[неофициальный перевод]
ЕВРОПЕЙСКИЙ СУД ПО ПРАВАМ ЧЕЛОВЕКА
СУДЕБНОЕ РЕШЕНИЕ
КАСТЕЛЛС (CASTELLS) ПРОТИВ ИСПАНИИ
(Страсбург, 23 апреля 1992 года)
(Извлечение)
КРАТКОЕ НЕОФИЦИАЛЬНОЕ ИЗЛОЖЕНИЕ ОБСТОЯТЕЛЬСТВ ДЕЛА
A. Основные факты
В 1979 г. заявитель, сенатор, избранный от политического
движения, выступающего за независимость Страны Басков, опубликовал
в еженедельнике "Пунто и Ора де Еускалхерриа" статью, в которой
привлек внимание общественного мнения к убийствам и нападениям,
совершенным вооруженными группировками против баскских граждан. Он
утверждал, что эти группировки орудовали при полной
безнаказанности, поскольку за ними стояли Правительство и правящая
партия. "Мы должны открыто назвать ответственных", - так
заканчивалась статья.
Органы прокуратуры возбудили против Кастеллса уголовное
преследование. Он был лишен парламентского иммунитета, и 7 июля
1981 г. ему было предъявлено обвинение в оскорблении Правительства
(статья 161 Уголовного кодекса).
31 октября 1983 г. Палата по уголовным делам Верховного суда
признала заявителя виновным и приговорила его к одному году
тюремного заключения. Суд посчитал, что положение заявителя как
сенатора обязывало его ограничиться теми средствами критики
Правительства, которые предусмотрены Правилами процедуры Сената и
которые он не выполнил. Более того, его статья продемонстрировала
намерение опорочить Правительство. Суд отказался допустить
доказательства, которые защита просила приобщить к делу, чтобы
показать, что содержавшаяся в статье информация была общеизвестной
и соответствовала действительности.
10 апреля 1985 г. Конституционный Суд отклонил жалобу г-на
Кастеллса, поданную 22 ноября 1983 г. в процедуре ампаро. Однако
исполнение приговора было приостановлено.
B. Разбирательство в Комиссии по правам человека
В жалобе, поданной в Комиссию 17 сентября 1985 г., заявитель
утверждал, что были нарушены статьи 6, 7, 10, 14 Конвенции.
Комиссия признала жалобу неприемлемой в отношении статей 6 и 7
и приемлемой в отношении статей 10 и 14.
В своем докладе 8 января 1991 г. Комиссия пришла к выводу:
a) девятью голосами против трех, что было нарушение статьи 10;
b) единогласно, что никакого отдельного вопроса на основании
статьи 14 в сочетании со статьей 10 не возникает.
Комиссия передала дело в Суд 8 марта 1991 г.
ИЗВЛЕЧЕНИЕ ИЗ СУДЕБНОГО РЕШЕНИЯ
ВОПРОСЫ ПРАВА
I. О предполагаемом нарушении статьи 10 Конвенции
23. Г-н Кастеллс заявляет, что он стал жертвой нарушения права
на свободу слова, в том виде как она гарантирована статьей 10
Конвенции, которая гласит:
"1. Каждый человек имеет право на свободу выражать свое мнение.
Это право включает свободу придерживаться своего мнения и свободу
получать и распространять информацию и идеи без какого-либо
вмешательства со стороны государственных органов и независимо от
государственных границ...
2. Осуществление этих свобод, налагающее обязанности и
ответственность, может быть сопряжено с формальностями, условиями,
ограничениями или санкциями, которые установлены законом и которые
необходимы в демократическом обществе в интересах государственной
безопасности, территориальной целостности или общественного
спокойствия, в целях предотвращения беспорядков и преступлений,
для охраны здоровья и нравственности, защиты репутации или прав
других лиц, предотвращения разглашения информации, полученной
конфиденциально, или обеспечения авторитета и беспристрастности
правосудия".
Правительство оспаривает это утверждение, тогда как Комиссия
согласна с ним.
A. Предварительное возражение Правительства
24. Правительство утверждает, как и ранее в Комиссии, что
заявитель не исчерпал внутренние средства правовой защиты (статья
26 Конвенции). Возможно, "по тактическим соображениям" он не
поднимал в Конституционном Суде вопроса о якобы происшедшем
нарушении его права на свободу слова, охраняемую в соответствии со
статьей 20 Конституции. В своей жалобе, переданной в процедуре
ампаро, он ссылался на эту статью лишь косвенно, жалуясь на
дискриминацию при осуществлении данной свободы; кроме того, он не
упоминал ни о статье 10 Конвенции, ни об аналогичных нормах в
других международных пакетах. В соответствии с Учредительным
актом, регламентирующим процедуру подачи и рассмотрения таких
жалоб (N 2/1070), ему надлежало четко указать и фактические
обстоятельства, и те нормы, которые якобы были нарушены. Отсюда
следует, что г-н Кастеллс не дал Конституционному Суду возможности
вынести решение по вопросу, который сейчас рассматривается в Суде.
25. В ответ заявитель утверждал, что в Конституционном Суде он
специально ссылался на статью 20 Конституции. Прежде всего сами
обстоятельства, изложенные в его жалобе ампаро, свидетельствовали,
что предметом спора был типичный пример осуществления права на
свободу слова, и со всей очевидностью доказывали вмешательство в
это право. Более того, он письменно процитировал искомую статью, а
в своей устной аргументации настаивал, что имело место нарушение
статьи 20 в сочетании со статьей 14 Конституции (равенство перед
законом). Верно, что в основном он строил свою аргументацию на
более ограниченной основе - праве выборного представителя на
основании статьи 23 Конституции выступать с критикой политического
характера, но достаточно прочесть п. 10 части "Вопросы права"
Судебного решения по его делу от 10 апреля 1985 г., чтобы увидеть,
что и вопрос о свободе слова в свете статьи 20 также был им
поставлен. В этом пункте Конституционный Суд подробно исследовал
вопрос о соответствии статьи 161 Уголовного кодекса, по которой он
обвинялся и был осужден, конституционному принципу свободы слова
(см. п. 15 и 17 выше).
26. Выразив свое согласие с заявителем, Комиссия прежде всего
просила Суд констатировать, что рассмотрение данного возражения
находится вне его компетенции.
27. По этому вопросу Суд ограничивается ссылкой на общую линию
своей практики, которая нашла свое недавнее подтверждение в
Решении по делу Б. против Франции от 25 марта 1992 г. (Серия A, т.
232-C, с. 45, п. 35 - 36).
Относительно существа возражения Суд отмечает, что статья 26
Конвенции должна применяться "с определенной степенью гибкости и
без излишнего формализма"; достаточно, чтобы "жалобы, которые
предназначены для последующего представления в учреждения
Конвенции", разбирались бы "по крайней мере по существу и в
соответствии с формальными требованиями и в пределах сроков,
установленных внутренним законодательством" (см. Решение по делу
Гуцарди против Италии от 6 ноября 1980 г. Серия A, т. 39, с. 26,
п. 72, и Судебное решение по делу Кардо против Франции от 19 марта
1991 г. Серия A, т. 200, с. 18, п. 34).
28. Заявитель ссылается на статью 10 Конвенции в двух аспектах:
как он утверждает, его преследовали и осудили за утверждения,
которые были истинными, но ему помешали установить в суде их
соответствие действительности; кроме того, опубликованная им
статья относится к области политической критики, заниматься
которой - долг любого члена Парламента.
29. Г-н Кастеллс поднимал оба эти вопроса в Верховном суде.
Судебное решение от 31 октября 1983 г. отвергло эти доводы,
посчитав, что они не оправдывают оскорбления Правительства, и
признало, что заявитель преступил границы приемлемой политической
критики (см. п. 13 выше).
30. Основывая свою жалобу ампаро на статье 23 Конституции,
заявитель отстаивал как сенатор право критиковать действия
Правительства, что, очевидно, является неотъемлемой частью свободы
слова выборных представителей. Более того, Конституционный Суд
признал это, соединив жалобу по статьям 14 и 20 с жалобой по
статье 23 (см. п. 17 выше).
Заявитель ссылался на презумпцию невиновности и право приобщать
к делу доказательства, подтверждающие достоверность его
высказываний, что прямо связано с предполагаемым нарушением статьи
10 Конвенции. Такой же вывод следует из позиции Конституционного
Суда, который соединил вопрос о приобщении к делу доказательств с
рассмотрением дела по существу на основании статьи 161 Уголовного
кодекса (п. 9 и 10 части "Вопросы права" Судебного решения от 10
апреля 1985 г.; см. п. 17 выше).
31. Суд, как и Комиссия, отмечает, что г-н Кастеллс
неоднократно цитировал статью 20 Конституции в своих обращениях в
суды (см. п. 13 и 15 выше). В ряде письменных обращений в
Конституционный Суд он настаивал на своем праве "получать и
распространять правдивую информацию" (см. п. 16 выше).
Нет сомнений, что причину неудачи жалобы ампаро следует искать
в тех границах, которыми ограничил свою компетенцию
Конституционный Суд; он сосредоточился по преимуществу на
толковании понятия "оскорбление Правительства" и соответственно
применении статьи 161 Уголовного кодекса, чем подлежало заниматься
общим судам (см. п. 17 выше), и, следовательно, конституционный
аспект свободы слова остался в стороне.
32. Следовательно, Суд полагает, что заявитель действительно
ставил перед Конституционным Судом, "по крайней мере в принципе",
вопросы, относящиеся к статье 10 Конвенции. Таким образом,
возражение, что г-н Кастеллс не исчерпал внутренних средств
правовой защиты, должно быть отклонено.
B. Об обоснованности жалобы
33. Согласно жалобе г-на Кастеллса, уголовное дело против него
и последовавшее затем его осуждение за оскорбление Правительства
представляет собой вмешательство в осуществление им права на
свободу слова в частности, потому что ему не было позволено
доказать достоверность содержавшихся в его статье утверждений.
34. Ограничения и наказания, на которые он жаловался,
несомненно, являются "вмешательством" в осуществление свободы, о
которой идет речь. Для того чтобы такое вмешательство не нарушало
статьи 10, оно должно быть "предусмотрено законом" и направлено на
достижение одной или более правомерных целей, указанных в статье
10 п. 2 и "необходимых в демократическом обществе".
1. "Предусмотрено законом"
35. Не вызывает сомнений, что оспариваемое судебное
преследование имеет правовое основание, а именно статьи 161 и 162
Уголовного кодекса. Заявитель этого не оспаривает, но он
утверждает, будто не представлял себе, что ему будет отказано в
таком средстве защиты, как доказательство достоверности его
утверждений, особенно после принятия Конституции 1978 г. Он
настаивал, что до 19 мая 1982 г. Верховный суд никогда не
рассматривал дела об оскорблении Правительства и о допущении
доказательств в целях защиты от обвинений в подобных преступлениях
(статья 240). В доктрине и судебной практике высказывались по
этому поводу разные точки зрения.
36. В возражении Правительства указывалось, что по
законодательству Испании, в частности по статье 461 Уголовного
кодекса, доказательство достоверности распространенных сведений
как средство защиты допустимо только тогда, когда оскорбления
направлены против гражданских служащих, находящихся при исполнении
служебных обязанностей; ни до, ни после 1978 г. Верховный суд не
позволял когда-либо использовать exceptio veritatis для
оскорблений, которые не были бы направлены против отдельных
личностей. Однако г-н Кастеллс оскорбил Правительство в целом.
37. Исходя из текста статьи 461 Уголовного кодекса, Суд считает
такое толкование разумным. Прецедентов такого рода, по-видимому,
не было - отсюда колебания, выказанные Верховным судом в его
разъяснениях от 19 мая 1982 г. (см. п. 12 выше), что, однако, не
имеет значения: разъяснение охватывало в общей форме несколько
возможных типов оскорблений и должно было применяться в новых
ситуациях; вышеупомянутое Решение ограничилось тем, что применило
его к особым обстоятельствам (см. mutatis mutandis Решение по делу
"Обсервер" и "Гардиан" против Соединенного Королевства от 26
ноября 1991 г. Серия A, т. 216, с. 27 - 28, п. 53).
Поэтому Суд, как и Комиссия, считает, что нормы, регулирующие
условия оспариваемого вмешательства, были достаточно предсказуемы,
исходя из целей статьи 10 п. 2 Конвенции.
2. Правомерность преследуемой цели
38. Согласно утверждению заявителя ни выдвинутое против него
обвинение, ни последующее его осуждение не преследовали
правомерной цели, подпадающей под действие статьи 10 п. 2.
Действия, в которых он был обвинен, - и это допускал сам Верховный
суд, не вызывали какой-либо тревоги; как явствует из Судебного
решения от 31 октября 1983 г., вмешательство решало не задачу
защиты общественного порядка и национальной безопасности, а
фактически охраняло честь Правительства - ответчика.
39. Однако в своем Решении от 10 апреля 1985 г., на которое
ссылается Правительство, Конституционный Суд сделал упор на то,
что безопасность государства может оказаться в опасности из-за
попыток дискредитировать демократические институты (см. п. 17
выше). В своей статье г-н Кастеллс не просто описывает очень
серьезную ситуацию в Стране Басков, он обвиняет власти, в
частности полицию, в пассивности и даже попустительстве
организаторам преступной деятельности, подразумевая тем самым, что
Правительство также несет ответственность.
Таким образом, можно сказать, и это соответствует точке зрения
Правительства и Комиссии, что в конкретных обстоятельствах Испании
1979 г. судебное преследование заявителя было начато в целях
"предотвращения беспорядков" в смысле статьи 10 п. 2, а не только
для "защиты репутации... других лиц".
3. Необходимость вмешательства
40. Г-н Кастеллс отметил свое согласие с Комиссией и подчеркнул
чрезвычайную важность свободы слова для выборного представителя -
выразителя мнений и обеспокоенности своего электората. Эта свобода
заслуживает дополнительных гарантий, когда обсуждаются вопросы,
представляющие общественный интерес. Так было и в этом случае;
спорная статья была частью широкой дискуссии о климате
нестабильности, сложившемся в Стране Басков начиная с 1977 г.
Осуждение заявителя скорее призвано было защитить власти от атак
оппозиции, чем Правительство от необоснованных и порочащих
обвинений; хотя разглашение фактов, о которых шла речь, ставило
Правительство в неловкое положение, оно отвечало общественным
интересам.
41. Правительство подчеркивало, что свобода слова не является
абсолютной; она налагает "обязанности и ответственность" (статья
10 п. 2 Конвенции). Г-н Кастеллс преступил обычные границы
политической дискуссии; он оскорбил демократическое Правительство,
способствуя дестабилизации в критический для Испании период, а
именно вскоре после принятия Конституции, когда группы разной
ориентации равно прибегают к насилию.
42. Суд напомнил, что свобода слова, закрепленная в статье 10
п. 1, составляет одну из важнейших опор демократического общества
и одно из главных условий его прогресса. При условии соблюдения
требований статьи 10 п. 2 она применима не только к "информации"
или "идеям", которые встречаются благосклонно или рассматриваются
как безобидные либо безразличные, но и в отношении тех, которые
задевают, шокируют или беспокоят. Таковы требования плюрализма,
толерантности и либерализма, без которых нет "демократического
общества" (см. inter alia Решение по делу Хэндисайд против
Соединенного Королевства от 7 декабря 1976 г. Серия A, т. 24, с.
23, п. 49, и вышеупомянутое Решение по делу "Обсервер" и
"Гардиан". Серия A, т. 216, с. 30, п. 59 "a").
Свобода слова важна для всех, но это особенно справедливо,
когда речь идет о выборных представителях народа. Они представляют
свой электорат, привлекают внимание к его заботам и отстаивают его
интересы. Соответственно, вмешательство в осуществление свободы
слова члена Парламента от оппозиции, каковым является заявитель,
требует самого пристального внимания со стороны Суда.
43. В рассматриваемом деле г-н Кастеллс выражал свое мнение не
в зале заседаний Сената, что он мог бы делать, не опасаясь
санкций, он предпочел сделать это в периодической печати. Однако
это не означает, что он был не вправе критиковать таким образом
Правительство.
В этой связи не следует забывать особую роль прессы в правовом
государстве. Хотя она и не должна преступать определенных границ,
установленных inter alia для предотвращения беспорядков и защиты
репутации других лиц, тем не менее на нее возлагается обязанность
передавать информацию и идеи по политическим и иным вопросам,
представляющим общественный интерес (см. mutatis mutandis Решение
по делу "Санди таймс" против Соединенного Королевства от 26 апреля
1979 г. Серия A, т. 30, с. 40, п. 65, и вышеупомянутое Решение по
делу "Обсервер" и "Гардиан". Серия A, т. 216, с. 30, п. 59 "b").
Свобода печати предоставляет для граждан один из самых
совершенных способов открывать для себя и вырабатывать мнение о
взглядах и позиции своих политических лидеров. В частности, она
дает политикам возможность высказываться по поводу того, что
заботит общественное мнение, позволяет участвовать в свободной
политической дискуссии каждому, что является стержнем понятия
демократического общества (см. Решение по делу Лингенс против
Австрии от 8 июля 1986 г. Серия A, т. 103, с. 26, п. 42).
44. В своем Решении от 31 октября 1983 г. Верховный суд встал
на ту точку зрения, что статья перешла грань между политической
критикой и оскорблением, хотя и несколько смягченным образом (см.
п. 13 выше).
45. Суд, как и Комиссия, отметил, что г-н Кастеллс начал с
критики безнаказанности, которой пользуются члены различных
экстремистских группировок, совершивших ряд нападений в Стране
Басков начиная с 1977 г. Тем самым он рассказывал о фактах,
представляющих большой интерес для общественного мнения того
региона, где продается большая часть тиража данного периодического
издания. Однако в своих выводах он выдвинул серьезные обвинения
против Правительства, которое, по его мнению, несет
ответственность за возникшее положение (см. п. 7 выше).
46. Свобода политической дискуссии, несомненно, не является
абсолютной по своей природе. Государства - участники могут
подвергать ее определенным "ограничениям" или "санкциям", но Суду
принадлежит право выносить окончательное решение о совместимости
этих мер со свободой слова, воплощенной в статье 10 (см. mutatis
mutandis вышеупомянутое Решение по делу "Обсервер" и "Гардиан").
Пределы допустимой критики в отношении Правительства шире, чем
в отношении рядового гражданина или даже политического деятеля. В
демократической системе действия или упущения Правительства должны
стать предметом пристального внимания не только законодательных и
судебных властей, но также прессы и общественного мнения. Более
того, доминирующее положение, которое занимает Правительство,
делает необходимым, чтобы оно демонстрировало сдержанность, когда
встает вопрос об уголовном преследовании за критику, особенно
когда имеются другие средства ответа на неоправданные нападки его
противников или средств массовой информации. Тем не менее у
компетентных органов государственной власти как гарантов
общественного порядка остается открытой возможность принятия мер,
в том числе уголовно-правового характера, направленных на то,
чтобы адекватным образом, без излишних эксцессов реагировать на
безосновательные или недобросовестные обвинения порочащего
характера.
47. Г-н Кастеллс несколько раз предлагал в Верховном суде, а в
последующем в Конституционном Суде, установить, что приведенные им
факты достоверны и хорошо известны; с его точки зрения, это лишало
его утверждения какого-либо оскорбительного звучания (см. п. 11 и
16 выше).
19 мая 1982 г. Верховный суд объявил такие доказательства
недопустимыми на том основании, что нельзя использовать
достоверность фактов как средство защиты, если речь идет об
оскорблениях, направленных против государственных институтов (см.
п. 12 и 13 выше); он подтвердил такое толкование в своем Решении
от 31 октября 1983 г. (см. п. 13 выше). Конституционный Суд решил,
что это вопрос о соблюдении законности и в качестве такового
находится за пределами его компетенции (см. п. 17 выше).
Поэтому заявитель при рассмотрении возбужденного против него
уголовного дела по статье 161 Уголовного кодекса не мог ссылаться
в свою защиту на добросовестность и достоверность фактов.
48. В возражении Правительства говорилось, что, т.к.
утверждения г-на Кастеллса не были достаточно точны, они не могли
претендовать на то, что их правдивость будет подтверждена; более
того, они имеют оценочный характер, в отношении к которым критерий
достоверности неприменим.
Этот аргумент не убедителен. Вышедшая в "Пунто и Ора де
Еускалхерриа" статья должна рассматриваться в целом. Заявитель
начал ее с длинного списка нападений и убийств, совершенных в
Стране Басков, затем подчеркнул, что они остались безнаказанными;
далее в статье он утверждал о причастности к ним различных
экстремистских организаций, которые он назвал, а в конце возложил
ответственность за создавшееся положение на Правительство. На
самом деле достоверность многих из этих утверждений поддавалась
проверке, а г-н Кастеллс обоснованно мог рассчитывать, что ему
дадут возможность доказать свою добросовестность.
Невозможно судить, каков был бы результат разбирательства, если
бы Верховный суд согласился допустить доказательства, которые
заявитель хотел приобщить к делу, но Суд придает решающее значение
тому обстоятельству, что Верховный суд объявил такие
доказательства неприемлемыми применительно к рассматриваемому
преступлению (см. п. 12 выше). Он считает, что такое вмешательство
в осуществление свободы слова заявителя не было необходимым в
демократическом обществе.
49. Правительство ссылается также на относительно мягкий
характер наложенных санкций, но в свете предыдущего вывода Суд не
обязан анализировать данный довод.
50. Суд решил, что имело место нарушение статьи 10.
II. Предполагаемое нарушение статьи 14
в сочетании со статьей 10
51. Г-н Кастеллс требовал считать его жертвой дискриминации,
потому что другие люди высказывали подобные взгляды без наложения
на них каких-либо уголовных санкций. Он ссылался на статью 14,
которая сформулирована следующим образом:
"Пользование правами и свободами, признанными в настоящей
Конвенции, должно быть обеспечено без какой-либо дискриминации по
признаку пола, расы, цвета кожи, языка, религии, политических или
иных убеждений, национального или социального происхождения,
принадлежности к национальным меньшинствам, имущественного
положения, рождения или любым иным обстоятельствам".
Правительство отрицало утверждение заявителя.
52. Поскольку данный вопрос не является ключевым в деле, Суд не
считает необходимым его рассмотрение (см. inter alia Решение по
делу Эйри против Ирландии от 9 октября 1979 г. Серия A, т. 32, с.
16, п. 30).
III. Применение статьи 50
53. В соответствии со статьей 50,
"Если Суд установит, что решение или мера, принятые судебными
или иными властями Высокой Договаривающейся Стороны, полностью или
частично противоречат обязательствам, вытекающим из настоящей
Конвенции, а также если внутреннее право упомянутой Стороны
допускает лишь частичное возмещение последствий такого решения или
такой меры, то решением Суда, если в этом есть необходимость,
предусматривается справедливое возмещение потерпевшей стороне".
54. Заявитель хотел прежде всего добиться публикации краткого
изложения решения Суда в газетах Страны Басков, Мадрида и других
провинциях страны, а также изъятия всякого упоминания о его
осуждении из Центрального уголовного архива.
Суд указал, что он не компетентен принимать такие обязывающие
решения (см. mutatis mutandis Решение по делу "Манифаттура ФЛ"
против Италии от 27 февраля 1992 г. Серия A, т. 230-B, с. 21, п.
22).
A. Материальный ущерб
55. Г-н Кастеллс потребовал 375000 песет в качестве компенсации
за потерю заработка. Как обвиняемый, отпущенный под залог, он
должен был пятьдесят два раза отмечаться в суде по месту
жительства (Сан-Себастьян), и три раза в Верховном суде в Мадриде
(см. п. 8 и 9 выше), что привело к потере времени и возможности
заниматься профессиональной деятельностью в качестве адвоката.
Суд придерживается той точки зрения, что данное ограничение
вряд ли могло причинить ущерб г-ну Кастеллсу, т.к., будучи
адвокатом, он часто посещал суды, о которых идет речь. Причинение
ему материального ущерба, таким образом, не установлено.
B. Нематериальный вред
56. Заявитель потребовал также компенсации морального вреда, не
называя конкретных цифр. Суд не исключает наличие такого вреда, но
исходя из обстоятельств дела считает, что признание настоящим
Судебным решением факта нарушения само по себе представляет
достаточно справедливое удовлетворение.
C. Издержки и расходы
57. В качестве компенсации издержек и расходов, понесенных им в
испанских судах, г-н Кастеллс потребовал 2181476 песет. Суд
присуждает ему только 1000000 песет, т.к. спорные суммы относились
к жалобам ампаро, т.е. тем, которые не были признаны Комиссией
приемлемыми.
58. Наконец заявитель хотел получить 3328000 песет за
понесенные им издержки и расходы в органах Конвенции, а также
20000 немецких марок гонораров г-ну Корффу и г-ну Верваеле.
Как и Правительство, Суд считает чрезмерным число адвокатов,
представлявших г-на Кастеллса, который предстал перед Судом в
сопровождении четырех адвокатов; следует также иметь в виду, что
Комиссия объявила некоторые первоначально заявленные жалобы
неприемлемыми.
Проведя оценку по справедливости, Суд присуждает г-ну Кастеллсу
компенсацию на общую сумму 2000000 песет.
ПО ЭТИМ ОСНОВАНИЯМ СУД ЕДИНОГЛАСНО
1. Постановил, что он компетентен рассматривать предварительное
возражение Правительства, но отверг его;
2. Постановил, что имело место нарушение статьи 10;
3. Постановил, что нет необходимости рассматривать дело по
статье 14, в сочетании со статьей 10;
4. Постановил, что настоящее Судебное решение представляет
собой достаточное справедливое удовлетворение предполагаемого
морального вреда в целях статьи 50;
5. Постановил, что Королевство Испания должно выплатить
заявителю в течение трех месяцев 3000000 (три миллиона) песет за
издержки и расходы;
6. Отверг оставшуюся часть требований заявителя.
Совершено на английском и французском языках и оглашено во
Дворце прав человека в Страсбурге 23 апреля 1992 г.
Председатель
Рольф РИССДАЛ
Грефье
Марк-Андре ЭЙССЕН
В соответствии со статьей 51 п. 2 Конвенции и статьей 53 п. 2
Регламента Суда к настоящему Решению прилагаются отдельные мнения
судей.
СОВПАДАЮЩЕЕ МНЕНИЕ СУДЬИ ДЕ МЕЙЕРА
Г-н Кастеллс приводит в спорной статье длинный перечень убийств
и нападений, совершенных в Стране Басков <1>, и осуждает
безнаказанность, которой пользуются лица, их совершившие, описывая
ее как возмутительную <2>. Он жаловался на бездействие властей
<3>, которые, как он утверждал, ничего не сделали для установления
личности преступников, хотя те же самые власти выказали большое
рвение "в других случаях" <4>. Он усмотрел в этом свидетельство
сговора с виновной стороной <5> и приписал ответственность за "эти
действия" Правительству и его сторонникам <6>.
--------------------------------
<1> Пункт 48 Судебного решения. См. первый и второй абзацы
статьи в п. 7 Судебного решения.
<2> Название статьи и п. 45 и 48 Судебного решения.
<3> Пункт 39 Судебного решения.
<4> См., в частности, третий и шестой абзацы статьи.
<5> Пункт 39 Судебного решения.
<6> Последний абзац статьи и п. 39 и 45 Судебного решения.
Это, несомненно, были серьезные обвинения <*>.
--------------------------------
<*> Пункт 45 Судебного решения.
Однако, выдвигая их, он правомерно осуществлял свое право на
свободу слова. Это право, как видно из материалов поступившего в
Суд дела, оказалось нарушено, т.к. г-н Кастеллс был подвергнут
судебному преследованию и осужден за обнародование своих взглядов
по вопросу, представлявшему общий интерес; наказывать гражданина
за такие действия в "демократическом обществе" недопустимо.
В этой связи безразлично, прав или не прав был г-н Кастеллс.
Вопрос о достоверности фактов как средстве защиты не имеет
отношения к оценке ситуации <*>; это тем более справедливо, что
убийства и нападения, на которые делаются ссылки в статье,
действительно имели место, а безнаказанность лиц, их совершивших,
никто не отрицал.
--------------------------------
<*> См. по этому вопросу отдельное мнение г-на Пекканена, с. 29
ниже, и mutatis mutandis Судебное решение по делу Лингенс против
Австрии от 8 июля 1986 г. Серия A, т. 103, с. 27 - 28, п. 45 и 46.
Стоит добавить также, что в той мере, в какой это касается
оскорблений, ложных обвинений и диффамации, нет никаких оснований
для предоставления институтам государства большей защиты, чем
индивиду, либо охранять репутацию Правительства больше, чем
оппозиции <*>.
--------------------------------
<*> Поэтому я не могу одобрить "усиленную защиту",
предоставляемую Правительством в соответствии со статьями 161 и
162 Уголовного кодекса Испании (п. 20 Судебного решения).
СОВПАДАЮЩЕЕ МНЕНИЕ СУДЬИ ПЕККАНЕНА
В своей статье г-н Кастеллс вначале привел список убийств и
нападений, происшедших в Стране Басков, и подчеркнул, что эти
преступления остались нераскрытыми и безнаказанными. Он также
упомянул о причастности к ним различных правоэкстремистских
организаций. Из этих фактов он сделал вывод, что "за этими
действиями может стоять только Правительство, партия Правительства
и их люди".
Г-н Кастеллс был приговорен Верховным судом за оскорбительные,
но не грубые высказывания в адрес Правительства. Верховный суд
нашел inter alia, что эти оскорбительные высказывания с целью
политической критики превысили допустимые пределы такой критики и
задели честь Правительства. Верховный суд придерживается мнения,
что по испанскому законодательству достоверность фактов как
средство защиты (exceptio veritatis) недопустимо в подобных
случаях.
Суд придал решающее значение тому обстоятельству, что Верховный
суд Испании объявил недопустимой такую достоверность фактов как
средство защиты по рассматриваемому преступлению. К сожалению, я
не могу разделить данное мнение. Решающим в нарушении статьи 10
Конвенции, с моей точки зрения, является наказание г-на Кастеллса
за то, что он посчитал Правительство ответственным за указанные
инциденты и опубликовал свое мнение.
Относительно вопроса об exceptio veritatis, который подробно
обсуждается в Судебном решении, я полагаю, что для г-на Кастеллса
оказалось бы невозможным доказать достоверность его мнения,
выраженного в порядке политической полемики, - мнения, где
утверждалось, что за всеми этими убийствами и нападениями стоит
Правительство. Поэтому exceptio veritatis не имеет отношения к
настоящему делу. Для обнаружения нарушения статьи 10 Конвенции
достаточно того, что г-н Кастеллс был осужден за критику
Правительства, совершенную им способом, который должен быть
позволен в демократическом обществе.
СОВПАДАЮЩЕЕ МНЕНИЕ СУДЬИ КАРИЛЬО САЛСЕДО
Я полностью разделяю точку зрения, высказанную Судом в 46
пункте Решения. Я хотел бы подчеркнуть, что свобода слова является
одним из опорных столпов демократического общества. Но я должен
отметить, что осуществление этой свободы "налагает обязанности и
ответственность" (статья 10 п. 2 Конвенции), и в ситуации, где
насилие по политическим мотивам создает постоянную угрозу жизни и
безопасности населения, бывает особенно трудно найти справедливое
соотношение между потребностями защиты свободы слова и
императивами защиты демократического государства.
Предусмотрев в п. 2 статьи 10, что осуществление свободы слова
и мнений, свободы получать и распространять информацию и идеи
"может быть сопряжено с формальностями, условиями, ограничениями
или санкциями, которые установлены законом и которые необходимы в
демократическом обществе", Конвенция признает, что эти свободы не
являются абсолютными. Более того, Конвенция также признает тот
принцип, что никакая группа лиц или индивид не имеют права
заниматься деятельностью и совершать действия, направленные на
невыполнение содержащихся в ней прав и свобод (статья 17), что
подразумевает, на мой взгляд, наличие у государств позитивных
обязательств.
Поэтому у государств развязаны руки в принятии мер, в том числе
уголовно-правового характера, которые направлены на соразмерную,
без эксцессов и в соответствии с требованиями Конвенции, реакцию
на недобросовестные и безосновательные порочащие обвинения.
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
CASE OF CASTELLS v. SPAIN
JUDGMENT
(Strasbourg, 23.IV.1992)
In the case of Castells v. Spain <*>,
The European Court of Human Rights, sitting, in accordance with
Article 43 (art. 43) of the Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ("the Convention") <**> and the
relevant provisions of the Rules of Court, as a Chamber composed
of the following judges:
--------------------------------
Notes by the Registrar
<*> The case is numbered 2/1991/254/325. The first number is
the case's position on the list of cases referred to the Court in
the relevant year (second number). The last two numbers indicate
the case's position on the list of cases referred to the Court
since its creation and on the list of the corresponding
originating applications to the Commission.
<**> As amended by Article 11 of Protocol No. 8 (P8-11), which
came into force on 1 January 1990.
Mr R. Ryssdal, President,
Mr {Thor Viljhalmsson} <*>,
Mr R. Macdonald,
Mr J. De Meyer,
Mr S.K. Martens,
Mrs E. Palm,
Mr R. Pekkanen,
Mr A.N. Loizou,
Mr J.A. Carrillo Salcedo, ad hoc Judge,
--------------------------------
<*> Здесь и далее по тексту слова на национальном языке набраны
латинским шрифтом и выделены фигурными скобками.
and also of Mr M.-A. Eissen, Registrar, and Mr H. Petzold,
Deputy Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 29 November 1991 and 26 March
1992,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the last-
mentioned date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case was referred to the Court by the European
Commission of Human Rights ("the Commission") and by the
Government of the Kingdom of Spain ("the Government") on 8 and 21
March 1991 respectively, within the three-month period laid down
by Article 32 para. 1 and Article 47 (art. 32-1, art. 47) of the
Convention. It originated in an application (no. 11798/85) against
Spain lodged with the Commission under Article 25 (art. 25) by a
Spanish national, Mr Miguel Castells, on 17 September 1985.
The Commission's request referred to Articles 44 and 48 (art.
44, art. 48) and to the declaration whereby Spain recognised the
compulsory jurisdiction of the Court (Article 46) (art. 46); the
Government's application referred to Article 48 (art. 48). The
object of the request and of the application was to obtain a
decision as to whether the facts of the case disclosed a breach by
the respondent State of its obligations under Article 10 (art. 10)
of the Convention, taken alone or in conjunction with Article 14
(art. 14+10).
2. In response to the enquiry made in accordance with Rule 33
para. 3 (d) of the Rules of Court, the applicant stated that he
wished to take part in the proceedings and sought leave, as a
lawyer, to present his own case, assisted by two Spanish fellow
lawyers (Rule 30 para. 1).
The President granted this request on 15 April 1991 and
authorised the applicant to use the Spanish language (Rule 27
para. 3).
3. The Chamber to be constituted included ex officio Mr J.M.
Morenilla, the elected judge of Spanish nationality (Article 43 of
the Convention) (art. 43), and Mr R. Ryssdal, the President of the
Court (Rule 21 para. 3 (b)). On 22 March 1991, Mr F. Matscher,
having been duly delegated by the President, drew by lot, in the
presence of the Registrar, the names of the other seven members,
namely Mr {Thor Vilhjalmsson}, Mr R. Macdonald, Mr J. De Meyer, Mr
S.K. Martens, Mrs E. Palm, Mr R. Pekkanen and Mr A.N. Loizou
(Article 43 in fine of the Convention and Rule 21 para. 4) (art.
43).
By a letter to the President of 15 March, Mr Morenilla had
declared his intention of withdrawing from the case pursuant to
Rule 24 para. 2 because he had represented the Spanish Government
before the Commission as Agent. On 26 April the Government
notified the Registrar that Mr Juan Antonio Carrillo Salcedo,
professor at Seville University, had been appointed ad hoc judge
(Article 43 of the Convention and Rule 23) (art. 43).
4. Mr Ryssdal assumed the office of President of the Chamber
(Rule 21 para. 5) and, through the Registrar, consulted the Agent
of the Government, the Delegate of the Commission and the
applicant on the organisation of the procedure (Rules 37 para. 1
and 38). Pursuant to the President's orders and instructions, the
Registrar received the memorials of the Government and the
applicant on 29 July and 29 August 1991 respectively. On 25
September the Secretary to the Commission produced various
documents at the Registrar's request, then on 5 November submitted
the Delegate's observations.
5. In accordance with the President's decision, the hearing
took place in public in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on
27 November 1991. The Court had held a preparatory meeting
beforehand.
There appeared before the Court:
(a) for the Government
Mr J. Borrego Borrego, Head of the Legal Department for Human
Rights, Ministry of Justice, Agent,
Mr J.M. Villar Uribarri, Ministry of Justice, Counsel;
(b) for the Commission
Mr L. Loucaides, Delegate;
(c) for the applicant
Mr M. Castells, abogado, applicant,
Mr J.M. Montero, abogado,
Mr E. Villa, abogado, Counsel,
Mr J. Vervaele, Professor,
Mr D. Korff, assistants.
The Court heard addresses by Mr Borrego Borrego for the
Government, by Mr Loucaides for the Commission and, for the
applicant, by Mr Castells himself, by Mr Montero, by Mr Villa and
by Mr Vervaele, as well as their replies to its questions and to
the question of a judge.
AS TO THE FACTS
6. Mr Miguel Castells, a Spanish national, resides at San
Sebastiсn ({Guipuzcoa}), where he is a lawyer. At the material
time he was a senator elected on the list of Herri Batasuna, a
political grouping supporting independence for the Basque Country.
A. The particular circumstances of the case
1. The disputed article
7. In the week of 4 to 11 June 1979, the weekly magazine "Punto
y Hora de Euskalherria" published an article entitled Insultante
Impunidad (Outrageous Impunity) and signed by the applicant. The
article read as follows:
"In a few days, at the San {Fermin} holiday, a year will have
gone by since the murders of {German Rodriguez} at Pamplona
(Iruna) and of Joseba {Barandiaran} at San {Sebastian} (Donosti).
The authorities have not identified the perpetrators of these
crimes. They have not even acknowledged to which organisations
they belong. Nor have they identified the persons who killed,
between 12 and 15 May 1977, Gregorio Marichalar {Ayestaran}, aged
63, and Rafael {Gomez Jauregui}, aged 78, at {Renteria}, {Jose}
Luis Cano at Irun and Manuel Fuentes Mesa at Ortuella; on 14 May,
again in 1977, {Jose} Luis {Aristizabal} at San {Sebastian}, and,
at around the same date, in the same town, Isidro Susperregui
Aldekoa, over 70 years old; at the beginning of June, still in
1977, Javier {Nunez Fernandez} at Bilbao; Francisco Aznar
Clemente, Pedro {Maria Martinez} Ocio, Romualdo Barroso Chaparro,
Juan {Jose} Castillo and Bienvenido Pereda Moral, on 3 March 1976
at Gasteiz, and, in the same year, on 7 March at Basauri, Vicente
{Anton} Ferrero, on 9 May at Montejurra, Aniano {Jimenez} and
Ricardo Pellejero, in June Alberto Romero {Solino} at Eibar, in
September {Jesus Maria} Zabala at {Fuenterrabia}, in November
Santiago Navas and {Jose} Javier Nuin at Santesteban and on 10
July Normi Menchaka at Santurce; {Jose} Emilio {Fernandez}
{Perez}, 16 years old, and Felipe Carro Flores, 15 years old, on
24 July and 25 July 1978, one at Apatomonasterio and the other at
Sestao. I only mention the dead ones and the list is far from
being exhaustive. These are only examples. Not one, I repeat, not
one of the murders, of the interminable list of fascist murders
carried out in the Basque Country (Euzkadi), has shown the
slightest sign of being cleared up by the authorities. Will the
individuals who assassinated Emilia Larrea, Roberto Aramburu,
Josemari Iturrioz, Agurtzane Arregui, Argala, {Jose} Ramon Ansa
and Gladys del Estal, the most recent murders, be identified? And
when I say most recent I should specify the date - 9 June 1979 -
because tomorrow there will be others.
And there remain the hundreds of cases, for there are hundreds
of them, in which people burst in, pistols at the ready, to the
bars of the villages and the suburbs (Amorebieta, Durango,
{Eguia}, Loyola, etc.) or simply run through the streets wounding
and beating up everyone they come across; the bombs left in
popular meeting places (Punto y Hora, Bordatxo, Alay Bar, Santi
Bar, Askatasuna etc.) or in cars, attacks whose survivors suffer
the consequences for life etc.
The perpetrators of these crimes act, continue to work and
remain in posts of responsibility, with total impunity. No warrant
has been issued for their arrest. The description of the persons
who carried out these acts has been neither drawn up or published;
nor have there been any lists of suspects in the newspapers, or
photokit pictures, and, far less, rewardsoffered to the public, or
arrests, or inspections or searches of their homes. The public's
help has not been sought through the media, as has happened in
other cases. Indeed it is significant that such help is not even
accepted in connection with these crimes. No link has been
established, there have been no official communiquщs full of
explicit accusations and reprobation in the press, as in other
cases.
The right-wing, who are in power, have all the means at their
disposal (police, courts and prisons) to seek out and punish the
perpetrators of so many crimes. But don't worry, the right will
not seek itself out.
Extreme right-wing organisations? Before Franco's death no one
in the Basque Country thought that it was possible to secure the
arrest or conviction for "unlawful association" of a single
member, and far less one of the leaders, of the "Triple A", of the
"{Batallon} {Vasco-Espanol}", of the "{Batallon} Guezalaga", of
the ATE, of the Adolf Hitler commando, of the Francisco Franco
commando, of the Mussolini commando, of the New Order, of Omega,
of the "Movimiento Social {Espanol}", of "{Accion} Nacional
{Espanola}" or of the "Guerrilleros de Cristo Rey". No one can
believe it now either.
"ETA" members held as prisoners? Hundreds of them have been to
prison. Persons suspected of being members of "ETA"? Thousands of
them have been detained in police stations. Sympathisers? One
could go on with the list for ever. Yet not a single leader or
member of the Triple A has been bothered.
Those responsible for public order and criminal prosecutions
are the same today as they were before. And here in the Basque
Country nothing has changed as far as impunity and questions of
liability are concerned.
The period when Ibanez Freire was Director General of the Civil
Guard, and Fraga was Minister of the Interior, was also a time
when there was a great increase in so-called extreme right-wing
activities in the Basque Country. The same phenomenon, the same
coincidences are recurring now.
The increase in the activities of groups free to act as they
will is generally accompanied in the Basque Country by an increase
in the strength of the security forces.
These commandos, because we have to call them something, seem
totally at home in the Basque Country, in the middle of a
community completely hostile to them. This is too inexplicable for
there not to be an obvious explanation. They have precise
information to carry out their attacks, often more detailed than
that available to local people.
They have substantial files which are kept up to date. They
have a considerable supply of weapons and of money. They have
unlimited material and resources and operate with complete
impunity. Considering the timing of their operations and the
conditions in which they are carried out it can be said that they
are guaranteed legal immunity in advance. Forbidding people to see
this is futile.
This is important to the people. In the Basque Country it is
more important than all the provisional schemes for self-
government, democratic consensus and other meaningless or abstract
nonsense, because it is a visible, tangible reality which
confronts people on a daily basis.
Frankly, I do not believe that the fascist associations which I
cited earlier have any independent existence, outside the State
apparatus. In other words I do not believe that they actually
exist. Despite all these different badges, it is always the same
people.
Behind these acts there can only be the Government, the party
of the Government and their personnel. We know that they are
increasingly going to use as a political instrument the ruthless
hunting down of Basque dissidents and their physical elimination.
If they want to be so lacking in a sense of political vision
that's their problem! But for the sake of the next victim from our
people, those responsible must be identified right away with
maximum publicity."
2. The criminal proceedings against the applicant
(a) The judicial investigation
8. On 3 July 1979 the prosecuting authorities instituted
criminal proceedings against Mr Castells for insulting the
Government (Article 161 of the Criminal Code; see paragraph 20
below). The court with competence for the investigation procedure,
the Supreme Court, requested the Senate to withdraw the
applicant's parliamentary immunity, which it did by a majority on
27 May 1981.
9. On 7 July 1981 the Supreme Court charged the applicant with
having proffered serious insults against the Government and civil
servants (Articles 161 para. 1 and 242 of the Criminal Code). It
further ordered his detention on remand, taking into account the
sentences laid down for the offences in question (six to twelve
years' imprisonment; see paragraph 20 below), but allowed his
release on bail in view of his status as a senator and the "lack
of alarm" (falta de alarma) caused by the alleged offences.
On 28 September 1981 the court varied its previous decision. It
allowed the applicant's provisional release subject solely to the
obligation to report to the judge at regular intervals. In
addition to the circumstances already cited, it stressed that,
during his questioning, Mr Castells had shown a co-operative
attitude and had declared that his article had been intended
merely as a political denunciation and not to insult or threaten
the Government or its members.
10. On 12 December 1981 the applicant's defence counsel
challenged four of the five members of the relevant division of
the Supreme Court. It was submitted that their political
convictions and the posts which they had held under the previous
political regime disqualified them from hearing a case concerning
the freedom of opinion of an individual who, like the applicant,
had been a notorious opponent of the regime in question. They
relied on Article 54 para. 9 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
After several interlocutory applications, including one which
resulted in a decision of the Constitutional Court on 12 July 1982
enjoining the Supreme Court to find the challenge admissible, the
latter court, sitting in plenary session, dismissed the challenge
on its merits on 11 January 1983. The Supreme Court took the view
that although the judges had indeed sat in the Criminal Division
of the Supreme Court under the previous political regime and one
of them had, from 1966 to 1968, been the presiding judge in the
Public Order Court, they had at that time merely applied the
legislation in force.
On 4 May 1983 the Constitutional Court dismissed an appeal
(amparo) which Mr Castells had lodged alleging a violation of
Article 24 para. 2 of the Constitution (right to an impartial
tribunal). It found that the fact that the judges in question
might have political convictions differing from those of the
applicant could not be regarded as being of direct or indirect
relevance ({interes} directo o indirecto) to the solution of the
dispute within the meaning of Article 54 para. 9 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure.
11. In the meantime the investigation of the case had
progressed. On 3 February 1982 the public prosecutor had concluded
that the facts constituted an offence of proffering serious
insults against the Government and demanded a prison sentence of
six years and a day.
In their memorial (conclusiones provisionales) of 2 April 1982,
the defence lawyers contended that the disputed article contained
accurate information and did not express the accused's personal
opinion, but the views of the general public. They offered to
adduce evidence to establish the truth of the information. In
particular they suggested that the competent authorities should
produce reports on any police inquiries, detentions, prosecutions
or other measures undertaken against the members of the extreme
right-wing groups responsible for the attacks denounced in the
article; as the facts reported were common knowledge they could
not be said to be insulting. In addition, the defence lawyers
requested that evidence be taken from fifty-two witnesses,
including members of the Belgian, Italian, French, English, Irish
and Danish parliaments and of the European Parliament, on the
matter of parliamentary practice regarding the freedom of
political criticism; they argued that the accused had acted in his
capacity as an elected representative and in conformity with the
obligations attaching thereto.
12. By decision (Auto) of 19 May 1982, the Supreme Court
refused to admit the majority of the evidence put forward by the
defence, on the ground that it was intended to show the truth of
the information disseminated.
There were divergences in academic opinion and even in its own
case-law as to whether the defence of truth (exceptio veritatis)
could be pleaded in respect of insults directed at the State
institutions, but the reforms of the Criminal Code then under way
clarified the question: those institutions fell outside the scope
of that defence and Article 461 of the Criminal Code (see
paragraph 21 below) authorised it only where civil servants were
involved. The evidence which the defence proposed to adduce was
not therefore admissible in the proceedings pending, without
prejudice to the possibility available to the accused of
instituting criminal proceedings as he considered fit.
Mr Castells filed an appeal (recurso de {suplica}), but on 16
June 1982 the Supreme Court confirmed its decision on the ground
that the accuracy of the information was not decisive for a charge
of insulting the Government.
The applicant then filed an appeal (amparo) in the
Constitutional Court, alleging that the rights of the defence had
been disregarded. That court dismissed it on 10 November 1982,
holding that the question could be resolved only in the light of
the proceedings in their entirety and after the decision of the
trial court.
(b) The trial
13. The Criminal Division of the Supreme Court held a hearing
on 27 October 1983 and gave judgment on 31 October. It sentenced
the applicant to a term of imprisonment of one year and a day for
proffering insults of a less serious kind (menos graves) against
the Government; as an accessory penalty he was also disqualified
for the same period from holding any public office and exercising
a profession and ordered to pay costs.
It found in the first place, with regard to the objective
element of the offence, that the expressions used in the article
were sufficiently strong to damage the reputation of the injured
parties and to reveal an attitude of contempt. As far as the
subjective element was concerned, it considered that, as a
senator, Mr Castells had available to him very obvious means of
expression, provided for in the Assembly's rules of procedure,
through which to carry out his duties of monitoring and
criticising the Government's activities; as he had failed to use
these means, he could not claim to have acted on behalf of his
electorate. The defence's second argument, based on the aim of
political criticism (animus criticandi), did not remove its
defamatory purpose (animus injuriandi), but reduced the importance
thereof. In the case under examination, the insults proffered with
the aim of political criticism had exceeded the permissible limits
of such criticism and attacked the Government's honour. It was
therefore preferable to apply Article 162 of the Criminal Code,
which provided for the offence of proffering less serious insults
against the Government, rather than Article 161. On the question
of the constitutional right to freedom of expression (Article 20
of the Constitution; see paragraph 19 below) there were limits to
that right, in particular in relation to the right to honour and
to a private life and the right to control use of one's likeness.
Furthermore, the fact that the insult appeared in a press article
suggested that it was the fruit of a more complicated intellectual
process and a degree of reasoning which made it more clear and
precise.
Finally, the Supreme Court confirmed its decision of 19 May
1982 regarding the admissibility of the defence of truth.
The applicant again indicated in the Supreme Court his
intention of filing an appeal (amparo) against the judgment,
relying inter alia on Articles 14, 20, 23 and 24 of the
Constitution. He lodged his appeal on 22 November 1983.
14. On 6 December 1983 the Supreme Court, having regard to the
circumstances of the case, stayed for two years the enforcement of
the prison sentence (Article 93 of the Criminal Code), but left in
place the accessory penalty. The enforcement of the latter measure
was nevertheless stayed by the Constitutional Court on 22 February
1984.
3. The appeal (amparo) to the Constitutional Court
15. In his appeal (amparo) of 22 November 1983, Mr Castells
complained that he had not been able to have the Supreme Court's
judgment examined by a higher court and of the length of the
proceedings.
He maintained further that the court had violated the principle
of the presumption of innocence by refusing to allow him to adduce
evidence. He considered it contrary to the most elementary rules
of justice to convict someone - and in this case a senator - for
making statements which were accurate and sufficiently important
for it to be necessary to bring them to the attention of the
community as a matter of urgency and in detail, without having
allowed him to establish their truth.
He alleged, in addition, a breach of the principle of equality
before the law (Article 14 of the Constitution), taken alone or in
conjunction with the right to freedom of expression (Article 20),
as other persons had published similar articles without
encountering difficulties. Furthermore, he claimed that he had
been the victim of a violation of his right to formulate political
criticism, which he argued was inherent in Article 23 as it
applied to him in his capacity as a senator. According to him,
that provision, which guarantees the right to participate in
public affairs, entitled him to carry out his parliamentary duties
of scrutiny through any organ or means generally available.
The applicant made a further reference to Article 20 of the
Constitution in the summary of his complaints (suplico).
16. In his observations of 22 March 1984, the public prosecutor
noted that Article 14 guaranteed equality before the law and not
equality outside the law. As regards the complaint based on
Article 23, it overlapped with the preceding complaint or was
based on a misunderstanding: clearly a member of parliament did
not carry out his duties only in the assembly, but outside it he
did not enjoy any immunity; although he could, like any citizen,
criticise the action of the Government, he should not forget that
the freedom of expression had its limits, fixed by the
Constitution.
For his part, Mr Castells, by a letter of 21 May 1984, again
offered to prove the truth of his statements, because that
demonstrated "the violation by the contested judgment of the right
to "receive and communicate true information by any means of
dissemination", referred to in Article 20 of the Constitution". He
also mentioned this right in his appeal (recurso de {suplica})
against the rejection of this offer by the Constitutional Court
(20 July 1984) and in his observations of 21 February 1985.
17. The Constitutional Court dismissed the appeal on 10 April
1985.
In summarising the applicant's complaints at point 2 of the "As
to the Law" part of its judgment, it took together, like the
public prosecutor, those relating to Articles 14 and 23, without
referring to Article 20: alleged violation of the right to
equality before the law, guaranteed under Article 14 taken alone
or in conjunction with Article 23, inasmuch as the contested
decision restricted the powers of monitoring, scrutiny and
criticism of a senator.
At point 6 it stated that parliamentary privileges were to be
interpreted strictly as otherwise they could become instruments
for infringing the rights of others; they lapsed when their holder
had acted as a mere citizen, even in his capacity as a politician.
At points 9 and 10 it considered the central issue: the right
to rely on relevant evidence in presenting the defence case, and
in particular to plead the defence of truth in respect of an
offence of the type in question. The court noted in this
connection:
"In order to assess whether evidence which it is sought to
adduce is relevant, it is necessary to establish a link between
that evidence and the thema decidendi, which must first be
determined on the basis of the parties' allegations. Except in the
case of facts which are manifest or common knowledge, the court
must not intervene in this regard, otherwise it will prejudge the
merits, if only in part ... . It is preferable for the courts to
avoid [such a preliminary assessment]; it does not however in
itself infringe constitutional rights provided that the other
defence rights are respected. Even though in the present case the
court ought perhaps not to have anticipated its opinion on the
defence of truth when assessing the relevance of the evidence,
[that irregularity] therefore infringes the constitutional right
to use relevant evidence - particularly where as here the decision
is taken at a single level of jurisdiction - only if there has
been a breach of a substantive right in issue.
..."
Article 161 of the Criminal Code had given rise to criticism
among academic writers because it restricted the freedom of
expression. In any event, it should be read in conjunction with
Article 20 which guaranteed that freedom. In this connection it
had to be accepted that criminal legislation could constitute an
adequate means of regulating the exercise of fundamental rights
provided that it respected the essential content of the right in
question. The limits of the freedoms of information and of opinion
were beyond question to be found in the area of State security,
which could be jeopardised by attempts to discredit democratic
institutions. In conclusion the question whether the defence of
truth was or was not admissible in this field was purely one of
statutory interpretation and the specific application of Article
161 in the case under review was a matter falling within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
18. On 1 April 1986 the Supreme Court ruled that the term of
imprisonment had been definitively served. Subsequently, the
record of the conviction was annulled in accordance with Article
118 of the Criminal Code. It could therefore no longer be
disclosed by investigation of the applicant's criminal record
unless the request came from judges or courts in connection with a
new criminal inquiry.
B. Relevant legislation
1. Constitution of 1978
19. The relevant articles of the Constitution provide as
follows:
Article 14
"All Spanish citizens are equal before the law. Any
discrimination based on birth, race, sex, religion, opinion or any
other condition or personal or social circumstances shall be
prohibited."
Article 18
"1. The right to honour, to a private life and to a family life
and the right to control use of one's likeness shall be protected.
..."
Article 20
"1. The following rights shall be recognised and protected:
(a) the right freely to express and disseminate thoughts, ideas
and opinions by word of mouth, in writing or by any other means of
reproduction;
...
(d) the right to receive and communicate true information by
any means of dissemination. The right to invoke the conscience
clause and that of professional confidentiality shall be governed
by statute.
2. The exercise of these rights may not be restricted by any
prior censorship.
...
4. These freedoms shall be limited by respect for the rights
secured in this Title, by the provisions of the implementing Acts
and in particular by the right to honour and to a private life and
the right to control use of one's likeness and to the protection
of youth and children."
Article 23
"1. Citizens shall have the right to participate in public life
directly or through their representatives freely elected at
periodically held elections by universal suffrage.
..."
2. The Criminal Code
20. The Institutional Act 8/1983 of 25 June 1983 reformed the
Criminal Code. It provides that the offences of insulting the
Government shall be punishable by the following penalties:
Article 161
"The following shall be liable to long-term prison sentences
[from six years and a day to twelve years - Article 30 of the
Criminal Code]:
1. Those who seriously insult, falsely accuse or threaten ...
the Government ...;
2. ..."
Article 162
"When the insult or threat referred to in the preceding Article
is not serious, it shall be punishable by a shortterm prison
sentence [from six months and a day to six years - Article 30 of
the Criminal Code]."
These provisions appear in a separate chapter of the Criminal
Code. The chapter in question is based on the principle of
authority (decision of the Supreme Court of 19 May 1982; see
paragraph 12 above) and provides for a strengthened protection for
the life, freedom and honour of the senior officials of the State.
The offence of falsely accusing the Government was not introduced
until 1983.
21. Title X of Book II of the Criminal Code defines the
offences of proffering insults and making false accusations. The
latter consists of accusing a person wrongly of an offence coming
within the category of those which have to be prosecuted even
without a complaint (Article 453 of the Criminal Code). On the
other hand, an insult is any expression or action which discredits
a person or exposes him to contempt, in particular by accusing him
of an offence of the kind which may be prosecuted only if a
complaint is laid (Articles 457 and 458 of the Criminal Code). The
practical importance of the distinction is that the defence of
truth is admissible for the offence of false accusation (Article
456) but not for the offence of proffering insults, except where
the insults are directed against civil servants in respect of acts
relating to the performance of their duties (Article 461 of the
Criminal Code).
By the judgment of 31 October 1983 the Supreme Court specified
that the defence of truth could not be pleaded in connection with
the offence of insulting one of the senior institutions of the
State: in the first place no official as such was concerned and,
secondly, the institutions in question enjoyed extra protection in
this field under the criminal law (see paragraphs 12 and 13
above).
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION
22. In his application of 17 September 1985 to the Commission
(no. 11798/85), Mr Castells relied on Articles 6, 7, 10 and 14
(art. 6, art. 7, art. 10, art. 14) of the Convention.
By a partial decision of 9 May 1989, the Commission dismissed
the complaints based on Articles 6 and 7 (art. 6, art. 7) as
inadmissible. On 7 November 1989 it found the remainder of the
application admissible. In its report of 8 January 1991 (Article
31) (art. 31), it expressed the opinion that there had been a
violation of Article 10 (art. 10) (nine votes to three) and that
no separate question arose under Article 14 (art. 14)
(unanimously). The full text of its opinion and of the two
dissenting opinions contained in the report is reproduced as an
annex to this judgment <*>.
--------------------------------
<*> Note by the Registrar: for practical reasons this annex
will appear only with the printed version of the judgment (volume
236 of Series A of the Publications of the Court), but a copy of
the Commission's report is obtainable from the registry.
AS TO THE LAW
I. Alleged violation of Article 10 (art. 10)
23. Mr Castells claimed to be a victim of a violation of his
right to freedom of expression as guaranteed under Article 10
(art. 10) of the Convention, which is worded as follows:
"1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression.
This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to
receive and impart information and ideas without interference by
public authority and regardless of frontiers. ...
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it
duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities,
conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and
are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of
national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or
morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others,
for preventing the disclosure of information received in
confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of
the judiciary."
The Government contested this assertion, whereas the Commission
agreed with it.
A. The Government's preliminary objection
24. The Government contended, as they had done before the
Commission, that the applicant had failed to exhaust his domestic
remedies (Article 26 of the Convention) (art. 26). Probably "for
tactical reasons", he had not specifically raised in the
Constitutional Court the complaint concerning the alleged breach
of the right to freedom of expression protected under Article 20
of the Constitution. In his amparo appeal he had referred to this
provision only indirectly, complaining of discrimination in the
exercise of that freedom; in addition, he had made no mention of
Article 10 (art. 10) of the Convention or of similar provisions in
other international instruments. According to the Institutional
Act governing the amparo appeal procedure (no. 2/1979), he ought
to have indicated clearly both the facts and the provisions
allegedly infringed. It followed that Mr Castells had not given
the Constitutional Court the opportunity to rule on the question
which was now before the Court.
25. In reply the applicant maintained that he had expressly
invoked Article 20 of the Constitution in the Constitutional
Court. In the first place the facts set out in his amparo
application established that what was at stake was a typical
example of the exercise of the right to freedom of expression and
showed evidently that there had been an interference. Furthermore,
in the suplico he had cited, among other provisions, the article
in question and in the legal argument he had alleged a violation
of Article 20, taken together with Article 14 (equality before the
law). It was true that he had argued on the more limited basis of
the right of an elected representative to formulate political
criticism, under Article 23, but it was sufficient to read point
10 of the "As to the Law" part of the judgment of 10 April 1985 to
see that the problem had indeed been raised. In that passage the
Constitutional Court examined in detail the compatibility of
Article 161 of the Criminal Code, the basis for the contested
prosecution and conviction, with the freedom of expression (see
paragraphs 15 and 17 above).
26. While expressing its agreement with the applicant, the
Commission primarily invited the Court to find that it lacked
jurisdiction to entertain the objection.
27. On this point the Court confines itself to referring to its
consistent case-law, confirmed most recently in its B. v. France
judgment of 25 March 1992 (Series A no. 232-C, p.45, paras. 35 -
36).
As regards the merits of the submission, it observes that
Article 26 (art. 26) must be applied "with some degree of
flexibility and without excessive formalism"; it is sufficient
that "the complaints intended to be made subsequently before the
Convention organs" should have been raised "at least in substance
and in compliance with the formal requirements and time-limits
laid down in domestic law" (see the Guzzardi v. Italy judgment of
6 November 1980, Series A no. 39, p. 26, para. 72, and the Cardot
v. France judgment of 19 March 1991, Series A no. 200, p. 18,
para. 34).
28. The applicant relied on Article 10 (art. 10) of the
Convention in two respects: he had, he claimed, been prosecuted
and convicted for making statements which were true, but whose
accuracy he had been prevented from establishing; in addition, the
contested article came within the sphere of the political
criticism which it was the duty of any member of parliament to
engage in.
29. It appears that Mr Castells had raised both of these points
in the Supreme Court. The judgment of 31 October 1983 refused to
admit the defence of truth in relation to the offence of insulting
the Government and ruled that the applicant had overstepped the
bounds of acceptable political criticism (see paragraph 13 above).
30. The submissions in support of the amparo appeal of 22
November 1983 made only an indirect and brief reference to Article
20 of the Constitution (see paragraph 15 above); they did however
set out the complaints discussed above.
While basing his case on a narrower provision, Article 23 of
the Constitution, the applicant claimed the right, in his capacity
as a senator, to criticise the Government's action, a right which
is manifestly inherent in the freedom of expression in the
specific case of elected representatives. Moreover the
Constitutional Court recognised this in its summary of the
complaints; it took together the complaint concerning Articles 14
and 20 and that relating to Article 23 (see paragraph 17 above).
The applicant also invoked both his right to be presumed
innocent and his right to adduce evidence capable of establishing
the accuracy of his statements. In so doing, he was formulating a
complaint which was plainly linked to the alleged violation of
Article 10 (art. 10) of the Convention. Indeed that was how the
Constitutional Court construed the complaint; it joined the
question of the relevance of the evidence to that of the merits of
the case, namely the offence provided for in Article 161 of the
Criminal Code, whose compatibility with the freedom of expression
it examined (points 9 and 10 of the "As to the Law" part of the
judgment of 10 April 1985; see paragraph 17 above).
31. The Court notes finally, like the Commission, that Mr
Castells cited Article 20 of the Constitution both in his notice
of the amparo appeal, filed in the Supreme Court, and in the
suplico of his application of 22 November 1983 (see paragraphs 13
and 15 above). Subsequently, in a number of written communications
to the Constitutional Court, he also referred, in connection with
the defence of truth, to his right "to receive and communicate
true information" (see paragraph 16 above).
No doubt the reason why the appeal failed in this respect is to
be found in the limits which at the time the Constitutional Court
set to its jurisdiction. In its view, the problem of the
admissibility of the defence of truth in relation to the offence
of insulting the Government raised a question of statutory
interpretation rather than an issue of compliance with the
Constitution, and the application of Article 161 of the Criminal
Code in the case under review was exclusively a matter for the
ordinary courts (see paragraph 17 above; and, mutatis mutandis,
the Guzzardi v. Italy judgment, cited above, Series A no. 39, p.
27, para. 72).
32. Accordingly, the Court considers that the applicant did
invoke before the Constitutional Court, "at least in substance",
the complaints relating to Article 10 (art. 10) of the Convention.
The objection that Mr Castells failed to exhaust domestic remedies
must therefore be dismissed.
B. Merits of the complaint
33. In Mr Castells's submission, the criminal proceedings
brought against him, and his subsequent conviction for insulting
the Government, interfered with his freedom of expression, in
particular because he was not allowed to establish the truth of
the statements contained in his article.
34. The restrictions and penalties of which he complained are
undeniably an "interference" with the exercise of the freedom in
question. For such an interference to avoid infringing Article 10
(art. 10), it must be "prescribed by law", carried out in pursuit
of one or more of the legitimate aims set out in Article 10 para.
2 (art. 10-2) and "necessary in a democratic society" in order to
attain such an aim or aims.
1. "Prescribed by law"
35. There can be no doubt that the contested prosecution had a
legal basis, namely Articles 161 and 162 of the Criminal Code. The
applicant did not dispute this, but he alleged that he could not
have expected that his defence of truth would be held to be
inadmissible, in particular following the adoption of the 1978
Constitution. He maintained that, until 19 May 1982, the Supreme
Court had never ruled on the question in relation to the offence
of insulting the Government and the admissibility of such a
defence for offences of this nature (Article 240) was the subject
of differing opinions both among academic writers and in the case-
law.
36. In the Government's contention, on the other hand, it is
clear from the Spanish legislation, and in particular from Article
461 of the Criminal Code, that in the field in question the
defence of truth is admissible only where the insults are directed
against civil servants in the performance of their duties; neither
before nor after 1978 had the Supreme Court ever allowed the
exceptio veritatis for insults which were not directed against
individuals. Mr Castells, however, had accused the Government as a
whole.
37. In the light of the wording of Article 461 of the Criminal
Code, the Court considers this interpretation to be reasonable.
There was apparently no precedent - hence the hesitation shown by
the Supreme Court in its decision of 19 May 1982 (see paragraph 12
above) -, but that is immaterial here: it was a text which covered
in a general fashion several possible types of insult and which
had inevitably to be capable of being brought into play in new
situations; the above-mentioned decision confined itself to
applying it to different circumstances (see, mutatis mutandis, the
Observer and Guardian v. the United Kingdom judgment of 26
November 1991, Series A no. 216, pp. 27 - 28, para. 53).
The Court therefore finds, like the Commission, that the rules
governing the contested interference were sufficiently foreseeable
for the purposes of Article 10 para. 2 (art. 10-2) of the
Convention.
2. Was the aim pursued legitimate?
38. According to the applicant, neither the charge laid against
him nor his subsequent conviction pursued a legitimate aim under
paragraph 2 of Article 10 (art. 10-2). The acts of which he was
accused, as the Supreme Court itself admitted, had not engendered
any alarm (see paragraph 9 above); in addition, it appeared from
the judgment of 31 October 1983 that the object of the
interference had been not to protect public order and national
security, but in fact to preserve the respondent Government's
honour.
39. However, in its decision of 10 April 1985 - on which the
Government relied - the Constitutional Court stressed that the
security of the State could be threatened by attempts to discredit
democratic institutions (see paragraph 17 above). In his article
Mr Castells did not merely describe a very serious situation,
involving numerous attacks and murders in the Basque Country; he
also complained of the inactivity on the part of the authorities,
in particular the police, and even their collusion with the guilty
parties and inferred therefrom that the Government was
responsible.
It may therefore be said, and this conforms to the view held by
the Government and the Commission, that in the circumstances
obtaining in Spain in 1979 the proceedings instituted against the
applicant were brought for the "prevention of disorder", within
the meaning of Article 10 para. 2 (art. 10-2), and not only for
the "protection of the reputation ... of others".
3. Necessity of the interference
40. Mr Castells noted his agreement with the Commission and
emphasised the crucial importance of freedom of expression for an
elected representative, as the spokesman for the opinions and
anxieties of his electorate. In addition, that freedom required
extra guarantees when the discussion related to a matter of public
interest. This had indeed been the case in this instance; the
contested article was part of a wide debate on the climate of
insecurity which had prevailed in the Basque Country since 1977.
The applicant's conviction had been intended to protect the
authorities against the attacks of the opposition rather than the
Government against unjustified and defamatory accusations;
although embarrassing for the Government, the revelation of the
facts in question had served the public interest.
41. The Government stressed that freedom of expression was not
absolute; it carried with it "duties" and "responsibilities"
(Article 10 para. 2 of the Convention) (art. 10-2). Mr Castells
had overstepped the normal limits of political debate; he had
insulted a democratic government in order to destabilise it, and
during a very sensitive, indeed critical, period for Spain, namely
shortly after the adoption of the Constitution, at a time when
groups of differing political persuasions were resorting to
violence concurrently.
42. The Court recalls that the freedom of expression, enshrined
in paragraph 1 of Article 10 (art. 10-1), constitutes one of the
essential foundations of a democratic society and one of the basic
conditions for its progress. Subject to paragraph 2 of Article
10(art. 10-2), it is applicable not only to "information" or
"ideas" that are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or
as a matter of indifference, but also to those that offend, shock
or disturb. Such are the demands of that pluralism, tolerance and
broadmindedness without which there is no "democratic society"
(see, inter alia, the Handyside v. the United Kingdom judgment of
7 December 1976, Series A no. 24, p. 23, para. 49, and the
Observer and Guardian judgment, cited above, Series A no. 216, p.
30, para. 59 (a)).
While freedom of expression is important for everybody, it is
especially so for an elected representative of the people. He
represents his electorate, draws attention to their preoccupations
and defends their interests. Accordingly, interferences with the
freedom of expression of an opposition member of parliament, like
the applicant, call for the closest scrutiny on the part of the
Court.
43. In the case under review Mr Castells did not express his
opinion from the senate floor, as he might have done without fear
of sanctions, but chose to do so in a periodical. That does not
mean, however, that he lost his right to criticise the Government.
In this respect, the pre-eminent role of the press in a State
governed by the rule of law must not be forgotten. Although it
must not overstep various bounds set, inter alia, for the
prevention of disorder and the protection of the reputation of
others, it is nevertheless incumbent on it to impart information
and ideas on political questions and on other matters of public
interest (see, mutatis mutandis, the Sunday Times v. the United
Kingdom judgment of 26 April 1979, Series A no. 30, p. 40, para.
65, and the Observer and Guardian judgment, cited above, Series A
no. 216, p. 30, para. 59 (b)).
Freedom of the press affords the public one of the best means
of discovering and forming an opinion of the ideas and attitudes
of their political leaders. In particular, it gives politicians
the opportunity to reflect and comment on the preoccupations of
public opinion; it thus enables everyone to participate in the
free political debate which is at the very core of the concept of
a democratic society (see the Lingens v. Austria judgment of 8
July 1986, Series A no. 103, p. 26, para. 42).
44. In its judgment of 31 October 1983, the Supreme Court took
the view that the contested article had crossed over the line
between political criticism and insult, albeit only slightly, by
its use of certain terms (see paragraph 13 above).
45. The Court observes, like the Commission, that Mr Castells
began by denouncing the impunity enjoyed by the members of various
extremist groups, the perpetrators of numerous attacks in the
Basque Country since 1977. He thereby recounted facts of great
interest to the public opinion of this region, where the majority
of the copies of the periodical in question were sold. In his
conclusion, however, he levelled serious accusations against the
Government, which in his view was responsible for the situation
which had arisen (see paragraph 7 above).
46. The freedom of political debate is undoubtedly not absolute
in nature. A Contracting State may make it subject to certain
"restrictions" or "penalties", but it is for the Court to give a
final ruling on the compatibility of such measures with the
freedom of expression enshrined in Article 10 (art. 10) (see,
mutatis mutandis, the Observer and Guardian judgment, cited above,
Series A no. 216, para. 59 (c)).
The limits of permissible criticism are wider with regard to
the Government than in relation to a private citizen, or even a
politician. In a democratic system the actions or omissions of the
Government must be subject to the close scrutiny not only of the
legislative and judicial authorities but also of the press and
public opinion. Furthermore, the dominant position which the
Government occupies makes it necessary for it to display restraint
in resorting to criminal proceedings, particularly where other
means are available for replying to the unjustified attacks and
criticisms of its adversaries or the media. Nevertheless it
remains open to the competent State authorities to adopt, in their
capacity as guarantors of public order, measures, even of a
criminal law nature, intended to react appropriately and without
excess to defamatory accusations devoid of foundation or
formulated in bad faith.
47. In this instance, Mr Castells offered on several occasions,
before the Supreme Court and subsequently in the Constitutional
Court, to establish that the facts recounted by him were true and
well known; in his view, this deprived his statements of any
insulting effect (see paragraphs 11 and 16 above).
On 19 May 1982 the Supreme Court declared such evidence
inadmissible on the ground that the defence of truth could not be
pleaded in respect of insults directed at the institutions of the
nation (see paragraphs 12 and 21 above); it confirmed this
interpretation in its judgment of 31 October 1983 (see paragraph
13 above). The Constitutional Court took the view that it was a
question of ordinary statutory interpretation and as such fell
outside its jurisdiction (see paragraph 17 above).
The applicant could not therefore, in the criminal proceedings
brought against him under Article 161 of the Criminal Code, plead
the defences of truth and good faith.
48. In the Government's contention, because Mr Castells's
allegations were not sufficiently precise, their truth could not
be demonstrated; in addition, they were to be regarded as value
judgments, in relation to which the defence of truth was
irrelevant.
This argument is not convincing. The article which appeared in
Punto y Hora de Euskalherria (see paragraph 7 above) must be
considered as a whole. The applicant began by drawing up a long
list of murders and attacks perpetrated in the Basque Country,
then stressed that they had remained unpunished; he continued by
alleging the involvement of various extremist organisations, which
he named, and finally attributed to the Government the
responsibility for the situation. In fact many of these assertions
were susceptible to an attempt to establish their truth, just as
Mr Castells could reasonably have tried to demonstrate his good
faith.
It is impossible to state what the outcome of the proceedings
would have been had the Supreme Court admitted the evidence which
the applicant sought to adduce; but the Court attaches decisive
importance to the fact that it declared such evidence inadmissible
for the offence in question (see paragraph 12 above). It considers
that such an interference in the exercise of the applicant's
freedom of expression was not necessary in a democratic society.
49. The Government also relied on the relatively lenient nature
of the sanction imposed, but in the light of the foregoing
conclusion the Court does not have to examine this argument.
50. In sum, there has been a violation of Article 10 (art. 10).
II. Alleged violation of Article 14 in conjunction
with Article 10 (art. 14+10)
51. Mr Castells also claimed to be the victim of discrimination
because other persons had expressed similar views without any
criminal sanctions being imposed on them. He relied on Article 14
(art. 14), which is worded as follows:
"The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in [the]
Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground
such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other
opinion, national or social origin, association with a national
minority, property, birth or other status."
The Government denied this assertion.
52. As this question is not a fundamental aspect of the case,
the Court does not consider it necessary to deal with it
separately (see, inter alia, the Airey v. Ireland judgment of 9
October 1979, Series A no. 32, p. 16, para. 30).
III. Application of Article 50 (art. 50)
53. According to Article 50 (art. 50):
"If the Court finds that a decision or a measure taken by a
legal authority or any other authority of a High Contracting Party
is completely or partially in conflict with the obligations
arising from the ... Convention, and if the internal law of the
said Party allows only partial reparation to be made for the
consequences of this decision or measure, the decision of the
Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured
party."
54. The applicant sought in the first place the publication of
a summary of the Court's judgment in the newspapers of the Basque
Country, of Madrid and the rest of the State, and the removal of
any reference to his conviction in the central criminal records
(Registro Central de Penados y Rebeldes).
The Court points out that it does not have jurisdiction to make
such orders (see, mutatis mutandis, the Manifattura FL v. Italy
judgment of 27 February 1992, Series A no. 230-B, p. 21, para.
22).
A. Pecuniary damage
55. Mr Castells also claimed 375,000 pesetas in respect of loss
of earnings. As an accused on bail, he had to appear fifty-two
times before the court of his place of residence (San {Sebastian})
and three times before the Supreme Court of Madrid (see paragraphs
8 - 9 above), which resulted in a loss of time and opportunity in
the exercise of his professional activity as a lawyer.
The Court takes the view that this constraint can have caused
him hardly any loss since, as a lawyer, he frequently attended the
courts in question. That he sustained pecuniary damage is
therefore not established.
B. Non-pecuniary damage
56. The applicant also claimed, without giving any figures,
compensation for non-pecuniary damage. The Court does not rule out
the possibility that he may have sustained such damage, but in the
circumstances of the case the finding of a violation set out in
the present judgment constitutes in itself sufficient just
satisfaction.
C. Costs and expenses
57. In respect of his costs and expenses incurred in the
Spanish courts, Mr Castells claimed 2,181,476 pesetas. The Court
awards him only 1,000,000 of this amount, since some of the sums
in question related to amparo appeals unconnected with the
complaints found admissible by the Commission.
58. Finally the applicant sought 3,328,000 pesetas for his
costs and expenses before the Convention organs, together with
20,000 DM for the fees of Mr Korff and Mr Vervaele.
Like the Government, the Court considers excessive the number
of lawyers representing Mr Castells, who appeared before it with
four lawyers; it should also be borne in mind that the Commission
declared inadmissible some of the complaints raised initially.
Making an assessment on an equitable basis, the Court awards Mr
Castells an overall amount of 2,000,000 pesetas.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
1. Holds that it has jurisdiction to consider the Government's
preliminary objection, but dismisses it;
2. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 10 (art.
10);
3. Holds that it is not necessary to consider the case also
under Article 14, taken together with Article 10 (art. 14+10);
4. Holds that, as regards the non-pecuniary damage alleged, the
present judgment constitutes sufficient just satisfaction for the
purposes of Article 50 (art. 50);
5. Holds that the Kingdom of Spain is to pay to the applicant,
within three months, 3,000,000 (three million) pesetas for costs
and expenses;
6. Dismisses the remainder of the applicant's claims.
Done in English and in French, and delivered at a public
hearing in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 23 April
1992.
Signed: Rolv RYSSDAL
President
Signed: {Marc-Andre} EISSEN
Registrar
In accordance with Article 51 para. 2 (art. 51-2) of the
Convention and Rule 53 para. 2 of the Rules of Court, the
following separate opinions are annexed to this judgment:
(a) concurring opinion of Mr De Meyer;
(b) concurring opinion of Mr Pekkanen;
(c) concurring opinion of Mr Carillo Salcedo, ad hoc judge.
Initialled: R.R.
Initialled: M.-A.E.
CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE DE MEYER
(Translation)
In the disputed article Mr Castells drew up a long list of
murders and attacks carried out in the Basque Country <1> and
denounced the impunity, described by him as outrageous (insultante
impunidad), enjoyed by their perpetrators <2>. He complained of
the inaction of the authorities <3>, who, he alleged, had done
nothing to identify them, although the same authorities had
displayed great diligence "in other cases" (en otros supuestos)
<4>. He saw this as evidence of collusion with the guilty parties
<5> and attributed responsibility for "these acts" (estas
acciones) to the Government and its supporters <6>.
--------------------------------
<1> Paragraph 48 of the judgment. See the first and second
paragraphs of the article (paragraph 7 of the judgment).
<2> Title of the article and paragraphs 45 and 48 of the
judgment.
<3> Paragraph 39 of the judgment.
<4> See in particular the third and sixth paragraphs of the
article.
<5> Paragraph 39 of the judgment.
<6> Last paragraph of the article and paragraphs 39 and 45 of
the judgment.
These were undoubtedly serious accusations <*>.
--------------------------------
<*> Paragraph 45 of the judgment.
In levelling them, however, he was merely legitimately
exercising his right to freedom of opinion and of expression. This
right was infringed in the case before the Court because Mr
Castells was prosecuted and convicted for having written and
published his views on a question of general interest; in a
"democratic society" it is not acceptable that a citizen be
punished for doing this.
In this connection it makes no difference whether Mr Castells
was right or wrong. The question of the defence of truth was not
relevant in relation to his assessment of the situation <*>; this
is especially so because the murders and attacks referred to in
the article really occurred and the impunity of their perpetrators
does not even seem to have been denied.
--------------------------------
<*> See on this point the separate opinion of Mr Pekkanen, p.
29 below, and, mutatis mutandis, the Lingens v. Austria judgment
of 8 July 1986, Series A no. 103, pp. 27-28, paras. 45 and 46.
It may be worth adding that as far as insults, false accusation
and defamation are concerned there are no grounds for affording
better protection to the institutions than to individuals, or to
the Government than the opposition <*>.
--------------------------------
<*> I cannot therefore approve the "strengthened protection"
afforded the Government under Articles 161 and 162 of the Spanish
Criminal Code (paragraph 20 of the judgment).
CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE PEKKANEN
In his article Mr Castells firstly enumerated a list of murders
and attacks carried out in the Basque Country and stressed that
they still remained unsolved and unpunished. He also evoked the
involvement of various extreme right-wing organisations. From
these facts he then drew the conclusion that: "Behind these acts
there can only be the Government, the party of the Government and
their personnel".
Mr Castells was sentenced by the Supreme Court for proffering
insults of a less serious kind against the Government. The Supreme
Court found inter alia that the insults proffered with the aim of
political criticism had exceeded the permissible limits of such
criticism and attacked the Government's honour. The Supreme Court
was also of the opinion that the defence of truth (exceptio
veritatis) was not admissible in such cases under Spanish law.
The Court attached decisive importance to the fact that the
Supreme Court of Spain declared the defence of truth inadmissible
for the offence in question. Unfortunately I am unable to accept
this opinion. The decisive fact for a violation of Article 10
(art. 10) of the Convention is, in my view, that Mr Castells was
punished for holding the opinion that the Government was
responsible for the incidents in question and publishing it.
With regard to the question of exceptio veritatis, which is
discussed at length in the judgment, I consider that it was not
possible for Mr Castells to prove the truthfulness of his opinion,
an opinion expressed as part of a political debate and affirming
that the Government was behind the murders and attacks in
question. Exceptio veritatis is therefore not relevant in the
instant case. For a finding of a violation of Article 10 (art. 10)
of the Convention it is sufficient that Mr Castells was punished
for criticising the Government when he had done so in a way which
should be allowed in a democratic society.
CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE CARRILLO SALCEDO
I fully share the views expressed by the Court at paragraph 46
of the judgment. I should like to stress that freedom of
expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a
democratic society. But I must also emphasise that the exercise of
that freedom "carries with it duties and responsibilities"
(Article 10 para. 2 of the Convention) (art. 10-2), and that, in a
situation where politically motivated violence poses a constant
threat to the lives and security of the population, it is
particularly difficult to strike a fair balance between the
requirements of protecting freedom of expression and the
imperatives of protecting the democratic State.
By providing, in Article 10 para. 2 (art. 10-2), that the
exercise of the freedom of expression and the freedom to hold
opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas "may be
subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties
as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic
society", the Convention recognises that these freedoms are not
absolute. Moreover, the Convention also recognises the principle
that no group or person has the right to pursue activities which
aim at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms enshrined
in it (Article 17) (art. 17); that implies in addition, in my
view, positive obligations for the States parties.
Therefore, it remains open to the States to adopt measures,
even of a criminal law nature, intended to react appropriately and
without excess, that is, in conformity with the Convention
requirements, to defamatory accusations devoid of factual
foundation or formulated in bad faith.
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