[неофициальный перевод]
ЕВРОПЕЙСКИЙ СУД ПО ПРАВАМ ЧЕЛОВЕКА
СУДЕБНОЕ РЕШЕНИЕ
КАСАДО КОКА (CASADO COCA) ПРОТИВ ИСПАНИИ
(Страсбург, 24 февраля 1994 года)
(Извлечение)
КРАТКОЕ НЕОФИЦИАЛЬНОЕ ИЗЛОЖЕНИЕ ОБСТОЯТЕЛЬСТВ ДЕЛА
A. Основные факты
В 1979 г. заявитель начал заниматься юридической практикой в
Барселоне; он регулярно помещал в ряде местных газет объявления,
рекламируя свою практику, и направлял письма в различные
коммерческие организации, предлагая свои услуги. Совет коллегии
адвокатов Барселоны привлек его к дисциплинарной ответственности
по нескольким обвинениям, разбирательство по которым закончилось в
1981 г., и ему было вынесено несколько замечаний и предупреждений.
С октября 1982 г. в информационном бюллетене Ассоциации жителей
и владельцев недвижимости в Валлдореитх (Барселона) было
опубликовано объявление заявителя, где он коротко сообщал свое
имя, после чего шло слово "адвокат", адрес и телефонный номер
конторы. 5 апреля 1983 г. Совет коллегии адвокатов вынес г-ну
Касадо Кока серьезное предупреждение, которое было подтверждено 3
июня Национальным советом коллегии адвокатов.
Заявитель обратился в административный суд, утверждая, что
имело место нарушение статьи 20 Конституции страны (свобода
слова). 11 мая 1987 г. Административный суд Барселоны вынес
Решение не в его пользу, а 23 сентября 1988 г. Верховный суд
отклонил его жалобу по вопросам права.
Он направил жалобу в процедуре ампаро в Конституционный Суд,
который 17 апреля 1989 г. объявил, что статья 20 Конституции не
распространяется на рекламные объявления.
B. Разбирательство в Комиссии по правам человека
В жалобе, поданной в Комиссию 25 мая 1989 г., заявитель
утверждал, что нарушено право на свободу слова в свете статьи 10
Конвенции. Жалоба была объявлена частично приемлемой 2 декабря
1991 г.
Попытавшись безуспешно добиться мирового соглашения, Комиссия
приняла 1 декабря 1992 доклад, в котором установила факты и
выразила мнение, что имело место нарушение статьи 10 Конвенции
(девятью голосами против девяти, голос председательствующего
оказался решающим).
ИЗВЛЕЧЕНИЕ ИЗ СУДЕБНОГО РЕШЕНИЯ
ВОПРОСЫ ПРАВА
Утверждение о нарушении статьи 10
32. Г-н Касадо Кока жаловался на наложенные на него 6 апреля
1983 г. Советом коллегии адвокатов Барселоны дисциплинарные
взыскания за публикацию объявления о своей практике в нескольких
номерах местного бюллетеня новостей. Он ссылался на статью 10
Конвенции, которая предусматривает:
"1. Каждый человек имеет право на свободу выражать свое мнение.
Это право включает свободу придерживаться своего мнения и свободу
получать и распространять информацию и идеи без какого-либо
вмешательства со стороны государственных органов и независимо от
государственных границ. Настоящая статья не препятствует
государствам осуществлять лицензирование радиовещательных,
телевизионных или кинематографических предприятий.
2. Осуществление этих свобод, налагающее обязанности и
ответственность, может быть сопряжено с формальностями, условиями,
ограничениями или санкциями, которые установлены законом и которые
необходимы в демократическом обществе в интересах государственной
безопасности, территориальной целостности или общественного
спокойствия, в целях предотвращения беспорядков и преступлений,
для охраны здоровья и нравственности, защиты репутации или прав
других лиц, предотвращения разглашения информации, полученной
конфиденциально, или обеспечения авторитета и беспристрастности
правосудия".
A. Применимость статьи 10 Конвенции
33. Правительство оспаривало применимость статьи 10. Оно
утверждало, что объявления заявителя не несли никакой информации
коммерческого характера, а были чисто рекламными. Он оплатил их с
единственной целью получить больше клиентов. Реклама как таковая
не входит в сферу действия свободы слова; реклама служит не
общественному интересу, а частным интересам заинтересованных лиц.
Применять гарантии статьи 10 к рекламе было бы равносильно
изменению сферы действия указанной статьи.
34. Согласно заявителю, информация, содержавшаяся в его
объявлениях, в действительности была предназначена для широкой
публики; она обеспечила увеличение притока клиентов, а значит,
публика посчитала ее необходимой и полезной. Более того, реклама
является общим понятием, включающим несколько видов информации в
зависимости от политического или коммерческого содержания или
передаваемых с ее помощью идей. Кроме того, защита прав человека
не обязательно должна служить публичному интересу; она может
служить и частным интересам.
35. Суд прежде всего отмечает, что статья 10 гарантирует
свободу слова "всем". В ней не проводится различия в зависимости
от преследуемой ею цели - будет ли это извлечение прибыли или нет
(см. mutatis mutandis Решение по делу "Аутроник АГ" против
Швейцарии от 22 мая 1990 г. Серия A, т. 178, с. 23, п. 47), иной
подход мог бы привести к нарушению статьи 14.
В своем Решении по делу Бартольд против Федеративной Республики
Германии от 25 марта 1983 г. (Серия A, т. 90, с. 20 - 21, п. 42).
Суд оставил открытым вопрос, подпадает ли коммерческая реклама как
таковая в сферу действия гарантий статьи 10, но своими
последующими решениями выработал устоявшуюся судебную практику,
согласно которой статья 10 применима не только к определенному
типу информации и идей, особенно политического характера (см.
Решение по делу "Маркт интерн Верлаг ГмбХ" и Клаус Бирман против
Федеративной Республики Германии от 20 ноября 1989 г. Серия A, т.
165, с. 17, п. 26), но также к художественному самовыражению (см.
Решение по делу Мюллер и другие против Швейцарии от 24 мая 1988 г.
Серия A, т. 133, с. 19, п. 27), к информации коммерческого
характера (см. вышеупомянутое Решение по делу "Маркт интерн Верлаг
ГмбХ" и Клауса Бирмана) и даже, как справедливо указала Комиссия,
- к легкой музыке и коммерческим объявлениям, транслируемым по
кабелю (см. Решение по делу "Гроппера радио АГ" и другие против
Швейцарии от 28 марта 1990 г. Серия A, т. 173, с. 22, п. 54 - 55).
36. В данном деле спорные объявления содержали лишь имя,
профессию, адрес и телефонный номер заявителя. Они, очевидно, были
опубликованы с целью рекламы, но вместе с тем они давали лицам,
нуждающимся в правовой помощи, полезную для них информацию,
которая, по всей видимости, облегчала им доступ к правосудию.
37. Поэтому статья 10 подлежит применению.
B. Соблюдение требований статьи 10
1. Имело ли место вмешательство "публичных властей"
38. Согласно Правительству, если вмешательство и имело место,
то оно исходило не от "государственных органов" в смысле п. 1
статьи 10. Письменные предупреждения Совета коллегии адвокатов
Барселоны (см. п. 10 выше) можно считать внутренними санкциями,
наложенными на г-на Касадо Кока его коллегами. Испанское
государство лишь утвердило Королевским декретом Устав,
выработанный самими членами коллегии, статья 31 которого запрещает
профессиональную рекламу (см. п. 22 выше).
39. Суд, так же как заявитель и Комиссия, отмечает, однако,
что, согласно статье 1 Закона 1974 г. о профессиональных
объединениях, они являются корпорациями публичного права (см. п.
20 выше). Применительно к коллегиям адвокатов данная особенность
правового статуса усиливается их целью служения общественному
интересу путем оказания свободной и надлежащей правовой помощи в
сочетании с государственным контролем за осуществлением
юридической практики и соблюдением норм профессиональной этики
(см. в отношении коллегий адвокатов Решение по делу Ван дер
Мюсселе против Бельгии от 23 ноября 1983 г. Серия A, т. 70, с. 15,
п. 29 in fine, и Решение по делу X против Бельгии от 30 ноября
1987 г. Серия A, т. 127-B, с. 27 - 28, п. 24 - 29; см. также
mutatis mutandis в отношении медицинских ассоциаций Решение по
делу Ле Конта, Ван Левена и Де Мейера от 23 июня 1981 г. Серия A,
т. 43, с. 26 - 27, п. 64). Оспариваемое Решение было принято в
соответствии с нормами, применяемыми к членам коллегии адвокатов
Барселоны, и оно могло быть обжаловано в компетентные суды (см. п.
22 выше). Эти суды, равно как и Конституционный Суд, - все они
государственные учреждения - подтвердили правильность применения
санкции (см. п. 12, 13 и 15 выше). Раз это так, то налицо все
разумные основания полагать, что произошло вмешательство
"публичных властей" в осуществление г-ном Касадо Кока свободы
распространять информацию.
2. Было ли вмешательство оправданным
40. Такое вмешательство не противоречит статье 10, если только
оно "предусмотрено законом", преследует правомерную цель в
соответствии со статьей 10 п. 2 и "необходимо в демократическом
обществе" для достижения названной цели (см., в частности, Решение
по делу Торгеир Торгеирсон против Исландии от 25 июня 1992 г.
Серия A, т. 239, с. 25, п. 56).
а) "Предусмотрено законом"
41. Заявитель утверждал, что обжалуемая им санкция утратила
свою законодательную основу. Закон 1974 г. лишился юридической
силы после вступления в действие Конституции 1978 г., в
соответствии с которой все противоречащие ей ранее принятые нормы
отменяются (см. п. 19 выше). Так как Устав Коллегии адвокатов
Испании был принят во исполнение указанного Закона, то его
постигла та же участь.
42. Правительство и Комиссия настаивали на том, что применение
дисциплинарных мер основывалось на запрете членам коллегии
адвокатов заниматься рекламой своей деятельности в соответствии со
статьей 31 Устава Коллегии адвокатов Испании, Уставом Коллегии
адвокатов Барселоны и решениями ее совета (см. п. 22, 24 и 25
выше).
43. Толкование и применение внутреннего законодательства
возлагаются прежде всего на национальные государственные органы,
особенно суды (см. inter alia вышеупомянутое Решение по делу
Торгеир Торгеирсон против Исландии. Серия A, т. 239, с. 25, п.
58). Жалоба заявителя в Верховный суд была основана на том, что
был нарушен принцип, согласно которому установить, что является
правонарушением, и предусмотреть санкцию за него может только
законодательный акт. Верховный суд, отклонив жалобу, сослался на
практику Конституционного Суда (см. п. 13 и 18 выше). Суд считает
такой подход разумным, так же как и данное Конституционным Судом в
Решении от 17 апреля 1989 толкование статьи 20 Конституции (см. п.
15 и 16 выше). Короче говоря, вмешательство было "предусмотрено
законом".
b) Правомерная цель
44. Правительство и Комиссия полагают, что в целом главной
целью запрета членам коллегии адвокатов рекламировать свою
профессиональную деятельность является "защита прав других лиц", в
частности прав общественности и других членов коллегии.
Правительство также указало, что реклама всегда считалась
несовместимой с достоинством профессии, уважением к коллегам и
интересами широкой публики.
45. С точки зрения заявителя, мнение Комиссии применимо только
к случаям, когда реклама носит сопоставительный характер или не
соответствует действительности, но не тогда, когда объявление
просто дает информацию об адвокатской практике. Оспариваемый
запрет создает неравенство между теми членами коллегии, которые
практикуют самостоятельно, и теми, кто практикует, являясь
одновременно гражданскими служащими или университетскими
преподавателями. Для первых реклама служит единственным возможным
средством сообщить о себе потенциальным клиентам, тогда как
положение последних предоставляет им большие возможности заявить о
себе. Кроме того, этот запрет не распространяется на крупные
юридические консалтинговые фирмы, действующие на международном
уровне, или на страховые компании, которые также предлагают
юридическую помощь. Таким образом, запрет в отношении практикующих
независимых юристов выступает инструментом охраны интересов
некоторых привилегированных членов профессии.
46. У Суда нет оснований сомневаться, что обжалуемые правила
коллегии адвокатов были предназначены для защиты интересов широкой
публики, обеспечивая одновременно уважение к членам профессии. В
этой связи следует принимать во внимание особый характер
адвокатской профессии; в своем качестве слуг правосудия адвокаты
пользуются исключительным правом участия в суде и иммунитетом от
судебного преследования за свои выступления в зале суда; их
поведение должно быть поэтому скромным, честным и достойным.
Ограничения на рекламу традиционно оправдывались ссылкой на эти
особые черты. В случае с рассматриваемым решением ничто не
указывает на то, что намерение Совета коллегии адвокатов в то
время не соответствовало признанной цели законодательства. Более
того, факты, на которые ссылается г-н Касадо Кока, относятся
прежде всего к способу применения законодательства, о котором идет
речь, а следовательно, относятся к оценке необходимости применения
указанной дисциплинарной меры.
c) "Необходимо в демократическом обществе"
47. Заявитель утверждал, что обжалуемое взыскание не было
"необходимо в демократическом обществе", т.к. оно представляло
собой несоразмерное вмешательство в его право распространять
коммерческую информацию, право, которое гарантировано членам
коллегии адвокатов, так же как и другим гражданам, в соответствии
со статьей 10.
48. Правительство полагало, что оспариваемые нормы Устава
Коллегии адвокатов Испании отражают концепцию профессионального
статуса слуг правосудия, которой придерживаются сами члены
коллегии адвокатов. В 1982 г. практика всех европейских коллегий
адвокатов была аналогичной, хотя впоследствии было отмечено
некоторое ослабление жесткости этих правил. В любом случае,
наложенное на г-на Касадо Кока взыскание носило почти
символический характер. Фактически оно порицало повторное
использование рекламы г-ном Касадо Кока, который уже получал
предупреждения и замечания в связи с объявлениями, которые он
размещал в некоторых газетах в рубрике "различная реклама" и в
разосланных им ряду компаний письмах (см. п. 7 и 8 выше). С учетом
этого, а также принимая во внимание, что речь идет о свободе слова
применительно к коммерции, Правительство настаивало, что
национальные власти должны обладать в этой связи значительной
свободой усмотрения.
49. С точки зрения Комиссии, запрет членам коллегии адвокатов
использовать практически любую рекламу представляется чрезмерным и
плохо совместимым со свободой распространять информацию и
сопутствующим правом ее получать. В объявлении заявителя
помещались сведения совершенно нейтрального характера (его имя,
род занятий, адрес конторы и номер телефона), и они не содержали
информации, которая бы не соответствовала действительности или
была бы оскорбительной для его коллег адвокатов. Поэтому он был
вправе распространять такую информацию точно так же, как его
потенциальные клиенты имели право ее получать.
50. Согласно практике, выработанной Судом, государства -
участники Конвенции пользуются определенной свободой усмотрения
при оценке необходимости того или иного вида вмешательства, но это
усмотрение подлежит контролю со стороны институтов Совета Европы
как в отношении соответствующих норм, так и решений по их
применению (см. inter alia Решение по делу "Маркт интерн Верлаг
ГмбХ" и Клауса Бирмана. Серия A, т. 165, с. 20, п. 33). Подобная
свобода усмотрения особенно существенна в сложной и переменчивой
области недобросовестной конкуренции (там же). Это же верно и
применительно к рекламе. Таким образом, в нынешнем случае задача
Суда ограничивается тем, чтобы установить, насколько в принципе
оправданными были меры, принятые на национальном уровне, и их
соразмерность (см. inter alia там же, а также вышеупомянутое
Решение по делу Бартольда. Серия A, т. 90, с. 25, п. 55).
51. Реклама является одним из способов сообщить о свойствах
предлагаемых товаров и услуг. Тем не менее в некоторых случаях она
может быть подвергнута ограничениям, в особенности для того, чтобы
предотвратить недобросовестную конкуренцию или появление
недостоверной либо вводящей в заблуждение рекламы. В определенных
условиях публикация даже объективной, правдивой рекламы может быть
ограничена для того, чтобы обеспечить уважение прав других лиц или
в связи с особыми обстоятельствами определенных видов деятельности
и профессиональных занятий. Однако любые подобные ограничения
должны тщательно анализироваться Судом, который призван взглянуть
на оспариваемое взыскание в свете всего дела в целом (см. mutatis
mutandis указанное Решение по делу "Маркт интерн Верлаг ГмбХ" и
Клауса Бирмана. Серия A, т. 165, с. 20, п. 34).
52. Г-н Касадо Кока получил 6 апреля 1983 г. письменное
предупреждение от Совета коллегии адвокатов Барселоны за нарушение
им запрета на помещение профессиональной рекламы (см. п. 10 и 22
выше). Подтверждая правильность применения взыскания, Совет
национальной коллегии адвокатов установил, что объявления, о
которых идет речь, с учетом их характера выходят за пределы,
установленные соответствующими правилами Коллегии адвокатов
Барселоны; административный суд Барселоны привел те же доводы в
обоснование своего Решения (см. п. 11, 12, 24 и 25 выше) отметив,
что эти правила допускали использование рекламы в некоторых
случаях - а именно, когда адвокатская практика только создается
или когда поменялся членский состав, адрес или телефон - и при
определенных условиях (см. п. 25 выше). Таким образом, запрет не
был абсолютным.
53. Заявитель и Комиссия утверждали, что некоторые коммерческие
предприятия, такие, как страховые компании, не подвергаются
ограничениям в отношении рекламы своих юридических услуг.
54. По мнению Суда, страховые компании нельзя сравнивать с
членами коллегии адвокатов, занимающимися самостоятельной
практикой, чей особый статус отводит им центральное место в
системе отправления правосудия в качестве посредников между
публикой и судами. Это объясняет ограничения, налагаемые на
поведение членов коллегии адвокатов, а также полномочия по
контролю и надзору за их соблюдением, возложенные на советы
коллегий адвокатов.
Тем не менее правила, которыми должны руководствоваться члены
профессиональной корпорации, в частности в области рекламы,
различны в разных странах в зависимости от их культурных традиций.
Более того, в большинстве государств - участников Конвенции,
включая Испанию, на протяжении некоторого времени существовала
тенденция к ослаблению строгости этих правил вследствие
происходивших перемен и, в частности, возрастания роли средств
массовой информации. Правительство цитировало примеры из Кодекса
деонтологии адвокатов Европейского Сообщества (Страсбург, 28
октября 1988 г.) и Резолюции Конференции коллегий адвокатов стран
Европы (Краков, 24 мая 1991 г.); поддерживая принцип запрета
рекламы, эти документы вместе с тем разрешали членам коллегии
адвокатов выступать в средствах массовой информации, заявлять о
себе и участвовать в обсуждении вопросов общественной жизни. В
соответствии с этими руководящими указаниями, Совет коллегий
адвокатов Каталонии издал (4 июля 1991 г.) новые правила
относительно рекламы, разрешающие распространение писем или
статей, в том числе и в прессе (см. п. 28 выше). Недавно
Правительство начало изучение проекта нового Устава Коллегии
адвокатов Испании (см. п. 23 выше), который предполагает несколько
большую свободу в данной сфере.
55. Широкий спектр правил поведения и различия в темпах
перемен, происходящих в государствах - членах Совета Европы,
указывает на сложность проблемы. Благодаря прямым непрерывным
контактам со своими членами руководство коллегии адвокатов и суды
страны находятся в лучшем положении, чем международный суд, чтобы
определить, как в данный период времени найти равновесие между
различными интересами, а именно требованиями надлежащего
отправления правосудия, достоинством профессии, правом каждого
получать информацию об оказываемой юридической помощи и
предоставлением членам коллегии адвокатов возможности
рекламировать свою адвокатскую практику.
56. В свете вышесказанного Суд пришел к выводу, что в
рассматриваемый период времени - 1982 - 1983 гг. - реакция
соответствующих властей не может считаться несоразмерной
преследуемой цели.
57. Отсюда следует, что нарушения статьи 10 не установлено.
ПО ЭТИМ ОСНОВАНИЯМ СУД
1. Постановил единогласно, что статья 10 подлежит применению в
настоящем деле;
2. Постановил семью голосами против двух, что ее нарушение
места не имело.
Совершено на английском и французском языках и оглашено во
Дворце прав человека в Страсбурге 24 февраля 1994 г.
Председатель
Рольф РИССДАЛ
Грефье
Марк-Андре ЭЙССЕН
В соответствии со статьей 51 п. 2 Конвенции и статьей 53 п. 2
Регламента Суда к настоящему Решению прилагается совместное особое
мнение судей.
СОВМЕСТНОЕ ОСОБОЕ МНЕНИЕ СУДЕЙ ТОРА ВИЛЬЯЛМСОНА И ПАЛМ
Мы согласны с большинством Палаты в том, что статья 10
применима к данному случаю, что имело место вмешательство, которое
было предусмотрено законом и преследовало правомерную цель.
Однако, что касается необходимости вмешательства, мы согласны с
тем, что было сказано в п. 54 - 65 доклада Комиссии.
Соответственно, мы полагаем, что нарушение статьи 10 Конвенции
имело место.
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
CASE OF CASADO COCA v. SPAIN
JUDGMENT
(Strasbourg, 24.II.1994)
In the case of Casado Coca v. Spain <*>,
--------------------------------
<*> Note by the Registrar: The case is numbered 8/1993/403/481.
The first number is the case's position on the list of cases
referred to the Court in the relevant year (second number). The
last two numbers indicate the case's position on the list of cases
referred to the Court since its creation and on the list of the
corresponding originating applications to the Commission.
The European Court of Human Rights, sitting, in accordance with
Article 43 (art. 43) of the Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ("the Convention") and the
relevant provisions of the Rules of Court, as a Chamber composed
of the following judges:
Mr R. Ryssdal, President,
Mr {Thor Vilhjalmsson} <*>,
Mr A. Spielmann,
Mr N. Valticos,
Mrs E. Palm,
Mr I. Foighel,
Mr J.M. Morenilla,
Sir John Freeland,
Mr F. Bigi,
and also of Mr M.-A. Eissen, Registrar, and Mr H. Petzold,
Deputy Registrar,
--------------------------------
<*> Здесь и далее по тексту слова на национальном языке набраны
латинским шрифтом и выделены фигурными скобками.
Having deliberated in private on 29 October 1993 and 26 January
1994,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the last-
mentioned date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case was referred to the Court by the European
Commission of Human Rights ("the Commission") on 19 February 1993,
within the three-month period laid down by Article 32 para. 1 and
Article 47 (art. 32-1, art. 47) of the Convention. It originated
in an application (no. 15450/89) against the Kingdom of Spain
lodged with the Commission under Article 25 (art. 25) by a Spanish
national, Mr Pablo Casado Coca, on 25 May 1989.
The Commission's request referred to Articles 44 and 48 (art.
44, art. 48) and to the declaration whereby Spain recognised the
compulsory jurisdiction of the Court (Article 46) (art. 46). The
object of the request was to obtain a decision as to whether the
facts of the case disclosed a breach by the respondent State of
its obligations under Article 10 (art. 10).
2. In response to the enquiry made in accordance with Rule 33
para. 3 (d) of the Rules of Court, the applicant stated that he
wished to take part in the proceedings and to present his own
case. On 30 April 1993 the President of the Court granted his
request and also gave him leave to use the Spanish language during
the proceedings (Rules 27 para. 3 and 30).
3. The Chamber to be constituted included ex officio Mr J.M.
Morenilla, the elected judge of Spanish nationality (Article 43 of
the Convention) (art. 43), and Mr R. Ryssdal, the President of the
Court (Rule 21 para. 3 (b)). On 27 February 1993, in the presence
of the Registrar, Mr R. Bernhardt, the Vice-President of the
Court, drew by lot the names of the other seven members, namely Mr
{Thor Vilhjalmsson}, Mr A. Spielmann, Mr N. Valticos, Mrs E. Palm,
Mr I. Foighel, Sir John Freeland and Mr F. Bigi (Article 43 in
fine of the Convention and Rule 21 para. 4) (art. 43).
4. As President of the Chamber (Rule 21 para. 5), Mr Ryssdal,
acting through the Registrar, consulted the Agent of the Spanish
Government ("the Government"), the applicant and the Delegate of
the Commission on the organisation of the proceedings (Rules 37
para. 1 and 38). Pursuant to the orders made in consequence, the
Registrar received the applicant's memorial on 29 April 1993 and
the Government's memorial on 13 July. On 7 September the Secretary
to the Commission informed the Registrar that the Delegate would
submit his observations at the hearing.
On 24 August and 15 September 1993 the Commission produced
various documents which the Registrar had sought on instructions
from the President, acting at the Government's request. In October
the Government and the applicant likewise filed several documents.
5. In accordance with the decision of the President, who had
also given the Agent of the Government leave to use the Spanish
language at the hearing (Rule 27 para. 2), the hearing took place
in public in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 26 October
1993. The Court had held a preparatory meeting beforehand.
There appeared before the Court:
(a) for the Government
Mr J. Borrego Borrego, Head of the Human Rights Legal Service,
Ministry of Justice, Agent;
(b) for the Commission
Mr {L.F. Martinez}, Delegate;
(c) the applicant, Mr P. Casado Coca, abogado.
The Court heard addresses by them and also replies to its
questions. The Agent of the Government produced certain documents.
AS TO THE FACTS
I. The circumstances of the case
6. Mr Pablo Casado Coca, a Spanish national, lives at
Valldoreitx, near Barcelona, and practises as a lawyer (abogado)
in Barcelona.
7. After setting up his practice in 1979, he regularly placed
notices advertising it in the "miscellaneous advertisements" pages
of several Barcelona newspapers and the Revista alemana de
{Espana} ("German Journal of Spain"). He also wrote to various
companies offering his services.
8. The Barcelona Bar Council (Junta de Govern del Col.legi
d'Advocats) brought disciplinary proceedings against him four
times on this account, and in 1981 and 1982 these led to the
imposition of penalties, namely two reprimands and two warnings.
The applicant lodged internal appeals against these penalties but
did not apply to the competent courts.
A. The Bar Council proceedings
9. From October 1982 notices giving details of the applicant's
legal practice were published in the newsletter of the Valldoreitx
Residents' and Property Owners' Association. They took up
approximately one-third of a page and gave the applicant's name,
with the title "lawyer" (letrado), and his office address and
telephone number.
10. The Barcelona Bar Council brought further disciplinary
proceedings against Mr Casado Coca on this account. On 6 April
1983 he again received a written warning for disregarding the ban
on professional advertising (Article 31 of Royal Decree no.
2090/82 of 24 July 1982, laying down the Statute of the Bar - see
paragraph 22 below).
11. On 3 June 1983, following an internal appeal by the
applicant, the National Bar Council (Consejo general de la
{Abogacia}) upheld the penalty imposed. Referring to Article 31 of
the Statute of the Bar as amplified in the relevant rules of the
Barcelona Bar Council (see paragraphs 22, 24 and 27 below), it
held that, given their nature, the notices in question went beyond
the defined limits. It also pointed out that the applicant had
recently incurred other disciplinary penalties for the same
reason, and these had to be taken into consideration when ruling
on the appeal.
B. Proceedings in the competent courts
12. Mr Casado Coca then applied to the Barcelona Audiencia
Territorial. He argued in particular that the purpose of his
notice was to inform the public and that the warning infringed
Article 20 of the Constitution, which guaranteed the right to
freedom of expression. He also alleged that the principle that
only a statute could define offences and lay down penalties had
been contravened because the provisions which prohibited
advertising by members of the Bar and attached disciplinary
penalties were regulatory in nature.
The court dismissed his application on 11 May 1987, holding
that the notice in question was a vehicle for advertising and not
simply an announcement of information. It appeared beside similar
announcements by a driving school and an old people's home and
went beyond the limits laid down in the Bar's rules, which allowed
notices only to announce the setting up of a practice or a change
of address; this was not the applicant's case.
13. On 23 September 1988 the Supreme Court dismissed an appeal
on points of law by Mr Casado Coca and at the same time refused to
refer the case to the Constitutional Court on grounds of
unconstitutionality.
It rejected the ground of appeal based on disregard of the
principle that only a statute could define offences and lay down
penalties. It did so by reference to the case-law of the
Constitutional Court, according to which Article 36 of the
Constitution (see paragraph 18 below) makes it permissible for
statute law to provide that the rules governing professional
associations and the practice of the professions may be laid down
by means of regulations. It held that Article 20 did not protect
advertising as a fundamental right, because advertising was not a
matter of expressing thoughts, ideas or opinions but of announcing
the existence of a profit-making business activity.
Moreover, the ban on professional advertising by members of the
Bar had legitimate aims, namely to uphold free competition and to
protect clients' interests. In such a case the right in question
could be subject to restrictions.
C. Proceedings in the Constitutional Court
14. The applicant then lodged an appeal (recurso de amparo)
with the Constitutional Court. He again maintained that it was
contrary to the principle of statutory definition of offences and
prescription of penalties enshrined in the Constitution to lay
down administrative penalties by means of a decree, and that since
the notice set out genuine information, i.e. his name, address and
telephone number, the penalty imposed contravened Article 20 of
the Constitution.
15. On 17 April 1989 the Constitutional Court declared the
appeal inadmissible.
It held that the penalty complained of did not infringe the
fundamental right to communicate genuine information. The aim of
the advertising was connected with the "carrying on of a
commercial, industrial, craft or professional activity"; it
consisted in "directly or indirectly promoting the conclusion of
contracts relating to movable or immovable property, services,
rights or obligations", whereas the purpose of the fundamental
right defined in Article 20 para. 1 (d) was to enable citizens to
"form their beliefs by weighing different or even diametrically
opposed opinions and thus taking part in the discussion of public
affairs". The ban on advertising professional services did not
infringe the fundamental right in question.
II. Relevant domestic law
A. General provisions
1. The 1978 Constitution
16. Article 20 of the Constitution guarantees the right to
freedom of expression:
"1. The following rights shall be recognised and protected:
(a) the right freely to express and disseminate thoughts, ideas
and opinions by word of mouth, in writing or by any other means of
reproduction;
...
(d) the right to receive and communicate true information by
any means of dissemination. The right to invoke the conscience
clause and that of professional confidentiality shall be governed
by statute.
2. The exercise of these rights may not be restricted by any
prior censorship.
...
4. These freedoms shall be limited by respect for the rights
secured in this Part, by the provisions of the implementing Acts
and in particular by the right to honour and to a private life and
the right to control use of one's likeness and to the protection
of youth and children."
17. Article 25 enshrines the principle that only a statute can
define offences and lay down penalties:
"1. No one may be convicted or punished for any act or omission
which at the time it was committed did not constitute, under the
legislation in force at that time, a criminal offence, whether
serious or petty, or an administrative offence.
..."
18. Article 36 deals with professional associations:
"The special features of the legal status of professional
associations and the practice of professions requiring a
university degree shall be laid down by statute. The internal
structure and functioning of associations must be democratic."
According to the case-law of the Constitutional Court, this
Article does not preclude a statutory provision that rules
governing professional associations and the practice of the
professions are to be laid down in administrative regulations
(judgments of 20 February and 24 September 1984).
19. The Constitution states that any previous provisions
contrary to it are repealed.
2. Law no. 2/1974 on professional associations
20. Law no. 2/1974, which was published in the Spanish Official
Gazette of 15 February 1974, governs the functioning and
organisation of professional associations. Section 1 provides:
"Professional associations are public-law corporations,
protected by law and recognised by the State, enjoying legal
personality and having full capacity to act in pursuit of their
objectives."
21. Section 5 (i) makes the professional associations
responsible for regulating their members' professional activities,
for ensuring that professional ethics and dignity are upheld and
that the rights of private individuals are respected, and for
exercising disciplinary powers in professional and internal
matters. To these ends, the relevant national councils adopt
statutes, which are approved by the Government. These statutes lay
down the rights and duties of the members of each profession and
the disciplinary rules applicable to them.
B. Special provisions governing Bars
1. The Statute of the Spanish Bar
(a) Regime applicable at the material time
22. Royal Decree 2090/82 laying down the Statute of the Spanish
Bar (Estatuto general de la {Abogacia Espanola}) was published in
the Spanish Official Gazette on 2 September 1982.
Article 31
"Members of the Bar are not allowed to
(a) announce or circulate information about their services
directly or through advertising media,... or express opinions free
of charge in professional journals or other publications or media
without permission from the Bar Council;
..."
Articles 107 - 112 govern the disciplinary powers of Bar
councils. An appeal against penalties lies to the National Bar
Council (Article 96 para. 1) and subsequently to the competent
courts (Article 99).
(b) Proposed new regime
23. At sessions held on 5 - 6 March, 21 - 22 May and 25 June
1993 the Assembly of the Chairmen of the Spanish Bars adopted the
draft of a new national Statute, which has been submitted to the
Government for approval. Article 31 of the draft Statute provides:
"1. Members of the Bar may advertise their services and
practices in accordance with the legislation in force, this
Statute and other rules and decisions of the Bar.
2. Direct or indirect advertising of individual members of the
Bar and their services and participation by the former in legal
advice programmes in the media shall be subject to certain
conditions. Members of the Bar must
(a) comply with the special provisions applicable to practice
at the Bar as well as with the current legislation on advertising;
(b) show regard for truth, rigour and exactness without
detracting from other members' advertisements by imitating them or
inviting confusion with them, without lapsing into self-praise and
comparisons with or denigration of their colleagues and without
citing their own professional successes, their clientele or the
financial terms on which they provide services; and
(c) request the relevant Bar council's prior authorisation for
the proposed advertisement, specifying its content and the way in
which it will be published.
The Bar council may grant authorisation, make it subject to
certain amendments or refuse it. In all cases, it shall give a
reasoned decision that can be challenged in accordance with the
procedure laid down in Articles 130 et seq. of this Statute and
shall be communicated to the member of the Bar making the request
within not more than thirty days of that request, failing which
the council shall be deemed to have given its tacit consent.
3. Notwithstanding the above, members of the Bar may, without
seeking prior authorisation,
(a) use a letterhead stating their name, profession and
university degrees, or those of their partners, and the name,
telephone number and other particulars of their chambers, in the
form customarily used by members of the Bar;
(b) affix to the outside of the building in which they have
their chambers or their private residence and to the door of their
chambers or nearby, a sign or plate announcing their practice, of
the size and kind usual in the area of the Bar;
(c) have their status as a member of the Bar included in
telephone, fax, telex and other directories;
(d) announce by letter or in the press any changes of address,
telephone number or other particulars of their chambers, likewise
in the form customarily used by members of the Bar to which they
belong; and
(e) take part in conferences and symposia, mentioning their
membership of the Bar, publish articles in the specialist and non-
specialist press and make statements on radio or television.
4. Members of the Bar who continuously or occasionally provide
services to individuals or companies must require them to refrain
from any advertising that does not comply with the provisions of
this Statute.
5. The Bar council shall rule on allegedly doubtful or
unforeseen cases and violations of provisions governing
advertising or any misuse of rights derived from the rules in this
Statute. It may expressly prohibit practices it deems contrary to
the spirit of this Statute and punish any breaches of such
prohibitions."
2. The rules specific to the Barcelona Bar
(a) Regime applicable at the material time
(i) The 1947 Statute of the Barcelona Bar
24. At the time when the penalty was imposed on the applicant,
the 1947 Statute of the Barcelona Bar (Estatutos del Colegio de
Abogados de Barcelona) was still in force. Article 18 quite simply
prohibited members of the Bar from advertising, in the following
terms:
Article 18
"Members of the Bar are forbidden to publish notices relating
to the practice of their profession as a means of advertising or
propaganda."
(ii) The decision of 24 February 1981
25. Being of the view that the ban on advertising was an
important rule of professional conduct, the Barcelona Bar Council
adopted a decision on 24 February 1981 on "Members of the Bar and
advertising" (Acord sobre "Els advocats i la publicitat"), which
provided, inter alia:
"1. General principle
It is forbidden for members of the Bar to undertake any direct
or indirect personal advertising intended to attract clients.
...
2. Authorised notices
Members of the Bar may publish small notices in local daily
newspapers in order to announce the setting up of their practices
or changes in membership or of address, telephone number or telex
number.
The size and content of notices must be approved in advance by
the Bar Council. They may not appear more than three times during
a maximum period of two months.
...
6. Professional directories
Members of the Bar may publish their names, addresses,
telephone numbers and telex numbers, with a brief indication of
the type of professional services offered, in professional
directories, provided that all members of the Bar have the same
access to these.
..."
(b) Subsequent regime
(i) The 1985 Statute of the Barcelona Bar
26. A new Statute of the Barcelona Bar (Estatuts del Il.lustre
Col.legi d'Advocats de Barcelona) was published in the Catalonia
Official Gazette of 5 June 1985. Article 19 provides:
"1. It is forbidden for members of the Bar to undertake any
personal advertising intended to secure clients, whether directly
or indirectly.
2. It is also forbidden for members of the Bar to consent
either expressly or tacitly to any form of advertising offered to
them.
3. The foregoing prohibition shall cover both advertising by
word of mouth and written or graphic advertising in any form and
of any kind. It shall also apply to advertising by means of radio
or television broadcasts.
...
5. The Bar Council may adopt rules to deal in greater detail
with the matters covered in this Article."
Failure to comply with the provisions of the Statute
constitutes serious or minor misconduct, depending on the
circumstances, and may lead to penalties being imposed (Articles
94 to 96 of the Statute).
(ii) The 1985 decision of the Barcelona Bar Council
27. On 5 February 1985 the Bar Council amended the rules laid
down in its 1981 decision (see paragraph 25 above) by forbidding
members of the Bar to send press releases involving personal
advertising to the media.
(iii) The rules adopted by the Council of the Catalonia
Bars in 1991
28. On 4 July 1991 the Council of the Catalonia Bars (Consell
dels Col.legis d'Advocats de Catalunya) adopted new rules on
advertising. These superseded the earlier rules included in the
statutes and decisions of the Catalonia Bars (Rule 6).
The preamble states:
"Advertising by members of the Bar is traditionally considered
to be more or less incompatible with professional ethics. However,
it is obvious that advertising, provided it does not go beyond
certain limits, does not offend the vital principles of the
profession's code of ethics, namely probity and independence.
Today information is one of the foundations of democratic
countries and a right for users of a service.
..."
Rules 2 and 3 make a distinction in this field:
"Rule 2
Authorised advertising
Members of the Bar may
...
(b) publish documents, circulars or articles on legal subjects,
even in publications not specialising in law, bearing their
signature and indicating the author's status as a member of the
Bar;
(c) express their personal opinions in the media on subjects of
public interest or on cases in which they are involved
professionally, taking care at all times to maintain professional
secrecy;
(d) publish brochures giving details of their practices, the
members of the Bar who work there and the types of case handled.
This publicity material must be approved in advance by the Bar
Council. They may also publish information circulars on legal
topics. The brochures and circulars referred to in this paragraph
may be distributed only to clients and not to third parties;
... "
"Rule 3
Unauthorised advertising
Members of the Bar may not advertise otherwise than as allowed
under the terms of the preceding Rule. In particular, they may not
(a) advertise their services by making known their professional
successes, giving the names of their clients or comparing
themselves with other members of the Bar or by allowing others so
to act without objecting;
(b) send brochures, circulars or other documents or offer their
services to persons other than clients;
...
(e) advertise in the press or on radio or television except as
allowed under Rule 2."
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION
29. Mr Casado Coca applied to the Commission on 25 May 1989. He
alleged several breaches of the Convention:
(a) Article 7 (art. 7), in that the disciplinary rules of the
Spanish Bars were laid down by decree and not by a Law;
(b) Article 10 (art. 10), because the Barcelona Bar Council had
given him a warning for publishing a notice in a local newsletter;
(c) Article 4 para. 2 (art. 4-2), because members of the
Spanish Bar could not choose to specialise;
(d) Article 14 taken together with Article 10 (art. 14+10), in
that the members of other professions had more scope to advertise.
30. On 2 December 1991 the Commission declared the application
(no. 15450/89) admissible in respect of the complaint relating to
Article 10 (art. 10) but inadmissible as to the remainder. In its
report of 1 December 1992 (made under Article 31) (art. 31), the
Commission expressed the opinion by nine votes to nine, with the
President's casting vote, that there had been a breach of Article
10 (art. 10). The full text of the Commission's opinion and of the
two dissenting opinions contained in the report is reproduced as
an annex to this judgment <*>.
--------------------------------
<*> Note by the Registrar: for practical reasons this annex
will appear only with the printed version of the judgment (volume
285-A of Series A of the Publications of the Court), but a copy of
the Commission's report is available from the registry.
GOVERNMENT'S FINAL SUBMISSIONS TO THE COURT
31. In their memorial of 13 July 1993 the Government requested
the Court to hold
"1. that this case does not come within the scope of Article 10
(art. 10); and
2. that if Article 10 (art. 10) does apply in this case, the
Kingdom of Spain has not failed to fulfil its obligations under
the Convention".
AS TO THE LAW
Alleged violation of article 10 (art. 10)
32. Mr Casado Coca complained of the disciplinary sanction
imposed on him by the Barcelona Bar Council on 6 April 1983 for
having published a notice about his practice in several issues of
a local newsletter. He relied on Article 10 (art. 10) of the
Convention, which provides:
"1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right
shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart
information and ideas without interference by public authority and
regardless of frontiers. This article (art. 10) shall not prevent
States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or
cinema enterprises.
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it
duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities,
conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and
are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of
national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or
morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others,
for preventing the disclosure of information received in
confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of
the judiciary."
A. Applicability of Article 10 (art. 10)
33. The Government disputed the applicability of Article 10
(art. 10). They contended that the applicant's notices did not in
any way constitute information of a commercial nature but were
simply advertising. He had paid for them with the sole aim of
securing more clients. Advertising as such did not come within the
ambit of freedom of expression; an advertisement did not serve the
public interest but the private interests of the individuals
concerned. Applying the guarantees of Article 10 (art. 10) to
advertising would be tantamount to altering the scope of that
Article (art. 10).
34. According to the applicant, the information given in his
notices had indeed been intended for the general public; assuming
it had succeeded in attracting an influx of clients, this would
have been because the public had found it useful and necessary.
Advertising was, moreover, a general concept comprising several
categories according to the political or commercial content of the
information or ideas in question. Furthermore, the protection of
human rights did not necessarily have to further the public
interest; it could serve private interests.
35. The Court would first point out that Article 10 (art. 10)
guarantees freedom of expression to "everyone". No distinction is
made in it according to whether the type of aim pursued is profit-
making or not (see, mutatis mutandis, the Autronic AG v.
Switzerland judgment of 22 May 1990, Series A no. 178, p. 23,
para. 47) and a difference in treatment in this sphere might fall
foul of Article 14 (art. 14).
In its Barthold v. Germany judgment of 25 March 1985 (Series A
no. 90, pp. 20 - 21, para. 42) the Court left open the question
whether commercial advertising as such came within the scope of
the guarantees under Article 10 (art. 10), but its later case-law
provides guidance on this matter. Article 10 (art. 10) does not
apply solely to certain types of information or ideas or forms of
expression (see the markt intern Verlag GmbH and Klaus Beermann v.
Germany judgment of 20 November 1989, Series A no. 165, p. 17,
para. 26), in particular those of a political nature; it also
encompasses artistic expression (see the {Muller} and Others v.
Switzerland judgment of 24 May 1988, Series A no. 133, p. 19,
para. 27), information of a commercial nature (see the markt
intern Verlag GmbH and Klaus Beermann judgment previously cited,
ibid.) - as the Commission rightly pointed out - and even light
music and commercials transmitted by cable (see the Groppera Radio
AG and Others v. Switzerland judgment of 28 March 1990, Series A
no. 173, p. 22, paras. 54 - 55).
36. In the instant case the impugned notices merely gave the
applicant's name, profession, address and telephone number. They
were clearly published with the aim of advertising, but they
provided persons requiring legal assistance with information that
was of definite use and likely to facilitate their access to
justice.
37. Article 10 (art. 10) is therefore applicable.
B. Compliance with Article 10 (art. 10)
1. Whether there was an interference
by a "public authority"
38. The Government submitted that if there was an interference,
it did not come from a "public authority" within the meaning of
Article 10 para. 1 (art. 10-1). The Barcelona Bar Council's
written warning (see paragraph 10 above) could be regarded as an
internal sanction imposed on Mr Casado Coca by his peers. The
Spanish State had merely ratified, in the form of a royal decree,
the statute drawn up by the members of the Bar themselves, under
Article 31 of which professional advertising was banned (see
paragraph 22 above).
39. Like the applicant and the Commission, the Court notes,
however, that section 1 of the 1974 Law on professional
associations states that they are public-law corporations (see
paragraph 20 above). In the case of the Bars, this status is
further buttressed by their purpose of serving the public interest
through the furtherance of free, adequate legal assistance
combined with public supervision of the practice of the profession
and of compliance with professional ethics (see, in the case of a
Bar, the Van der Mussele v. Belgium judgment of 23 November 1983,
Series A no. 70, p. 15, para. 29 in fine, and the H. v. Belgium
judgment of 30 November 1987, Series A no. 127-B, pp. 27 - 28,
paras. 24 - 29; see also, mutatis mutandis, in the case of a
medical association, the Le Compte, Van Leuven and De Meyere
judgment of 23 June 1981, Series A no. 43, pp. 26 - 27, para. 64).
Furthermore, the impugned decision was adopted in accordance with
the provisions applicable to members of the Barcelona Bar and an
appeal against it lay to the competent courts (see paragraph 22
above). These courts and the Constitutional Court, all of which
are State institutions, upheld the penalty (see paragraphs 12, 13
and 15 above). That being so, it is reasonable to hold that there
was an interference by a "public authority" with Mr Casado Coca's
freedom to impart information.
2. Whether the interference was justified
40. Such an interference contravenes Article 10 (art. 10)
unless it was "prescribed by law", had an aim that was legitimate
under Article 10 para. 2 (art. 10-2) and was "necessary in a
democratic society" for the aforementioned aim (see, in
particular, the Thorgeir Thorgeirson v. Iceland judgment of 25
June 1992, Series A no. 239, p. 25, para. 56).
(a) "Prescribed by law"
41. The applicant contended that the penalty complained of
lacked a valid basis in law. The 1974 Law had become null and void
after the 1978 Constitution came into force, under which any
earlier provisions contrary to it were repealed (see paragraph 19
above). Since the Statute of the Spanish Bar had been adopted
pursuant to that Law, it had been affected in the same way.
42. It was common ground between the Government and the
Commission that the disciplinary measure was based on the ban on
advertising imposed on members of the Bar by Article 31 of the
Statute of the Spanish Bar and by the Statute of the Barcelona Bar
and its council's decisions (see paragraphs 22, 24 and 25 above).
43. It is primarily for the national authorities, notably the
courts, to interpret and apply domestic law (see, inter alia, the
Thorgeir Thorgeirson v. Iceland judgment previously cited, Series
A no. 239, p. 25, para. 58). In the instant case, in rejecting the
ground of appeal based on violation of the principle that only a
statute can define offences and lay down penalties, the Supreme
Court took as its authority the Constitutional Court's case-law on
the subject (see paragraphs 13 and 18 above). In the light of the
wording of the provisions in question (see, mutatis mutandis, the
Castells v. Spain judgment of 23 April 1992, Series A no. 236, p.
21, para. 37) and the state of its own case-law at the time, the
Court finds this interpretation to be reasonable and likewise the
Constitutional Court's interpretation of Article 20 of the
Constitution in its decision of 17 April 1989 (see paragraphs 15
and 16 above). In short, the interference was "prescribed by law".
(b) Legitimate aim
44. The Government and the Commission considered on the whole
that the main aim of the ban on professional advertising by
members of the Bar was the "protection of the rights of others",
in particular the rights of the public and other members of the
Bar. The Government also pointed out that advertising had always
been found to be incompatible with the dignity of the profession,
the respect due to fellow members of the Bar and the interests of
the public.
45. In the applicant's view, the Commission's opinion could
only be held in cases where the advertising was comparative or
untruthful, but not where a notice simply gave information about a
practice. The impugned ban made it possible to perpetuate
discrimination between members of the Bar in independent practice
and those practising as employees, civil servants or university
teachers. For the former, advertising was the only possible means
of reaching potential clients, whereas the positions held by the
latter afforded them greater scope for making themselves known.
Furthermore, the ban did not apply to the big legal consulting
firms active on an international scale or to insurance companies
which also offered legal assistance. Far from being a measure
protecting the independent practitioner, the ban was a way of
safeguarding the interests of certain privileged members of the
profession.
46. The Court does not have any reason to doubt that the Bar
rules complained of were designed to protect the interests of the
public while ensuring respect for members of the Bar. In this
connection, the special nature of the profession practised by
members of the Bar must be considered; in their capacity as
officers of the court they benefit from an exclusive right of
audience and immunity from legal process in respect of their oral
presentation of cases in court, but their conduct must be
discreet, honest and dignified. The restrictions on advertising
were traditionally justified by reference to these special
features. In the case of the decision in issue, there is nothing
to show that the Bar Council's intention at the time did not
correspond to the acknowledged aim of the legislation.
Furthermore, the factors alluded to by Mr Casado Coca relate
primarily to the way in which the legislation in question was
applied and are therefore relevant to assessing the need for the
disciplinary measure.
(c) "Necessary in a democratic society"
47. The applicant contended that the penalty complained of was
not "necessary in a democratic society", because it constituted a
disproportionate interference with his right to impart commercial
information, a right which members of the Bar, like other
citizens, were guaranteed under Article 10 (art. 10). He added
that such a restriction was permissible only if it reflected a
freely and democratically accepted willingness to exercise self-
restraint; that was not so in the instant case.
48. The Government considered that the impugned rules of the
Spanish Bar possessed those characteristics. They reflected the
conception that members of the Bar themselves had of their
profession as officers of the court, which excluded practising the
profession on a purely commercial basis. Furthermore, in 1982 they
corresponded to the common general practice of European Bars, even
if a degree of relaxation of the rules in this area has been noted
since.
In any case, the penalty imposed on Mr Casado Coca was almost a
token one in nature. It in fact sanctioned repeated advertising by
Mr Casado Coca, who had already received warnings and reprimands
in respect of the notices he had placed in the "miscellaneous
advertisements" sections of several newspapers and the circulars
he had sent to companies (see paragraphs 7 and 8 above). That
being so and where commercial speech was concerned, the Government
claimed a considerable margin of appreciation for the relevant
authorities.
49. In the Commission's view, banning practically all
advertising by members of the Bar appeared to be excessive and
scarcely compatible with the right to freedom of expression, which
includes the freedom to impart information and its corollary, the
right to receive it. The applicant's notice set out particulars
that were wholly neutral (his name, occupation and business
address and telephone number) and did not contain information that
was untrue or offensive to fellow members of the Bar. He was
therefore entitled to impart that information, just as his
potential clients were entitled to receive it.
50. Under the Court's case-law, the States parties to the
Convention have a certain margin of appreciation in assessing the
necessity of an interference, but this margin is subject to
European supervision as regards both the relevant rules and the
decisions applying them (see, inter alia, the markt intern Verlag
GmbH and Klaus Beermann judgment previously cited, Series A no.
165, p. 20, para. 33). Such a margin of appreciation is
particularly essential in the complex and fluctuating area of
unfair competition (ibid.). The same applies to advertising. In
the instant case, the Court's task is therefore confined to
ascertaining whether the measures taken at national level are
justifiable in principle and proportionate (see, inter alia, ibid.
and the Barthold judgment previously cited, Series A no. 90, p.
25, para. 55).
51. For the citizen, advertising is a means of discovering the
characteristics of services and goods offered to him.
Nevertheless, it may sometimes be restricted, especially to
prevent unfair competition and untruthful or misleading
advertising. In some contexts, the publication of even objective,
truthful advertisements might be restricted in order to ensure
respect for the rights of others or owing to the special
circumstances of particular business activities and professions.
Any such restrictions must, however, be closely scrutinised by the
Court, which must weigh the requirements of those particular
features against the advertising in question; to this end, the
Court must look at the impugned penalty in the light of the case
as a whole (see, mutatis mutandis, the markt intern Verlag GmbH
and Klaus Beermann judgment previously cited, Series A no. 165, p.
20, para. 34).
52. In the present case, Mr Casado Coca received a written
warning from the Barcelona Bar Council on 6 April 1983 for having
contravened the ban on professional advertising (see paragraphs 10
and 22 above). In confirming the penalty, the National Bar Council
held that, given their nature, the notices in question went beyond
the limits permitted by the relevant rules of the Barcelona Bar;
the Barcelona Audiencia Territorial gave the same ground for its
judgment (see paragraphs 11, 12, 24 and 25 above). The Court notes
that those rules allowed advertising in certain cases - namely
when a practice was being set up or when there was a change in its
membership, address or telephone number - and under certain
conditions (see paragraph 25 above). The ban was therefore not an
absolute one.
53. The applicant and the Commission argued that commercial
undertakings such as insurance companies are not subject to
restrictions on advertising their legal consulting services.
54. In the Court's opinion, however, they cannot be compared to
members of the Bar in independent practice, whose special status
gives them a central position in the administration of justice as
intermediaries between the public and the courts. Such a position
explains the usual restrictions on the conduct of members of the
Bar and also the monitoring and supervisory powers vested in Bar
councils.
Nevertheless, the rules governing the profession, particularly
in the sphere of advertising, vary from one country to another
according to cultural tradition. Moreover, in most of the States
parties to the Convention, including Spain, there has for some
time been a tendency to relax the rules as a result of the changes
in their respective societies and in particular the growing role
of the media in them. The Government cited the examples of the
Code of Conduct for Lawyers in the European Community (Strasbourg,
28 October 1988) and the conclusions of the Conference of the
European Bars (Cracow, 24 May 1991); while upholding the principle
of banning advertising, these documents authorise members of the
Bar to express their views to the media, to make themselves known
and to take part in public debate. In accordance with these
guidelines, the new rules on advertising issued by the Council of
the Catalonia Bars (4 July 1991) allow the publication of
circulars or articles, including in the press (see paragraph 28
above). More recently, the Government have begun to study the
draft of the new Statute of the Spanish Bar (see paragraph 23
above), which permits somewhat greater freedom in this sphere.
55. The wide range of regulations and the different rates of
change in the Council of Europe's member States indicate the
complexity of the issue. Because of their direct, continuous
contact with their members, the Bar authorities and the country's
courts are in a better position than an international court to
determine how, at a given time, the right balance can be struck
between the various interests involved, namely the requirements of
the proper administration of justice, the dignity of the
profession, the right of everyone to receive information about
legal assistance and affording members of the Bar the possibility
of advertising their practices.
56. In view of the above, the Court holds that at the material
time - 1982-83 - the relevant authorities' reaction could not be
considered disproportionate to the aim pursued.
57. In conclusion, no breach of Article 10 (art. 10) has been
made out.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT
1. Holds unanimously that Article 10 (art. 10) applied in the
instant case.
2. Holds by seven votes to two that there has not been a breach
of it.
Done in English and in French, and delivered at a public
hearing in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 24 February
1994.
Signed: Rolv RYSSDAL
President
Signed: {Marc-Andre} EISSEN
Registrar
In accordance with Article 51 para. 2 (art. 51-2) of the
Convention and Rule 53 para. 2 of the Rules of Court, the joint
dissenting opinion of Mr {Thor Vilhjalmsson} and Mrs Palm is
annexed to this judgment.
Initialled: R.R.
Initialled: M.-A. E.
JOINT DISSENTING OPINION
OF JUDGES {THOR VILHJALMSSON} AND PALM
We agree with the majority of the Chamber that Article 10 (art.
10) of the Convention is applicable in this case and that there
has been an interference, which was prescribed by law and had a
legitimate aim.
However, with regard to the necessity, we agree with what is
said in paragraphs 54-65 of the Commission's report. Accordingly
we find that there has been a violation of Article 10 (art. 10) of
the Convention.
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