[неофициальный перевод]
ЕВРОПЕЙСКИЙ СУД ПО ПРАВАМ ЧЕЛОВЕКА
СУДЕБНОЕ РЕШЕНИЕ
МАККАНН (McCANN) И ДРУГИЕ ПРОТИВ СОЕДИНЕННОГО КОРОЛЕВСТВА
(Страсбург, 27 сентября 1995 года)
(Извлечение)
КРАТКОЕ НЕОФИЦИАЛЬНОЕ ИЗЛОЖЕНИЕ ОБСТОЯТЕЛЬСТВ ДЕЛА
A. Основные факты
Заявители, граждане Ирландии и подданные Соединенного
Королевства Маргарет Макканн, Даниэл Фаррелл и Джон Сэвидж,
являются родителями Даниэля Макканна, Майред Фаррелл и Шона
Сэвиджа, которые были застрелены 6 марта 1988 г. в Гибралтаре
военнослужащими специальной воздушно-десантной службы, которая
входит в состав Британской армии.
Властям Соединенного Королевства, Испании и Гибралтара еще до 4
марта 1988 г. стало известно, что Временная ИРА (Ирландская
республиканская армия) планирует террористический акт в
Гибралтаре. Из анализа разведывательных данных британские власти и
власти Гибралтара пришли к выводу, что 5 марта группа ИРА
(личности участников уже были установлены) проведет
террористический акт, заложив бомбу с механизмом дистанционного
управления в легковой автомобиль. Было решено арестовать членов
группы после того, как они доставят автомобиль в Гибралтар, что
дало бы возможность обеспечить улики для последующего судебного
разбирательства. Власти считали членов группы опасными
террористами, которые почти наверняка будут вооружены и в случае
столкновения с силами безопасности, возможно, используют свое
оружие или взорвут бомбу.
Шестого марта 1988 г. после полудня было установлено, что Шон
Сэвидж припарковал автомобиль в Гибралтаре. Позднее наблюдатели
заметили, что он вместе с Даниэлем Макканном и Майред Фаррелл
обследовал то место, где находился припаркованный им автомобиль.
После того как все трое удалились от машины, эксперт по
обезвреживанию бомб доложил после беглого визуального осмотра
автомашины, что, по его мнению, в ней, возможно, заложена бомба.
Было принято решение об аресте трех указанных лиц. Комиссар
полиции Гибралтара поручил руководство операцией командиру
военнослужащих специальной воздушно-десантной службы (SAS). Двое
военнослужащих следовали за Макканном и Фаррелл. Когда Макканн
оглянулся, один из них выхватил пистолет и приказал остановиться.
Макканн сделал движение рукой к внутреннему карману, рука Фаррелл
быстро скользнула к сумочке. Думая, что оба потянулись за
механизмом дистанционного управления, чтобы взорвать бомбу,
заложенную в автомобиль, сотрудники SAS выстрелили несколько раз с
близкого расстояния, сразив обоих.
За Сэвиджем следовали двое других военнослужащих. Когда
раздались выстрелы по Макканну и Фаррелл, он резко развернулся и
лицом к лицу столкнулся с сотрудниками SAS, следовавшими за ним.
Один из них громко приказал ему остановиться и вытащил пистолет.
Правая рука Сэвиджа двинулась к бедру. Опасаясь, что он хочет
привести в действие механизм дистанционного управления, сотрудники
SAS выстрелили с близкого расстояния, что привело к гибели
Сэвиджа.
По свидетельству патологоанатома, в Фаррелл попало восемь пуль,
в Макканна - пять и в Сэвиджа - шестнадцать.
Ни оружия, ни дистанционного устройства ни у кого из трех
подозреваемых обнаружено не было. В результате осмотра было
установлено, что в машине, ранее припаркованной Сэвиджем, не было
взрывного устройства или бомбы. Однако другая машина, позднее
обнаруженная испанской полицией в Марбелле, Испания, содержала
взрывное устройство из шестидесяти четырех килограммов взрывчатки
"Семтэкс". Эта машина была взята напрокат Фаррелл на чужое имя.
Расследование дела о гибели указанных лиц коронером Гибралтара
было открыто 6 сентября 1988 г. Коронер председательствовал на
заседании жюри присяжных, избранных из местных жителей. Были
заслушаны показания семидесяти девяти свидетелей, включая
военнослужащих, офицеров полиции, сотрудников службы наблюдения,
участвовавших в этой операции, а также патологоанатомов, судебных
экспертов и специалистов по взрывным устройствам. Тридцатого
сентября 1988 г. присяжные вынесли вердикт о правомерности
происшедшего.
Не согласившись с вердиктом, заявители 1 марта 1990 г.
предъявили иски Министерству обороны в Высоком Суде Северной
Ирландии. Однако в ирландском суде оказался невозможным процесс
против Короны. Истцы безуспешно пытались преодолеть это
препятствие. В конечном счете 4 октября 1991 г. в рассмотрении
дела было окончательно отказано.
B. Разбирательство в Комиссии по правам человека
В жалобе, поданной в Комиссию 14 августа 1991 г., заявители
утверждали, что лишение жизни Даниэля Макканна, Майред Фаррелл и
Шона Сэвиджа является нарушением статьи 2 Конвенции, защищающей
право на жизнь. Жалоба была принята к рассмотрению 3 сентября 1993
г.
Предприняв безуспешную попытку мирового соглашения, Комиссия
представила доклад 4 марта 1994 г., в котором изложила факты по
делу и пришла к заключению, что статья 2 не была нарушена
(одиннадцатью голосами против шести).
Дело было передано Комиссией в Суд 20 мая 1994 г.
ИЗВЛЕЧЕНИЕ ИЗ СУДЕБНОГО РЕШЕНИЯ
ВОПРОСЫ ПРАВА
I. О предполагаемом нарушении статьи 2 Конвенции
145. Заявители утверждают, что лишение жизни г-на Макканна, г-
жи Фаррелл и г-на Сэвиджа сотрудниками сил безопасности является
нарушением статьи 2 Конвенции, которая гласит:
"1. Право каждого человека на жизнь охраняется законом. Никто
не может быть умышленно лишен жизни иначе как во исполнение
смертного приговора, вынесенного судом за совершение преступления,
в отношении которого законом предусмотрено такое наказание.
2. Лишение жизни не рассматривается как нарушение настоящей
статьи, когда оно является результатом абсолютно необходимого
применения силы:
a) для защиты любого лица от противоправного насилия;
b) для осуществления законного ареста или предотвращения побега
лица, задержанного на законных основаниях;
c) для подавления, в соответствии с законом, бунта или мятежа".
A. Толкование статьи 2
1. Общий подход
146. В своем подходе к толкованию статьи 2 Суд должен исходить
из того, что цель и предназначение Конвенции как инструмента
защиты прав человека и ее применение должны быть такими, чтобы ее
гарантии были конкретными и эффективными (см., в частности,
Решение по делу Серинг против Соединенного Королевства от 7 июля
1989 г. Серия A, т. 161, с. 34, п. 87, и Решение по делу Лоизиду
против Турции (предварительные возражения) от 23 марта 1995 г.
Серия A, т. 310, с. 27, п. 72).
147. Нужно также иметь в виду, что статья 2 не только защищает
право на жизнь, но и излагает обстоятельства, при которых лишение
жизни может быть правомерным; это одна из основополагающих статей
Конвенции, в отношении которой в мирное время не допускается
отступления, возможного по статье 15. В сочетании со статьей 3 она
гарантирует одну из основных ценностей демократических обществ,
создавших Совет Европы (см. вышеупомянутое Решение по делу
Серинга, с. 34, п. 88). Толкование норм, содержащихся в этой
статье, должно быть ограничительным.
148. Суд считает, что исключения, изложенные в п. 2, конечно,
распространяются на случаи намеренного лишения жизни, но говорят
не только о них. Как указала Комиссия, текст статьи 2, взятой в
целом, свидетельствует, что п. 2 главным образом определяет не те
случаи, при которых кто-то может быть намеренно лишен жизни, а
описывает ситуации, когда допускается "применение силы", что может
привести к непреднамеренному лишению жизни. Применяемая сила,
однако, должна быть "абсолютно необходимой" для достижения одной
из целей, изложенных в подпунктах "a", "b" и "c" (см. жалобу N
10044/82, Стюарт против Соединенного Королевства от 10 июля 1984
г. Серия А, т. 39, с. 169 - 171).
149. В этом отношении использование формулы "абсолютно
необходимый" в п. 2 статьи 2 указывает на то, что следует провести
более строгую и тщательную, чем обычно, проверку того, является ли
действие государства "необходимым в демократическом обществе" в
соответствии с п. 2 в статьях 8 - 11 Конвенции. В частности,
применение силы должно быть строго соразмерно достижению целей,
изложенных в п. 2 "a", "b" и "c" статьи 2.
150. В соответствии с важностью этой нормы (статьи 2) в
демократическом обществе Суд должен при рассмотрении дела
подвергнуть случаи лишения жизни самому тщательному изучению,
особенно тогда, когда преднамеренно применяется сила, влекущая за
собой лишение жизни, причем необходимо учитывать не только
действия представителей государства, которые реально применяют эту
силу, но также и все сопутствующие обстоятельства, включая такие
вопросы, как планирование возможных действий и контроль за ними.
2. Об обязанности охранять жизнь в свете статьи 2 п. 1
a) Соответствие национального права и практики его применения
требованиям статьи 2
151. В разделе жалобы под таким заголовком заявители
утверждают, что в статье 2 п. 1 Конвенции на государства
возлагается позитивная обязанность "охранять" жизнь. В частности,
национальное право должно строго контролировать и ограничивать
обстоятельства, при которых человек может быть лишен жизни
представителями государства, действующими от его имени.
Государство должно также обеспечить надлежащую подготовку,
инструктаж и указания для своих военнослужащих или других
должностных лиц, действующих от его имени, которые вправе
применять силу, и должно осуществлять строгий контроль за любыми
операциями с применением силы, способной повлечь за собой лишение
жизни.
По мнению заявителей, внутреннее право является расплывчатым и
неопределенным и не включает норму об абсолютной необходимости,
содержащуюся в статье 2. Они утверждают, что это само по себе
представляет нарушение статьи 2 п. 1. Это положение нарушается
также тем, что право не содержит требования, чтобы должностные
лица действовали в строгом соответствии с нормами статьи 2 п. 1.
152. По мнению Комиссии, с которым согласилось Правительство
Соединенного Королевства, статью 2 не следует толковать как
требование наличия во внутреннем праве идентичной формулировки.
Достаточно, если оно по существу обеспечивает охрану права,
предусматриваемого Конвенцией.
153. Суд напоминает, что Конвенция не обязывает Высокие
Договаривающиеся Стороны инкорпорировать ее нормы в национальное
законодательство (см. inter alia Решение по делу Джеймс и другие
против Соединенного Королевства от 21 февраля 1986 г. Серия A, т.
98, с. 47, п. 84, и Решение по делу "Святые монастыри" против
Греции от 9 декабря 1994 г. Серия A, т. 301-A, с. 39, п. 90).
Более того, в функции органов Конвенции не входит изучение in
abstracto соответствия законодательных или конституционных норм
требованиям Конвенции (см., например, Решение по делу Класс и
другие против Федеративной Республики Германии от 6 сентября 1978
г. Серия A, т. 28, с. 18, п. 33).
154. Учитывая вышесказанное, следует отметить, что статья 2
Конституции Гибралтара (см. п. 133 выше) аналогична статье 2
Конвенции, за исключением того, что норма, обосновывающая
применение силы, способной повлечь за собой лишение жизни, говорит
о "разумно оправданной" силе в отличие от "абсолютно необходимой"
в п. 2 статьи 2. Хотя на первый взгляд кажется, что норма
Конвенции является более строгой, чем соответствующая норма
национального права, Правительство утверждает, что, учитывая,
каким образом норма толкуется и применяется национальными судами
(см. п. 134 - 135 выше), между двумя этими понятиями нет по
существу сколько-нибудь значительной разницы.
155. По мнению Суда, независимо от того, насколько справедливо
данное утверждение, различие между этими двумя нормами не
настолько велико, чтобы на одном этом основании сделать вывод о
нарушении статьи 2 п. 1.
156. Что касается аргументов заявителей относительно подготовки
и инструктирования лиц, действующих от имени государства, и
необходимости оперативного контроля, Суд считает, что это вопросы,
которые в контексте данного дела поднимают в свете статьи 2 п. 2
проблему соразмерности реакции государства на возникшую угрозу
террористического акта. В этом отношении достаточно отметить, что
инструкции о порядке действий, полученные военнослужащими и
полицейскими в данном случае, представляют собой ряд правил, четко
определяющих порядок применения силы, и полностью соответствуют
внутренним нормам, а также по существу норме, содержащейся в
Конвенции (см. п. 16, 18 и 136 - 137 выше).
b) Адекватность коронерского расследования как механизма
проведения следствия
157. В разделе под таким заголовком заявители также утверждают,
ссылаясь на соответствующие нормы, содержащиеся в Принципах ООН о
применении силы (см. п. 138 - 139 выше), что государство обязано
обеспечить эффективную процедуру ex post facto для установления
обстоятельств, связанных с гибелью в результате действий лиц,
выступающих от имени государства, путем независимой судебной
процедуры, к которой родственники должны иметь свободный доступ.
Вместе с amici curiae организацией "Международная амнистия",
Англо-ирландской правозащитной организацией и другими
организациями они утверждают, что процедура расследования не
отвечала этому процессуальному требованию в силу ряда недостатков.
В частности, не было проведено независимое полицейское
расследование ни одного из аспектов операции, в ходе которой в
результате применения огнестрельного оружия погибли люди; не были
соблюдены существующие правила расследования на месте
преступления; не все очевидцы происшествия были найдены или
опрошены полицией; коронер рассматривал дело с составом присяжных,
сформированным из жителей гарнизонного городка, тесно связанного с
военными; коронер отказал в разрешении на проведение проверки
состава присяжных с целью исключить тех из них, кто находится на
службе Короны; ограничение в публичном интересе свидетельств по
указанию правительственных властей фактически помешало изучению
операции в целом.
По мнению заявителей, в ходе расследования они не имели равного
представительства со стороной, защищавшей интересы Короны, что
значительно затрудняло их усилия по установлению истины; им не
оказали судебной помощи, и их представляли только два адвоката;
свидетельские показания были предоставлены заблаговременно
представителям Короны и адвокатам, представлявшим интересы полиции
и военнослужащих, но не были предоставлены их адвокатам, за
исключением отчетов о результатах баллистической и
патологоанатомической экспертиз; они не имели средств, необходимых
для оплаты копии следственных протоколов, которая составляла от
500 до 700 фунтов стерлингов.
158. Правительство утверждает, что механизм расследования был
эффективным, независимым и гласным, полностью удовлетворял всем
процессуальным требованиям, которые можно вывести из статьи 2 п. 1
Конвенции. В частности, представители Правительства утверждали,
что Суд не должен стремиться определить единый набор норм, на
основе которых должны оцениваться все следственные действия по
установлению обстоятельств смерти. Более того, важно проводить
различие между следствием и гражданско-правовыми процедурами по
возмещению за предполагаемое нарушение права на жизнь. И наконец,
они призвали Суд отклонить аргумент amici curiae Англо-ирландской
правозащитной организации и других о том, что в каждом случае,
когда Суд обнаруживает серьезные расхождения с рекомендациями ООН
"Принципы эффективного предупреждения и расследования внезаконных,
произвольных и суммарных казней" расследования, проведенного по
делу о смерти человека, имеет место нарушение статьи 2 п. 1 (см.
п. 140 выше).
159. С точки зрения Комиссии, в ходе расследования действия
государства были подвергнуты широкому, независимому и в высшей
степени гласному рассмотрению, тем самым обеспечив достаточные
процессуальные гарантии достижения целей, изложенных в статье 2
Конвенции.
160. Суд не считает, что по данному делу необходимо принять
решение о том, дает ли статья 2 п. 1 право на обращение в суд с
гражданским иском в связи с лишением жизни, поскольку этот вопрос
целесообразнее рассматривать на основании статей 6 и 13 Конвенции,
на которые заявители не ссылаются.
161. Суд ограничивается тем, что отмечает, как и Комиссия, что
запрет общеюридического характера лицам, действующим от имени
государства, произвольно лишать кого-либо жизни был бы на практике
неэффективным, если бы не существовала процедура для рассмотрения
законности применения государственными органами силы, влекущей за
собой лишение жизни. Обязанность охранять право на жизнь,
содержащаяся в этой норме (статья 2), рассматриваемая в сочетании
с общей обязанностью государств, согласно статье 1 Конвенции,
"обеспечивать каждому человеку, находящемуся под их юрисдикцией,
права и свободы, определенные в разделе I настоящей Конвенции",
подразумевает необходимость иметь в той или иной форме возможность
провести эффективное официальное расследование в случаях гибели
людей в результате применения силы, в том числе лицами,
действующими от имени государства.
162. Однако в связи с данным делом не представляется
необходимым, чтобы Суд решал, в какой форме должно проходить такое
расследование и при каких условиях оно должно осуществляться,
поскольку в действительности имело место гласное расследование, на
котором заявители были представлены в соответствии с законом и в
ходе которого были выслушаны семьдесят девять свидетелей. Более
того, расследование продолжалось девятнадцать дней, и, как следует
из многотомного стенографического отчета, в ходе его были подробно
рассмотрены все события, связанные с гибелью людей. Далее, из
стенографического отчета, включая напутственное слово коронера
присяжным, видно, что адвокаты, представлявшие интересы
заявителей, смогли допросить, в том числе путем перекрестного
допроса, ключевых свидетелей, военнослужащих и полицейских,
участвовавших в планировании и осуществлении антитеррористической
операции, и сделать в ходе расследования заявления, которые они
сочли необходимыми.
163. В свете вышеизложенного Суд не считает, что различные
недостатки, которые, как утверждают заявители и amici curial,
имели место в ходе следствия, существенно помешали проведению
тщательного, беспристрастного и внимательного изучения
обстоятельств, связанных с гибелью людей.
164. Из этого следует, что в данном отношении не было нарушения
статьи 2 п. 1 Конвенции.
B. Применение статьи 2 к фактам по данному делу
1. Общий подход к оценке свидетельских показаний
165. Признавая, что органы Конвенции никоим образом формально
не связаны решениями жюри присяжных в ходе расследования,
Правительство тем не менее считает, что вердикты присяжных
исключительно важны для любого последующего рассмотрения
обстоятельств смерти погибших. Следовательно, Суд обязан учесть их
значимость, если только ничто не свидетельствует о их
иррациональном характере или о том, что они были вынесены
ненадлежащим судом первой инстанции. В данном деле имевшийся
состав присяжных был в исключительно удачном положении с точки
зрения возможностей оценки обстоятельств, связанных с гибелью
людей. Члены жюри присяжных выслушали каждого из семидесяти девяти
свидетелей и подробный перекрестный допрос ряда из них. Благодаря
этому жюри могло оценить достоверность и доказательную ценность
свидетельских показаний. Правительство отметило, что присяжные
также заслушали аргументы различных сторон, в том числе заявления
адвокатов, представлявших интересы погибших.
166. С другой стороны, заявители утверждают, что судебные
расследования по своей природе не могут быть полным, углубленным
изучением таких спорных случаев лишения жизни, которые были в этом
деле. В процессе расследования к тому же не было оценки в плане
таких понятий, как "соразмерность" и "абсолютная необходимость".
Были применены более мягкие критерии "разумного применения силы"
или "разумной необходимости". Кроме того, жюри присяжных,
рассматривая действия военнослужащих, сопровождавшиеся применением
оружия, сосредоточило внимание на их уголовной виновности, а не на
таких обвинениях, как небрежное планирование операции.
167. Комиссия рассмотрела дело на основании объяснений сторон и
представленных ими документов, прежде всего материалов
расследования. Комиссия не считала себя связанной выводами жюри
присяжных.
168. Суд принимает во внимание, что в соответствии с Конвенцией
установление и подтверждение фактических обстоятельств относится в
основном к компетенции Комиссии. Соответственно только в
исключительных обстоятельствах Суд пользуется своими полномочиями
в этой области. Суд, однако, не связан выводами Комиссии и вправе
давать свою собственную оценку фактическим обстоятельствам в свете
всех материалов, представленных ему (см., в частности, Решение по
делу Круз Варас и другие против Швеции от 20 марта 1991 г. Серия
A, т. 201, с. 29, п. 74, а также Решение по делу Класса от 22
сентября 1993 г. Серия A, т. 269, с. 17, п. 29).
169. По данному делу ни Правительство, ни заявители на слушании
в Суде не оспаривали фактов, установленных Комиссией, хотя
фундаментально расходятся в выводах, которые следуют из них в
свете статьи 2 Конвенции.
На основании выступлений сторон и материалов дела Суд считает,
что факты, установленные Комиссией, и выводы, изложенные выше в
пунктах 13 - 132, являются правильным и достоверным изложением
фактов, лежащих в основе настоящего дела.
170. Что касается оценки этих фактов с точки зрения статьи 2,
то Суд отмечает, что жюри присяжных имело возможность заслушать
свидетелей непосредственно, наблюдать за их поведением и оценивать
доказательную силу их показаний.
Тем не менее необходимо учитывать, что выводы жюри присяжных
ограничиваются решением о законности лишения жизни и, как это
принято, не содержат мотивировки принятого решения. Кроме того,
внимание жюри присяжных и критерии, примененные им, были
направлены на то, чтобы выяснить, было ли лишение жизни,
совершенное военнослужащими SAS, разумно оправданным при тех
обстоятельствах, а не на то, было ли оно "абсолютно необходимым" в
смысле статьи 2 п. 2, в понимании, изложенном выше (см. п. 120 и
148 - 149).
171. Принимая во внимание вышеизложенное, Суд должен сам
решить, свидетельствуют ли факты, установленные Комиссией, о
нарушении статьи 2 Конвенции.
172. Заявители, кроме того, считают, что при расследовании
действий государства по делу, в котором сознательное намерение
применить силу, способную привести к лишению жизни, было прямо
выражено в письменной форме, Суд должен возложить бремя
доказывания на Правительство, которое должно снять все разумные
сомнения в том, что планирование и исполнение операции
соответствовали статье 2 Конвенции. Суд также не должен позволить
государству сомневаться в том, что речь идет о его уголовной
ответственности.
173. Суд, решая вопрос о том, имело ли место нарушение статьи 2
по данному делу, не решает вопроса об уголовной ответственности
тех, кто прямо или косвенно к нему причастен. В соответствии со
своей обычной практикой он осуществляет оценку в свете всех
материалов, представленных ему заявителями и Правительством, или,
в случае необходимости, материалов, полученных им самим (см.
Решение по делу Ирландия против Соединенного Королевства от 18
января 1978 г. Серия A, т. 25, с. 64, п. 160, и вышеупомянутое
Решение по делу Круз Варас и другие, с. 29, п. 75).
2. Утверждения заявителей о
преднамеренном характере лишения жизни
174. Заявители утверждают, что лишение жизни указанных лиц
преднамеренно планировалось. Признавая отсутствие доказательств о
существовании прямого приказа высшего руководства Министерства
обороны, они заявляют, что имеются веские косвенные доказательства
в пользу их утверждения. Они считают, что замысел убийства мог
быть выражен путем намеков и косвенных указаний наряду с выбором
такого военного подразделения, как SAS, которое, как следует из
показаний его сотрудников во время расследования, обучено
нейтрализовывать цели огнем на поражение. Предоставление ложной
информации, подобной той, которая фактически была дана
военнослужащим в этом случае, создает вероятность открытия огня на
поражение. Использование SAS само по себе является свидетельством
того, что лишение жизни было умышленным.
175. Заявители, кроме того, утверждают, что полиция Гибралтара,
по-видимому, не знала о незаконной акции. Офицер E подразделения
SAS проводил секретный инструктаж для своих сотрудников, в котором
полиция Гибралтара не участвовала. Более того, когда
военнослужащие прибыли в отделение полиции после стрельбы, их
сопровождал армейский юрист, который ясно заявил, что сотрудники
прибыли только с целью сдачи оружия. К тому же они были немедленно
отправлены самолетом из Гибралтара, и допрос в полиции так и не
состоялся.
176. В обоснование своих утверждений заявители указывали, в
частности, на следующие факторы.
Самым хорошим и безопасным способом предотвращения взрыва и
захвата подозреваемых было бы не допустить их вместе с взрывным
устройством в Гибралтар. Власти имели их фотографии и знали их
настоящие и вымышленные имена, а также какие паспорта у них были с
собой.
Если подозреваемые были под пристальным наблюдением испанских
властей на пути от Малаги до Гибралтара, как утверждает журналист
г-н Дебелиус, то аренда белого автомобиля "Рено" должна была быть
замечена и было бы известно, что в нем нет бомбы (см. п. 128
выше).
Данное утверждение подтверждается тем, что власти не приняли
мер по ограждению опасной зоны и выводу людей из нее. В Гибралтаре
находилось много военных с опытом быстрого вывода людей из зоны
возможного взрыва. Единственное объяснение этого бездействия
состоит в том, что службы безопасности знали, что в автомобиле не
было бомбы.
Военнослужащий G, который был направлен для осмотра автомобиля
и доложил, что он подозревает наличие бомбы в автомобиле, во время
расследования признал, что он не является специалистом по передаче
радиосигналов (см. п. 53 выше). Это важный момент, поскольку
единственной основой для его вывода явилось то, что радиоантенна
выглядела более старой, чем автомобиль. Настоящий специалист
подумал бы об устранении антенны, чтобы нейтрализовать
радиодетонатор, что могло бы быть сделано, как засвидетельствовал
д-р Скотт, без приведения в действие взрывного устройства.
Специалист должен знать, что, если подозреваемые намеревались
взорвать бомбу с помощью радиосигнала, они не стали бы
использовать ржавую антенну, которая ухудшает возможность приема
четкого сигнала, а применили бы хорошую, чистую антенну (см. п.
114 выше). Из показаний G также явствует, что он не является
специалистом и по взрывным устройствам. Таким образом, существует
возможность, что настоящая роль сотрудника G состояла в том, чтобы
доложить, что он подозревает наличие бомбы в автомобиле для
получения от полиции Гибралтара подписи на документе, разрешающем
SAS применение оружия на поражение.
177. Согласно заявлению Правительства решение жюри присяжных о
законности лишения жизни подразумевает, что жюри считает
установленным фактом отсутствие заговора с целью лишения жизни
трех террористов и что при планировании и выполнении операции в
Гибралтаре такая цель не ставилась. Задача операции состояла в
осуществлении законного ареста трех террористов, и именно с этой
целью была запрошена и получена помощь военных. Кроме того, жюри
присяжных, по-видимому, не согласилось также с утверждением
заявителей, что военнослужащие A, B, C и D сознательно стремились
убить террористов, действуя в соответствии либо с прямым приказом,
либо отданным "кивком головы или намеком".
178. По заключению Комиссии, отсутствуют доказательства в
пользу утверждения заявителей о существовании преднамеренного
заговора с целью убить подозреваемых.
179. Суд отмечает, что ему необходимо получить убедительные
доказательства, прежде чем он сможет сделать вывод о существовании
преднамеренного плана, в том смысле, который вкладывают в это
заявители.
180. Изучив представленные ему материалы, Суд не считает
установленным, что на высшем уровне руководства Министерства
обороны или в Правительстве имел место заговор с целью лишения
жизни и что военнослужащие A, B, C и D побуждались к этому или им
были даны соответствующие указания их начальниками, которые
проводили инструктаж перед операцией, или что они по собственной
инициативе действительно решили убить подозреваемых независимо от
того, будут ли основания для применения оружия на поражение, и не
считаясь с полученными инструкциями на арест. Отсутствуют также
доказательства, что власти в скрытой форме поощряли, намекали и
косвенно побуждали к ликвидации трех подозреваемых.
181. Факторы, которыми оперируют заявители, сводятся к ряду
предположений о том, что власти, по-видимому, знали об отсутствии
бомбы в автомобиле. Однако, принимая во внимание полученную
властями оперативную информацию, биографии трех террористов,
имевших ранее отношение к взрывным устройствам, а также тот факт,
что г-н Сэвидж, как было видно наблюдавшим, "возился с чем-то",
перед тем как покинул автомобиль (см. п. 38 выше), мнение о том,
что в автомобиле находилась бомба, нельзя назвать ни
неправдоподобным, ни полностью лишенным оснований.
182. В частности, решение пропустить террористов в Гибралтар,
хотя и заслуживает критики, учитывая риск, с которым оно было
связано, соответствовало разработанному плану ареста, согласно
которому никакие действия по задержанию не должны были
предприниматься, пока все трое не появятся в Гибралтаре и не будет
достаточных доказательств подготовки ими преступления, необходимых
для их осуждения.
183. Суд также не может согласиться с утверждением заявителей,
что использование SAS само по себе является доказательством того,
что лишение жизни подозреваемых было умышленным. В этой связи Суд
отмечает, что SAS является особым подразделением, которое прошло
специальную подготовку по борьбе с терроризмом. Поэтому вполне
естественно, что, получив заранее предупреждение о предстоящем
террористическом акте, власти захотели прибегнуть к умению и опыту
SAS, чтобы противодействовать этой угрозе по возможности с
наибольшей безопасностью и знанием дела.
184. Суд поэтому отклоняет как недоказанное выдвинутое
заявителями обвинение в том, что лишение жизни трех подозреваемых
было преднамеренным или результатом молчаливого соглашения
участников операции.
3. Проведение и планирование операции
a) Аргументы выступивших в Суде
1) Заявители
185. По мнению заявителей, Суд поступит неправильно, как это
сделала Комиссия, ограничив рассмотрение вопросом о том,
оправданны ли действия военнослужащих, которые фактически убили
подозреваемых. Он должен рассмотреть ответственность Правительства
по всем аспектам операции. В самом деле, военнослужащие вполне
могли бы быть оправданы уголовным судом, если бы доказали, что
действительно верили той необоснованной и ложной информации,
которую они получили.
186. Офицер E, непосредственный начальник военнослужащих во
время операции, сказал им, что трое подозреваемых в Гибралтаре
заложили бомбу в автомобиль (тогда как военнослужащий G,
специалист по обезвреживанию бомб, доложил, что он лишь
подозревает наличие бомбы), что бомба была с дистанционным
управлением, что каждый из подозреваемых мог взорвать ее из любой
точки Гибралтара простым щелчком выключателя и что подозреваемые
без колебаний могут это сделать, как только почувствуют, что они
замечены. В действительности эти "несомненные обстоятельства" и
"факты" были не более чем подозрениями или, в лучшем случае,
сомнительными оценками. Однако они были сообщены как достоверные
факты военнослужащим, которые были обучены, как это выяснилось из
показаний во время расследования, не только открывать огонь при
малейшем намеке на угрозу, но и продолжать стрелять, пока не
ликвидируют свою цель.
В целом заявители считают, что лишение жизни стало результатом
некомпетентности и небрежности в планировании и проведении
антитеррористической операции по аресту подозреваемых, а также
неспособности сохранить надлежащий баланс между необходимостью
противодействия возникшей угрозе и правом подозреваемых на жизнь.
2) Правительство
187. Правительство заявило, что действия военнослужащих были
абсолютно необходимыми для защиты людей от противоправного насилия
в понимании статьи 2 п. 2 "а" Конвенции. Каждый из военнослужащих
в мгновение секунды должен был принять решение, которое могло бы
повлиять на жизнь многих людей. Они считали, что те движения,
которые сделали подозреваемые в тот момент, когда их пытались
задержать, создавали впечатление, что террористы вот-вот взорвут
бомбу. Это обстоятельство было подтверждено другими свидетелями,
которые видели эти движения. Если признать, что военнослужащие
честно и разумно считали, что террористы, по которым они открыли
огонь, собирались взорвать бомбу нажатием кнопки, то тогда у них
не было иного выбора, кроме как открыть огонь.
188. Правительство также подчеркнуло, что многое из той
информации, которая была в распоряжении властей, и многие выводы,
сделанные ими, оказались точными. Все трое погибших являлись
членами группы активных действий ИРА, которая планировала операцию
в Гибралтаре; они действительно располагали большим количеством
взрывчатых веществ, позднее обнаруженных в Испании; в этой
операции должна была применяться бомба, заложенная в автомобиле.
Таким образом, жизнь людей в Гибралтаре подвергалась реальной и
серьезной опасности.
189. Правительство далее заявило, что при расследовании вопроса
о планировании антитеррористической операции необходимо иметь в
виду, что разведывательные оценки неизбежно основываются на
неполной информации, поскольку бывают известны только фрагменты
общей картины. Более того, опыт показал, что ИРА отличается особой
безжалостностью и умением в проведении контрразведывательных
действий и что эта организация делает все возможное, чтобы скрыть
свои намерения. Кроме того, опыт событий в Северной Ирландии
доказал, что ИРА постоянно и быстро применяет новые технологии.
Поэтому властям необходимо было иметь в виду, что террористы могли
располагать более современными и легче маскируемыми
радиоуправляемыми средствами, чем это было в прежних операциях.
Наконец, последствия недооценки угрозы, исходящей от группы
активных действий, могли привести к катастрофе. Если бы им удалось
взорвать бомбу того типа и мощности, как та, что была обнаружена в
Испании, все находящиеся на автостоянке люди погибли бы или
получили бы тяжкие телесные повреждения, а все те, кто оказался бы
в расположенных поблизости зданиях (в числе которых были школа и
дом престарелых), получили бы серьезные травмы.
190. Предложения разведывательных служб в ходе операции были
разумными в свете того неизбежно ограниченного объема информации,
который был у властей; недооценка возможностей и средств
террористов привела бы, вероятно, к разрушительным последствиям. В
связи с этим Правительство сделало следующие замечания.
Считалось, что будет применено дистанционно управляемое
средство, потому что оно повышает шансы террористов скрыться и
максимально увеличивает долю потерь среди военных в сравнении с
гражданскими лицами. Кроме того, ИРА всего за шесть недель до
этого применила подобное устройство в Брюсселе.
Предполагалось, что любое средство дистанционного управления,
подобное представленному Суду, достаточно невелико для того, чтобы
можно было легко скрыть его под одеждой. Военнослужащие,
участвовавшие в операции, без труда проделывали это с
радиоаппаратурой такого размера.
Как показал в ходе расследования капитан Эдвардс, проведенные
эксперименты доказали, что бомбу на автостоянке можно было
взорвать с того места, где были убиты террористы (см. п. 116
выше).
Прошлый опыт давал все основания предполагать, что взрывное
устройство, применяемое террористами, можно было привести в
действие простым нажатием кнопки.
По словам свидетеля O, террористам не понадобилась бы машина
для предварительной парковки, поскольку они с легкостью нашли бы 8
марта свободное место на автостоянке. Причем использование машины
для предварительной парковки существенно увеличивало риск
обнаружения террористов, так как потребовались бы две поездки в
Гибралтар (см. п. 23 "e" выше).
Нет оснований сомневаться в добросовестности оценки, сделанной
военнослужащим G относительно того, что машина была заминирована.
Прежде всего потому, что он хорошо знаком с тем видом бомб,
который мог быть применен в данном случае. Кроме того, машину на
стоянку ставил известный специалист по производству подобных
устройств, причем было замечено, что он возился с чем-то между
сиденьями, а радиоантенна, как казалось, не соответствовала
автомобилю. Заминированные автомобили, применяемые ИРА, как
известно из опыта, оснащаются специально установленными антеннами,
и военнослужащий G не мог с уверенностью сказать после наружного
осмотра, что в автомобиле не установлено взрывное устройство (см.
п. 48 выше). Более того, все трое подозреваемых, как казалось,
уезжали из Гибралтара. Наконец, установление оцепления вокруг
автомобиля началось только двадцать минут спустя после упомянутой
выше оценки, как из-за нехватки людей, так и потому, что до 7 - 8
марта не предполагалось проводить мероприятия по эвакуации.
Было бы неосмотрительно со стороны властей полагать, что
террористы не взорвали бы бомбу в случае опасности. ИРА -
террористическая организация, которая считает, что находится в
состоянии войны с Соединенным Королевством, а члены ИРА уже не раз
демонстрировали пренебрежение опасностью. Существовал реальный
риск того, что если бы террористы оказались перед выбором,
проводить ли взрыв, который мог повлечь за собой большое число
жертв среди гражданского населения, или отказаться от него совсем,
они предпочли бы первое.
3) Комиссия
191. Комиссия, приняв во внимание то, как военные оценивали
опасность для жизни жителей Гибралтара, пришла к мнению, что
лишение жизни трех подозреваемых может рассматриваться как
абсолютно необходимое условие для обеспечения законной защиты
людей от противоправного насилия. Кроме того, Комиссия пришла к
следующему выводу: учитывая возможность того, что подозреваемые
привезли в машине бомбу, взрыв которой повлек бы за собой гибель
многих людей, а также возможность того, что подозреваемые могли
взорвать ее, если бы военнослужащие сделали попытку помешать им,
планирование и проведение данной операции властями не указывают на
наличие какого-либо преднамеренного замысла или на отсутствие
надлежащего внимания, в результате которых могло произойти
применение силы, влекущей лишение жизни, несоразмерное с
необходимостью охраны права на жизнь.
b) Оценка Суда
1) Предварительные замечания
192. Рассматривая дело в свете статьи 2 Конвенции, Суд должен
учитывать, что информация, полученная властями Соединенного
Королевства, о готовящемся террористическом акте в Гибралтаре,
поставила их перед серьезной дилеммой. С одной стороны, от них
требовалось исполнять свой долг по охране права на жизнь людей в
Гибралтаре, включая военнослужащих Великобритании, с другой -
минимально применять силу, влекущую лишение жизни, против тех, кто
подозревается в создании такой угрозы, в свете обязательств,
вытекающих из норм как национального, так и международного права.
193. Необходимо принять во внимание также следующие факторы.
Во-первых, власти столкнулись с группой активных действий ИРА,
состоящей из лиц, ранее осуждавшихся за организацию взрывов, и
известного специалиста - подрывника. ИРА, судя по ее деятельности
в прошлом, всегда пренебрежительно относилась к человеческой
жизни, включая и жизнь членов своей организации.
Во-вторых, власти располагали предупреждением о грозящей акции
террористов, тем самым имея достаточную возможность планировать
свои действия и совместно с местными властями Гибралтара принять
меры против террористического акта и арестовать подозреваемых.
Однако несомненно, что спецслужбы не могли иметь полной информации
и вынуждены были готовить ответную операцию, основываясь на
предположениях.
194. На основании вышеизложенного, принимая решение о
соответствии примененной силы статье 2, Суд должен тщательно
изучить (как указывалось ранее) не только вопрос о строгой
соразмерности силы, примененной военнослужащими, с необходимостью
защитить людей от противоправного насилия, но и вопрос о том,
планировалась ли и проводилась ли властями антитеррористическая
операция так, чтобы свести к минимуму (насколько возможно)
применение силы, влекущей лишение жизни. Суд рассмотрел каждый из
этих вопросов по порядку.
2) Действия военнослужащих
195. Следует напомнить, что военнослужащим, которые открыли
стрельбу (A, B, C и D), командиры сообщили, что машина
заминирована и любой из трех подозреваемых может взорвать бомбу с
помощью радиоустройства, которое можно укрыть под одеждой, что
включить это устройство можно нажатием кнопки, что в случае
противодействия им террористы, вероятно, произведут взрыв, который
приведет к многочисленным жертвам и тяжелым ранениям, и что также
существует вероятность, что подозреваемые будут вооружены и окажут
сопротивление при аресте (см. п. 23, 24 - 27, 28 - 31 выше).
196. Что касается лишения жизни Макканна и Фаррелл, то Суд
напоминает: Комиссия установила, что они были застрелены с
близкого расстояния после того, как сделали, по мнению
военнослужащих A и B, подозрительные движения руками, похожие на
попытку осуществить взрыв бомбы (см. п. 132 выше). Согласно
свидетельским показаниям, когда указанные лица падали, по ним
стреляли, но когда они лежали на земле, по ним не стреляли (см. п.
59 - 67 выше). Четверо свидетелей показали, что слышали
предупредительный окрик (см. п. 75 выше). Офицер P подтвердил
показания военнослужащих относительно сделанных террористами
движений руками (см. п. 76 выше). Офицер Q и полицейский констебль
Пароди также подтвердили, что Фаррелл сделала быстрое,
подозрительное движение рукой к своей сумочке (там же).
197. Что касается лишения жизни Сэвиджа, согласно показаниям
свидетелей, между выстрелами у гаража компании "Шелл" (Макканн и
Фаррелл) и выстрелами у туннеля Лэндпорт (Сэвидж) прошло всего
несколько секунд. Комиссия сделала вывод, что маловероятно, чтобы
военнослужащие C и D сначала увидели, как застрелили Макканна и
Фаррелл, а затем начали преследовать Сэвиджа, который обернулся то
ли после сигнала полицейской сирены, то ли при звуках выстрелов
(см. п. 132 выше).
Военнослужащий C открыл огонь, потому что Сэвидж направил руку
в карман пиджака и тем самым вызвал опасение, что он намеревается
нажать кнопку взрывного устройства. К тому же военнослужащий C
увидел, что карман оттопырен каким-то большим предметом, который
он счел пультом дистанционного управления взрывного устройства.
Военнослужащий D также открыл огонь на поражение, полагая, что
подозреваемый пытается взорвать бомбу. Показания военнослужащих
нашли некоторое подтверждение в показаниях свидетелей H и J,
которые видели, как Сэвидж резко обернулся, услышав полицейскую
сирену или первый выстрел, и оказался перед военнослужащими (см.
п. 83 и 85 выше).
Комиссия пришла к выводу, что в Сэвиджа стреляли с близкого
расстояния, пока он не упал на землю и, вероятно, в тот момент,
когда он должен был коснуться или уже коснулся земли (см. п. 132
выше). Этот вывод был подтвержден во время расследования
патологоанатомами (см. п. 110 выше).
198. Впоследствии было выяснено, что подозреваемые не имели
оружия, что у них не было средств дистанционного управления
взрывом и что в машине не было бомбы (см. п. 93, 96 выше).
199. Все четверо военнослужащих признали, что они стреляли на
поражение. Они считали, что надо было стрелять в подозреваемых до
тех пор, пока те физически будут не в состоянии включить взрывное
устройство (см. п. 61, 63, 80 и 120 выше). Согласно заключению
патологоанатомов, Фаррелл получила восемь пуль, Макканн - пять,
Сэвидж - шестнадцать (см. п. 108 - 110 выше).
200. Суд признает, что военнослужащие искренне верили (в свете
полученной ими информации, которая была изложена выше), что
необходимо не дать подозреваемым возможности включить взрывное
устройство и тем самым предотвратить гибель многих людей (см. п.
195 выше). Действия, предпринятые ими, согласно полученному
приказу, рассматривались ими, следовательно, как абсолютно
необходимые для защиты права ни в чем не повинных людей на жизнь.
Суд считает, что применение силы лицами, находящимися на службе
государства, для достижения одной из целей, указанных в п. 2
статьи 2 Конвенции, может быть оправданно в соответствии с этой
статьей в тех случаях, когда применение силы основывается на
искреннем убеждении, которое может считаться верным в момент
совершения действия, но впоследствии оказывается ошибочным.
Выносить иное решение - означало бы возложить нереальный груз
ответственности на плечи государства и сотрудников
правоохранительных органов при выполнении долга и даже подвергать
опасности их жизни и жизни других людей.
Следовательно, можно сделать вывод, учитывая дилемму, стоявшую
перед властями в связи с обстоятельствами дела, что действия
военных сами по себе не вступают в противоречие с положениями
Конвенции (п. 2 статьи 2).
201. Тем не менее возникает вопрос о том, была ли операция
против террористов в целом подготовлена и проведена в соответствии
с требованиями статьи 2 п. 2 и можно ли считать сведения и
инструкции, данные военнослужащим (из которых неизбежно следовало
применение оружия на поражение), адекватными, принимая во внимание
право на жизнь трех подозреваемых.
3) Подготовка и проведение операции
202. Прежде всего Суд отмечает, что, как следует из
оперативного приказа комиссара полиции, власти имели намерение
арестовать подозреваемых в подходящий момент. В ходе расследования
были даны показания, согласно которым до 6 марта военнослужащими
отрабатывалась операция по проведению задержания и прилагались
усилия для поиска подходящего места в Гибралтаре, куда
подозреваемых можно было бы поместить после задержания (см. п. 18
и 55 выше).
203. Можно поставить вопрос: почему всех троих подозреваемых не
задержали на границе немедленно после их прибытия в Гибралтар и
почему (как выяснилось из показаний инспектора Аллгера) было
принято решение не препятствовать им при въезде в Гибралтар, если
власти располагали информацией о том, что эти лица прибыли с
намерением провести террористическую акцию? Получив заранее
предупреждение о намерениях террористов, власти без труда могли
организовать операцию по их аресту. Хотя для властей было
неожиданным более раннее прибытие подозреваемых, на границе была
группа наблюдателей и неподалеку расположенная группа захвата (см.
п. 34 выше). В распоряжении спецслужб и испанских властей были
фотографии всех трех подозреваемых, были известны их имена,
настоящие и вымышленные, а также по каким паспортам они могут
прибыть (см. п. 33 выше).
204. По этому вопросу Правительство заявило, что в то время оно
не располагало достаточными основаниями для задержания и
предъявления обвинения подозреваемым. Более того, отпустить их,
когда им станет известно о степени информированности властей, и
позволить им или другим лицам предпринять еще одну попытку
означало бы явно повысить степень последующего риска. Кроме того,
не было уверенности, что эти трое - единственные террористы, с
которыми властям придется иметь дело; не располагали они и полной
информацией о том, как подозреваемые намереваются совершить взрыв
бомбы.
205. В этом отношении Суд ограничивается замечанием, что
следует считать, что возможные последствия от недостаточности улик
для задержания и судебного разбирательства менее важны, чем
опасность для населения Гибралтара (которой прежде всего было
обеспокоено Правительство, как это следует из представленных им
объяснений), возникшая в связи с тем, что их въезд в страну не был
предотвращен. С точки зрения Суда, либо власти знали, что в
автомобиле не было никакой бомбы, что Суд уже не принял во
внимание (см. п. 181 выше), либо имел место серьезный просчет лиц,
ответственных за проведение операции. В результате сложились
условия, в которых применение оружия со смертельным исходом,
учитывая имевшиеся оценки спецслужб, было возможно или с большой
степенью вероятности предвидимо.
Решение не останавливать трех террористов при въезде в
Гибралтар, таким образом, является существенным фактором, который
необходимо принимать во внимание.
206. Суд отмечает, что на оперативном совещании 5 марта, на
котором присутствовали военнослужащие A, B, C и D, рассматривалась
вероятность того, что акция будет совершена посредством мощного
взрывного устройства, помещенного в автомобиль. Был сделан ряд
ключевых оценок. В частности, предполагалось, что террористы не
будут использовать дополнительный автомобиль для предварительной
парковки; что бомба будет взорвана с помощью радиоуправляемого
устройства; что взрыв может быть произведен нажатием кнопки; что,
скорее всего, подозреваемые взорвут бомбу, если их попытаются
задержать; что они будут вооружены и, весьма вероятно, применят
оружие, если произойдет столкновение (см. п. 23 - 31 выше).
207. В данном случае все эти решающие предположения, за
исключением намерения террористов совершить преступление, были
ошибочными. Тем не менее, как было продемонстрировано
Правительством на основе его опыта столкновений с ИРА, эти
предположения представляли все возможные гипотезы в ситуации,
когда реальные факты неизвестны и когда власти действуют на основе
ограниченной разведывательной информации.
208. В действительности, по-видимому, другие варианты развития
событий были проработаны недостаточно. Например, поскольку взрыв
бомбы ожидался не ранее 8 марта, когда должна была состояться
церемония смены караула, то также можно было прийти к выводу, что
эти три террориста были направлены с разведывательной миссией.
Хотя эта возможность и затрагивалась, она, по-видимому, серьезно
не воспринималась (см. п. 45 выше).
К тому же на оперативных совещаниях или после того, как
подозреваемые были обнаружены, могли быть высказаны предположения,
что они едва ли намеревались взорвать бомбу и уничтожить тем самым
большое число гражданских лиц в тот момент, когда г-н Макканн и
мисс Фаррелл шли не спеша в направлении пограничного района,
поскольку это увеличивало бы риск их обнаружения и задержания (см.
п. 57 выше). Также неправдоподобна мысль о том, что в этот момент
они уже настроили передатчик, который позволил бы им немедленно
взорвать предполагаемую бомбу в случае попытки их задержания (см.
п. 115 выше).
Кроме того, даже если учесть уровень технической подготовки
ИРА, то описание детонатора как "устройства, где надо только
нажать кнопку", без тех оговорок, которые позже были сделаны
экспертами во время расследования (см. п. 115 и 131 выше), о
значении которых компетентные власти должны были быть осведомлены,
представляет собой крайне упрощенную характеристику этих
устройств.
209. Настораживает в данной ситуации и то, что предположение о
возможности "подозревать наличие бомбы в автомобиле", которое
военнослужащий G сделал после беглого внешнего осмотра автомобиля,
было передано другим военнослужащим, согласно собственному
свидетельству последних, как определенно установленный факт
наличия такой бомбы (см. п. 48 и 51 - 52 выше). Следует вспомнить,
что, хотя военнослужащий G и имел опыт работы с взрывными
устройствами, заложенными в автомобили, он, как выяснилось, не был
специалистом в области радиосвязи или взрывчатых веществ, а делая
заключение о возможности подозревать наличие бомбы в автомобиле,
он основывался на том, что заметил, что антенна не соответствовала
автомобилю; таким образом, его оценка скорее носила
предположительный характер (см. п. 53 выше).
210. В условиях, когда не получили достаточного внимания
альтернативные варианты и когда с определенностью сообщалось о
существовании автомобиля со взрывным устройством, которое,
согласно сделанным оценкам, могло быть детонировано нажатием
кнопки, целый ряд рабочих гипотез был преподнесен военнослужащим
A, B, C и D как установленные факты, в связи с чем применение
силы, влекущей за собой лишение жизни, стало почти неизбежным.
211. Однако тот факт, что не учитывалась возможность ошибки,
следует рассматривать также в сочетании с полученной
военнослужащими установкой, что если они открывают огонь, то
должны вести его, пока подозреваемый не будет мертв. Как
отмечалось коронером в его напутственном слове присяжным во время
расследования, все четверо военнослужащих стреляли с целью лишить
жизни подозреваемых (см. п. 61, 63, 80 и 120 выше). Военнослужащий
E свидетельствовал, что военнослужащим говорили, что велика
вероятность того, что они будут вынуждены стрелять на поражение,
поскольку в случае использования устройства, приводимого в
действие нажатием кнопки, в их распоряжении остается очень мало
времени (см. п. 26 выше). В этой обстановке власти, связанные
обязанностью уважать право подозреваемых на жизнь, должны были
проявлять величайшую осторожность при оценке находящейся в их
распоряжении информации перед передачей ее военнослужащим,
применение оружия которыми автоматически означает стрельбу на
поражение.
212. Поскольку из-за ограничений в публичных интересах (см. п.
104-1 "iii" выше) в ходе официального расследования детально не
рассматривались полученные военнослужащими инструкции, остается
неясным, были ли они обязаны определять, оправдано ли применение
огнестрельного оружия с целью поражения теми конкретными
обстоятельствами, с которыми они столкнулись в момент ареста.
Их рефлекторные действия в этом жизненно важном вопросе лишены
той степени осторожности в использовании огнестрельного оружия,
которую следует ожидать от сотрудников правоохранительных органов
в демократическом обществе, даже когда они имеют дело с опасными
людьми, подозреваемыми в терроризме, и явно не отвечают
требованиям проявлять осторожность, предусматриваемую инструкциями
по использованию полицией огнестрельного оружия, в которых
подчеркивается ответственность перед законом каждого офицера в
зависимости от ситуации, в которой применено оружие (см. п. 136 и
137 выше).
Это упущение властей также дает основания предполагать, что не
была проявлена необходимая осторожность при контроле и проведении
операции ареста.
213. В итоге, принимая во внимание, что было решено не
препятствовать въезду подозреваемых в Гибралтар, что власти не
смогли учесть возможность ошибочности своих разведывательных
оценок, по крайней мере в некоторых аспектах, и что, когда
военнослужащие открыли огонь, это автоматически означало
применение силы, влекущей за собой лишение жизни, Суд не убежден,
что лишение жизни трех террористов представляло собой применение
силы, абсолютно необходимой для защиты людей от противоправного
насилия по смыслу статьи 2 п. 2 "a" Конвенции.
214. Соответственно, Суд констатирует, что имело место
нарушение статьи 2 Конвенции.
II. Применение статьи 50 Конвенции
215. Статья 50 Конвенции предусматривает следующее:
"Если Суд установит, что решение или мера, принятые судебными
или иными властями Высокой Договаривающейся Стороны, полностью или
частично противоречат обязательствам, вытекающим из настоящей
Конвенции, а также если внутреннее право упомянутой Стороны
допускает лишь частичное возмещение последствий такого решения или
такой меры, то решением Суда, если в этом есть необходимость,
предусматривается справедливое возмещение потерпевшей стороне".
216. Заявители потребовали выплатить возмещение в том же самом
размере, в каком оно присуждается согласно английскому праву лицу,
незаконно лишенному жизни лицами, действующими от имени
государства. В случае, если Суд установит, что лишение жизни было
как неправомерным, так и преднамеренным или явилось результатом
грубой небрежности, они просили также выплатить штрафную
компенсацию в том же самом размере, в каком она присуждается
согласно английскому праву родственникам лица, лишенного жизни при
подобных обстоятельствах.
217. Что касается судебных издержек и расходов, то заявители
потребовали компенсации всех издержек, прямых или косвенных,
возникших в результате лишения жизни, включая расходы
родственников и адвокатов, участвовавших в расследовании в
Гибралтаре, и все расходы в Страсбурге. Издержки солиситора,
связанные с расследованием в Гибралтаре, оценены в сумме 56200
фунтов стерлингов и его затраты в Страсбурге - 28800 фунтов
стерлингов. Адвокат запросил 16700 фунтов стерлингов в покрытие
затрат и расходов в Европейском суде.
218. Правительство полагало, что, если будет установлен факт
нарушения Конвенции, это само является достаточным возмещением
материального и морального ущерба.
Что касается затрат, понесенных в учреждениях Страсбурга, то
было указано, что заявителям следует присудить только фактически
понесенные самые необходимые затраты в разумных пределах. Однако
касательно требований о возмещении затрат, связанных с
расследованием в Гибралтаре, Правительство придерживалось той
точки зрения, что
1) в принципе затраты по проведению судебного разбирательства в
стране, включая затраты на расследование коронером, не подлежат
возмещению по статье 50;
2) поскольку юридические представители заявителей действовали
безвозмездно, то не может быть никакого основания для присуждения
судебных издержек в пользу заявителей;
3) в любом случае требуемые к возмещению судебные издержки не
были рассчитаны на основе обычных ставок солиситора.
A. Возмещение материального и морального ущерба
219. Суд отмечает, что из представлений заявителей не ясно,
подпадает ли требование о финансовой компенсации под определение
материального или морального ущерба или под оба сразу. В любом
случае, учитывая тот факт, что трое погибших подозреваемых
террористов намеревались произвести взрыв в Гибралтаре, Суд не
считает уместным присуждать компенсацию по данному пункту. Поэтому
Суд отклонил требование заявителей о возмещении ущерба.
B. Судебные издержки и расходы
220. Суд напоминает, что в соответствии с его практикой в
подобных делах возмещаются только фактически понесенные самые
необходимые затраты в разумных пределах.
221. Что касается затрат в Гибралтаре, то заявители утверждали
на слушаниях в Комиссии, что их юридические представители
выполняли свои функции безвозмездно. Ничего не говорилось об
обязательстве оплаты солиситора. В этих обстоятельствах нельзя
требовать возмещения затрат по статье 50, поскольку они не были
фактически понесены.
222. Что касается издержек и расходов, понесенных во время
слушаний в Страсбурге, то Суд, проведя справедливую оценку,
присудил в пользу солиситора и адвоката соответственно 22000 и
16700 фунтов стерлингов за минусом 37731 французского франка,
полученного от Совета Европы в виде судебной помощи.
ПО ЭТИМ ОСНОВАНИЯМ СУД
1. Постановил десятью голосами против девяти, что имело место
нарушение статьи 2 Конвенции;
2. Постановил единогласно, что Соединенное Королевство должно
выплатить заявителям в течение трех месяцев 38700 (тридцать восемь
тысяч семьсот) фунтов стерлингов в порядке возмещения судебных
издержек и расходов в связи с разбирательством дела в Страсбурге
за вычетом 37731 (тридцать семь тысяч семьсот тридцать один)
французского франка, конвертированного в фунты стерлингов по
валютному курсу на день вынесения настоящего Решения;
3. Отклонил единогласно требование заявителей о выплате
возмещения за причиненный вред;
4. Отклонил единогласно требование заявителей о возмещении
расходов, понесенных при расследовании в Гибралтаре;
5. Отклонил единогласно другие требования заявителей о
справедливой компенсации.
Совершено на английском и французском языках и оглашено во
Дворце прав человека в Страсбурге 27 сентября 1995 г.
Председатель
Рольф РИССДАЛ
Грефье
Герберт ПЕТЦОЛЬД
В соответствии со статьей 51 п. 2 Конвенции и статьей 53 п. 2
Регламента Суда A к настоящему Решению прилагается особое мнение
судей.
СОВМЕСТНОЕ ОСОБОЕ МНЕНИЕ СУДЕЙ РИССДАЛА,
БЕРНХАРДТА, ТОРА ВИЛЬЯЛМСОНА, ГЕЛЬКЮКЛЮ, ПАЛМ,
ПЕККАНЕНА, СЭРА ДЖОНА ФРИЛЭНДА, БАКА И ЯМБРЕКА
1. Мы не можем согласиться с мнением большинства наших коллег о
том, что в данном деле имело место нарушение статьи 2 Конвенции.
2. Мы представим свои соображения по основным моментам дела в
том порядке, в котором они рассматриваются в Судебном решении.
3. Что касается раздела, в котором дается интерпретация статьи
2, мы согласны с выводом, сделанным в п. 155, что различие между
нормами Конвенции и национальными нормами в том, что касается
правомерности использования оружия, приведшего к лишению жизни, не
является достаточным, чтобы только на этом основании можно было
сделать вывод о нарушении статьи 2 п. 1. Мы также согласны с
выводом, сделанным в п. 164, что не было нарушения статьи 2 п. 1
вследствие каких-либо недостатков при проведении на национальном
уровне расследования обстоятельств, сопутствовавших гибели людей.
4. Что касается раздела, в котором рассматривается применение
статьи 2 к фактам данного дела, мы полностью согласны с
отклонением как бездоказательного утверждения заявителей о том,
что лишение жизни трех подозреваемых было умышленным или явилось
результатом молчаливого соглашения участников операции (п. 184).
5. Мы также согласны с выводом, сделанным в п. 200,
относительно того, что действия четырех военнослужащих, которые
вели огонь, не являются по своей сути нарушением статьи 2.
Справедливо допустить, что эти военнослужащие искренне верили,
учитывая предоставленную им информацию, что необходимо было
действовать именно так, как они и поступили, для того чтобы
помешать подозреваемым взорвать бомбу, что привело бы к большим
человеческим жертвам: предпринимаемые ими действия воспринимались
ими как абсолютно необходимые для защиты жизни невинных людей.
6. Мы, однако, не согласны с оценкой, сделанной большинством
(п. 202 - 214), способа, которым руководители операции
осуществляли ее контроль и организацию. Именно на ней основано
решение о наличии нарушения.
7. Напомним вначале, что события этого дела были тщательно
изучены на местном уровне в ходе расследования, которое
проводилось в Гибралтаре в течение 19 дней с 6 по 30 сентября 1988
г. Жюри присяжных, выслушав показания 79 свидетелей (включая
военных, офицеров полиции и сотрудников службы наблюдения,
участвовавших в операции, а также патологоанатомов, экспертов
судебной медицины и специалистов по взрывным устройствам) и
выступление коронера о применяемых нормах национального права,
приняло решение девятью голосами против двух о правомерном лишении
жизни. Далее обстоятельства дела были тщательно изучены и оценены
Комиссией, которая в своем докладе пришла к выводу одиннадцатью
голосами против шести о том, что нарушение Конвенции не имело
места.
Вывод проведенного судебного расследования на основе
действующего национального права не является сам по себе решающим
фактором при разрешении спора на основании Конвенции в данном
Суде. Но, учитывая чрезвычайную важность в этом деле надлежащей
оценки фактов и несомненного преимущества, которое имело жюри
присяжных, наблюдая поведение свидетелей, которые давали свои
показания при допросе и перекрестном допросе, значение этого
вывода, конечно, нельзя недооценивать. Равным образом, Суд не
связан оценкой установленных фактов Комиссией, но со стороны Суда,
поскольку он знакомится с показаниями свидетелей лишь
опосредованным образом, было бы ошибкой не придать должного
значения докладу Комиссии - органа, который прежде всего
уполномочен в соответствии с Конвенцией устанавливать факты и
который, несомненно, имеет большой опыт в выполнении этой задачи.
8. Прежде чем обратиться к различным аспектам операции, которые
подверглись критике в Судебном решении, мы хотели бы выделить три
момента общего характера.
Первое: делая любую оценку способа организации и контроля за
проведением операции, Суд должен стараться устоять перед
искушением воспользоваться преимуществом возможности судить задним
числом. В то время властям приходилось планировать и принимать
решения в условиях недостатка информации. Только подозреваемые
знали точно о своих намерениях, и частью их цели, так же, как,
несомненно, частью их подготовки, было сделать так, чтобы об их
намерениях было известно как можно меньше. Вряд ли оправданны
ретроспективные выводы, когда многое уже прояснилось, о том, что
было бы лучше действовать другим способом, чем тем, который был
выбран в то время в трудных условиях проведения
антитеррористической операции, и таким путем признать его виновным
и ошибочным. Его не следует считать таковым, если только не
установлено, что при известных в то время обстоятельствах
предпочтительнее был бы другой способ действий.
9. Второе: необходимость для руководителей операции действовать
в строгих рамках закона, в то время как подозреваемые считали
гибель сотрудников сил безопасности нормальной, а случайную смерть
или увечья, причиненные гражданским лицам, несущественными,
неизбежно давала подозреваемым тактическое преимущество, которым
им ни в коем случае не следовало дать воспользоваться. Последствия
взрыва большой бомбы в центре Гибралтара могли быть настолько
разрушительными, что власти, понимая свою ответственность, не
должны были рисковать и дать подозреваемым возможность осуществить
такой взрыв. Конечно, обязательство Великобритании по статье 2 п.
1 Конвенции распространяется на жизни подозреваемых в такой же
степени, как и на жизни многих других гражданских и военных лиц,
которые находились в это время в Гибралтаре. Но в отличие от этих
других целью находившихся в Гибралтаре подозреваемых было
осуществление преступного замысла, который при успешной его
реализации мог бы привести к потере многих невинных жизней. Они
предпочли поставить себя в такое положение, где имелась серьезная
опасность возникновения непримиримого конфликта между этими двумя
обязанностями.
10. Третье: при оценке Судом поведения властей должна в полной
мере учитываться
a) информация, которая была получена ранее, о намерениях ИРА
организовать крупный террористический акт в Гибралтаре с помощью
группы активных действий из трех человек; и
b) факт обнаружения (в соответствии с показаниями, которые дал
на следствии свидетель O) в Брюсселе 21 января 1988 г. автомобиля,
содержащего большое количество взрывчатого вещества "Семтекс", и
четырех детонаторов с радиоуправляемой системой, то есть
устройства, известного в Северной Ирландии.
В свете пункта "a" решение о том, что в ответ на просьбу
комиссара полиции Гибралтара об оказании военной помощи сотрудники
SAS должны быть направлены для участия в операции, было полностью
оправданным. Военные подразделения, обученные борьбе с
террористами и успешно действующие малочисленными группами,
конечно, были подходящим выбором для борьбы с угрозой теракта,
подготовляемого группой активных действий ИРА в густонаселенном
районе, таком как Гибралтар, где необходимо было в максимальной
степени ограничить риск случайной гибели людей.
Совещание о деталях операции, состоявшееся 5 марта 1988 г. (п.
22 - 31), показывает разумность оценки ситуации, сделанной в то
время и при известных в то время обстоятельствах. Приказ комиссара
полиции Гибралтара о проведении операции, составленный в тот же
день, четко запрещал применение большей, чем необходимо, силы и
требовал, чтобы любое применение огнестрельного оружия проводилось
осторожно, с учетом безопасности людей, находящихся поблизости.
Цель операции обозначена в нем как намерение защитить жизнь людей,
предотвратить попытку совершения теракта, арестовать преступников
и гарантировать безопасность содержания заключенных под стражей
(п. 17 и 18).
Все это свидетельствует о соответствующем внимании со стороны
властей. Об этом же говорит и осторожный подход к передаче в
конечном счете управления операцией военным 6 марта 1988 г. (п. 54
- 58).
11. Что касается изложенных в Решении Суда отдельных
критических замечаний по проведению операции, то главное в них -
выражение сомнения (в п. 203 - 205) относительно решения не
препятствовать въезду в Гибралтар трех подозреваемых лиц. В п. 203
указывается, что с учетом заблаговременно полученной властями
информации, а также находящихся в их распоряжении сил безопасности
они имели возможность провести операцию задержания на границе.
Однако в Решении Суда не говорится о том, что власти не
устраивал арест подозреваемых на этой стадии. С нашей точки
зрения, это правильно, поскольку на этой стадии могло не оказаться
достаточных улик, чтобы обосновать их задержание и предать суду.
Освободить их после того, как они узнают о состоянии готовности
властей, значило бы увеличить риск того, что они сами или другие
члены ИРА могли бы впоследствии успешно осуществить повторный
террористический акт в Гибралтаре. С учетом обстоятельств,
известных в то время, не было, соответственно, "серьезным
просчетом" со стороны властей то, что они отложили арест, вместо
того чтобы просто остановить подозреваемых на границе и вернуть их
в Испанию.
12. Пункт 206 Решения Суда перечисляет некоторые "ключевые
суждения", сделанные властями, которые, как сказано в п. 207,
оказались ошибочными, хотя они принимаются в качестве возможных
гипотез в ситуации, когда истинные факты были неизвестны и власти
действовали на основе ограниченной разведывательной информации.
Пункт 208 продолжает критику в том направлении, что, "по-видимому,
другие варианты развития событий были проработаны недостаточно".
13. В качестве первого примера обоснования критических
замечаний этот пункт далее констатирует, что, поскольку взрыв
бомбы не ожидался до 8 марта, "также можно было прийти к выводу,
что... террористы были направлены с разведывательной миссией".
Однако не было ничего нелогичного в заключении, сделанном на
оперативном совещании 5 марта, что автомобиль, который прибудет в
Гибралтар, едва ли, с учетом приведенных доводов, будет просто
"дополнительным автомобилем для предварительной парковки" (см. п.
23 "e"). Поэтому, когда автомобиль был запаркован в людном месте
одним из подозреваемых, и при этом все трое оказались в
Гибралтаре, власти могли вполне оправданно действовать согласно
рабочей гипотезе о нахождении в автомобиле взрывного устройства.
Одновременно, поскольку подозреваемые едва ли собирались еще раз
рисковать и повторно приехать в Гибралтар, не представлялось
"также" вероятным, что они прибыли лишь с разведывательной
миссией.
Кроме того, военнослужащий F, главный военный советник
комиссара полиции Гибралтара, дал во время расследования показания
о том, что, согласно разведывательным данным, мероприятия
разведывательного характера ранее уже неоднократно осуществлялись
террористами. Как ему доложили, эти мероприятия уже завершены, и
операция готова была начаться. В этих условиях, если бы власти не
действовали с учетом наихудшего варианта, т.е. варианта наличия в
автомобиле взрывного устройства, которое могло быть взорвано
подозреваемыми во время их пребывания в Гибралтаре, то они
продемонстрировали бы безответственное отношение к общественной
безопасности.
14. Далее, во втором абзаце п. 208 проводится мысль о том, что
на оперативных совещаниях или после того, как подозреваемые были
обнаружены, "могли быть высказаны предположения, что они едва ли
намеревались взорвать бомбу и уничтожить тем самым большое число
гражданских лиц в тот момент, когда Макканн и Фаррелл шли не спеша
в направлении пограничного района, поскольку это увеличивало бы
риск их обнаружения и задержания".
Вопрос, однако, заключается в том, могли ли власти с
уверенностью действовать, предполагая, что подозреваемые едва ли
взорвут бомбу, если во время продвижения к границе они поймут, что
их обнаружили и существует угроза задержания. По нашему мнению,
ответ ясен: весь предыдущий опыт деятельности ИРА безусловно не
дает надежных оснований для вывода о том, что убийство большого
числа гражданских лиц явилось бы само по себе сдерживающим
фактором, или о том, что подозреваемые во время задержания
предпочли бы отказаться от взрыва, нежели произвести его, вызвав
жертвы среди гражданских лиц. Нелишне вспомнить, что, согласно
показаниям военнослужащего F, в разведывательной информации были
данные о том, что в ИРА есть намерение устроить "фейерверк". Он
также высказал уверенность в том, что, будучи загнанными в угол,
подозреваемые без колебания нажали бы на кнопку ради достижения
хотя бы некоторого пропагандистского успеха: они попытались бы
извлечь такой успех из факта ввоза взрывного устройства в
Гибралтар, и это перевесило негативную оценку, которая могла бы
вызвать гибель гражданских лиц.
15. Далее во втором абзаце п. 208 утверждается, что вряд ли
Макканн и Фаррелл намеревались взорвать бомбу, когда они "шли не
спеша в направлении пограничного района", и далее,
"неправдоподобна мысль о том, что в этот момент они уже настроили
передатчик, который позволил бы им немедленно взорвать
предполагаемую бомбу в случае попытки их задержания".
В этом случае, как мы полагаем, вопрос состоит в том, могли ли
власти с должным благоразумием действовать по-другому, когда
имелась, пусть даже самая минимальная, возможность того, что если
не раньше, то сразу же после того, как подозреваемые поймут, что
их обнаружили, передатчик будет в состоянии готовности для взрыва
бомбы.
16. Далее, в третьем подпункте п. 208 говорится, что "даже если
учесть уровень технической подготовки ИРА, то описание детонатора
как "устройства, где надо только нажать кнопку", без тех оговорок,
которые позже были сделаны экспертами во время расследования (см.
п. 115 и 131 выше), о значении которых компетентные власти должны
были быть осведомлены, представляет собой крайне упрощенную
характеристику этих устройств". Цель этой критики не вполне ясна.
Очевидно лишь то - и с этим согласился эксперт заявителей во время
расследования, - что передатчик того типа, который, как полагали,
скорее всего был использован в данном случае, мог быть настроен
таким образом, чтобы вызвать взрыв простым нажатием кнопки, а в
свете прошлого опыта было бы крайне неразумно сбрасывать со счета
возможность технических новшеств ИРА в этой области.
17. В пункте 209 Судебного решения выражена обеспокоенность
тем, что сделанное военнослужащим G предположение о том, что можно
подозревать наличие бомбы в автомобиле, было передано другим
военнослужащим таким образом, что у них создалось впечатление о
том, что присутствие бомбы было уже определенно установлено.
Однако с учетом предположений по поводу вероятности использования
дистанционного управления, а также ряда признаков, указывающих на
то, что автомобиль, безусловно, должен был вызывать подозрение о
наличии в нем взрывного устройства, ответные действия, которые,
вне сомнения, обязаны были предпринять военнослужащие, явились бы
идентичными, вне зависимости от того, поняли ли они переданную
информацию как достоверную или она была воспринята ими в том
смысле, как это имел в виду военнослужащий G. В любом случае
существование риска для населения Гибралтара, с учетом источника
риска, вполне оправдывало последовавшие ответные действия.
18. Пункт 209, со ссылкой на предположение, сделанное
военнослужащим G, также напоминает, что, хотя у него и был опыт
работы со взрывными устройствами, заложенными в автомобили, он не
являлся специалистом по радиосвязи и взрывчатым веществам. Однако,
рассматривая это предположение, справедливости ради можно было бы
добавить, что, хотя проведенный им осмотр автомашины не был
продолжительным, он тем не менее был достаточным для того, чтобы
дать ему возможность сделать вывод (особенно из-за необычного вида
антенны, не соответствующей возрасту автомашины, и знания того,
что ИРА в прошлом использовала автомашины со специально
установленными антеннами), что данный автомобиль следовало
рассматривать в качестве подозрительного на наличие бомбы.
Как бы то ни было, действия властей не основывались только на
оценке военнослужащего G. И раньше полагали, на что мы ссылались в
п. 13, что маловероятно использование "дополнительной автомашины
для предварительной парковки". Кроме этого было замечено, что
машина была припаркована Сэвиджем, который был известен как
специалист по изготовлению бомб и который провел в машине (по
показаниям одного свидетеля) две или три минуты, возясь с чем-то
между сиденьями.
19. В пункте 210 Судебного решения фактически утверждается, что
использование силы, влекущей за собой лишение жизни, стало "почти
неизбежным" после передачи военнослужащим A, B, C и D ряда рабочих
гипотез, правомерность которых была поставлена под сомнение в
связи с тем, что не были полностью учтены альтернативные
возможности, и в связи с тем, что с "определенностью сообщалось о
существовании автомобиля со взрывным устройством, которое... могло
быть детонировано нажатием кнопки".
В пунктах 13 - 16 мы уже касались аргументов, выдвинутых в
поддержку вывода, что не были учтены должным образом
альтернативные гипотезы, а в п. 17 и 18 - вопроса, каким образом
было доложено о наличии заминированной автомашины.
Мы оспариваем вывод о том, что применение силы, повлекшей за
собой лишение жизни, стало "почти неизбежным" из-за ошибок властей
в этих вопросах. Совершенно независимо от любых других соображений
этот вывод недостаточно учитывает роль случая в возможном исходе
событий. Если бы не действия, предпринятые Макканном и Фаррелл,
когда военнослужащие A и B приблизились к ним, и которые могли
быть вызваны абсолютно случайно раздавшимся в это время звуком
полицейской сирены, остается вероятность того, что они могли бы
быть схвачены и арестованы без единого выстрела, и если бы не
действия Сэвиджа, когда военнослужащие C и D приблизились к нему,
которые могли быть вызваны тем, что он услышал стрельбу, которая
произошла во время инцидента с Макканном и Фаррелл, сохраняется
вероятность, что он также мог быть схвачен и арестован без
применения оружия.
20. В конце пункта 211 несколько иносказательно констатируется,
что власти не проявили достаточной осторожности при оценке
находящейся в их распоряжении информации перед передачей ее
военнослужащим, "применение оружия которыми автоматически означает
стрельбу на поражение". Другими словами, не учитывалась
возможность ошибок, о чем говорится в начале пункта. Мы уже
касались проблемы "недостаточной проработки других вариантов
развития событий" (см. п. 13 - 16 выше), идентичной проблеме
возможности ошибки. Чтобы судить о способе оценки властями
информации, имеющейся в их распоряжении, должно в любом случае
надлежащим образом учитывать необходимость для властей
довольствоваться неполной информацией (см. п. 8 выше), и нет
неоспоримых оснований предполагать, что имелась информация,
которую они должны были бы знать, но не знали.
21. В пункте 212 после краткого упоминания об ограничениях
расследования в публичном интересе и слов о том, что не ясно,
"оправдано ли применение огнестрельного оружия с целью поражения
теми конкретными обстоятельствами, с которыми они столкнулись в
момент ареста", далее говорится, что "их рефлекторные действия в
этом жизненно важном вопросе лишены той степени осторожности в
использовании огнестрельного оружия, которую следует ожидать от
сотрудников правоохранительных органов в демократическом обществе,
даже когда они имеют дело с опасными людьми, подозреваемыми в
терроризме, и явно не отвечают требованиям проявлять осторожность,
предусматриваемую инструкциями по использованию полицией
огнестрельного оружия". И в заключение утверждается, что это
"упущение властей также дает основания предполагать, что не была
проявлена необходимая осторожность при контроле и проведении
операции ареста".
22. Относительно предположения о том, что если бы от
военнослужащих в соответствии с их подготовкой и инструкциями
требовалась оценка ситуации, чтобы стрельба на поражение могла
быть расценена ими как оправданная обстоятельствами, необходимо
напомнить, что ситуация предполагала полную уверенность с их
стороны в том, что подозреваемые могли в любую минуту, нажав на
кнопку, взорвать бомбу. В данной ситуации стрельба с целью только
ранить могла бы привести к особенно опасному повороту: ранение
могло и не лишить подвижности подозреваемого и позволило бы ему
или ей нажать кнопку, если он или она намеревались сделать это.
23. В целом, что касается подготовки этих военнослужащих (и не
только их), во время расследования было получено достаточно
свидетельств того, что они обучены реагировать на угрозу (подобную
той, которая, как предполагалось, была создана в данном случае
подозреваемыми - опасными террористами, подвергающими
непосредственному риску жизни многих людей) открытием огня
немедленно, как только становится ясно, что подозреваемый не
отказывается от своих намерений. Задача, которая преследуется при
этом, может быть достигнута только огнем на поражение. Во время
расследования было также установлено, что от военнослужащих SAS
требуют осмотрительности, что они не должны открывать огонь не
задумываясь, и они этого и не сделали; но они действительно должны
действовать очень быстро. Кроме этого доказано, что военнослужащие
SAS на самом деле в подавляющем большинстве случаев в прошлом
успешно арестовывали террористов.
24. Мы далеко не убеждены, что у Суда в свете результатов
расследования и данных о террористической деятельности были
основания считать, что военнослужащие были малоподготовлены и что
действия военных в данном случае "лишены той степени осторожности
в использовании огнестрельного оружия, которую следует ожидать от
сотрудников правоохранительных органов в демократическом
обществе". (Мы также не считаем в свете имеющихся данных, что
справедливо утверждение о "рефлекторном действии в этом жизненно
важном вопросе". Быть обученным мгновенно реагировать и
действительно поступать так, когда требует ситуация, не является
рефлекторным действием.)
Мы также не признаем того, что различия между руководством для
полицейских по использованию огнестрельного оружия (п. 137
Судебного решения) и руководством "Огнестрельное оружие - правила
применения", приложенным к оперативному приказу комиссара полиции
(п. 136) и рассмотренным вместе (как следовало сделать) с
Правилами применения оружия, выданными военнослужащему F.
Министерством обороны (п. 16), могут быть основанием для
утверждения, что норма осторожности, вменяемая в обязанность
военнослужащим, была недостаточной. Эти различия без сомнения
можно отнести за счет различий в подготовке и требованиях тех,
кому эти руководства были адресованы, принимая во внимание
соответствующую предварительную подготовку этих категорий лиц
(необходимо отметить, что в соответствии с показаниями
военнослужащего F военнослужащие SAS слушают лекции о концепции
правового государства и необходимости ограничивать до минимума
применение силы). Мы не понимаем, как можно увидеть в самих
инструкциях для военнослужащих отсутствие должной осторожности при
использовании огнестрельного оружия.
В соответствии с этим мы считаем, что вывод о том, что со
стороны властей имели место упущения в этом отношении,
предопределившие отсутствие необходимой осторожности при контроле
и проведении операции ареста, является необоснованным.
25. Обвинение в нарушении государством своего обязательства
охранять право на жизнь по статье 2 Конвенции является чрезвычайно
серьезным. По причинам, приведенным выше, анализ обстоятельств
дела в п. 203 - 213 Судебного решения, как нам кажется, не
обосновывает вывода о нарушении статьи 2. Мы склонны согласиться с
мотивировкой и заключениями Комиссии, изложенными в ее
всеобъемлющем, тщательном и исключительно реалистичном докладе.
Подобно Комиссии, мы считаем, что не было просчетов со стороны
властей при организации и проведении операции, позволяющих сделать
вывод о том, что против подозреваемых была применена сила,
несоразмерная с целью защиты невинных людей от противоправного
насилия. Мы считаем, что применение силы, влекущей за собой
лишение жизни, в данном деле, как бы ни было прискорбно ее
применение, не превышает того, что при известных в то время
обстоятельствах было "абсолютно необходимо" в этом случае и не
равносильно нарушению Соединенным Королевством его обязательств по
Конвенции.
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
CASE OF McCANN AND OTHERS v. THE UNITED KINGDOM
JUDGMENT
(Strasbourg, 27.IX.1995)
In the case of McCann and Others v. the United Kingdom <1>,
The European Court of Human Rights, sitting, pursuant to Rule
51 of Rules of Court A <2>, as a Grand Chamber composed of the
following judges:
--------------------------------
Notes by the Registrar
<1> The case is numbered 17/1994/464/545. The first number is
the case's position on the list of cases referred to the Court in
the relevant year (second number). The last two numbers indicate
the case's position on the list of cases referred to the Court
since its creation and on the list of the corresponding
originating applications to the Commission.
<2> Rules A apply to all cases referred to the Court before the
entry into force of Protocol No. 9 (P9) and thereafter only to
cases concerning States not bound by that Protocol (P9). They
correspond to the Rules that came into force on 1 January 1983, as
amended several times subsequently.
Mr R. Ryssdal, President,
Mr R. Bernhardt,
Mr {Thor Vilhjalmsson} <*>,
Mr F. {Golcuklu},
Mr C. Russo,
Mr A. Spielmann,
Mr N. Valticos,
Mrs E. Palm,
Mr R. Pekkanen,
Mr J.M. Morenilla,
Sir John Freeland,
Mr A.B. Baka,
Mr M.A. Lopes Rocha,
Mr G. Mifsud Bonnici,
Mr J. Makarczyk,
Mr B. Repik,
Mr P. Jambrek,
Mr P. Kuris,
Mr U. Lohmus,
and also of Mr H. Petzold, Registrar,
--------------------------------
<*> Здесь и далее по тексту слова на национальном языке набраны
латинским шрифтом и выделены фигурными скобками.
Having deliberated in private on 20 February and 5 September
1995,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the last-
mentioned date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case was referred to the Court by the European
Commission of Human Rights ("the Commission") on 20 May 1994,
within the three-month period laid down by Article 32 para. 1 and
Article 47 (art. 32-1, art. 47) of the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ("the
Convention"). It originated in an application (no. 18984/91)
against the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
lodged with the Commission under Article 25 (art. 25) on 14 August
1991 by Ms Margaret McCann, Mr Daniel Farrell and Mr John Savage,
who are all Irish and United Kingdom citizens. They are
representatives of the estates of Mr Daniel McCann, Ms Mairead
Farrell and Mr Sean Savage (see paragraph 23 below).
The Commission's request referred to Articles 44 and 48 (art.
44, art. 48) and to the declaration whereby the United Kingdom
recognised the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court (Article 46)
(art. 46). The object of the request was to obtain a decision as
to whether the facts of the case disclosed a breach by the
respondent State of its obligations under Article 2 (art. 2) of
the Convention.
2. In response to the enquiry made in accordance with Rule 33
para. 3 (d) of Rules of Court A, the applicants stated that they
wished to take part in the proceedings and designated the lawyers
who would represent them (Rule 30).
3. The Chamber to be constituted included ex officio Sir John
Freeland, the elected judge of British nationality (Article 43 of
the Convention) (art. 43), and Mr R. Ryssdal, the President of the
Court (Rule 21 para. 3 (b)). On 28 May 1994, in the presence of
the Registrar, the President drew by lot the names of the other
seven members, namely Mr {Thar Vilhjalmsson}, Mr F. {Golcuklu}, Mr
A. Spielmann, Mrs E. Palm, Mr A.N. Loizou, Mr M.A. Lopes Rocha and
Mr P. Jambrek (Article 43 in fine of the Convention and Rule 21
para. 4) (art. 43).
4. As President of the Chamber (Rule 21 para. 5), Mr Ryssdal,
acting through the Registrar, consulted the Agent of the United
Kingdom Government ("the Government"), the applicants' lawyers and
the Delegate of the Commission on the organisation of the
proceedings (Rules 37 para. 1 and 38). Pursuant to the orders made
in consequence, the Government's memorial was lodged at the
registry on 3 and 4 November 1994, the applicants' memorial on 22
November and their claims for just satisfaction under Article 50
(art. 50) of the Convention on 18 and 25 January 1995. The
Secretary to the Commission subsequently informed the Registrar
that the Delegate did not wish to comment in writing on the
memorials filed.
5. On 21 September 1994, the President had granted, under Rule
37 para. 2, leave to Amnesty International to submit written
comments on specific aspects of the case. Leave was also granted
on the same date, subject to certain conditions, to Liberty, the
Committee on the Administration of Justice, Inquest and British-
Irish Rights Watch to submit joint written comments. The
respective comments were received on 16 November and 2 December
1994.
6. On 21 September 1994, the Chamber decided, pursuant to Rule
51, to relinquish jurisdiction forthwith in favour of a Grand
Chamber. By virtue of Rule 51 para. 2 (a) and (b), the President
and the Vice-President of the Court (Mr Ryssdal and Mr R.
Bernhardt) as well as the other members of the original Chamber
are members of the Grand Chamber. However, at his request, Mr
Loizou was exempted from sitting in the case (Rule 24 para. 3). On
24 September 1994 the names of the additional judges were drawn by
lot by the President, in the presence of the Registrar, namely Mr
C. Russo, Mr N. Valticos, Mr R. Pekkanen, Mr J.M. Morenilla, Mr
A.B. Baka, Mr G. Mifsud Bonnici, Mr J. Makarczyk, Mr B. Repik, Mr
P. Kuris and Mr U. Lohmus.
7. On 15 February 1995, the Government submitted a brief
concerning various issues raised by the applicants and the
intervenors in their memorials.
8. In accordance with the President's decision, the hearing
took place in public in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on
20 February 1995. The Grand Chamber had held a preparatory meeting
beforehand and decided to consent to the filing of the
Government's brief.
9. There appeared before the Court:
(a) for the Government
Mr M.R. Eaton, Deputy Legal Adviser, Foreign and Commonwealth
Office, Agent,
Mr S. Richards, Barrister-at-Law,
Mr J. Eadie, Barrister-at-Law,
Mr N. Lavender, Barrister-at-Law, Counsel,
Mr D. Seymour, Home Office,
Ms S. Ambler-Edwards, Ministry of Defence,
Mr D. Pickup, Ministry of Defence, Advisers;
(b) for the Commission
Sir Basil Hall, Delegate;
(c) for the applicants
Mr D. Korff, Counsel,
Mr B. McGrory, Solicitor.
The Court heard addresses by Sir Basil Hall, Mr Korff, Mr
McGrory and Mr Richards.
10. At the request of the Court the Government submitted, on 9
March 1995, various judgments of the English and Northern Ireland
courts concerning the use of lethal force by members of the
security forces.
11. On 23 March 1995 the applicants submitted their reply to
the Government's brief.
AS TO THE FACTS
12. The facts set out below, established by the Commission in
its report of 4 March 1994 (see paragraphs 132 and 142 below), are
drawn mainly from the transcript of evidence given at the
Gibraltar inquest (see paragraph 103 below).
I. Particular circumstances of the case
13. Before 4 March 1988, and probably from at least the
beginning of the year, the United Kingdom, Spanish and Gibraltar
authorities were aware that the Provisional IRA (Irish Republican
Army - "IRA") were planning a terrorist attack on Gibraltar. It
appeared from the intelligence received and from observations made
by the Gibraltar police that the target was to be the assembly
area south of Ince's Hall where the Royal Anglian Regiment usually
assembled to carry out the changing of the guard every Tuesday at
11.00 hours.
14. Prior to 4 March 1988, an advisory group was formed to
advise and assist Mr Joseph Canepa, the Gibraltar Commissioner of
Police ("the Commissioner"). It consisted of Soldier F (senior
military adviser and officer in the Special Air Service or "SAS"),
Soldier E (SAS attack commander), Soldier G (bomb-disposal
adviser), Mr Colombo (Acting Deputy Commissioner of Police),
Detective Chief Inspector Ullger, attached to Special Branch, and
Security Service officers. The Commissioner issued instructions
for an operational order to be prepared to deal with the
situation.
A. Military rules of engagement
15. Soldier F and his group, including Soldier E and a number
of other SAS soldiers, had arrived in Gibraltar prior to 4 March
1988. Preliminary briefings had been conducted by the Ministry of
Defence in London. According to the military rules of engagement
(entitled "Rules of Engagement for the Military Commander in
Operation Flavius") issued to Soldier F by the Ministry of
Defence, the purpose of the military forces being in Gibraltar was
to assist the Gibraltar police to arrest the IRA active service
unit ("ASU") should the police request such military intervention.
The rules also instructed F to operate as directed by the
Commissioner.
16. The rules also specified the circumstances in which the use
of force by the soldiers would be permissible as follows:
"Use of force
4. You and your men will not use force unless requested to do
so by the senior police officer(s) designated by the Gibraltar
Police Commissioner; or unless it is necessary to do so in order
to protect life. You and your men are not then to use more force
than is necessary in order to protect life...
Opening fire
5. You and your men may only open fire against a person if you
or they have reasonable grounds for believing that he/she is
currently committing, or is about to commit, an action which is
likely to endanger your or their lives, or the life of any other
person, and if there is no other way to prevent this.
Firing without warning
6. You and your men may fire without warning if the giving of a
warning or any delay in firing could lead to death or injury to
you or them or any other person, or if the giving of a warning is
clearly impracticable.
Warning before firing
7. If the circumstances in paragraph 6 do not apply, a warning
is necessary before firing. The warning is to be as clear as
possible and is to include a direction to surrender and a clear
warning that fire will be opened if the direction is not obeyed."
B. Operational order of the Commissioner
17. The operational order of the Commissioner, which was drawn
up on 5 March 1988, stated that it was suspected that a terrorist
attack was planned in Gibraltar and that the target was highly
probably the band and guard of the First Battalion of the Royal
Anglian Regiment during a ceremonial changing of the guard at
Ince's Hall on 8 March 1988. It stated that there were
"indications that the method to be used is by means of explosives,
probably using a car bomb". The intention of the operation was
then stated to be
"(a) to protect life;
(b) to foil the attempt;
(c) to arrest the offenders;
(d) the securing and safe custody of the prisoners".
18. The methods to be employed were listed as police
surveillance and having sufficient personnel suitably equipped to
deal with any contingency. It was also stated that the suspects
were to be arrested by using minimum force, that they were to be
disarmed and that evidence was to be gathered for a court trial.
Annexed to the order were, inter alia, lists of attribution of
police personnel, firearms rules of engagement and a guide to
firearms use by police (see paragraphs 136 and 137 below).
C. Evacuation plan
19. A plan for evacuation of the expected area of attack was
drawn up on 5 March 1988 by Chief Inspector Lopez. It was to be
put into effect on Monday or Tuesday (7-8 March). It included
arrangements to evacuate and cordon off the area around Ince's
Hall to a radius of 200 m, identified the approach roads to be
closed, detailed the necessary traffic diversions and listed the
personnel to implement the plan. The plan was not, however,
distributed to other officers.
D. Joint operations room
20. The operation in Gibraltar to counter the expected
terrorist attack was run from a joint operations room in the
centre of Gibraltar. In the operations room there were three
distinct groups - the army or military group (comprising the SAS
and bomb-disposal personnel), a police group and the surveillance
or security service group. Each had its own means of communication
with personnel on the ground operated from a separate control
station. The two principal means of communication in use were,
however, the two radio-communication networks known as the
surveillance net and the tactical or military net. There was a
bomb-disposal net which was not busy and, while the police had a
net, it was not considered secure and a telephone appears to have
been used for necessary communications with the central police
station.
E. First sighting of the suspects
in Spain on 4 March 1988
21. On 4 March 1988, there was a reported sighting of the ASU
in Malaga in Spain. As the Commissioner was not sure how or when
they would come to Gibraltar surveillance was mounted.
F. Operational briefing on 5 March 1988
22. At midnight between 5 and 6 March 1988, the Commissioner
held a briefing which was attended by officers from the Security
Services (including from the surveillance team Witnesses H, I, J,
K, L, M and N), military personnel (including Soldiers A, B, C, D,
E, F and G) and members of the Gibraltar police (Officers P, Q and
R and Detective Chief Inspector Ullger, Head of Special Branch,
and Detective Constable Viagas).
The Commissioner conducted the police aspect of the briefing,
the members of the Security Services briefed on the intelligence
aspects of the operation, the head of the surveillance team
covered the surveillance operation and Soldier E explained the
role of the military if they were called on for assistance. It
then appears that the briefing split into smaller groups, E
continuing to brief the soldiers under his command but in the same
location.
The Commissioner also explained the rules of engagement and
firearms procedures and expressed the importance to the police of
gathering evidence for a subsequent trial of the terrorists.
23. The briefing by the representative of the Security Services
included inter alia the following assessments:
(a) the IRA intended to attack the changing of the guard
ceremony in the assembly area outside Ince's Hall on the morning
of Tuesday 8 March 1988;
(b) an ASU of three would be sent to carry out the attack,
consisting of Daniel McCann, Sean Savage and a third member, later
positively identified as Mairead Farrell. McCann had been
previously convicted and sentenced to two years' imprisonment for
possession of explosives. Farrell had previously been convicted
and sentenced to fourteen years' imprisonment for causing
explosions. She was known during her time in prison to have been
the acknowledged leader of the IRA wing of prisoners. Savage was
described as an expert bomb-maker. Photographs were shown of the
three suspects;
(c) the three individuals were believed to be dangerous
terrorists who would almost certainly be armed and who, if
confronted by security forces, would be likely to use their
weapons;
(d) the attack would be by way of a car bomb. It was believed
that the bomb would be brought across the border in a vehicle and
that it would remain hidden inside the vehicle;
(e) the possibility that a "blocking" car - i.e. a car not
containing a bomb but parked in the assembly area in order to
reserve a space for the car containing the bomb - would be used
had been considered, but was thought unlikely.
This possibility was discounted, according to Senior Security
Services Officer O in his evidence to the inquest, since
(1) it would involve two trips;
(2) it would be unnecessary since parking spaces would be
available on the night before or on a Tuesday morning;
(3) there was the possibility that the blocking car would
itself get blocked by careless parking. The assessment was that
the ASU would drive in at the last moment on Monday night or on
Tuesday morning. On the other hand Chief Inspector Lopez, who was
not present at the briefing, stated that he would not have brought
in a bomb on Tuesday since it would be busy and difficult to find
a parking place.
1. Mode of detonation of bomb
24. Various methods of detonation of the bomb were mentioned at
the briefing: by timing device, by RCIED (radio-controlled
improvised explosive device) and by command wire. This last option
which required placing a bomb connected to a detonator by a wire
was discounted as impracticable in the circumstances. The use of a
timer was, according to O, considered highly unlikely in light of
the recent IRA explosion of a bomb by timer device at Enniskillen
which had resulted in a high number of civilian casualties. Use of
a remote-control device was considered to be far more likely since
it was safer from the point of view of the terrorist who could get
away from the bomb before it exploded and was more controllable
than a timer which once activated was virtually impossible to
stop.
25. The recollection of the others present at the briefing
differs on this point. The police witnesses remembered both a
timer and a remote-control device being discussed. The
Commissioner and his Deputy expected either type of device. Chief
Inspector Ullger recalled specific mention of the remote-control
device as being more likely. The surveillance officers also
thought that an emphasis was placed on the use of a remote-control
device.
26. The military witnesses in contrast appear to have been
convinced that it would certainly be a remote-control device.
Soldier F made no mention of a timer but stated that they were
briefed that it was to be a "button job", that is, radio-
controlled so that the bomb could be detonated at the press of a
button. He believed that there had been an IRA directive not to
repeat the carnage of a recent bomb in Enniskillen and to keep to
a minimum the loss of life to innocent civilians. It was thought
that the terrorists knew that if it rained the parade would be
cancelled and in that event, if a timer was used, they would be
left with a bomb that would go off indiscriminately.
Soldier E also stated that at the briefing they were informed
that the bomb would be initiated by a "button job". In answer to a
question by a juror, he stated that there had been discussion with
the soldiers that there was more chance that they would have to
shoot to kill in view of the very short time factor which a
"button job" would impose.
27. Soldiers A, B, C and D stated that they were told at the
briefing that the device would be radio-controlled. Soldier C said
that E stressed to them that it would be a "button job".
2. Possibility that the terrorists would detonate
the bomb if confronted
28. Soldier O stated that it was considered that, if the means
of detonation was by radio control, it was possible that the
suspects might, if confronted, seek to detonate the device.
Soldier F also recalled that the assessment was that any one of
the three could be carrying a device. In answer to a question
pointing out the inconsistency of this proposition with the
assessment that the IRA wished to minimise civilian casualties, F
stated that the terrorists would detonate in order nonetheless to
achieve some degree of propaganda success. He stated that the
briefing by the intelligence people was that it was likely if the
terrorists were cornered they would try to explode the bomb.
Soldier E confirmed that they had been told that the three
suspects were ruthless and if confronted would resort to whatever
weapons or "button jobs" they carried. He had particularly
emphasised to his soldiers that there was a strong likelihood that
at least one of the suspects would be carrying a "button job".
29. This was recalled, in substance, by Soldiers C and D.
Soldier B did not remember being told that they would attempt to
detonate if arrested but was aware of that possibility in his own
mind. They were warned that the suspects were highly dangerous,
dedicated and fanatical.
30. It does not appear that there was any discussion at the
briefing as to the likely size, mode of activation or range of a
remote-control device that might be expected. The soldiers appear
to have received information at their own briefings. Soldier F did
not know the precise size a radio detonator might be, but had been
told that the device would be small enough to conceal on the
person. Soldier D was told that the device could come in a small
size and that it could be detonated by the pressing of just one
button.
31. As regards the range of the device, Soldier F said that the
military were told that the equipment which the IRA had was
capable of detonating a radio-controlled bomb over a distance of a
mile and a half.
G. Events on 6 March 1988
1. Deployment of Soldiers A, B, C and D
32. The operations room opened at 8.00 hours. The Commissioner
was on duty there from 10.30 to 12.30 hours. When he left, Deputy
Commissioner Colombo took his place. Members of the surveillance
teams were on duty in the streets of Gibraltar as were Soldiers A,
B, C and D and members of the police force involved in the
operation. Soldiers A, B, C and D were in civilian clothing and
were each armed with a 9mm Browning pistol which was carried in
the rear waistband of their trousers. Each also carried a radio
concealed on their person. They were working in pairs. In each
pair, one was in radio communication on the tactical net and the
other on the surveillance net. Police officers P, Q and R, who
were on duty to support the soldiers in any arrest, were also in
plain clothes and armed.
2. Surveillance at the border
33. On 6 March 1988, at 8.00 hours, Detective Constable Huart
went to the frontier to keep observation for the three suspects
from the computer room at the Spanish immigration post. He was
aware of the real names of the three suspects and had been shown
photographs. The Spanish officers had photographs. The computer
room was at some distance from the frontier crossing point itself.
The Spanish officers at the immigration post showed him passports
by means of a visual aid unit. It appears that they only showed
him the passports of those cars containing two men and one woman.
Several pictures were flashed up for him during the course of the
day but he did not recognise them. At the inquest, under cross-
examination, he at first did not recall that he had been given any
of the aliases that the three suspects might be employing. Then,
however, he thought that he remembered the name of Coyne being
mentioned in relation to Savage and that at the time he must have
known the aliases of all three, as must the Spanish officers.
Chief Inspector Ullger, who had briefed Huart however, had no
recollection of the name of Coyne being mentioned before 6 March
and he only recalled the name of Reilly in respect of McCann.
However, if Huart recalled it, he did not doubt that it was so.
34. On the Gibraltar side of the border, the customs officers
and police normally on duty were not informed or involved in the
surveillance on the basis that this would involve information
being provided to an excessive number of people. No steps were
taken to slow down the line of cars as they entered or to
scrutinise all passports since it was felt that this might put the
suspects on guard. There was, however, a separate surveillance
team at the border and, in the area of the airfield nearby, an
arrest group. Witness M who led a surveillance team at the
frontier expressed disappointment at the apparent lack of co-
operation between the various groups involved in Gibraltar but he
understood that matters were arranged that way as a matter of
security.
35. At the inquest, Chief Inspector Ullger stated, when pressed
about the failure to take more scrupulous measures on the
Gibraltar side,
"In this particular case, we are talking about dangerous
terrorists. We were talking about a very, very major and delicate
operation - an operation that had to succeed. I think the only way
it could have succeeded is to allow the terrorists to come in and
for the terrorists to have been dealt with in the way they were
dealt with as far as the surveillance is concerned."
36. While Soldiers E and F made reference to the preferred
military option as being to intercept and arrest the suspects in
the frontier area, it appears not to have been pursued with any
conviction, on the assumption that identification would not be
possible in light of the brief time available for identification
to be made (10 to 15 seconds per car) and the lack of prior
warning from the Spanish side.
3. Arrest options: Advisory Group policy
37. Soldier F stated that the military option had been refined
down to the preferred option of arresting the suspects when they
were on foot in the assembly area, to disarm them and then to
defuse the bomb. He referred also to four key indicators
formulated by the Advisory Group with a view to guiding the
Commissioner:
1. if a car was driven into Gibraltar and parked in the
assembly area by an identified member of the active service unit;
2. if a car was driven into the assembly area by an ASU member
without prior warning;
3. the presence in Gibraltar of the other members of the ASU;
4. if there was clear indication that terrorists having parked
their car bomb intended to leave Gibraltar, that is to say, they
were heading for the border.
The plan was for an arrest to be carried out once all the
members of the ASU were present and identified and they had parked
a car which they intended to leave. Any earlier action was
considered premature as likely to raise suspicion in any
unapprehended members of the ASU with possible risk resulting and
as leaving no evidence for the police to use in court.
4. Sighting of Mr Savage
38. Detective Constable Viagas was on surveillance duty in a
bank which had a view over the area in which the car driven in by
the terrorists was expected to be parked. At about 12.30 hours, he
heard a report over the surveillance net that a car had parked in
a parking space in the assembly area under observation. A member
of the Security Service commented that the driver had taken time
to get out and fiddled with something between the seats. DC Viagas
saw the man lock the car door and walk away towards the Southport
Gate. One of the Security Service officers present consulted a
colleague as to possible identification but neither was sure. A
field officer was requested to confirm the identity. DC Viagas
could not himself identify the man from his position.
39. Witness N of the Security Service team on surveillance in
the car-park in the assembly area recalled that at 12.45 hours a
white Renault car drove up and parked, the driver getting out
after two to three minutes and walking away.
A young man resembling the suspect was spotted next at about
14.00 hours in the area. Witness H, who was sent to verify his
identification, saw the suspect at about that time and recognised
him as Savage without difficulty. Witness N also saw the suspect
at the rear of John Mackintosh Hall and at 14.10 hours reported
over the radio to the operations room that he identified him as
Savage and also as the man who had earlier parked the car in the
assembly area.
Officer Q who was on duty on the street recalled hearing over
the surveillance net at about 14.30 hours that Savage had been
identified.
40. The Commissioner however did not recollect being notified
about the identification of Savage until he arrived in the
operations room at 15.00 hours. Colombo did not recall hearing
anything about Savage either until it was reported that he had met
up with two other suspects at about 14.50 hours. Soldiers E and F
recalled however that a possible sighting of Savage was reported
at about 14.30 hours. Soldier G also refers to the later sighting
at 14.50 hours as the first identification of Savage.
41. There appears to have been a certain time-lag between
information on the ground either being received in the operations
room or being passed on. Soldiers E and F may have been more aware
than the Commissioner of events since they were monitoring closely
the information coming in over the nets, which apparently was not
audible to the Commissioner where he sat at a table away from the
control stations.
42. The suspect was followed for approximately an hour by
Witness H who recalled that the suspect was using anti-
surveillance techniques such as employing devious routes through
the side streets. Witness N was also following him, for an
estimated 45 minutes, and considered that he was alert and taking
precautions, for example stopping round the corner at the end of
alleyways to see who followed.
5. Sighting of Mr McCann and Ms Farrell
43. Witness M who was leading the surveillance at the border
stated that two suspects passed the frontier at about 14.30 hours
though apparently they were initially not clearly identified. They
were on foot and reportedly taking counter-surveillance measures
(Farrell looking back frequently). Their progress into Gibraltar
was followed.
44. At 14.30 hours, Soldiers E and F recalled a message being
received that there was a possible sighting of McCann and Farrell
entering on foot. The Commissioner was immediately informed.
6. Sighting of three suspects in the assembly area
45. At about 14.50 hours, it was reported to the operations
room that the suspects McCann and Farrell had met with a second
man identified as the suspect Savage and that the three were
looking at a white Renault car in the car-park in the assembly
area.
Witness H stated that the three suspects spent some
considerable time staring across to where a car had been parked,
as if, in his assessment, they were studying it to make sure it
was absolutely right for the effect of the bomb. DC Viagas also
witnessed the three suspects meeting in the area of the car-park,
stating that all three turned and stared towards where the car was
parked. He gave the time as about 14.55 hours. He stated that the
Security Services made identification of all three at this moment.
At this moment, the possibility of effecting an arrest was
considered. There were different recollections. Mr Colombo stated
that he was asked whether he would hand over control to the
military for the arrest but that he asked whether the suspects had
been positively identified; he was told that there was 80%
identification. Almost immediately the three suspects moved away
from the car through the Southport Gate. He recalled that the
movement of the three suspects towards the south gave rise to some
discussion as to whether this indicated that the three suspects
were on reconnaissance and might return for the car. It was for
this reason that the decision was taken not to arrest at this
point.
46. At 15.00 hours, Mr Colombo rang the Commissioner to inform
him that it was more and more likely to be McCann and Farrell.
When the Commissioner arrived shortly afterwards, Mr Colombo
informed him that the suspects McCann and Farrell had met up with
a third person thought to be Savage and that an arrest had almost
been made.
47. The Commissioner asked for positive identification of the
three suspects. Identification was confirmed by 15.25 hours when
it was reported to the operations room that the three suspects had
returned to the assembly area and gone past looking at the car
again. The three suspects continued north and away from the car.
Soldiers E and F recalled that control was passed to the military
but immediately taken back as the Commissioner requested further
verification of the identities of the suspects. The confirmation
of identity which the Commissioner had requested was received
almost immediately.
7. Examination of the suspect car in the assembly area
48. After the three suspects' identities had been confirmed and
they had moved away from the assembly area, Soldier G examined the
suspect car. He conducted an examination from the exterior without
touching the car. He described it as a newish-looking white
Renault. He detected nothing untoward inside the car or anything
visibly out of place or concealed under the seats. He noted that
the aerial of the car, which was rusty, was out of place with the
age of the car. He was in the area for less than two minutes. He
returned to the operations room and reported to the Commissioner
that he regarded the car as a "suspect car bomb". At the inquest,
he explained that this was a term of art for a car parked in
suspicious circumstances where there is every reason to believe
that it is a car bomb and that it could not be said that it was
not a car bomb.
49. The Commissioner recalled that G had reported that it was a
suspect car bomb since there was an old aerial situated centrally
of a relatively new car. He stated that as a result they treated
it as a "possible car bomb".
50. Soldier F referred to the aerial as rendering the car
suspicious and stated that this information was passed on to all
the parties on the ground.
51. Soldier E was more categorical and stated that as far as G
could tell "from a cursory visual examination he was able to
confirm our suspicion that they were dealing with a car bomb".
52. Soldier A stated that he believed 100 per cent that there
was a bomb in the debussing area, that the suspects had remote-
control devices and were probably armed. This was what he had been
told over the radio. Soldier C recalled that it had been confirmed
by Soldier E that there was a device in Ince's Hall area which
could be detonated by one of three suspects who was more likely to
be Savage because he had been seen "fiddling" with something in
the car earlier. He had also been told of the indication of an old
aerial on a new car.
Soldier D said that it had been confirmed to him by Soldier E
that there was a bomb there. To his recollection, no one told them
that there was a possibility that the three suspects might not be
carrying the remote-control devices with them on the Sunday or
that possibly they had not brought a bomb in. He had been told by
Soldier E - whom he fully trusted - that there was a bomb in the
car.
53. At the inquest Soldier G was described as being the bomb-
disposal adviser. He had experience of dealing with car bombs in
Northern Ireland but at the inquest he stated in reply to various
questions that he was neither a radio-communications expert nor an
explosives expert. He had not thought of de-activating the suspect
bomb by unscrewing the aerial from the car. When it was put to him
in cross-examination, he agreed that to have attempted to unscrew
the aerial would have been potentially dangerous.
8. Passing of control to the military for arrest
54. After receiving the report from Soldier G and in view of
the fact that the three suspects were continuing northwards
leaving the car behind, the Commissioner decided that the three
suspects should be arrested on suspicion of conspiracy to murder.
At 15.40 hours, he signed a form requesting the military to
intercept and apprehend the suspects. The form, which had been
provided in advance by the military, stated:
"I, Joseph Luis Canepa, Commissioner of Police, having
considered the terrorist situation in Gibraltar and having been
fully briefed on the military plan with firearms, request that you
proceed with the military option which may include the use of
lethal force for the preservation of life."
After the form was signed, Soldier F walked across to the
tactical net and issued instructions that the military should
intervene.
Soldier E ascertained the positions of the soldiers by radio.
Soldiers C and D had been visually monitoring the movement of the
three suspects in Line Wall Road and Smith Dorrien Avenue.
Soldiers A and B were making their way north through Casemates
Square and into the Landport tunnel. The soldiers were informed
that control had passed to them to make an arrest.
55. The evidence at the inquest given by the soldiers and
Police Officer R and DC Ullger was that the soldiers had practised
arrest procedures on several occasions with the police before 6
March 1988. According to these rehearsals, the soldiers were to
approach the suspects to within a close distance, cover the
suspects with their pistols and shout "Stop. Police. Hands up." or
words to that effect. They would then make the suspects lie on the
ground with their arms away from their bodies until the police
moved in to carry out a formal arrest. Further, DC Ullger stated
that special efforts had been made to identify a suitable place in
Gibraltar for the terrorists to be held in custody following their
arrest.
56. On reaching the junction of Smith Dorrien Avenue with
Winston Churchill Avenue, the three suspects crossed the road and
stopped on the other side talking. Officer R, observing, saw them
appear to exchange newspapers. At this point, Soldiers C and D
were approaching the junction from Smith Dorrien Avenue. Soldiers
A and B emerging from Landport tunnel also saw the three suspects
at the junction from their position where the pathway to the
tunnel joined Corral Road.
57. As the soldiers converged on the junction, however, Savage
split away from suspects McCann and Farrell turning south towards
the Landport tunnel. McCann and Farrell continued north up the
right-hand pavement of Winston Churchill Avenue.
58. Savage passed Soldiers A and B, brushing against the
shoulder of B. Soldier B was about to turn to effect the arrest
but A told him that they should continue towards suspects McCann
and Farrell, knowing that C and D were in the area and that they
would arrest Savage. Soldiers C and D, aware that A and B were
following suspects McCann and Farrell, crossed over from Smith
Dorrien Avenue and followed Savage.
9. McCann and Farrell shootings
59. The evidence of Soldiers A and B at the inquest was to the
following effect.
60. Soldiers A and B continued north up Winston Churchill
Avenue after McCann and Farrell, walking at a brisk pace to close
the distance. McCann was walking on the right of Farrell on the
inside of the pavement. He was wearing white trousers and a white
shirt, without any jacket. Farrell was dressed in a skirt and
jacket and was carrying a large handbag.
61. When Soldier A was approximately ten metres (though maybe
closer) behind McCann on the inside of the pavement, McCann looked
back over his left shoulder. McCann appeared to look directly at A
and the smile left his face, as if he had a realisation of who A
was and that he was a threat.
Soldier A drew his pistol, intending to shout a warning to stop
at the same time, though he was uncertain if the words actually
came out. McCann's hand moved suddenly and aggressively across the
front of his body. A thought that he was going for the button to
detonate the bomb and opened fire. He shot one round into McCann's
back from a distance of three metres (though maybe it may have
been closer). Out of the corner of his eye, A saw a movement by
Farrell. Farrell had been walking on the left of McCann on the
side of the pavement next to the road. A saw her make a half turn
to the right towards McCann, grabbing for her handbag which was
under her left arm. A thought that she was also going for a button
and shot one round into her back. He did not disagree when it was
put to him that the forensic evidence suggested that he may have
shot from a distance of three feet (see paragraph 111 below). Then
A turned back to McCann and shot him once more in the body and
twice in the head. A was not aware of B opening fire as this was
happening. He fired a total of five shots.
62. Soldier B was approaching directly behind Farrell on the
road side of the pavement. He was watching her. When they were
three to four metres away and closing, he saw in his peripheral
vision that McCann turned his head to look over his shoulder. He
heard what he presumed was a shout from A which he thought was the
start of the arrest process. At almost the same instant, there was
firing to his right. Simultaneously, Farrell made a sharp movement
to her right, drawing the bag which she had under her left arm
across her body. He could not see her hands or the bag and feared
that she was going for the button. He opened fire on Farrell. He
deemed that McCann was in a threatening position and was unable to
see his hands and switched fire to McCann. Then he turned back to
Farrell and continued firing until he was certain that she was no
longer a threat, namely, her hands away from her body. He fired a
total of seven shots.
63. Both soldiers denied that Farrell or McCann made any
attempt to surrender with their hands up in the air or that they
fired at the two suspects when they were lying on the ground. At
the inquest, Soldier A stated expressly that his intention had
been to kill McCann "to stop him becoming a threat and detonating
that bomb".
64. The shooting took place on the pavement in front of a Shell
petrol station in Winston Churchill Avenue.
After the shooting, the soldiers put on berets so they would be
recognised by the police. They noticed a police car, with its
siren going, coming south from the sundial down the far side of
Winston Churchill Avenue. A number of policemen jumped out of the
car and leapt the central barrier. Soldier A still had his pistol
in his hand. He put his hands up in the air and shouted "Police".
A recalled hearing shooting from behind as the police car was
approaching.
While neither of the soldiers was aware of the police car or
siren until after the shooting, the majority of witnesses,
including the police officers P, Q and R who were in the vicinity
to support the soldiers in the arrest and a number of the
surveillance team as well as civilian witnesses, recalled that the
sound of the police siren preceded, if only by a very short time,
the sound of the gunfire. Officers P and Q, who were watching from
a relatively close distance, considered that Farrell and McCann
reacted to the sound of the siren: Q was of the opinion that it
was the siren that caused Farrell and McCann to stop and turn.
65. The arrival of the police car at the scene was an
unintended occurrence. After the Commissioner had handed over
control to the military at 15.40 hours, he instructed Mr Colombo
to ensure that there was police transport available. Mr Colombo
telephoned Chief Inspector Lopez at the Central Police Station,
who in turn instructed the Controller Police Constable Goodman to
recall the duty police car. The Controller recorded the call at
15.41 hours. He radioed the patrol car informing the officers that
they were to return immediately. He did not know where the car was
at the time or what the reason for the recall was. When Inspector
Revagliatte who was in the car asked if it was urgent, the
Controller told him it was a priority message and further
instructions would be given on arrival.
66. At the time of the message, the police car was waiting in a
queue of traffic in Smith Dorrien Avenue. Revagliatte told the
driver to put on siren and beacons. The car pulled out into the
opposite lane to overtake the queue of traffic. They cut back into
the proper lane at the lights at the junction with Winston
Churchill Avenue and continued north along Winston Churchill
Avenue in the outer lane. As they passed the Shell garage, the
four policemen in the car heard shots. Revagliatte instructed the
driver to continue. When he looked back, he saw two persons lying
on the pavement. The car went round the sundial roundabout and
returned to stop on the other side of the road opposite the Shell
garage. The police siren was on during this time. When the car
stopped, the four policemen got out, three of them jumping the
central barrier and Revagliatte walking round to arrive at the
scene.
67. Officers P, Q and R were in the vicinity of the Shell
petrol station and also arrived quickly on the scene of the McCann
and Farrell shootings. Officers P and R placed their jackets over
the bodies. Officer P dropped his gun while crouched and had to
replace it in his holster. Officer Q and Revagliatte carried out a
search of the bodies.
10. Eyewitness accounts of the McCann
and Farrell shootings
68. The shooting took place on a fine Sunday afternoon, when
there were many people out on the streets and the roads were busy
with traffic. The Shell garage was also overlooked by a number of
apartment buildings. The shooting consequently was witnessed by a
considerable number of people, including police officers involved
in the operation, police officers who happened to pass the area on
other duties, members of the surveillance team and a number of
civilians and off-duty policemen.
69. Almost all the witnesses who gave evidence at the inquest
recalled that Farrell had carried her bag under her right arm, not
as stated by Soldiers A and B under her left arm. The Coroner
commented in his summing-up to the jury that this might have had
significance with regard to the alleged justification of the
soldiers for opening fire, namely, the alleged movement of the bag
across the front of her body.
70. More significantly, three witnesses, two of whom gave an
interview on the controversial television documentary concerning
the events "Death on the Rock", gave evidence which suggested that
McCann and Farrell had been shot while lying on the ground. They
stated that they had witnessed the shooting from apartment
buildings overlooking the Shell petrol station (see paragraph 125
below).
71. Mrs Celecia saw a man lying on a pavement with another
nearby with his hands outstretched: while she did not see a gun
she heard shots which she thought came from that direction. After
the noise, the man whom she had thought was shooting appeared to
put something inside his jacket. When shown a photograph of the
aftermath of the scene, Mrs Celecia failed to identify either
Soldier A or B as the man whom she thought that she had seen
shooting.
72. Mr Proetta saw a girl put her hands up though he thought it
was more in shock than in surrender. After she had been shot and
fallen to the ground, he heard another fusillade of shots. He
assumed that the men nearby were continuing to fire but agreed
that there was an echo in the area and that the sound could have
come from the Landport tunnel area.
Mrs Proetta saw a man and a woman raise their hands over their
shoulders with open palms. They were shot, according to her
recollection, by men who jumped the barrier. When the bodies were
on the ground, she heard further shots and saw a gun in the hand
of a man crouching nearby, though she did not see any smoke or
cartridges ejecting from the gun. She assumed since she saw a gun
that the shots came from it. It also appears that once the bodies
fell they were obscured from her view by a low wall and all she
saw was a man pointing in their direction.
73. Mr Bullock recalled seeing a man reeling backwards under
fire with his hands thrown back.
None of the other witnesses saw McCann or Farrell put their
hands up or the soldiers shoot at the bodies on the ground.
74. Witness I, a member of the surveillance team, stated that
he saw McCann and Farrell shot when they were almost on the
ground, but not on the ground.
75. While the soldiers were not sure that any words of warning
were uttered by Soldier A, four witnesses (Officers P and Q,
Witness K and Police Constable Parody) had a clear recollection of
hearing words "Police, Stop" or words to that effect.
76. Officer P, who was approaching from the north and had
reached the perimeter wall of the Shell garage, states that he saw
McCann make a move as if going for a gun and that Farrell made a
move towards her handbag which made him think that she was going
for a detonator. Officer Q, who was watching from the other side
of the road, also saw Farrell make a move towards her handbag, as
did Police Constable Parody, an off-duty policeman watching from
an overlooking apartment.
11. The shooting of Savage
77. At the inquest the evidence of Soldiers C and D was to the
following effect.
78. After the three suspects had split up at the junction,
Soldier D crossed the road and followed Savage who was heading
towards the Landport tunnel. Savage was wearing jeans, shirt and a
jacket. Soldier C was briefly held up on the other side of the
road by traffic on the busy road but was catching up as D closed
in on Savage. D intended to arrest by getting slightly closer,
drawing his pistol and shouting "Stop. Police. Hands up". When D
was about three metres away, he felt that he needed to get closer
because there were too many people about and there was a lady
directly in line. Before D could get closer however, he heard
gunfire to the rear. At the same time, C shouted "Stop". Savage
spun round and his arm went down towards his right hand hip area.
D believed that Savage was going for a detonator. He used one hand
to push the lady out of line and opened fire from about two to
three metres away. D fired nine rounds at rapid rate, initially
aiming into the centre of Savage's body, with the last two at his
head. Savage corkscrewed as he fell. D acknowledged that it was
possible that Savage's head was inches away from the ground as he
finished firing. He kept firing until Savage was motionless on the
ground and his hands were away from his body.
79. Soldier C recalled following after Savage, slightly behind
D. Savage was about eight feet from the entrance to the tunnel but
maybe more. C's intention was to move forward to make arrest when
he heard shots to his left rear from the direction in which
Farrell and McCann had headed. Savage spun round. C shouted "Stop"
and drew his pistol. Savage moved his right arm down to the area
of his jacket pocket and adopted a threatening and aggressive
stance. C opened fire since he feared Savage was about to detonate
the bomb. He saw something bulky in Savage's right hand pocket
which he believed to be a detonator button. He was about five to
six feet from Savage. He fired six times as Savage spiralled down,
aiming at the mass of his body. One shot went into his neck and
another into his head as he fell. C continued firing until he was
sure that Savage had gone down and was no longer in a position to
initiate a device.
80. At the inquest, both soldiers stated under cross-
examination that once it became necessary to open fire they would
continue shooting until the person was no longer a threat. C
agreed that the best way to ensure this result was to kill. D
stated that he was firing at Savage to kill him and that this was
the way that all soldiers were trained. Both soldiers, however,
denied that they had shot Savage while he was on the ground.
Soldier E (the attack commander) stated that the intention at
the moment of opening fire was to kill since this was the only way
to remove the threat. He added that this was the standard followed
by any soldier in the army who opens fire.
81. The soldiers put on berets after the incident to identify
themselves to the police.
12. Eyewitness accounts of the Savage shooting
82. Witnesses H, I and J had been involved in surveillance of
the three suspects in or about the Smith Dorrien/Winston Churchill
area.
83. Witness H had observed Soldiers A and B moving after McCann
and Farrell up Winston Churchill Avenue. He moved to follow Savage
whom he noticed on the corner about to turn into the alleyway
leading to the Landport tunnel. He indicated Savage to Soldiers C
and D who were accompanying him at this point. While he was moving
to follow Savage, H saw the McCann and Farrell shooting from a
distance. He continued to follow after Savage, who had gone into
the alleyway. He heard a siren, a shout of "Stop" and saw Savage
spin round. The soldiers were five feet away from Savage. H then
turned away and did not witness the shooting itself.
84. Witness I had met with Witness H and Soldier D and had
confirmed that Savage had gone towards the Landport tunnel.
Witness I entered the alleyway after the shooting had begun. He
saw one or two shots being fired at Savage who was on the ground.
He saw only one soldier firing from a distance of five, six or
seven feet. He did not see the soldier put his foot on Savage's
chest while shooting.
85. Witness J had followed after Savage when he had separated
from McCann and Farrell. When Savage was twenty feet into the
alleyway near a large tree, she heard noise of gunfire from behind
and at that same time a police siren in fairly close proximity.
Savage spun round very quickly at the sound of gunfire, looking
very stunned. J turned away and did not see the shooting. When she
turned round again, she saw Savage on his back and a soldier
standing over him saying, "Call the police".
86. Mr Robin Mordue witnessed part of the shooting but as he
fell to the ground himself and later took cover behind a car he
saw only part of the incident. He did not recall Savage running.
When he saw the soldier standing over Savage, there were no more
shots.
87. The evidence of Mr Kenneth Asquez was surrounded by the
most controversy. A handwritten statement made by him appears to
have been used by Thames Television in its documentary "Death on
the Rock" (see paragraph 125 below). The draft of an affidavit,
prepared by a lawyer acting for Thames Television who interviewed
Mr Asquez, but not approved by him, was also used for the script
of the programme. In them, he alleged that while in a friend's car
on the way to the frontier via Corral Road, he passed the Landport
tunnel. He heard "crackers" and saw a man bleeding on the floor.
He saw another man showing an ID card and wearing a black beret
who had his foot on the dying man's throat and was shouting,
"Stop. It's OK. It's the police". At that instant, the man fired a
further three to four shots. At the inquest, he stated that the
part of the statement relating to the shooting was a lie that he
had made up. He appeared considerably confused and contradicted
himself frequently. When it was pointed out to him that until the
inquest it had not become known that the soldiers wore berets (no
newspaper report had mentioned the detail), he supposed that he
must have heard it in the street. When asked at the inquest why he
had made up the statement, he referred to previous illness,
pressure at work and the desire to stop being telephoned by a
person who was asking him to give an interview to the media.
88. Miss Treacy claimed that she was in the path leading from
the tunnel and that she was between Savage and the first of the
soldiers as the firing began, though not in the line of fire. She
recalled that Savage was running and thought that he was shot in
the back as he faced towards the tunnel. She did not see him shot
on the ground. Her account contained a number of apparent
discrepancies with the evidence of other witnesses; she said the
soldier shot with his left hand whereas he was in fact right-
handed; no one else described Savage as running; and she described
the body as falling with feet towards the nearby tree rather than
his head which was the way all the other witnesses on the scene
described it. The Coroner in his summing-up thought that it might
be possible to reconcile her account by the fact that Miss Treacy
may have not been looking at Savage as he spun round to face the
soldiers and that by the time she did look he was spinning round
towards the tunnel in reaction to the firing.
89. Mr Bullock and his wife stated that a man pushed past them
as they walked up Smith Dorrien Avenue to the junction and that
they saw that he had a gun down the back of his trousers. They saw
him meet up with another man, also with a gun in his trousers, on
the corner of the alleyway to the Landport tunnel. The men were
watching the shooting outside the Shell garage and, when the
shooting stopped, they turned and ran out of sight. After that
there was another long burst of shooting.
90. Another witness, Mr Jerome Cruz, however, who was in a car
in the traffic queue in Smith Dorrien Avenue and who remembered
seeing Mr Bullock dive for cover, cast doubts on his version. In
particular, he stated that Mr Bullock was not near the end of
Smith Dorrien Avenue but further away from the Shell garage (more
than 100 yards away) and that he had dived for cover as soon as
there was the sound of shooting. He agreed that he had also seen
persons crouching looking from behind a wall at the entrance to
the pathway leading to the tunnel.
13. Events following the shootings
91. At 15.47 - 15.48 hours, E received a message in the
operations room that apprehension of the three suspects had taken
place. It was not clear at that stage whether they had been
arrested or shot. By 16.00 to 16.05 hours, the report was received
in the operations room that the three suspects had been shot.
92. At 16.05 - 16.06 hours, Soldier F handed a form to the
Commissioner returning control. According to the transcript of the
evidence given by the Commissioner at the inquest, this form
addressed to him by Soldier F stated that "at 16.06 hours on 6
March a military assault force was completed at the military
option in respect of the terrorist bombing ASU in Gibraltar.
Control is hereby handed back to the Civil Power". Deputy
Commissioner Colombo telephoned to Central Station for the
evacuation plans to be put into effect. Instructions were also
given with a view to taking charge of the scenes of the incidents.
Soldier G was also instructed to commence the clearance of the
car.
93. After the shooting, the bodies of the three suspects and
Farrell's handbag were searched. No weapons or detonating devices
were discovered.
94. At the Shell garage scene, the shell cases and cartridges
were picked up without marking their location or otherwise
recording their position. The positions of the bodies were not
marked.
95. At the scene of the Savage shooting, only some of the
cartridge positions were marked. No police photographs were taken
of the bodies' positions. Inspector Revagliatte had made a chalk
outline of the position of Savage's body. Within that outline,
there were five strike marks, three in the area of the head.
96. Chief Inspector Lopez ordered a general recall of personnel
and went directly to the assembly area to begin cordoning it off.
The fire brigade also arrived at the assembly area.
The bomb-disposal team opened the suspect white Renault car but
found no explosive device or bomb. The area was declared safe
between 19.00 and 20.00 hours.
H. Police investigation following the shootings
97. Chief Inspector Correa was appointed in charge of the
investigation.
98. Inside Farrell's handbag was found a key ring with two keys
and a tag bearing a registration number MA9317AF. This information
was passed at about 17.00 hours to the Spanish police who
commenced a search for the car on the suspicion that it might
contain explosives. During the night of 6 to 7 March, the Spanish
police found a red Ford Fiesta with that registration number in La
Linea. Inside the car were found keys for another car,
registration number MA2732AJ, with a rental agreement indicating
that the car had been rented at 10.00 hours on 6 March by
Katharine Smith, the name on the passport carried in Farrell's
handbag.
99. At about 18.00 hours on 8 March, a Ford Fiesta car with
registration number MA2732AJ was discovered in a basement car-park
in Marbella. It was opened by the Malaga bomb-disposal squad and
found to contain an explosive device in the boot concealed in the
spare-wheel compartment. The device consisted of five packages of
Semtex explosive (altogether 64 kg) to which were attached four
detonators and around which were packed 200 rounds of ammunition.
There were two timers marked 10 hrs 45 mins and 11 hrs 15 mins
respectively. The device was not primed or connected.
100. In the report compiled by the Spanish police on the device
dated Madrid 27 March 1988, it was concluded that there was a
double activating system to ensure explosion even if one of the
timers failed; the explosive was hidden in the spare-wheel space
to avoid detection on passing the Spanish/Gibraltarian customs;
the quantity of explosive and use of cartridges as shrapnel
indicated the terrorists were aiming for greatest effect; and that
it was believed that the device was set to explode at the time of
the military parade on 8 March 1988.
101. Chief Inspector Correa, who acted also as Coroner's
Officer, traced and interviewed witnesses of the shooting of the
three suspects. Police officers visited residences in the area
knocking on doors and returning a second time when persons were
absent. The Attorney-General made two or three appeals to the
public to come forward. At the inquest, Inspector Correa commented
that the public appeared more than usually reluctant to come
forward to give statements to the police.
102. A post-mortem was conducted in respect of the three
deceased suspects on 7 March 1988. Professor Watson, a highly
qualified pathologist from the United Kingdom, carried out the
procedure. His report was provided to a pathologist, Professor
Pounder, instructed by the applicants. Comment was later made at
the inquest by both pathologists with regard to defects in the
post-mortem procedures. In particular, the bodies had been
stripped before Professor Watson saw them, depriving him of
possible aid in establishing entry and exit wounds, there had been
no X-ray facilities and Professor Watson had not later been
provided either with a full set of photographs for reference, or
the forensic and ballistics reports.
I. The Gibraltar inquest
103. An inquest by the Gibraltar Coroner into the killings was
opened on 6 September 1988. The families of the deceased (which
included the applicants) were represented, as were the SAS
soldiers and the United Kingdom Government. The inquest was
presided over by the Coroner, who sat with a jury chosen from the
local population.
104. Prior to the inquest, three certificates to the effect
that certain information should not, in the public interest, be
disclosed, were issued by the Secretary of State for the Home
Department, the Secretary of State for Defence and the Deputy
Governor of Gibraltar, dated respectively 26 August, 30 August and
2 September 1988. These stated that the public interest required
that the following categories of information be protected from
disclosure:
1. In the case of the seven military witnesses, the objection
was to the disclosure of any information or documents which would
reveal:
(i) their identity;
(ii) the identity, location, chains of command, method of
operation and the capabilities of the units with which the
soldiers were serving on 6 March 1988;
(iii) the nature of their specialist training or equipment;
(iv) the nature of any previous operational activities of the
soldiers, or of any units with which any of them might at any time
have served;
(v) in the case of Soldier G (the ammunition technical
officer), any defence intelligence information, activities or
operations (and the sources of intelligence), including those on
the basis of which his assessments were made and details of
security forces counter-measures capabilities, including methods
of operation, specialist training and equipment.
2. In the case of Security Service witnesses, the objection was
to the disclosure of information which would reveal:
(a) the identities of members of the Security Service, and
details of their deployment, training and equipment;
(b) all sources of intelligence information;
(c) all details of the activities and operations of the
Security Service.
105. As was, however, expressly made clear in the certificates,
no objection was taken to the giving of evidence by either
military or Security Service witnesses as to:
(i) the nature of the information relating to the feared IRA
plot, which was transmitted to the Commissioner of Police and
others concerned (including general evidence as to the nature of a
Provisional IRA active service unit);
(ii) the assessments made by Soldier G as to the likelihood of,
and the risks associated with, an explosive device and as to the
protective measures which might have to be taken;
(iii) the events leading up to the shootings on 6 March 1988
and the circumstances surrounding them, including evidence
relating to the transfer of control to the military power.
106. The inquest lasted until 30 September and during the
nineteen days it sat, evidence was heard from seventy-nine
witnesses, including the soldiers, police officers and
surveillance personnel involved in the operation. Evidence was
also heard from pathologists, forensic scientists and experts in
relation to the detonation of explosive devices.
1. Pathologists' evidence at the inquest
107. Evidence was given by Professor Watson, the pathologist
who had conducted the post-mortem on the deceased on 7 March 1988
and also by Professor Pounder called on behalf of the applicants
(see paragraph 102 above).
108. Concerning Farrell, it was found that she had been shot
three times in the back, from a distance of some three feet
according to Professor Pounder. She had five wounds to the head
and neck. The facial injuries suggested that either the entire
body or at least the upper part of the body was turned towards the
shooter. A reasonable scenario consistent with the wounds was that
she received the shots to the face while facing the shooter, then
fell away and received the shots to the back. Professor Watson
agreed that the upward trajectory of the bullets that hit Farrell
indicated that she was going down or was down when she received
them. Altogether she had been shot eight times.
109. Concerning McCann, he had been shot in the back twice and
had three wounds in the head. The wound on the top of the head
suggested that the chest wounds came before the head wound and
that he was down or very far down when it was inflicted. The shots
to the body were at about a 45-degree angle. He had been hit by
five bullets.
110. Concerning Savage, he had been hit by sixteen bullets. He
had seven wounds to the head and neck, five on the front of the
chest, five on the back of the chest, one on the top of each
shoulder, three in the abdomen, two in the left leg, two in the
right arm and two on the left hand. The position of the entry
wounds suggested that some of the wounds were received facing the
shooter. But the wounds in the chest had entered at the back of
the chest. Professor Watson agreed that Savage was "riddled with
bullets" and that "it was like a frenzied attack". He agreed that
it would be reasonable to suppose from the strike marks on the
pavement that bullets were fired into Savage's head as he lay on
the ground. Professor Pounder also agreed that the evidence from
strike marks on the ground and the angle and state of wounds
indicated that Savage was struck by bullets when lying on his back
on the ground by a person shooting standing towards his feet. He
insisted under examination by counsel for the soldiers that the
three strike marks on the ground within the chalk outline
corresponded with wounds to the head. In his view "those wounds
must have been inflicted when either the head was on the ground or
very close to the ground indeed" and when pressed "within inches
of the ground".
2. Forensic evidence at the inquest
111. A forensic scientist specialising in firearms had examined
the clothing of the three deceased for, inter alia, powder
deposits which would indicate that shots had been fired at close
range. He found signs of partly burnt propellant powder on the
upper-right back of Farrell's jacket and upper-left front of
Savage's shirt which suggested close-range firing. He conducted
tests which indicated that such a result was only obtained with a
Browning pistol at a range of up to six feet. The density on
Farrell's jacket indicated a muzzle-to-target range of three feet
and on Savage's shirt of four to six feet.
3. Evidence relating to detonation devices
112. Issues arose at the inquest as to whether, even if the
three suspects had been carrying remote-control devices, they
would have been able to detonate the suspected bomb which was
approximately 1.4 km from the place where they were shot. Also it
was questioned whether the soldiers could reasonably have expected
that the applicants could have concealed the devices on their
persons without it being apparent and whether in fact the device
could have been detonated by pressing only one button.
113. Mr Feraday gave evidence for the Crown. He was a forensic
scientist employed at Explosives Forensic Laboratory at Royal
Armament Research and Development Establishment, with thirty-three
years experience of explosives. He produced an ICOM IC2
transmitter, as an example of a device used in Northern Ireland,
which was the size of a standard commercial walkie-talkie. It was
also produced in evidence by the Government to both the Commission
and Court in the Strasbourg proceedings (see paragraph 130 below).
While referring to the factors which could affect the range
(for example, terrain, weather conditions) Mr Feraday stated that
the equipment could, in optimum conditions, operate up to a thirty-
mile range. In his opinion, the aerial on the suspect car could
have received a signal though its efficiency would have been
fairly poor as it was not the right length for the frequency. He
considered that one would have to assume that from the distance of
about a mile a bomb could be detonated by remote control using
that aerial.
114. The applicants called Dr Scott, who held a masters degree
and doctorate in engineering and was a licensed radio operator. He
had been involved in two IRA trials in England. He had conducted
tests with similar receivers along the route taken by the three
suspects. He referred to the fact that there was rising ground
between the sites of the shootings and the assembly area as well
as a thick wall and a considerable number of buildings. The IRA
used encoders and decoders on their devices to prevent spurious
signals detonating their bombs: this required that a good clean
signal be received. Having regard to the facts that the aerial,
which "was a joke" from the point of view of effectiveness, the
wrong length for the expected frequency and pointing along the
roof rather than standing vertically, he stated that in his
professional opinion the purported receiver could not have been
detonated by a transmitter in the circumstances of the case. He
also stated that the bomb could have been neutralised by removing
the car aerial and that such a manoeuvre would not have
destabilised the explosive device.
115. Dr Scott also explained how the transmitter would operate.
Assuming the dial setting the frequency was already set, it would
be necessary to activate the on/off power switch, followed by the
on/off switch on the encoder and then a third button would have to
be pressed in order to transmit. While it would be possible to set
the device so that it would be necessary to press one button (the
transmit button) in order to detonate a bomb, this would require
leaving the power switches on for both the transmitter and the
encoder with the risk that the batteries would run down. There
would also be the risk that the device might be set off
accidentally by being bumped in the street or being hit by a
bullet or by a person falling awkwardly so as to hit the edge of a
pavement or bench.
116. Captain Edwards was called by the lawyer representing the
soldiers to rebut this evidence. He was a member of the Royal
Corps of Signals and had experience in VHF/HF radio in combat net
radio spectrum. He carried out tests to see if voice
communications were possible on an ICOM-type radio in the area of
or from the Shell garage to Ince's Hall. The equipment used was
not identical to that of Dr Scott. He stated that it was possible
to receive both voice communication and a single audio tone at the
site of the shootings from the assembly area. He did not however
use an encoder and his equipment was matched and compatible. Mr
Feraday was also recalled. He gave the opinion that if a weak
voice communication could be received then the signal would be
sufficient to set off a bomb.
117. It appears to have been accepted by all that the IRA have
developed the use of high-frequency devices, which require shorter
aerials and have a surer line-of-sight effect. These are stated to
have the characteristics suitable for detonation when the operator
of the device has line of sight of the bomb and carry with them
less possibility of interference from other radio sources or
countermeasures. No examples were known or at least given as to
this type of remote-control detonation being used other than in
line-of-sight conditions.
4. Submissions made in the course of the inquest
118. At the inquest, the representative of the applicants, Mr
P.J. McGrory, questioned the witnesses and made submissions to the
effect, inter alia, that either the decision to shoot to kill the
suspects had been made by the United Kingdom Government prior to
the incident and the soldiers were ordered to carry out the
shootings, or that the operation was planned and implemented in
such a way that the killing of the suspects by the soldiers was
the inevitable result. In any event, in light of the
circumstances, the use of lethal force by the soldiers was not
necessary or, if it was necessary, the force used was excessive
and therefore not justified. He maintained throughout, however,
that he did not challenge that the Commissioner of Police and his
officers had acted properly and in good faith.
119. Soldier F (the senior military commander) and Soldier E
(the tactical commander) denied that there had been a plan,
express or tacit, to execute the suspects. When it was put to
Soldiers A, B, C and D, they also denied that they had been sent
out either expressly or on the basis of "a nod or a wink" to kill
the suspects.
5. The Coroner's address to the jury
120. At the conclusion of the inquest, the Coroner addressed
the jury in respect of the applicable law, in particular, Article
2 of the Gibraltar Constitution (see paragraph 133 below). As
inquest proceedings did not allow for the parties to make
submissions to the jury, he summed up the respective propositions
of the applicants' representatives and the representatives of the
soldiers and the Crown referring to the evidence. He concluded
from the evidence given by the soldiers that when they opened fire
they shot intending to kill and directed the jury as to the range
of possible verdicts:
"... If the soldiers set out that day with the express intent
to kill that would be murder and it would be right to return a
verdict of unlawfully killed. Example two: were you to find in the
case of Savage (or any of the other two for that matter) that he
was shot on the ground in the head after effectively being put out
of action, that would be murder if you come to the conclusion that
the soldiers continued to finish him off. In both cases they
intended to kill not in self-defence or in the defence of others
or in the course of arrest... so it is murder and you will return
a verdict of unlawfully killed. If in this second example you were
to conclude that it is killing in pursuance of force used which
was more than reasonably necessary, then the verdict should also
be killed unlawfully but it would not have been murder. The third
example I offer is precisely of that situation. If you accept the
account that the soldiers' intention was genuinely to arrest (in
the sense that they were to apprehend the three suspects and hand
them over live to the Gibraltar police force) and that the
execution of the arrest went wrong and resulted in the three
deaths because either (a) force was used when it was not necessary
or (b) the force that was used was more than was reasonably
necessary, then that would not be murder... and the verdict would
be, as I say, unlawfully killed. Example four: if you are
satisfied that the soldiers were acting properly but nevertheless
the operation was mounted to encompass the deaths of the three
suspects to the ignorance of the soldiers, then you would also
bring in a verdict of unlawfully killed.
... So there are only three verdicts reasonably open to you and
these are:
(a) Killed unlawfully, that is unlawful homicide.
(b) Killed lawfully, that is justifiable, reasonable homicide.
(c) Open verdict.
Remembering that you must be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt
where the verdict of unlawfully killed is concerned, there are two
situations to consider. The first concerning the soldiers
themselves, the second if they have been the unwitting tools of a
plot to dispose of the three suspects.
As to the first concerning the soldiers themselves, I must tell
you that if you are not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that
they have killed unlawfully, you have then to decide whether your
verdict should be an open verdict or one of justifiable homicide.
My direction to you is that you should bring in a verdict of
justifiable homicide, i.e. killed lawfully, because in the nature
of the circumstances of this incident that is what you will have
resolved if you do not return a verdict of unlawful homicide in
respect of the soldiers themselves. That is the logic of the
situation. You may reach a situation in which you cannot resolve
either way, in which case the only alternative is to bring in an
open verdict, but I must urge you, in the exercise of your duty,
to avoid this open verdict. As to the second situation where they
are unwitting tools, the same applies..."
121. The jury returned verdicts of lawful killing by a majority
of nine to two.
J. Proceedings in Northern Ireland
122. The applicants were dissatisfied with these verdicts and
commenced actions in the High Court of Justice in Northern Ireland
against the Ministry of Defence for the loss and damage suffered
by the estate of each deceased as a result of their death. The
statements of claim were served on 1 March 1990.
123. On 15 March 1990 the Secretary of State for Foreign and
Commonwealth Affairs issued certificates under section 40 (3) a of
the Crown Proceedings Act 1947, as amended by the Crown
Proceedings (Northern Ireland) Order 1981. Section 40 (2) b of the
same Act excludes proceedings in Northern Ireland against the
Crown in respect of liability arising otherwise than "in respect
of Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom". A similar
exemption applies to the Crown in Northern Ireland pursuant to the
1981 Order. A certificate by the Secretary of State to that effect
is conclusive. The certificates stated in this case that any
alleged liability of the Crown arose neither in respect of Her
Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, nor in respect of Her
Majesty's Government in Northern Ireland.
124. The Ministry of Defence then moved to have the actions
struck out. The applicants challenged the legality of the
certificates in judicial review proceedings. Leave to apply for
judicial review was granted ex parte on 6 July 1990, but withdrawn
on 31 May 1991, after a full hearing, on the basis that the
application had no reasonable prospects of success. Senior Counsel
advised that an appeal against this decision would be futile.
The applicants' High Court actions were struck off on 4 October
1991.
K. The television documentary "Death on the Rock"
125. On 28 April 1988 Thames Television broadcast its
documentary entitled "Death on the Rock" (see paragraph 70 above),
during which a reconstruction was made of the alleged surveillance
of the terrorists' car by the Spanish police and witnesses to the
shootings described what they had seen, including allegations that
McCann and Farrell had been shot while on the ground. A statement
by an anonymous witness was read out to the effect that Savage had
been shot by a man who had his foot on his chest. The Independent
Broadcasting Authority had rejected a request made by the Foreign
and Commonwealth Secretary to postpone the programme until after
the holding of the inquest into the deaths.
L. Other evidence produced
before the Commission and Court
1. Statement of Chief Inspector Valenzuela
126. While an invitation had been made by the Gibraltar police
for a Spanish police officer to attend the inquest to give
evidence relating to the role of the Spanish police, he did not
attend, apparently since he did not receive permission from his
superiors.
127. The Government provided the Commission with a copy of a
statement made by Chief Inspector Rayo Valenzuela, a police
officer in Malaga, dated 8 August 1988. According to this
statement, the United Kingdom police had at the beginning of March
provided the Spanish police with photographs of the possible
members of the ASU, named as Daniel McCann, Mairead Farrell and
Sean Savage. The three individuals were observed arriving at
Malaga Airport on 4 March 1988 but trace of them was lost as they
left. There was then a search to locate the three suspects during
5 to 6 March 1988.
This statement provided by the Government was not included in
the evidence submitted at the inquest, as the Coroner declined to
admit it following the objection by Mr P.J. McGrory who considered
that it constituted hearsay in the absence of any police officer
from Spain giving evidence in person.
2. Statement of Mr Harry Debelius
128. This statement, dated 21 September 1988 and supplied on
behalf of the applicants, was made by a journalist who acted as
consultant to the makers of the Thames Television programme "Death
on the Rock". He stated that the white Renault car used by the ASU
was under surveillance by the Spanish authorities as it proceeded
down the coast towards Gibraltar. Surveillance is alleged to have
been conducted by four to five police cars which "leapfrogged" to
avoid suspicion, by helicopter and by agents at fixed observation
points. The details of the car's movements were transmitted to the
authorities in Gibraltar who were aware of the car's arrival at
the border. He refers to the source of this information as being
Mr {Augustin Valladolid}, a spokesman for the Spanish Security
Services in Madrid, with whom he and Mr Julian Manyon, a reporter
for Thames Television, had an interview lasting from 18.00 to
19.20 hours on 21 March 1988.
129. The applicants intended submitting this statement as
evidence before the inquest. The Coroner decided however that it
should also be excluded as hearsay on the same basis as the
statement relied upon by the Government (see paragraph 127 above).
3. Exhibits provided by the parties
130. An ICOM transmitter device was provided to the Commission
and Court by the Government with an improvised encoder attached.
The dimensions of the transmitter are 18 cm x 6.5 cm x 3.7 cm; the
encoder (which is usually taped to the transmitter and which can
be contained in a small flat Strepsil tin) is 8 cm x 9 cm x 3 cm.
The aerial from the transmitter is 18 cm long.
4. Further material submitted by the applicants
131. The applicants also submitted a further opinion of Dr
Scott, dated 22 October 1993, in which he reiterated his view that
it would have been impossible for the three suspects to have
detonated a bomb in the target area from the location where they
were shot using an ICOM or any other conceivable concealable
transmitter/aerial combination, which he maintains must have been
well known to the authorities. He also drew attention to the fact
that the strength of a hand-held transmitter is severely
attenuated when held close to the human body; when transmitting it
should be held well clear of the body with the aerial as high as
possible.
5. Findings of fact by the Commission
132. In its report of 4 March 1994, the Commission made the
following findings on questions of fact:
- that the suspects were effectively allowed to enter Gibraltar
to be picked up by the surveillance operatives in place in
strategic locations for that purpose (at paragraph 213);
- that there was no evidence to support the applicants'
contention of a premeditated design to kill Mr McCann, Ms Farrell
and Mr Savage (at paragraph 216);
- that there was no convincing support for any allegation that
the soldiers shot Mr McCann and Ms Farrell when they were
attempting to surrender or when they were lying on the ground.
However the soldiers carried out the shooting from close
proximity. The forensic evidence indicated a distance of as little
as three feet in the case of Ms Farrell (at paragraphs 222 and
223);
- Ms Farrell and Mr McCann were shot by Soldiers A and B at
close range after the two suspects had made what appeared to the
soldiers to be threatening movements. They were shot as they fell
to the ground but not when they were lying on the ground (at
paragraph 224);
- it was probably either the sound of the police siren or the
sound of the shooting of Mr McCann and Ms Farrell at the Shell
garage, or indeed both, which caused Mr Savage to turn round to
face the soldiers who were behind him. It was not likely that
Soldiers C and D witnessed the shooting of Mr McCann and Ms
Farrell before proceeding in pursuit of Savage (at paragraph 228);
- there was insufficient material to rebut the version of the
shooting given by Soldiers C and D. Mr Savage was shot at close
range until he hit the ground and probably in the instant as or
after he hit the ground. This conclusion was supported by the
pathologists' evidence at the subsequent inquest (at paragraphs
229 and 230);
- Soldiers A to D opened fire with the purpose of preventing
the threat of detonation of a car bomb in the centre of Gibraltar
by suspects who were known to them to be terrorists with a history
of previous involvement with explosives (at paragraph 231);
- a timer must in all probability have been mentioned at the
Commissioner's operational briefing. For whatever reason, however,
it was not a factor which was taken into account in the soldiers'
view of the operation (at paragraph 241).
II. Relevant domestic law and practice
133. Article 2 of the Gibraltar Constitution provides:
"1. No person shall be deprived of his life intentionally save
in execution of the sentence of a court in respect of a criminal
offence of which he has been convicted.
2. A person shall not be regarded as having been deprived of
his life in contravention of this section if he dies as a result
of the use to such extent and in such circumstances as are
permitted by law, of such force as is reasonably justifiable:
(a) for the defence of any person from violence or for the
defence of property;
(b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape
of a person lawfully detained;
...
(d) in order to prevent the commission by that person of a
criminal offence."
134. The relevant domestic case-law establishes that the
reasonableness of the use of force has to be decided on the basis
of the facts which the user of the force honestly believed to
exist: this involves the subjective test as to what the user
believed and an objective test as to whether he had reasonable
grounds for that belief. Given that honest and reasonable belief,
it must then be determined whether it was reasonable to use the
force in question in the prevention of crime or to effect an
arrest (see, for example, Lynch v. Ministry of Defence [1983]
Northern Ireland Law Reports 216; R v. Gladstone Williams [1983]
78 Criminal Appeal Reports 276, at p. 281; and R v. Thain [1985]
Northern Ireland Law Reports 457, at p. 462).
135. The test of whether the use of force is reasonable,
whether in self-defence or to prevent crime or effect an arrest,
is a strict one. It was described in the following terms in the
report of the Royal Commission appointed to consider the law
relating to indictable offences ([1879] 36 House of Lords Papers
117, at p. 167):
"We take one great principle of the common law to be, that
though it sanctions the defence of a man's person, liberty and
property against illegal violence, and permits the use of force to
prevent crimes to preserve the public peace and to bring offenders
to justice, yet all this is subject to the restriction that the
force used is necessary; that is, that the mischief sought to be
prevented could not be prevented by less violent means; and that
the mischief done by or which might reasonably be anticipated from
the force used is not disproportionate to the injury or mischief,
which it is intended to prevent."
Lord Justice McGonigal in Attorney General for Northern
Ireland's Reference ([1976] Northern Ireland Law Reports 169
(Court of Appeal)) stated his understanding of this approach as
follows (at p. 187):
"... it appears to me that, when one is considering whether
force used in any particular circumstances was reasonable, the
test of reasonableness should be determined in the manner set out
in that paragraph. It raises two questions:
(a) Could the mischief sought to be prevented have been
prevented by less violent means?
(b) Was the mischief done or which could reasonably be
anticipated from the force used disproportionate to the injury or
mischief which it was intended to prevent?
These are questions to be determined objectively but based on
the actions of reasonable men who act in the circumstances and in
the light of the beliefs which the accused honestly believed
existed and held. Force is not reasonable if
(a) greater than that necessary, or
(b) if the injury it causes is disproportionately greater than
the evil to be prevented."
136. The document annexed to the operational order of the
Commissioner of Police entitled "Firearms - rules of engagement"
provided in so far as relevant:
"General rules
1. Do not use more force than necessary to achieve your
objective.
2. If you use firearms you should do so with care for the
safety of persons in the vicinity.
3. Warning before firing
(a) A warning should, if practicable, be given before opening
fire. It should be as loud as possible and must include an order
to stop attacking and a statement that fire will be opened if the
orders are not obeyed.
(b) You may fire without warning in circumstances where the
giving of a warning or any delay in firing could lead to death or
serious injury to a person whom it is your duty to protect, or to
yourself, or to another member in your operation.
4. Opening fire
You may open fire against a hostage taker
(a) If he is using a firearm or any other weapon or exploding a
device and there is a danger that you or any member involved in
the operation, or a person whom it is your duty to protect, may be
killed or seriously injured.
(b) If he is about to use a firearm or any other weapon or
about to explode an explosive device and his action is likely to
endanger life or cause serious injury to you or another member
involved in the operation, or any person whom it is your duty to
protect...
5. If he is in the course of placing an explosive charge in or
near any vehicle, ship, building or installation which, if
exploded, would endanger life or cause serious injury to you or
another member involved in the operation or to any person whom it
is your duty to protect and there is no other way to protect those
in danger..."
137. Also attached to the operational order was a guide to
police officers in the use of firearms which read:
"Firearms: Use by Police.
The object of any police firearms operation is that the armed
criminal is arrested with the least possible danger to all
concerned. It is the first duty of the police to protect the
general public, but the police should not endanger their lives or
the lives of their colleagues for the sake of attempting to make
an early arrest. The physical welfare of a criminal armed with a
firearm should not be given greater consideration than that of a
police officer, and unnecessary risks must not be taken by the
police. In their full use of firearms, as in the use of any force,
the police are controlled by the restrictions imposed by the law.
The most important point which emerges from any study of the law
on this subject is that the responsibility is an individual one.
Any police officer who uses a firearm may be answerable to the
courts or to a coroner's inquest and, if his actions were unlawful
(or improper), then he as an individual may be charged with
murder, manslaughter or unlawful wounding. Similarly, if his use
of a firearm was unlawful or negligent the individual could find
himself defending a civil case in which substantial damages were
being claimed against him. That a similar claim could be made
against the Commissioner of Police will not relieve the individual
of his liabilities.
The fact that a police officer used his firearms under the
orders of a superior does not, of itself, exempt him from criminal
liability. When a police officer is issued with a firearm he is
not thereby given any form of authority to use it otherwise than
strictly in accordance with the law. Similarly, when an officer is
briefed about an operation, information about a criminal may
indicate that he is desperate and dangerous. Whilst this will be
one of the factors to consider it does not of itself justify
shooting at him.
The final responsibility for his actions rests on the
individual and therefore the final decision about whether a shot
will or will not be fired at a particular moment can only be made
by the individual. That decision must be made with a clear
knowledge of the law on the subject and in the light of the
conditions prevailing at the time."
III. United Nations instruments
138. The United Nations Basic Principles on the Use of Force
and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials ("UN Force and Firearms
Principles") were adopted on 7 September 1990 by the Eighth United
Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of
Offenders.
139. Article 9 of the UN Force and Firearms Principles
provides, inter alia, that "intentional lethal use of firearms may
only be made when strictly unavoidable in order to protect life".
Other relevant provisions provide as follows:
Article 10
"... law enforcement officials shall identify themselves as
such and shall give a clear warning of their intent to use
firearms, with sufficient time for the warnings to be observed,
unless to do so would unduly place the law enforcement officials
at risk or would create a risk of death or serious harm to other
persons, or would be clearly inappropriate or pointless in the
circumstances of the incident."
Article 22
"... Governments and law enforcement agencies shall ensure that
an effective review process is available and that independent
administrative or prosecutorial authorities are in a position to
exercise jurisdiction in appropriate circumstances. In cases of
death and serious injury or other grave consequences, a detailed
report shall be sent promptly to the competent authorities
responsible for administrative review and judicial control."
Article 23
"Persons affected by the use of force and firearms or their
legal representatives shall have access to an independent process,
including a judicial process. In the event of the death of such
persons, this provision shall apply to their dependants
accordingly."
140. Article 9 of the United Nations Principles on the
Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-Legal, Arbitrary
and Summary Executions, adopted on 24 May 1989 by Economic and
Social Council Resolution 1989/65, ("UN Principles on Extra-Legal
Executions") provides, inter alia, that:
"There shall be a thorough, prompt and impartial investigation
of all suspected cases of extra-legal, arbitrary and summary
executions, including cases where complaints by relatives or other
reliable reports suggest unnatural death in the above
circumstances..."
Articles 9 to 17 contain a series of detailed requirements that
should be observed by investigative procedures into such deaths.
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION
141. The applicants lodged their application (no. 18984/91)
with the Commission on 14 August 1991. They complained that the
killings of Daniel McCann, Mairead Farrell and Sean Savage by
members of the SAS (Special Air Service) constituted a violation
of Article 2 (art. 2) of the Convention.
142. On 3 September 1993 the Commission declared the
applicants' complaint admissible.
In its report of 4 March 1994 (Article 31) (art. 31), it
expressed the opinion that there had been no violation of Article
2 (art. 2) (eleven votes to six). The full text of the
Commission's opinion and of the three dissenting opinions
contained in the report is reproduced as an annex to this judgment
<1>.
--------------------------------
<1> Note by the Registrar: for practical reasons this annex
will appear only with the printed version of the judgment (volume
324 of Series A of the Publications of the Court), but a copy of
the Commission's report is available from the registry.
FINAL SUBMISSIONS TO THE COURT
143. The Government submitted that the deprivations of life to
which the applications relate were justified under Article 2 para.
2 (a) (art. 2-2-a) as resulting from the use of force which was no
more than absolutely necessary in defence of the people of
Gibraltar from unlawful violence and the Court was invited to find
that the facts disclosed no breach of Article 2 (art. 2) of the
Convention in respect of any of the three deceased.
144. The applicants submitted that the Government have not
shown beyond reasonable doubt that the planning and execution of
the operation was in accordance with Article 2 para. 2 (art. 2-2)
of the Convention. Accordingly, the killings were not absolutely
necessary within the meaning of this provision (art. 2-2).
AS TO THE LAW
I. Alleged violation of Article 2 (art. 2)
of the Convention
145. The applicants alleged that the killing of Mr McCann, Ms
Farrell and Mr Savage by members of the security forces
constituted a violation of Article 2 (art. 2) of the Convention
which reads:
"1. Everyone's right to life shall be protected by law. No one
shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution
of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for
which this penalty is provided by law.
2. Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in
contravention of this Article (art. 2) when it results from the
use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary:
(a) in defence of any person from unlawful violence;
(b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape
of a person lawfully detained;
(c) in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot
or insurrection."
A. Interpretation of Article 2 (art. 2)
1. General approach
146. The Court's approach to the interpretation of Article 2
(art. 2) must be guided by the fact that the object and purpose of
the Convention as an instrument for the protection of individual
human beings requires that its provisions be interpreted and
applied so as to make its safeguards practical and effective (see,
inter alia, the Soering v. the United Kingdom judgment of 7 July
1989, Series A no. 161, p. 34, para. 87, and the Loizidou v.
Turkey (Preliminary Objections) judgment of 23 March 1995, Series
A no. 310, p. 27, para. 72).
147. It must also be borne in mind that, as a provision (art.
2) which not only safeguards the right to life but sets out the
circumstances when the deprivation of life may be justified,
Article 2 (art. 2) ranks as one of the most fundamental provisions
in the Convention - indeed one which, in peacetime, admits of no
derogation under Article 15 (art. 15). Together with Article 3
(art. 15+3) of the Convention, it also enshrines one of the basic
values of the democratic societies making up the Council of Europe
(see the above-mentioned Soering judgment, p. 34, para. 88). As
such, its provisions must be strictly construed.
148. The Court considers that the exceptions delineated in
paragraph 2 (art. 2-2) indicate that this provision (art. 2-2)
extends to, but is not concerned exclusively with, intentional
killing. As the Commission has pointed out, the text of Article 2
(art. 2), read as a whole, demonstrates that paragraph 2 (art. 2-
2) does not primarily define instances where it is permitted
intentionally to kill an individual, but describes the situations
where it is permitted to "use force" which may result, as an
unintended outcome, in the deprivation of life. The use of force,
however, must be no more than "absolutely necessary" for the
achievement of one of the purposes set out in sub-paragraphs (a),
(b) or (c) (art. 2-2-a, art. 2-2-b, art. 2-2-c) (see application
no. 10044/82, Stewart v. the United Kingdom, 10 July 1984,
Decisions and Reports 39, pp. 169 - 71).
149. In this respect the use of the term "absolutely necessary"
in Article 2 para. 2 (art. 2-2) indicates that a stricter and more
compelling test of necessity must be employed from that normally
applicable when determining whether State action is "necessary in
a democratic society" under paragraph 2 of Articles 8 to 11 (art.
8-2, art. 9-2, art. 10-2, art. 11-2) of the Convention. In
particular, the force used must be strictly proportionate to the
achievement of the aims set out in sub-paragraphs 2 (a), (b) and
(c) of Article 2 (art. 2-2-a-b-c).
150. In keeping with the importance of this provision (art. 2)
in a democratic society, the Court must, in making its assessment,
subject deprivations of life to the most careful scrutiny,
particularly where deliberate lethal force is used, taking into
consideration not only the actions of the agents of the State who
actually administer the force but also all the surrounding
circumstances including such matters as the planning and control
of the actions under examination.
2. The obligation to protect life
in Article 2 para. 1 (art. 2-1)
(a) Compatibility of national law and practice with Article 2
(art. 2) standards
151. The applicants submitted under this head that Article 2
para. 1 (art. 2-1) of the Convention imposed a positive duty on
States to "protect" life. In particular, the national law must
strictly control and limit the circumstances in which a person may
be deprived of his life by agents of the State. The State must
also give appropriate training, instructions and briefing to its
soldiers and other agents who may use force and exercise strict
control over any operations which may involve the use of lethal
force.
In their view, the relevant domestic law was vague and general
and did not encompass the Article 2 (art. 2) standard of absolute
necessity. This in itself constituted a violation of Article 2
para. 1 (art. 2-1). There was also a violation of this provision
(art. 2-1) in that the law did not require that the agents of the
State be trained in accordance with the strict standards of
Article 2 para. 1 (art. 2-1).
152. For the Commission, with whom the Government agreed,
Article 2 (art. 2) was not to be interpreted as requiring an
identical formulation in domestic law. Its requirements were
satisfied if the substance of the Convention right was protected
by domestic law.
153. The Court recalls that the Convention does not oblige
Contracting Parties to incorporate its provisions into national
law (see, inter alia, the James and Others v. the United Kingdom
judgment of 21 February 1986, Series A no. 98, p. 47, para. 84,
and The Holy Monasteries v. Greece judgment of 9 December 1994,
Series A no. 301-A, p. 39, para. 90). Furthermore, it is not the
role of the Convention institutions to examine in abstracto the
compatibility of national legislative or constitutional provisions
with the requirements of the Convention (see, for example, the
Klass and Others v. Germany judgment of 6 September 1978, Series A
no. 28, p. 18, para. 33).
154. Bearing the above in mind, it is noted that Article 2 of
the Gibraltar Constitution (see paragraph 133 above) is similar to
Article 2 (art. 2) of the Convention with the exception that the
standard of justification for the use of force which results in
the deprivation of life is that of "reasonably justifiable" as
opposed to "absolutely necessary" in paragraph 2 of Article 2
(art. 2-2). While the Convention standard appears on its face to
be stricter than the relevant national standard, it has been
submitted by the Government that, having regard to the manner in
which the standard is interpreted and applied by the national
courts (see paragraphs 134 - 35 above), there is no significant
difference in substance between the two concepts.
155. In the Court's view, whatever the validity of this
submission, the difference between the two standards is not
sufficiently great that a violation of Article 2 para. 1 (art. 2-
1) could be found on this ground alone.
156. As regards the applicants' arguments concerning the
training and instruction of the agents of the State and the need
for operational control, the Court considers that these are
matters which, in the context of the present case, raise issues
under Article 2 para. 2 (art. 2-2) concerning the proportionality
of the State's response to the perceived threat of a terrorist
attack. It suffices to note in this respect that the rules of
engagement issued to the soldiers and the police in the present
case provide a series of rules governing the use of force which
carefully reflect the national standard as well as the substance
of the Convention standard (see paragraphs 16, 18 and 136 - 37
above).
(b) Adequacy of the inquest proceedings as an investigative
mechanism
157. The applicants also submitted under this head, with
reference to the relevant standards contained in the UN Force and
Firearms Principles (see paragraphs 138 - 39 above), that the
State must provide an effective ex post facto procedure for
establishing the facts surrounding a killing by agents of the
State through an independent judicial process to which relatives
must have full access.
Together with the amici curiae, Amnesty International and
British-Irish Rights Watch and Others, they submitted that this
procedural requirement had not been satisfied by the inquest
procedure because of a combination of shortcomings. In particular,
they complained that no independent police investigation took
place of any aspect of the operation leading to the shootings;
that normal scene-of-crime procedures were not followed; that not
all eyewitnesses were traced or interviewed by the police; that
the Coroner sat with a jury which was drawn from a "garrison" town
with close ties to the military; that the Coroner refused to allow
the jury to be screened to exclude members who were Crown
servants; that the public interest certificates issued by the
relevant Government authorities effectively curtailed an
examination of the overall operation.
They further contended that they did not enjoy equality of
representation with the Crown in the course of the inquest
proceedings and were thus severely handicapped in their efforts to
find the truth since, inter alia, they had had no legal aid and
were only represented by two lawyers; witness statements had been
made available in advance to the Crown and to the lawyers
representing the police and the soldiers but, with the exception
of ballistic and pathology reports, not to their lawyers; they did
not have the necessary resources to pay for copies of the daily
transcript of the proceedings which amounted to 500 - 700 GBP.
158. The Government submitted that the inquest was an
effective, independent and public review mechanism which more than
satisfied any procedural requirement which might be read into
Article 2 para. 1 (art. 2-1) of the Convention. In particular,
they maintained that it would not be appropriate for the Court to
seek to identify a single set of standards by which all
investigations into the circumstances of death should be assessed.
Moreover, it was important to distinguish between such an
investigation and civil proceedings brought to seek a remedy for
an alleged violation of the right to life. Finally, they invited
the Court to reject the contention by the intervenors British-
Irish Rights Watch and Others that a violation of Article 2 para.
1 (art. 2-1) will have occurred whenever the Court finds serious
differences between the UN Principles on Extra-Legal Executions
and the investigation conducted into any particular death (see
paragraph 140 above).
159. For the Commission, the inquest subjected the actions of
the State to extensive, independent and highly public scrutiny and
thereby provided sufficient procedural safeguards for the purposes
of Article 2 (art. 2) of the Convention.
160. The Court considers that it is unnecessary to decide in
the present case whether a right of access to court to bring civil
proceedings in connection with deprivation of life can be inferred
from Article 2 para. 1 (art. 2-1) since this is an issue which
would be more appropriately considered under Articles 6 and 13
(art. 6, art. 13) of the Convention - provisions (art. 6, art. 13)
that have not been invoked by the applicants.
161. The Court confines itself to noting, like the Commission,
that a general legal prohibition of arbitrary killing by the
agents of the State would be ineffective, in practice, if there
existed no procedure for reviewing the lawfulness of the use of
lethal force by State authorities. The obligation to protect the
right to life under this provision (art. 2), read in conjunction
with the State's general duty under Article 1 (art. 2+1) of the
Convention to "secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the
rights and freedoms defined in [the] Convention", requires by
implication that there should be some form of effective official
investigation when individuals have been killed as a result of the
use of force by, inter alios, agents of the State.
162. However, it is not necessary in the present case for the
Court to decide what form such an investigation should take and
under what conditions it should be conducted, since public inquest
proceedings, at which the applicants were legally represented and
which involved the hearing of seventy-nine witnesses, did in fact
take place. Moreover, the proceedings lasted nineteen days and, as
is evident from the inquest's voluminous transcript, involved a
detailed review of the events surrounding the killings.
Furthermore, it appears from the transcript, including the
Coroner's summing-up to the jury, that the lawyers acting on
behalf of the applicants were able to examine and cross-examine
key witnesses, including the military and police personnel
involved in the planning and conduct of the anti-terrorist
operation, and to make the submissions they wished to make in the
course of the proceedings.
163. In light of the above, the Court does not consider that
the alleged various shortcomings in the inquest proceedings, to
which reference has been made by both the applicants and the
intervenors, substantially hampered the carrying out of a
thorough, impartial and careful examination of the circumstances
surrounding the killings.
164. It follows that there has been no breach of Article 2
para. 1 (art. 2-1) of the Convention on this ground.
B. Application of Article 2 (art. 2)
to the facts of the case
1. General approach to the evaluation
of the evidence
165. While accepting that the Convention institutions are not
in any formal sense bound by the decisions of the inquest jury,
the Government submitted that the verdicts were of central
importance to any subsequent examination of the deaths of the
deceased. Accordingly, the Court should give substantial weight to
the verdicts of the jury in the absence of any indication that
those verdicts were perverse or ones which no reasonable tribunal
of fact could have reached. In this connection, the jury was
uniquely well placed to assess the circumstances surrounding the
shootings. The members of the jury heard and saw each of the
seventy-nine witnesses giving evidence, including extensive cross-
examination. With that benefit they were able to assess the
credibility and probative value of the witnesses' testimony. The
Government pointed out that the jury also heard the submissions of
the various parties, including those of the lawyers representing
the deceased.
166. The applicants, on the other hand, maintained that
inquests are by their very nature ill-equipped to be full and
detailed inquiries into controversial killings such as in the
present case. Moreover, the inquest did not examine the killings
from the standpoint of concepts such as "proportionality" or
"absolute necessity" but applied the lesser tests of "reasonable
force" or "reasonable necessity". Furthermore, the jury focused on
the actions of the soldiers as they opened fire as if it were
considering their criminal culpability and not on matters such as
the allegedly negligent and reckless planning of the operation.
167. The Commission examined the case on the basis of the
observations of the parties and the documents submitted by them,
in particular the transcript of the inquest. It did not consider
itself bound by the findings of the jury.
168. The Court recalls that under the scheme of the Convention
the establishment and verification of the facts is primarily a
matter for the Commission (Articles 28 para. 1 and 31) (art. 28-1,
art. 31). Accordingly, it is only in exceptional circumstances
that the Court will use its powers in this area. The Court is not,
however, bound by the Commission's findings of fact and remains
free to make its own appreciation in the light of all the material
before it (see, inter alia, the Cruz Varas and Others v. Sweden
judgment of 20 March 1991, Series A no. 201, p. 29, para. 74, and
the Klaas v. Germany judgment of 22 September 1993, Series A no.
269, p. 17, para. 29).
169. In the present case neither the Government nor the
applicants have, in the proceedings before the Court, sought to
contest the facts as they have been found by the Commission
although they differ fundamentally as to the conclusions to be
drawn from them under Article 2 (art. 2) of the Convention.
Having regard to the submissions of those appearing before the
Court and to the inquest proceedings, the Court takes the
Commission's establishment of the facts and findings on the points
summarised in paragraphs 13 to 132 above to be an accurate and
reliable account of the facts underlying the present case.
170. As regards the appreciation of these facts from the
standpoint of Article 2 (art. 2), the Court observes that the jury
had the benefit of listening to the witnesses at first hand,
observing their demeanour and assessing the probative value of
their testimony.
Nevertheless, it must be borne in mind that the jury's finding
was limited to a decision of lawful killing and, as is normally
the case, did not provide reasons for the conclusion that it
reached. In addition, the focus of concern of the inquest
proceedings and the standard applied by the jury was whether the
killings by the soldiers were reasonably justified in the
circumstances as opposed to whether they were "absolutely
necessary" under Article 2 para. 2 (art. 2-2) in the sense
developed above (see paragraphs 120 and 148 - 49 above).
171. Against this background, the Court must make its own
assessment whether the facts as established by the Commission
disclose a violation of Article 2 (art. 2) of the Convention.
172. The applicants further submitted that in examining the
actions of the State in a case in which the use of deliberate
lethal force was expressly contemplated in writing, the Court
should place on the Government the onus of proving, beyond
reasonable doubt, that the planning and execution of the operation
was in accordance with Article 2 (art. 2) of the Convention. In
addition, it should not grant the State authorities the benefit of
the doubt as if its criminal liability were at stake.
173. The Court, in determining whether there has been a breach
of Article 2 (art. 2) in the present case, is not assessing the
criminal responsibility of those directly or indirectly concerned.
In accordance with its usual practice therefore it will assess the
issues in the light of all the material placed before it by the
applicants and by the Government or, if necessary, material
obtained of its own motion (see the Ireland v. the United Kingdom
judgment of 18 January 1978, Series A no. 25, p. 64, para. 160,
and the above-mentioned Cruz Varas and Others judgment, p. 29,
para. 75).
2. Applicants' allegation that the killings
were premeditated
174. The applicants alleged that there had been a premeditated
plan to kill the deceased. While conceding that there was no
evidence of a direct order from the highest authorities in the
Ministry of Defence, they claimed that there was strong
circumstantial evidence in support of their allegation. They
suggested that a plot to kill could be achieved by other means
such as hints and innuendoes, coupled with the choice of a
military unit like the SAS which, as indicated by the evidence
given by their members at the inquest, was trained to neutralise a
target by shooting to kill. Supplying false information of the
sort that was actually given to the soldiers in this case would
render a fatal shooting likely. The use of the SAS was, in itself,
evidence that the killing was intended.
175. They further contended that the Gibraltar police would not
have been aware of such an unlawful enterprise. They pointed out
that the SAS officer E gave his men secret briefings to which the
Gibraltar police were not privy. Moreover, when the soldiers
attended the police station after the shootings, they were
accompanied by an army lawyer who made it clear that the soldiers
were there only for the purpose of handing in their weapons. In
addition, the soldiers were immediately flown out of Gibraltar
without ever having been interviewed by the police.
176. The applicants referred to the following factors, amongst
others, in support of their contention:
- The best and safest method of preventing an explosion and
capturing the suspects would have been to stop them and their bomb
from entering Gibraltar. The authorities had their photographs and
knew their names and aliases as well as the passports they were
carrying;
- If the suspects had been under close observation by the
Spanish authorities from Malaga to Gibraltar, as claimed by the
journalist, Mr Debelius, the hiring of the white Renault car would
have been seen and it would have been known that it did not
contain a bomb (see paragraph 128 above);
- The above claim is supported by the failure of the
authorities to isolate the bomb and clear the area around it in
order to protect the public. In Gibraltar there were a large
number of soldiers present with experience in the speedy clearance
of suspect bomb sites. The only explanation for this lapse in
security procedures was that the security services knew that there
was no bomb in the car;
- Soldier G, who was sent to inspect the car and who reported
that there was a suspect car bomb, admitted during the inquest
that he was not an expert in radio signal transmission (see
paragraph 53 above). This was significant since the sole basis for
his assessment was that the radio aerial looked older than the
car. A real expert would have thought of removing the aerial to
nullify the radio detonator, which could have been done without
destabilising the explosive, as testified by Dr Scott. He would
have also known that if the suspects had intended to explode a
bomb by means of a radio signal they would not have used a rusty
aerial - which would reduce the capacity to receive a clear signal
- but a clean one (see paragraph 114 above). It also emerged from
his evidence that he was not an explosives expert either. There
was thus the possibility that the true role of Soldier G was to
report that he suspected a car bomb in order to induce the
Gibraltar police to sign the document authorising the SAS to
employ lethal force.
177. In the Government's submission it was implicit in the
jury's verdicts of lawful killing that they found as facts that
there was no plot to kill the three terrorists and that the
operation in Gibraltar had not been conceived or mounted with this
aim in view. The aim of the operation was to effect the lawful
arrest of the three terrorists and it was for this purpose that
the assistance of the military was sought and given. Furthermore,
the jury must have also rejected the applicants' contention that
Soldiers A, B, C and D had deliberately set out to kill the
terrorists, whether acting on express orders or as a result of
being given "a nod and a wink".
178. The Commission concluded that there was no evidence to
support the applicants' claim of a premeditated plot to kill the
suspects.
179. The Court observes that it would need to have convincing
evidence before it could conclude that there was a premeditated
plan, in the sense developed by the applicants.
180. In the light of its own examination of the material before
it, the Court does not find it established that there was an
execution plot at the highest level of command in the Ministry of
Defence or in the Government, or that Soldiers A, B, C and D had
been so encouraged or instructed by the superior officers who had
briefed them prior to the operation, or indeed that they had
decided on their own initiative to kill the suspects irrespective
of the existence of any justification for the use of lethal force
and in disobedience to the arrest instructions they had received.
Nor is there evidence that there was an implicit encouragement by
the authorities or hints and innuendoes to execute the three
suspects.
181. The factors relied on by the applicants amount to a series
of conjectures that the authorities must have known that there was
no bomb in the car. However, having regard to the intelligence
information that they had received, to the known profiles of the
three terrorists, all of whom had a background in explosives, and
the fact that Mr Savage was seen to "fiddle" with something before
leaving the car (see paragraph 38 above), the belief that the car
contained a bomb cannot be described as either implausible or
wholly lacking in foundation.
182. In particular, the decision to admit them to Gibraltar,
however open to criticism given the risks that it entailed, was in
accordance with the arrest policy formulated by the Advisory Group
that no effort should be made to apprehend them until all three
were present in Gibraltar and there was sufficient evidence of a
bombing mission to secure their convictions (see paragraph 37
above).
183. Nor can the Court accept the applicants' contention that
the use of the SAS, in itself, amounted to evidence that the
killing of the suspects was intended. In this respect it notes
that the SAS is a special unit which has received specialist
training in combating terrorism. It was only natural, therefore,
that in light of the advance warning that the authorities received
of an impending terrorist attack they would resort to the skill
and experience of the SAS in order to deal with the threat in the
safest and most informed manner possible.
184. The Court therefore rejects as unsubstantiated the
applicants' allegations that the killing of the three suspects was
premeditated or the product of a tacit agreement amongst those
involved in the operation.
3. Conduct and planning of the operation
(a) Arguments of those appearing before the Court
(1) The applicants
185. The applicants submitted that it would be wrong for the
Court, as the Commission had done, to limit its assessment to the
question of the possible justification of the soldiers who
actually killed the suspects. It must examine the liability of the
Government for all aspects of the operation. Indeed, the soldiers
may well have been acquitted at a criminal trial if they could
have shown that they honestly believed the ungrounded and false
information they were given.
186. The soldiers had been told by Officer E (the attack
commander) that the three suspects had planted a car bomb in
Gibraltar, whereas Soldier G - the bomb-disposal expert - had
reported that it was merely a suspect bomb; that it was a remote-
control bomb; that each of the suspects could detonate it from
anywhere in Gibraltar by the mere flicking of a switch and that
they would not hesitate to do so the moment they were challenged.
In reality, these "certainties" and "facts" were no more than
suspicions or at best dubious assessments. However, they were
conveyed as facts to soldiers who not only had been trained to
shoot at the merest hint of a threat but also, as emerged from the
evidence given during the inquest, to continue to shoot until they
had killed their target.
In sum, they submitted that the killings came about as a result
of incompetence and negligence in the planning and conduct of the
anti-terrorist operation to arrest the suspects as well as a
failure to maintain a proper balance between the need to meet the
threat posed and the right to life of the suspects.
(2) The Government
187. The Government submitted that the actions of the soldiers
were absolutely necessary in defence of persons from unlawful
violence within the meaning of Article 2 para. 2 (a) (art. 2-2-a)
of the Convention. Each of them had to make a split-second
decision which could have affected a large number of lives. They
believed that the movements which they saw the suspects make at
the moment they were intercepted gave the impression that the
terrorists were about to detonate a bomb. This evidence was
confirmed by other witnesses who saw the movements in question. If
it is accepted that the soldiers honestly and reasonably believed
that the terrorists upon whom they opened fire might have been
about to detonate a bomb by pressing a button, then they had no
alternative but to open fire.
188. They also pointed out that much of the information
available to the authorities and many of the judgments made by
them proved to be accurate. The three deceased were an IRA active
service unit which was planning an operation in Gibraltar; they
did have in their control a large quantity of explosives which
were subsequently found in Spain; and the nature of the operation
was a car bomb. The risk to the lives of those in Gibraltar was,
therefore, both real and extremely serious.
189. The Government further submitted that in examining the
planning of the anti-terrorist operation it should be borne in
mind that intelligence assessments are necessarily based on
incomplete information since only fragments of the true picture
will be known. Moreover, experience showed that the IRA were
exceptionally ruthless and skilled in counter-surveillance
techniques and that they did their best to conceal their
intentions from the authorities. In addition, experience in
Northern Ireland showed that the IRA is constantly and rapidly
developing new technology. They thus had to take into account the
possibility that the terrorists might be equipped with more
sophisticated or more easily concealable radio-controlled devices
than the IRA had previously been known to use. Finally, the
consequences of underestimating the threat posed by the active
service unit could have been catastrophic. If they had succeeded
in detonating a bomb of the type and size found in Spain, everyone
in the car-park would have been killed or badly maimed and
grievous injuries would have been caused to those in adjacent
buildings, which included a school and an old-people's home.
190. The intelligence assessments made in the course of the
operation were reasonable ones to make in the light of the
inevitably limited amount of information available to the
authorities and the potentially devastating consequences of
underestimating the terrorists' abilities and resources. In this
regard the Government made the following observations:
- It was believed that a remote-controlled device would be used
because it would give the terrorists a better chance of escape and
would increase their ability to maximise the proportion of
military rather than civilian casualties. Moreover, the IRA had
used such a device in Brussels only six weeks before.
- It was assumed that any remote-control such as that produced
to the Court would be small enough to be readily concealed about
the person. The soldiers themselves successfully concealed radios
of a similar size about their persons.
- As testified by Captain Edwards at the inquest, tests carried
out demonstrated that a bomb in the car-park could have been
detonated from the spot where the terrorists were shot (see
paragraph 116 above).
- Past experience strongly suggested that the terrorists'
detonation device might have been operated by pressing a single
button.
- As explained by Witness O at the inquest, the use of a
blocking car would have been unnecessary because the terrorists
would not be expected to have any difficulty in finding a free
space on 8 March. It was also dangerous because it would have
required two trips into Gibraltar, thereby significantly
increasing the risk of detection (see paragraph 23 (point (e)
above).
- There was no reason to doubt the bona fides of Soldier G's
assessment that the car was a suspect car bomb. In the first place
his evidence was that he was quite familiar with car bombs.
Moreover, the car had been parked by a known bomb-maker who had
been seen to "fiddle" with something between the seats and the car
aerial appeared to be out of place. IRA car bombs had been known
from experience to have specially-fitted aerials and G could not
say for certain from an external examination that the car did not
contain a bomb (see paragraph 48 above). Furthermore, all three
suspects appeared to be leaving Gibraltar. Finally the operation
of cordoning off the area around the car began only twenty minutes
after the above assessment had been made because of the shortage
of available manpower and the fact that the evacuation plans were
not intended for implementation until 7 or 8 March.
- It would have been reckless for the authorities to assume
that the terrorists might not have detonated their bomb if
challenged. The IRA were deeply committed terrorists who were, in
their view, at war with the United Kingdom and who had in the past
shown a reckless disregard for their own safety. There was still a
real risk that if they had been faced with a choice between an
explosion causing civilian casualties and no explosion at all, the
terrorists would have preferred the former.
(3) The Commission
191. The Commission considered that, given the soldiers'
perception of the risk to the lives of the people of Gibraltar,
the shooting of the three suspects could be regarded as absolutely
necessary for the legitimate aim of the defence of others from
unlawful violence. It also concluded that, having regard to the
possibility that the suspects had brought in a car bomb which, if
detonated, would have occasioned the loss of many lives and the
possibility that the suspects could have been able to detonate it
when confronted by the soldiers, the planning and execution of the
operation by the authorities did not disclose any deliberate
design or lack of proper care which might have rendered the use of
lethal force disproportionate to the aim of saving lives.
(b) The Court's assessment
(1) Preliminary considerations
192. In carrying out its examination under Article 2 (art. 2)
of the Convention, the Court must bear in mind that the
information that the United Kingdom authorities received that
there would be a terrorist attack in Gibraltar presented them with
a fundamental dilemma. On the one hand, they were required to have
regard to their duty to protect the lives of the people in
Gibraltar including their own military personnel and, on the
other, to have minimum resort to the use of lethal force against
those suspected of posing this threat in the light of the
obligations flowing from both domestic and international law.
193. Several other factors must also be taken into
consideration.
In the first place, the authorities were confronted by an
active service unit of the IRA composed of persons who had been
convicted of bombing offences and a known explosives expert. The
IRA, judged by its actions in the past, had demonstrated a
disregard for human life, including that of its own members.
Secondly, the authorities had had prior warning of the
impending terrorist action and thus had ample opportunity to plan
their reaction and, in co-ordination with the local Gibraltar
authorities, to take measures to foil the attack and arrest the
suspects. Inevitably, however, the security authorities could not
have been in possession of the full facts and were obliged to
formulate their policies on the basis of incomplete hypotheses.
194. Against this background, in determining whether the force
used was compatible with Article 2 (art. 2), the Court must
carefully scrutinise, as noted above, not only whether the force
used by the soldiers was strictly proportionate to the aim of
protecting persons against unlawful violence but also whether the
anti-terrorist operation was planned and controlled by the
authorities so as to minimise, to the greatest extent possible,
recourse to lethal force. The Court will consider each of these
points in turn.
(2) Actions of the soldiers
195. It is recalled that the soldiers who carried out the
shooting (A, B, C and D) were informed by their superiors, in
essence, that there was a car bomb in place which could be
detonated by any of the three suspects by means of a radio-control
device which might have been concealed on their persons; that the
device could be activated by pressing a button; that they would be
likely to detonate the bomb if challenged, thereby causing heavy
loss of life and serious injuries, and were also likely to be
armed and to resist arrest (see paragraphs 23, 24 - 27, and 28 -
31 above).
196. As regards the shooting of Mr McCann and Ms Farrell, the
Court recalls the Commission's finding that they were shot at
close range after making what appeared to Soldiers A and B to be
threatening movements with their hands as if they were going to
detonate the bomb (see paragraph 132 above). The evidence
indicated that they were shot as they fell to the ground but not
as they lay on the ground (see paragraphs 59-67 above). Four
witnesses recalled hearing a warning shout (see paragraph 75
above). Officer P corroborated the soldiers' evidence as to the
hand movements (see paragraph 76 above). Officer Q and Police
Constable Parody also confirmed that Ms Farrell had made a sudden,
suspicious move towards her handbag (ibid.).
197. As regards the shooting of Mr Savage, the evidence
revealed that there was only a matter of seconds between the
shooting at the Shell garage (McCann and Farrell) and the shooting
at Landport tunnel (Savage). The Commission found that it was
unlikely that Soldiers C and D witnessed the first shooting before
pursuing Mr Savage who had turned around after being alerted by
either the police siren or the shooting (see paragraph 132 above).
Soldier C opened fire because Mr Savage moved his right arm to
the area of his jacket pocket, thereby giving rise to the fear
that he was about to detonate the bomb. In addition, Soldier C had
seen something bulky in his pocket which he believed to be a
detonating transmitter. Soldier D also opened fire believing that
the suspect was trying to detonate the supposed bomb. The
soldiers' version of events was corroborated in some respects by
Witnesses H and J, who saw Mr Savage spin round to face the
soldiers in apparent response to the police siren or the first
shooting (see paragraphs 83 and 85 above).
The Commission found that Mr Savage was shot at close range
until he hit the ground and probably in the instant as or after he
had hit the ground (see paragraph 132 above). This conclusion was
supported by the pathologists' evidence at the inquest (see
paragraph 110 above).
198. It was subsequently discovered that the suspects were
unarmed, that they did not have a detonator device on their
persons and that there was no bomb in the car (see paragraphs 93
and 96 above).
199. All four soldiers admitted that they shot to kill. They
considered that it was necessary to continue to fire at the
suspects until they were rendered physically incapable of
detonating a device (see paragraphs 61, 63, 80 and 120 above).
According to the pathologists' evidence Ms Farrell was hit by
eight bullets, Mr McCann by five and Mr Savage by sixteen (see
paragraphs 108 - 10 above).
200. The Court accepts that the soldiers honestly believed, in
the light of the information that they had been given, as set out
above, that it was necessary to shoot the suspects in order to
prevent them from detonating a bomb and causing serious loss of
life (see paragraph 195 above). The actions which they took, in
obedience to superior orders, were thus perceived by them as
absolutely necessary in order to safeguard innocent lives.
It considers that the use of force by agents of the State in
pursuit of one of the aims delineated in paragraph 2 of Article 2
(art. 2-2) of the Convention may be justified under this provision
(art. 2-2) where it is based on an honest belief which is
perceived, for good reasons, to be valid at the time but which
subsequently turns out to be mistaken. To hold otherwise would be
to impose an unrealistic burden on the State and its law-
enforcement personnel in the execution of their duty, perhaps to
the detriment of their lives and those of others.
It follows that, having regard to the dilemma confronting the
authorities in the circumstances of the case, the actions of the
soldiers do not, in themselves, give rise to a violation of this
provision (art. 2-2).
201. The question arises, however, whether the anti-terrorist
operation as a whole was controlled and organised in a manner
which respected the requirements of Article 2 (art. 2) and whether
the information and instructions given to the soldiers which, in
effect, rendered inevitable the use of lethal force, took
adequately into consideration the right to life of the three
suspects.
(3) Control and organisation of the operation
202. The Court first observes that, as appears from the
operational order of the Commissioner, it had been the intention
of the authorities to arrest the suspects at an appropriate stage.
Indeed, evidence was given at the inquest that arrest procedures
had been practised by the soldiers before 6 March and that efforts
had been made to find a suitable place in Gibraltar to detain the
suspects after their arrest (see paragraphs 18 and 55 above).
203. It may be questioned why the three suspects were not
arrested at the border immediately on their arrival in Gibraltar
and why, as emerged from the evidence given by Inspector Ullger,
the decision was taken not to prevent them from entering Gibraltar
if they were believed to be on a bombing mission. Having had
advance warning of the terrorists' intentions it would certainly
have been possible for the authorities to have mounted an arrest
operation. Although surprised at the early arrival of the three
suspects, they had a surveillance team at the border and an arrest
group nearby (see paragraph 34 above). In addition, the Security
Services and the Spanish authorities had photographs of the three
suspects, knew their names as well as their aliases and would have
known what passports to look for (see paragraph 33 above).
204. On this issue, the Government submitted that at that
moment there might not have been sufficient evidence to warrant
the detention and trial of the suspects. Moreover, to release
them, having alerted them to the authorities' state of awareness
but leaving them or others free to try again, would obviously
increase the risks. Nor could the authorities be sure that those
three were the only terrorists they had to deal with or of the
manner in which it was proposed to carry out the bombing.
205. The Court confines itself to observing in this respect
that the danger to the population of Gibraltar - which is at the
heart of the Government's submissions in this case - in not
preventing their entry must be considered to outweigh the possible
consequences of having insufficient evidence to warrant their
detention and trial. In its view, either the authorities knew that
there was no bomb in the car - which the Court has already
discounted (see paragraph 181 above) - or there was a serious
miscalculation by those responsible for controlling the operation.
As a result, the scene was set in which the fatal shooting, given
the intelligence assessments which had been made, was a
foreseeable possibility if not a likelihood.
The decision not to stop the three terrorists from entering
Gibraltar is thus a relevant factor to take into account under
this head.
206. The Court notes that at the briefing on 5 March attended
by Soldiers A, B, C, and D it was considered likely that the
attack would be by way of a large car bomb. A number of key
assessments were made. In particular, it was thought that the
terrorists would not use a blocking car; that the bomb would be
detonated by a radio-control device; that the detonation could be
effected by the pressing of a button; that it was likely that the
suspects would detonate the bomb if challenged; that they would be
armed and would be likely to use their arms if confronted (see
paragraphs 23 - 31 above).
207. In the event, all of these crucial assumptions, apart from
the terrorists' intentions to carry out an attack, turned out to
be erroneous. Nevertheless, as has been demonstrated by the
Government, on the basis of their experience in dealing with the
IRA, they were all possible hypotheses in a situation where the
true facts were unknown and where the authorities operated on the
basis of limited intelligence information.
208. In fact, insufficient allowances appear to have been made
for other assumptions. For example, since the bombing was not
expected until 8 March when the changing of the guard ceremony was
to take place, there was equally the possibility that the three
terrorists were on a reconnaissance mission. While this was a
factor which was briefly considered, it does not appear to have
been regarded as a serious possibility (see paragraph 45 above).
In addition, at the briefings or after the suspects had been
spotted, it might have been thought unlikely that they would have
been prepared to explode the bomb, thereby killing many civilians,
as Mr McCann and Ms Farrell strolled towards the border area since
this would have increased the risk of detection and capture (see
paragraph 57 above). It might also have been thought improbable
that at that point they would have set up the transmitter in
anticipation to enable them to detonate the supposed bomb
immediately if confronted (see paragraph 115 above).
Moreover, even if allowances are made for the technological
skills of the IRA, the description of the detonation device as a
"button job" without the qualifications subsequently described by
the experts at the inquest (see paragraphs 115 and 131 above), of
which the competent authorities must have been aware, over-
simplifies the true nature of these devices.
209. It is further disquieting in this context that the
assessment made by Soldier G, after a cursory external examination
of the car, that there was a "suspect car bomb" was conveyed to
the soldiers, according to their own testimony, as a definite
identification that there was such a bomb (see paragraphs 48, and
51 - 52 above). It is recalled that while Soldier G had experience
in car bombs, it transpired that he was not an expert in radio
communications or explosives; and that his assessment that there
was a suspect car bomb, based on his observation that the car
aerial was out of place, was more in the nature of a report that a
bomb could not be ruled out (see paragraph 53 above).
210. In the absence of sufficient allowances being made for
alternative possibilities, and the definite reporting of the
existence of a car bomb which, according to the assessments that
had been made, could be detonated at the press of a button, a
series of working hypotheses were conveyed to Soldiers A, B, C and
D as certainties, thereby making the use of lethal force almost
unavoidable.
211. However, the failure to make provision for a margin of
error must also be considered in combination with the training of
the soldiers to continue shooting once they opened fire until the
suspect was dead. As noted by the Coroner in his summing-up to the
jury at the inquest, all four soldiers shot to kill the suspects
(see paragraphs 61, 63, 80 and 120 above). Soldier E testified
that it had been discussed with the soldiers that there was an
increased chance that they would have to shoot to kill since there
would be less time where there was a "button" device (see
paragraph 26 above). Against this background, the authorities were
bound by their obligation to respect the right to life of the
suspects to exercise the greatest of care in evaluating the
information at their disposal before transmitting it to soldiers
whose use of firearms automatically involved shooting to kill.
212. Although detailed investigation at the inquest into the
training received by the soldiers was prevented by the public
interest certificates which had been issued (see paragraph 104, at
point 1. (iii) above), it is not clear whether they had been
trained or instructed to assess whether the use of firearms to
wound their targets may have been warranted by the specific
circumstances that confronted them at the moment of arrest.
Their reflex action in this vital respect lacks the degree of
caution in the use of firearms to be expected from law enforcement
personnel in a democratic society, even when dealing with
dangerous terrorist suspects, and stands in marked contrast to the
standard of care reflected in the instructions in the use of
firearms by the police which had been drawn to their attention and
which emphasised the legal responsibilities of the individual
officer in the light of conditions prevailing at the moment of
engagement (see paragraphs 136 and 137 above).
This failure by the authorities also suggests a lack of
appropriate care in the control and organisation of the arrest
operation.
213. In sum, having regard to the decision not to prevent the
suspects from travelling into Gibraltar, to the failure of the
authorities to make sufficient allowances for the possibility that
their intelligence assessments might, in some respects at least,
be erroneous and to the automatic recourse to lethal force when
the soldiers opened fire, the Court is not persuaded that the
killing of the three terrorists constituted the use of force which
was no more than absolutely necessary in defence of persons from
unlawful violence within the meaning of Article 2 para. 2 (a)
(art. 2-2-a) of the Convention.
214. Accordingly, the Court finds that there has been a breach
of Article 2 (art. 2) of the Convention.
II. Application of Article 50 (art. 50)
of the Convention
215. Article 50 (art. 50) of the Convention provides as
follows:
"If the Court finds that a decision or a measure taken by a
legal authority or any other authority of a High Contracting Party
is completely or partially in conflict with the obligations
arising from the... Convention, and if the internal law of the
said Party allows only partial reparation to be made for the
consequences of this decision or measure, the decision of the
Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured
party."
216. The applicants requested the award of damages at the same
level as would be awarded under English law to a person who was
unlawfully killed by agents of the State. They also asked, in the
event of the Court finding that the killings were both unlawful
and deliberate or were the result of gross negligence, exemplary
damages at the same level as would be awarded under English law to
a relative of a person killed in similar circumstances.
217. As regards costs and expenses, they asked for all costs
arising directly or indirectly from the killings, including the
costs of relatives and lawyers attending the Gibraltar inquest and
all Strasbourg costs. The solicitor's costs and expenses in
respect of the Gibraltar inquest are estimated at 56,200 GBP and
his Strasbourg costs at 28,800 GBP. Counsel claimed 16,700 GBP in
respect of Strasbourg costs and expenses.
218. The Government contended that, in the event of a finding
of a violation, financial compensation in the form of pecuniary
and non-pecuniary damages would be unnecessary and inappropriate.
As regards the costs incurred before the Strasbourg
institutions, they submitted that the applicants should be awarded
only the costs actually and necessarily incurred by them and which
were reasonable as to quantum. However, as regards the claim for
costs in respect of the Gibraltar inquest, they maintained that
(1) as a point of principle, the costs of the domestic
proceedings, including the costs of the inquest, should not be
recoverable under Article 50 (art. 50);
(2) since the applicants' legal representatives acted free of
charge, there can be no basis for an award to the applicants;
(3) in any event, the costs claimed were not calculated on the
basis of the normal rates of the solicitor concerned.
A. Pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage
219. The Court observes that it is not clear from the
applicants' submissions whether their claim for financial
compensation is under the head of pecuniary or non-pecuniary
damages or both. In any event, having regard to the fact that the
three terrorist suspects who were killed had been intending to
plant a bomb in Gibraltar, the Court does not consider it
appropriate to make an award under this head. It therefore
dismisses the applicants' claim for damages.
B. Costs and expenses
220. The Court recalls that, in accordance with its case-law,
it is only costs which are actually and necessarily incurred and
reasonable as to quantum that are recoverable under this head.
221. As regards the Gibraltar costs, the applicants stated in
the proceedings before the Commission that their legal
representatives had acted free of charge. In this connection, it
has not been claimed that they are under any obligation to pay the
solicitor the amounts claimed under this item. In these
circumstances, the costs cannot be claimed under Article 50 (art.
50) since they have not been actually incurred.
222. As regards the costs and expenses incurred during the
Strasbourg proceedings, the Court, making an equitable assessment,
awards 22,000 GBP and 16,700 GBP in respect of the solicitor's and
counsel's claims respectively, less 37,731 French francs received
by way of legal aid from the Council of Europe.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT
1. Holds by ten votes to nine that there has been a violation
of Article 2 (art. 2) of the Convention;
2. Holds unanimously that the United Kingdom is to pay to the
applicants, within three months, 38,700 GBP (thirty-eight thousand
seven hundred) for costs and expenses incurred in the Strasbourg
proceedings, less 37,731 (thirty-seven thousand seven hundred and
thirty-one) French francs to be converted into pounds sterling at
the rate of exchange applicable on the date of delivery of the
present judgment;
3. Dismisses unanimously the applicants' claim for damages;
4. Dismisses unanimously the applicants' claim for costs and
expenses incurred in the Gibraltar inquest;
5. Dismisses unanimously the remainder of the claims for just
satisfaction.
Done in English and in French, and delivered at a public
hearing in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 27 September
1995.
Signed: Rolv RYSSDAL
President
Signed: Herbert PETZOLD
Registrar
In accordance with Article 51 para. 2 (art. 51-2) of the
Convention and Rule 53 para. 2 of Rules of Court A, the joint
dissenting opinion of Judges Ryssdal, Bernhardt, {Thar
Vilhjalmsson}, Golcuklu, Palm, Pekkanen, Sir John Freeland, Baka
and Jambrek is annexed to this judgment.
Initialled: R.R.
Initialled: H.P.
JOINT DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGES
RYSSDAL, BERNHARDT, {THOR VILHJALMSSON}, {GOLCUKLU},
PALM, PEKKANEN, SIR JOHN FREELAND, BAKA AND JAMBREK
1. We are unable to subscribe to the opinion of a majority of
our colleagues that there has been a violation of Article 2 (art.
2) of the Convention in this case.
2. We will take the main issues in the order in which they are
dealt with in the judgment.
3. As to the section which deals with the interpretation of
Article 2 (art. 2), we agree with the conclusion in paragraph 155
that the difference between the Convention standard and the
national standard as regards justification for the use of force
resulting in deprivation of life is not such that a violation of
Article 2 para. 1 (art. 2-1) could be found on that ground alone.
We also agree with the conclusion in paragraph 164 that there has
been no breach of Article 2 para. 1 (art. 2-1) on the ground of
any shortcoming in the examination at national level of the
circumstances surrounding the deaths.
4. As to the section dealing with the application of Article 2
(art. 2) to the facts of the case, we fully concur in rejecting as
unsubstantiated the applicants' allegations that the killing of
the three suspects was premeditated or the product of a tacit
agreement among those involved in the operation (paragraph 184).
5. We also agree with the conclusion in paragraph 200 that the
actions of the four soldiers who carried out the shootings do not,
in themselves, give rise to a violation of Article 2 (art. 2). It
is rightly accepted that those soldiers honestly believed, in the
light of the information which they had been given, that it was
necessary to act as they did in order to prevent the suspects from
detonating a bomb and causing serious loss of life: the actions
which they took were thus perceived by them as absolutely
necessary in order to safeguard innocent lives.
6. We disagree, however, with the evaluation made by the
majority (paragraphs 202 - 14) of the way in which the control and
organisation of the operation were carried out by the authorities.
It is that evaluation which, crucially, leads to the finding of
violation.
7. We recall at the outset that the events in this case were
examined at the domestic level by an inquest held in Gibraltar
over a period of nineteen days between 6 and 30 September 1988.
The jury, after hearing the evidence of seventy-nine witnesses
(including the soldiers, police officers and surveillance
personnel involved in the operation and also pathologists,
forensic scientists and experts on the detonation of explosive
devices), and after being addressed by the Coroner in respect of
the applicable domestic law, reached by a majority of nine to two
a verdict of lawful killing. The circumstances were subsequently
investigated in depth and evaluated by the Commission, which found
in its report, by a majority of eleven to six, that there had been
no violation of the Convention.
The finding of the inquest, as a domestic tribunal operating
under the relevant domestic law, is not of itself determinative of
the Convention issues before the Court. But, having regard to the
crucial importance in this case of a proper appreciation of the
facts and to the advantage undeniably enjoyed by the jury in
having observed the demeanour of the witnesses when giving their
evidence under examination and cross-examination, its significance
should certainly not be underestimated. Similarly, the
Commission's establishment and evaluation of the facts is not
conclusive for the Court; but it would be mistaken for the Court,
at yet one further remove from the evidence as given by the
witnesses, to fail to give due weight to the report of the
Commission, the body which is primarily charged under the
Convention with the finding of facts and which has, of course,
great experience in the discharge of that task.
8. Before turning to the various aspects of the operation which
are criticised in the judgment, we would underline three points of
a general nature.
First, in undertaking any evaluation of the way in which the
operation was organised and controlled, the Court should
studiously resist the temptations offered by the benefit of
hindsight. The authorities had at the time to plan and make
decisions on the basis of incomplete information. Only the
suspects knew at all precisely what they intended; and it was part
of their purpose, as it had no doubt been part of their training,
to ensure that as little as possible of their intentions was
revealed. It would be wrong to conclude in retrospect that a
particular course would, as things later transpired, have been
better than one adopted at the time under the pressures of an
ongoing anti-terrorist operation and that the latter course must
therefore be regarded as culpably mistaken. It should not be so
regarded unless it is established that in the circumstances as
they were known at the time another course should have been
preferred.
9. Secondly, the need for the authorities to act within the
constraints of the law, while the suspects were operating in a
state of mind in which members of the security forces were
regarded as legitimate targets and incidental death or injury to
civilians as of little consequence, would inevitably give the
suspects a tactical advantage which should not be allowed to
prevail. The consequences of the explosion of a large bomb in the
centre of Gibraltar might well be so devastating that the
authorities could not responsibly risk giving the suspects the
opportunity to set in train the detonation of such a bomb. Of
course the obligation of the United Kingdom under Article 2 para.
1 (art. 2-1) of the Convention extended to the lives of the
suspects as well as to the lives of all the many others, civilian
and military, who were present in Gibraltar at the time. But,
quite unlike those others, the purpose of the presence of the
suspects in Gibraltar was the furtherance of a criminal enterprise
which could be expected to have resulted in the loss of many
innocent lives if it had been successful. They had chosen to place
themselves in a situation where there was a grave danger that an
irreconcilable conflict between the two duties might arise.
10. Thirdly, the Court's evaluation of the conduct of the
authorities should throughout take full account of (a) the
information which had been received earlier about IRA intentions
to mount a major terrorist attack in Gibraltar by an active
service unit of three individuals; and (b) the discovery which
(according to evidence given to the inquest by Witness O) had been
made in Brussels on 21 January 1988 of a car containing a large
amount of Semtex explosive and four detonators, with a radio-
controlled system - equipment which, taken together, constituted a
device familiar in Northern Ireland.
In the light of (a), the decision that members of the SAS
should be sent to take part in the operation in response to the
request of the Gibraltar Commissioner of Police for military
assistance was wholly justifiable. Troops trained in a counter-
terrorist role and to operate successfully in small groups would
clearly be a suitable choice to meet the threat of an IRA active
service unit at large in a densely populated area such as
Gibraltar, where there would be an imperative need to limit as far
as possible the risk of accidental harm to passers-by.
The detailed operational briefing on 5 March 1988 (paragraphs
22 - 31) shows the reasonableness, in the circumstances as known
at the time, of the assessments then made. The operational order
of the Gibraltar Commissioner of Police, which was drawn up on the
same day, expressly proscribed the use of more force than
necessary and required any recourse to firearms to be had with
care for the safety of persons in the vicinity. It described the
intention of the operation as being to protect life; to foil the
attempt; to arrest the offenders; and the securing and safe
custody of the prisoners (paragraphs 17 and 18).
All of this is indicative of appropriate care on the part of
the authorities. So, too, is the cautious approach to the eventual
passing of control to the military on 6 March 1988 (paragraphs 54
- 58).
11. As regards the particular criticisms of the conduct of the
operation which are made in the judgment, foremost among them is
the questioning (in paragraphs 203 - 05) of the decision not to
prevent the three suspects from entering Gibraltar. It is pointed
out in paragraph 203 that, with the advance information which the
authorities possessed and with the resources of personnel at their
disposal, it would have been possible for them "to have mounted an
arrest operation" at the border.
The judgment does not, however, go on to say that it would have
been practicable for the authorities to have arrested and detained
the suspects at that stage. Rightly so, in our view, because at
that stage there might not be sufficient evidence to warrant their
detention and trial. To release them, after having alerted them to
the state of readiness of the authorities, would be to increase
the risk that they or other IRA members could successfully mount a
renewed terrorist attack on Gibraltar. In the circumstances as
then known, it was accordingly not "a serious miscalculation" for
the authorities to defer the arrest rather than merely stop the
suspects at the border and turn them back into Spain.
12. Paragraph 206 of the judgment then lists certain "key
assessments" made by the authorities which, in paragraph 207, are
said to have turned out, in the event, to be erroneous, although
they are accepted as all being possible hypotheses in a situation
where the true facts were unknown and where the authorities were
operating on the basis of limited intelligence information.
Paragraph 208 goes on to make the criticism that "insufficient
allowances appear to have been made for other assumptions".
13. As a first example to substantiate this criticism, the
paragraph then states that since the bombing was not expected
until 8 March "there was equally the possibility that the...
terrorists were on a reconnaissance mission".
There was, however, nothing unreasonable in the assessment at
the operational briefing on 5 March that the car which would be
brought into Gibraltar was unlikely, on the grounds then stated,
to be a "blocking" car (see paragraph 23, point e). So, when the
car had been parked in the assembly area by one of the suspects
and all three had been found to be present in Gibraltar, the
authorities could quite properly operate on the working assumption
that it contained a bomb and that, as the suspects were unlikely
to risk two visits, it was not "equally" possible that they were
on a reconnaissance mission.
In addition, Soldier F, the senior military adviser to the
Gibraltar Commissioner of Police, gave evidence to the inquest
that, according to intelligence information, reconnaissance
missions had been undertaken many times before: reconnaissance
was, he had been told, complete and the operation was ready to be
run. In these circumstances, for the authorities to have proceeded
otherwise than on the basis of a worst-case scenario that the car
contained a bomb which was capable of being detonated by the
suspects during their presence in the territory would have been to
show a reckless failure of concern for public safety.
14. Secondly, it is suggested in the second sub-paragraph of
paragraph 208 that, at the briefings or after the suspects had
been spotted, "it might have been thought unlikely that they would
have been prepared to explode the bomb, thereby killing many
civilians, as Mr McCann and Ms Farrell strolled towards the border
area since this would have increased the risk of detection and
capture".
Surely, however, the question is rather whether the authorities
could safely have operated on the assumption that the suspects
would be unlikely to be prepared to explode the bomb when, even if
for the time being moving in the direction of the border, they
became aware that they had been detected and were faced with the
prospect of arrest. In our view, the answer is clear: certainly,
previous experience of IRA activities would have afforded no
reliable basis for concluding that the killing of many civilians
would itself be a sufficient deterrent or that the suspects, when
confronted, would have preferred no explosion at all to an
explosion causing civilian casualties. It is relevant that,
according to Soldier F's evidence at the inquest, part of the
intelligence background was that he had been told that the IRA
were under pressure to produce a "spectacular". He also gave
evidence of his belief that, when cornered, the suspects would
have no qualms about pressing the button to achieve some degree of
propaganda success: they would try to derive such a success out of
having got a bomb into Gibraltar and that would outweigh in their
minds the propaganda loss arising from civilian casualties.
15. The second sub-paragraph of paragraph 208 goes on to
suggest that it "might also have been thought improbable that at
that point" - that is, apparently, as McCann and Farrell "strolled
towards the border" - "[the suspects] would have set up the
transmitter in anticipation to enable them to detonate the
supposed bomb immediately if confronted".
Here, the question ought, we consider, to be whether the
authorities could prudently have proceeded otherwise than on the
footing that there was at the very least a possibility that, if
not before the suspects became aware of detection then immediately
afterwards, the transmitter would be in a state of readiness to
detonate the bomb.
16. It is next suggested, in the third sub-paragraph of
paragraph 208, that "even if allowances are made for the
technological skills of the IRA, the description of the detonation
device as a "button job" without the qualifications subsequently
described by the experts at the inquest..., of which the competent
authorities must have been aware, over-simplifies the true nature
of these devices". The exact purport of this criticism is perhaps
open to some doubt. What is fully clear, however, is that, as the
applicants' own expert witness accepted at the inquest, a
transmitter of the kind which was thought likely to be used in the
present case could be set up so as to enable detonation to be
caused by pressing a single button; and in the light of past
experience it would have been most unwise to discount the
possibility of technological advance in this field by the IRA.
17. Paragraph 209 of the judgment expresses disquiet that the
assessment made by Soldier G that there was a "suspect car bomb"
was conveyed to the soldiers on the ground in such a way as to
give them the impression that the presence of a bomb had been
definitely identified. But, given the assessments which had been
made of the likelihood of a remote control being used, and given
the various indicators that the car should indeed be suspected of
containing a bomb, the actions which the soldiers must be expected
to have taken would be the same whether their understanding of the
message was as it apparently was or whether it was in the sense
which Soldier G apparently intended. In either case, the existence
of the risk to the people of Gibraltar would have been enough,
given the nature of that risk, justifiably to prompt the response
which followed.
18. Paragraph 209, in referring to the assessment made by
Soldier G, also recalls that while he had experience with car
bombs, he was not an expert in radio communications or explosives.
In considering that assessment, it would, however, be fair to add
that, although his inspection of the car was of brief duration, it
was enough to enable him to conclude, particularly in view of the
unusual appearance of its aerial in relation to the age of the car
and the knowledge that the IRA had in the past used cars with
aerials specially fitted, that it was to be regarded as a suspect
car bomb.
The authorities were, in any event, not acting solely on the
basis of Soldier G's assessment. There had also been the earlier
assessment, to which we have referred in paragraph 13 above, that
a "blocking" car was unlikely to be used. In addition, the car had
been seen to be parked by Savage, who was known to be an expert
bomb-maker and who had taken some time (two to three minutes,
according to one witness) to get out of the car, after fiddling
with something between the seats.
19. Paragraph 210 of the judgment asserts, in effect, that the
use of lethal force was made "almost unavoidable" by the
conveyance to Soldiers A, B, C and D of a series of working
hypotheses which were vitiated by the absence of sufficient
allowances for alternative possibilities and by "the definite
reporting... of a car bomb which..., could be detonated at the
press of a button".
We have dealt in paragraphs 13-16 with the points advanced in
support of the conclusion that insufficient allowance was made for
alternative possibilities; and in paragraphs 17 and 18 with the
question of reporting as to the presence of a car bomb.
We further question the conclusion that the use of lethal force
was made "almost unavoidable" by failings of the authorities in
these respects. Quite apart from any other consideration, this
conclusion takes insufficient account of the part played by chance
in the eventual outcome. Had it not been for the movements which
were made by McCann and Farrell as Soldiers A and B closed on them
and which may have been prompted by the completely coincidental
sounding of a police car siren, there is every possibility that
they would have been seized and arrested without a shot being
fired; and had it not been for Savage's actions as Soldiers C and
D closed on him, which may have been prompted by the sound of
gunfire from the McCann and Farrell incident, there is every
possibility that he, too, would have been seized and arrested
without resort to shooting.
20. The implication at the end of paragraph 211 that the
authorities did not exercise sufficient care in evaluating the
information at their disposal before transmitting it to soldiers
"whose use of firearms automatically involved shooting to kill"
appears to be based on no more than "the failure to make provision
for a margin of error" to which the beginning of the paragraph
refers. We have dealt already with the "insufficient allowances
for alternative possibilities" point (see, again, paragraphs 13 -
16 above), which we take to be the same as the alleged failure to
provide for a margin of error which is referred to here. Any
assessment of the evaluation by the authorities of the information
at their disposal should, in any event, take due account of their
need to reckon throughout with the incompleteness of that
information (see paragraph 8 above); and there are no cogent
grounds for any suggestion that there was information which they
ought reasonably to have known but did not.
21. Paragraph 212, after making a glancing reference to the
restrictive effect of the public interest certificates and saying
that it is not clear "whether the use of firearms to wound their
targets may have been warranted by the specific circumstances that
confronted them at the moment of arrest", goes on to say that
"their reflex action in this vital respect lacks the degree of
caution... to be expected from law-enforcement personnel in a
democratic society, even when dealing with dangerous terrorist
suspects, and stands in marked contrast to the standard of care
reflected in the instructions in the use of firearms by the
police". It concludes with the assertion that this "failure by the
authorities also suggests a lack of appropriate care in the
control and organisation of the arrest operation".
22. As regards any suggestion that, if an assessment on the
issue had been required by their training or instruction to be
carried out by the soldiers, shooting to wound might have been
considered by them to have been warranted by the circumstances at
the time, it must be recalled that those circumstances included a
genuine belief on their part that the suspects might be about to
detonate a bomb by pressing a button. In that situation, to shoot
merely to wound would have been a highly dangerous course:
wounding alone might well not have immobilised a suspect and might
have left him or her capable of pressing a button if determined to
do so.
23. More generally as regards the training given, there was in
fact ample evidence at the inquest to the effect that soldiers
(and not only these soldiers) would be trained to respond to a
threat such as that which was thought to be posed by the suspects
in this case - all of them dangerous terrorists who were believed
to be putting many lives at immediate risk - by opening fire once
it was clear that the suspect was not desisting; that the intent
of the firing would be to immobilise; and that the way to achieve
that was to shoot to kill. There was also evidence at the inquest
that soldiers would not be accepted for the SAS unless they
displayed discretion and thoughtfulness; that they would not go
ahead and shoot without thought, nor did they; but they did have
to react very fast. In addition, evidence was given that SAS
members had in fact been successful in the past in arresting
terrorists in the great majority of cases.
24. We are far from persuaded that the Court has any sufficient
basis for concluding, in the face of the evidence at the inquest
and the extent of experience in dealing with terrorist activities
which the relevant training reflects, that some different and
preferable form of training should have been given and that the
action of the soldiers in this case "lacks the degree of caution
in the use of firearms to be expected of law-enforcement personnel
in a democratic society". (We also question, in the light of the
evidence, the fairness of the reference to "reflex action in this
vital respect" - underlining supplied. To be trained to react
rapidly and to do so, when the needs of the situation require, is
not to take reflex action.)
Nor do we accept that the differences between the guide to
police officers in the use of firearms (paragraph 137 of the
judgment) and the "Firearms - rules of engagement" annexed to the
Commissioner's operational order (paragraph 136), when the latter
are taken together (as they should be) with the Rules of
Engagement issued to Soldier F by the Ministry of Defence
(paragraph 16), can validly be invoked to support a contention
that the standard of care enjoined upon the soldiers was
inadequate. Those differences are no doubt attributable to the
differences in backgrounds and requirements of the recipients to
whom they were addressed, account being taken of relevant training
previously given to each group (it is to be noted that, according
to the evidence of Soldier F at the inquest, many lectures are
given to SAS soldiers on the concepts of the rule of law and the
use of minimum force). We fail to see how the instructions for the
soldiers could themselves be read as showing a lack of proper
caution in the use of firearms.
Accordingly, we consider the concluding stricture, that there
was some failure by the authorities in this regard suggesting a
lack of appropriate care in the control and organisation of the
arrest operation, to be unjustified.
25. The accusation of a breach by a State of its obligation
under Article 2 (art. 2) of the Convention to protect the right to
life is of the utmost seriousness. For the reasons given above,
the evaluation in paragraphs 203 to 213 of the judgment seems to
us to fall well short of substantiating the finding that there has
been a breach of the Article (art. 2) in this case. We would
ourselves follow the reasoning and conclusion of the Commission in
its comprehensive, painstaking and notably realistic report. Like
the Commission, we are satisfied that no failings have been shown
in the organisation and control of the operation by the
authorities which could justify a conclusion that force was used
against the suspects disproportionately to the purpose of
defending innocent persons from unlawful violence. We consider
that the use of lethal force in this case, however regrettable the
need to resort to such force may be, did not exceed what was, in
the circumstances as known at the time, "absolutely necessary" for
that purpose and did not amount to a breach by the United Kingdom
of its obligations under the Convention.
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