[неофициальный перевод]
ЕВРОПЕЙСКИЙ СУД ПО ПРАВАМ ЧЕЛОВЕКА
СУДЕБНОЕ РЕШЕНИЕ
БЕЛЬДЖУДИ (BELDJOUDI) ПРОТИВ ФРАНЦИИ
(Страсбург, 26 марта 1992 года)
(Извлечение)
КРАТКОЕ НЕОФИЦИАЛЬНОЕ ИЗЛОЖЕНИЕ ОБСТОЯТЕЛЬСТВ ДЕЛА
A. Основные факты
Г-н Моханд Бельджуди родился во Франции в 1950 г., его родители
- выходцы из Алжира, как и он, потеряли французское гражданство в
1963 г., после обретения Алжиром независимости. Г-н Бельджуди был
воспитан во Франции и всегда там проживал либо со своими
родителями, либо с гражданкой Франции г-жой Мартин Бельджуди,
урожденной Тейшен, с которой он состоит в браке с 1970 г. Его
родители, а также пять братьев и сестер проживают во Франции.
В 1969, 1974, 1977 и 1978 гг. он осуждался за разные уголовные
преступления, в т.ч. и за кражу с отягчающими обстоятельствами, за
что был приговорен к восьми годам тюремного заключения.
В ноябре 1979 г. министр внутренних дел издал распоряжение о
его высылке из страны на том основании, что его присутствие на
территории Франции представляет угрозу общественному порядку.
Жалоба г-на Бельджуди на это решение была отклонена
административным судом Версаля в апреле 1988 г. Тем временем в
1986 г. г-н Бельджуди привлекался к суду за другие правонарушения
и безуспешно пытался получить французское гражданство в 1983 и
1984 гг. 18 января 1991 г. Государственный совет отклонил его
жалобу на решение административного суда и распоряжение министра о
его высылке из страны. Данное распоряжение еще не выполнено, т.к.
г-н Бельджуди ожидает вызова в суд в департаменте Верхняя Сена и
находится под судебным надзором, в частности по обвинению в
укрывательстве краденого товара при отягчающих обстоятельствах.
B. Разбирательство в Комиссии по правам человека
В жалобе, поданной в Комиссию 28 марта 1986 г., заявитель
утверждал, что решение о его высылке нарушает несколько статей
Конвенции: 8, 3 и 9, 12 и 14 в сочетании со статьей 8. Жалоба была
объявлена приемлемой 11 июля 1989 г. После безуспешных попыток
урегулировать дело мировым соглашением сторон 6 сентября 1990 г.
Комиссия подготовила доклад, в котором установлены факты и ее
выводы о том:
a) что высылка г-на Бельджуди является нарушением его права и
права г-жи Бельджуди на уважение их семейной жизни в смысле статьи
8 Конвенции (двенадцать голосов против пяти), но не является
нарушением статьи 3 (единогласно);
b) что не было нарушения статьи 14 в сочетании со статьей 8 или
статьями 9 и 12 (единогласно).
Данное дело передано Комиссией в Суд 12 ноября 1990 г.
ИЗВЛЕЧЕНИЕ ИЗ СУДЕБНОГО РЕШЕНИЯ
ВОПРОСЫ ПРАВА
I. О предполагаемом нарушении статьи 8
65. По мнению заявителей, решение о высылке из страны г-на
Бельджуди является посягательством на их личную и семейную жизнь.
Они ссылаются на статью 8 Конвенции, которая гласит:
"1. Каждый человек имеет право на уважение его личной и
семейной жизни, неприкосновенности его жилища и тайны
корреспонденции.
2. Не допускается вмешательство со стороны государственных
органов в осуществление этого права, за исключением вмешательства,
предусмотренного законом и необходимого в демократическом обществе
в интересах государственной безопасности и общественного
спокойствия, экономического благосостояния страны, в целях
предотвращения беспорядков или преступлений, для охраны здоровья
или нравственности или защиты прав и свобод других лиц".
Правительство оспаривает это положение, тогда как Комиссия
разделяет его, по крайней мере в той части, которая касается
семейной жизни.
A. Статья 8 п. 1
66. Прежде всего Правительство выразило сомнения по поводу
наличия действительной семейной жизни между, с одной стороны, г-
ном Бельджуди и, с другой стороны, его родителями, братьями,
сестрами и его супругой.
В дальнейшем Правительство не поднимало больше этот вопрос в
Суде.
67. Как и Комиссия, Суд считает, что такая мера, как высылка из
страны, представляет собой вмешательство государственных органов в
осуществление заявителями права на уважение их семейной жизни,
гарантированного статьей 8 п. 1.
B. Статья 8 п. 2
68. В связи с этим следует определить, соответствует ли
оспариваемая высылка требованиям п. 2, т.е. является ли она
"предусмотренной законом", направлена ли на достижение одной или
нескольких правомерных целей, которые в нем перечислены, и
"необходимой в демократическом обществе" для реализации этих
целей.
1. "Предусмотрено законом"
69. Суд и стороны отмечают, что распоряжение министра от 2
ноября 1979 г. основывается на статье 23 Ордонанса от 2 ноября
1945 г. об условиях въезда и пребывания иностранцев во Франции
(см. п. 43 выше). Государственный совет подтвердил законность
распоряжения своим Решением от 18 января 1991 г. (см. п. 28 выше).
2. Правомерная цель
70. Правительство и Комиссия считают, что обсуждаемое
вмешательство преследует цели, абсолютно совместимые с Конвенцией:
"защита публичного порядка" и "предотвращение преступлений".
Заявители не оспаривают данное положение.
Суд пришел к такому же заключению.
3. "Необходимо в демократическом обществе"
71. По утверждению заявителей, высылка г-на Бельджуди не может
считаться "необходимой в демократическом обществе".
Они ссылаются, в частности, на ряд обстоятельств. Заявитель
родился во Франции от родителей - выходцев из Алжира, тогда
французской территории, он всегда жил во Франции, так же, как его
братья и сестры (см. п. 9 выше); он заявляет, что не знает
арабского языка, вырос в условиях французской культуры и получил
французское образование; в 1970 г. он женился на француженке (см.
п. 10, 11 выше), которой придется покинуть родину, чтобы не
расставаться с мужем; он пользовался статусом француза до 3
февраля 1972 г., т.е. до даты получения официального уведомления о
декрете премьер-министра, отказавшего ему во французском
гражданстве (см. п. 32 выше); в начале 1994 г. префект
департамента Верхняя Сена предложил ему временный вид на
жительство (см. п. 22 выше), а министром внутренних дел 31 августа
1989 г. ему было предоставлено право на жительство (см. п. 16
выше); его высылка из страны стала бы невозможной, если бы Законы
от 29 октября 1981 г. и 9 сентября 1986 г. вступили в силу раньше
(см. п. 44, 45 выше).
Короче говоря, г-н Бельджуди, который отнюдь не считает себя
"иммигрантом во втором поколении", и его жена утверждают, что все
их семейные, социальные, культурные и языковые корни находятся во
Франции. Они ссылаются на отсутствие чрезвычайных обстоятельств,
способных служить основанием для высылки.
72. Комиссия в основном соглашается с данным утверждением,
вместе с тем она особо выделяет два дополнительных момента. Во-
первых, г-жа Бельджуди вполне могла иметь веские причины не
следовать за своим мужем в Алжир, тем более что в момент выхода
замуж она думала, что будет жить с ним во Франции. Во-вторых,
правонарушения, совершенные г-ном Бельджуди (до и после решения о
высылке), по всей вероятности, не таковы, чтобы соображения
публичного порядка взяли верх над уважением семейной жизни.
73. Правительство, в свою очередь, ссылается прежде всего на
характер деяний, являющихся основанием для высылки из страны. Оно
обращает внимание на множественность и тяжесть преступлений,
совершенных заявителем (в совершеннолетнем возрасте) на протяжении
пятнадцати лет (см. п. 12 выше). Оно отмечает также суровость
наказаний, наложенных французскими судами, и, в частности,
приговор, вынесенный судом ассизов департамента Верхняя Сена (см.
п. 12 выше). В целом все эти приговоры предусматривают более 10
лет лишения свободы. Правительство отмечает, наконец, что
заявитель продолжал преступную деятельность после получения
уведомления о высылке, и в настоящий момент находится в
предварительном заключении по обвинению в совершении нового
преступления (см. п. 12, 14 выше). В целом, опасность деяний,
совершаемых г-ном Бельджуди, делает невозможным для общества его
пребывание на французской территории.
Правительство считает также, что не следует преувеличивать
степень вмешательства. Оно затрагивает семейную жизнь заявителей
только в качестве супругов. Г-н Бельджуди с 1969 г. не проживает
совместно со своими родителями и не поддерживает материально своих
братьев и сестер. Кроме того, у него нет детей. Супругам
приходилось в течение продолжительного времени проживать раздельно
вследствие пребывания г-на Бельджуди в местах заключения. Кроме
того, г-н Бельджуди не доказал, что его жена, если ему
действительно придется покинуть территорию Франции, не сможет
последовать за ним либо в Алжир, где, как известно, сохранились
многочисленные связи с Францией, либо в какое-нибудь третье
государство. В конечном счете трудности обосноваться где-либо вне
Франции, без разрыва семейных отношений, вовсе не являются
непреодолимыми.
74. Суд признает, что в обязанность государств - членов входит
обеспечение публичного порядка, а также контроля за въездом,
пребыванием и высылкой лиц, не являющихся гражданами страны в
соответствии с установившимся принципом международного права и
обязательствами, вытекающими из договоров (см. Решения по делу
Абдулазиз, Кабаль и Балкандали против Соединенного Королевства от
28 мая 1985 г. Серия A, т. 94, с. 34, п. 67, по делу Беррехаб
против Нидерландов от 21 июня 1988 г. Серия А, т. 138, с. 15 - 16,
п. 28, 29, по делу Мустаким против Бельгии от 18 февраля 1991 г.
Серия A, т. 193, с. 19, п. 43).
Вместе с тем, учитывая, что их решения по данному вопросу могут
нарушить право, закрепленное в статье 8 п. 1, они должны быть
необходимыми в демократическом обществе, т.е. должны оправдываться
насущной общественной потребностью и, кроме того, быть соразмерны
преследуемой цели.
75. В данном конкретном случае уголовное прошлое Бельджуди
представляется более тяжелым, чем прошлое Мустакима (см.
вышеупомянутое Решение). Правительство совершенно справедливо
обращает на это внимание. В связи с этим важно выяснить, являются
ли остальные обстоятельства дела - обоих заявителей вместе или
только одного из них - достаточными, чтобы служить противовесом
этому серьезному обстоятельству.
76. Заявители подали одну совместную жалобу и высказали
одинаковые претензии. Учитывая их возраст, а также отсутствие
детей, оспариваемое вмешательство касается в первую очередь их
совместной семейной жизни в качестве супругов. Правительство
резонно обращает внимание на это обстоятельство.
Между тем их брак был заключен во Франции более 20 лет тому
назад, и Франция всегда была местом проживания их семьи. Не
вызывает сомнения, что продолжительные периоды времени,
проведенные г-ном Бельджуди в местах заключения, надолго разлучали
супругов, но они тем не менее не разрушили их семейную жизнь,
право на которую гарантировано в статье 8.
77. Г-н Бельджуди, лицо, подлежащее высылке, родился во Франции
от родителей, которые в тот момент имели французское гражданство;
он сам имел французское гражданство до 1 января 1963 г. Считается,
что он потерял право на французское гражданство в этот момент,
т.к. его родители не подали до 27 марта 1967 г. заявление о
сохранении за ним французского гражданства (см. п. 9 выше). Не
следует, однако, забывать, что, будучи в то время
несовершеннолетним, заявитель не мог лично высказать свое мнение.
Кроме того, уже в 1970 г., т.е. через год после первой судимости,
но вместе с тем за 9 лет до вынесения решения о высылке, он
выразил желание вновь обрести французское гражданство; призванный,
по его просьбе, в вооруженные силы Франции в 1971 г., он был
признан французскими военными властями пригодным к несению военной
службы (см. п. 31, 33 выше).
Более того, заявитель женился на француженке. Все его близкие
родственники сохраняли французское гражданство до 1 января 1963
г., сам он живет во Франции вот уже несколько десятков лет.
Наконец, вся жизнь, более 40 лет, г-на Бельджуди прошла во
Франции; он учился во французской школе и, по всей видимости, не
знает арабского языка. Единственное, что, по-видимому, связывает
его с Алжиром, - это его национальность.
78. Что касается г-жи Бельджуди, то она родилась во Франции, от
родителей - французов, всю жизнь прожила во Франции и имеет
французское гражданство. Если бы она последовала за своим мужем
после его высылки из страны, то ей пришлось бы обосноваться за
границей, вероятнее всего в Алжире, в государстве, язык которого
она, скорее всего, не знает. Такая резкая смена обстановки могла
бы создать ей значительные трудности, вызванные необходимостью
адаптироваться к новым условиям, и породила бы реальные
препятствия практического и даже юридического плана.
Правительственный комиссар признал это на заседании
Государственного совета (см. п. 27 выше). В связи с этим
оспариваемое вмешательство могло бы нарушить единство или, может
быть, даже само существование семьи.
79. С учетом всех этих обстоятельств, очевидно, что в отношении
соблюдения права заявителей на семейную жизнь решение о высылке г-
на Бельджуди, в случае его исполнения, оказалось бы несоразмерным
преследуемой правомерной цели и тем самым была бы нарушена статья
8.
80. Данный вывод освобождает Суд от необходимости рассматривать
вопрос, является ли высылка из страны также нарушением права
заявителей на личную жизнь.
II. О предполагаемом нарушении статьи 14
в сочетании со статьей 8
81. В связи со сделанным выше в п. 79 выводом Суд не считает
нужным рассматривать и жалобу заявителей на то, что в случае
высылки г-на Бельджуди они подвергнутся дискриминации,
противоречащей статье 14.
III. О предполагаемом нарушении статей 3, 9 и 12
82. При рассмотрении дела в Комиссии заявители сослались также
на статьи 3, 9 и 12.
В дальнейшем они не ссылались на них в Суде, поэтому Суд не
считает себя обязанным рассматривать эти вопросы.
IV. Применение статьи 50
83. В соответствии со статьей 50,
"Если Суд установит, что решение или мера, принятые судебными
или иными властями Высокой Договаривающейся Стороны, полностью или
частично противоречат обязательствам, вытекающим из настоящей
Конвенции, а также если внутреннее право упомянутой Стороны
допускает лишь частичное возмещение последствий такого решения или
такой меры, то Решением Суда, если в этом есть необходимость,
предусматривается справедливое возмещение потерпевшей стороне".
На основании этого положения заявители требуют возмещения
понесенного ущерба и судебных расходов.
84. Ни одно из положений статьи 8 на настоящий момент не было
нарушено. Тем не менее Суд пришел к заключению, что решение
выслать г-на Бельджуди повлекло бы за собой таковое, если бы оно
было принято к исполнению. Исходя из этого следует рассматривать
статью 50 как применимую к данному случаю (см. mutatis mutandis
Решение по делу Серинга от 7 июля 1989 г. Серия A, т. 161, с. 49,
п. 126).
A. Возмещение ущерба
85. Считая себя понесшими ущерб в результате нарушения
Конвенции, г-н и г-жа Бельджуди требуют выплатить им в качестве
возмещения 10000000 французских франков.
Правительство находит эту сумму абсолютно беспрецедентной и,
главное, необоснованной, поскольку мера по выдворению из страны не
была осуществлена.
Представитель Комиссии также считает данное требование
чрезмерно завышенным. Он предлагает тем не менее в качестве
возмещения морального вреда приемлемую сумму, меньшую, чем та,
которую получил г-н Мустаким, вынужденный после выдворения из
Бельгии проживать несколько лет за ее пределами.
86. Заявителям был нанесен моральный вред. Вместе с тем
настоящее Решение Суда является его достаточным возмещением.
B. Судебные издержки и расходы
87. Г-н и г-жа Бельджуди ходатайствуют о возмещении им судебных
издержек и расходов, которые они, по их утверждению, понесли во
время рассмотрения дела в органах Конвенции, а именно 100000
французских франков.
По утверждению Правительства, счет, представленный от имени
заявителей, грешит неточностью. Вместе с тем сумма в 40000
франков, по-видимому, может быть приемлемой, если только не
возникнут особые обстоятельства, установленные надлежащим образом.
88. Учитывая изложенные в последующем обстоятельства, Суд
считает справедливым определить для этих целей сумму в 60000
французских франков.
ПО ЭТИМ ОСНОВАНИЯМ СУД
1. Постановил семью голосами против двух, что нарушение статьи
8 по отношению к обоим заявителям имело бы место, если бы решение
выслать г-на Бельджуди было исполнено;
2. Постановил восемью голосами против одного, что не требуется
рассматривать дело ни в свете статьи 14 в сочетании со статьей 8,
ни в свете статей 3, 9 и 12;
3. Постановил единогласно по поводу морального ущерба,
понесенного заявителями, что данное Решение само по себе является
справедливым и достаточным возмещением для целей статьи 50;
4. Постановил единогласно, что государство - ответчик должно
выплатить заявителям в трехмесячный срок 60000 (шестьдесят тысяч)
французских франков в качестве возмещения судебных издержек и
расходов;
5. Отклонил единогласно требование заявителей о выплате суммы,
превышающей данную.
Совершено на английском и французском языках и оглашено во
Дворце прав человека в Страсбурге 26 мая 1992 г.
Председатель
Рольф РИССДАЛ
Грефье
Марк-Андре ЭЙССЕН
В соответствии со статьей 51 п. 2 Конвенции и статьей 53 п. 2
Регламента Суда к настоящему Решению прилагаются отдельные мнения
судей.
ОСОБОЕ МНЕНИЕ СУДЬИ ПЕТТИТИ
В отличие от большинства я не голосовал за признание нарушения
статьи 8.
Совершенно очевидно, что вынесенное Решение имеет ограниченное
значение и обусловлено особыми обстоятельствами: на сегодняшний
момент г-н Бельджуди прожил во Франции 41 год и 22 года женат на
француженке. Тем не менее ни принципиальный подход, ни мотивы
Решения, как мне кажется, в точности не соответствуют толкованию и
оценке статьи 8 Конвенции в части, касающейся высылки иностранцев
- преступников.
Большинство судей учитывало, что распоряжение о высылке от 2
ноября 1979 г. дано до осуждения заявителя в 1978 г. и 1986 г., но
основывалось также на том дополнительном критерии, что заявителю
было отказано в получении гражданства в 1970 г. и что у него не
было связей с Алжиром. Оно считает, что высылка несоразмерна
правомерной цели, не уточняя при этом параметров этой
несоразмерности, о чем говорится в решении Государственного
совета.
Конвенция не ограничивает суверенного права государств
принимать решение о высылке со своей территории иностранцев -
правонарушителей и преступников.
Конвенция не гарантирует как таковое право иностранцев
пребывать на территории государств - участников. Право убежища и
право не быть высланным не фигурируют также как таковые и в числе
прав и свобод, гарантированных Конвенцией (многие решения такого
плана были приняты Комиссией).
Только при исключительных обстоятельствах высылка из страны
может явиться нарушением Конвенции, например, когда существует
серьезная угроза того, что высылаемое лицо в том государстве, куда
его высылают, подвергнется бесчеловечному или унижающему
достоинство обращению, особенно если нет никакой возможности
выслать это лицо в какое-либо иное государство. Постановление по
делу Мустакима имело иной характер, т.к. речь шла о подростке,
который был связан только с той страной, где жила его семья, и
который вернулся в это общество.
В деле Бельджуди обстоятельства совершенно иные: взрослый
рецидивист; личность, нарушающая публичный порядок. Его случай
вполне отвечает законным требованиям выдворения из страны.
Помимо всего прочего, он отказался приобрести французское
гражданство при вступлении в брак с француженкой.
Европейский суд исходил, по всей видимости, из непредоставления
заявителю французского гражданства. Рассуждать таким образом
означает забыть, что Эвианские соглашения являются международным
договором. Вопросы гражданства, в т.ч. и возможности его выбора,
были определены совместно Францией и Алжиром. Таким образом, это
не одностороннее решение Франции. Алжир также потребовал для себя
возможности выбора и широко пользуется правом выдворять из страны
правонарушителей - французов, даже если они родились и выросли в
Алжире. Такого рода двусторонний договор основывается на
взаимности и международном публичном праве. Францию нельзя
обвинить в нарушении Европейской конвенции о защите прав человека,
если исходить из того, что в решении вопроса о гражданстве г-на
Бельджуди она опиралась на Эвианские соглашения и на Кодекс о
гражданстве. Кроме того, как и любое другое государство, Франция
суверенна в вопросах предоставления гражданства или отказа в нем.
Большинство судей, по-видимому, считали г-на Бельджуди "как бы
французом", а такого понятия в международном праве не существует.
Факт постоянного проживания либо пребывания в принимающей
стране не может быть безусловным препятствием, противоречащим
осуществлению права на высылку правонарушителей. Не следует
считать, что особые отношения, существующие между Францией и
Алжиром, сами по себе могут быть препятствием для высылки из
страны, поскольку и в других государствах - членах Совета Европы
имеются подобного рода ситуации, связанные с исторически
сложившимися отношениями, например между Великобританией и
выходцами из стран Содружества, и т.д., где подобного рода
отношения не являются препятствием для высылки из страны на
законных основаниях.
Государства - члены Совета Европы достаточно часто высылают
правонарушителей. Единственно возможным общим исключением из этой
практики может быть ссылка на статью 3 либо, при длительном
периоде пребывания в стране, можно сослаться на статью 8.
Большинство судей, несомненно, принимают во внимание такой
немаловажный аспект, как прошлые судимости и поведение
правонарушителя. При этом, исходя из критерия соразмерности, на
одной чаше весов оказывается этот аспект его жизни, а на другой
его личная и семейная жизнь. Между тем следовало бы точнее
сбалансировать эти два аспекта, Европейский суд это делает в общих
чертах. В рассматриваемом Решении не уточняется тот порог
общественной опасности и возможных рецидивов, по которому можно
определить, следует или нет высылать иностранца - правонарушителя.
Как явствует из Решения, большинство посчитало также, что если
высылка будет осуществлена, то заявитель окажется именно в Алжире,
что отнюдь не очевидно.
В отличие от выдворений в административном порядке, не
связанных с преступной деятельностью (хотя и они могут иметь
драматические последствия для семейной жизни), серьезная проблема
высылки иностранцев - правонарушителей вызывает озабоченность
Европейского Экономического Сообщества, Совета Европы и Интерпола.
В этой связи необходимо выработать общую европейскую политику,
отвечающую духу Конвенции о защите прав человека и основных
свобод.
Решение большинства является, по моему мнению, источником
противоречий вследствие расширительного толкования статьи 8 в
вопросе о том, является ли вмешательство в частную либо семейную
жизнь правонарушителя - рецидивиста обстоятельством, достаточным
для того, чтобы помешать высылке из страны; в этом случае статус
рецидивиста является для него своего рода иммунитетом. В самом
деле, как и содержание под стражей, всякое выдворение из страны
затрагивает частную или семейную жизнь. Между тем нарушение
частной жизни в данном конкретном деле происходит в связи с
поведением самого правонарушителя.
Каждое государство самостоятельно определяет свою политику в
борьбе с правонарушениями, так же, как и тяжесть наказаний. Для
многих государств высылка служит показательным примером,
сопровождающим наказание. В странах, где проживает много
иностранцев, эта мера в большей степени, чем угроза тюремного
заключения, является барьером на пути совершения новых
преступлений; она укрепляет также национальное согласие в вопросе
о приеме новых иммигрантов, которые своим трудом способствуют
процветанию нации. Высылка из страны, в том виде, как она принята
в криминологии и уголовной политике, является также и мерой защиты
потенциальных жертв рецидивистов, особенно в странах, где
наблюдается резкий рост преступлений и существует разветвленная
сеть организованной преступности.
Конвенция о защите прав человека не может не признавать такой
параметр, как права других лиц и необходимость их защиты. Конечно,
в данном случае было бы предпочтительнее, чтобы французское
Правительство, учитывая новые нормы (более близкие к статье 8
Конвенции), содержащиеся в Законах от 29 октября 1981 г. (статьи
23, 25) и от 2 августа 1989 г., отказалось бы в этом конкретном
деле от выдворения данного лица, приняв во внимание положение его
супруги - француженки. Европейский суд, осуществляя контроль за
высылкой из страны, мог бы применять либо статью 6, если имеет
место нарушение внутренней процедуры с точки зрения Европейской
конвенции о защите прав человека, либо статью 3 (бесчеловечное и
унижающее достоинство обращение). Понятие равновесия интересов при
возможном и неочевидном применении статьи 8 требует строгого
критерия соразмерности, который, по моему мнению, отсутствует в
мотивировочной части Решения по делу Бельджуди.
Право государства выдворять иностранцев - правонарушителей и
преступников призвано сбалансировать широкие возможности,
предоставленные мигрантам и лицам, пользующимся правом на убежище,
что является важным моментом международной солидарности и защиты
прав человека.
ОТДЕЛЬНОЕ МНЕНИЕ СУДЬИ ДЕ МЕЙЕРА
Как и большинство моих коллег, я считаю, что произошло бы
нарушение основных прав заявителей, "если бы решение выдворить г-
на Бельджуди из страны было исполнено".
Но о каком праве или о каких правах идет речь?
Наш коллега господин Мартенс совершенно справедливо ставил
вопрос о том, что данное дело не затрагивает права на уважение
частной жизни, равно как и права на семейную жизнь.
Я в значительной мере поддерживаю его замечания.
Мне кажется тем не менее, что, учитывая обстоятельства,
упомянутые в пунктах 77 и 78 данного Решения, высылка г-на
Бельджуди по отношению к обоим заявителям представляла бы собой не
только недопустимое вмешательство в их частную и семейную жизнь,
но и, прежде всего, бесчеловечное обращение.
Так обстояло бы дело, причем не в отдаленном будущем, имея в
виду, что их ожидало в Алжире, в данном случае речь идет не об
этом, а вполне реально, учитывая, что г-на Бельджуди выдворили бы
из страны, в которой он прожил более 40 лет и которая практически
всегда была "его" с самого рождения, даже если он и не имеет ее
"гражданства". И если верно, что, как явствует из дела, г-н
Бельджуди был осужден за многочисленные правонарушения, по большей
части достаточно серьезные, и еще сегодня подозревается в
совершении других, то применения уголовного законодательства
достаточно, чтобы наказать его за содеянное.
ОСОБОЕ МНЕНИЕ СУДЬИ ВАЛЬТИКОСА
К сожалению, я должен выразить свое несогласие с мнением
большинства судей, которые посчитали, что в данном деле имело
место нарушение статьи 8 Конвенции, в частности в том, что
касается семейной жизни заявителя.
Мое объяснение может быть кратким, поскольку оно основывается в
основном на несогласии, выраженном мною в аналогичном, хотя и не
идентичном деле, касающемся молодого человека по имени Мустаким.
Различия между этими двумя делами имеют двоякий характер. С
одной стороны, в рассматриваемом случае речь идет о связях,
существующих между мужем и женой, а не о связях молодого человека
с его семьей. С другой стороны, Мустаким совершил многочисленные
правонарушения относительно меньшей степени тяжести, в то время
как в данном случае речь идет о повторных насильственных
преступлениях, совершенных на протяжении 17 лет сорокалетним
мужчиной, приговоренным почти к 11 годам тюремного заключения. Суд
не отрицает, впрочем, что здесь речь идет о "гораздо более
тяжелом" уголовном прошлом.
Высылка иностранцев как мера, предусмотренная для подобных дел,
является прерогативой государств, при этом Конвенция ограничивает
ее использование. (см. статьи 5 п. 1 "f" Конвенции и Протоколы N 4
и 7) лишь в строго определенных случаях. Данный случай к таковым
не относится.
Конечно, при рассмотрении данного дела Суд обращается к понятию
"семейная жизнь", которая гарантируется статьей 8 Конвенции. Суд
считает, что со стороны Правительства имело место вмешательство
публичной власти в осуществление права заявителей на уважение их
семейной жизни. Тем не менее можно поставить вопрос: применима ли
статья 8 в деле, подобном этому? Разве она создана для того, чтобы
сделать невозможным высылку иностранцев, состоящих в браке с
гражданами данного государства? Такое толкование могло бы открыть
путь для многих злоупотреблений.
Во всяком случае я не вижу возможности применения статьи 8
Конвенции для ограничения прав государств свободно принимать
обоснованные соображениями общественной безопасности меры по
выдворению иностранцев из страны.
СОВПАДАЮЩЕЕ МНЕНИЕ СУДЬИ МАРТЕНСА
1. Я разделяю выводы Суда, вместе с тем я бы предпочел, чтобы
по делу г-на Бельджуди свое Решение Суд основывал:
a) на менее казуистическом рассуждении;
b) на нарушении права на уважение частной жизни.
2. Пункт 1 статьи 3 дополнительного Протокола N 4 к Конвенции
запрещает высылать граждан страны. В сегодняшней Европе, где уже
второе поколение иммигрантов <1> воспитывает детей (и где
наблюдается вызывающий большую тревогу рост безудержной
ксенофобии), уже давно пора поставить вопрос, не следует ли
распространить этот запрет на иностранцев, родившихся и выросших в
одном из государств - участников либо полностью интегрированных в
это общество вследствие долгого проживания в нем и не имеющих,
таким образом, более никаких связей со страной происхождения <2>.
--------------------------------
<1> Я, безусловно, отдаю себе отчет в том, что настоящее дело
отличается от рядового случая выдворения иммигранта второго
поколения тем, что родители г-на Бельджуди, когда они обосновались
во Франции, были не "иммигрантами" в строгом смысле слова, а
французскими гражданами, приехавшими жить в свою страну. Тем не
менее мне кажется оправданным не принимать здесь во внимание эту
разницу.
<2> Данный вопрос имеет, по-видимому, более ограниченное
значение в государствах - членах, в которых в силу права земли
иммигранты второго поколения имеют право на гражданство в силу
рождения на территории этого государства; в таком случае,
вероятно, точнее будет говорить о высылке "интегрированных
иностранцев", а не о высылке "иммигрантов второго поколения".
Я считаю, что просто гражданство само по себе не является
объективным и разумным оправданием разных подходов к высылке кого-
либо из страны, которую в обоих случаях можно назвать его
"собственной страной". Вот почему я без колебаний ответил
утвердительно на поставленный выше вопрос. Я понимаю, что все
большее число государств - членов Совета Европы согласны с тем,
что не следует высылать <3> из страны "интегрированных
иностранцев", как и граждан страны, причем отступление от этого
правила может быть оправданным лишь в исключительных случаях.
--------------------------------
<3> Этот принцип уже принят в рамках международного Пакта о
гражданских и политических правах, статья 12 п. 4 которого гласит:
"Никто не может быть произвольно лишен права въезда в свою
страну"; из этого вытекает, что запрет на высылку распространяется
не только на граждан своего государства, но и, как это вытекает из
формулировки "своя собственная страна", на всех "интегрированных
иностранцев" (например, на иммигрантов второго поколения): (см.
Nowak М. CCPR-Kommentar, Art. 12, Randnummern 45-51; Van Dijk et
Van Hoof. De Europese Conventie, 2nd edition, p. 551; Velu et
Ergec. La Convention Eur. DH, з 372, p. 322).
Моя собственная страна входит в число этих государств <4>, и,
начиная с 1981 г., за исключением периода с 1986 г. по 1989 г.,
такое же положение дел существует во Франции <5>.
--------------------------------
<4> См. версию 1990 г. "Circular on Aliens": Nederlandse
Staatscourant". 12 maart 1990, no. 50; см. также на эту тему:
Groenendijk. Nederlands Juristenblad. 1987, p. 1341 et seq.;
Swart, Preadvies, Nederlandse Juristen-vereniging. 1990, з 35, p.
242 et seq.
<5> См. п. 42 - 50 Решения Суда.
На мой взгляд, Суду следовало бы исходить в своем Решении из
вышеуказанного принципа и сделать заключение об отсутствии в
данном случае исключительных обстоятельств, оправдывающих
отступление от этого принципа. При такой мотивировке Решения можно
было бы достичь того, чего не удалось достичь Решением по делу
Мустакима <6>, как и настоящим Решением, а именно установления
определенного уровня правовой безопасности, которая представляется
особенно желательной в этой области.
--------------------------------
<6> Решение от 18 февраля 1991 г. Серия A, т. 193.
3. Как совершенно справедливо подчеркнул г-н Шермер <7>,
последнее соображение является также аргументом в пользу того,
чтобы Решение Суда мотивировать, по возможности, нарушением права
на частную жизнь, поскольку, хотя не все "интегрированные
иностранцы", которым угрожает высылка, состоят в браке, у всех у
них есть частная жизнь.
--------------------------------
<7> См. его совпадающее мнение, приложенное к заключению
Комиссии по данному делу, с. 48 и 49.
Я считаю такую мотивировку возможной. Высылка из страны
необратимым образом разрывает все социальные связи между
высылаемым лицом и обществом, в котором он живет, а я думаю, что
все эти связи могут быть включены в понятие частной жизни в смысле
статьи 8. При поверхностном рассмотрении создается впечатление,
что в этой статье выражена иная точка зрения. В целом в ней
гарантируется иммунитет тесного круга лиц, внутри которого каждый
проживает свою собственную частную жизнь по своему усмотрению.
Понятие "тесный круг" предполагает существование "внешнего мира",
который, по логике вещей, не входит в понятие частной жизни.
Однако по зрелом размышлении приходится констатировать, что
понятие "тесный круг" оказывается слишком ограниченным. Слова
"семейная жизнь" уже расширяют этот круг, однако есть еще и
близкие родственники, с которыми, в строгом смысле слова, семейной
жизни не существует. Тем не менее отношения с такими лицами,
например со своими родителями, вне всякого сомнения входят в сферу
отношений, уважение которых гарантирует статья 8. То же самое
можно сказать по поводу отношений с любовниками и друзьями. Я
разделяю, таким образом, мнение Комиссии, которая неоднократно
заявляла, что понятие "уважение частной жизни" "включает также, в
определенной мере, право устанавливать и поддерживать связи с
другими людьми, в частности в сфере эмоциональных отношений, для
развития и становления своей собственной личности" <8>.
--------------------------------
<8> См. inter alia D.R., т. 5, с. 86 - 87; D.R., т. 10, с. 100;
Серия B, т. 36, с. 25 - 26.
Если, поступая таким образом, Комиссия имела в виду дать
определение понятия "частная жизнь" в смысле статьи 8 (как это
было предложено Doswald-Beck в Human Rights Law Journal, 1983, p.
288), то я должен выразить свое несогласие с такой формулировкой:
"очень трудно дать определение этого понятия", и, на мой взгляд,
не наступило еще время браться за эту задачу.
На мой взгляд, Решения Суда по делу Даджен против Соединенного
Королевства, по делу Риз против Соединенного Королевства, по делу
Косси против Соединенного Королевства и по делу Б. против Франции
<9> основаны на мысли о том, что "в определенной мере "внешние"
nrmnxemh% одного человека с другими (за пределами "тесного круга")
относятся к области частной жизни" <10>.
--------------------------------
<9> Решения от 22 октября 1981 г., 17 октября 1986 г., 27
сентября 1990 г. и 25 марта 1992 г. Серия А, т. 45, 106, 184 и 232-
С.
<10> См. также: Velu et Ergec. La Convention Enr. DH з 652 p.
535 et seq.
В основе упомянутого выше запрета высылки своих собственных
граждан лежит, по-видимому, та же самая мысль: когда говорят о
гражданах страны, то почти всегда в первую очередь имеют в виду
тех, кого с этой страной связывают особенно тесные и
многочисленные узы, т.к. они родились в этой стране и
воспитывались <11> в семье, многие поколения которой издавна живут
на этой земле <12>; по всей видимости, было сочтено неприемлемым,
чтобы государство, вынуждая таких лиц покинуть страну и никогда
более в нее не возвращаться, необратимо разрывало эти связи.
--------------------------------
<11> См. п. 88 Решения Суда от 28 мая 1985 г. по делу
Абдулазиз, Кабал и Балкандали против Соединенного Королевства.
Серия A, т. 94, с. 41.
<12> О том, что история жизни отдельного человека и связанные с
ним личные воспоминания могут относиться к тем сферам, уважение
которых гарантируется статьей 8, см. Решение Суда от 7 июля 1989
г. по делу Гаскин против Соединенного Королевства (Серия A, т.
160).
Резюмируя сказанное, я думаю, что высылка какого-либо лица,
особенно (как в данном случае) в страну, где условия жизни резко
отличаются от тех, к которым он привык, и где, ощущая себя
иностранцем в обстановке чуждой ему культуры, он рискует жить
почти в полной социальной изоляции, является нарушением его права
на частную жизнь.
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
CASE OF BELDJOUDI v. FRANCE
JUDGMENT
(Strasbourg, 26.III.1992)
In the case of Beldjoudi v. France <1>,
The European Court of Human Rights, sitting, in accordance with
Article 43 (art. 43) of the Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ("the Convention") <2> and the
relevant provisions of the Rules of Court, as a Chamber composed
of the following judges:
--------------------------------
Notes by the Registrar
<1> The case is numbered 55/1990/246/317. The first number is
the case's position on the list of cases referred to the Court in
the relevant year (second number). The last two numbers indicate
the case's position on the list of cases referred to the Court
since its creation and on the list of the corresponding
originating applications to the Commission.
<2> As amended by Article 11 of Protocol No. 8 (P8-11), which
came into force on 1 January 1990.
Mr R. Ryssdal, President,
Mr F. Matscher,
Mr L.-E. Pettiti,
Mr C. Russo,
Mr A. Spielmann,
Mr J. De Meyer,
Mr N. Valticos,
Mr S.K. Martens,
Mr R. Pekkanen,
and also of Mr M.-A. Eissen, Registrar, and Mr H. Petzold,
Deputy Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 25 October 1991 and 26
February 1992,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the last-
mentioned date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case was referred to the Court by the European
Commission of Human Rights ("the Commission") on 12 November 1990,
within the three-month period laid down by Article 32 para. 1 and
Article 47 (art. 32-1, art. 47) of the Convention. It originated
in an application (no. 12083/86) against the French Republic
lodged with the Commission under Article 25 (art. 25) by Mr Mohand
Beldjoudi, an Algerian citizen, and his wife Mrs Martine Beldjoudi
{nee} Teychene, a French national, on 28 March 1986.
The Commission's request referred to Articles 44 and 48 (art.
44, art. 48) and to the declaration whereby France recognised the
compulsory jurisdiction of the Court (Article 46) (art. 46). The
object of the request was to obtain a decision as to whether the
facts of the case disclosed a breach by the respondent State of
its obligations under Article 8 (art. 8), taken either alone or
together with Article 14 (art. 14+8), and Articles 3, 9 and 12
(art. 3, art. 9, art. 12).
2. In response to the enquiry made in accordance with Rule 33
para. 3 (d) of the Rules of Court, the applicants stated that they
wished to take part in the proceedings and designated the lawyer
who would represent them (Rule 30).
3. On 22 November 1990 the President decided that, in the
interests of the proper administration of justice, this case
should be considered by the Chamber constituted on 24 May 1990 to
hear the Djeroud case <3> (Rule 21 para. 6). It included ex
officio Mr L.-E. Pettiti, the elected judge of French nationality
(Article 43 of the Convention) (art. 43), and Mr R. Ryssdal, the
President of the Court (Rule 21 para. 3 (b)). The other seven
members, whose names had been drawn by lot, were Mr F. Matscher,
Mr J. Pinheiro Farinha, Sir Vincent Evans, Mr C. Russo, Mr J. De
Meyer, Mr N. Valticos and Mr R. Pekkanen (Article 43 in fine of
the Convention and Rule 21 para. 4) (art. 43). Subsequently, Mr
S.K. Martens and Mr A. Spielmann, substitute judges, replaced Sir
Vincent Evans and Mr Pinheiro Farinha, who had resigned from the
Court and whose successors had taken up their duties before the
hearing (Rules 2 para. 3, 22 para. 1 and 24 para. 1).
--------------------------------
<3> Note by the Registrar: case no. 34/1990/225/289, struck out
of the list on 23 January 1991 following a friendly settlement
(Series A no. 191-B).
4. As President of the Chamber (Rule 21 para. 5) Mr Ryssdal,
through the Registrar, consulted the Agent of the French
Government ("the Government"), the Delegate of the Commission and
the lawyer for the applicants on the organisation of the procedure
(Rule 37 para. 1 and Rule 38). Pursuant to the orders made in
consequence, the Registrar received the applicants' memorial on 29
April 1991 and the Government's memorial on 30 April. On 8 July
the Secretary to the Commission informed him that the Delegate
would submit his observations at the hearing.
5. Counsel for the applicants wrote to the President on 14
October 1991, as did the Agent of the Government on 17 October, on
the question whether Mr Beldjoudi would be able to attend the
hearing in person, despite his detention (Article 4 para. 1 (a) of
the European Agreement relating to Persons Participating in
Proceedings before the European Commission and Court of Human
Rights).
6. In accordance with the President's decision, the hearing
took place in public in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on
21 October 1991. The Court had held a preparatory meeting
beforehand.
There appeared before the Court:
(a) for the Government
Mr J.-P. Puissochet, Director of Legal Affairs, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Agent,
Mrs E. Florent, Administrative Court Judge, on secondment to
the Department of Legal Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Mr R. Riera, Head of the Litigation Section, Department of
Civil Liberties and Legal Affairs, Ministry of the Interior,
Counsel;
(b) for the Commission
Mr H. Danelius, Delegate;
(c) for the applicants
Mr B. Donche, avocat, Counsel.
The Court heard addresses by Mr Puissochet for the Government,
Mr Danelius for the Commission and Mr Donche for the applicants,
as well as their replies to its questions.
Mr Beldjoudi was able to attend the hearing in person.
7. At the hearing, the Agent of the Government and the lawyer
representing the applicants produced various documents. On that
day and the following day, the former also provided certain
information.
8. On 18 November the Agent supplied further information and
observations, and produced certain documents, as the President had
invited him to do during the hearing.
In a letter received at the registry on 6 December, the lawyer
for the applicants made observations on these documents, and
produced a schedule of costs and fees.
On 21 February 1992, the Government submitted a memorandum.
AS TO THE FACTS
I. The circumstances of the case
A. Introduction
9. Mr Mohand Beldjoudi, who is a mechanic by profession, is an
Algerian citizen. He was born in France on 23 May 1950, in
Courbevoie (Hauts-de-Seine department). He lived with his parents
in the Paris region until October 1969. His parents were born in
Algeria in 1909 and 1926 respectively. That country was a French
department at the time, and became independent on 3 July 1962,
following the Evian "Agreements" of 19 March 1962. In common with
their children, they were deemed to have lost French nationality
on 1 January 1963 (Law of 20 December 1966 - see paragraph 58
below), because they had not made a declaration recognising French
nationality before 27 March 1967 (section 2 of the Order of 21
July 1962 - see paragraph 57 below). Mr Beldjoudi's father arrived
in metropolitan France in 1926 and served in the French army from
1931 to 1955. He subsequently worked until his retirement in 1970
as an assistant, later a civil servant, in the Ministry of Public
Health and Population Affairs, this being a post reserved for
French nationals. He died in Colombes (Hauts-de-Seine) in 1986.
Mohand Beldjoudi's mother, who left Algeria in 1948, and four
of his brothers and sisters - all born in metropolitan France
prior to 1 January 1963 - each have an Algerian national identity
card. They reside in France, where they hold residence permits
which are valid for ten years and are renewable. The youngest
sister resumed French nationality on 20 July 1988.
10. Mrs Martine Teychene was born in France on 8 November 1951,
both her parents being French. She has French nationality and
works as a secretary.
11. The applicants were married at Colombes on 11 April 1970,
after living together for some time. They live at La Garenne-
Colombes (Hauts-de-Seine); they have no children.
12. Over the years Mr Beldjoudi was convicted and received
custodial sentences as follows:
(a) 27 March 1969, eight months' imprisonment for assault and
battery (Paris Criminal Court);
(b) 29 July 1974, six months' imprisonment for driving a
vehicle without a licence and possession of category one or
category four weapons or ammunition (same court);
(c) 10 January 1976, eighteen months' imprisonment, of which
fourteen months suspended, and four years' probation for theft
(Paris Court of Appeal);
(d) 25 November 1977, eight years' imprisonment for aggravated
theft (Hauts-de-Seine Assize Court);
(e) 28 March 1978, three months' imprisonment for acquisition
and possession of category one or category four weapons or
ammunition (Nanterre Criminal Court);
(f) 4 February 1986, eighteen months' imprisonment, of which
ten months suspended, and five years' probation for assault and
battery and criminal damage (same court).
13. His periods of imprisonment before 1991, pending trial or
after conviction, were as follows:
(a) 20 July - 17 September 1968, one month and twenty-eight
days;
(b) 25 August - 8 October 1973, one month and fourteen days;
(c) 3 April - 21 August 1974, four months and eighteen days;
(d) 26 March 1975 - 4 December 1981, six years, eight months
and eight days;
(e) 20 October 1985 - 25 April 1986, six months and five days.
Their total length was almost seven years, ten months and two
weeks.
14. On 17 January 1991 the applicant was detained on remand at
{Fleury-Merogis} <*> (Essonne) and his wife was placed under
judicial supervision in Ecos (Eure), both having been charged with
aggravated receiving of stolen property by an investigating judge
at the Melun tribunal de grande instance (Seine-et-Marne).
--------------------------------
<*> Здесь и далее по тексту слова на национальном языке набраны
латинским шрифтом и выделены фигурными скобками.
In a judgment of 23 January 1992 the Indictments Division of
the Paris Court of Appeal ordered Mr Beldjoudi's release subject
to judicial supervision.
B. The deportation proceedings
1. The deportation order
15. The Minister of the Interior had on 2 November 1979 issued
a deportation order against Mr Beldjoudi, on the ground that his
presence on French territory was a threat to public order (ordre
public).
The order, which was in accordance with the opinion of the
Commission on Deportation of Aliens (Commission d'expulsion des
{etrangers}), was served on the applicant on 14 November 1979 at
Melun Prison.
2. The requests for the order to be withdrawn
16. Mr Beldjoudi requested the Minister of the Interior on five
occasions to withdraw the order. The last request, of 8 August
1984, was the only one to receive a reply. This was sent to his
lawyer on 4 December 1989 by the Director of the Department of
Civil Liberties and Legal Affairs at the Ministry of the Interior,
and read as follows:
"Following the decision of the European Commission of Human
Rights of 11 July 1989 declaring Mr Beldjoudi's application
admissible [(see paragraph 62 below)], you again drew my attention
to your client's case. You wished in particular to know whether
the Minister might be prepared to consider a friendly settlement
of this matter.
In the light of a careful re-examination of Mr Beldjoudi's
case, the Minister issued a compulsory residence order ({arrete
d'assignation a residence}) on 31 August 1989 for the Hauts-de
Seine department, where the applicant has his habitual residence.
The residence document issued to him has attached to it
permission to undertake paid work.
This goodwill decision in favour of Mr Beldjoudi, which has
been taken in view of his family ties, may be continued if his
conduct is not in conflict therewith.
I confirm, however, that in view of the seriousness and the
number of the offences committed by Mr Beldjoudi, it has not
appeared possible to revoke the deportation order issued against
him.
..."
17. The compulsory residence order was served in November 1989.
3. The appeal for the order to be set aside
(a) Before the Versailles Administrative Court
18. On 27 December 1979 Mr Beldjoudi appealed to the Paris
Administrative Court for the deportation order to be set aside.
Having been born in France of parents who were themselves French
at the time, he was to be regarded as French and hence not liable
to deportation; further, he had no ties with Algeria and had been
married to a Frenchwoman for nearly ten years.
19. The Conseil d'Etat assigned the case to the Versailles
Administrative Court, within whose local jurisdiction it fell.
20. On 27 November 1980 that court ordered additional
investigative measures: it asked the Minister of the Interior to
submit his observations on the applicant's latest memorial and to
produce a copy of the decree of 16 September 1970 refusing him
French nationality (see paragraph 32 below).
21. In an interlocutory judgment of 14 October 1983 it decided
to adjourn the case until the ordinary courts had decided the
question of Mr Beldjoudi's nationality (see paragraphs 34 and 35
below).
22. On 8 February 1984 Mr Beldjoudi turned down the provisional
residence permit which had been offered to him by the prefecture
of the Hauts-de-Seine department, on the grounds that by accepting
it he would be acknowledging that he was of Algerian nationality.
23. Mr Beldjoudi resumed the proceedings on 20 January 1988,
submitting a supplementary memorial, without waiting for a
decision on his appeal to the Court of Cassation (see paragraph 41
below). He argued from a law of 9 September 1986, which had
amended the second paragraph of section 25 of the 1945 Order on
which the deportation order was based: having been habitually
resident in France from birth, he could not be the subject of such
an order, as he had not been convicted and sentenced to a term of
imprisonment of at least six months not suspended or one year
suspended in respect of offences committed after the coming into
force of that law.
24. On 18 February 1988 Mr Beldjoudi added to his supplementary
memorial. With reference to Article 8 (art. 8) of the Convention,
he maintained that implementation of the said order would be a
serious interference with the respect due to his private and
family life; he pointed out in this connection that he had been
married to a Frenchwoman since 1970, he had been born in France,
had lived there uninterruptedly and had received a French
education and upbringing there.
25. On 21 April 1988 the court dismissed the appeal for the
following reasons:
"Considering that by the order dated 2 November 1979 the
Minister of the Interior, following the opinion of the special
commission set up under section 25 of the Order of 2 November
1945, ordered the deportation of Mr Beldjoudi, an Algerian
citizen, who had been convicted by a criminal court on 25 November
1977 and sentenced to eight years' imprisonment for aggravated
theft;
Considering that it does not appear from the case-file that the
Minister, in deciding that the presence of Mr Beldjoudi was a
threat to public order and consequently ordering his deportation,
failed to examine all the evidence relating to the applicant's
conduct or assessed that conduct in a manifestly erroneous manner;
and that it is not alleged that this assessment was based on
material errors of fact;
Considering that Mr Beldjoudi is not justified in relying on
provisions emanating from the Declaration of the Rights of Man and
of the Citizen, claiming to this end the benefit of provisions in
section 25 of the Order of 2 November 1945 as amended in a version
subsequent to the decision appealed against; that having regard to
the fact that the measure taken against the applicant was
necessary for public safety, he is not entitled to take advantage
of the provisions of Article 8 (art. 8) of the European Convention
on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;".
(b) Before the Conseil d'Etat
26. Mr Beldjoudi appealed to the Conseil d'Etat on 17 June
1988, asking it to quash the judgment of 21 April 1988 and set
aside the order of 2 November 1979 as being ultra vires.
27. The Government Commissioner (commissaire du Gouvernement),
Mr Ronny Abraham, made the following submissions:
"The majority of the grounds of appeal should not keep you
long. One of them, however, should induce you to re-examine, and
in our opinion to amend, your case-law on a point which is of
considerable importance.
...
According to the appellant, the deportation order against him
is in breach of Article 8 (art. 8) [of the Convention], as it
constitutes an excessive interference with his family life. Mr
Beldjoudi has been married to a Frenchwoman since 11 April 1970.
He had thus been so married for over nine years at the time of the
decision appealed against.
In the current state of your case-law this ground of appeal
would have to be dismissed as ineffective.
Thus in a decision of 25 July 1980, Touami ben Abdeslem,
[Recueil Lebon, tables], p. 820, and JCP [Juris-Classeur
{periodique}] 1981.II.19.613, note Pacteau, your court held that
an alien 'cannot to any effect rely on ... the provisions of
Article 8 (art. 8) of the Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ... in support of his submissions
asking for the deportation order against him to be set aside'.
Making the same point, but expressed slightly differently, the
Chrouki judgment of 6 December 1985 found that Article 8 (art. 8)
of the European Convention on Human Rights did not prevent
exercise of the power conferred on the Minister of the Interior by
section 23 of the Order of 2 November 1945, and dismissed the
ground of appeal without further consideration (appeal no. 55912).
This is the dominant line of your case-law, although there are
also some decisions in which you appear rather to have taken a
position on the merits and circumstances of the case in order to
reject the ground of appeal: the Bahi decision of 6 February 1981,
for instance, held that the requirements of Article 8 (art. 8) of
the Convention could not in the particular case prevent a
deportation order, but the wording used is too lapidary to be seen
as a real change of direction of your case-law.
Whatever the position may be on these uncertainties, we will
suggest to you today that you definitely abandon the solution laid
down in the Touami ben Abdeslem judgment and adopt an entirely new
approach to the question before us.
There are three principal reasons why we suggest this new
approach to you.
The first reason is a negative one. It is that we do not really
see what can justify the radically unfavourable answer given in
1980.
You surely did not intend to deny Article 8 (art. 8) of the
Convention its character as a provision which is directly
applicable in the domestic legal order. All your case-law is
consistent as to the direct effect of the European Convention on
Human Rights, nor does the actual wording of the Touami judgment
in any way suggest such an interpretation, as Article 8 (art. 8)
was not rejected as such, but only with reference to the removal
of aliens.
Was it your intention rather to apply the technique of the
'screen law', considering that as the law gives a complete and
exclusive definition of the legal conditions for deportation, the
addition of supplementary conditions derived from international
agreements would amount to disregarding the legislature's
intention? If that was the reason for your decision at the time,
it would clearly no longer be applicable today, following your
plenary court decision of 20 October 1989 in the Nicolo case,
according to which treaties take precedence over laws, even if the
laws postdate them. But we doubt whether this was the explanation
of your decision in Touami: the decision related to a 1978
deportation order; but at that time the relevant internal
legislation was not subsequent but prior to France's ratification
of the Convention, and the 'screen law' theory explanation is thus
not tenable.
More simply, it seems probable to us that you considered that a
deportation order was not in itself an interference with the
alien's family life: if the alien has family ties on French
territory, nothing prevents the other members of the family group
leaving France with him. But this is a very theoretical way of
looking at things. It is no doubt correct that in certain cases
there is nothing to prevent the family leaving French territory;
but in other cases, especially if the alien has a spouse or
children of French nationality, it may be difficult on practical
or even legal grounds for the other members of the family to
follow him, with the effect that the expulsion measure jeopardises
the pursuit of an ordinary family life. In any event, it is in our
opinion not possible to state that a deportation measure can never
of itself be capable of interfering with the family life of the
person concerned, and there is no reason to dismiss a priori as
ineffective a ground of appeal based on Article 8 (art. 8).
There is a second reason which supports us in this view: your
case-law is not at all in harmony with that developed by the
European Court of Human Rights in recent years.
In the Berrehab v. the Netherlands judgment of 21 June 1988 the
Strasbourg Court defined for the first time the possible impact of
Article 8 (art. 8) on expulsion measures against aliens. The
substance of its decision was that where the alien has real family
ties in the territory of the State in which he is resident and the
expulsion measure is such as to jeopardise the maintenance of
those ties, the measure is justified with regard to Article 8
(art. 8) only if it is proportionate to the legitimate aim
pursued, in other words, if the interference with family life
which follows from it is not excessive with respect to the public
interest to be protected. This balance between the public and
private interests induced the Court to find in the Berrehab case
that there had been a violation of the Convention by the
Netherlands, with respect to an alien who was the father of a
child born of a (dissolved) marriage with a Netherlands woman and
who had been refused renewal of his residence permit for purely
economic reasons, reasons which were indeed legitimate, but which
led in the particular case to consequences whose seriousness was
not proportionate to the public interest pursued.
Such an intellectual approach ought not to disconcert you, and
we see nothing to prevent you henceforth adopting it as yours with
reference to the deportation of aliens, provided of course that
Article 8 (art. 8) of the Convention is in fact pleaded.
Reviewing proportionality is among your tried and tested
techniques, and the concept of a balance to be struck between
divergent public and private interests is certainly not unfamiliar
to you, since you constantly make use of it in certain contexts.
Admittedly, the field of deportation has until now been dominated
rather by the concept of discretionary power and its corollary of
a limited power of review restricted to manifest abuse of
discretion. But even in this field you carry out a complete review
where the statutory provisions require this - as in the case of
the concepts of 'absolute urgency' and 'compelling necessity for
national security' which exceptionally permit the expulsion of
aliens belonging to categories who in principle are protected
against such a measure, under the legislation in force after 1981
- and in our opinion the same should apply in the case of the
application of Article 8 (art. 8) of the Convention.
Furthermore - and here we come to our final argument -
maintaining your case-law as in Touami ben Abdeslem would have the
awkward consequence of making appeals to the Strasbourg
institutions directly available to aliens who were the subject of
a deportation order and complained of an interference with their
family life, without their being obliged first to have recourse to
the domestic courts.
For it is a known fact that, according to the consistent case-
law of the European Commission of Human Rights, the rule that
domestic remedies must first be exhausted, which under Article 26
(art. 26) of the Convention is a condition of admissibility of
individual applications submitted to the Commission, must be
understood as imposing on an applicant the obligation only to have
prior recourse to domestic remedies which have a reasonable chance
of success, having regard in particular to the case-law of the
highest courts, with the effect that a definite line of caselaw
excluding a priori the taking into account of Article 8 (art. 8)
of the Convention would entitle an alien to take his claims
directly to the European institutions.
The present case is a perfect illustration of this. Without
waiting for you to give a decision and hence before having
exhausted all possible domestic remedies, Mr Beldjoudi lodged with
the European Commission of Human Rights an application complaining
of a violation of Article 8 (art. 8) of the Convention which he
claimed to be the victim of. Despite the proceedings still pending
before you, the European Commission of Human Rights declared the
application admissible in a decision of 11 July 1989, referring in
particular to your Touami ben Abdeslem decision.
Further, after adopting its report, the European Commission of
Human Rights referred the application to the European Court of
Human Rights, and the same case is thus simultaneously pending
before you and before the Strasbourg Court, which will no doubt
give a decision this year. This is an exceptional situation, which
cannot be regarded as satisfactory or normal with respect to the
control machinery set up by the European Convention on Human
Rights, which is based on the concept of the subsidiarity of
control by the European institutions to control by the domestic
courts.
The only way to avoid such a situation occurring again, and
indeed to avoid the domestic courts losing jurisdiction altogether
in favour of the European Court, consists in you yourselves
reviewing compliance with Article 8 (art. 8) rather than leaving
this task to the Strasbourg institutions, whom incidentally you
would not be doing a favour by allowing applicants immediate
access to them.
If you agree with us on this question of principle, you will
then have to make a decision on two points in the present case:
firstly, does the deportation of Mr Beldjoudi constitute an
'interference' with his 'right to respect for his family life', to
use the language of Article 8 (art. 8)? Secondly, is this
'interference' necessary and proportionate to the aim pursued, in
the circumstances of the case?
We suggest that you answer both questions in the affirmative.
In our opinion, it cannot be doubted that the deportation of
the applicant jeopardises his family life to a certain extent.
No doubt the possibility cannot be excluded of his French
spouse being able to follow him abroad, which in practice means to
Algeria. But it must be admitted that that would not be easy, and
that legal and practical obstacles could make it difficult for the
couple to restart life abroad.
However, the serious nature of the offences committed by the
applicant appears to us to justify the deportation order issued
against him, and the interference with the applicant's family life
is in the instant case not disproportionate to the threat to
public order which the applicant's presence on French territory
represented on 2 November 1979, the date for you to have reference
to.
We are indeed far removed from the circumstances which gave
rise to the above-mentioned Berrehab judgment.
From 1969, when he was only nineteen years of age, Mr Beldjoudi
committed various offences for which he received various
convictions: assault and battery, driving a vehicle without a
licence, carrying a prohibited weapon.
Above all, on 5 February 1975 he gained entry at night,
together with accomplices, to the residence of two people who were
subjected to violence by the criminals in order to steal their
savings. For these acts the applicant was convicted on 25 November
1977 and sentenced to eight years' imprisonment for aggravated
theft.
In these circumstances, the decision taken with respect to him
in 1979 does not appear to us to have been disproportionate to the
aim pursued, or to be excessive even having regard to the family
consequences it has for the applicant.
In one pan of the scales one must place the public interest in
the removal of an individual who is a serious threat to the safety
of persons and property. In the other pan one must bear in mind
the difficulties Mr Beldjoudi and his wife (the couple have no
children) would have in resettling abroad without damaging their
family life. It seems to us that the balance is tilted towards the
public interest.
We would not have any doubt in reaching this conclusion, had
not the European Commission of Human Rights - as it is now
necessary to mention - adopted an opposite position, in the report
it drew up on this case under Article 31 para. 1 (art. 31-1) of
the Convention and which it referred to the Court together with
the application.
The Commission was of the opinion, by twelve votes to five,
that the deportation of Mr Beldjoudi constituted a violation of
Article 8 (art. 8).
The greatest regard must of course be had to such an opinion,
but it must, however, not be forgotten that it is only an opinion,
albeit a highly authoritative one and deserving of respect, as the
Commission in a sense fulfils for the Court the same function as
the Government Commissioner before your court; this is a
sufficient indication of its importance, but the Court is not
obliged to follow it; and in the past the Court has on several
occasions differed from the Commission's opinion.
We for our part are unable to agree with the Commission's
reasoning. It is clear from reading its report that it based
itself not so much on Mr Beldjoudi's matrimonial ties, as on the
fact that the applicant was born in France, has always lived
there, appears not to have personal ties with Algeria, and does
not know the Arabic language and that, in the words of the
Commission, 'the nationality link, though a legal reality, in no
way reflects the real situation in human terms' (see paragraph 64
of the report).
We appreciate the significance in human terms of these facts.
Under the post-1981 legislation they might perhaps have protected
Mr Beldjoudi against deportation, despite the seriousness of the
offences committed by him. But they appear to us to have nothing
to do with the concept of 'family life' protected by Article 8
(art. 8), or with that of 'private life', which two members of the
Commission, in a concurring but separate opinion annexed to the
report, suggested as a better basis for a finding of a violation
of Article 8 (art. 8).
In fact, what the Commission intended to protect was not the
applicant's 'family life' or 'private life' but rather his
personal life and social life. But that seems to us to be outside
the scope of the Article relied on.
We add for the sake of completeness of information that the
deportation of Mr Beldjoudi has not actually been enforced and
that the authorities have, in a spirit of conciliation, assigned
him to compulsory residence in the Hauts-de-Seine department,
where he still is.
For all these reasons, we submit that the appeal should be
dismissed."
28. On 18 January 1991 the Conseil d'Etat ruled in accordance
with the above submissions, and gave the following reasons for its
decision:
"The technical correctness of the judgment appealed against
Considering, firstly, that contrary to what the appellant
maintains, the judgment appealed against did not omit to rule on
the ground of appeal based on the application of section 25 of the
Order of 2 November 1945;
Considering, secondly, that it follows from a judgment of the
Versailles Court of Appeal of 14 October 1987, given prior to the
judgment appealed against, that the appellant is of Algerian
nationality; that the Administrative Court was thus rightly able
to regard the question of nationality, on which it had by an
earlier judgment adjourned a decision, as having been settled and
to give no decision on the ground of appeal based on Mr
Beldjoudi's French nationality, abandoned by him;
The lawfulness of the Minister of the Interior's order of 2
November 1979
Considering that Mr Beldjoudi, who did not raise any ground of
appeal before the Administrative Court relating to the outward
legality of the order for his deportation, is in any event not
entitled to raise for the first time on appeal arguments based on
the lack of reasons in the opinion of the Commission on
Deportation, the order pronouncing deportation and the letter
notifying it, which are based on legal grounds different from
those on which his application at first instance was based;
Considering that according to section [23] of the Order of 2
November 1945, in the wording in force at the time of the decision
appealed against, prior to the Law of 29 October 1981,
'deportation may be ordered by an order of the Minister of the
Interior if the alien's presence on French territory constitutes a
threat to public order or public finance'; that it can be seen
from the documents in the case-file that the aforesaid measure was
taken by the Minister of the Interior after he had taken into
consideration not only the criminal convictions pronounced against
Mr Beldjoudi but also the totality of Mr Beldjoudi's conduct; that
it is thus not tainted by error of law;
Considering that under Article 8 (art. 8) of the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, '1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private
and family life, his home and his correspondence - 2. There shall
be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this
right except such as is in accordance with the law and is
necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national
security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country,
for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of
health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms
of others'; that the measure appealed against, based on the
defence of public order, was necessary for the defence of that
order in view of the applicant's conduct and the seriousness of
the offences committed by him; that in these circumstances it was
not in violation of Article 8 (art. 8) of the said Convention;
Considering that it follows from the foregoing that Mr
Beldjoudi is not justified in requesting the quashing of the
judgment appealed against, by which the Versailles Administrative
Court dismissed his claim that the order of the Minister of the
Interior of 2 November 1979, requiring him to leave French
territory, be set aside;" (Recueil Lebon 1991, p. 18)
4. The applications for a stay of execution
29. On 27 December 1979 Mr Beldjoudi had lodged with the
registry of the Conseil d'Etat an application for a stay of
execution. It was dismissed by the court on 16 May 1980, on the
grounds that "none of the arguments relied on appear[ed] such as
to justify withdrawal of the deportation order".
30. While his appeal for the order to be set aside was pending
before the Versailles Administrative Court (see paragraphs 18 - 25
above), the applicant twice requested a stay of execution. The
requests, which were registered on 26 March 1986 and 22 February
1988, were joined to the merits of the case and dismissed on 21
April 1988 (see paragraph 25 above).
C. The applications for resumption or recognition of
French nationality
1. The application for resumption
31. On 1 April 1970, eleven days before his marriage, Mr
Beldjoudi made a declaration before the Colombes tribunal
d'instance with a view to resumption of French nationality. He
relied on section 3 of the Law of 20 December 1966, which allowed
such a right to minor children born before 1 January 1963 whose
parents had not made such a declaration.
32. A prime ministerial Decree, adopted on 16 September 1970 in
accordance with the opinion of the Conseil d'Etat and served on 3
February 1972, refused him recognition of French nationality
(section 4 of the Decree of 27 November 1962).
33. The applicant was at his request registered with the 1973
intake, and on 7 July 1971 at Blois he was given a certificate of
fitness for national service, issued by the commanding officer of
the French Army selection centre no. 10. He did not do the said
military service, however, as the commanding officer of the
Versailles recruitment office had deleted his name from the
register on 25 June 1971.
2. The application for recognition
(a) Before the Colombes tribunal d'instance
34. On 17 June 1983 Mr Beldjoudi submitted a declaration of
nationality to the Colombes tribunal d'instance, accompanying it
by supporting documents. He claimed that he had enjoyed
uninterrupted ostensible possession (possession {d'etat}) of
French status.
35. On 15 July the judge sent the file back to the applicant's
lawyer, informing him that the applicant should apply to the
prefecture of the Hauts-de-Seine department with a request for
naturalisation.
36. On 21 December Mr Beldjoudi asked the judge in question to
issue him with a certificate of French nationality. In an opinion
of 28 December the judge declined, as the evidence produced was
not sufficient to prove that the applicant enjoyed French
nationality.
(b) Before the Nanterre tribunal de grande instance
37. On 17 January 1984 the applicant started proceedings
against the procureur de la {Republique} in the Nanterre tribunal
de grande instance, in order to have his French nationality
recognised.
38. The court dismissed the claim on 15 December 1985, on the
grounds that the applicant had lost French nationality on 1
January 1963, pursuant to the second paragraph of section 1 of the
Law of 20 December 1966 (see paragraph 58 below).
(c) Before the Versailles Court of Appeal
39. Mr Beldjoudi appealed against the judgment to the
Versailles Court of Appeal on 7 March 1986. He maintained that his
father had not passed on to him anything which would allow him to
claim an Algerian identity as to culture and language, that the
Islamic religion was foreign to him, that he had ostensible
possession of French status, and that the challenge to his French
nationality on the basis of his Islamic status represented a
discriminatory interference with his freedom of conscience and his
right to lead a normal family life, in manifest breach of Articles
3, 8, 9, 12 and 14 (art. 3, art. 8, art. 9, art. 12, art. 14) of
the Convention.
40. The Court of Appeal dismissed his appeal on 14 October
1987. It gave the following reasons for its decision:
"Considering that civil status is transmitted by descent; that
a child born of two parents with special civil status (statut
civil de droit local) possesses that status; that prior to
Algerian independence Mr Beldjoudi senior did not, as he could
have done, declare that he renounced his personal special civil
status in order to acquire normal civil status (statut civil de
droit commun); that the fact that Mr Mohand Beldjoudi had Islamic
special civil status concerned only the rules applicable to the
exercise of his civil rights and respected his freedom of
religious conviction and did not require him to adhere to the
Islamic religion; that, contrary to his claims, Mr Beldjoudi
cannot claim for himself and his father ostensible possession of
French status when, according to a letter from the Prefect and
Commissioner of the Republic for the Department of Hauts-de-Seine
dated 4 June 1984, his father, brothers and sisters have all for
many years been holders of Algerian national identity cards and
aliens' residence permits, and he himself has never since Algerian
independence held documents such as a French national identity
card or a French passport providing evidence of his ostensible
possession of French status, but was the subject of a deportation
order on 2 November 1979 which has apparently not prevented him up
to now leading a normal family life in France; that accordingly
the final ground of appeal he relies on, based on ostensible
possession of French status and a violation of the European
Convention on Human Rights, which was moreover not in force when
he lost French nationality, must be dismissed;"
The decision was served on the applicant on 20 July 1989.
(d) Before the Court of Cassation
41. Mr Beldjoudi had appealed on 15 February 1989. The appeal
was dismissed by the Court of Cassation (First Civil Division) on
12 March 1991 for the following reasons:
"Whereas according to the recitals of the judgment appealed
against (Versailles, 14 October 1987), Mr Mohand Beldjoudi, born
at Courbevoie on 23 May 1950, the son of Seghir Beldjoudi, born on
9 April 1909 at Sidi-Moufouk (Algeria), and Hanifa Khalis, born in
1926 at Elflaya (Algeria), brought proceedings in order to have
his French nationality recognised; and whereas his application was
dismissed on the grounds that, being aged under eighteen on the
coming into force of Order no. 62-825 of 21 July 1962, he had, as
regards the effect of the independence of Algeria on his
nationality, followed the status of his parents, who were natives
of that territory and had special civil status, and, not having
benefited from the collective effect of a declaration recognising
French nationality made by his father at the appropriate time, he
was deemed to have lost French nationality on 1 January 1963, in
accordance with paragraph 2 of section 1 of Law no. 66-945 of 20
December 1966;
Whereas Mr Beldjoudi complains that the judgment appealed
against reached its decision on an invalid ground, namely that
review of the constitutionality of the Law of 20 December 1966 was
not a matter for the ordinary courts, in dismissing his ground of
appeal based on the fact that the said Law was contrary to the
provisions of Article 5 (d) (iii) of the International Convention
of 7 March 1966 on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, ratified by France and published in the Official
Journal of 10 November 1971, which prohibited all discrimination
based on origin, especially ethnic origin, in the granting or
withdrawing of nationality of the citizens of member States;
But whereas the judgment appealed against held that Law no. 66-
945 of 20 December 1966 based itself, in order to regulate the
consequences for nationality of Algerian independence, on the
civil status of persons originating from that territory and not on
criteria prohibited by the aforesaid convention;
It follows that the judgment does not warrant the criticism
made of it by the ground of appeal, which cannot be upheld;"
II. Relevant domestic law
A. Deportation of aliens
42. Deportation of aliens is governed by the provisions of the
Order of 2 November 1945 relating to the conditions of entry and
residence of aliens in France. The wording of the Order has been
amended on several occasions, including amendments subsequent to 2
November 1979, the date when the ministerial order relating to the
applicant was issued (see paragraph 15 above). The legislation in
question did not include any transitional provisions.
1. Grounds for deportation
(a) The position in 1979
43. In 1979, section 23 of the 1945 Order read as follows:
"... deportation may be ordered by an order of the Minister of
the Interior if the alien's presence on French territory
constitutes a threat to public order or public finance."
(b) The situation after 1979
44. Section 23 was amended by a Law of 29 October 1981, under
which deportation was now subject to the existence of a "serious
threat to public order".
Section 26 of the new Law, however, provided for a derogation,
except in the case of aliens under eighteen years of age:
"In the event of absolute urgency ..., deportation may be
ordered where it constitutes a compelling necessity for the
security of the State or for public safety.
..."
45. These rules were altered by a Law of 9 September 1986.
Section 23 resumed its original wording, that of 1945. It
added, however, that "the deportation order [could] be revoked at
any time by the Minister of the Interior".
As for section 26, it stated that "a threat [to public order]
having a particularly serious character" could in the event of
absolute urgency justify deportation.
46. A Law of 2 August 1989 reintroduced the 1981 provisions.
47. The Minister of the Interior issued 383 deportation orders
in 1990. Of these, 101 were based on section 26 of the 1945 Order,
54 relating to ordinary criminal offences and 47 to offences
against the external or internal security of the State.
2. Persons liable to deportation
(a) The position in 1979
48. The 1945 Order did not define any categories of persons who
were protected against all deportation measures.
(b) The position after 1979
49. By contrast, after being amended by the Law of 29 October
1981, section 25 of the Order stated:
"The following may not be the subject of a deportation order
under section 23:
1. An alien under eighteen years of age;
2. An alien who proves by any means that he has habitually
resided in France since attaining the age of ten years at the
most;
3. An alien who proves by any means that he has habitually
resided in France for over fifteen years, and also an alien who
has lawfully resided in France for over ten years;
4. An alien who has been married for at least six months and
whose spouse is of French nationality;
5. An alien who is the father or mother of a French child
residing in France, provided that he exercises parental authority
(at least in part) with respect to that child or is actually
meeting his needs;
6. An alien who is the beneficiary of a pension in respect of
an accident in employment or occupational illness paid by a French
organisation, and whose permanent disability percentage is greater
than or equal to 20%;
7. An alien lawfully residing in France under one of the
residence documents provided for by the present Order or
international agreements, and who has not been definitively
convicted and sentenced to a penalty equivalent at least to one
year's non-suspended imprisonment.
However, as a derogation from no. 7 above, any alien who has
been definitively convicted and sentenced to a penalty of
nonsuspended imprisonment for any length of time for an offence
under sections 4 and 8 of Law no. 73-548 of 27 June 1973 on
multiple occupation, Article L.364-2-1 of the Code of Employment
or Articles 334, 334-1 and 335 of the Criminal Code, may be
deported.
..."
50. The Law of 9 September 1986 restricted the categories of
nondeportation, but the Law of 2 August 1989 returned to the 1981
legislation.
3. Enforcement of deportation
51. Deportation is regarded in French law as a police measure,
not a criminal sanction. An alien affected does not benefit from
the retrospective effect of the more favourable later provisions.
He can thus not rely on them in support of an application for a
decision concerning him to be set aside.
52. Once a deportation order has been issued by the Minister of
the Interior, it remains in force indefinitely. The alien
concerned may at any time, as often as he wishes, request that it
be revoked.
53. If the alien has been absent from French territory for over
five years and wishes to obtain such revocation, his request is
considered by a committee which consists of judges only. If the
committee finds in his favour, its opinion is binding on the
Minister.
54. It frequently happens that the Minister of the Interior
waives enforcement of a deportation order while nevertheless
declining to revoke it. In such cases a compulsory residence order
is issued in respect of the alien, in the hope of his
reintegration into society. If he continues to disturb public
order, he may be deported. This is then a fresh decision,
separable from the order and itself capable of being challenged
before the administrative court judge.
If the matter is referred to the judge, he considers the
behaviour of the person concerned during the period when his
presence on French territory has been tolerated. In order to
assess the lawfulness of the measure, he thus considers the facts
as they are at the date when he takes his decision.
4. The case-law of the Conseil d'Etat
55. For a period of some ten years the Conseil d'Etat
considered arguments based on Article 8 (art. 8) of the Convention
to be of no effect as against a deportation order (see for example
the Touami ben Abdeslem judgment of 25 July 1980, Recueil Lebon
1980, p. 820, and Juris-Classeur {periodique} 1981, jurisprudence,
no. 19613, with note by Mr Bernard Pacteau, and the Chrouki
judgment of 6 December 1985).
The Beldjoudi judgment of 18 January 1991 (see paragraph 28
above) marks the abandonment of this line of case-law. Instead of
reviewing whether there has been a manifest error of discretion
with reference only to the threat to public order, the court now
carries out a complete review of proportionality, and this has
sometimes led to the setting aside of deportation orders (see for
example the Belgacem judgment of 19 April 1991 (plenary court),
with submissions by Government Commissioner Mr Ronny Abraham,
Revue {francaise} de droit administratif 1991, pp. 497 - 510, and
the Hadad judgment of 26 July 1991 (the President of the Judicial
Division), to be reported in the Recueil Lebon).
B. Acquisition of French nationality
1. Recognition of nationality
(a) The Law of 28 July 1960
56. The Law of 28 July 1960 inserted into the Code of
Nationality a Part VII, "Recognition of French Nationality".
It was limited to overseas territories (TOM), and introduced a
new method for certain categories of "domiciled persons" and their
descendants to have their French nationality recognised, subject
to the two conditions of settling on French territory and making a
declaration.
(b) The Order of 21 July 1962
57. Algeria did not have the status of a TOM when it gained
independence. This induced the French legislature to enact the
Order of 21 July 1962 relating to various provisions on
nationality.
Under this Order persons of normal civil status, and persons of
special civil status who had not been granted Algerian nationality
under Algerian law, kept their French nationality as of right.
With respect to other persons of special civil status - the
category to which the applicant's family belonged - section 21
provided that as from 1 January 1963 they and their children would
not be able to establish their French nationality except by
showing that they had made a declaration of "recognition of French
nationality".
(c) The Law of 20 December 1966
58. The Law of 20 December 1966 terminated the application of
the 1962 Order as from 21 March 1967. It brought about the loss of
French nationality in the absence of a declaration of recognition.
Paragraph 2 (c) of section 1 of the Law stated that:
"Persons of special civil status of Algerian origin who have
not by that date made the declaration provided for in Article 152
of the Code of Nationality shall be deemed to have lost French
nationality on 1 January 1963. However, persons of special civil
status of Algerian origin shall keep French nationality as of
right if no other nationality has been conferred on them after 3
July 1962."
Section 3 nevertheless offered minor children born before 1
January 1963 - such as the applicant - the possibility of resuming
French nationality where the parent whose nationality they had
taken had not made the declaration of recognition.
(d) The Law of 9 January 1973
59. The Law of 9 January 1973 abolished recognition and deleted
this word from the Code of Nationality. Part VIII of the Code,
completely rewritten, laid down for the future special conditions
for resumption of nationality for certain categories of persons
who had lost French nationality following the gaining of
independence by their country.
2. Naturalisation
60. Naturalisation is granted by decree. It may be granted
inter alia to "nationals or former nationals of territories or
States over which France has exercised sovereignty or a
protectorate or a mandate or trusteeship" (paragraph 5 of Article
64 of the Code of Nationality).
However, "an alien who has been the subject of a deportation
order or a compulsory residence order shall not be eligible for
naturalisation unless such order has been revoked in the form in
which it was issued" (first paragraph of Article 65). In addition,
"no one may be naturalised if he is not of good character and
morals or if he has been convicted of one of the offences
mentioned in Article 79 ..." (Article 68).
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION
61. In their application (no. 12083/86) lodged with the
Commission on 28 March 1986 Mr and Mrs Beldjoudi alleged that the
deportation order against Mr Beldjoudi violated several provisions
of the Convention: Article 8 (art. 8), by infringing their right
to respect for their private and family life; Article 3 (art. 3),
as the probable refusal of the Algerian authorities to issue Mr
Beldjoudi with a passport allowing him to leave Algeria would
constitute inhuman and degrading treatment; Article 14 in
conjunction with Article 8 (art. 14+8), by discriminating on the
grounds of Mr Beldjoudi's religious beliefs or ethnic origin;
Article 9 (art. 9), by interfering with their freedom of thought,
conscience and religion; and Article 12 (art. 12), by infringing
their right to marry and to found a family.
62. The Commission declared the application admissible on 11
July 1989. In its report of 6 September 1990 (Article 31) (art.
31), it expressed the opinion:
(a) that the deportation of Mr Beldjoudi would violate his and
his spouse's right to respect for their family life within the
meaning of Article 8 (art. 8) (twelve votes to five), but would
not violate Article 3 (art. 3) (unanimously);
(b) that there had not been a failure to comply with the
requirements of Article 14 in conjunction with Article 8 (art.
14+8) (unanimously) or with those of Articles 9 and 12 (art. 9,
art. 12) (unanimously).
The full text of the Commission's opinion and of the two
separate opinions contained in the report is reproduced as an
annex to this judgment <3>,
---------------------------------
<3> Note by the Registrar: For practical reasons this annex
will appear only with the printed version of the judgment (volume
234-A of Series A of the Publications of the Court), but a copy of
the Commission's report is obtainable from the registry.
FINAL SUBMISSIONS TO THE COURT
63. In their memorial the Government asked the Court "to hold
that in the present case there [had] not been a violation of
Article 8 (art. 8) of the Convention, or of the other Articles
relied on by the applicants".
64. Counsel for the applicants made the following final
submissions:
"Mr and Mrs Beldjoudi ask the Court:
to hold that the deportation order issued against Mr Mohand
Beldjoudi by the French Government on 2 November 1979 constitutes
a violation both of Article 8 (art. 8) of the ... Convention ...
and of Article 8 in conjunction with Article 14 (art. 14+8) of the
said Convention.
Should the French Government not put an end to this violation
without delay, Mr and Mrs Beldjoudi ask that France be ordered to
pay them, as compensation for the damage resulting from these
violations, the sum of 10,000,000 French francs as damages and the
sum of 100,000 French francs as reimbursement of irrecoverable
costs incurred for the defence of their interests before the
European Commission and Court of Human Rights."
AS TO THE LAW
I. Alleged violation of Article 8 (art. 8)
65. The applicants claimed that the decision to deport Mr
Beldjoudi interfered with their private and family life. They
relied on Article 8 (art. 8) of the Convention, which reads as
follows:
"1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and
family life, his home and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with
the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with
the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests
of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of
the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the
protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the
rights and freedoms of others."
This claim was disputed by the Government, but the Commission
agreed with it, at least with regard to family life.
A. Paragraph 1 of Article 8 (art. 8-1)
66. The Government initially expressed doubt as to the
existence of a real family life linking Mr Beldjoudi on the one
hand and his parents, brothers and sisters and his wife on the
other hand. They did not repeat this point before the Court.
67. The Court merely notes, in agreement with the Commission,
that enforcement of the deportation order would constitute an
interference by a public authority with the exercise of the
applicants' right to respect for their family life, as guaranteed
by paragraph 1 of Article 8 (art. 8-1).
B. Paragraph 2 of Article 8 (art. 8-2)
68. It must therefore be determined whether the expulsion in
issue would comply with the conditions of paragraph 2 (art. 8-2),
that is to say, whether it would be "in accordance with the law",
directed towards one or more of the legitimate aims listed, and
"necessary" for the realisation of those aims "in a democratic
society".
1. "In accordance with the law"
69. The Court, in agreement with those appearing before it,
takes note that the ministerial order of 2 November 1979 was based
on section 23 of the Order of 2 November 1945 relating to the
conditions of entry and residence of aliens in France (see
paragraph 43 above). It was also found to be lawful by the Conseil
d'Etat in its judgment of 18 January 1991 (see paragraph 28
above).
2. Legitimate aim
70. The Government and the Commission considered that the
interference in issue was directed at aims which were entirely in
accordance with the Convention, the "prevention of disorder" and
the "prevention of crime". The applicants did not dispute this.
The Court reaches the same conclusion.
3. "Necessary in a democratic society"
71. The applicants argued that the deportation of Mr Beldjoudi
could not be regarded as "necessary in a democratic society".
They relied on a number of circumstances. Thus, Mr Beldjoudi
was born in France of parents who originated from a territory
which was French at the time, namely Algeria; he had always lived
in France, as had his brothers and sisters (see paragraph 9
above); he stated that he did not know Arabic, and had received a
French education and upbringing; he had married a Frenchwoman in
1970 (see paragraphs 10-11 above), who would be forced to go into
exile from her own country in order not to be separated from her
husband; he claimed to have had ostensible possession of French
status until 3 February 1972, when he was served with the prime
ministerial decree refusing to recognise his French nationality
(see paragraph 32 above); the Prefect of Hauts-deSeine had early
in 1984 offered him a temporary residence permit (see paragraph 22
above) and the Minister of the Interior had issued a compulsory
residence order in his favour on 31 August 1989 (see paragraph 16
above); he would not have been liable to deportation if the Laws
of 29 October 1981 and 9 September 1986 had entered into force
earlier (see paragraphs 44 and 45 above).
In short, Mr Beldjoudi - who does not regard himself as a
"second generation immigrant" - and his wife claimed that all
their family ties, social links, cultural connections and
linguistic ties were in France. They claimed that there were no
exceptional circumstances which could justify deportation.
72. The Commission agreed in substance with this argument, but
attached particular weight to two additional factors. Firstly, Mrs
Beldjoudi might have good grounds for not following her husband to
Algeria, especially as she had reason to believe at the time of
her marriage that she would be able to continue living with him in
France. Secondly, the offences committed by Mr Beldjoudi - both
before and after the deportation order - were ultimately not of
such a type that the requirements of public order should outweigh
considerations of a family nature.
73. The Government's first argument was based on the nature of
the facts justifying the deportation. They stressed the large
number and serious nature of the offences committed by Mr
Beldjoudi, all of them during his adult life, over a period of
fifteen years (see paragraph 12 above). They also noted the
severity of the sentences passed by the French courts, in
particular by the Hauts-de-Seine Assize Court for an offence
classified as a serious crime (see paragraph 12 above); they
totalled over ten years in prison. Finally, they pointed out that
Mr Beldjoudi had continued with his life of crime even after being
served with the deportation order, and that he was currently
detained on remand, charged with a fresh offence (see paragraphs
12 and 14 above). In short, the dangerous character of Mr
Beldjoudi meant that his presence on French territory could not be
tolerated by the community.
The Government also considered that the extent of the
interference complained of should not be exaggerated. Only the
family life of the applicants as spouses was relevant, as Mr
Beldjoudi had not lived with his parents since 1969 and did not
contribute to the maintenance of his brothers and sisters;
furthermore, the couple had no children. But the applicants had
had to separate for long periods because of Mr Beldjoudi's terms
of imprisonment. Moreover, Mr Beldjoudi had not shown that his
wife would be unable to accompany him to Algeria (a State which
had preserved numerous ties with France) or a third country, if he
were in fact compelled to leave French territory. In short, the
difficulties of resettling outside France without destroying
family life would not be insurmountable.
74. The Court acknowledges that it is for the Contracting
States to maintain public order, in particular by exercising their
right, as a matter of well-established international law and
subject to their treaty obligations, to control the entry,
residence and expulsion of aliens (see the Abdulaziz, Cabales and
Balkandali v. the United Kingdom judgment of 28 May 1985, Series A
no. 94, p. 34, para. 67, the Berrehab v. the Netherlands judgment
of 21 June 1988, Series A no. 138, pp. 15 - 16, зз 28 - 29, and
the Moustaquim v. Belgium judgment of 18 February 1991, Series A
no. 193, p. 19, para. 43).
However, their decisions in this field must, in so far as they
may interfere with a right protected under paragraph 1 of Article
8 (art. 8-1), be necessary in a democratic society, that is to
say, justified by a pressing social need and, in particular,
proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.
75. In the present case, as was rightly emphasised by the
Government, Mr Beldjoudi's criminal record appears much worse than
that of Mr Moustaquim (see the above-mentioned judgment, Series A
no. 193, p. 19, para. 44). It should therefore be examined whether
the other circumstances of the case, relating to both applicants
or to one of them only, are enough to compensate for this
important fact.
76. The applicants lodged a single application and raised the
same complaints. Having regard to their age and the fact that they
have no children, the interference in question primarily affects
their family life as spouses, as the Government rightly pointed
out.
They were married in France over twenty years ago and have
always had their matrimonial home there. The periods when Mr
Beldjoudi was in prison undoubtedly prevented them from living
together for a considerable time, but did not terminate their
family life, which remained under the protection of Article 8
(art. 8).
77. Mr Beldjoudi, the person immediately affected by the
deportation, was born in France of parents who were then French.
He had French nationality until 1 January 1963. He was deemed to
have lost it on that date, as his parents had not made a
declaration of recognition before 27 March 1967 (see paragraph 9
above). It should not be forgotten, however, that he was a minor
at the time and unable to make a declaration personally. Moreover,
as early as 1970, a year after his first conviction but over nine
years before the adoption of the deportation order, he manifested
the wish to recover French nationality; after being registered at
his request in 1971, he was declared by the French military
authorities to be fit for national service (see paragraphs 31 and
33 above).
Furthermore, Mr Beldjoudi married a Frenchwoman. His close
relatives all kept French nationality until 1 January 1963, and
have resided in France for several decades.
Finally, he has spent his whole life - over forty years - in
France, was educated in French and appears not to know Arabic. He
does not seem to have any links with Algeria apart from that of
nationality.
78. Mrs Beldjoudi for her part was born in France of French
parents, has always lived there and has French nationality. Were
she to follow her husband after his deportation, she would have to
settle abroad, presumably in Algeria, a State whose language she
probably does not know. To be uprooted like this could cause her
great difficulty in adapting, and there might be real practical or
even legal obstacles, as was indeed acknowledged by the Government
Commissioner before the Conseil d'Etat (see paragraph 27 above).
The interference in question might therefore imperil the unity or
even the very existence of the marriage.
79. Having regard to these various circumstances, it appears,
from the point of view of respect for the applicants' family life,
that the decision to deport Mr Beldjoudi, if put into effect,
would not be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued and would
therefore violate Article 8 (art. 8).
80. Having reached this conclusion, the Court need not examine
whether the deportation would also infringe the applicants' right
to respect for their private life.
II. Alleged violation of Article 14
in conjunction with Article 8 (art. 14+8)
81. In view of the finding in paragraph 79 above, the Court
does not consider it necessary also to examine the complaint that
the applicants would, if Mr Beldjoudi were deported, suffer
discrimination contrary to Article 14 (art. 14) in the enjoyment
of their right to respect for their family life.
III. Alleged violation of Articles 3, 9 and 12
(art. 3, art. 9 art. 12)
82. The applicants also relied on Articles 3, 9 and 12 (art. 3,
art. 9, art. 12) before the Commission.
These complaints were not mentioned before the Court, which
does not consider it necessary to examine them of its own motion.
IV. Application of Article 50 (art. 50)
83. Under Article 50 (art. 50),
"If the Court finds that a decision or a measure taken by a
legal authority or any other authority of a High Contracting Party
is completely or partially in conflict with the obligations
arising from the ... Convention, and if the internal law of the
said Party allows only partial reparation to be made for the
consequences of this decision or measure, the decision of the
Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured
party."
Pursuant to this Article (art. 50), the applicants claimed
compensation for loss and reimbursement of costs.
84. No breach of Article 8 (art. 8) has as yet occurred.
Nevertheless, the Court having found that the Minister's decision
to deport Mr Beldjoudi would, if implemented, give rise to such a
breach, Article 50 (art. 50) must be taken as applying to the
facts of the present case (see, mutatis mutandis, the Soering v.
the United Kingdom judgment of 7 July 1989, Series A no. 161, p.
49, para. 126).
A. Damage
85. Mr and Mrs Beldjoudi alleged that they had suffered damage
because of the failure to comply with the requirements of the
Convention, and claimed 10,000,000 French francs.
The Government considered this figure to be entirely
unprecedented and in any case completely unjustified, as the
deportation order had not been enforced.
The Delegate of the Commission also considered the claim to be
excessive. He suggested, however, that a reasonable sum should be
awarded in respect of non-pecuniary damage; this should be less
than that awarded to Mr Moustaquim, who had been obliged to live
outside Belgium for some years after being deported.
86. The applicants must have suffered non-pecuniary damage, but
the present judgment provides them with sufficient compensation in
this respect.
B. Costs and expenses
87. Mr and Mrs Beldjoudi sought reimbursement of the costs and
expenses allegedly incurred by them during the proceedings before
the Convention institutions, namely 100,000 French francs.
The Government argued that the account submitted by counsel for
the applicants was excessively vague. However, a sum of 40,000
francs would be acceptable, in the absence of special
circumstances duly proved.
88. Having regard to the detailed information subsequently
provided, the Court considers it reasonable to award 60,000 French
francs under this head.
FOR THESE REASONS THE COURT
1. Holds by seven votes to two that, in the event of the
decision to deport Mr Beldjoudi being implemented, there would be
a violation of Article 8 (art. 8) with respect to both applicants;
2. Holds by eight votes to one that it is not necessary also to
consider the case from the point of view of Article 14 in
conjunction with Article 8 (art. 14+8), or of Articles 3, 9 and 12
(art. 3, art. 9, art. 12);
3. Holds unanimously that with respect to the non-pecuniary
damage suffered by the applicants the present judgment constitutes
in itself sufficient just satisfaction for the purposes of Article
50 (art. 50);
4. Holds unanimously that the respondent State is to pay to the
applicants within three months 60,000 (sixty thousand) French
francs for costs and expenses;
5. Dismisses unanimously the remainder of the claim for just
satisfaction.
Done in English and in French, and delivered at a public
hearing in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 26 March
1992.
Signed: Rolv RYSSDAL
President
Signed: {Marc-Andre} EISSEN
Registrar
In accordance with Article 51 para. 2 (art. 51-2) of the
Convention and Rule 53 para. 2 of the Rules of Court, the
following separate opinions are annexed to this judgment:
(a) dissenting opinion of Mr Pettiti;
(b) separate opinion of Mr De Meyer;
(c) dissenting opinion of Mr Valticos;
(d) concurring opinion of Mr Martens.
Initialled: R. R.
Initialled: M.-A.E.
DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE PETTITI
(Translation)
Unlike the majority, I have not voted in favour of a violation
of Article 8 (art. 8).
To be sure, the effect of the judgment is confined to the
particular case and to the special circumstances: Mr Beldjoudi has
spent forty-one years of his life to date in France and has been
married to a Frenchwoman for twenty-two years. But it seems to me
that neither the reasoning on the principle nor the grounds given
for the decision are consistent with a precise construction and
evaluation of Article 8 (art. 8) of the European Convention, with
reference to the deportation of aliens who have committed crimes.
The majority have indeed taken into account the fact that the
deportation order was issued on 2 November 1979, before the
convictions of 28 March 1978 and 4 December 1986; but they also
seem to have accepted as additional criteria or reasons the
authorities' refusal in 1970 to grant Mr Beldjoudi the French
nationality sought by him, and also the absence of links with
Algeria. They consider that deportation would not be proportionate
to the legitimate aim, without giving adequate specifications of
the extent of that proportionality in reply to the distinctions
drawn by the Conseil d'Etat.
The Convention does not limit the sovereign right of States to
decide to deport from their territory aliens who have committed
crimes.
The right of an alien to reside on the territory of a High
Contracting Party is not guaranteed as such by the Convention.
Similarly, the right of asylum and the right not to be deported do
not appear as such in the series of rights and freedoms guaranteed
by the Convention (this is stated in several decisions of the
Commission).
Only in exceptional circumstances can expulsion mean a
violation of the Convention, for example if there is a very
serious risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 (art. 3) in the
destination State, especially where there is no possibility of
deportation to some other democratic State. The Moustaquim
judgment had a different context, as it concerned a young
adolescent who had no roots outside the country where his family
lived, and who had been reintegrated into society.
In the present Beldjoudi case, the circumstances are just the
contrary: as an adult, a persistent offender, a person within the
sphere of attacks on public order, he came within the class of
legitimate deportations.
Moreover, he apparently refused to acquire French nationality
by marriage, and had even turned down a compulsory residence
order, and so forth.
The European Court appears also to have considered as an
implicit reason for its decision the non-attribution of French
nationality. This is to forget that the Evian agreements are an
international treaty. The determination of nationality, including
the opportunity to choose, was defined by France and Algeria. This
was therefore not a unilateral decision by France. Algeria for its
part had also insisted on such choices, and does not refrain from
deporting Frenchmen who have committed crimes, even if they were
born in Algeria and have lived there. Such a bilateral treaty is
based on reciprocity and public international law. France cannot
be accused of violating the European Convention on Human Rights
for having applied the provisions of the Evian agreements and the
Code of Nationality to determine Mr Beldjoudi's nationality.
Moreover, like any State, France is sovereign in granting or
refusing naturalisation.
It appears that the majority of the Court also considered that
Mr Beldjoudi was a quasi-Frenchman, a concept which is unknown in
international law.
The fact of having lived continuously in the host country or
country of residence cannot be a complete bar to the exercise of
the right to deport criminals. The special relationship between
France and Algeria cannot in itself be considered as preventing
deportation, as other member States of the Council of Europe also
have similar situations arising from historical relationships
between Germans and Poles, Austrians and Italians, Britons and
Commonwealth citizens, etc., and such relationships do not prevent
justified deportations.
Member States expel criminal citizens in the normal course of
events. The only possible general defence should be a reference to
Article 3 (art. 3), otherwise a long period of residence would
suffice for reliance on Article 8 (art. 8). A great many
deportations of aliens from Europe would be affected.
The majority did indeed take note of the significant factor
following from Mr Beldjoudi's criminal record and conduct, even
after the deportation order of 1979; but they balanced this factor
against his personal and family life, on the basis of
proportionality. Again, precise criteria should be defined for
this balancing exercise, as the European Court normally does. In
this judgment there is no definition of the threshold of risks and
level of reoffending which should determine whether or not
criminal aliens are to be deported. The majority also appear to
have considered that departure for Algeria would inevitably have
followed in the event of deportation, but this is not certain.
The serious problem of deportations of aliens who have
committed crimes, which is a very different problem from that of
administrative deportations not brought about by criminal
convictions, some of which have dramatic consequences for
families, is the subject of concern by the European Economic
Community, the Council of Europe and the international
organisation Interpol. An overall European policy should be
sought, in the spirit of the Convention for the Protection of
Fundamental Rights.
In my opinion, the decision of the majority carries within it a
source of contradictions, in an exponential interpretation of
Article 8 (art. 8), if an interference with the private or family
life of a persistent offender suffices to prevent deportation, as
the position of a persistent offender would amount to a sort of
immunity for his benefit. In fact, any deportation affects private
or family life, just as any detention does. If a further offence
is committed, there would be a further interference. But in that
case private life is affected by the conduct of the person
concerned.
Each member State remains the master of its own criminal
policy, just as it retains the right to define the severity of
sentences. In many States deportation is an exemplary penalty in
addition to the sentence. In countries with a high proportion of
aliens in the population, it is deportation much rather than the
threat of prison which is a safeguard against repeated offending
and strengthens the national consensus in favour of welcoming
immigrants of good character who by their work share in the
prosperity of the nation. A deportation measure, as accepted in
criminology and criminal policy, is also a measure of protection
for the potential victims of repeated offenders, especially in
countries with a serious increase in crime and a high
concentration of organised crime.
The Convention on Human Rights cannot ignore the aspect of the
rights of others and their necessary protection. It would no doubt
have been preferable if the French Government, bearing in mind the
new provisions (closer to Article 8 of the Convention) (art. 8) of
the Law of 29 October 1981 (sections 23 and 25) and the Law of 2
August 1989, had waived deportation in this particular case, in
view of the position of the French spouse. If the European Court
intended to move towards the review of deportations in similar
cases for all member States, it would have to examine matters from
the point of view either of Article 6 (art. 6), if that Article
had been violated with reference to the domestic proceedings seen
in the light of the European Convention on Human Rights, or of
Article 3 (art. 3) (inhuman and degrading treatment). The concept
of a balance of interests in the event of the possible but not
certain use of Article 8 (art. 8) would require a strict
application of proportionality, which in my opinion is lacking in
the reasoning of the Beldjoudi judgment. The State's right to
deport aliens who commit crimes is to a certain extent for the
general interest the counterpart of the welcome given to persons
enjoying the right of asylum and migrants, which is a key element
of international solidarity and the protection of human rights.
SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE DE MEYER
(Translation)
Like the majority of my colleagues, I consider that there would
be a violation of the applicants' fundamental rights "in the event
of the decision to deport Mr Beldjoudi being implemented".
But which right or rights are these?
Our colleague Mr Martens was right to wonder whether the case
did not concern their right to respect for their private life just
as much as their right to respect for their family life. I agree
to a great extent with his observations <4>.
--------------------------------
<4> See pp. 37 to 39 below.
It seems to me, however, that ultimately, bearing in mind the
circumstances mentioned in paragraphs 77 and 78 of the judgment,
the deportation of Mr Beldjoudi, with respect to both applicants,
would not merely constitute an unacceptable interference with
their private and family life, but would actually be inhuman
treatment <5>.
--------------------------------
<5> It is because the case should in my opinion also have been
examined from this point of view that I have been unable to
approve of point 2 of the operative provisions of the judgment. I
entirely agree with it in so far as it relates to Articles 9, 12
and 14 (art. 9, art. 12, art. 14) of the Convention.
This would be so, not indirectly because of what might await
them in Algeria - that is not the point in issue here <6> - but
directly, in that Mr Beldjoudi would be ejected, after over forty
years, from a country which has always in fact been "his" since
birth, even though he does not possess its "nationality".
--------------------------------
<6> The present case differs in this respect from the Soering
(Series A no. 161) and Cruz Varas (Series A no. 201) cases.
While it is true, as the documents in the case show, that Mr
Beldjoudi has already been convicted of numerous offences, mostly
comparatively serious ones, and is now once more under suspicion
of having committed others <7>, he can be sufficiently punished
for these by the criminal law.
---------------------------------
<7> See paragraphs 12, 14, 73 and 75 of the judgment.
DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE VALTICOS
(Translation)
I regret that I must express my dissent from the opinion of the
majority of the Court, who have concluded that there was a
violation of Article 8 (art. 8) of the Convention in the instant
case, with reference in particular to Mr Beldjoudi's family life.
My explanation need not be long, as it is based in essence on
the dissenting opinion I gave in the similar, although not
identical, case of the youth Moustaquim.
The differences between the two cases cut both ways: on the one
hand, the present case concerns the ties between a husband and his
wife, not those between a young man and his family. On the other
hand, young Moustaquim's criminal behaviour consisted of the
offences of an adolescent, very numerous but for the most part
comparatively unimportant, whereas here there were repeated crimes
of violence committed by a person aged about forty, who had been
sentenced to nearly eleven years' imprisonment in less than
seventeen years. Moreover, the Court acknowledged that Mr
Beldjoudi's criminal record was "much worse".
The deportation of aliens - which one can understand being
contemplated in a case as serious as this one - is a prerogative
of States, and its use is restricted by the Convention (Article 5
para. 1 (f) of the Convention and Protocols Nos. 4 and 7) (art. 5-
1-f, P4, P7) only in well-defined cases. This is not one of them.
Admittedly, the Court has in the present case interposed the
concept of family life, which is protected by Article 8 (art. 8)
of the Convention. It considers that there was on the part of the
Government an interference by a public authority with the exercise
of the applicants' right to respect for their family life. One may
well wonder, however, whether Article 8 (art. 8) is really
applicable to a case such as this and whether it was designed to
prohibit the deportation of aliens married to citizens of the host
country. Such an interpretation might open the way to many abuses.
In any event, it does not seem to me to be possible to use
Article 8 (art. 8) of the Convention to restrict the right of
States to take deportation measures, where they have valid reasons
for deciding on them in defence of public safety, and where their
effect on family life is only an indirect consequence.
CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE MARTENS
1. I agree with the findings of the Court but, as far as Mr
Beldjoudi is concerned, I would have preferred its decision to
have been based on (a) a less casuistic reasoning and (b)
interference with the right to respect for private life.
2. Paragraph 1 of Article 3 of Protocol No. 4 (P4-3) to the
Convention forbids the expulsion of nationals. In a Europe where a
second generation of immigrants <8> is already raising children
(and where violent xenophobia is increasing to an alarming extent)
it is high time to ask ourselves whether this ban should not apply
equally to aliens who were born and bred in a member State or who
have otherwise, by virtue of long residence, become fully
integrated there (and, conversely, become completely segregated
from their country of origin) <9>.
--------------------------------
<8> I realise, of course, that the present case may be
distinguished from an ordinary "second-generation immigrant's
expulsion case" in that Mr Beldjoudi's parents, when they took up
residence in France, were not "immigrants" stricto sensu but
French citizens coming to live in their own country. I think,
however, that it is legitimate to ignore this difference for
present purposes.
<9> This question has, of course, a more limited scope in those
member States where, under the principle of ius soli,
secondgeneration immigrants acquire citizenship by reason of their
birth within the territory; it is, therefore, probably more exact
to refer to expulsion of "integrated aliens" rather than "second-
generation immigrants' expulsion".
In my opinion, mere nationality does not constitute an
objective and reasonable justification for the existence of a
difference as regards the admissibility of expelling someone from
what, in both cases, may be called his "own country". I therefore
have no hesitation in answering the above question in the
affirmative. I believe that an increasing number of member States
of the Council of Europe accept the principle that such
"integrated aliens" should be no more liable to expulsion than
nationals <10>, an exception being justified, if at all, only in
very exceptional circumstances. My own country is one of those
States <11> and since 1981 - with the exception of the period 1986-
1989 so is France <12>.
--------------------------------
<10> This principle has already been accepted in the context of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: under
Article 12 para. 4 of the Covenant "no one shall be arbitrarily
deprived of the right to enter his own country"; this right
implies a ban on the expulsion not only of nationals, but also -
as appears from the drafting history of the words "his own
country" - of all "integrated aliens" (such as second-generation
immigrants); see M. Nowak, CCPR-Kommentar, Art. 12, Randnummern 45
- 51; Van Dijk & Van Hoof, De Europese Conventie, 2nd edition, p.
551; Velu and Ergec, La Convention {europeenne} des Droits de
l'Homme, para. 372 (p. 322).
<11> See the 1990 version of the "Circular on Aliens":
Nederlandse Staatscourant 12 maart 1990, no. 50; see further on
this issue, inter alia: Groenendijk, Nederlands Juristenblad 1987,
pp. 1341 et seq.; Swart, Preadvies, Nederlandse Juristen-
vereniging 1990, para. 35 (pp. 242 et seq.).
<12> See paragraphs 42 - 50 of the Court's judgment.
I would have preferred the Court's decision in the present case
to have been based on the aforesaid principle, coupled with a
finding that there were no very exceptional circumstances
justifying a departure therefrom. A judgment along those lines
would have achieved what the Moustaquim v. Belgium <13> and the
present judgment have failed to do, namely introduce a measure of
legal certainty; this seems highly desirable, especially in this
field.
--------------------------------
<13> Judgment of 18 February 1991, Series A no. 193.
3. The latter consideration also militated, as Mr Schermers
rightly pointed out <14>, in favour of basing the Court's decision
- if possible - on interference with the right to respect for
private life, since, whilst not all "integrated aliens" threatened
with expulsion are married, they all have a private life.
--------------------------------
<14> See his concurring opinion appended to the Commission's
opinion in the present case pp. 48 and 49.
In my opinion, it is possible to do so. Expulsion severs
irrevocably all social ties between the deportee and the community
he is living in and I think that the totality of those ties may be
said to be part of the concept of private life, within the meaning
of Article 8 (art. 8).
It is true that, at least at first sight, the text of this
provision seems to suggest otherwise. Read as a whole, it
apparently guarantees immunity of an inner circle in which one may
live one's own, one's private, life as one chooses. This "inner
circle" concept presupposes an "outside world" which, logically,
is not encompassed within the concept of private life. Upon
further consideration, however, this "inner circle" concept
appears too restrictive. "Family life" already enlarges the
circle, but there are relatives with whom one has no family life
stricto sensu. Yet the relationship with such persons, for
instance one's parents, undoubtedly falls within the sphere which
has to be respected under Article 8 (art. 8). The same may be said
with regard to one's relationships with lovers and friends. I
therefore share the view of the Commission, which has repeatedly
held that "respect for private life"
"comprises also to a certain degree the right to establish and
to develop relationships with other human beings, especially in
the emotional field, for the development and fulfilment of one's
own personality" <15>.
--------------------------------
<15>. See, inter alia: Decisions and Reports, no. 5, pp. 86 -
87, and no. 10, p. 100; Series B no. 36, pp. 25 - 26.
If the Commission, in so holding, intended to give a definition
of "private life" within the meaning of Article 8 (art. 8) (as has
been suggested by Doswald-Beck, Human Rights Law Journal 1983,
p.288), I do not agree: it is highly difficult to define the
concept and I submit that the time has not yet come to try to do
so.
I think that the Court's Dudgeon v. the United Kingdom, Rees v.
the United Kingdom, Cossey v. the United Kingdom and B. v. France
judgments <16> are also based on the idea that to a certain extent
a person's "external" relations with others (outside the "inner
circle") do fall within the sphere of private life <17>.
--------------------------------
<16> Judgments of 22 October 1981, 17 October 1986, 27
September 1990 and 25 March 1992, Series A nos. 45, 106, 184 and
232-C.
<17> See further: Velu and Ergec, La Convention {europeenne}
des Droits de l'Homme, para. 652 (pp. 535 et seq.).
The same idea presumably underlies the aforementioned ban on
the expulsion of nationals: when speaking of nationals, one almost
always thinks primarily of those whose links with a given country
are particularly close and manifold because they have been born
and bred there <18>, in a family which has lived there for
generations <19>; it was clearly felt to be unacceptable that, by
compelling such persons to leave, never to return, a State should
be entitled to sever those ties irrevocably.
--------------------------------
<18> See paragraph 88 of the Court's Abdulaziz, Cabales and
Balkandali v. the United Kingdom judgment of 28 May 1985 (Series A
no. 94, p. 41).
<19> For the idea that a person's personal history and memories
may be said to fall within the sphere which has to be respected
under Article 8 (art. 8), see the Court's Gaskin v. the United
Kingdom judgment of 7 July 1989 (Series A no. 160).
To sum up: I think that expulsion, especially (as in the
present case) to a country where living conditions are markedly
different from those in the expelling country and where the
deportee, as a stranger to the land, its culture and its
inhabitants, runs the risk of having to live in almost total
social isolation, constitutes interference with his right to
respect for his private life.
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