthermore, it is to be assumed that there are such documents
in the home of Ms [G.], the Chairwoman of the Freiburg Bunte
Liste.
For these reasons, it is to be expected that evidence will be
found in the course of a search of the premises indicated in this
decision."
11. The search of the law office, the need for which the
investigating authorities had first tried to obviate by
questioning a witness, was effected by representatives of the
Freiburg public prosecutor's office and the police on 13 November
1986. According to a police officer's report drawn up on the
following day, the premises were entered at about 9.00 a.m. and
inspected in the presence of two office assistants. The actual
search began at about 9.15 a.m., when the applicant's colleague
arrived, and lasted until about 10.30 a.m. The applicant himself
arrived at 9.30 a.m. He declined to give any information as to the
identity of Klaus Wegner, on the ground that he might thereby
expose himself to the risk of criminal prosecution.
Those conducting the search examined four filing cabinets with
data concerning clients, three files marked respectively "BL",
"C.W. -Freiburg District Court ..." and "G. - Hamburg Regional
Court" and three defence files marked respectively "K.W. -
Karlsruhe District Court ...", "Niemietz et al. - Freiburg
District Court ..." and "D. - Freiburg District Court". According
to the applicant, the office's client index was also looked at and
one of the files in question was its "Wegner defence file". Those
searching neither found the documents they were seeking nor seized
any materials. In the proceedings before the Commission, the
applicant stated that he had been able to put aside in time
documents pointing to the identity of Klaus Wegner and had
subsequently destroyed them.
12. The homes of Ms D. and Ms G. were also searched; documents
were found that gave rise to a suspicion that the letter to Judge
Miosga had been sent by Ms D. under an assumed name.
13. On 10 December 1986 the Chairman of the Freiburg Bar
Association, who had been informed about the search by the
applicant's colleague, addressed a formal protest to the President
of the Munich District Court. The Chairman sent copies to the
Bavarian Minister of Justice and the Munich Bar Association and
invited the latter to associate itself with the protest.
In a reply of 27 January 1987, the President of the Munich
District Court stated that the search was proportionate because
the letter in question constituted a serious interference with a
pending case; hence no legal action on the protest was necessary.
14. The criminal proceedings against "Klaus Wegner" were later
discontinued for lack of evidence.
15. On 27 March 1987 the Munich I Regional Court declared an
appeal (Beschwerde) lodged by the applicant, pursuant to
Article 304 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, against the search
warrant to be inadmissible, on the ground that it had already been
executed ("wegen prozessualer {Uberholung}"). It considered that
in the circumstances there was no legal interest in having the
warrant declared unlawful. It had not been arbitrary, since there
had been concrete indications that specified material would be
found. There was no ground for holding that Article 97 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure (see paragraph 21 below) had been
circumvented: the warrant had been based on the fact that mail for
the Freiburg Bunte Liste had for some time been delivered to the
applicant's office and it could not be assumed that that mail
could concern a lawyer-client relationship. In addition, personal
honour was not so minor a legal interest as to render the search
disproportionate. There could be no question in the present case
of preventing a lawyer from freely exercising his profession.
16. On 28 April 1987 the applicant lodged a constitutional
complaint (Verfassungsbeschwerde) against the search warrant of
8 August 1986 and the Munich I Regional Court's decision of
27 March 1987. On 18 August a panel of three judges of the Federal
Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) declined to accept
the complaint for adjudication, on the ground that it did not
offer sufficient prospects of success.
The Federal Constitutional Court also found that the Munich I
Regional Court's decision of 27 March 1987 that the applicant's
appeal was inadmissible was not objectionable in terms of
constitutional law. Furthermore, as regards the actual execution
of the warrant, Mr Niemietz had not exhausted the remedy available
to him under section 23(1) of the Introductory Act to the Courts
Organisation Act ({Einfuhrungsgesetz} zum
Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz).
II. Relevant domestic law
17. The search complained of was ordered in the context of
criminal proceedings for insulting behaviour, an offence
punishable by imprisonment for a maximum, where no physical
violence is involved, of one year or a fine (Article 185 of the
Criminal Code).
18. Article 13 para. 1 of the Basic Law (Grundgesetz)
guarantees the inviolability of the home (Wohnung); this provision
has been consistently interpreted by the German courts in a wide
sense, to include business premises (see, in particular, the
Federal Constitutional Court's judgment of 13 October 1971 -
Entscheidungssammlung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts, vol. 32,
p. 54).
19. Article 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides
that the home and other premises (Wohnung und andere {Raume}) of a
person who is not suspected of a criminal offence may be searched
only in order to arrest a person charged with an offence, to
investigate indications of an offence or to seize specific objects
and provided always that there are facts to suggest that such a
person, indications or objects is or are to be found on the
premises to be searched.
20. Search warrants may be challenged, as regards their
lawfulness, in proceedings instituted under Article 304 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure and, as regards their manner of
execution, in proceedings instituted under section 23(1) of the
Introductory Act to the Courts Organisation Act.
21. In Germany a lawyer is an independent organ in the
administration of justice and an independent counsel and
representative in all legal matters.
An unauthorised breach of secrecy by a lawyer is punishable by
imprisonment for a maximum of one year or a fine (Article 203
para. 1(3) of the Criminal Code). A lawyer is entitled to refuse
to give testimony concerning any matter confided to him in a
professional capacity (Article 53 para. 1(2) and (3) of the Code
of Criminal Procedure). The last-mentioned provisions, in
conjunction with Article 97, prohibit, with certain exceptions,
the seizure of correspondence between lawyer and client.
III. Case-law of the court of justice of the
European Communities
22. In its judgment of 21 September 1989 in Joined Cases 46/87
and 227/88 Hoechst v. Commission [1989] European Court Reports
("ECR") 2859 at 2924, the Court of Justice of the European
Communities stated as follows:
"Since the applicant has also relied on the requirements
stemming from the fundamental right to the inviolability of the
home, it should be observed that, although the existence of such a
right must be recognized in the Community legal order as a
principle common to the laws of the Member States in regard to the
private dwellings of natural persons, the same is not true in
regard to undertakings, because there are not inconsiderable
divergences between the legal systems of the Member States in
regard to the nature and degree of protection afforded to business
premises against intervention by the public authorities.
No other inference is to be drawn from Article 8 (1) (art.
8-1) of the European Convention on Human Rights which provides
that: "Everyone has the right to respect for his private and
family life, his home and his correspondence". The protective
scope of that article is concerned with the development of man's
personal freedom and may not therefore be extended to business
premises. Furthermore, it should be noted that there is no
case-law of the European Court of Human Rights on that subject.
None the less, in all the legal systems of the Member States,
any intervention by the public authorities in the sphere of
private activities of any person, whether natural or legal, must
have a legal basis and be justified on the grounds laid down by
law, and, consequently, those systems provide, albeit in different
forms, protection against arbitrary or disproportionate
intervention. The need for such protection must be recognized as a
general principle of Community law. In that regard, it should be
pointed out that the Court has held that it has the power to
determine whether measures of investigation taken by the
Commission under the ECSC Treaty are excessive (judgment of
14 December 1962 in Joined Cases 5 to 11 and 13 to 15/62 San
Michele and Others v. Commission [1962] ECR 449)."
This statement was affirmed in the same court's judgments of
17 October 1989 in Case 85/87 Dow Benelux v. Commission [1989] ECR
3137 at 3157 and Joined Cases 97 to 99/87 Dow Chemical {Iberica}
and Others v. Commission [1989] ECR 3165 at 3185-6.
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION
23. In his application (no. 13710/88) lodged with the
Commission on 15 February 1988, Mr Niemietz alleged that the
search had violated his right to respect for his home and
correspondence, guaranteed by Article 8 (art. 8) of the
Convention, and had also, by impairing the goodwill of his law
office and his reputation as a lawyer, constituted a breach of his
rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1). In addition, he
submitted that, contrary to Article 13 (art. 13) of the
Convention, he had no effective remedies before German authorities
in respect of those complaints.
24. By decision of 5 April 1990, the Commission declared the
complaints under Article 8 (art. 8) of the Convention and Article
1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) admissible and the remainder of the
application inadmissible.
In its report of 29 May 1991 (Article 31) (art. 31), the
Commission expressed the unanimous opinion that there had been a
violation of Article 8 (art. 8) of the Convention and that no
separate issue arose under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1). The
full text of the Commission's opinion is reproduced as an annex to
this judgment <3>.
--------------------------------
<3> Note by the Registrar: for practical reasons this annex
will appear only with the printed version of the judgment (volume
251- B of Series A of the Publications of the Court), but a copy
of the Commission's report is available from the registry.
FINAL SUBMISSIONS MADE TO THE COURT
25. At the hearing, the Agent of the Government invited the
Court to find that the Federal Republic of Germany had not
violated Article 8 (art. 8) of the Convention in the present case.
The applicant, for his part, requested the Court to hold that
the search of his office had constituted a breach of the
Convention.
AS TO THE LAW
I. Alleged violation of Article 8 (art. 8)
of the Convention
26. Mr Niemietz alleged that the search of his law office had
given rise to a breach of Article 8 (art. 8) of the Convention,
which reads as follows:
"1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and
family life, his home and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with
the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with
the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests
of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of
the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the
protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the
rights and freedoms of others."
This submission was accepted by the Commission, on the basis
that the search constituted an unjustified interference with the
applicant's private life and home.
A. Was there an "interference"?
27. In contesting the Commission's conclusion, the Government
maintained that Article 8 (art. 8) did not afford protection
against the search of a lawyer's office. In their view, the
Convention drew a clear distinction between private life and home,
on the one hand, and professional and business life and premises,
on the other.
28. In arriving at its opinion that there had been an
interference with Mr Niemietz's "private life" and "home", the
Commission attached particular significance to the confidential
relationship that exists between lawyer and client. The Court
shares the Government's doubts as to whether this factor can serve
as a workable criterion for the purposes of delimiting the scope
of the protection afforded by Article 8 (art. 8). Virtually all
professional and business activities may involve, to a greater or
lesser degree, matters that are confidential, with the result
that, if that criterion were adopted, disputes would frequently
arise as to where the line should be drawn.
29. The Court does not consider it possible or necessary to
attempt an exhaustive definition of the notion of "private life".
However, it would be too restrictive to limit the notion to an
"inner circle" in which the individual may live his own personal
life as he chooses and to exclude therefrom entirely the outside
world not encompassed within that circle. Respect for private life
must also comprise to a certain degree the right to establish and
develop relationships with other human beings.
There appears, furthermore, to be no reason of principle why
this understanding of the notion of "private life" should be taken
to exclude activities of a professional or business nature since
it is, after all, in the course of their working lives that the
majority of people have a significant, if not the greatest,
opportunity of developing relationships with the outside world.
This view is supported by the fact that, as was rightly pointed
out by the Commission, it is not always possible to distinguish
clearly which of an individual's activities form part of his
professional or business life and which do not. Thus, especially
in the case of a person exercising a liberal profession, his work
in that context may form part and parcel of his life to such a
degree that it becomes impossible to know in what capacity he is
acting at a given moment of time.
To deny the protection of Article 8 (art. 8) on the ground
that the measure complained of related only to professional
activities - as the Government suggested should be done in the
present case - could moreover lead to an inequality of treatment,
in that such protection would remain available to a person whose
professional and non-professional activities were so intermingled
that there was no means of distinguishing between them. In fact,
the Court has not heretofore drawn such distinctions: it concluded
that there had been an interference with private life even where
telephone tapping covered both business and private calls (see the
Huvig v. France judgment of 24 April 1990, Series A no. 176-B,
p. 41, para. 8, and p. 52, para. 25); and, where a search was
directed solely against business activities, it did not rely on
that fact as a ground for excluding the applicability of Article 8
(art. 8) under the head of "private life" (see the Chappell v. the
United Kingdom judgment of 30 March 1989, Series A no. 152-A,
pp. 12 - 13, para. 26, and pp. 21-22, para. 51.)
30. As regards the word "home", appearing in the English text
of Article 8 (art. 8), the Court observes that in certain
Contracting States, notably Germany (see paragraph 18 above), it
has been accepted as extending to business premises. Such an
interpretation is, moreover, fully consonant with the French text,
since the word "domicile" has a broader connotation than the word
"home" and may extend, for example, to a professional person's
office.
In this context also, it may not always be possible to draw
precise distinctions, since activities which are related to a
profession or business may well be conducted from a person's
private residence and activities which are not so related may well
be carried on in an office or commercial premises. A narrow
interpretation of the words "home" and "domicile" could therefore
give rise to the same risk of inequality of treatment as a narrow
interpretation of the notion of "private life" (see paragraph 29
above).
31. More generally, to interpret the words "private life" and
"home" as including certain professional or business activities or
premises would be consonant with the essential object and purpose
of Article 8 (art. 8), namely to protect the individual against
arbitrary interference by the public authorities (see, for
example, the Marckx v. Belgium judgment of 13 June 1979, Series A
no. 31, p. 15, para. 31). Such an interpretation would not unduly
hamper the Contracting States, for they would retain their
entitlement to "interfere" to the extent permitted by paragraph 2
of Article 8 (art. 8-2); that entitlement might well be more
far-reaching where professional or business activities or premises
were involved than would otherwise be the case.
32. To the above-mentioned general considerations, which
militate against the view that Article 8 (art. 8) is not
applicable, must be added a further factor pertaining to the
particular circumstances of the case. The warrant issued by the
Munich District Court ordered a search for, and seizure of,
"documents" - without qualification or limitation - revealing the
identity of Klaus Wegner (see paragraph 10 above). Furthermore,
those conducting the search examined four cabinets with data
concerning clients as well as six individual files (see paragraph
11 above); their operations must perforce have covered
"correspondence" and materials that can properly be regarded as
such for the purposes of Article 8 (art. 8). In this connection,
it is sufficient to note that that provision does not use, as it
does for the word "life", any adjective to qualify the word
"correspondence". And, indeed, the Court has already held that, in
the context of correspondence in the form of telephone calls, no
such qualification is to be made (see the above-mentioned Huvig
judgment, Series A no. 176-B, p. 41, para. 8, and p. 52, para.
25). Again, in a number of cases relating to correspondence with a
lawyer (see, for example, the {Schonenberger} and Durmaz v.
Switzerland judgment of 20 June 1988, Series A no. 137, and the
Campbell v. the United Kingdom judgment of 25 March 1992, Series A
no. 233), the Court did not even advert to the possibility that
Article 8 (art. 8) might be inapplicable on the ground that the
correspondence was of a professional nature.
33. Taken together, the foregoing reasons lead the Court to
find that the search of the applicant's office constituted an
interference with his rights under Article 8 (art. 8).
B. Was the interference "in accordance with the law"?
34. The applicant submitted that the interference in question
was not "in accordance with the law", since it was based on
suspicions rather than facts and so did not meet the conditions
laid down by Article 103 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see
paragraph 19 above) and since it was intended to circumvent the
legal provisions safeguarding professional secrecy.
35. The Court agrees with the Commission and the Government
that that submission must be rejected. It notes that both the
Munich I Regional Court and the Federal Constitutional Court
considered that the search was lawful in terms of Article 103 of
the aforesaid Code (see paragraphs 15 - 16 and 19 above) and sees
no reason to differ from the views which those courts expressed.
C. Did the interference have a legitimate aim or aims?
36. Like the Commission, the Court finds that, as was not
contested by the applicant, the interference pursued aims that
were legitimate under paragraph 2 of Article 8 (art. 8-2), namely
the prevention of crime and the protection of the rights of
others, that is the honour of Judge Miosga.
D. Was the interference "necessary
in a democratic society"?
37. As to whether the interference was "necessary in a
democratic society", the Court inclines to the view that the
reasons given therefor by the Munich District Court (see paragraph
10 above) can be regarded as relevant in terms of the legitimate
aims pursued. It does not, however, consider it essential to
pursue this point since it has formed the opinion that, as was
contended by the applicant and as was found by the Commission, the
measure complained of was not proportionate to those aims.
It is true that the offence in connection with which the
search was effected, involving as it did not only an insult to but
also an attempt to bring pressure on a judge, cannot be classified
as no more than minor. On the other hand, the warrant was drawn in
broad terms, in that it ordered a search for and seizure of
"documents", without any limitation, revealing the identity of the
author of the offensive letter; this point is of special
significance where, as in Germany, the search of a lawyer's office
is not accompanied by any special procedural safeguards, such as
the presence of an independent observer. More importantly, having
regard to the materials that were in fact inspected, the search
impinged on professional secrecy to an extent that appears
disproportionate in the circumstances; it has, in this connection,
to be recalled that, where a lawyer is involved, an encroachment
on professional secrecy may have repercussions on the proper
administration of justice and hence on the rights guaranteed by
Article 6 (art. 6) of the Convention. In addition, the attendant
publicity must have been capable of affecting adversely the
applicant's professional reputation, in the eyes both of his
existing clients and of the public at large.
E. Conclusion
38. The Court thus concludes that there was a breach of
Article 8 (art. 8).
II. Alleged violation of Article 1
of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1)
39. Mr Niemietz also argued that, by impairing his reputation
as a lawyer, the search constituted a violation of Article 1 of
Protocol No. 1 (P1-1), which provides:
"Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful
enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his
possessions except in the public interest and subject to the
conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of
international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair
the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to
control the use of property in accordance with the general
interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions
or penalties."
40. Having already taken into consideration, in the context of
Article 8 (art. 8), the potential effects of the search on the
applicant's professional reputation (see paragraph 37 above), the
Court agrees with the Commission that no separate issue arises
under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1).
III. Application of Article 50
(art. 50) of the Convention
41. Article 50 (art. 50) of the Convention reads:
"If the Court finds that a decision or a measure taken by a
legal authority or any other authority of a High Contracting Party
is completely or partially in conflict with the obligations
arising from the ... Convention, and if the internal law of the
said Party allows only partial reparation to be made for the
consequences of this decision or measure, the decision of the
Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured
party."
42. In a letter filed on 16 December 1991 (see paragraph 4
above), the applicant requested the Court, taking into account in
particular the damage caused to the reputation of his practice, to
award him under Article 50 (art. 50) compensation of a type and
amount to be determined by the Court in its discretion.
43. The Court is unable to accede to that request.
The applicant has, in the first place, not established that
the breach of Article 8 (art. 8) caused him pecuniary damage. If
and in so far as it may have occasioned non-pecuniary damage, the
Court considers, like the Delegate of the Commission, that its
finding of a violation constitutes of itself sufficient just
satisfaction therefor. Finally, although Mr Niemietz stated at the
hearing that his request extended to his costs and expenses
referable to the proceedings in Germany and in Strasbourg, he has
supplied no particulars of that expenditure.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
1. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 8 (art. 8)
of the Convention;
2. Holds that no separate issue arises under Article 1 of
Protocol No. 1 (P1-1);
3. Dismisses the applicant's claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English and in French, and delivered at a public
hearing in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 16 December
1992.
Signed: Rolv RYSSDAL
President
Signed: {Marc-Andre} EISSEN
Registrar
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