[неофициальный перевод]
ЕВРОПЕЙСКИЙ СУД ПО ПРАВАМ ЧЕЛОВЕКА
СУДЕБНОЕ РЕШЕНИЕ
ГИТОНАС (GITONAS) И ДРУГИЕ ПРОТИВ ГРЕЦИИ
(Страсбург, 1 июля 1997 года)
(Извлечение)
КРАТКОЕ НЕОФИЦИАЛЬНОЕ ИЗЛОЖЕНИЕ ОБСТОЯТЕЛЬСТВ ДЕЛА
A. Основные факты
Первый заявитель, г-н Гитонас, служащий Инвестиционного банка,
временно, несколько месяцев - до 24 мая 1989 г. занимал пост
заместителя руководителя секретариата премьер-министра.
Второй заявитель, г-н Палеотодорос 10 ноября 1987 г. был
назначен на должность генерального директора второго
телевизионного канала Греции, которую он занимал до 23 ноября
1988 г.
Третий заявитель, г-н Сифунакис, был назначен генеральным
директором Греческой радиовещательной компании 25 февраля 1987 г.,
а затем 10 ноября 1987 г. - генеральным директором первого
телевизионного канала Греции. Эту должность он занимал до 8 июля
1988 г.
На всеобщих парламентских выборах 8 апреля 1990 г. все
заявители были избраны депутатами: первый заявитель - от 2-го
избирательного округа Афин, второй - от Занте и третий - от
Лесбоса.
В период с 25 апреля по 2 мая 1990 г. четыре избирателя из
вышеуказанных округов и один кандидат в депутаты, являвшийся
соперником третьего заявителя на выборах, обратились в Высший
специальный суд с требованием аннулировать результаты выборов в
отношении заявителей на основании статьи 56 п. 3 Конституции,
содержащей перечень государственных, муниципальных и иных
должностей, которые лишают права лиц, их занимающих, быть
выдвинутыми в кандидаты и тем более избираться депутатами.
Высший специальный суд тремя Решениями от 23 января 1991 г. и
29 мая 1991 г. отменил результаты выборов в отношении заявителей
на том основании, что они занимали упомянутые посты в течение
более трех месяцев на протяжении трех лет, предшествующих выборам,
и в силу этого подпадали под правило неизбираемости, установленное
статьей 56 п. 3 Конституции.
Еще один заявитель, г-н Каварацис, в период с 23 мая 1990 г.
по 13 сентября 1993 г. занимал пост первого заместителя директора
Фонда социального обеспечения. Он баллотировался кандидатом в
депутаты на всеобщих выборах 10 октября 1993 г. и был избран по
избирательному округу Эвроса. 2 ноября 1993 г. другой кандидат от
этого избирательного округа обратился в Высший специальный суд,
требуя признать избрание г-на Каварациса недействительным на
основании статьи 56 п. 3 Конституции.
Наконец, последний заявитель, г-н Гиакуматос, в период с
11 сентября 1991 г. по 13 сентября 1993 г. занимал должность
второго заместителя директора Фонда социального обеспечения. Он
являлся кандидатом на всеобщих выборах 10 октября 1993 г. и был
избран от 2-го избирательного округа Афин. 2 ноября 1993 г. другой
кандидат от этого избирательного округа обратился в тот же суд с
просьбой аннулировать избрание г-на Гиакуматоса на основании
положений статьи 56 п. 3 Конституции.
Решениями, вынесенными в один и тот же день - 22 марта
1995 г., Высший специальный суд аннулировал результаты выборов в
отношении обоих заявителей на том основании, что они занимали
вышеупомянутые должности в течение более трех месяцев на
протяжении трех лет, предшествующих выборам.
B. Разбирательство дела в Комиссии по правам человека
Жалоба г-на Гитонаса была передана в Комиссию 12 июня 1991 г.
Жалобы г-на Палеотодороса и г-на Сифунакиса - 22 ноября 1991 г.
10 октября 1994 г. Комиссия решила объединить жалобы, в которых
утверждалось, что была нарушена статья 3 Протокола N 1 "Право на
свободные выборы". Жалобы были признаны приемлемыми. Не добившись
мирового соглашения, Комиссия 7 марта 1996 г. подготовила доклад,
в котором установила факты и пришла к выводу о нарушении статьи 3
Протокола N 1 (девятью голосами против восьми).
Жалобы г-на Каварациса и г-на Гиакуматоса по тем же
основаниям, поданные в Комиссию 16 мая и 28 мая 1995 г., были
признаны приемлемыми соответственно 24 июня и 14 мая 1996 г.
Комиссия подготовила два доклада от 27 ноября 1996 г. и 21 января
1997 г., в которых установила факты и пришла к выводу о нарушениях
статьи 3 Протокола N 1 (шестнадцатью голосами против двенадцати по
делу г-на Каварациса и четырнадцатью голосами против двенадцати по
делу г-на Гиакуматоса).
Дела (Гитонас и другие против Греции, Каварацис против Греции
и Гиакуматос против Греции) были направлены Комиссией в Суд как
три отдельных дела 28 мая 1996 г., 22 января 1997 г. и 27 января
1997 г. соответственно. Дела были объединены 19 марта 1997 г.
ИЗВЛЕЧЕНИЕ ИЗ СУДЕБНОГО РЕШЕНИЯ
ВОПРОСЫ ПРАВА
I. О предполагаемом нарушении статьи 3
Протокола N 1 к Конвенции
36. Заявители утверждают, что аннулирование Высшим специальным
судом результатов выборов на основании статьи 56 п. 3 Конституции
является нарушением права избирателей свободно выбирать своих
представителей, а также права заявителей быть избранными. При этом
заявители ссылаются на статью 3 Протокола N 1, которая гласит:
"Высокие Договаривающиеся Стороны обязуются проводить с
разумной периодичностью свободные выборы путем тайного голосования
в таких условиях, которые обеспечивали бы свободное волеизъявление
народа при выборе законодательной власти".
Заявители утверждают, что текст статьи 56 п. 3 Конституции
неясен и непоследователен. Однако основное содержание их жалобы
касается решений названного суда, который вопреки своей
собственной практике прибег к расширительному толкованию этой
статьи, создав таким образом новые, не предусмотренные этой
статьей случаи неизбираемости. Это было сделано, невзирая на то,
что в Конституции дан исчерпывающий перечень случаев
неизбираемости и что если этот перечень и может быть истолкован,
то лишь ограничительно.
37. Правительство придерживается той точки зрения, что
установленные статьей 56 п. 3 Конституции ограничения избираемости
государственных служащих, коими являются и заявители, не
произвольны и не препятствуют волеизъявлению народа при избрании
законодательного корпуса. Эти ограничения были заранее известны
потенциальным кандидатам, что давало им возможность сделать для
себя соответствующие выводы. Ограничения преследуют цель
гарантировать подлинное волеизъявление народа путем обеспечения
одинаковых возможностей для всех кандидатов, равно как и
осуществление в полном объеме права, гарантированного статьей 3
Протокола N 1. Более того, эти ограничения введены с учетом реалий
политической жизни Греции и имеют целью обеспечить политическую
нейтральность государственной службы, независимость членов
Парламента, соблюдение принципа разделения властей. И наконец,
требуя, чтобы государственные служащие, желающие выдвинуть свои
кандидатуры на выборах, оставили свои посты за тридцать три месяца
до начала выборов, конституционный законодатель не превысил
пределов усмотрения, предоставленных государствам - участникам
Конвенции в свете статьи 3 Протокола N 1.
38. По мнению Комиссии, система аннулирования результатов
выборов в соответствии со статьей 56 п. 3 Конституции является
непоследовательной. Во-первых, ряд постов и должностей
государственной службы, гораздо более значительных, чем те,
которые занимали заявители (например, министры, мэры и некоторые
другие высокопоставленные служащие), и предоставляющих значительно
большие возможности для влияния на электорат, не подпадают под
указанные ограничения. Во-вторых, в течение трех лет перед
выборами отсутствовал точный учет периода (который, кстати, был
весьма невелик), в течение которого заявители занимали должности,
лишающие их права выдвигать свои кандидатуры на выборах.
В-третьих, неопровержимая презумпция неизбираемости, имплицитно
присущая этой статье, лишала суды возможности проанализировать
характер занимаемой должности, реальный период работы и уровень
ответственности на данном посту. И наконец, не было доказано, что
заявители могли извлечь выгоду из своего служебного положения,
получив благодаря ему некие преимущества перед другими
кандидатами. С учетом того, что отмена результатов выборов в
отношении заявителей не оправдывалась необходимостью защиты
интересов греческих избирателей, Комиссия сделала вывод о
нарушении статьи 3 Протокола N 1 к Конвенции.
39. Суд обращает внимание на то, что статья 3 Протокола N 1
говорит о праве лица голосовать и выдвигать свою кандидатуру на
выборах. Несмотря на важность этих прав, они тем не менее не носят
абсолютного характера. Поскольку статья 3 признает эти права,
однако не конкретизирует их и тем более не дает им юридического
определения, появляются возможности для введения "подразумеваемых
ограничений" (см. Решение по делу Матье-Моэн и Клерфейт против
Бельгии от 2 марта 1987 г. Серия A, т. 113, с. 23, п. 52).
Национальный правопорядок государств - участников сопровождает
избирательное право граждан своих стран и правила избираемости
такими условиями, которые в принципе не противоречат статье 3
Протокола N 1. Государства - участники располагают широкими
пределами усмотрения в этой области, однако только Европейский суд
в последней инстанции определяет, соблюдены ли при этом требования
Протокола N 1 к Конвенции. Суд обязан убедиться в том, что эти
условия, установленные национальным законом, не ограничивают права
граждан до такой степени, что выхолащивается сама суть этих прав и
они становятся неэффективными, а также в том, что власти
преследуют правомерные цели и что используемые ими при этом
средства являются соразмерными (там же).
По существу, государства достаточно свободны в рамках своего
конституционного строя устанавливать статус парламентариев,
включая критерии избираемости. Хотя в основе этих критериев общая
забота о том, чтобы обеспечить независимость членов Парламента, а
также свободное волеизъявление избирателей, эти критерии
различаются в зависимости от исторических и политических
особенностей каждого государства. Множество ситуаций,
предусмотренных конституциями и избирательным законодательством
государств - членов Совета Европы, свидетельствует о разнообразии
выбора критериев. Однако ни один из них не должен считаться более
значимым, чем любой другой, если только он гарантирует
волеизъявление народа путем свободных, справедливых и
периодических выборов.
Суд обращает внимание на то, что статья 56 п. 3 Конституции,
примененная к заявителям, устанавливает основания неизбираемости,
которые являются одновременно относительными и окончательными.
Статья содержит запрет определенным категориям государственных
служащих, военнослужащим, служащим юридических лиц публичного
права, государственных и муниципальных предприятий и учреждений
выдвигать свои кандидатуры на парламентских выборах и быть
избранными в любом избирательном округе страны, где они выполняли
свои служебные обязанности более трех месяцев на протяжении трех
лет, предшествующих выборам. Более того, эти лица лишаются таких
прав даже в случае их ухода в отставку перед выборами, что не
предусмотрено по отношению к некоторым другим категориям
государственных служащих, подпадающих под действие статьи 56 п. 1
Конституции (см. п. 29 выше).
Институт неизбираемости известен многим государствам - членам
Совета Европы; он преследует двоякую цель - способствовать
надлежащему функционированию и укреплению демократического строя,
чтобы, с одной стороны, кандидаты различных ориентаций обладали
равными возможностями влияния на избирателей, поскольку лица,
занимающие государственные должности, могут в ряде случаев иметь
преимущества перед другими кандидатами, и чтобы, с другой стороны,
избирательный корпус был защищен от давления, оказываемого теми
должностными лицами, которые в силу своего положения призваны
принимать многие, в том числе важные, решения и в связи с этим
пользуются значительным авторитетом у рядовых граждан, выбор
которых в таких условиях может оказаться необъективным.
41. Суд признает, что система, введенная статьей 56,
представляет некоторую сложность. Однако Суд не находит в ней
каких-либо элементов неопределенности, отмеченных Комиссией. Еще в
меньшей степени Суд считает, что она носит произвольный характер.
Что касается так называемого особого отношения к некоторым
категориям государственных служащих и политических деятелей (п. 1
статьи 56), которые в силу своего положения располагают большими
возможностями влияния на избирателей, то в данном вопросе Суд
согласен с позицией Правительства.
В отличие от лиц, упомянутых в п. 3 статьи 56, которые
занимают чисто административные должности, общим признаком
государственных служащих, перечисленных в п. 1 этой статьи,
является политический характер их деятельности и связанной с ней
ответственности. Мэры и главы муниципалитетов, равно как и члены
Парламента, обязаны своим положением непосредственно избирателям.
Губернаторы, руководители государственных учреждений и ведомств и
другие высокопоставленные государственные служащие, назначаемые
Правительством, разрабатывают и осуществляют правительственную
политику в своей сфере деятельности, но, как и министры,
подотчетны Парламенту.
Что касается объективных критериев, по которым согласно
статье 56 п. 3 определяется неизбираемость и которые не дают
возможности Высшему специальному суду принимать во внимание какие
бы то ни было особенности конкретного дела, Суд не находит такую
ситуацию неразумной; практически очень трудно доказать, что
нахождение на государственной службе было использовано в
избирательных целях.
42. Заявители, по существу, преследовали цель привлечь
внимание к тому факту, что их служебное положение не подпадало под
действие статьи 56 п. 3 Конституции и что в судебной практике
Высшего специального суда не содержалось ничего такого, что могло
бы объяснить решения в отношении заявителей. По существу,
временное назначение г-на Гитонаса (переводом из банка) не могло
изменить его статуса служащего Инвестиционного банка и не отвечало
процедуре назначения лица на государственную должность, тем более
что учреждение должности заместителя руководителя секретариата
премьер-министра оказалось неправомерным из-за отсутствия для
этого законных оснований. Должности г-на Палеотодороса и г-на
Сифунакиса (генеральные директора первого и второго национальных
телевизионных каналов) нельзя приравнивать к должности
председателя Греческой радиовещательной компании или сотрудника
государственного ведомства с полномочиями, осуществляемыми на
территории всей страны. Наконец, г-н Каварацис и г-н Гиакуматос,
первый и второй заместители директора Фонда социального
обеспечения, не могли считаться штатными сотрудниками
государственного ведомства, осуществляющего деятельность в
общенациональном масштабе, поскольку характер их работы был ближе
к деятельности управляющего Фондом социального обеспечения,
который, согласно ранее принятым Решениям Высшего специального
суда, был признан не подпадающим под действие статьи 56 п. 3.
43. Правительство согласилось с соображениями Высшего
специального суда, содержащимися в его решениях по делам
заявителей. Оно подчеркнуло, что, претендуя на оценку
законодательства страны, Европейский суд выступает как
юрисдикционная инстанция, дополняющая судебную систему
государства - участника.
44. Суд отмечает, что вопросами применения и толкования
внутреннего законодательства должны заниматься прежде всего
национальные органы и, в частности, суды первой инстанции и
апелляционные суды, которые специально предназначены для
выполнения такого рода функций.
Суд обращает внимание на то, что должности заявителей не
указаны как таковые среди должностей, перечисленных в статье 56
п. 3 Конституции. Однако это не гарантирует заявителям право быть
избранными. В соответствии со статьей 58 Конституции (см. п. 29
выше) только Высший специальный суд компетентен решать споры,
связанные с неизбираемостью. При этом, как и в любой юридической
системе, где существует этот институт, лицо, избранное в нарушение
его норм, не может оставаться членом Парламента.
В настоящем деле Высший специальный суд после анализа
должностных обязанностей заявителей и соответствующего
законодательства вынес Решение о том, что должности заявителей
аналогичны должностям, перечисленным в статье 56 п. 3 Конституции.
Он констатировал, что обстоятельства, относящиеся к периоду работы
заявителей на соответствующих постах, продолжительность их работы
и круг должностных обязанностей давали основание для применения к
каждому из них правила неизбираемости. Этот Суд по обоснованным
соображениям счел необходимым аннулировать результаты выборов в
отношении заявителей (см. п. 10, 14, 18, 22 и 27 выше).
Суд не может прийти к иному выводу. В решениях Высшего
специального суда не содержится ничего, что позволяет считать, что
отмена результатов выборов противоречит греческому
законодательству, является произвольной или несоразмерной,
препятствует "свободному волеизъявлению народа при выборе
законодательной власти" (см. mutatis mutandis вышеупомянутое
Решение по делу Матье-Моэн и Клерфейта, с. 25, п. 57).
Следовательно, Суд не усматривает нарушения статьи 3
Протокола N 1.
ПО ЭТИМ ОСНОВАНИЯМ СУД ЕДИНОГЛАСНО
Постановил: нарушения статьи 3 Протокола N 1 не было.
Совершено на английском и французском языках и оглашено во
Дворце прав человека в Страсбурге 1 июля 1997 г.
Председатель
Рольф РИССДАЛ
Грефье
Герберт ПЕТЦОЛЬД
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
CASE OF GITONAS AND v. GREECE
JUDGMENT
(Strasbourg, 25.II.1993)
In the case of Gitonas and Others v. Greece <1>,
--------------------------------
<1> The case originated in a decision to join cases
68/1996/687/877-879, 17/1997/801/1004 and 23/1997/807/1010. In
each individual case number, the first number is that case's
position on the list of cases referred to the Court in the
relevant year (second number). The third number indicates that
case's position on the list of cases referred to the Court since
its creation and the last number or numbers indicate its position
on the list of the corresponding originating applications to the
Commission.
The European Court of Human Rights, sitting, in accordance
with Article 43 (art. 43) of the Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ("the Convention") and the
relevant provisions of Rules of Court A <2>, as a Chamber composed
of the following judges:
--------------------------------
<2> Rules A apply to all cases referred to the Court before
the entry into force of Protocol No. 9 (P9) (1 October 1994) and
thereafter only to cases concerning States not bound by that
Protocol (P9). They correspond to the Rules that came into force
on 1 January 1983, as amended several times subsequently.
Mr R. Ryssdal, President,
Mr {Thor Vilhjalmsson} <*>,
Mr L.-E. Pettiti,
Mr C. Russo,
Mr A. Spielmann,
Mr N. Valticos,
Mr R. Pekkanen,
Mr P. Kuris,
Mr J. Casadevall,
and also of Mr H. Petzold, Registrar, and Mr P.J. Mahoney,
Deputy Registrar,
--------------------------------
<*> Здесь и далее по тексту слова на национальном языке
набраны латинским шрифтом и выделены фигурными скобками.
Having deliberated in private on 22 March and 23 June 1997,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the
last-mentioned date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case was referred to the Court as three separate cases
(Gitonas and Others v. Greece, Kavaratzis v. Greece and
Giakoumatos v. Greece) by the European Commission of Human Rights
("the Commission") on 28 May 1996 and 22 and 27 January 1997,
within the three-month period laid down by Article 32 para. 1 and
Article 47 of the Convention (art. 32-1, art. 47). It originated
in five applications (nos. 18747/91, 19376/92, 19379/92, 28208/95
and 27755/95) against the Hellenic Republic lodged with the
Commission under Article 25 (art. 25) by five Greek nationals,
Mr Konstantinos Gitonas, Mr Dimitrios Paleothodoros, Mr Nicolaos
Sifounakis, Mr Ioannis Kavaratzis and Mr Gerassimos Giakoumatos on
12 June 1991, 22 November 1991 and 16 and 28 May 1995.
The Commission's requests referred to Articles 44 and 48
(art. 44, art. 48) and to the declaration whereby Greece
recognised the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court (Article 46)
(art. 46). The object of the requests was to obtain a decision as
to whether the facts of the cases disclosed a breach by the
respondent State of its obligations under Article 3 of
Protocol No. 1 (P1-3).
2. In response to the enquiry made in accordance with Rule 33
para. 3 (d) of Rules of Court A, the applicants stated that they
wished to take part in the proceedings and designated the lawyers
who would represent them (Rule 30).
3. The Chamber to be constituted in the case of Gitonas and
Others included ex officio Mr N. Valticos, the elected judge of
Greek nationality (Article 43 of the Convention) (art. 43), and
Mr R. Ryssdal, the President of the Court (Rule 21 para. 4 (b)).
On 10 June 1996, in the presence of the Registrar, the President
drew by lot the names of the other seven members, namely
Mr L.-E. Pettiti, Mr C. Russo, Mr A. Spielmann, Mr R. Pekkanen,
Mr L. Wildhaber, Mr P. Kuris and Mr J. Casadevall, (Article 43 in
fine of the Convention and Rule 21 para. 5) (art. 43).
Subsequently Mr {Thor Vilhjalmsson}, substitute judge, replaced
Mr Wildhaber, who was unable to take part in the further
consideration of the case (Rules 22 para. 1 and 24 para. 1). On
29 January 1997 the President decided that, in the interests of
the proper administration of justice, the cases of Kavaratzis and
Giakoumatos should be considered by the Chamber already
constituted to hear the case of Gitonas and Others (Rule 21
para. 7).
4. As President of the Chamber (Rule 21 para. 6), Mr Ryssdal,
acting through the Registrar, consulted the Agent of the Greek
Government ("the Government"), the applicants' lawyers and the
Delegate of the Commission on the organisation of the proceedings
(Rules 37 para. 1 and 38). Pursuant to the order made in
consequence, the Registrar received on 17 and 20 January 1997
respectively the applicants' and the Government's memorials in the
case of Gitonas and Others, and on 19, 20 and 24 February the
Government's and the applicants' memorials in the cases of
Kavaratzis and Giakoumatos.
5. On 19 March 1997 the Chamber decided to join the three
cases (Rule 37 para. 3). In accordance with the President's
decision, the hearing took place in public in the Human Rights
Building, Strasbourg, on 19 March 1997. The Court had held a
preparatory meeting beforehand.
There appeared before the Court:
(a) for the Government
Mr G. Kanellopoulos, Legal Assistant,
Legal Council of State, Delegate of the Agent,
Mrs K. Grigoriou, Legal Assistant,
Legal Council of State, Adviser;
(b) for the Commission
Mr L. Loucaides, Delegate;
(c) for four of the applicants (Mr Gitonas, Mr Paleothodoros,
Mr Sifounakis and Mr Giakoumatos)
Mr C. Mavrias, university professor, Counsel;
(d) for the fifth applicant (Mr Kavaratzis)
Mr G. Theofanous, of the Athens Bar, Counsel.
The Court heard addresses by Mr Loucaides, Mr Mavrias,
Mr Theofanous and Mr Kanellopoulos.
AS TO THE FACTS
I. Circumstances of the case
A. The case of Mr Gitonas
6. On 18 November 1986 Mr Gitonas, then an employee of the
Investment Bank (Trapeza Ependisseon), was seconded to the post of
Deputy Head (Anaplirotis Genikos Diefthindis) of the Prime
Minister's private office. He occupied that post for a period of
approximately thirty months until 24 May 1989, when his secondment
ended.
7. In the general election of 8 April 1990 the applicant stood
as a candidate for the Socialist Party (PA.SO.K) in the second
Athens constituency. As he obtained more than the required minimum
number of votes for election, the Athens Court of First Instance
(Polymeles protodikio) declared in a decision of 17 April 1990
that he had been elected.
8. On 26 and 27 April and 2 May 1990 three members of the
constituency's electorate lodged an application with the Special
Supreme Court (Anotato Idiko Dikastirio) for an order annulling
Mr Gitonas's election. They relied on Article 56 para. 3 of the
Constitution (see paragraph 29 below) and maintained, inter alia,
that the applicant's election was a nullity as, before the
election, he had held the post of Deputy Head of the Prime
Minister's private office, a ground for disqualification from
standing for election under that Article.
9. In the proceedings the applicant argued that as an employee
of the Investment Bank, a private-law entity, he could not be
considered a civil servant and he pointed out that he had become
deputy head of the Prime Minister's private office by secondment.
10. The Special Supreme Court considered the three
applications together and gave its judgment (no. 16/1991) by nine
votes to two on 23 January 1991. It annulled Mr Gitonas's election
on the following grounds:
"Under [Article 56 para. 3], as is apparent both from its
wording (the disqualification applies in "any" constituency) and
from its purpose (to deter civil servants ... from using their
posts to prepare for a political career, and at the same time to
ensure that civil servants are politically neutral in the
performance of their duties as required by the Constitution and by
statute), the disqualification covers the whole geographical area
in which those duties were performed ..., so that a civil servant
who has general responsibility throughout Greece may not become an
elected member of parliament in any constituency. The bar applies
in all cases where the post has been occupied for more than three
months during the three years preceding the election even if, in
the interval between the post being taken up and the election,
another general election took place in which the person concerned
stood as a candidate ...
The aforementioned constitutional provision means that the bar
applies irrespective of the lawfulness of the administrative act
whereby the post was filled ...
The provision applies to salaried civil servants appointed to
established posts expressly created by law and governed
exclusively by public-law rules; included within that category are
dismissable civil servants in temporary posts within the meaning
of Article 103 para. 5 of the Constitution ...
Law no. 1299/1982 on "the organisation of the Prime Minister's
private office" established an independent public service to
assist and directly serve the Prime Minister in the performance of
his duties. To this political private office of the Prime Minister
... were subsequently added - by decision of the Prime Minister
taken under section 12 (b) of Law no. 1299/1982 - the special
office of the deputy head responsible for supervising and
implementing the decisions of the public government bodies and of
the Prime Minister, and a category A post of Deputy
Director-General. Generally speaking, the ordinary rules do not
apply to recruitment to posts in the Prime Minister's political
private office, which are filled, without any competition being
held, either by appointment or secondment from the civil service
or a public-law or public-sector entity, or by assignment of
duties which the person concerned performs concurrently ... with
those of his usual occupation, as determined by the Prime
Minister, in a decision published in the Official Gazette
(section 6). Under section 6 (1), persons seconded to the
political private office of the Prime Minister must elect whether
to receive their entire remuneration of all kinds from their
permanent post or from the post to which they have been seconded
... It is apparent from the aforementioned provisions that the
post of Deputy Head of the Prime Minister's political private
office ... is a remunerated post occupied by a dismissable civil
servant within the meaning of Article 103 para. 5 of the
Constitution, with general and decision-making responsibility for
the entire country, and as such is covered by Article 56 para. 3.
... The documents in the case file show that [the applicant]
was seconded from the Investment Bank to the post of Deputy Head
of the Prime Minister's political private office by decision
no. Y311/1986, of the then Prime Minister, published in the
Official Gazette of 18 November 1986, and served in that post
continuously until 24 May 1989, when his secondment was ended by a
similar decision of the Prime Minister ... By a written
declaration of 18 November 1986 [the applicant] elected to receive
the remuneration attaching to his permanent post. Consequently, as
he occupied a remunerated post in category A, with nationwide
responsibility, for more than three months during the three years
preceding the general election of 8 April 1990, he was barred from
standing as a candidate or being elected as a member of parliament
in that election even if, in the interval between his taking up
that post and the latest election, another election had been held
in which [the applicant] had stood."
In a dissenting opinion two members of the Special Supreme
Court took the view that section 12 (b) of Law no. 1299/1982 did
not authorise the creation of a post of Deputy Director-General
and that the applicant had never acquired the status of salaried
civil servant; even supposing that the Investment Bank belonged to
the public sector and that the post had been created under the
provisions of Law no. 1299/1982, the applicant's secondment had
been temporary, which meant that he had retained his former status
as an employee of the bank, which continued to pay his salary.
B. The case of Mr Paleothodoros
11. On 10 November 1987 Mr Paleothodoros was appointed
Director-General of Greece's second television channel (Elliniki
Tileorassi 2, "ET2") by a resolution of the board of governors of
the Greek Broadcasting Company (ERT-AE), a public company. He
occupied that post for approximately a year, until 23 November
1988.
12. In the election of 8 April 1990 the applicant stood as a
candidate for the electoral coalition "Zante Initiative for
Progress, Development and Simple Proportional Representation"
(Zakinthini Protovoulia gia proodo - anaptixi - apli analogiki) in
the Zante constituency. As he obtained more than the required
minimum number of votes for election, the Zante Court of First
Instance declared, in a decision of 11 April 1990, that he had
been elected.
13. On 25 April 1990 a member of the constituency's
electorate, relying on Article 56 para. 3 of the Constitution (see
paragraph 29 below), lodged an application with the Special
Supreme Court for an order annulling Mr Paleothodoros's election
on the ground that during the period preceding the election
Mr Paleothodoros had occupied the post of Director-General of ET2.
14. The Special Supreme Court, by six votes to five, annulled
the election in a judgment (no. 41/1991) of 29 May 1991 in these
terms:
"...
The disqualification [from standing for election] also applies
where, in the interval between the disqualifying post being taken
up and the relevant election, another election took place in which
the person concerned stood as a candidate. The possibility that a
civil servant will use his post to prepare for his political
career does in fact exist in this case too, as the effects of such
preparations are not limited to the election immediately following
the taking up of the post but may extend to subsequent elections;
consequently, it has to be accepted that the civil servant
continues to be disqualified under the Constitution, if the
election takes place within three years as specified in the
Constitution.
A public undertaking is an undertaking which under the law ...
exists to promote the general interest, in the form of a legal
entity over which the State exerts a decisive influence and which
operates according to economic criteria, not by speculating ...
but by making profits that will enable it to achieve its
fundamental objectives ...
Section 1 of Law no. 1730/1987 established a private-law
entity in the form of a company called "Greek Radio-Television"...
Section 1 (3) provides that ERT-AE is a public undertaking
belonging to the public sector (Law no. 1256/1982); it is
controlled and supervised by the State. By section 2 (1) of the
aforementioned Law, the objects of ERT-AE are to organise, operate
and develop radio and television broadcasting, and contribute to
informing, educating and entertaining the Greek people. That
provision also lays down that ERT-AE is not a profit-seeking
entity ...
The [ERT-AE's] main departments set out and apply, for the
areas within their responsibility, the basic principles laid down
by the board of governors and are financially independent ... The
board of governors appoints a director-general to head each
department (section 3). It follows that a director-general -
appointed by the board of governors and given the task of applying
in the area for which he is responsible the basic principles laid
down by the board, to whose supervision he is moreover subject -
is the employee of a public undertaking within the meaning of
Article 56 para. 3 of the Constitution; because of that position
..., he is liable to the disqualification referred to in that
Article.
...
It is apparent from the aforementioned provisions, and in
particular those providing that ET1 and ET2 enjoy independence in
programme scheduling, that ... the director-general participates
in the choice or may influence the content of television
programmes, and the programmes ... are broadcast throughout Greece
and can be received in all areas of the country. In the course of
his duties a director-general may, through his role in determining
television programme scheduling, have an advantage over other
Greek citizens in preparing for a political career.
... Mr Paleothodoros was appointed as Director-General of ET2
by the ERT-AE's board of governors and remained in that position
from 10 November 1987 to 23 November 1988 ... In the light of the
foregoing, [the applicant] was a member of staff of a public
entity for a period of more than three months during the three
years preceding the election; as his authority was by its nature
general, he is disqualified from standing for election under
Article 56 para. 3 of the Constitution ..."
In a dissenting opinion five members of the Special Supreme
Court expressed the view that the responsibilities of the
directors-general of ET1 and ET2 were not such as to create a link
between the head of a department and a particular constituency.
The mere fact that the television channel's credits were broadcast
in a particular constituency did not amount to performing official
duties in that constituency.
C. The case of Mr Sifounakis
15. On 25 February 1987 Mr Sifounakis was appointed
Director-General of the Greek Broadcasting Company (ERT) and on
10 November 1987 Director-General of its first television channel
(ET1). The applicant occupied that post until 8 July 1988.
16. In the general election of 8 April 1990 the applicant
stood as a candidate for the Socialist Party (PA.SO.K) in the
Lesbos constituency. As he obtained more than the required minimum
number of votes for election, the Lesbos Court of First Instance
declared in a decision of 12 April 1990 that he had been elected.
17. On 25 April 1990 a candidate from the same party in the
same constituency lodged an application with the Special Supreme
Court for an order annulling Mr Sifounakis's election and a
declaration that he himself, as first substitute member for
Lesbos, was the member of parliament. In support of his
application he relied on Article 56 para. 3 of the Constitution
(see paragraph 29 below), maintaining in particular that the
applicant's election was a nullity as, before the election, the
applicant had held the post of Director-General of ERT and ET1 and
was consequently barred from standing as a candidate.
18. In a judgment (no. 40/1991) of 29 May 1991 the Special
Supreme Court annulled Mr Sifounakis's election for the same
reasons as it gave in Mr Paleothodoros's case. It found that ERT,
a company wholly owned by the State but administratively and
financially independent and operating in the public interest
according to the rules governing the private economy
(Law no. 230/1975), had merged with the ERT-AE by virtue of
Law no. 1730/1987.
D. The case of Mr Kavaratzis
19. From 23 May 1990 to 13 September 1993 Mr Kavaratzis
occupied the post of First Deputy Director of the Social Security
Fund (Idryma Koinonikon Asfalisseon - "IKA").
20. In the general election of 10 October 1993 he stood as a
candidate for the "Nea Dimokratia" Party in the Evros
constituency. As he obtained more than the required minimum number
of votes for election, the Alexandroupolis Court of First Instance
declared in a decision no. 126/1993 that he had been elected.
21. On 2 November 1993 another candidate for that constituency
from the same party lodged an application with the Special Supreme
Court for an order annulling Mr Kavaratzis's election and for a
declaration that he, as first substitute candidate for the Evros
constituency, had been elected a member of parliament. He relied
on Article 56 para. 3 of the Constitution (see paragraph 29 below)
and maintained in particular that Mr Kavaratzis's election was a
nullity as, before the election, he had held the post of First
Deputy Director of the IKA.
22. On 22 March 1995 the Special Supreme Court annulled (by
six votes to five) his election on the following grounds (judgment
no. 10/1995):
"...
Under this Court's case-law: (1) the governor of a public-law
company or public undertaking - who, by virtue of Article 56
para. 1 of the Constitution, cannot be elected as a member of
parliament if he has not resigned before becoming a candidate, but
who is not disqualified under paragraph 3 of that Article - is the
sole organ ... running that entity or undertaking, in other words
having the exclusive right to decide ... questions relating to its
management (see judgment no. 46/1990 of the Special Supreme
Court). (2) What matters for the purposes of determining whether
in law an organ is a "governor" is not merely that the term
"governor" is used in the law or the articles of association, but
also the powers which the organ is given by those provisions (see
judgments nos. 46/1990, and 4 and 5/1991 of the Special Supreme
Court). (3) Persons classified by the law as governors of
public-law entities but who, by virtue of the provisions governing
their occupational status, are nevertheless subordinate to the
entity are subject to the disqualification provided for in
paragraph 3 of Article 56 of the Constitution (see judgments
nos. 4 and 5/1991 of the Special Supreme Court).
The Social Security Fund is managed by its governor and a
board of directors. The governor is the highest-ranking
administrative organ of the IKA; he [is empowered] to decide any
question not expressly reserved by law to the board of directors,
to act as the head of all the Fund's departments and to supervise
them and review their actions, to take all appropriate measures,
to recruit staff and take disciplinary action, to represent the
Fund in court and other proceedings, to chair the board of
directors; more generally, he is the highest-ranking
administrative organ of the Fund; that organ is not subordinate to
any other organ of the entity and manages the IKA jointly with the
board of directors (see judgments nos. 4 and 5/1991 of the Special
Supreme Court).
The post of First Deputy Director of the IKA was created by
Royal Decree no. 11 of 15 May 1957, and that of Second Deputy
Director by section 15 of Law no. 1573/1985. Neither organ, which
the aforementioned provisions ... classify as deputy director, is
a governor of the IKA so as to be subject to disqualification from
election under Article 56 of the Constitution ... The fact that
the deputy director acts as the governor's replacement is not
sufficient for him to be ascribed governor status, especially as
by law, and in particular section 15 (2) of Law no. 1573/1985, it
is the governor who appoints one of the deputy directors to act as
his replacement and as that delegation [of powers] ... does not
alter the nature of that organ even during periods when the
replacement is effective ...
In the instant case, during the period in issue, the governor
of the IKA, by decisions ..., delegated to the [applicant] - the
first deputy director - certain powers concerning questions within
the remit of the IKA's departments, but excluding matters relating
to "the development of the Fund's general strategy". By a decision
of 23 September 1991 the governor of the IKA appointed the
[applicant] to act as his replacement for the period from
1 October to 31 March of each year. The first deputy director is
appointed for three years and takes part in deliberations of the
board of directors in a consultative capacity. It is apparent from
the foregoing that, although the first deputy director of the IKA
is not subject to the Civil Service Code ..., his relationship
with the IKA is that of employee and more particularly of a
dismissable salaried member of staff (Article 103 paras. 5 and 6
of the Constitution) of that public-law entity; consequently, he
is subject to the disqualification from election provided for in
Article 56 para. 3
...
...
The first deputy director of the IKA is a member of staff with
nationwide responsibilities and for that reason he cannot be
elected as a member of parliament in any constituency.
..."
23. In a dissenting opinion five members of the Special
Supreme Court took the view that, like the governor, the deputy
directors were the highest-ranking organs of the IKA, and not
members of its staff, for five reasons: (a) a distinction was
drawn in the IKA's articles of association (Article 2) between the
"management", which included the board of directors, the governors
and the deputy directors, and the "departments", to which the
IKA's "members of staff" were attached; (b) the deputy directors
were excluded from the provisions of the royal decree ... "on the
application of the Civil Servants Code to the IKA's members of
staff" by Article 2 of that Code; (c) deputy directors were not
subject to disciplinary measures, whereas being so subject was a
decisive factor for classification as a civil servant or as a
member of staff of a public-law entity; (d) deputy directors were
not subordinate to the governor in the exercise of the powers he
had delegated them, which they would necessarily have been if they
were civil servants; and (e) they had a right to vote when
chairing meetings of the IKA's board of directors as the
governor's replacement.
E. The case of Mr Giakoumatos
24. From 11 September 1991 to 13 September 1993 Mr Giakoumatos
occupied the post of Second Deputy Director of the Social Security
Fund.
25. In the general election of 10 October 1993 the applicant
stood as a candidate for the "Nea Dimokratia" Party in the second
Athens constituency. As he obtained more than the required minimum
number of votes for election, the Athens Court of First Instance
declared in a decision no. 3131/1993 that he had been elected.
26. On 2 November 1993 another candidate for that constituency
from the same party lodged an application with the Special Supreme
Court for an order annulling Mr Giakoumatos's election and for a
declaration that he, as first substitute candidate for the second
Athens constituency, had been elected a member of parliament. He
relied on Article 56 para. 3 of the Constitution (see paragraph 29
below) and maintained in particular that the applicant's election
was a nullity as, before the election, he had held the post of
Second Deputy Director of the IKA.
27. On 22 March 1995 the Special Supreme Court annulled (by
six votes to five) Mr Giakoumatos's election on the following
grounds (judgment no. 9/1995):
"...
Under this Court's case-law: (1) the governor of a public-law
company or public undertaking - who, by virtue of Article 56
para. 1 of the Constitution, cannot be elected as a member of
parliament if he has not resigned before becoming a candidate, but
who is not disqualified under paragraph 3 of that Article - is the
sole organ ... running that entity or undertaking, in other words
having the exclusive right to decide ... questions relating to its
management (see judgment no. 46/1990 of the Special Supreme
Court). (2) What matters for the purposes of determining whether
in law an organ is a "governor" is not merely that the term
"governor" is used in the law or the articles of association, but
also the powers which the organ is given by those provisions (see
judgments nos. 46/1990, and 4 and 5/1991 of the Special Supreme
Court). (3) Persons classified by the law as governors of
public-law entities but who, by virtue of the provisions governing
their occupational status, are nevertheless subordinate to the
entity are subject to the disqualification provided for in
paragraph 3 of Article 56 of the Constitution (see judgments
nos. 4 and 5/1991 of the Special Supreme Court).
The Social Security Fund is managed by its governor and a
board of directors. The governor is the highest-ranking
administrative organ of the IKA; he [is empowered] to decide any
question not expressly reserved by law to the board of directors,
to act as the head of all the Fund's departments and to supervise
them and review their actions, to take all appropriate measures,
to recruit staff and take disciplinary action, to represent the
Fund in court and other proceedings, to chair the board of
directors; more generally, he is the highest-ranking
administrative organ of the Fund; that organ is not subordinate to
any other organ of the entity and manages the IKA jointly with the
board of directors (see judgments nos. 4 and 5/1991 of the Special
Supreme Court).
The post of First Deputy Director of the IKA was created by
Royal Decree no. 11 of 15 May 1957, and that of Second Deputy
Director by section 15 of Law no. 1573/1985. Neither organ, which
the aforementioned provisions ... classify as deputy director, is
a governor of the IKA so as to be subject to disqualification from
election under Article 56 of the Constitution ... The fact that
the deputy director acts as the governor's replacement is not
sufficient for him to be ascribed governor status, especially as
by law, and in particular section 15 (2) of Law no. 1573/1985, it
is the governor who appoints one of the deputy directors to act as
his replacement and as that delegation [of powers] ... does not
alter the nature of that organ even during periods when the
replacement is effective ...
In the instant case, during the period in issue, the governor
of the IKA, by decision ..., delegated to the [applicant] - the
second deputy director - certain powers concerning questions
within the remit of the IKA's departments, but excluding matters
relating to "the development of the Fund's general strategy". By
the same decision the governor of the IKA appointed the
[applicant] to act as his replacement for the period from 1 April
to 30 September of each year. The second deputy director is
appointed for three years and takes part in deliberations of the
board of directors in a consultative capacity. It is apparent from
the foregoing that, although the second deputy director of the IKA
is not subject to the Civil Service Code ..., his relationship
with the IKA is that of employee and he is a salaried member of
staff - for the duration of his term in office - of a public-law
entity; consequently, he is subject to the disqualification from
election provided for in Article 56 para. 3
...
..."
28. In a dissenting opinion five members of the Special
Supreme Court took the view that, like the governor, the deputy
directors were the highest-ranking organs of the IKA, and not
members of its staff, for five reasons: (a) a distinction was
drawn in the IKA's articles of association (Article 2) between the
"management", which included the board of directors, the governors
and the deputy directors, and the "departments", to which the
IKA's "members of staff" were attached; (b) the deputy directors
were excluded from the provisions of the royal decree ... "on the
application of the Civil Servants Code to the IKA's members of
staff" by Article 2 of that Code; (c) deputy directors were not
subject to disciplinary measures, whereas being so subject was a
decisive factor for classification as a civil servant or as a
member of staff of a public-law entity; (d) deputy directors were
not subordinate to the governor in the exercise of the powers he
had delegated them, which they would necessarily have been if they
were civil servants; and (e) they had a right to vote when
chairing meetings of the IKA's board of directors as the
governor's replacement.
II. Relevant domestic law
A. The Constitution
29. The relevant Articles of the Constitution provide:
Article 15 para. 2
"Radio and television shall be subject to direct State
control. Their aim shall be the objective, even-handed
broadcasting of information and news and of literary and artistic
works; quality of programmes must be maintained in all cases, in
view of their social role and the country's cultural development."
Article 56
"1. Salaried civil and public servants, officers of the armed
forces and the security forces, employees of local authorities or
other public-law entities, the mayors of municipalities, the
governors or chairmen of boards of directors of public-law
entities or public or municipal undertakings, notaries and land
registrars may not stand as candidates or be elected as members of
parliament if they have not resigned before becoming candidates.
Resignation shall take effect as soon as it is submitted in
writing. A member of the armed forces who resigns may not be
reinstated. Civil and public servants may not be reinstated until
a year has elapsed after their resignation.
...
3. Salaried civil servants, active members of the armed forces
and officers of the security forces, members of staff of
public-law entities in general, and the governors and members of
staff of public or municipal undertakings or charitable bodies may
not stand as candidates or be elected as members of parliament in
any constituency where they have performed their duties for more
than three months during the three years preceding the elections.
The permanent secretaries of ministries during the last six months
of the four-year parliamentary term shall be subject to the same
restrictions. Candidates for election to the State Parliament and
subordinate civil servants from the central departments of State
shall not be subject to these restrictions.
..."
Article 58
"Where the validity of legislative elections is contested
because of irregularities in the electoral process or a
candidate's failure to meet the requirements laid down by law, the
elections shall be reviewed and any disputes arising from them
heard by the Special Supreme Court referred to in Article 100."
Article 103
"1. Civil servants shall carry out the State's will and serve
the people; they shall abide by the Constitution and be devoted to
their country. The qualifications and procedural requirements for
their appointment shall be laid down by law.
...
5. The benefit of irremovability may be withdrawn by statute
from senior civil servants on secondment, persons directly
appointed as ambassadors, members of the private offices of the
President of the Republic, the Prime Minister, ministers and
ministers of State.
..."
B. The case-law of the Special Supreme Court
30. In a judgment (no. 46/1990) of 12 December 1990 the
Special Supreme Court held that the chairman of the board of
directors of a public undertaking (the Greek Organisation for
Small and Medium-Sized Businesses in the Craft Industry -
"EOMMEX") could not be equated with the governor of such an
undertaking and was not therefore subject to the disqualification
from standing for election provided for in Article 56 para. 3 of
the Constitution. In particular, the Special Supreme Court said:
"... In using the word "governor", the Constitution is
referring to the single person, the organ of the undertaking that,
under the provisions governing the undertaking and the general
law, runs it, that is to say the organ that alone decides, under
its powers as laid down by law or in the articles of association,
questions concerning the management of the undertaking (such as
achieving its objectives, managing staff and making agreements).
What matters for the purposes of [Article 56 para. 3] is to know
what the powers concerned are, not the description of the elected
member as "governor", as it cannot be ruled out that a person who
is not so described in the articles of association of the
undertaking ... may perform such duties even though his title is
that of chairman of the board of directors.
... It is apparent from the foregoing that the person who acts
as chairman of the board of directors of EOMMEX cannot be
described as "governor" in the aforementioned sense.
The chairman (a) draws up the agenda; (b) receives reports on
the functioning of the entity from its manager; (c) supervises the
manager's implementation of the board of directors' resolutions;
and (d) represents EOMMEX in court proceedings whilst being
empowered to assign that task to other people ... He cannot, by
virtue of these functions, which are the only ones the law
allocates to him, be described as a "governor" of the
organisation, since none of them, not even the last one,
corresponds to the concept of managerial act ... The position
would be different had the manager's functions been assigned to
the chairman, since in that eventuality the chairman of the board
of directors would actually be "managing" the organisation.
..."
31. The Special Supreme Court has also held that the
Secretary-General of the Greek Tourist Board ("EOT") and the
Governor of the Social Security Fund ("IKA") were not caught by
the disqualification in Article 56. With regard to the
Secretary-General, it held (in judgment no. 15/1978) that he was
not subordinate to EOT's board of directors, to which he was in no
way answerable, not even for disciplinary purposes; with regard to
the Governor it held (in judgments nos. 4 and 5/1991): "It is
apparent from paragraph 3 of Article 56 - in which the grounds for
disqualification from standing for election, which must be
strictly construed, are exhaustively set forth - read together
with paragraph 1 of that Article that the governors of public-law
entities, who are covered by the disabilities referred to in
paragraph 1 ... are not covered by those in paragraph 3 as they
are not included among the exhaustive list of persons subject to
disqualification."
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION
32. Mr Gitonas applied to the Commission on 12 June 1991,
Mr Paleothodoros and Mr Sifounakis on 22 November 1991,
Mr Kavaratzis on 16 May 1995 and Mr Giakoumatos on 28 May 1995.
Relying on Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-3), they complained
that their election to the Greek Parliament had been annulled
because they had been in public office within the three preceding
years.
33. In a decision of 10 October 1994 the Commission joined the
three applications of Mr Gitonas, Mr Paleothodoros and
Mr Sifounakis (nos. 18747/91, 19376/92 and 19379/92). It declared
their applications admissible on 1 March 1995 and those of
Mr Kavaratzis (no. 28208/95) and Mr Giakoumatos (no. 27755/95)
admissible on 24 June and 14 May 1996 respectively.
In its reports of 7 March 1996, 28 November 1996 and
21 January 1997 (Article 31) (art. 31), it expressed the opinion,
by nine votes to eight in the case of Mr Gitonas and Others,
sixteen votes to twelve in the case of Mr Kavaratzis and fourteen
votes to twelve in the case of Mr Giakoumatos that there had been
a violation of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-3). The full text
of the Commission's opinions on the three applications and of the
separate opinions contained in the reports is reproduced as an
annex to this judgment <3>.
--------------------------------
<3> For practical reasons this annex will appear only with the
printed version of the judgment (in Reports of Judgments and
Decisions 1997-IV), but a copy of the Commission's report is
obtainable from the registry.
FINAL SUBMISSIONS TO THE COURT
34. In their memorials the Government submitted: "In the
present case the disqualifications referred to in Article 56
para. 3 of the Greek Constitution and the annulment of the
applicants' election by the judgments of the Special Supreme Court
pursuant to that provision are neither arbitrary nor irrational
and do not infringe the free expression of opinion of the
electorate; on the contrary, they are consistent with the
principle of equality of treatment for all citizens in the
exercise of their right to stand for election and with the
political evolution and the reality of public political life in
Greece. Consequently, they do not exceed the margin of
appreciation reserved to the States." They invited the Court "to
reject the applications ... in their entirety".
35. Mr Giakoumatos concluded as follows:
"There is no statutory basis whatsoever for assimilating the
applicant to a member of staff of a public-law corporation. On the
other hand, the law provides that the deputy directors are not
members of the administrative staff of the Social Security Fund
(Article 2 of Presidential Decree no. 266/1989), just as it also
expressly precludes them from the scope of the Civil Servants Code
(Article 2 of Royal Decree no. 993/1966).
Furthermore, where the citizen's right to be elected to
Parliament is concerned, the Constitution must be strictly, not
broadly, construed to the letter of the provisions on
disqualification, so as not to introduce new grounds for
disqualification from holding parliamentary office.
However, the Special Supreme Court assimilated the status of
second deputy director to that of a member of staff of a public
corporation operating in the public interest and followed a line
of reasoning that was contrary to the above-mentioned legislation
and also to the principle that fundamental rights are not to be
subject to restrictions, especially not grounds for
disqualification without statutory basis because such grounds
cannot be presumed.
Accordingly, the Special Supreme Court violated Article 3 of
Protocol No. 1 to the Convention (P1-3) in its judgment
no. 9/1995, since it reduced the scope of the electorate's right
to elect the candidates of its choice and at the same time
infringed my right to be elected to Parliament."
AS TO THE LAW
Alleged violation of Article 3 of Protocol no. 1 (P1-3)
36. The applicants alleged that the annulment of their
election by the Special Supreme Court pursuant to Article 56
para. 3 of the Constitution infringed the right of the electorate
freely to choose its representatives and, by the same token, their
own right to be elected. They relied on Article 3 of
Protocol No. 1 (P1-3), which provides:
"The High Contracting Parties undertake to hold free elections
at reasonable intervals by secret ballot, under conditions which
will ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people in
the choice of the legislature."
They said that Article 56 para. 3 was imprecise and
incoherent, but the substance of their complaints concerned the
decisions of the Special Supreme Court, which, contrary to its
case-law, had construed Article 56 para. 3 broadly thereby
creating a new ground for disqualification not contained in that
Article. That was despite the fact that the grounds for
disqualification were exhaustively set out in the Constitution
itself and had to be strictly construed.
37. The Government maintained that the restrictions laid down
by Article 56 para. 3 of the Constitution on public and civil
servants, such as the applicants, standing for election were not
arbitrary and did not prevent the free expression of the opinion
of the people in the choice of the legislature. They were known in
advance to prospective candidates thus enabling them to make
appropriate arrangements and were aimed at ensuring both the
genuine manifestation of the people's will through equality of
treatment of candidates for election and the full exercise of the
individual right guaranteed by Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-3).
Moreover, the realities of Greek political life had been taken
into account in the restrictions, which in addition tended to
preserve the neutrality of the civil service, the independence of
members of parliament and the principle of the separation of
powers. Lastly, in requiring civil servants wishing to stand as
candidates to vacate office thirty-three months before the
elections, the constitutional legislature had not exceeded the
margin of appreciation afforded Contracting States by Article 3 of
Protocol No. 1 (P1-3).
38. In the Commission's view, the system for disqualification
instituted by Article 56 para. 3 was incoherent. The incumbents of
posts in public office that were far more important than those
occupied by the applicants - such as ministers, mayors or several
other high-ranking civil servants - and which gave much more scope
for influencing the electorate, were not subject to the
restrictions set out in that paragraph. Secondly, no account was
taken of the exact period - which in addition was very short -
when the position giving rise to disqualification had been held
during the three years preceding the elections. Thirdly, the
virtually irrebuttable presumption of disqualification created by
the said paragraph prevented the courts considering the nature of
the post concerned, the effective length of time it had been held
and the level of responsibility it implied. Lastly, it had not
been shown in the instant case that the applicants had derived a
benefit from their positions or gained an advantage over other
candidates. Considering that the annulment of their election was
not justified by the need to protect the Greek electorate, it
concluded that there had been a violation of Article 3 of
Protocol No. 1 (P1-3).
39. The Court reiterates that Article 3 of Protocol
No. 1 (P1-3) implies subjective rights to vote and to stand for
election. As important as those rights are, they are not, however,
absolute. Since Article 3 (P1-3) recognises them without setting
them forth in express terms, let alone defining them, there is
room for "implied limitations" (see the Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt
v. Belgium judgment of 2 March 1987, Series A no. 113, p. 23,
para. 52). In their internal legal orders the Contracting States
make the rights to vote and to stand for election subject to
conditions which are not in principle precluded under Article 3
(P1-3). They have a wide margin of appreciation in this sphere,
but it is for the Court to determine in the last resort whether
the requirements of Protocol No. 1 (P1) have been complied with;
it has to satisfy itself that the conditions do not curtail the
rights in question to such an extent as to impair their very
essence and deprive them of their effectiveness; that they are
imposed in pursuit of a legitimate aim; and that the means
employed are not disproportionate (ibid.).
More particularly, the States enjoy considerable latitude to
establish in their constitutional order rules governing the status
of parliamentarians, including criteria for disqualification.
Though originating from a common concern - ensuring the
independence of members of parliament, but also the electorate's
freedom of choice -, the criteria vary according to the historical
and political factors peculiar to each State. The number of
situations provided for in the Constitutions and the legislation
on elections in many member States of the Council of Europe shows
the diversity of possible choice on the subject. None of these
criteria should, however, be considered more valid than any other
provided that it guarantees the expression of the will of the
people through free, fair and regular elections.
40. The Court notes that paragraph 3 of Article 56 of the
Constitution, which was applied in the applicants' case,
establishes grounds for disqualification that are both relative
and final in that certain categories of holders of public office -
including salaried public servants and members of staff of
public-law entities and public undertakings - are precluded from
standing for election and being elected in any constituency where
they have performed their duties for more than three months in the
three years preceding the elections; the disqualification will
moreover stand notwithstanding a candidate's prior resignation,
unlike the position with certain other categories of public
servant under paragraph 1 of that Article (see paragraph 29
above).
Such disqualification, for which equivalent provisions exist
in several member States of the Council of Europe, serves a dual
purpose that is essential for the proper functioning and upholding
of democratic regimes, namely ensuring that candidates of
different political persuasions enjoy equal means of influence
(since holders of public office may on occasion have an unfair
advantage over other candidates) and protecting the electorate
from pressure from such officials who, because of their position,
are called upon to take many - and sometimes important - decisions
and enjoy substantial prestige in the eyes of the ordinary
citizen, whose choice of candidate might be influenced.
41. The Court acknowledges that the system introduced by
Article 56 is somewhat complex. However, it has not encountered
any of the incoherencies referred to by the Commission and still
less would it say that the system is arbitrary.
With regard to the alleged special treatment that paragraph 1
of Article 56 affords to certain categories of civil servant and
politician who, through their position, are better placed to
influence the electorate, the Court agrees with the Government's
arguments. Unlike the positions referred to in paragraph 3 of
Article 56, which are purely administrative posts, the feature
common to those referred to in paragraph 1 is their political
nature and the political responsibility which that entails. Mayors
and heads of municipalities, in company with members of
parliament, owe their position directly to the electorate.
Governors and presidents of public-law entities and other
high-ranking civil servants appointed by the Government conceive
and implement Government policy in their field of activity and are
thus subject, like ministers, to parliamentary scrutiny.
As for the objective establishment of criteria for
disqualification, which is laid down by paragraph 3 of Article 56
and prevents the Special Supreme Court from having regard to any
special features of the case, the Court does not find it
unreasonable having regard to the enormous practical difficulty in
proving that a position in the civil service has been used to
electoral ends.
42. The applicants' case was in substance aimed at showing
that not only did their positions fall outside the scope of
Article 56 para. 3, but also that there was nothing in the Special
Supreme Court's case-law to suggest that it would come to the
decision it did. More particularly, Mr Gitonas's secondment could
not alter his status as an employee of the Investment Bank and
could not be compared with an appointment as a civil servant since
the post of Deputy Head of the Prime Minister's private office had
been created illegally, as it had no statutory basis. The posts of
Mr Paleothodoros and Mr Sifounakis (Directors-General of the first
and second national television channels) could not be equated with
that of the Chairman of the Greek Broadcasting Company or of a
member of staff of a public undertaking with responsibilities in
all Greek constituencies. Lastly, Mr Kavaratzis and
Mr Giakoumatos, first and second deputy directors of the IKA,
could not be considered to be members of staff of a public-law
entity with nationwide activities since the nature of their duties
meant that their posts were more akin to that of the Governor of
the IKA, which the Special Supreme Court had already found was not
caught by Article 56 para. 3.
43. The Government agreed with the reasoning of the Special
Supreme Court in its decisions concerning the applicants. It
emphasised that if the European Court were to embark on its own
analysis of the relevant legislation, it would become a further
level of jurisdiction superimposed on those existing in the
Contracting States.
44. The Court points out that it is primarily for the national
authorities, and in particular the courts of first instance and of
appeal, which are specially qualified for the task, to construe
and apply domestic law.
It notes that the positions held by the applicants were not
among those expressly referred to in Article 56 para. 3. However,
that did not guarantee them a right to be elected. The Special
Supreme Court has sole jurisdiction under Article 58 of the
Constitution (see paragraph 29 above) to decide any dispute over
disqualifications and, as in any judicial order where such a
system exists, anyone elected in breach of the applicable rules
will forfeit his position as a member of parliament.
In the instant case the Special Supreme Court, after analysing
the nature of the posts held by the applicants and the applicable
legislation, held that the posts were similar to the ones
described in paragraph 3 of Article 56; it further found that the
conditions relating to when the position was held, and the
duration and extent of the duties, were met in the case of each of
the applicants. On reasonable grounds it considered it necessary
to annul their election (see paragraphs 10, 14, 18, 22 and 27
above).
The Court cannot reach any other conclusion; there is nothing
in the judgments of the Special Supreme Court to suggest that the
annulments were contrary to Greek legislation, arbitrary or
disproportionate, or thwarted "the free expression of the opinion
of the people in the choice of the legislature" (see, mutatis
mutandis, the aforementioned Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt judgment,
p. 25, para. 57).
Consequently, there has been no violation of Article 3 of
Protocol No. 1 (P1-3).
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
Holds that there has been no violation of Article 3 of
Protocol No. 1 (P1-3).
Done in English and in French, and delivered at a public
hearing in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 1 July 1997.
Signed: Rolv RYSSDAL
President
Signed: Herbert PETZOLD
Registrar
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