[неофициальный перевод]
ЕВРОПЕЙСКИЙ СУД ПО ПРАВАМ ЧЕЛОВЕКА
СУДЕБНОЕ РЕШЕНИЕ
БУГХАНЕМИ (BOUGHANEMI) ПРОТИВ ФРАНЦИИ
(Страсбург, 24 апреля 1996 года)
(Извлечение)
КРАТКОЕ НЕОФИЦИАЛЬНОЕ ИЗЛОЖЕНИЕ ОБСТОЯТЕЛЬСТВ ДЕЛА
A. Основные факты
Заявитель, уроженец Туниса, 1960 г. рождения, прибыл во
Францию в 1968 г. и проживал там вместе с семьей вплоть до его
высылки из страны. Заявитель находился в фактических брачных
отношениях с гражданкой Франции (г-жой С.), родившей ребенка
19 июня 1993 г., которого он официально признал 5 апреля 1994 г.
Ранее он был осужден за разные преступления, в том числе и за
сутенерство, и приговаривался к лишению свободы общим сроком почти
на четыре года.
8 марта 1988 г. министр внутренних дел подписал распоряжение о
его высылке из страны на том основании, что его присутствие на
территории Франции является угрозой общественному порядку
(статьи 23 и 24 Ордонанса от 2 ноября 1945 г. с последующими
изменениями). Распоряжение о высылке из страны было исполнено
12 ноября 1988 г., но заявитель вернулся во Францию и проживал там
нелегально.
10 августа 1990 г. министр внутренних дел ответил отказом на
ходатайство г-на Бугханеми об отмене распоряжения о высылке.
Заявитель обжаловал отказ в административный суд г. Лиона, но
26 февраля 1991 г. суд отклонил жалобу. 7 декабря 1992 г. Решение
суда было подтверждено Государственным советом.
Заявитель был арестован за невыполнение распоряжения о высылке
и приговорен к трем месяцам лишения свободы. 12 октября 1994 г. он
был выслан в Тунис.
B. Разбирательство в Комиссии по правам человека
В жалобе, поданной в Комиссию 3 июня 1993 г. на нарушение
статьи 8 Конвенции, заявитель полагал право на уважение частной и
семейной жизни. Жалоба была признана приемлемой 29 августа 1994 г.
Безрезультатно попытавшись решить вопрос на основе мирового
соглашения, 10 января 1995 г. Комиссия подготовила доклад, в
котором были установлены факты и выражено мнение о том, что имело
место нарушение статьи 8 (двадцатью одним голосом против пяти).
Комиссия и Правительство Франции направили дело в Суд 1 марта
и 20 апреля 1995 г. соответственно.
ИЗВЛЕЧЕНИЕ ИЗ СУДЕБНОГО РЕШЕНИЯ
ВОПРОСЫ ПРАВА
I. О предполагаемом нарушении статьи 8 Конвенции
31. По утверждению г-на Бугханеми, высылка его из страны,
произведенная французскими властями, явилась вмешательством в его
частную и семейную жизнь и нарушила его права, гарантированные
статьей 8 Конвенции, которая гласит:
"1. Каждый человек имеет право на уважение его личной и
семейной жизни, неприкосновенности его жилища и тайны
корреспонденции.
2. Не допускается вмешательство со стороны государственных
органов в осуществление этого права, за исключением вмешательства,
предусмотренного законом и необходимого в демократическом обществе
в интересах государственной безопасности и общественного
спокойствия, экономического благосостояния страны, в целях
предотвращения беспорядков или преступлений, для охраны здоровья
или нравственности или защиты прав и свобод других лиц".
Правительство оспаривает это утверждение, у Комиссии иное
мнение.
A. Пункт 1 статьи 8
32. Необходимо прежде всего определить, может ли заявитель
ссылаться на наличие у него во Франции "частной и семейной жизни"
в смысле статьи 8 п. 1.
33. По мнению Правительства, заявитель не сумел доказать, что
его связывали с родителями, братьями и сестрами реальные тесные
узы. Все вышеуказанные родственники проживают во Франции, но
заявитель, которому на момент высылки было 34 года, давно уже жил
отдельно. Ни один документ, изученный административными судами, не
подтвердил утверждение заявителя, что он получал помощь со стороны
семьи.
Что касается ссылок заявителя на его собственную семейную
жизнь, то они не могут быть приняты во внимание, так как
совместная жизнь и признание отцовства имели место после решения о
его высылке из страны и Решения Государственного совета от
7 декабря 1992 г. Данные отношения, установленные после
нелегального возвращения заявителя во Францию, не могут служить
подтверждением наличия семейной жизни. Из заявлений, сделанных
6 декабря 1994 г. бывшей сожительницей г-на Бугханеми (см. п. 16
выше), следует, что их совместная жизнь окончательно прекратилась
задолго до 28 июля 1994 г., даты последнего задержания заявителя,
и a fortiori до 12 октября 1994 г., даты его повторной высылки в
Тунис. Ребенка г-н Бугханеми признал только 5 апреля 1994 г., т.е.
через десять месяцев после его рождения 19 июня 1993 г., в то
время как по французскому законодательству он мог это сделать даже
до его рождения, причем мать ребенка не смогла бы ему в этом
воспрепятствовать. Кстати, в поданной в Комиссию 3 июня 1993 г.
жалобе ничего не сказано о том, что ожидается рождение ребенка.
Этот факт заявителем упомянут лишь в дополнениях к жалобе от 5 мая
1994 г. Более того, между отцом и сыном, по всей видимости, не
возникло связи, которая могла бы быть нарушена высылкой первого из
страны. И наконец, г-н Бугханеми не представил никаких
доказательств того, что он содержит своего ребенка, принимает
участие в его воспитании или осуществляет иные родительские права.
34. Комиссия считает, что исполнение решения о высылке
представляет собой вмешательство в осуществление права заявителя
на уважение его частной и семейной жизни.
35. Суд считает, что сомнения Правительства относительно
наличия семейных отношений между г-ном Бугханеми и г-жой С. не
лишены оснований: их совместная жизнь началась, по всей видимости,
только после незаконного возвращения г-на Бугханеми и продолжалась
один год, а на момент его повторной высылки и за много месяцев до
рождения ребенка они уже вместе не жили.
Тем не менее нельзя прийти к заключению об отсутствии у
заявителя частной и семейной жизни во Франции.
Заявитель признал, хотя и довольно поздно, ребенка, рожденного
г-жой С. В понятие семьи, на котором основана статья 8, входят и
узы, которые существуют между лицом и его ребенком, даже если мать
и отец не проживают совместно и независимо от того, рожден ли
ребенок в браке или вне его (см. mutatis mutandis, Решение по делу
Беррехаб против Нидерландов от 21 июня 1988 г. Серия A, т. 138,
с. 14, п. 21, и Решение по делу Гюль против Швейцарии от
19 февраля 1996 г. Reports, 1996-I, с. 173 - 174, п. 32). Хотя
последующие события при исключительных обстоятельствах могут
разорвать эти узы (см. вышеуказанное Решение по делу Гюль), в
данном случае таких обстоятельств нет как в связи с запоздалым
признанием ребенка, так и в связи с предполагаемым отношением
заявителя к ребенку.
Кроме того, родители г-на Бугханеми и его братья и сестры
проживают на законных основаниях во Франции, и ничто не
доказывает, что их не связывают никакие узы.
Из-за высылки заявитель оказался разлученным со своими
родственниками и с ребенком. Таким образом, высылка может
рассматриваться как вмешательство в осуществление права,
предусмотренного статьей 8.
B. Пункт 2 статьи 8
36. В связи с этим следует определить, подпадает ли высылка
под условия п. 2, т.е. была ли она "предусмотрена законом",
преследовала ли одну или несколько правомерных целей и была ли
"необходима в демократическом обществе" для ее или их
осуществления.
1. "Предусмотрено законом"
37. Из материалов дела следует, что принятое в отношении г-на
Бугханеми решение о его высылке основано на статьях 23 и 24
Ордонанса от 2 ноября 1945 г. об условиях въезда и пребывания
иностранцев во Франции с последующими изменениями (см. п. 18 и 19
выше).
2. Правомерная цель
38. Правительство и Комиссия считают, что вышеуказанное
вмешательство преследовало цели, вполне совместимые с Конвенцией:
"охрана публичного порядка" и "предотвращение преступлений". Суд
пришел к такому же заключению.
3. "Необходимо в демократическом обществе"
39. Правительство утверждает, что вышеназванное вмешательство
соразмерно преследуемым целям. Оно подчеркнуло, что заявитель
совершил большое количество правонарушений, и тяжесть последнего
преступления, в результате которого он был осужден за "сутенерство
в особо тяжелой форме". Правительство указало на отягчающие
обстоятельства, которые сопровождали данное преступление: акты
насилия, наличие соучастников, принуждение жертвы заниматься
проституцией за пределами метрополии.
В то же время имевшее место вмешательство в частную и семейную
жизнь заявителя не следует преувеличивать: им не было доказано ни
наличия особо тесных уз с его живущей во Франции семьей, ни какого
бы то ни было социального приобщения к жизни в этой стране, где он
фактически никогда не работал. Кроме того, по достижении
совершеннолетия он не ходатайствовал о получении французского
гражданства. Более того, он, как стало известно, сохранил свои
связи с Тунисом, не ограничившись лишь тунисским гражданством: его
родители - тунисцы, детство он провел в Тунисе, и во Франции он
вращался среди тунисцев, говорит по-арабски или по крайней мере на
его обиходном диалекте. Кроме того, поскольку он прожил в Тунисе
до восьмилетнего возраста, вполне очевидно, что там и были
заложены основы его воспитания, в частности, в течение первых двух
лет его школьного образования. Кстати, он и не утверждал, что
разорвал все связи с этой страной. И наконец, у него, по-видимому,
имеются деловые отношения с тунисскими кругами. Короче, его жизнь
не ограничивается только Францией.
40. Комиссия отклонила этот довод. По вопросу степени
вмешательства в частную и семейную жизнь г-на Бугханеми Комиссия
отмечает, что он прибыл во Францию в возрасте восьми лет, где и
проживал вплоть до своей первой высылки в Тунис в 1988 г. в
возрасте 28 лет и второй высылки в октябре 1994 г. в возрасте
34 лет. Вся его семья находится во Франции, и там он жил с
француженкой, от нее имеет ребенка, которого признал 5 апреля
1994 г. В этой связи представитель Комиссии напомнил содержание
письма, которое г-жа С. направила в Комиссию 15 июня 1994 г. (см.
п. 16 выше). Хотя с правовой точки зрения заявитель является
иностранцем, с Францией его связывают семейные и социальные узы, и
Правительство не смогло доказать, что заявителя связывает что-либо
с Тунисом, кроме гражданства. Таким образом, несмотря на тяжесть
предъявленных обвинений, повлекших за собой высылку из страны, не
было обеспечено справедливое равновесие между преследуемыми
целями, с одной стороны, и правом на уважение личной и семейной
жизни, с другой.
41. Суд отмечает, что лежащая на государстве - участнике
ответственность за обеспечение публичного порядка выражается, в
частности, в его праве в соответствии с признанным принципом
международного права и в рамках его обязательств по договорам
контролировать въезд и пребывание иностранцев и высылать за
пределы страны правонарушителей из их числа.
Однако поскольку их решения могут в демократическом обществе
нарушить право, охраняемое статьей 8 п. 1, такие решения должны
оправдываться крайней социальной необходимостью и соответствовать
правомерной цели (см. среди прочих Решение по делу Бельджуди
против Франции от 26 марта 1992 г. Серия A, т. 234-A, с. 27,
п. 74, и Решение по делу Насри против Франции от 13 июля 1995 г.
Серия A, т. 320-B, с. 25, п. 41). Вынося решение о "необходимости"
вмешательства, Суд принимает во внимание предоставляемые
государствам - участникам пределы усмотрения по данному вопросу
(см., например, вышеуказанное Решение по делу Беррехаба, с. 15,
п. 28).
42. Задача Суда состоит в том, чтобы определить, было ли
соблюдено при высылке справедливое равновесие между
соответствующими интересами, а именно правом заявителя на уважение
его частной и семейной жизни, с одной стороны, и, с другой
стороны, охраной общественного порядка и предотвращением
преступлений.
43. Г-н Бугханеми прибыл во Францию в возрасте восьми лет, где
пребывал на законных основаниях с 1968-го по 1988 год, а затем
после тайного возвращения до 12 октября 1994 г. Основную часть
своего образования он получил во Франции. Там же живут и его
родители, и десять братьев и сестер, из которых пятеро учатся в
школе, восемь из них родились во Франции, и двое имеют французское
гражданство. Кроме того, во Франции он сожительствовал с
гражданкой Франции, ребенка которой он признал только 5 апреля
1994 г., хотя ребенок родился 19 июня 1993 г.
44. Однако заявитель сохранил тунисское гражданство и, по всей
видимости, никогда не проявлял желания стать гражданином Франции.
Вполне возможно, что, кроме гражданства, он сохранил с Тунисом,
как это утверждает Правительство, и какие-то иные связи: в
Комиссии он не утверждал, что не знает арабского языка, что порвал
все связи со своей родиной, что не возвращался туда до выдворения
из Франции.
Суд считает также, что обстоятельства настоящего дела
отличаются от обстоятельств по делам Мустаким против Бельгии
(Решение от 18 февраля 1991 г. Серия A, т. 193), Бельджуди против
Франции и Насри против Франции (см. вышеупомянутые Решения), по
которым Суд вынес Решение о нарушении статьи 8.
Суд придает особенно большое значение тому, что решение о
высылке г-на Бугханеми было принято после того, как последний был
приговорен почти к четырем годам заключения строгого режима, из
них к трем годам - за сутенерство в особо опасной форме (см. п. 8
и 39 выше). Тяжесть этого последнего преступления, а также
предыдущие правонарушения заявителя весомо свидетельствуют против
него.
45. С учетом вышеизложенного Суд не считает, что высылка
заявителя является несоразмерной по отношению к правомерным целям.
Таким образом, нарушение статьи 8 места не имело.
ПО ЭТИМ ОСНОВАНИЯМ СУД
Постановил семью голосами против двух, что не было нарушения
статьи 8 Конвенции.
Совершено на французском и английском языках и оглашено во
Дворце прав человека в Страсбурге 24 апреля 1996 г.
Председатель
Рольф РИССДАЛ
Грефье
Герберт ПЕТЦОЛЬД
В соответствии со статьей 51 п. 2 Конвенции и статьей 53 п. 2
Регламента Суда A к настоящему Решению прилагаются отдельные
мнения судей.
СОВПАДАЮЩЕЕ МНЕНИЕ СУДЬИ ПЕТТИТИ
Как и большинство, я голосовал за то, чтобы признать, что
статья 8 Конвенции не нарушена. Однако я считаю, что следовало
исходить из иной мотивировки.
Учитывая особые обстоятельства дела (преступник - рецидивист,
сутенер), было бы предпочтительнее исходить из статьи 1 Конвенции,
в которой не предусматривается обязательство для государства не
выдворять преступников - рецидивистов, и на этом основании решить,
что нарушения права на уважение семейной жизни не было. Семейная
жизнь предполагает сплоченность членов семьи, что противоречит
деятельности, связанной с сутенерством в особо тяжелой форме.
Учитывая вышеизложенное, отпала бы необходимость
анализировать, было ли вмешательство. Наличие братьев и сестер
само по себе не создает семейной жизни (см. п. 43 настоящего
Решения). Кроме того, большинство не уточнило, какой была практика
Суда по жалобе, основанной на статье 8, но поданной иностранцем,
который после выдворения нелегально вернулся в страну и там тайно
проживал.
Следует еще раз подчеркнуть, что рассмотренные Судом дела по
высылке из страны указывают на необходимость разработки
европейской политики государств - участников, определив пределы их
обязательств в этой области. В подобных случаях речь не идет о
том, чтобы искать справедливое равновесие между публичным порядком
и конкретными интересами заявителя.
Интересы общества и семьи нельзя сравнивать и сопоставлять с
интересами, связанными с сутенерской деятельностью. Государства -
члены Совета Европы должны также учитывать необходимость защиты
женщин, которых сутенеры принуждают к проституции.
Следует также отметить, что среди государств - членов Совета
Европы имеется мало стран, которые, подобно Франции, проводят
политику воссоединения семей.
ОСОБОЕ МНЕНИЕ СУДЬИ МАРТЕНСА
1. В этом деле Суд вновь столкнулся с вопросом о высылке
интегрированного иностранца, который прибыл во Францию в
восьмилетнем возрасте, где и проживал, как и его родители, братья
и сестры, вплоть до момента его высылки, после двадцати двух лет
пребывания в стране.
2. Существует несколько путей рассмотрения данного вопроса.
3. Это, разумеется, тот, по которому до сих пор шло
большинство в Суде. Отправной идеей является то, что Конвенция не
защищает иностранцев от высылки, даже если они укоренились в
стране. Однако они могут ссылаться на Конвенцию, поскольку высылка
является вмешательством, нарушающим их право на уважение семейной
жизни. В этом случае Суд должен решить, является ли вмешательство
оправданным в свете статьи 8 п. 2.
4. В этом традиционном подходе имеются два совершенно
очевидных недостатка.
Во-первых, не у всякого интегрировавшегося иностранца есть
семейная жизнь.
Во-вторых, это приводит к отсутствию правовой определенности.
Национальные административные органы и суды не могут заранее
сказать, будет ли признана приемлемой жалоба на высылку такого
иностранца. Для национальных властей индивидуальный подход
большинства в Суде к каждому случаю в отдельности представляет
собой лотерею, а для Суда - источник проблем. Проблемы
действительно появляются, поскольку Суду приходится делать почти
невозможные сравнения между обоснованностью переданного на его
рассмотрение дела и дел, по которым Суд уже вынес решения. А ведь,
мягко говоря, совсем нелегко сравнивать такие дела, как: дело
Мустаким против Бельгии (Решение от 18 февраля 1991 г. Серия A,
т. 193), дело Бельджуди против Франции (Решение от 26 марта
1992 г. Серия A, т. 234-A), дело Насри против Франции (Решение от
13 июля 1995 г. Серия A, т. 320-B) и дело Бугханеми против
Франции. Что нужно сделать в этом случае: просто ли сравнить
количество и тяжесть наказаний и приговоров или следует также
принять во внимание и личные обстоятельства? Вполне очевидно, что
большинство в Суде избрало этот последний подход и посчитало для
себя возможным провести сравнение, но - при всем моем уважении к
Суду - я не могу отделаться от ощущения того, что результаты
данного сравнения несколько произвольны.
5. Первый из вышеуказанных недостатков может быть легко
устранен, если признать, что высылка интегрировавшихся иностранцев
в любом случае является вмешательством в их частную жизнь. Я
выступил в поддержку такого подхода в своем совпадающем мнении в
связи с делом Бельджуди. Этот подход разделяют также судьи
Де Мейер, Моренилла, Вильдхабер. Мне кажется, что при таком
подходе судебная практика была бы значительно лучше. Хочу
надеяться, что формулировка п. 42 Решения Суда, где он
ссылается на "право заявителя на уважение его частной и семейной
жизни", является подтверждением того, что Суд к этому стремится.
6. Однако подход с позиции частной жизни сам по себе, конечно,
не устраняет второго недостатка в традиционном взгляде, ибо при
этом необходимо в то же время определить, является ли
вмешательство в частную жизнь оправданным.
7. Чтобы устранить всякую неопределенность, существует только
один путь - это признать положение, за которое выступал сначала
судья Де Мейер, а затем судья Моренилла. Они исходят из того, что
иностранцы, прожившие всю (или почти всю) свою жизнь в каком-либо
государстве, должны быть приравнены к гражданам этого государства.
Высылка граждан запрещена статьей 3 п. 1 Протокола N 4 (П 4-3-1),
судьи Де Мейер и Моренилла утверждают, что высылка
интегрировавшихся иностранцев запрещается в соответствии со
статьей 3 Конвенции. Принятием данного положения устраняется
всякая неопределенность, поскольку статья 3 не допускает
исключений. При таком подходе сама по себе высылка такого
иностранца является нарушением Конвенции, независимо от
совершенных им преступлений.
8. Хотя я разделяю эту позицию, мне трудно признать, что здесь
не может быть исключений. В связи с этим я считаю, что хотя, как
правило, высылка интегрировавшихся иностранцев является нарушением
их права на уважение их частной жизни, однако при совершенно
особых обстоятельствах такая высылка может быть оправданной.
Думаю, что совпадающее мнение судьи Вильдхабера по делу Насри идет
в том же направлении, хотя он, по-видимому, склонен проявлять
меньше строгости, чем я, в отношении того, что относится к
исключениям.
9. По моему мнению, второй недостаток традиционного подхода,
т.е. его непредсказуемость, можно сильно ограничить, если бы Суд
признал, что высылка такого иностранца в принципе является
нарушением его права на уважение его личной жизни, но в
исключительных случаях она может считаться оправданной, если
иностранец осужден за очень тяжкие правонарушения, например,
преступления против государства, политический или религиозный
терроризм или занятие наркобизнесом.
10. Я согласен, что сутенерство в особо тяжелой форме является
серьезным и, более того, отвратительным преступлением, но я в то
же время считаю, что в связи с настоящим делом оно подпадает под
категорию "обычных преступлений", тяжесть которых не настолько
велика, чтобы отнести их к исключительным обстоятельствам, могущим
оправдать высылку интегрировавшегося иностранца, поскольку в
отношении таких преступлений обычные уголовные меры пресечения и
санкции должны быть достаточными, как они должны быть достаточными
и в отношении правонарушений, совершенных гражданами данной
страны.
11. По этим причинам я голосовал за признание нарушения
Конвенции.
ОСОБОЕ МНЕНИЕ СУДЬИ БАКА
Как и большинство в Суде, я считаю, что приказ о высылке
является вмешательством в личную и семейную жизнь заявителя. Я
согласен с тем, что высылка предусмотрена законом и преследует
правомерную цель.
В то же время вопреки мнению большинства я считаю, что в
демократическом обществе не было необходимости в издании приказа о
высылке, так как он несоразмерен преследуемой правомерной цели и
соответственно привел в настоящем деле к нарушению статьи 8
Конвенции.
По моему мнению, большая часть семейных и социальных уз
заявителя связана с Францией. Его родители и десять братьев и
сестер проживают во Франции, а восемь членов этой семьи там
родились. У него во Франции есть ребенок, хотя до сих пор точный
характер связи между ними остается невыясненным.
Учитывая все эти факторы, а также то, что заявитель покинул
Тунис в возрасте восьми лет со знанием арабского языка, не
соответствующим уровню, требуемому взрослому для владения
повседневным языком, и что "большую часть своего образования он
получил" во Франции, я пришел к заключению, что между охраняемыми
интересами не было обеспечено справедливой соразмерности. При этих
обстоятельствах высылка может полностью разрушить частную и
семейную жизнь заявителя, мало способствуя предотвращению
совершения преступлений и беспорядков.
Для меня также не убедителен довод Суда о том, что "решение о
высылке заявителя было принято после вынесения приговора" и что
"тяжесть этого последнего преступления, а также предыдущие
судимости сильно ему вредят".
В связи с этим я считаю, что обращение с заявителем, который
большую часть своей жизни (двадцать два года) провел во Франции,
не должно быть значительно менее благоприятным, чем с гражданином
данной страны. Он совершил преступления и был за это осужден. Если
само по себе наказание адекватно и соответствует совершенному
преступлению, как это и должно быть, то добавлять к этому еще и
высылку означает, по моему мнению, придание чрезмерного значения
общему интересу в предотвращении преступлений и защите
правопорядка по сравнению с защитой права индивидуума на личную и
семейную жизнь.
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
CASE OF BOUGHANEMI v. FRANCE
JUDGMENT
(Strasbourg, 24.IV.1996)
In the case of Boughanemi v. France <1>,
The European Court of Human Rights, sitting, in accordance
with Article 43 (art. 43) of the Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ("the Convention") and the
relevant provisions of Rules of Court A <2>, as a Chamber composed
of the following judges:
--------------------------------
Notes by the Registrar
<1> The case is numbered 16/1995/522/608. The first number is
the case's position on the list of cases referred to the Court in
the relevant year (second number). The last two numbers indicate
the case's position on the list of cases referred to the Court
since its creation and on the list of the corresponding
originating applications to the Commission.
<2> Rules A apply to all cases referred to the Court before
the entry into force of Protocol No. 9 (P9) (1 October 1994) and
thereafter only to cases concerning States not bound by that
Protocol (P9). They correspond to the Rules that came into force
on 1 January 1983, as amended several times subsequently.
Mr R. Ryssdal, President,
Mr F. Matscher,
Mr L.-E. Pettiti,
Mr A. Spielmann,
Mr N. Valticos,
Mr S.K. Martens,
Mr A.N. Loizou,
Mr A.B. Baka,
Mr M.A. Lopes Rocha,
and also of Mr H. Petzold, Registrar, and Mr P.J. Mahoney,
Deputy Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 24 November 1995 and 27 March
1996,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the
last-mentioned date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case was referred to the Court by the European
Commission of Human Rights ("the Commission") and by the French
Government ("the Government") on 1 March and 20 April 1995
respectively, within the three-month period laid down by Article
32 para. 1 and Article 47 (art. 32-1, art. 47) of the Convention.
It originated in an application (no. 22070/93) against the French
Republic lodged with the Commission under Article 25 (art. 25) by
a Tunisian national, Mr Kamel Boughanemi, on 3 June 1993.
The Commission's request referred to Articles 44 and 48 (art.
44, art. 48) and to the declaration whereby France recognised the
compulsory jurisdiction of the Court (Article 46) (art. 46). The
object of the request was to obtain a decision as to whether the
facts of the case disclosed a breach by the respondent State of
its obligations under Article 8 (art. 8) of the Convention.
2. In response to the enquiry made in accordance with Rule 33
para. 3 (d) of Rules of Court A, the applicant stated that he
wished to take part in the proceedings and designated the lawyer
who would represent him (Rule 30). By a letter of 1 August 1995
the lawyer in question informed the Registrar that he was no
longer acting for Mr Boughanemi.
3. The Chamber to be constituted included ex officio Mr L.-E.
Pettiti, the elected judge of French nationality (Article 43 of
the Convention) (art. 43), and Mr R. Ryssdal, the President of the
Court (Rule 21 para. 4 (b)). On 5 May 1995, in the presence of the
Registrar, the President drew by lot the names of the other seven
members, namely Mr F. Matscher, Mr A. Spielmann, Mr N. Valticos,
Mr S.K. Martens, Mr A.N. Loizou, Mr A.B. Baka and Mr M.A. Lopes
Rocha (Article 43 in fine of the Convention and Rule 21 para. 5)
(art. 43).
4. As President of the Chamber (Rule 21 para. 6), Mr Ryssdal,
acting through the Registrar, consulted the Agent of the
Government, the applicant's lawyer and the Delegate of the
Commission on the organisation of the proceedings (Rules 37
para. 1 and 38). Pursuant to the orders made in consequence, the
registry received the Government's memorial on 28 August 1995. On
30 October 1995 the Secretary to the Commission indicated that the
Delegate did not wish to reply in writing.
5. On 19 June 1995 the Commission had produced various
documents that the Registrar had requested on the President's
instructions.
6. In accordance with the President's decision, the hearing
took place in public in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on
21 November 1995. The Court had held a preparatory meeting
beforehand.
There appeared before the Court:
(a) for the Government
Mr M. Perrin de Brichambaut, Director of Legal Affairs,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Agent,
Mr J. Cochard, Emeritus President of the Social Division of
the Court of Cassation and President of an association for the
prevention of procuring,
Mrs M. Pauti, Head of the Comparative and International Law
Office, Department of Civil Liberties and Legal Affairs, Ministry
of the Interior,
Mrs S. Crouzier, assistant at the Legal Affairs Department,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Counsel;
(b) for the Commission
Mr J.-C. Geus, Delegate.
The Court heard addresses by Mr Geus, Mr Perrin de Brichambaut
and Mr Cochard.
AS TO THE FACTS
I. Particular circumstances of the case
7. Mr Kamel Boughanemi was born on 23 November 1960 in Tunisia
and has Tunisian nationality. He came to France in 1968 and lived
there continuously until his deportation. His parents and his ten
brothers and sisters reside in France. Eight of his brothers and
sisters were born there. He claims that he lived with a woman of
French nationality (Miss S.), whose child, born on 19 June 1993,
he formally recognised on 5 April 1994.
A. The applicant's criminal record
8. The applicant was convicted on a number of occasions. On
21 December 1981 he was sentenced to ten months' imprisonment,
four of which were suspended, for burglary. On 22 September 1983
he was sentenced to two months' imprisonment for an assault
resulting in the victim's not being fit for work for a period
exceeding eight days. On 25 September 1986 he was fined 1,500
francs for driving without a licence and without insurance and on
24 March 1987 he was sentenced to three years' imprisonment for
living on the earnings of prostitution with aggravating
circumstances.
B. The deportation procedure
1. The deportation order
9. On 8 March 1988 the Minister of the Interior issued an
order for Mr Boughanemi's deportation worded a follows:
"... Having regard to sections 23 and 24 of Ordinance no.
45-2658 of 2 November 1945, as amended, concerning the conditions
of entry and residence of aliens in France;
Having regard to Decree no. 82-440 of 26 May 1982;
Whereas Kamel Boughanemi ... committed the following offences:
on 21 August 1981 a burglary; on 21 November 1981 an assault on
the person of a representative of the public authority who was
performing his duties; on 25 January 1983 an assault; and from
26 September 1986 to 10 October 1986, acts amounting to living on
the earnings of prostitution with aggravating circumstances;
Whereas on account of his behaviour the presence of this
foreign national on French territory represents a threat to public
order; ...
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AS FOLLOWS
Article 1: the above-mentioned person is enjoined to leave the
French territory;
Article 2: the Prefect of Police and the prefects are
instructed to serve and execute this order. ..."
10. The deportation order was executed on 12 November 1988 but
the applicant returned to France and lived there illegally.
11. On 16 March 1989 the Lyons Administrative Court dismissed
the applicant's appeal alleging that the deportation order was an
abuse of authority.
2. The application to have the deportation
order rescinded
12. On 21 March 1990 the applicant applied to the Minister of
the Interior to have the deportation order rescinded. His
application was rejected on 10 August 1990 on the following
grounds:
"...I hereby inform you that the deportation order was made by
the competent authorities in view of the nature and increasing
gravity of the offences committed by the applicant. The threat to
public order was also assessed with reference to Mr Boughanemi's
general conduct as was required under the circular on the
implementation of the Law of 9 September 1986.
In addition, the Lyons [Administrative Court] confirmed the
deportation order on 16 March 1989.
It is accordingly impossible for me to grant your request. The
deportation order of 8 March 1988 must therefore remain in force.
..."
3. The application for judicial review
(a) In the Lyons Administrative Court
13. On 9 October 1990 Mr Boughanemi lodged with the Lyons
Administrative Court an application for judicial review of the
Minister's decision refusing to rescind the deportation order. In
its judgment of 26 February 1991 dismissing the application, the
Lyons court gave the following grounds:
"...Under section 23 of the Ordinance of 2 November 1945, as
amended in particular by the Law of 2 August 1989, "subject to the
provisions of section 25, deportation may be decided by order of
the Minister of the Interior if an alien's presence on French
territory constitutes a serious threat to public order. The
deportation order may be rescinded at any time by the Minister of
the Interior..." Although section 25, as amended by the
aforementioned Law, prohibits the Minister, save in cases of
extreme urgency as provided for in section 26, from ordering the
deportation of certain categories of alien, that provision cannot
be usefully invoked to support an application to have a previously
issued deportation order rescinded. It is exclusively a matter for
the Minister to whom such an application has been made to assess
pursuant to section 23 whether the presence of the person
concerned on French territory constitutes at the date on which he
gives his decision a serious threat to public order.
In the first place, it follows from the foregoing that the
submission based on the fact that Mr Boughanemi has lived
continuously in France since the age of 8 and that for that
reason, in accordance with the new section 25 of the Ordinance of
2 November 1945, a deportation order could not be made against him
after the coming into operation of the Law of 2 August 1989 is
without force in regard to the decision refusing to rescind the
deportation order made against him on 8 March 1988. Nor can he
rely on the principle that more lenient criminal legislation
should be applied with retrospective effect.
Secondly, an appeal brought against the deportation decision
of 8 March 1988 alleging that it was an abuse of authority was
dismissed as unfounded by a judgment of this court on 16 March
1989. That decision carries with it the authority of res judicata,
which precludes Mr Boughanemi from pleading the unlawfulness of
that measure in support of his submissions directed against the
refusal to rescind it.
Finally, the documents in the file show that the Minister, who
took his decision in the light of all the circumstances of the
case, did not make a manifest error of assessment in concluding,
on the basis of the acts that gave rise to the applicant's being
arrested and prosecuted on several occasions between 1981 and 1988
and aspects of Mr Boughanemi's conduct, that the latter's presence
on French territory constituted a serious threat to public order
and in refusing on those grounds to rescind the deportation order
made against him.
It follows from all the foregoing considerations that the
applicant's submission that the impugned decision is vitiated as
an abuse of authority is unfounded and his application to have it
set aside on that ground must fail."
(b) In the Conseil d'Etat
14. On 7 December 1992 the Conseil d'Etat dismissed the
applicant's appeal lodged on 23 October 1991. It gave, inter alia,
the following reasons:
"...Although the wording of section 25 of the above-mentioned
Ordinance of 2 November 1945 was amended by the Law of 2 August
1989, Mr Boughanemi cannot usefully rely on this change in the
legal position in order to plead that the Minister of the Interior
was under a duty to rescind the deportation order issued against
him under previous legislation concerning aliens. It was
exclusively a matter for the Minister to whom an application for
such an order to be rescinded has been made to determine whether,
in accordance with section 23 of the Ordinance of 2 November 1945
as in force at the date of the application, the presence of the
person concerned on French territory represented a serious threat
to public order.
It appears from the documents in the file that the Minister,
who took his decision in the light of all the evidence in the
case, did not make a manifest error of assessment in finding that
the presence in France of the appellant, who had committed
repeated and increasingly serious offences, including that of
living on the earnings of prostitution with aggravating
circumstances, still represented, as at 10 August 1990, a serious
threat to public order. He was therefore entitled to refuse to
rescind the order for Mr Boughanemi's deportation.
In the circumstances of this case, the Minister of the
Interior's refusal to rescind the deportation order made against
Mr Boughanemi, who returned to France and lived there illegally
after the execution of that deportation order, did not interfere
with the latter's family life to an extent that exceeded what was
necessary to preserve public order. Thus the submission that the
refusal to rescind the deportation order of 8 March 1988 infringed
the right to respect for family life guaranteed by Article 8 (art.
8) of the European Convention on Human Rights must fail. ..."
4. The deportation
15. Mr Boughanemi was arrested on 28 July 1994 for breach of
the deportation order and was sentenced to three months'
imprisonment. On 12 October 1994 he was deported to Tunisia.
C. The statements of Miss S.
16. On 20 June 1994 the Commission received from Miss S. (see
paragraph 7 above) the following letter, dated 15 June 1994:
"As partner (concubine) and mother of the child of Mr Kamel
Boughanemi, I wish by this letter to draw your attention to our
situation.
The difficulty of getting his identity papers back makes it
impossible for us to lead a normal life.
There is also the fact that, as I am myself unemployed, my
financial circumstances make it impossible for me to give him
either moral or financial support. What is more, I am his partner
and, despite all his efforts to be recognised as a normal citizen,
it is unfortunately impossible for us to live together. Faced with
all the problems raised by his getting administrative recognition,
I write to you in the hope that you will take account of the fact
that both he and I are acting in good faith. ..."
On 6 December 1994 Miss S. made the following statement to an
officer of the criminal investigation department (extracts from
the police report):
"... I do know Kameledine Boughanemi. I've known him for about
three years. I lived with him from the end of 1992 till Christmas
1993 when we separated because of a disagreement.
When we lived together he was out of work. He lived at my
place ... I paid for his keep.
He never gave me any money because he didn't have any.
He didn't recognise my son until April 1994, because to begin
with I wasn't too keen on the idea.
So far he has never sent any money for our child. He calls me
from time to time to find out if there is any news about his
application to the European Court. I don't intend to live with him
if he comes back.
I have nothing else to say on this matter. ..."
II. Relevant domestic law
17. Deportation is governed by Ordinance no. 45-2658 of 2
November 1945 concerning the conditions of entry and residence of
aliens in France, as amended by, inter alia, the following Laws:
no. 81-973 of 29 October 1981; no. 86-1025 of 9 September 1986;
no. 89-548 of 2 August 1989; no. 91-1383 of 31 December 1991; and
no. 93-1027 of 24 August 1993.
A. The rules governing deportation
1. Normal procedure
(a) Principles and procedure
18. According to the first paragraph of section 23 of the
Ordinance, as amended by the Law of 9 September 1986, "subject to
the provisions of section 25, deportation may be decided by order
of the Minister of the Interior if an alien's presence on French
territory constitutes a threat to public order".
The Law of 2 August 1989 restored the wording that this
section had contained prior to the Law of 9 September 1986, to the
effect that deportation might only be ordered in the event of a
"serious" threat to public order.
19. Section 24, as amended by the Laws of 29 October 1981 and
9 September 1986, stated:
"Deportation as provided for in section 23 may be ordered only
where the following conditions are satisfied:
1) The alien must be given advance notice in accordance with
the conditions laid down in a decree of the Conseil d'Etat;
2) The alien shall be summoned to be interviewed by a board
which is convened by the prefect and is composed as follows:
the President of the tribunal de grande instance of the
administrative capital of the {departement} <*> or a judge
delegated by him, chairman;
-------------------------------
<*> Здесь и далее по тексту слова на национальном языке
набраны латинским шрифтом и выделены фигурными скобками.
a judicial officer (magistrat) designated by the general
assembly of the tribunal de grande instance of the administrative
capital of the {departement}; and
an administrative court judge.
The head of the aliens' department at the prefecture shall act
as rapporteur; the director of health and social affairs of the
{departement} or his representative shall be heard by the board.
They shall not attend the board's deliberations.
The summons, which must be served on the alien at least eight
days before the board's meeting, shall inform him that he has the
right to be assisted by a lawyer or by any other person of his
choice and to be heard with the help of an interpreter.
The alien may request legal aid in accordance with the
conditions laid down in Law no. 72-11 of 3 January 1972. This
possibility shall be mentioned in the summons. A provisional grant
of legal aid may be decided by the chairman of the board.
The board's hearing shall be public. The chairman shall ensure
the proper conduct of the proceedings. All the orders made by him
to that end must be executed immediately. Before the board the
alien may put forward all the reasons that militate against his
deportation. A report recording the alien's statements shall be
transmitted, together with the board's opinion, to the Minister of
the Interior, who shall give a decision. The board's opinion shall
also be communicated to the person concerned."
The Law of 2 August 1989 inserted, inter alia, the following
provision:
"3) If the board issues an opinion opposing deportation, a
deportation order may not be made."
The latter provision was however repealed by the Law of 24
August 1993.
(b) Protected aliens
20. Section 25 of the Ordinance, as amended by the Law of 29
October 1981, subsequently amended by the Law of 9 September 1986,
provided:
"A deportation order made under section 23 may not be issued
against the following persons:
1) A minor alien under 18 years of age, unless a deportation
or removal order has been made against the persons who actually
provide for his or her maintenance and no other person lawfully
residing in France is in a position to so provide for him or her;
in the case of a minor alien under 16 years of age, the opinion of
the deportation board of the {departement} must be in favour of
deportation;
2) An alien, who has been married for at least one year and
whose spouse is a French national, provided that the two spouses
genuinely live together;
3) An alien who is the father or the mother of a French child
residing in France provided that he or she exercises parental
rights, even only on a partial basis, in respect of the child or
actually provides for him or her;
4) An alien who proves by any means that he has habitually
resided in France since the age of 10 or younger or for over ten
years and who has not been convicted with final effect of an
offence for which he or she has been sentenced to a non-suspended
term of imprisonment of at least six months or a suspended term of
one year or several terms of imprisonment whose aggregate is at
least equal to such periods;
5) An alien who is in receipt of an industrial accident
disability pension paid by a French institution where his or her
permanent and partial disability is at least 20%."
21. The Law of 2 August 1989 amended those provisions,
restoring to a large extent the wording in force prior to the Law
of 9 September 1986:
"A deportation order made under section 23 may not be issued
against the following persons:
1) A minor alien under 18 years of age;
2) An alien who proves by any means that he has habitually
resided in France since the age of 10 or younger;
3) An alien who proves by any means that he has habitually
resided in France for more than fifteen years or an alien who has
lawfully resided in France for more than ten years;
4) An alien, who has been married for at least six months and
whose spouse is a French national;
5) An alien who is the father or the mother of a French child
residing in France provided that he or she exercises parental
rights, even only on a partial basis, in respect of the child or
actually provides for him or her;
6) An alien who is in receipt of an industrial accident or
occupational disability pension paid by a French institution where
his or her permanent disability is at least 20%;
7) An alien residing lawfully in France by virtue of one of
the residence permits provided for in this Ordinance or in the
international agreements, who has not been sentenced with final
effect to a non-suspended term of imprisonment of one year or
more. ..."
The same law added a paragraph, which was worded as follows:
"The aliens referred to in sub-paragraphs (1) to (6) may not
be the subject of a removal order made under section 22 of this
Ordinance or of an exclusion order made by a court under section
19 of this Ordinance prohibiting them from entering the
territory."
22. Section 25 was further amended and supplemented by the
Laws of 31 December 1991 and 24 August 1993:
"A deportation order made under section 23 may not be issued
against the following persons:
1) A minor alien under 18 years of age;
2) An alien who proves by any means that he has habitually
resided in France since the age of 6 or younger;
3) An alien who proves by any means that he has habitually
resided in France for more than fifteen years or an alien who has
lawfully resided in France for more than ten years, unless for the
whole of this period he has been in possession of a temporary
residence permit bearing the word "student";
4) An alien, who has been married for at least one year and
whose spouse is a French national provided that they have not
ceased to live together and that the spouse has kept his or her
French nationality;
5) An alien who is the father or the mother of a French child
residing in France provided that he or she exercises parental
rights, even only on a partial basis, in respect of the child or
actually provides for him or her;
6) An alien who is in receipt of an industrial accident or
occupational disability pension paid by a French institution where
his or her permanent disability is at least 20%;
7) An alien residing lawfully in France by virtue of one of
the residence permits provided for in this Ordinance or in the
international agreements, who has not been sentenced with final
effect to a non-suspended term of imprisonment of one year or
more. ...
The aliens referred to in sub-paragraphs (1) to (6) may not be
the subject of a removal order made under section 22 of this
Ordinance.
By way of derogation from the provisions of this section, a
deportation order under sections 23 and 24 may be made against an
alien falling within one of the categories listed in
sub-paragraphs (3), (4), (5) and (6) if he or she has been
sentenced with final effect to a non-suspended term of
imprisonment of at least five years."
2. Procedure for urgent cases
23. Section 26 of the Ordinance, as amended by the Law of
9 September 1986 provided:
"In cases of extreme urgency and by way of derogation from
sections 23 to 25, deportation may be ordered where the alien's
presence on French territory constitutes a particularly serious
threat to public order.
This procedure may not however be applied in respect of minors
under the age of 18."
24. Section 26 was subsequently amended by the Law of 2 August
1989 and then by the Law of 24 August 1993 and now reads as
follows:
"Deportation may be ordered:
(a) in cases of extreme urgency, by way of derogation from
section 24 (2);
(b) where such a measure constitutes an absolute necessity for
the security of the State and public safety, by way of derogation
from section 25.
In cases of extreme urgency and where the measure is an
absolute necessity for the security of the State and public
safety, deportation may be ordered by way of derogation from
sections 24 (2) and 25.
The procedures provided for in this section may not be applied
in respect of a minor alien under 18."
B. Applications to have a deportation order rescinded
25. The second paragraph of section 23 of the Ordinance, as
amended by the Law of 9 September 1986, provided:
"The deportation order may at any time be rescinded by the
Minister of the Interior. Where the application for an order to be
rescinded is submitted on the expiry of a period of five years
from the actual execution of the order, it may be rejected only
after the opinion of the board provided for in section 24 has been
sought. The person concerned may be represented before the board."
The wording that applied prior to the Law of 9 September 1986
was restored by the Law of 2 August 1989: the Minister was
required to abide by the opinion expressed by the board.
However, this provision was again amended by the Law of
24 August 1993 to the effect that the board's opinion must
compulsorily be sought, but it no longer binds the Minister.
C. Sanctions
26. Section 27 of the Ordinance, as amended by the Law of
9 September 1986, provided:
"Any alien who has evaded or attempted to evade the execution
of a deportation order or a removal order or who, having been
deported or being subject to a prohibition on entering the
territory, re-enters the national territory without an
authorisation shall be liable to a term of imprisonment of from
six months to three years.
The court may in addition issue an order banning a person so
convicted from re-entering the territory for a period not
exceeding ten years.
The ban on re-entering the territory automatically entails the
convicted person's removal from French territory, on completion of
his prison sentence where appropriate."
27. The Law of 31 December 1991 states that the same penalty
applies to "any alien who has evaded or attempted to evade the
execution of a measure refusing him or her entry into France" (the
first paragraph as supplemented) or "who has not submitted to the
relevant administrative authority the travel documents making
possible the execution of one of the measures referred to in the
first paragraph or who, where he or she has no such documents, has
failed to communicate the information making it possible to
execute such measures" (new paragraph inserted between the first
and second paragraphs).
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION
28. Mr Boughanemi applied to the Commission on 3 June 1993. He
complained of a violation of his right to respect for his private
and family life as guaranteed under Article 8 (art. 8) of the
Convention.
29. The Commission declared the application (no. 22070/93)
admissible on 29 August 1994. In its report of 10 January 1995
(Article 31) (art. 31), it expressed the opinion by twenty-one
votes to five that there had been a violation of Article 8 (art.
8). The full text of the Commission's opinion and of the two
dissenting opinions contained in the report is reproduced as an
annex to this judgment <3>.
--------------------------------
Note by the Registrar
<3> For practical reasons this annex will appear only with the
printed version of the judgment (in Reports of Judgments and
Decisions 1996-II), but a copy of the Commission's report is
obtainable from the registry.
FINAL SUBMISSIONS TO THE COURT
30. In their memorial the Government
"request the Court to dismiss Mr Boughanemi's application".
AS TO THE LAW
Alleged violation of Article 8 (art. 8)
of the Convention
31. In Mr Boughanemi's submission, his deportation by the
French authorities interfered with his private and family life and
breached Article 8 (art. 8) of the Convention, which is worded as
follows:
"1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and
family life, his home and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with
the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with
the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests
of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of
the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the
protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the
rights and freedoms of others."
The Government contested this contention, whereas the
Commission accepted it.
A. Paragraph 1 of Article 8 (art. 8-1)
32. It is necessary in the first place to determine whether
the applicant can claim to have had in France a "private and
family life" within the meaning of Article 8 para. 1 (art. 8-1).
33. According to the Government, the applicant has failed to
show that he had close and real ties with his parents and his
brothers and sisters. Admittedly they lived in France, but the
applicant, who was aged 34 at the date of his second deportation,
no longer lived with them. None of the evidence examined by the
administrative courts substantiated the applicant's claim that he
had actually received assistance from his family.
In addition, the applicant's relationship with a woman and the
fact that he had fathered a child, circumstances to which he had
referred before the Commission, could not be taken into account.
He had begun to live with the woman and had recognised the child
after the deportation order had been issued and after the judgment
of the Conseil d'Etat of 7 December 1992. In any event, these
ties, which had been established after the applicant's illegal
return to France, could not constitute family life. It was clear
from the statements made on 6 December 1994 by the applicant's
former companion (see paragraph 16 above) that their life together
had ended for good well before 28 July 1994, the date of the
applicant's last arrest and, a fortiori, before 12 October 1994,
when the applicant had been deported to Tunisia a second time. As
far as the child was concerned, Mr Boughanemi had not formally
recognised him until 5 April 1994, ten months after his birth - on
19 June 1993 - although under French law he could have done so
even before the birth and without the mother's being able to
prevent him. Nor had the applicant indicated that the child's
birth was imminent in his application lodged with the Commission
on 3 June 1993; he had mentioned the birth for the first time in
his observations of 5 May 1994. Furthermore no relationship that
could have been compromised by the deportation had developed
between the applicant and his son. Finally, Mr Boughanemi had not
shown that he provided for his son, or that he contributed to his
education or that he enjoyed parental rights.
34. The Commission took the view that the execution of the
deportation order amounted to an interference with the applicant's
right to respect for his private and family life.
35. The Court considers that the Government's doubts as to the
reality of family ties between Mr Boughanemi and Miss S. are not
wholly unfounded. It would appear that their life together did not
begin until after the applicant's return as an illegal immigrant
and only lasted one year. When he was deported for the second time
the couple had already separated; this separation occurred several
months before the child's birth.
However, these observations do not justify finding that the
applicant had no private and family life in France.
In the first place, Mr Boughanemi recognised, admittedly
somewhat belatedly, the child born to Miss S. The concept of
family life on which Article 8 (art. 8) is based embraces, even
where there is no cohabitation, the tie between a parent and his
or her child, regardless of whether or not the latter is
legitimate (see, mutatis mutandis, the judgments of Berrehab v.
the Netherlands, 21 June 1988, Series A no. 138, p. 14, para. 21,
and {Gul} v. Switzerland, 19 February 1996, Reports of Judgments
and Decisions 1996-I, pp. 173-74, para. 32). Although that tie may
be broken by subsequent events, this can only happen in
exceptional circumstances (see the {Gul} judgment cited above,
loc. cit.). In the present case neither the belated character of
the formal recognition nor the applicant's alleged conduct in
regard to the child constitutes such a circumstance.
Secondly, Mr Boughanemi's parents and his ten brothers and
sisters are legally resident in France and there is no evidence
that he has no ties with them.
Mr Boughanemi's deportation had the effect of separating him
from them and from the child. It can therefore be regarded as an
interference with the exercise of the right guaranteed under
Article 8 (art. 8).
B. Paragraph 2 of Article 8 (art. 8-2)
36. It is accordingly necessary to determine whether the
deportation in issue satisfied the conditions laid down in
paragraph 2 (art. 8-2), namely whether it was "in accordance with
the law", whether it pursued one or more of the legitimate aims
listed in that paragraph (art. 8-2) and whether it was "necessary
in a democratic society" to attain such aim or aims.
1. "In accordance with the law"
37. It is not in dispute that the order for Mr Boughanemi's
deportation was based on sections 23 and 24 of the Ordinance of 2
November 1945 on the conditions of entry and residence of aliens
in France, as amended (see paragraphs 18 and 19 above).
2. Legitimate aim
38. The Government and the Commission considered that the
interference in question pursued aims that were fully consistent
with the Convention, namely "the prevention of disorder" and the
prevention of "crime". The Court arrives at the same conclusion.
3. "Necessary in a democratic society"
39. The Government maintained that the interference was
proportionate to the aims pursued. They drew attention to the
number of offences committed by Mr Boughanemi and the seriousness
of the last offence which had led to his conviction for living on
the earnings of prostitution with aggravating circumstances. They
pointed to those aggravating circumstances, namely violence, the
fact that there were several perpetrators and the pressure brought
to bear on the victim to prostitute herself outside the territory
of mainland France.
In addition, the prejudice to the applicant's private and
family life caused by the interference should not be exaggerated.
The applicant had failed to show either that he had particularly
close ties with his family living in France or that he was in any
way integrated in the society of that country, where he had never
really worked. Furthermore, on attaining his majority he had not
sought French nationality. At the same time he had retained ties
with Tunisia that went beyond mere nationality. His parents were
Tunisian; he had spent his infancy there and in France he moved in
Tunisian circles. Mr Boughanemi could speak Arabic or at least had
an adequate command of everyday language. Moreover, having lived
in Tunisia up to the age of 8, the two years of schooling that he
had received there had laid the foundations of his education. In
addition, the applicant did not claim that he had never returned
there or that he had cut all ties with that country. Finally, he
maintained active relations with the Tunisian community so that
his life was not confined to the French dimension.
40. The Commission rejected this line of argument. It
observed, as regards the extent of the interference with the
applicant's private and family life, that he had arrived in France
aged 8 and had remained there until his first deportation to
Tunisia in 1988, when he was 28, and again until his second
deportation in October 1994, when he was 34. He had all his family
in France and had lived there with a French woman, whose child he
had fathered and, on 5 April 1994, formally recognised. In this
last connection, the Delegate of the Commission noted the wording
of the letter that Miss S. had sent to the Commission on 15 June
1994 (see paragraph 16 above). Although legally an alien, the
applicant therefore had family and social ties in France and the
Government had not shown that he had any link with Tunisia other
than nationality. Thus, despite the serious nature of the
convictions leading to his deportation, a fair balance had not
been struck between the aims pursued, on the one hand, and the
right to respect for private and family life, on the other.
41. The Court acknowledges that it is for the Contracting
States to maintain public order, in particular by exercising their
right, as a matter of well-established international law and
subject to their treaty obligations, to control the entry and
residence of aliens and notably to order the expulsion of aliens
convicted of criminal offences.
However, their decisions in this field must, in so far as they
may interfere with a right protected under paragraph 1 of Article
8 (art. 8-1), be necessary in a democratic society, that is to
say, justified by a pressing social need and, in particular,
proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued (see, among other
authorities, the judgments of Beldjoudi v. France, 26 March 1992,
Series A no. 234-A, p. 27, para. 74, and Nasri v. France, 13 July
1995, Series A no. 320-B, p. 25, para. 41). In determining whether
the interference was "necessary", the Court makes allowance for
the margin of appreciation that is left to the Contracting States
in this field (see, for instance, the Berrehab judgment cited
above, p. 15, para. 28).
42. Its task consists of ascertaining whether the deportation
in issue struck a fair balance between the relevant interests,
namely the applicant's right to respect for his private and family
life, on the one hand, and the prevention of disorder or crime, on
the other.
43. The applicant arrived in France at the age of 8 and was
legally resident there from 1968 to 1988, and then lived there,
after his return as an illegal immigrant, until 12 October 1994.
He had most of his schooling there. His parents and his ten
brothers and sisters live there, five of his siblings are in
school there, eight of them were born there and two have French
nationality. In addition, Mr Boughanemi lived with a French woman
there as man and wife and formally recognised - admittedly not
until 5 April 1994 - her child who was born on 19 June 1993.
44. However, he kept his Tunisian nationality and, so it would
seem, never manifested a wish to become French. It is probable, as
the Government pointed out, that he retained links with Tunisia
that went beyond the mere fact of his nationality. Before the
Commission he did not claim that he could not speak Arabic, or
that he had cut all his ties with his country of birth, or that he
had not returned there after his deportation.
In addition, in the Court's view, the circumstances of the
present case are different from those in the cases of Moustaquim
v. Belgium (judgment of 18 February 1991, Series A no. 193),
Beldjoudi v. France and Nasri v. France (judgments cited above),
which all concerned the deportation of aliens convicted of
criminal offences and in which the Court found a violation of
Article 8 (art. 8).
Above all the Court attaches particular importance to the fact
that Mr Boughanemi's deportation was decided after he had been
sentenced to a total of almost four years' imprisonment,
non-suspended, three of which were for living on the earnings of
prostitution with aggravating circumstances (see paragraphs 8 and
39 above). The seriousness of that last offence and the
applicant's previous convictions count heavily against him.
45. Having regard to the foregoing, the Court does not find
that the applicant's deportation was disproportionate to the
legitimate aims pursued. There has accordingly been no violation
of Article 8 (art. 8).
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT
Holds by seven votes to two that there has been no violation
of Article 8 (art. 8) of the Convention.
Done in English and in French, and delivered at a public
hearing in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 24 April
1996.
Signed: Rolv RYSSDAL
President
Signed: Herbert PETZOLD
Registrar
In accordance with Article 51 para. 2 (art. 51-2) of the
Convention and Rule 53 para. 2 of Rules of Court A, the following
separate opinions are annexed to this judgment:
(a) concurring opinion of Mr Pettiti;
(b) dissenting opinion of Mr Martens;
(c) dissenting opinion of Mr Baka.
Initialled: R.R.
Initialled: H.P.
CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE PETTITI
(Translation)
I voted with the majority to find no violation of Article 8
(art. 8) of the Convention. However, I consider that a different
reasoning could have been adopted.
In view of the particular circumstances of the case (the
applicant being a habitual offender and convicted of living on the
earnings of prostitution), it would have been preferable to take
as the starting-point for the Court's decision Article 1 (art. 1)
of the Convention, which does not require States to refrain from
deporting aliens who have repeatedly committed criminal offences,
and then to find that there had been no violation of the right to
respect for family life. Family life implies a degree of cohesion
on the part of its members incompatible with conduct of such a
kind as living on the earnings of prostitution with aggravating
circumstances.
It would thus no longer have been necessary to examine the
question whether or not there had been an interference. The fact
that a person has brothers and sisters is not sufficient to
constitute family life (see paragraph 43 of the judgment).
Moreover, the majority did not make clear what the Court's
approach was to an application seeking to rely on Article 8
(art. 8) but brought by an alien who had returned unlawfully to
live in France as an illegal immigrant following his deportation.
Once again cases of deportation brought before the Court
highlight the need for the States to adopt a European policy
clarifying the extent of their commitments in this field. It is
not necessary in a case such as the present one to examine whether
a fair balance has been struck between the general interest and
the applicant's individual interest.
The general interest of society and the family cannot be
compared with and set against that of living on the earnings of
prostitution. The member States of the Council of Europe must also
take into account the protection of women who are the victims of
prostitution forced on them by pimps.
The proper reasoning in cases concerning deportation should,
in my view, be different from that adopted in the Moustaquim v.
Belgium case (judgment of 18 February 1991, Series A no. 193),
which involved the protection of an adolescent.
It should also be noted that few member States of the Council
of Europe follow a policy of family reunion of the sort adopted by
France.
DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE MARTENS
1. In this case the Court was again confronted with the issue
of the expulsion of an integrated alien, the applicant having come
to France when he was 8 years old and having lived there since
then, like his parents, brothers and sisters, until - after
twenty-two years of residence - he was expelled.
2. There are several ways of dealing with this issue.
3. Firstly, of course, there is the approach which the
majority of the Court has followed up to now. Its starting-point
is that the Convention does not protect aliens from expulsion, not
even when they are integrated. They may, however, rely on the
Convention to the extent that expulsion constitutes interference
with their right to respect for their family life. If they do so,
it is for the Court to assess whether the interference is
justified under Article 8 para. 2 (art. 8-2).
4. This traditional approach has two obvious disadvantages.
Firstly, not every integrated alien has a family life.
Secondly, it leads to a lack of legal certainty. National
administrations and national courts are unable to predict whether
expulsion of an integrated alien will be found acceptable or not.
The majority's case-by-case approach is a lottery for national
authorities and a source of embarrassment for the Court. A source
of embarrassment since it obliges the Court to make well-nigh
impossible comparisons between the merits of the case before it
and those which it has already decided. It is - to say the least -
far from easy to compare the cases of Moustaquim v. Belgium
(judgment of 18 February 1991, Series A no. 193), Beldjoudi v.
France (judgment of 26 March 1992, Series A no. 234-A), Nasri v.
France (judgment of 13 July 1995, Series A no. 320-B) and
Boughanemi v. France. Should one just make a comparison based on
the number of convictions and the severity of sentences or should
one also take into account personal circumstances? The majority
has, obviously, opted for the latter approach and has felt able to
make the comparison <1>, but - with due respect - I cannot help
feeling that the outcome is necessarily tainted with
arbitrariness.
--------------------------------
<1> See paragraph 44 of the Court's judgment.
5. The first disadvantage of the majority approach is easily
mended by accepting that expulsion of integrated aliens at any
rate constitutes interference with their private life. I argued in
favour of that approach in my concurring opinion in Beldjoudi <2>.
This approach has, moreover, been advocated by Judges
De Meyer <3>, Morenilla <4> and Wildhaber <5>. In my opinion the
Court would already considerably improve its doctrine if it
accepted this approach. I very much hope that the wording of
paragraph 42 of the Court's judgment - where it refers to "the
applicant's right to respect for his private and family life" -
shows the Court's willingness to do so.
--------------------------------
<2> Series A no. 234-A, pp. 37 et seq.
<3> Series A no. 234-A, p. 35.
<4> Series A no. 320-B, p. 31.
<5> Series A no. 320-B, p. 32.
6. However, accepting the private-life approach does not, of
course, in itself remove the second disadvantage of the
traditional approach, since under the private-life approach it
will likewise be necessary to assess whether the interference was
justified.
7. There is only one way to remove all uncertainty and that is
to accept the thesis advocated first by Judge De Meyer and
recently also by Judge Morenilla <6>. Judges De Meyer and
Morenilla start from the idea that integrated aliens - that is,
aliens who have lived all, or practically all, their lives within
a State - should no more be expelled than nationals. Expulsion of
nationals is forbidden by Article 3 para. 1 of Protocol No. 4
(P4-3-1), and Judges De Meyer and Morenilla assert that expulsion
of integrated aliens is forbidden under Article 3 (art. 3) of the
Convention. Accepting this thesis would, obviously, remove all
uncertainty since Article 3 (art. 3) does not allow exceptions.
Under this approach expulsion of an integrated alien per se
constitutes a violation, whatever the crimes committed.
--------------------------------
<6> See notes 3 and 4.
8. Although I share the idea that integrated aliens should no
more be expelled than nationals, I find it difficult to accept
that there cannot be exceptions. I therefore hold that although as
a rule expelling integrated aliens should constitute a violation
of their right to respect for their private life, under very
exceptional circumstances such expulsion should be held justified.
I have the feeling that Judge Wildhaber's concurring opinion in
the Nasri case <7> goes in the same direction, although he would
probably be inclined to be less severe as to what comes within the
scope of the exception.
--------------------------------
<7> See note 5.
9. In my opinion the second disadvantage of the traditional
approach - its unpredictability - could be considerably attenuated
if the Court were to accept that expulsion of an integrated alien
as a rule constitutes lack of respect for his private life, but
may exceptionally be justified where the alien is convicted of
very serious crimes, such as serious crimes against the State,
political or religious terrorism or holding a leading position in
a drug-trafficking organisation.
10. I agree that living on the earnings of prostitution with
aggravating circumstances is a serious and, moreover, a
contemptible crime, but I find, nevertheless, that for present
purposes it falls within the category of "normal crimes" which are
not serious enough to qualify as exceptional circumstances
justifying expulsion of an integrated alien, since for normal
crimes normal criminal sanctions and measures should suffice, as
they have to suffice for crimes of nationals.
11. On these grounds I voted for a violation.
DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE BAKA
Like the majority I am of the view that the deportation order
amounted to an interference with the applicant's private and
family life. I also share the view that the deportation was in
accordance with the law and served a legitimate aim.
On the other hand, unlike the majority, I consider that the
deportation order was not necessary in a democratic society,
because it was disproportionate to the legitimate aim pursued, and
consequently that there has been a violation of Article 8 (art. 8)
of the Convention in the present case.
In my assessment the applicant has most of his family and
social ties in France. His parents and his ten brothers and
sisters reside in France and eight members of the family were born
there. He has a child in France, although uncertainty remains as
to the exact nature of the ties between them.
Taking into account all these factors and also that the
applicant left Tunisia at the age of 8 with a knowledge of Arabic
which definitely does not amount to an adequate command of
everyday language for a grown-up and that he "had most of his
schooling" in France, I have come to the conclusion that a fair
balance has not been struck between the protected interests. Under
these circumstances, the expulsion could completely ruin private
and family life while giving very little protection to the
prevention of crime and disorder.
I am also not persuaded by the argument of the Court that the
applicant's "deportation was decided after he had been sentenced"
and that the "seriousness of that last offence and the applicant's
previous convictions count heavily against him".
In this respect, I believe that the applicant, who has spent
most of his life (twenty-two years) in France, should enjoy
treatment not significantly less favourable than would be accorded
to a national of the country. He committed crimes and he has been
sentenced for that. If the criminal sentence itself is adequate
and proportionate to the crime committed - as it should be -, to
add an expulsion order as well is, in my view, to overemphasise
heavily the general interest in the prevention of crime and
disorder as against the protection of the individual's right to
private and family life.
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