[неофициальный перевод]
ЕВРОПЕЙСКИЙ СУД ПО ПРАВАМ ЧЕЛОВЕКА
СУДЕБНОЕ РЕШЕНИЕ
ВАН МЕХЕЛЕН (VAN MECHELEN) И ДРУГИЕ ПРОТИВ НИДЕРЛАНДОВ
(Страсбург, 23 апреля 1997 года)
(Извлечение)
КРАТКОЕ НЕОФИЦИАЛЬНОЕ ИЗЛОЖЕНИЕ ОБСТОЯТЕЛЬСТВ ДЕЛА
A. Основные факты
Данное дело возникло из жалоб, поданных в Комиссию четырьмя
гражданами Нидерландов: Гендриком ван Мехеленом, Виллемом
Венериусом, Иоганном Венериусом и Антониусом Амандусом
Прюижмбоомом, которые родились соответственно в 1960, 1961, 1962 и
1964 гг.
В январе и феврале 1989 г. заявители были арестованы в связи с
вооруженным ограблением почты в Оирсчоте, происшедшим 26 января,
сопровождавшимся перестрелкой, в результате которой были ранены
четверо полицейских. Арестованным были предъявлены обвинения в
краже при отягчающих обстоятельствах и в нескольких покушениях на
предумышленное и простое убийство. Они отрицали все эти обвинения
и продолжали их отрицать в течение всего последовавшего затем
процесса.
В Судебных решениях, вынесенных 12 мая, 3 августа и 9 октября
1989 г., Окружной суд Хертогенбоса признал заявителей виновными и
приговорил каждого из них к десяти годам тюремного заключения.
Обвинения были основаны inter alia на полицейских докладах,
содержащих показания офицеров полиции, свидетельствовавших под
номерами, но в остальном остававшихся анонимными, а также
показаниях свидетелей, как полицейских, так и обычных жителей.
Заявители подали апелляцию в апелляционный суд, который в
отличие от окружного суда рассматривал четыре дела одновременно.
Защита потребовала допроса полицейских в открытом суде.
апелляционный суд, однако, решил, что всех свидетелей наедине
допросит следователь.
Следователь заслушал показания под присягой двадцати
свидетелей, из которых одиннадцать не были идентифицированы
защитой, поскольку при их допросе следователем защитник и прокурор
находились в раздельных комнатах, которые соединялись между собой
и с кабинетом следователя при помощи звуковой связи.
Свидетели, дававшие показания под номерами - офицеры
полиции, - утверждали, что если их имена будут раскрыты, то они
больше не смогут выполнять свои обязанности надлежащим образом.
Более того, все они пожелали остаться анонимными из страха перед
репрессиями против себя и своих семей. Все они подтвердили свои
свидетельские показания в окружном суде, рассматривавшем дело по
первой инстанции.
В своем официальном докладе следователь заявил, что ему
известна личность каждого из анонимных свидетелей, и то, что это
были 11 разных людей. В докладе излагались причины, по которым
свидетели пожелали остаться анонимными. Следователь счел причины
убедительными и достаточными, а показания - заслуживающими
доверия. Как обвинение, так и защита имели возможность задавать
вопросы, и опрос каждого из свидетелей занял от двух до пяти
часов. Заданные вопросы, но не ответы - т.к. это могло привести к
раскрытию личности свидетеля или используемых полицией методов
дознания - записывались. Все, кто принимал участие в опросе,
получили копию проекта доклада, и им было разрешено дать свои
комментарии.
В последующем апелляционный суд отверг просьбу защиты о
повторном допросе анонимных свидетелей в открытом суде, но
допросил ряд свидетелей, чья личность не была засекречена.
В четырех отдельных Судебных решениях, вынесенных 4 февраля
1991 г., апелляционный суд признал всех четырех заявителей
виновными в покушении на убийство и в ограблении с применением
насилия и приговорил каждого к 14 годам тюремного заключения.
Помимо показаний 11 свидетелей, о которых говорилось выше, в деле
имеются вещественные улики, показания в суде офицеров полиции и
гражданских лиц, чья личность была известна, а также расшифровка
перехваченного телефонного разговора между женой третьего
заявителя и ее матерью. Опознали заявителей как лиц, совершивших
преступление, анонимные офицеры полиции, свидетельствовавшие под
номерами.
Заявители подали жалобу, основывающуюся на вопросах права, в
Верховный суд. Их жалобы были отклонены в четырех самостоятельных
Судебных решениях от 9 июня 1992 г.
B. Разбирательство в Комиссии по правам человека
В жалобах, поданных в Комиссию 24 и 27 ноября и 8 декабря
1992 г., заявители утверждали, что было нарушено их право
допрашивать свидетелей, предусмотренное статьей 6 п. 3 "d"
Конвенции. Жалобы были объявлены приемлемыми 15 мая 1995 г.
В своем докладе от 27 февраля 1996 г. Комиссия установила
факты и пришла к выводу, что нарушения статьи 6 п. 1 и 3 "d"
Конвенции не было (двадцать голосов против восьми).
Европейская комиссия передала дело в Суд 17 апреля 1996 г.
ИЗВЛЕЧЕНИЕ ИЗ СУДЕБНОГО РЕШЕНИЯ
ВОПРОСЫ ПРАВА
I. О предполагаемом нарушении
статьи 6 п. 1 и 3 "d" Конвенции
46. Заявители жаловались, что приговор им был вынесен главным
образом на основе свидетельских показаний офицеров полиции, чья
личность оставалась анонимной и которые не были заслушаны публично
в их присутствии. Тем самым была нарушена статья 6 п. 1 и 3 "d",
которая гласит:
"1. Каждый человек имеет право... при рассмотрении любого
уголовного обвинения, предъявляемого ему, на справедливое и
публичное разбирательство дела... Судебное решение объявляется
публично, однако пресса и публика могут не допускаться на судебные
заседания в течение всего процесса или его части по соображениям
морали, общественного порядка или государственной безопасности в
демократическом обществе, а также когда того требуют интересы
несовершеннолетних или для защиты частной жизни сторон, или - в
той мере, в какой это, по мнению Суда, строго необходимо - при
особых обстоятельствах, когда гласность нарушала бы интересы
правосудия.
...
3. Каждый человек, обвиняемый в совершении уголовного
преступления, имеет как минимум следующие права:
...
d) допрашивать показывающих против него свидетелей или иметь
право на то, чтобы эти свидетели были допрошены, и иметь право на
вызов и допрос свидетелей в его пользу на тех же условиях, что и
для свидетелей, показывающих против него;
..."
Ни Правительство, ни Комиссия не разделяли эту точку зрения.
A. Доводы в Суде
47. Заявители ставили под вопрос саму необходимость сохранения
анонимности офицеров полиции. Они утверждали, что для них или
членов их семей не было никакой опасности. Это подкреплялось тем,
что г-ну Энгелену, одному из свидетелей обвинения, чье имя было
названо и который на ранней стадии процесса давал показания, не
была предоставлена анонимность, и неизвестно, чтобы ему на
каком-то этапе угрожали.
Более того, в обращении утверждалось, что допрос свидетелей не
должен был проводиться у следователя. Целесообразнее было бы,
чтобы офицеров полиции, если нужно в масках, допрашивали в
открытом судебном заседании.
Кроме того, заявители считали, что у них не было достаточной
возможности возражать и задавать вопросы офицерам полиции. Они
обратили внимание на условия, в которых велся допрос анонимных
свидетелей.
Анонимные офицеры полиции были помещены в одну комнату со
следователем и отделены от заявителей и их адвокатов, которые не
могли знать, был ли кто-нибудь еще в этой комнате и что там
происходило.
Не на все вопросы, поставленные защитой, был получен ответ,
например, где находился офицер полиции в то время, когда он вел
свои наблюдения, носил ли он очки и пользовался ли он, когда
следил за стоянкой жилых автоприцепов, какими-нибудь оптическими
приборами или направленным микрофоном.
И наконец, заявители утверждали, что обвинительный приговор
против них в решающей мере строился на показаниях, данных именно
этими свидетелями. Единственным показанием, на котором основывался
апелляционный суд, было опознание заявителей этими офицерами
полиции.
48. Правительство и Комиссия считали, что нарушения статьи 6
п. 1 и 3 "d" не было.
Они полагали, что безопасность самих офицеров полиции и их
семей, а также необходимость не рисковать возможностью их
дальнейшего использования в других подобных операциях являлись
достаточным основанием для сохранения их анонимности.
Примененная процедура была выработана Верховным судом
Нидерландов в его Решении от 2 июля 1990 г. (см. п. 40 выше) в
развитие Решения Суда по делу Костовски от 20 ноября 1989 г.
(Серия A, т. 166). Эта процедура, согласно их утверждениям, была
принята Судом в его Решении по делу Доорсон против Нидерландов от
26 марта 1996 г. (Reports, 1996-II).
В соответствии с этой процедурой показания анонимных офицеров
полиции были запротоколированы
a) следователем, который
b) сам удостоверил личность соответствующих офицеров полиции;
c) письменно высказал свое мнение об их надежности и доверии к
их информации в своем официальном докладе;
d) привел обоснованное мнение по поводу имеющихся у них причин
сохранять свою анонимность и нашел их достаточными;
e) предоставил защите достаточную возможность опросить их или
поставить перед ними вопросы. Официальный доклад следователя,
который был очень подробным, все это подтвердил.
Кроме того, полученные таким путем показания подкреплялись
другими свидетельствами не из анонимных источников, а именно
записями телефонных переговоров, заявлениями других офицеров
полиции, а также некоторыми техническими свидетельствами. Поэтому
обвинительный приговор не основывался исключительно на показаниях.
B. Оценка Суда
1. Принципы, подлежащие применению
49. Поскольку требования статьи 6 п. 3 следует рассматривать
как конкретные аспекты права на справедливое разбирательство,
гарантированные в статье 6 п. 1, Суд объединит рассмотрение жалоб
на нарушение статьи 6 п. 1 и 3 "d" (см. среди многих других
вышеупомянутое Решение по делу Доорсона, с. 469 - 470, п. 66).
50. Суд повторяет, что допустимость доказательств является
вопросом, который регулируется главным образом национальным
законодательством, и по общему правилу именно национальные суды
призваны оценивать предъявленные им доказательства. Задача Суда,
согласно Конвенции, заключается не в том, чтобы оценивать
показания свидетелей, а в том, чтобы удостовериться, было ли
судебное разбирательство в целом справедливым, включая и то, как
были получены доказательства (см. среди других прецедентов
вышеупомянутое Решение по делу Доорсона, с. 470, п. 67).
51. Обычно все доказательства должны быть представлены в ходе
публичного слушания в присутствии обвиняемого, с тем чтобы
обеспечить состязательность. Из этого принципа имеются исключения,
но они не должны ущемлять право на защиту; по общему правилу
статья 6 п. 1 и 3 "d" требует, чтобы обвиняемому была
предоставлена адекватная возможность оспаривать утверждения и
допрашивать свидетельствующих против него лиц, либо когда они дают
показания в суде, либо на более поздней стадии (см. Решение по
делу Люди против Швейцарии от 15 июня 1992 г. Серия A, т. 238,
с. 21, п. 49).
52. В своем Решении по делу Доорсона (там же, с. 470, п. 69)
Суд указал, что использование показаний анонимных свидетелей для
обоснования обвинительного приговора ни при каких обстоятельствах
несовместимо с Конвенцией.
53. В этом своем Решении Суд отметил следующее:
"Статья 6 специально не требует принимать в расчет интересы
свидетелей. Однако, когда на карту ставится жизнь, свобода или
безопасность человека, тогда, по общему правилу, вопрос попадает в
сферу действия статьи 8 Конвенции. Подобные интересы свидетелей и
жертв защищаются в принципе другими статьями Конвенции согласно
которым Договаривающиеся государства должны организовать свое
судопроизводство по уголовным делам таким образом, чтобы эти
интересы не оказывались под угрозой. В таких обстоятельствах
принципы справедливого судебного разбирательства требуют также,
чтобы в соответствующих случаях интересы защиты соизмерялись с
интересами тех свидетелей или жертв, которых вызвали в суд для
дачи показаний" (см. вышеупомянутое Решение по делу Доорсона,
с. 470, п. 70).
54. Однако если сохраняется анонимность свидетелей обвинения,
защита сталкивается с такими трудностями, которых при рассмотрении
уголовных дел обычно быть не должно. Соответственно, Суд признал,
что в таких случаях статья 6 п. 1 и п. 3 "d" Конвенции требует,
чтобы эти трудности защиты в достаточной мере уравновешивались
судебной процедурой (там же, с. 471, п. 72).
55. И наконец, следует напомнить, что обвинительный приговор
не должен основываться единственно или в решающей степени на
анонимных утверждениях (там же, с. 472, п. 76).
2. Применение вышеуказанных принципов
56. По мнению Суда, соотношение интересов защиты с аргументами
в пользу сохранения анонимности свидетелей поднимает особые
проблемы, т.к. свидетели, о которых идет речь, служат в
государственной полиции. Хотя их интересы, а равно их семей также
заслуживают защиты в соответствии с Конвенцией, следует признать,
что их положение до некоторой степени отличается от положения
незаинтересованного свидетеля или жертвы. На полицейских лежит
долг повиновения исполнительным властям государства, и они связаны
с прокуратурой; только по одним этим причинам к их использованию в
качестве анонимных свидетелей следует прибегать лишь в
исключительных обстоятельствах. Кроме того, сама природа их
служебных обязанностей, в частности производство ареста, требует
впоследствии дачу показаний в открытом судебном заседании.
57. С другой стороны, Суд в принципе признал, что при условии
уважения прав на защиту правомерным является желание руководства
полиции сохранить анонимность агента, занимающегося розыскной
деятельностью, для защиты его самого или его семьи и для того,
чтобы не ставить под угрозу возможность его использования в
будущих операциях (см. Решение по делу Люди, с. 21, п. 49).
58. Принимая во внимание то значение, которое имеет в
демократическом обществе право на справедливое отправление
правосудия, любые меры, ограничивающие права защиты, должны
диктоваться строгой необходимостью. Если менее ограничительная
мера будет достаточна, то именно она должна применяться.
59. В данном деле офицеры полиции, о которых идет речь,
находились в отдельной комнате со следователем, куда обвиняемые и
даже их адвокаты не имели доступа. Все общение шло по звуковому
проводу. Защита, таким образом, не знала не только личность
свидетелей из полиции, но и была лишена возможности следить за их
поведением, как это было бы при прямом допросе, а значит, и
проверить их надежность (см. Решение по делу Костовски, с. 20,
п. 42 in fine).
60. Суду не было удовлетворительным образом объяснено, почему
потребовалось прибегать к таким крайним ограничениям права
обвиняемых на то, чтобы показания против них давались в их
присутствии, и почему не были использованы иные, не столь далеко
идущие меры.
В отсутствие какой-либо дополнительной информации Суд не может
признать оперативные потребности полиции достаточным оправданием
для ограничения прав обвиняемых. Следует отметить, что
пояснительная записка к законопроекту, который стал Законом от
11 ноября 1993 г., упоминает в этой связи о возможности
использования грима или маски, а также предотвращения визуального
контакта.
61. Суд не убежден, что апелляционный суд в достаточной мере
оценил реальность угрозы мести офицерам полиции и членам их семей.
Из Решения суда не видно, чтобы он рассматривал вопрос, будут ли
заявители в состоянии выполнить такие угрозы или побудить других
сделать это по их поручению. Его Решение строилось исключительно
на серьезности совершенных преступлений (см. п. 26 выше).
В этой связи следует отметить, что г-н Энгелен, гражданский
свидетель, который на ранних стадиях рассмотрения дела опознал
одного из заявителей как лицо, совершившее преступление, не
пользовался защитой анонимности и ни разу не заявлял, что ему
угрожали.
62. Справедливо - как было отмечено Правительством и Комиссией
(см. п. 48 выше), - что анонимные офицеры полиции допрашивались в
присутствии следователя, который сам удостоверился в их личности и
в очень подробном официальном докладе об установленных им фактах
высказал свое мнение об их надежности и достоверности сообщаемых
ими сведений, а также о приведенных ими причинах сохранения
анонимности.
Однако эти меры не могут считаться достаточным основанием для
лишения защиты возможности задавать вопросы свидетелям в своем
присутствии, иметь собственное суждение об их поведении. Поэтому
нельзя сказать, что помехи в условиях, в которых пришлось работать
защите, уравновешиваются процедурой, о которой сказано выше.
63. Более того, единственным доказательством, на которое
полагался апелляционный суд, подтверждающим опознание заявителей в
качестве лиц, совершивших преступления, были показания анонимных
офицеров полиции. Таким образом, обвинительный приговор заявителей
"в решающей степени" основывался на этих анонимных заявлениях.
64. По мнению Суда, настоящее дело не подпадает под случай
Доорсона: в последнем решение основывалось на информации
(содержавшейся в материалах дела) о том, что свидетели Y 15 и
Y 16 - оба гражданские лица, лично знавшие обвиняемого, имели
достаточно причин полагать, что он может прибегнуть к насилию, и
они были заслушаны в присутствии адвоката и обвинителя (см.
вышеупомянутое Решение по делу Доорсона, с. 454 - 455, п. 25;
с. 455 - 456, п. 28; с. 470 - 471, п. 71 и 73).
Более того, в этом деле имелись другие доказательства, кроме
анонимных свидетельств, обеспечивавшие позитивную идентификацию
обвиняемого как лица, совершившего вменяемые ему преступления (там
же, с. 458 - 459, п. 34; с. 472, п. 76).
65. При таких обстоятельствах Суд не находит справедливой
примененную процедуру в целом.
C. Вывод
66. Имело место нарушение статьи 6 п. 1 и п. 3 "d".
II. Применение статьи 50 Конвенции
67. Статья 50 Конвенции предусматривает следующее:
"Если Суд установит, что решение или мера, принятые судебными
или иными властями Высокой Договаривающейся Стороны, полностью или
частично противоречат обязательствам, вытекающим из настоящей
Конвенции, а также если внутреннее право упомянутой Стороны
допускает лишь частичное возмещение последствий такого решения или
такой меры, то решением Суда, если в этом есть необходимость,
предусматривается справедливое возмещение потерпевшей стороне".
A. Ущерб
68. Заявители утверждали, что если бы апелляционный суд
Хертогенбоса не полагался на заявления анонимных офицеров полиции,
то против них не было бы заведено никакого дела и их бы оправдали.
Они потребовали возмещения морального вреда в сумме
250 голландских гульденов за каждый день, проведенный в
заключении.
Правительство сочло требования заявителей о возмещении ущерба
"непропорционально высокими".
Делегат Комиссии этот вопрос не комментировал.
69. Суд полагает, что в данных условиях этот аспект дела еще
не готов для вынесения по нему решения. Поэтому необходимо
отложить его, учитывая возможность достижения соглашения между
государством - ответчиком и заявителями.
B. Издержки и расходы
70. Заявители не предъявили претензий по поводу издержек и
расходов, понесенных ими в ходе внутренней процедуры уголовного
разбирательства.
Относительно издержек и расходов, понесенных при рассмотрении
дела в Европейской комиссии и Европейском суде по правам человека,
заявители требуют следующее:
Г-н Ван Мехелен и г-н Виллем Венериус (представленные
г-жой Спронкен) - 16598,07 нидерландского гульдена, включая налог
на добавленную стоимость;
Г-н Иоганн Венериус (представленный г-ном Сьекрона) -
30446,43 нидерландского гульдена, включая налог на добавленную
стоимость;
Г-н Прюижмбоом (представленный г-ном Кноопсом) -
11905 нидерландских гульденов, включая налог на добавленную
стоимость.
Правительство и делегат Комиссии данные требования не
комментировали.
71. Суд отмечает, что г-н Ван Мехелен, г-н Иоганн Венериус и
г-н Виллем Венериус получили судебную помощь от институтов
Конвенции.
72. Суд констатирует, что заявители действительно понесли в
силу необходимости требуемые ими издержки и расходы в попытках
добиться исправления установленных нарушений. Он также находит
требуемые заявителями Ван Мехеленом, Виллемом Венериусом и
Прюижмбоомом суммы разумными в количественном отношении.
С другой стороны, требование г-на Иоганна Венериуса
непропорционально по отношению к требованиям других заявителей. Не
было дано никакого объяснения такому несоответствию.
73. Суд присуждает г-ну Прюижмбоому требуемую сумму.
Г-ну Ван Мехелену и г-ну Виллему Венериусу, совместно, он
присуждает требуемые суммы за вычетом уже выплаченных им Советом
Европы в порядке судебной помощи, а именно 11412 французских
франков.
Принимая решение на основе справедливости, Суд присуждает
г-ну Иоганну Венериусу 20000 нидерландских гульденов, включая
налог на добавленную стоимость, за вычетом уже выплаченных ему
Советом Европы в порядке юридической помощи, а именно 11436
французских франков.
C. Проценты за просрочку
74. Согласно имеющейся у Суда информации, обычная процентная
ставка, применявшаяся в Нидерландах на дату принятия настоящего
Решения, составляла 5% годовых.
ПО ЭТИМ ОСНОВАНИЯМ СУД
1. Постановил шестью голосами против трех, что имело место
нарушение статьи 6 п. 1 и п. 3 "d" Конвенции;
2. Постановил единогласно, что государство - ответчик обязано
в течение трех месяцев оплатить расходы и издержки:
a) заявителям Ван Мехелену и Виллему Венериусу, совместно, -
16598,07 (шестнадцать тысяч пятьсот девяносто восемь нидерландских
гульденов и семь центов) за вычетом 11436 (одиннадцати тысяч
четырехсот тридцати шести) французских франков, переведенных в
нидерландские гульдены по обменному курсу, действовавшему на дату
вынесения настоящего Судебного решения;
b) заявителю Иоганну Венериусу - 20000 (двадцать тысяч)
голландских гульденов за вычетом 11436 (одиннадцати тысяч
четырехсот тридцати шести) французских франка переведенных в
нидерландские гульдены по обменному курсу, действовавшему на дату
вынесения настоящего Судебного решения;
c) заявителю Прюижмбоому - 11905 (одиннадцать тысяч девятьсот
пять) нидерландских гульденов;
d) простой процент, исходя из годовой ставки 5%, подлежит
уплате по истечении вышеупомянутого трехмесячного срока вплоть до
погашения;
3. Отверг единогласно оставшуюся часть требования заявителя
Иоганна Венериуса о возмещении издержек и расходов;
4. Постановил единогласно, что вопрос о применимости статьи 50
Конвенции к требованиям заявителей о возмещении вреда еще не готов
для решения и, соответственно,
a) откладывает указанный вопрос;
b) приглашает Правительство и заявителей представить в течение
предстоящих трех месяцев свои письменные замечания по этому
вопросу и, в частности, уведомить Суд о соглашении, которого они
могли бы достичь;
c) откладывает дальнейшее рассмотрение и делегирует
председателю Палаты полномочия возобновить его, если потребуется.
Совершено на английском и французском языках и оглашено во
Дворце прав человека в Страсбурге 23 апреля 1997 г.
Председатель
Рудольф БЕРНХАРДТ
Грефье
Герберт ПЕТЦОЛЬД
В соответствии со статьями 51 п. 2 Конвенции и 55 п. 2
Регламента Суда B к настоящему Решению прилагаются отдельные
мнения судей.
ОСОБОЕ МНЕНИЕ СУДЕЙ МАТШЕРА И ВАЛЬТИКОСА
Это пограничный случай. С одной стороны, условия, при которых
проходил суд и опрашивались свидетели, были не вполне
удовлетворительны и, вне всякого сомнения, они могли бы быть
улучшены, хотя следует признать, что в голландском праве были
предприняты усилия по адаптации процедуры заслушивания анонимных
свидетелей к требованиям статьи 6 Конвенции в том виде, как они
изложены в Решении по делу Костовски против Нидерландов от 20
ноября 1989 г. (Серия A, т. 166). С другой стороны, дело идет о
вооруженном ограблении, и вполне понятно, что свидетели, даже если
они являются офицерами полиции, боятся репрессий со стороны
преступников, которые рады возможности нажать на курок. Возможное
возникновение подобных ситуаций в будущем делает желательной
дальнейшую конкретизацию требований статьи 6 Конвенции.
Однако в настоящем случае, с учетом всех обстоятельств дела,
мы не можем найти нарушения статьи 6 Конвенции и в целом согласны
с мнением судьи Ван Дийка.
ОСОБОЕ МНЕНИЕ СУДЬИ ВАН ДИЙКА
1. К сожалению, я не могу согласиться с выводом большинства,
что имело место нарушение статьи 6 п. 1 в сочетании с п. 3 "d"
Конвенции. Я также не могу последовать за большинством и в том,
что касается сути рассуждений в поддержку этого вывода.
2. Хотя прецедентное право Суда относительно условий, при
которых обвинительный приговор по уголовному делу может частично
строиться на показаниях анонимных свидетелей, еще не получило
полного развития, Суд наметил основные линии. Я придерживаюсь
мнения, что настоящее Решение не находится в пределах обозначенных
ими рамок и не является логическим продолжением этих линий; с
другой стороны, обстоятельства дела не являются до такой степени
специфичными, чтобы обособить его от других, в частности от дела
Доорсона (см. Решение по делу Доорсон против Нидерландов от
26 марта 1996 г. Reports, 1996-II), где указано, что в действиях
Нидерландов не было нарушения статьи 6 п. 1 в сочетании со
статьей 6 п. 3 "d". Хотя Суд и не связан жестко прецедентом,
правовая определенность и юридическое равенство требуют, чтобы
судебная практика была ясной и непротиворечивой, а также
предсказуемой в той мере, в какой обстоятельства дела сопоставимы
с более ранними случаями.
3. Поскольку "допустимость доказательств регулируется главным
образом национальным правом, а по общему правилу оценку
представленных им доказательств производят национальные суды" (см.
Решение по делу Доорсона, с. 470, п. 67), то применяемые
национальное законодательство, прецедентное право и судебная
практика представляются до определенной степени значимыми и для
данного Суда.
Верховный суд Нидерландов пересмотрел судебную практику
относительно условий, при которых обвинительный приговор может
основываться на показаниях анонимных свидетелей в свете Решения
Суда по делу Костовски (см. п. 40 настоящего Решения). Более того,
взяв пересмотренную судебную практику за отправную точку и
основываясь inter alia на анализе практики настоящего Суда
относительно допустимости показаний анонимных свидетелей при
разбирательстве уголовных дел и значении его для внутреннего права
и законодательной практики Нидерландов, Правительство страны
предложило, а Законодательное собрание приняло несколько поправок
к Уголовно-процессуальному кодексу (см. п. 41 настоящего Решения и
цитируемую в нем Пояснительную записку к Закону 1993 г.).
Закон 1993 г. еще не вступил в силу, когда национальные суды
вынесли свои решения по данному делу. Однако если бы он уже
вступил в силу, то процедура, которой следовал апелляционный суд,
соответствовала бы его нормам. Действительно, перечисленные в
Законе причины, позволяющие держать личность свидетеля в секрете,
не включают, по тактическим соображениям, желательность не
раскрывать личность офицера, чтобы не поставить под угрозу
эффективность его работы в будущем. Пояснительная записка к Закону
подробно излагает мнение Правительства о том, что заключающийся в
расследовании серьезных преступлений общественный интерес сам по
себе не может служить оправданием для предоставления гарантии
полной анонимности (см. п. 41 - 42 настоящего Решения). Однако
апелляционный суд основывал свое согласие на сохранение
анонимности по желанию свидетелей не на этой причине, а на том,
что свидетели опасались за жизнь и безопасность свою и своих семей
(см. п. 26 настоящего Решения), что является основанием,
предусмотренным в статье 226 "a" Уголовно-процессуального кодекса.
Ранее сказанное, конечно, само по себе не гарантирует, что
пересмотренная практика Верховного суда и / или измененные нормы
Уголовно-процессуального кодекса будут соответствовать Конвенции
при всех обстоятельствах. Однако, как отмечалось выше, в этом
вопросе внутренняя судебная практика и законодательство обладают
собственной значимостью. Более того, в настоящем случае с учетом
юридических обстоятельств формирования соответствующей судебной
практики Нидерландов и истории подготовки нового законодательства,
когда в обоих случаях прецедентное право Европейского суда
учитывалось специально, имеются, по-видимому, достаточные
основания исходить из презумпции соответствия, по крайней мере в
отношении тех вопросов, которые уже рассматривались Судом.
4. Рассмотрение затронутых здесь вопросов в конечном счете
привело меня к выводу, что статья 6 п. 1 и 3 "d" в настоящем деле
нарушена не была. Возможно было бы предпочтительнее, если бы
апелляционный суд или следователь допросили свидетелей в
присутствии защиты и генерального прокурора, а обвиняемый следил
бы за ходом разбирательства в отдельной комнате. Из материалов
дела, которые были в Суде, я не могу установить, рассматривалась
ли вообще такая возможность. Однако и в том виде, как это было, с
учетом всех фактов и обстоятельств, по моему мнению, право защиты
допрашивать свидетелей не было ограничено в такой степени, которая
не давала бы ей надлежащей и адекватной возможности оспаривать
утверждения и задавать вопросы свидетелям, как того требует
статья 6 п. 1 и 3 "d" (см. Решение по делу Люди от 15 июня
1992 г.). Поэтому я считаю, что, с учетом всех компенсационных
элементов процедурного характера, предписанных апелляционным судом
и выполненных следователем, судебное разбирательство было
справедливым. Придя к этому выводу, я хотел бы подчеркнуть
следующие аспекты:
a) Анонимных свидетелей допрашивал не только обвинитель, но и
независимый и беспристрастный судья, который, судя по его
официальному докладу апелляционному суду по поводу установленных
им обстоятельств дела, приложил большие старания, чтобы
компенсировать защите неудобство, возникшее из-за отсутствия
контакта лицом к лицу со свидетелями. Заявители и их защитник
могли слышать допрос, который вел следователь, и задавать свои
собственные вопросы. В этом аспекте, как было отмечено и
Комиссией, настоящий случай отличается от случаев Костовски (см.
Решение по делу Костовски против Нидерландов от 20 ноября 1989 г.
Серия A, т. 166, с. 20, п. 42), Виндиша (см. Решение по делу
Виндиш против Австрии от 27 сентября 1990 г. Серия A, т. 186,
с. 10, п. 27), Саиди (см. Решение по делу Саиди против Франции от
20 сентября 1993 г. Серия A, т. 261-C, с. 56 - 57, п. 44). В
делах, подобных настоящему, практика заслушивания свидетелей
следователем, а не в самом судебном заседании, была принята Судом
как соответствующая Конвенции.
b) Апелляционный суд привел причины, по которым следователю
были делегированы полномочия по заслушиванию свидетелей. Значение,
которое меньшинство членов Комиссии придает тому, что
апелляционный суд не воспользовался возможностью самому оценить
надежность свидетелей, не является, по моему мнению, решающим; нет
причин, по которым суд не мог бы полагаться на оценку в равной
мере независимого и беспристрастного следователя. В этом отношении
уместно напомнить, что допросы у следователя проводились не на
досудебной стадии, а во время приостановления рассмотрения дела в
апелляционном суде и в соответствии с Решением апелляционного
суда; они являлись составной частью судебного разбирательства. По
делу Костовски, где Суд подчеркнул важность для слушающего дело
судьи следить за поведением свидетеля, судьей был заслушан только
один из свидетелей, однако личность этого лица осталась ему
неизвестной.
c) Показания в присутствии следователя были даны приведенными
к присяге офицерами полиции, которым было поручено осуществлять
дознание и расследование и которые отвечали за любое заявление,
сделанное ими в этой связи (см. Судебное решение по делу Люди,
с. 21, п. 49).
d) Следователь, который наблюдал за поведением свидетелей во
время допроса, высказал мотивированное мнение об их надежности,
что должно было компенсировать защите лишение визуальной
информации, которая позволяла бы ей проверить надежность
свидетелей (см. Решение по делу Виндиша, с. 10 - 11, п. 28 - 29).
e) Следователь высказал мотивированное мнение по поводу
желания офицеров полиции сохранить анонимность, и вслед за ним эти
причины счел оправданными и апелляционный суд. По их общему
мнению, характер обвинений и событий был таков, что страх
последствий, сопряженных с насилием, нельзя было считать
необоснованным. Статья 6 неограниченного права допроса свидетелей
не гарантирует. Необходимо не только признать дискреционное
усмотрение компетентных внутренних судов по принятию мер в
соответствии с потребностями надлежащего отправления правосудия,
но и уравновесить интересы защиты по статье 6 интересами
свидетелей, которые охраняются другими материальными статьями
Конвенции (см. Решение по делу Доорсона, с. 470, п. 70). А в
Решении по делу Люди Суд счел интерес полицейских властей в
сохранении анонимности их агентов "легитимным", еще больший вес
должен быть придан в этом случае, как это было сделано
апелляционным судом, интересу агентов защитить жизнь и
безопасность свою и своих семей (статьи 2, 3, 5 и 8 Конвенции).
f) Защита получила полную возможность слушать и задавать
вопросы свидетелям, а также комментировать запись их ответов и
действительно широко пользовалась этой возможностью; технические
дефекты, на которые она жаловалась, причиняли неудобства, и,
наверное, их можно было бы избежать, но, особенно учитывая
продолжительность времени слушаний и тщательность записи
показаний, эти дефекты не были настолько серьезны, чтобы помешать
защите.
g) Апелляционный суд не исключал заранее возможность
постановки перед свидетелями во время суда дополнительных
вопросов, но полагал, что защита не обосновала это в достаточной
степени. В то же время защите была предоставлена возможность
оспорить сделанные заявления и их использование в качестве
доказательств в открытом судебном разбирательстве в апелляционном
суде.
h) Обвинение не строилось исключительно на показаниях
анонимных свидетелей. Хотя эти показания, несомненно, были основой
доказательств, были показания и других свидетелей, некоторые
доказательства технического характера, а также запись телефонного
разговора. В этом отношении Суду следует признать, что "по общему
правилу именно национальные суды призваны давать оценку
представленным им доказательствам".
В Решении по делу Доорсона, где критерий "решающей степени"
получил обоснование и применение (с. 472, п. 76), Суд посчитал,
что этот критерий был удовлетворен в ситуации, когда в дополнение
к показаниям анонимных свидетелей обвинение основывалось и на
заявлении, которое было сделано в полиции свидетелем, чья личность
была установлена, но отозвано в процессе судебного
разбирательства, и на заявлении другого идентифицированного
свидетеля, который исчез до того, как защита получила возможность
допросить его (там же, с. 472, п. 76 и с. 458 - 459, п. 34).
Принимая во внимание все эти обстоятельства дела, я прихожу к
выводу, что суд, осудивший заявителей, был "справедливым" в смысле
статьи 6 Конвенции в том виде, как она толкуется предшествующей
судебной практикой.
Изложив свой вывод, я хочу со всем подобающим уважением
сделать следующие замечания по поводу рассуждений, на которых
основывается вывод большинства.
5. Как и большинство, в соответствии со сложившейся практикой
Суда я исхожу из того, что в обычных условиях доказательства
должны быть представлены при публичном слушании дела. Вот почему,
рассуждая теоретически, я нахожу, что предпочтительнее было бы
провести допрос офицеров полиции на заседании апелляционного суда,
а они, если это необходимо для их анонимности, могли бы надеть
маски. Однако я хочу также привлечь внимание к мнению
апелляционного суда о том, что это было слишком рискованно, т.к.
возможность раскрытия личности свидетелей нельзя было бы
исключить. Я предпочел бы, чтобы апелляционный суд привел
конкретные аргументы в поддержку такого мнения. С другой стороны,
у меня и, как я полагаю, у моих коллег по Суду не хватает
специальных знаний, чтобы судить, были ли эти опасения оправданны.
И снова можно задаться вопросом: стало бы положение защиты лучше в
плане наблюдения за поведением свидетелей и проверки их
надежности, если бы свидетели предстали в масках; эффективная
маскировка может существенно изменить звук и интонацию голоса, а
также манеру держаться заинтересованного лица. В общем можно
считать, что национальный суд находится в более выгодном
положении, чтобы судить о таком сложном вопросе фактического
характера, чем наш Суд, который должен подменять суждения
национального суда своими только тогда, когда последние явно
неразумны. Из формулировки Решения по делу Доорсона ясно видно,
что в подобных ситуациях Суд признает приоритет национального
суда.
6. Тот факт, что в участвовавших в преследовании офицеров
полиции стреляли, не обязательно означает, что на более поздней
стадии, во время или после суда, их жизнь и / или их семей будет в
опасности. Однако по обоим этим вопросам национальным властям (по
данному делу - национальным судам) следует оставить поле для
маневра, чтобы они могли найти баланс между интересами защиты, с
одной стороны, и свидетелей - с другой (см. Решение по делу
Доорсона, с. 470, п. 70). По моему мнению, апелляционный суд не
переступил через черту, установив, что риск раскрытия личности
свидетелей присутствовал и что их страх за жизнь и безопасность
свою и своих близких был оправдан в свете серьезности совершенных
преступлений и примененного насилия.
Я не согласен с большинством, что апелляционный суд не
предпринял никаких конкретных усилий, чтобы оценить реальность
угрозы репрессалий. В распоряжении апелляционного суда находился
доклад следователя с установленными им обстоятельствами по делу,
где он ссылался по этому вопросу не только на показания
заинтересованных офицеров полиции, но и дал свою собственную
оценку в свете опасности преступлений и насилия, примененных
преступниками. Решение апелляционного суда, подтвердившего мнение
следователя, рассматривалось в порядке надзора Верховным судом.
В Решении по делу Доорсона Суд установил, что не требуется
фактической угрозы, направленной против свидетелей, для признания
решения о сохранении их анонимности разумным, достаточно, чтобы
имелся соответствующий предыдущий опыт. По настоящему делу следует
также принять во внимание, что некоторые свидетели, преследуя
грабителей, получили ранение. Если даже занять позицию, что
профессия офицера полиции подразумевает некоторый риск, это тем
более не должно означать, что надо рисковать без необходимости, и
это не должно означать, что жизнь и безопасность их семей
заслуживают меньшей защиты, чем жизнь и безопасность других людей.
"Долг повиновения органам исполнительной власти государства" (см.
п. 56 настоящего Решения) не может подразумевать, что жизнь и
безопасность полицейских, а равно их семей не заслуживают защиты.
Вот почему я не могу согласиться с большинством, что единственно
из-за того, что в настоящее дело вовлечены служащие полиции, это
дело следует отличать от дела Доорсона в том, что касается поиска
баланса между интересами защиты и свидетелей.
То обстоятельство, что г-ну Энгелену, открыто давшему
изобличающие показания, не был причинен никакой вред, в данном
контексте нельзя признать решающим. В его случае полиция,
вероятно, совершила ошибку, раскрыв его личность, но в любом
случае последующие события автоматически и ретроспективно не
отменяют разумную оценку риска. Трудно винить свидетеля, который
не хочет ждать, пока что-нибудь плохое случится с ним или с другим
свидетелем; единственный критерий, из которого должны исходить
национальные суды, - это обоснованность опасений.
7. Я не вижу, почему на полицейских лежит специальный долг
давать показания в открытом суде (см. п. 56 Решения), тогда как
это предписываемый правом общегражданский долг. И даже если
согласиться с тем, что к использованию полицейских в качестве
анонимных свидетелей "следует прибегать только в исключительных
обстоятельствах" (там же), то, с другой стороны, можно спорить по
поводу того, что их анонимность должна встречать меньше возражений
с позиции защиты, т.к. их показания даются под присягой и личность
и компетенция этих профессионалов легко могут быть проверены
следователем.
8. Большинство также рассматривало вопрос, являются ли
"оперативные потребности" достаточным оправданием для сохранения
анонимности офицеров полиции. В этом контексте делалась ссылка на
Пояснительную записку к Закону от 11 ноября 1993 г., в которой
Правительство Нидерландов указывало, что, по его мнению, этот
интерес может быть в достаточной мере защищен не столь далеко
идущими ограничениями прав защиты. Однако, по моему мнению, эта
проблема для настоящего дела не является столь важной, т.к.
апелляционный суд в своем решении постановил, что из выдвинутых
свидетелями аргументов в поддержку требования об анонимности он
считает "решающим" аргумент, касающийся личной безопасности
свидетелей и их семей (см. п. 26 Решения).
9. Нельзя отрицать - и в самом деле никто не отрицал, - что
возможность защиты допрашивать свидетелей подверглась
ограничениям. Но таковые существуют и в обычной ситуации, когда
личность свидетелей защите известна. То обстоятельство, что на
некоторые вопросы свидетели не ответили, а следователь счел это
приемлемым, может быть подвергнуто критике, но это с большой долей
вероятности могло бы случиться, если бы замаскированных тем или
иным способом свидетелей допрашивали в открытом суде. Поэтому
можно спорить по поводу того, было ли необходимо и соразмерно
отказываться отвечать на некоторые заданные защитой вопросы с
целью сохранить анонимность свидетелей и секретность тактики,
применяемой полицией. Однако прежде всего на этот вопрос должен
дать ответ компетентный национальный суд, что он и сделал,
согласившись с позицией следователя, а когда защита оспорила это
решение в апелляционном суде, последний подтвердил его. В целом,
по моему мнению, ни ограничения, вызванные ситуацией, ни те, что
были приняты следователем, не оправдывают вывода о том, что
отсутствовала "надлежащая и адекватная возможность задавать
вопросы свидетелям", как того требует Суд в своем Решении,
вынесенном по делу Костовски. Препятствия действиям защиты были
достаточно сбалансированы установленной судебными властями
процедурой (см. Решение по делу Костовски, с. 21, п. 43, и Решение
по делу Доорсона, с. 472, п. 76).
10. Наконец, хотя показания анонимных свидетелей явились
существенной частью доказательств, нельзя сказать, что
обвинительные приговоры строились исключительно на этих
показаниях. Были ли они основаны на этих показаниях в "решающей
степени", как утверждает большинство (п. 63 Решения), трудно
сказать. Я разделяю мнение, высказанное делегатом Комиссии на
слушаниях в Суде, что этот критерий, изложенный в Решении по делу
Доорсона (с. 472, п. 76), трудно применить, так как если показания
анонимных свидетелей используются судом как часть доказательств,
это происходит потому, что суд считает их очень важной частью
доказательств, благодаря которым они становятся полными или по
крайней мере достаточными. Здесь вновь должно преобладать
заключение Суда, что "по общему правилу именно национальные суды
призваны оценивать предъявленные им доказательства" (п. 50
настоящего Решения). Более того, как уже упоминалось (см. п. 3 "h"
выше), обстоятельства данного дела в этом отношении, по-видимому,
не отличаются существенно от обстоятельств дела Доорсона.
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
CASE OF VAN MECHELEN AND OTHERS v. NETHERLANDS
JUDGMENT
(Strasbourg, 23.IV.1997)
In the case of Van Mechelen and Others v. the Netherlands <1>,
The European Court of Human Rights, sitting, in accordance
with Article 43 (art. 43) of the Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ("the Convention") and the
relevant provisions of Rules of Court B <2>, as a Chamber composed
of the following judges:
--------------------------------
Notes by the Registrar
<1> The case is numbered 55/1996/674/861-864. The first number
is the case's position on the list of cases referred to the Court
in the relevant year (second number). The last two numbers
indicate the case's position on the list of cases referred to the
Court since its creation and on the list of the corresponding
originating applications to the Commission.
<2> Rules of Court B, which came into force on 2 October 1994,
apply to all cases concerning the States bound by Protocol
No. 9 (P9).
Mr R. Bernhardt, President,
Mr F. Matscher,
Mr C. Russo,
Mr N. Valticos,
Mr I. Foighel,
Mr B. Repik,
Mr K. Jungwiert,
Mr E. Levits,
Mr P. van Dijk,
and also of Mr H. Petzold, Registrar, and Mr P.J. Mahoney,
Deputy Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 27 January and 18 March 1997,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the
last-mentioned date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case was referred to the Court by the European
Commission of Human Rights ("the Commission") on 17 April 1996,
within the three-month period laid down by Article 32 para. 1 and
Article 47 of the Convention (art. 32-1, art. 47). It originated
in four applications (nos. 21363/93, 21364/93, 21427/93 and
22056/93) against the Kingdom of the Netherlands lodged with the
Commission under Article 25 (art. 25) by Mr Hendrik van Mechelen
and Mr Willem Venerius on 27 November 1992, by Mr Johan Venerius
on 8 December 1992 and by Mr Antonius Amandus Pruijmboom on
24 November 1992. All four applicants are Netherlands nationals.
The Commission's request referred to Articles 44 and 48
(art. 44, art. 48) and to the declaration whereby the Netherlands
recognised the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court (Article 46)
(art. 46). The object of the request was to obtain a decision as
to whether the facts of the case disclosed a breach by the
respondent State of its obligations under Article 6 paras. 1 and
3 (d) of the Convention (art. 6-1, art. 6-3-d).
2. In response to the enquiry made in accordance with Rule 35
para. 3 (d) of Rules of Court B, the applicants designated the
lawyers who would represent them (Rule 31).
3. The Chamber to be constituted included ex officio
Mr S.K. Martens, the elected judge of Netherlands nationality
(Article 43 of the Convention) (art. 43), and Mr R. Bernhardt, the
Vice-President of the Court (Rule 21 para. 4 (b)). On 27 April
1996, in the presence of the Registrar, the President of the
Court, Mr R. Ryssdal, drew by lot the names of the other seven
members, namely Mr F. Matscher, Mr C. Russo, Mr N. Valticos,
Mr I. Foighel, Mr B. Repik, Mr K. Jungwiert and Mr E. Levits
(Article 43 in fine of the Convention and Rule 21 para. 5)
(art. 43). Subsequently Mr P. van Dijk, the newly elected judge of
Netherlands nationality, replaced Mr Martens who had resigned
(Rules 6 and 21 para. 3 (a)).
4. As President of the Chamber (Rule 21 para. 6),
Mr Bernhardt, acting through the Registrar, consulted the Agent of
the Netherlands Government ("the Government"), the applicants'
lawyers and the Delegate of the Commission on the organisation of
the proceedings (Rules 39 para. 1 and 40). Pursuant to the order
made in consequence, the Registrar received the Government's
memorial on 14 October 1996 and the applicants' memorials and
Article 50 claims (art. 50) between 22 and 29 October.
5. On 30 September 1996 the President of the Chamber rejected
an application by Rights International, a non-governmental
organisation based in New York, for leave to submit written
comments (Rule 39 para. 2).
6. On 10 January 1997 a document which the Registrar had
sought from the Government at the request of the President of the
Chamber was received at the registry.
7. On 22 January 1997 the President of the Chamber decided to
admit to the case file certain additional documents submitted by
the applicants.
8. In accordance with the President's decision, the hearing
took place in public in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on
23 January 1997. The Court had held a preparatory meeting
beforehand.
There appeared before the Court:
(a) for the Government
Mr R.A.A. {Bocker} <*>, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Mr H.A.M. von Hebel, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Agents,
Ms I.M. Abels, Ministry of Justice,
Ms N.H.N.I. Houben, Ministry of Justice, Advisers;
(b) for the Commission
Mr H.G. Schermers, Delegate;
(c) for the applicants
Mr G.G.J. Knoops, advocaat en procureur,
Mr J.M. {Sjocrona}, advocaat en procureur,
Ms T. Spronken, advocaat en procureur, Counsel,
Ms M. {Gare},
Ms S. van der Toorn, Assistants.
--------------------------------
<*> Здесь и далее по тексту слова на национальном языке
набраны латинским шрифтом и выделены фигурными скобками.
The Court heard addresses by Mr Schermers, Mr Knoops,
Mr {Sjocrona}, Ms Spronken and Mr von Hebel.
AS TO THE FACTS
I. Particular circumstances of the case
A. Background to the case
9. The police received information to the effect that the
applicants were the perpetrators of several robberies, and that
they operated from two residential caravan sites. It was decided
to detail a police observation team (observatieteam, "OT") to keep
these caravan sites under observation as from 25 January 1989.
10. On 26 January 1989 at around 5.15 p.m. three motor cars, a
Mercedes estate car, a BMW and a Lancia, were seen to leave one of
the two caravan sites shortly after each other. Their registration
numbers were noted.
11. On 26 January 1989 at around 6 p.m. the post office of the
town of Oirschot was robbed. The window of the post office was
broken down by backing a Mercedes estate car equipped with a steel
girder into it. One of the robbers, wearing a black balaclava
helmet and armed with a pistol, forced the staff to surrender some
70,000 Netherlands guilders. The robbers then set the Mercedes car
alight and made off in a BMW.
Police cars alerted by radio followed the BMW. Police officers
saw the BMW drive onto a sand track leading into a nearby forest.
Later they saw a column of smoke coming out of the forest. The BMW
was subsequently found there, burnt out.
Four police officers in a police car saw a red car (later
found to be a Lancia) leave the forest via the same sand track
used by the BMW and gave chase. In the course of the chase the
boot of the car was opened from the inside and men squatting in
the back opened fire at the pursuing police car with a pistol and
a sub-machine gun. A car containing civilians was hit by a stray
bullet but its occupants were not hurt.
The Lancia made off at high speed and entered a side road.
When the police car caught up with it the Lancia was stationary. A
man standing in the road fired at the police car with a
sub-machine gun. The police car was hit and its occupants injured,
after which the gunman and the persons in the Lancia made their
escape.
12. All three cars - the Mercedes, the BMW and the Lancia -
were later identified as the cars which had been seen leaving the
caravan site (see paragraph 10 above).
B. The criminal proceedings
1. Proceedings in the 's-Hertogenbosch Regional Court
13. The applicants and one other man, called Amandus
Pruijmboom (not to be confused with the applicant Antonius Amandus
Pruijmboom), were charged with attempted murder - or, in the
alternative, attempted manslaughter - and robbery with the threat
of violence and summoned to appear for trial before the
's-Hertogenbosch Regional Court (arrondissementsrechtbank) on
19 May 1989.
Evidence proffered by the prosecution included statements made
to a named police officer by police officers identified only by a
number.
14. In interlocutory judgments of 2 June 1989 the Regional
Court decided that it was necessary to establish whether the
police officers identified only by numbers had investigative
competence (opsporingsbevoegdheid). To that end it referred the
case to the investigating judge (rechter-commissaris) and
adjourned the case until 20 July.
The investigating judge established that the police officers
in question did in fact have investigative competence.
Counsel for Mr Willem Venerius argued, inter alia, that the
police officers identified only by a number were anonymous
witnesses, so that their statements did not constitute sufficient
proof, in the absence of corroborating evidence, to support a
conviction. The Regional Court rejected this argument, holding
that since the police officers in question had investigative
competence, the evidential value of their statements was not
affected by their anonymity.
The Regional Court convicted the accused of attempted
manslaughter and robbery with the threat of violence. The evidence
identifying the applicants as perpetrators of these crimes was
constituted by the statements made before the trial by the
anonymous police officers, none of whom gave evidence before
either the Regional Court or the investigating judge.
All five accused were sentenced to ten years' imprisonment.
2. Proceedings in the 's-Hertogenbosch Court of Appeal
15. The five convicted men appealed to the 's-Hertogenbosch
Court of Appeal (gerechtshof).
At the hearing before that court on 2 May 1990 the applicants'
lawyers made requests for several named and anonymous witnesses to
be heard. The Court of Appeal thereupon referred the case to the
investigating judge, firstly because it considered it necessary to
find out what objections the police officers themselves had
against the lifting of their anonymity and secondly because the
number of persons to be heard was such that it could not
conveniently be done in open court. The persons to be heard were
four named police officers, eleven anonymous police officers
(identified to the defence and the court only by a number) and two
civilians.
16. The named and anonymous witnesses were questioned on
24 and 27 September and on 5-8 and 13 November 1990.
All of the anonymous witnesses were - or had at the relevant
time been - police officers invested with investigative
competence.
The procedure followed for questioning them was that the
investigating judge, the witness and a registrar were together in
one room, and the defendants, their lawyers and the
advocate-general in another. The defendants, the lawyers and the
advocate-general could hear all the questions asked to the
witnesses and their replies through a sound link. The statements
of the witnesses were repeated by the investigating judge to the
registrar, who took them down.
17. On 24 September 1990 witness 001 was interrogated. He was
a member of an observation team. It was his wish and that of his
superiors that he remain anonymous in the interests of the
service; in addition, his family had been threatened in the past.
Witness 001 confirmed a statement which he had made earlier, to
the effect that when confronted with Mr van Mechelen through a
two-way mirror he had identified him as the man who had sat next
to the driver of the Lancia.
Witness BRZ03 was interrogated the same day. His wish to
remain anonymous was primarily inspired by the wish to ensure the
safety of his family and friends; he had been threatened in the
past. At the time of the crimes in question he had been a member
of an arresting team. He had been a passenger in the front seat of
the police car used to pursue the Lancia and had been badly
wounded in the shooting.
Witness 006 was a member of an observation team. He wished to
remain anonymous to ensure the safety of his family and friends
and his colleagues; he knew of cases in which a police officer's
family had been threatened. He confirmed the correctness of a
report which he had drawn up together with witness 005.
Witness BRZ09 had been a member of an arresting team at the
relevant time. He wished to remain anonymous in the interests of
the service but also for the safety of his family. He confirmed an
earlier report to the effect that he had been a back-seat
passenger in the police car which had pursued the Lancia, and had
been fired at.
18. On 27 September 1990 the investigating judge drew up an
official report of his findings with regard to the first four
anonymous witnesses. He considered them all reliable, although
they had shown great caution when asked questions which might
affect their anonymity. He also considered their reasons for
wishing to remain anonymous well-founded.
19. Also on 27 September 1990 the investigating judge
interrogated, in addition to two named police officers, the named
witness Mr Engelen. Mr Engelen was a civilian bystander who stated
that he had seen a man fire a gun. He had later identified Mr van
Mechelen as that man when confronted with him through a two-way
mirror.
20. On 3 October 1990 the Court of Appeal resumed the hearing.
The lawyer defending Mr Willem Venerius asked for one anonymous
police officer - BRZ03 - to be heard in open court. The Court of
Appeal however decided not to continue its own examination of the
case until all witnesses had been questioned by the investigating
judge.
21. On 5 November the investigating judge resumed the
interrogation of the witnesses.
Witness BRZ10 stated that he was a member of an arresting
team. He had been the driver of the police car used in the attempt
to pursue the Lancia and force it to stop. He had recognised
Mr Johan Venerius as the driver of the Lancia.
Witness 004 stated that he had been a member of an observation
team at the relevant time. He wished to remain anonymous because
he feared for the safety of his family. In addition, he was
involved in the work of the criminal intelligence department
(Criminele Inlichtingen Dienst, "CID"). His superiors wanted him
to remain anonymous for that reason. He too had recognised
Mr Johan Venerius as the driver of the Lancia.
Witness 005 was also a member of an observation team. He had
been a passenger in a police car which had passed the Lancia and
had recognised Mr Johan Venerius as the driver.
22. Witness 003 had been a member of an observation team at
the relevant time. He wished to remain anonymous in the interests
of the service as well as for the safety of his family. He had
been the driver of an unmarked police car and had seen the BMW and
the Lancia drive past but had not recognised any of their
occupants.
Witness 46204 had been a member of an arresting unit. He
wished to remain anonymous in the interests of the service as well
as for the safety of his family. He had seen the BMW both before
and after the robbery in Oirschot. The driver on both occasions
had been the applicant Pruijmboom, whom he had later recognised at
a confrontation.
Witness 46203 had been a member of the same arresting unit. He
was "99% certain" that he had seen Mr van Mechelen enter the
caravan site about an hour before the three cars left from there.
Witness BRZ08 had left the police force but at the relevant
time had been a member of an arresting team. He wished to remain
anonymous for the safety of his family, three of his colleagues
having been threatened in the past. He had been the driver of the
police car which had pursued the Lancia and had been fired at. He
had sustained injuries, as had the other police officers in the
car.
23. The various named police officers provided background
information relating to the investigation and the procedures
followed but did not positively identify any of the applicants as
the perpetrators. Some of them stated that they knew of colleagues
who had been threatened in other cases but none of them had yet
been threatened in this case.
24. On 19 November 1990 the investigating judge drew up a
report of his findings concerning the questioning of the
witnesses. This document reads as follows:
"Regional Court of 's-hertogenbosch
Investigating judge
with responsibility
for criminal cases
___________________
Official record of findings
The cases against:
Willem Venerius,
Johan Venerius,
Hendrik van Mechelen,
Amandus Pruijmboom, and
Antonius Amandus Pruijmboom
were referred by the Court of Appeal at 's-Hertogenbosch to
myself, A.H.L. Roosmale Nepveu, investigating judge with
responsibility for criminal cases at the Regional Court of
's-Hertogenbosch. I, investigating judge, wish to place the
following on record in connection with the investigation conducted
by myself with the assistance of the registrar.
The Court of Appeal referred the cases against the said
accused persons to me in order for a total of twenty-one witnesses
to be heard. Eleven of them are designated only by a number in the
documents.
I, investigating judge, questioned twenty witnesses in the
presence of the registrar. I also, together with the registrar,
drew up a record of the hearing for each accused separately. The
statements of the witnesses are however similar in all cases,
since the hearings took place simultaneously in all five cases.
Thus in the statements the names of fellow accused and their
counsel appear as 'persons asking questions'.
The witnesses indicated were questioned on the dates given
below:
24 September 1990 001
BRZ03
006
BRZ09
27 September 1990 F.P.W. Engelen
A.P.J.M. de Vet
G.J.M. Jansen
5 November 1990 BRZ10
004
005
6 November 1990 003
46204
46203
7 November 1990 BRZ08
H.P.C. Koene (adjourned)
8 November 1990 W.P.A. Meijers
P.F.M. Aarts
H.P.C. Koene (resumed)
13 November 1990 H.B. Corbijn
P.J.M. Swartjes
G.W.A.M. Ligtvoet.
...
The accused, their counsel and the advocate-general were
always invited to the hearings. Whenever they appeared they were
also given an opportunity to ask questions. They did so
extensively. The hearings took up a great deal of time. The
shortest hearing of an unidentified witness lasted nearly two
hours (46203); the longest about five hours (BRZ08). The hearings
of witnesses Jansen and Koene each lasted a good five hours. This
information may perhaps be of use in assessing the suggestion that
was made on 3 October 1990 to the Court of Appeal, that all the
witnesses should be heard by the Court in a single day.
Where a witness did not answer a question, this is also
indicated in the text of his statement.
The statements were recorded in very great detail and in fact
cover all the matters raised - also by the defence -, in a factual
and where necessary even literal transcript. Once the text existed
in draft form, those present were invariably given the opportunity
to make comments, request clarification and put further questions.
Where necessary the statement was then amended, clarified and
expanded - always, of course, within the limits of what the
witness really wanted to say. And even if ... there are drawbacks
to the manner in which the hearings of the unidentified witnesses
were carried out, it is my belief that the advocate-general and
the defence had sufficient opportunity to question the witnesses
thoroughly at the hearings. Those present really did have the
opportunity for hours on each occasion. If they so desired, those
present had several chances to put questions to a witness. Unlike
what normally happens at court hearings, everyone was able to
follow the entire transcription of the statements and then still
obtain clarifications and additions. Questions were barred only on
substantive grounds (see the records for details), not by reason
of the time taken for the interrogations.
In the light of recent case-law in the matter of statements by
unidentified witnesses, I think it is right for me to make known
my findings regarding the statements of the unidentified witnesses
heard in this case. I, the investigating judge, and the registrar,
are the only persons who attended all the hearings from start to
finish.
I stand by my official record of findings dated 27 September
1990 where the witnesses referred to in it are concerned [see
paragraph 18 above]. I would now add the following:
All the 'numbered witnesses' made their identities known to
me. It was clear to me that all eleven were different persons.
Their statements indicated such a knowledge of the facts that
I am entirely convinced that I was talking to the witnesses
referred to by numbers in the documents. I have no reason to doubt
their reliability. Nor at any time did I have the impression that
I was being lied to. On the contrary, each and every one of them
was very much to the point. The persons facing me wore serious
expressions. The unidentified witnesses were clearly quite aware
of the serious nature of the oath or pledge they had given and of
the very great interests at stake, especially for the accused
persons involved. The calm, quiet manner in which, for example,
BRZ03 and BRZ08 related their experiences in Leende (in which
connection I expressly leave it to the Court of Appeal to decide
whether these accused persons were the perpetrators) was
impressive and certainly gave no indication of malice towards the
accused. All the witnesses manifested a certain degree of
wariness, which, in view of their desire to remain anonymous and
the sometimes rather forceful manner of questioning on the part of
[two of the defence lawyers] in particular, did not bother me.
If all the statements are laid side by side, some differences
of detail can be observed. I do not think that these differences
are such as to warrant the conclusion that the witnesses may be
unreliable. Rather, in so far as I have observed any differences,
I would describe them rather as the 'extraneous noise' which in my
experience practically always affects statements by witnesses. Of
course it is ultimately for the Court of Appeal to decide on the
value of the statements.
The reasons for the witnesses wishing to remain anonymous in
the instant case are given in the records of the hearings. It
seems to me that I am now affording the Court an opportunity to
reflect on the value of those arguments. I think that the text of
the recent judgments of the Supreme Court of the Netherlands also
compels me, as the judge conducting the questioning, to state my
opinion on the reasons given by the witnesses for remaining
anonymous. I am also concerned to inform the Court of Appeal that
I am aware that the Court is called to take the final decision in
these matters. I consider the reasons behind the desire to remain
anonymous to be such as fully to justify anonymity. I have had
regard in this connection to the nature of these cases and to the
nature of the activities of the anonymous witnesses concerned.
I take the liberty of observing - while expressly leaving
aside the question whether these accused persons are the
perpetrators - that the instant case tellingly illustrates the
fact that there are evidently people for whom human lives do not
count when it comes to evading responsibility for exceptionally
serious crimes which they may have committed.
I can understand that there are major objections to revealing
the names and appearance of members of arresting teams,
observation teams and arresting units to the public at large. By
that I mean that the obvious interest of society in having very
serious crimes solved should weigh in the balance. At the same
time, I am of the opinion that the conduct of the unidentified
witnesses (who are no longer anonymous to myself) who have
appeared in this case is the subject of proper judicial
supervision. It is not apparent to me as investigating judge that
the 'numbered witnesses' acted carelessly. Rather, in my opinion,
the opposite was true.
During the last hearing of the witness Koene, [two of the
defence lawyers] asked me to record that, in their view, the
witness answered not only the questions of the defence but also
questions by the investigating judge in a ponderous, deliberate
manner that was hard to follow. I have been asked to endorse that
opinion. I decline to do so. The witness Koene was wary in his
answers, which I find understandable in view of the barrage of
questions - which were not always formulated equally clearly. It
must not be forgotten that a witness who is being questioned on
oath about a multitude of events that occurred some years
previously should not be reproached for failing, in his answers to
those questions, to keep up with the tempo of the rather forceful
questioning to which [the two lawyers] in particular subjected him
on 8 November 1990, together and in tandem. Furthermore, I can
imagine that a witness may be somewhat annoyed if he is repeatedly
asked the same question, especially if he has already replied
under oath on the day before. The witness Koene kept a cool head,
and in so doing demonstrated a certain quality. As far as I can
judge at the present time, I regard him as a reliable witness. Nor
do I think that he can be regarded as a reluctant witness, if only
by reason of his extensive statements in the records of 7 November
and 8 November 1990.
The witness Koene informed me on 15 November 1990 that on
26 January 1989 the persons numbered BRZ05 and BRZ14 were in the
car with BRZ10. He gave me this information following a request by
the defence.
I think I ought not to omit to mention, with regard to the
witness Engelen, that throughout the hours of insistent
questioning he certainly did not strike me as untruthful. In my
judgment, Mr Engelen is a simple, friendly and very obliging man.
Perhaps I can illustrate the impression I had of him by recording
that, after the interrogation had gone on for a considerable time,
I thought it opportune to ask the unusual question whether the
witness could read. I do not exclude the possibility that he is
not entirely aware of the great importance of an exact and
consistent account of what he saw.
In the second paragraph on the first page of the statement by
the witness Engelen, I suggested to him that the confrontation had
occurred on 15 February 1989. The date should be 9 March 1989.
[One of the defence lawyers] pointed this out to me later and I
think he is right.
...
(signed) A.H.L. Roosmale Nepveu
19 November 1990"
25. The hearing before the Court of Appeal was resumed on
16, 17 and 18 January 1991.
On 16 January a named witness, Mr Engelen, was heard in open
court. He had stated to the police in March 1989, and to the
investigating judge in September 1990, that he recognised the
applicant Van Mechelen as the man who had fired a sub-machine gun
at a police car in the village of Leende. Before the Court of
Appeal he stated that on the latter occasion he had been allowed
to re-read his earlier statement, but that he was no longer sure
whether he could still recognise either the weapon or the man who
had fired it. He also said that he had not been threatened in
connection with the case.
On 18 January the lawyer acting for the applicant Van Mechelen
brought forward two persons chosen for their excellent eyesight
(both having participated in the Olympic games as members of the
Netherlands rifle-shooting team), and who had participated in a
reconstruction of the shooting in light and weather conditions
similar to those obtaining at the time of the crime. These
witnesses both stated that they had been unable to distinguish the
features of the persons acting the parts of the perpetrators at
the distances at which it had been alleged that the accused had
been seen by Mr Engelen. A video recording had been made of the
reconstruction, in the presence of a notary who had kept the
original videotape under seal.
The hearing was again resumed on 21 January 1991, and the
video of the reconstruction was shown.
26. The Court of Appeal convicted all four applicants in four
separate but similar judgments on 4 February 1991.
All four applicants were found guilty of attempted murder and
robbery with the threat of violence and sentenced to fourteen
years' imprisonment. The fifth suspect, Mr Amandus Pruijmboom, was
acquitted.
The Court of Appeal's judgment in the case of the applicant
Van Mechelen contained the following:
"Considering with regard to the statements, used in evidence,
of the persons who remained anonymous, that these statements were
taken down by a judge, more particularly the investigating judge
responsible for criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the
's-Hertogenbosch Regional Court, who himself knows the identity of
the witnesses, who has heard these witnesses on oath, who in his
official record of his findings ... has given his reasoned opinion
of the reliability of the witnesses and their reasons for wishing
to remain anonymous, and who, moreover, has offered the accused
and the defence the opportunity to question these witnesses, of
which opportunity, as appears from the official records of the
interrogations, extensive use has been made.
The objections of the witnesses heard by the investigating
judge and identified only by a number to remain anonymous (sic)
are sufficient reason for the Court of Appeal to continue this
anonymity. The Court of Appeal refuses the request made by counsel
at the hearing to have these witnesses heard in open court, even
if this request should be understood to imply that the witnesses
might be disguised, since the possibility that the witnesses may
be recognised in open court cannot be excluded.
Of the arguments for continuing the anonymity of the
witnesses, the Court of Appeal considers particularly persuasive
the personal safety of these witnesses and their families, and it
makes no difference that these witnesses have not yet been
threatened. As already noted in the Court of Appeal's
interlocutory decision of 3 October 1990, the present case
concerns extremely serious crimes, the [attempted murder] having
been committed so as to evade recognition and arrest by the
police, the perpetrators having been prepared to sacrifice a
number of human lives. In these circumstances, the risk run by the
witnesses identified only by a number and their families if their
anonymity is lifted or insufficiently guaranteed is decisive. In
so far as anonymous witnesses have refused to answer questions
this was done in order not to disclose methods of investigation or
to maintain the anonymity of other investigating officers involved
in the case."
The Court of Appeal considered the statements of the anonymous
police officers to be corroborated by each other and by the
evidence available from non-anonymous sources. This other evidence
included a transcript of a telephone conversation between the wife
of Mr Johan Venerius and her mother intercepted two days after the
date of the crime, from which it appeared that Mr Johan Venerius
had not returned home in the meanwhile and his whereabouts were
unknown, as well as forensic reports relating to the cars and the
weapons used for the crime and the above-mentioned statements of
the named civilians and police officers. However, the Court of
Appeal did not rely on the statements of Mr Engelen.
3. Proceedings in the Supreme Court
27. The applicants filed appeals on points of law (cassatie)
to the Supreme Court (Hoge Raad).
In accordance with the advisory opinion of the
advocate-general, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeals in a
series of judgments of 9 June 1992. It held that in the
circumstances the evidence given by the unnamed police officers
was admissible, since on the one hand their evidence was
sufficiently corroborated by the evidence obtained from named
sources and on the other the procedure followed provided
sufficient compensation for the handicaps under which the defence
had laboured.
The Supreme Court's judgments concerning Mr Willem Venerius
and Mr van Mechelen were reported in Nederlandse Jurisprudentie
(Netherlands Law Reports, "NJ") 1992, nos. 772 and 773
respectively.
28. It has not been alleged that any named or anonymous
witnesses were at any time threatened by or on behalf of the
applicants.
II. Relevant domestic law and practice
29. Except for the differences noted below (see paragraphs 39
and following), relevant domestic law and practice at the time of
the criminal proceedings complained of were as set out in the
Court's Kostovski v. the Netherlands judgment of 20 November 1989
(Series A no. 166). Reference is therefore made to that judgment,
especially pp. 13 - 17, paras. 22 - 32.
A. The Code of Criminal Procedure
1. Evidence in general
30. The finding that an accused has committed the act with
which he is charged must be based on "legal means of evidence"
(wettige bewijsmiddelen - Article 338 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure (Wetboek van Strafvordering - CCP)).
"Legal means of evidence" include inter alia statements of
witnesses relating to facts or circumstances which they themselves
have witnessed (Articles 339 para. 1 (3) and 342 para. 1 CCP) and
written documents (Article 339 para. 1 (5) and 344 para. 1 CCP).
Such evidence must normally be corroborated by other evidence
(Articles 342 para. 2, 344 para. 1 (5) CCP). However, an official
record made in the proper form by a police officer invested with
investigative competence can be admitted without corroboration
(Article 344 para. 2 CCP).
2. Witnesses
31. The public prosecutor has the power to call witnesses and
experts to the hearing (Article 260 CCP). In his summons to the
accused he gives a list of the witnesses and experts to be brought
forward by the prosecution. If the accused wishes to call
witnesses, he can - according to Article 263 - submit a request to
the public prosecutor no later than three days before the court
hearing to summon a witness before the court. As a rule, the
public prosecutor should summon the witness, but - according to
Article 263 para. 4 - he may refuse to do so if it is to be
reasonably assumed that no prejudice to the rights of the defence
will be caused if the witness is not heard in open court ("Indien
redelijkerwijs moet worden aangenomen, dat de verdachte niet in
zijn verdediging kan worden geschaad wanneer een door hem
opgegeven getuige ... niet ter terechtzitting wordt gehoord"). He
has to give a reasoned decision in writing and must at the same
time inform the defence of its right under Article 280 para. 3
(see paragraph 33 below) to renew the request to the trial court
at the hearing.
32. At the opening of the trial hearing the prosecutor hands
to the court a list of all the witnesses called, which is then
read out by the registrar (griffier) (Article 280 para. 2).
33. If the public prosecutor has failed to summon a witness at
the request of the accused, or declined to do so, the defence may
ask the court to have that witness summoned (Article 280 para. 3).
The court so orders, unless it finds that the non-appearance of
this witness cannot reasonably be considered prejudicial to the
rights of the defence ("De rechtbank beveelt dat de ... getuige
... zal worden gedagvaard of schriftelijk opgeroepen, tenzij zij
... van oordeel is dat door het achterwege blijven daarvan de
verdachte redelijkerwijs niet in zijn verdediging kan worden
geschaad" - Article 280 para. 4).
34. A request by the defence to hear a witness who has not
been placed on the list of witnesses, who has not been convened to
attend the trial and whose summons the defence has not sought in
accordance with Article 280 falls under Article 315 CCP (see
paragraph 35 below). It appears from the judgment of 23 December
1986 by the Supreme Court that the trial court needs only accede
to a request of this nature if it finds it necessary to do so.
35. Under Article 315 CCP the trial court has the power to
order of its own accord the production of evidence, including the
summoning of witnesses whom it has not yet heard.
36. If it finds that there is occasion to do so, the trial
court may order that a witness be brought to its hearing by the
police (Articles 282 para. 1 and 315 CCP).
37. If at the trial the trial court finds it necessary to have
any factual question examined by the investigating judge, it must
suspend the hearing and refer the question to the investigating
judge along with the case file. The investigation carried out by
the investigating judge in these cases is deemed to be a
preliminary judicial investigation and is subject to the same
rules (Article 316 CCP).
38. Appeal proceedings against the conviction or sentence at
first instance involve a complete rehearing of the case. Both the
prosecution and the defence may ask for witnesses already heard at
first instance to be heard again; they may also produce new
evidence and request the hearing of witnesses not heard at first
instance (Article 414 CCP). The defence enjoys the same rights as
it does at first instance (Article 415 CCP).
B. Case-law relating to anonymous witnesses
39. In its judgment of 9 January 1990, NJ 1990, no. 409, the
Supreme Court held that there was no general rule in Netherlands
law to the effect that statements by anonymous police officers
could only be admitted if the trial court had first established
the existence of clear indications that the officers were under
threat.
40. In its judgment of 2 July 1990, NJ 1990, no. 692, the
Supreme Court considered that it had to be assumed in light of the
European Court's Kostovski judgment that the use of statements by
anonymous witnesses was subject to stricter requirements than
those defined in its case-law until then. It defined these
stricter requirements in the following rule: such a statement must
have been taken down by a judge who (a) is aware of the identity
of the witness, and (b) has expressed, in the official record of
the hearing of such a witness, his reasoned opinion as to the
reliability of the witness and as to the reasons for the wish of
the witness to remain anonymous, and (c) has provided the defence
with some opportunity to put questions or have questions put to
the witness. On the other hand, according to the same judgment, a
written document containing the statement of an anonymous witness
may be used in evidence if (a) the defence has not at any stage of
the proceedings asked to be allowed to question the witness
concerned, and (b) the conviction is based to a significant extent
on other evidence not derived from anonymous sources, and (c) the
trial court makes it clear that it has made use of the statement
of the anonymous witness with caution and circumspection.
C. Law reform
41. The Act of 11 November 1993, Staatsblad (Official Gazette)
1993, no. 603, has added to the CCP a number of detailed
provisions relating to the "protection of witnesses". It entered
into force on 1 February 1994. The additions include the
following.
Article 226a now provides that the identity of a witness may
remain secret if there is reason to believe that the disclosure of
his identity may threaten his life, health, safety, family life or
socio-economic existence and if the witness has made it clear that
he does not wish to make any statement because of this. The
decision is made by the investigating judge, who must first hear
the prosecution, the defence and the witness himself.
An appeal against the decision of the investigating judge lies
to the trial court (Article 226b).
The investigating judge may order that a threatened witness be
heard in the absence of the accused, or of counsel, or of both, so
as not to disclose the identity of the threatened witness; in that
event, the prosecuting authorities may not attend the questioning
of the witness either. The investigating judge must then allow the
defence to put questions of its own to the witness, either through
the use of telecommunication or in writing (Article 226d).
Article 264 now lays down that the prosecution may refuse to
summon a threatened witness.
If the trial court has ordered that a witness be heard and
that witness turns out to be under threat, he must be heard in
camera by the investigating judge (Article 280 para. 5).
The statement of an anonymous witness taken in accordance with
the above-mentioned provisions may only be used in evidence
against a person accused of crimes in respect of which his
detention on remand is permitted (Article 342 para. 2 (b)).
A new paragraph has been added to Article 344 to the effect
that a written document containing a statement of a person whose
identity is not apparent may only be used in evidence if the
conviction is based to a significant degree on other evidence and
if the defence has not at any time during the trial sought to
question that person or have him questioned.
42. The following passages are taken from the explanatory
memorandum of the bill which became the Act of 11 November 1993:
"The Bill is based on the assumption that only threatened
witnesses should be in a position to claim complete anonymity. I
realise that the usefulness of certain police officers (e.g.
undercover agents posing as drugs purchasers, members of an
arresting team or an observation team) will be reduced thereby.
However, the public interest in investigating serious crime cannot
alone justify guaranteeing complete anonymity. This interest can
in my opinion be sufficiently protected if the law creates the
possibility to refrain from asking the police officer for certain
identifying information and by granting the interrogating judge
the power to take all measures which are reasonably required to
prevent the disclosure of such identifying information, such as
making the police officer unrecognisable by the use of make-up or
disguise or preventing eye contact between the accused and the
police officer." (Explanatory Memorandum, Lower House of
Parliament 1991 - 92, 22 483, no. 3, p. 17).
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION
43. Mr van Mechelen and Mr Willem Venerius applied to the
Commission on 27 November 1992, Mr Johan Venerius on 8 December
and Mr Pruijmboom on 24 November. They relied on Article 6
paras. 1 and 3 (d) of the Convention (art. 6-1, art. 6-3-d),
complaining that their convictions were based to a decisive extent
on the evidence of anonymous witnesses, in respect of whom the
rights of the defence had been unacceptably restricted.
44. The Commission declared the applications (nos. 21363/93,
21364/93, 21427/93 and 22056/93) admissible on 15 May 1995. In its
report of 27 February 1996 (Article 31) (art. 31) it expressed the
opinion that there had been no violation of Article 6 paras. 1 and
3 (d) of the Convention (art. 6-1, art. 6-3-d) (twenty votes to
eight). The full text of the Commission's opinion and of the two
dissenting opinions contained in the report is reproduced as an
annex to this judgment <3>.
--------------------------------
Note by the Registrar
<3> For practical reasons this annex will appear only with the
printed version of the judgment (in Reports of Judgments and
Decisions 1997-III), but a copy of the Commission's report is
obtainable from the registry.
FINAL SUBMISSIONS TO THE COURT BY THE GOVERNMENT
45. The Government concluded their memorial by expressing the
opinion that the applicants had had a "fair trial" within the
meaning of Article 6 paras. 1 and 3 (d) of the Convention
(art. 6-1, art. 6-3-d).
AS TO THE LAW
I. Alleged violation of Article 6 paras. 1 and 3 (d)
of the Convention (art. 6-1, art. 6-3-d)
46. The applicants complained that their conviction had been
based essentially on the evidence of police officers whose
identity was not disclosed to them and who were not heard either
in public or in their presence. They alleged a violation of
Article 6 paras. 1 and 3 (d) (art. 6-1, art. 6-3-d), according to
which:
"1. In the determination of ... any criminal charge against
him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing ...
Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may
be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interest of
morals, public order or national security in a democratic society,
where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private
life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly
necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances
where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice.
...
3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following
minimum rights:
...
(d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to
obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf
under the same conditions as witnesses against him;
..."
Neither the Government nor the Commission shared this view.
A. Arguments before the Court
47. The applicants questioned the need to maintain the
anonymity of the police officers at all. There had in their
contention not been any danger for them or their families. This
was borne out by the fact that Mr Engelen, the one named witness
who in the earlier stages of the proceedings had made statements
incriminating one of the applicants, had not been granted
anonymity and it had not been suggested that he had at any time
been threatened.
Moreover, the interrogation of the witnesses should in their
contention not have taken place before the investigating judge. It
would in their view have been feasible to have the police officers
questioned in open court, wearing disguise if need be.
In addition, the applicants considered that they had not had
sufficient opportunity to challenge and question the police
officers. They drew attention to the conditions under which the
interrogation of the anonymous witnesses had taken place.
The anonymous police officers had been confined in a room with
the investigating judge, separated from the applicants and their
lawyers; it had not been possible for the applicants or their
lawyers to discover whether there had been any other person in
that room or what was going on there.
Not all the questions asked by the defence had been answered.
Questions not answered had included, for instance, where the
police officer being interrogated had been at the time he made his
observation, whether he wore spectacles, and whether the
observation of the caravan sites had involved the use of optical
aids or a directional microphone.
Finally, the applicants claimed that their conviction had been
based "to a decisive extent" on the evidence given by anonymous
witnesses. The only evidence relied on by the Court of Appeal
positively identifying the applicants had been that given by
anonymous police officers.
48. The Government and the Commission both considered that
there had been no violation of Article 6 paras. 1 and 3 (d)
(art. 6-1, art. 6-3-d).
They both considered that the safety of the police officers
themselves and their families, and the need not to impair their
usefulness in other similar operations, provided sufficient
justification for maintaining their anonymity.
The procedure followed had been that established by the
Netherlands Supreme Court in its judgment of 2 July 1990 (see
paragraph 40 above) in the wake of the European Court's judgment
in the Kostovski case (judgment of 20 November 1989, Series A
no. 166). This procedure, so they argued, had been accepted by the
Court in its Doorson judgment (Doorson v. the Netherlands,
26 March 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-II).
In accordance with this procedure, the statements of the
anonymous police officers had been taken down (a) by a judge, who
(b) had himself ascertained the identity of the police officers
concerned, (c) had given a written opinion of their reliability
and credibility in his official report, (d) had given a reasoned
opinion of their reasons to remain anonymous and found them
sufficient, and (e) had given the defence sufficient opportunity
to question them or have questions put to them. The official
report of the investigating judge, which was very detailed, bore
this out.
There had in addition been evidence from non-anonymous
sources, namely a recorded telephone conversation, statements of
named police officers and certain technical evidence, which tended
to corroborate the statements of the anonymous police officers.
The conviction of the applicants did therefore not rest solely on
the latter statements.
B. The Court's assessment
1. Applicable principles
49. As the requirements of Article 6 para. 3 (art. 6-3) are to
be seen as particular aspects of the right to a fair trial
guaranteed by Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1), the Court will examine
the complaints under Article 6 paras. 1 and 3 (d) taken together
(art. 6-1 + 6-3-d) (see, among many other authorities, the
above-mentioned Doorson judgment, pp. 469-70, para. 66).
50. The Court reiterates that the admissibility of evidence is
primarily a matter for regulation by national law and as a general
rule it is for the national courts to assess the evidence before
them. The Court's task under the Convention is not to give a
ruling as to whether statements of witnesses were properly
admitted as evidence, but rather to ascertain whether the
proceedings as a whole, including the way in which evidence was
taken, were fair (see, among other authorities, the
above-mentioned Doorson judgment, p. 470, para. 67).
51. In addition, all the evidence must normally be produced at
a public hearing, in the presence of the accused, with a view to
adversarial argument. There are exceptions to this principle, but
they must not infringe the rights of the defence; as a general
rule, paragraphs 1 and 3 (d) of Article 6 (art. 6-1, art. 6-3-d)
require that the defendant be given an adequate and proper
opportunity to challenge and question a witness against him,
either when he makes his statements or at a later stage (see the
{Ludi} v. Switzerland judgment of 15 June 1992, Series A no. 238,
p. 21, para. 49).
52. As the Court had occasion to state in its Doorson judgment
(ibid., p. 470, para. 69), the use of statements made by anonymous
witnesses to found a conviction is not under all circumstances
incompatible with the Convention.
53. In that same judgment the Court noted the following:
"It is true that Article 6 (art. 6) does not explicitly
require the interests of witnesses in general, and those of
victims called upon to testify in particular, to be taken into
consideration. However, their life, liberty or security of person
may be at stake, as may interests coming generally within the
ambit of Article 8 of the Convention (art. 8). Such interests of
witnesses and victims are in principle protected by other,
substantive provisions of the Convention, which imply that
Contracting States should organise their criminal proceedings in
such a way that those interests are not unjustifiably imperilled.
Against this background, principles of fair trial also require
that in appropriate cases the interests of the defence are
balanced against those of witnesses or victims called upon to
testify." (see the above-mentioned Doorson judgment, p. 470,
para. 70)
54. However, if the anonymity of prosecution witnesses is
maintained, the defence will be faced with difficulties which
criminal proceedings should not normally involve. Accordingly, the
Court has recognised that in such cases Article 6 para. 1 taken
together with Article 6 para. 3 (d) of the Convention (art. 6-1 +
6-3-d) requires that the handicaps under which the defence labours
be sufficiently counterbalanced by the procedures followed by the
judicial authorities (ibid., p. 471, para. 72).
55. Finally, it should be recalled that a conviction should
not be based either solely or to a decisive extent on anonymous
statements (ibid., p. 472, para. 76).
2. Application of the above principles
56. In the Court's opinion, the balancing of the interests of
the defence against arguments in favour of maintaining the
anonymity of witnesses raises special problems if the witnesses in
question are members of the police force of the State. Although
their interests - and indeed those of their families - also
deserve protection under the Convention, it must be recognised
that their position is to some extent different from that of a
disinterested witness or a victim. They owe a general duty of
obedience to the State's executive authorities and usually have
links with the prosecution; for these reasons alone their use as
anonymous witnesses should be resorted to only in exceptional
circumstances. In addition, it is in the nature of things that
their duties, particularly in the case of arresting officers, may
involve giving evidence in open court.
57. On the other hand, the Court has recognised in principle
that, provided that the rights of the defence are respected, it
may be legitimate for the police authorities to wish to preserve
the anonymity of an agent deployed in undercover activities, for
his own or his family's protection and so as not to impair his
usefulness for future operations (see the above-mentioned {Ludi}
judgment, p. 21, para. 49).
58. Having regard to the place that the right to a fair
administration of justice holds in a democratic society, any
measures restricting the rights of the defence should be strictly
necessary. If a less restrictive measure can suffice then that
measure should be applied.
59. In the present case, the police officers in question were
in a separate room with the investigating judge, from which the
accused and even their counsel were excluded. All communication
was via a sound link. The defence was thus not only unaware of the
identity of the police witnesses but were also prevented from
observing their demeanour under direct questioning, and thus from
testing their reliability (see the above-mentioned Kostovski
judgment, p. 20, para. 42 in fine).
60. It has not been explained to the Court's satisfaction why
it was necessary to resort to such extreme limitations on the
right of the accused to have the evidence against them given in
their presence, or why less far-reaching measures were not
considered.
In the absence of any further information, the Court cannot
find that the operational needs of the police provide sufficient
justification. It should be noted that the explanatory memorandum
of the bill which became the Act of 11 November 1993 (see
paragraph 42 above) refers in this connection to the possibilities
of using make-up or disguise and the prevention of eye contact.
61. Nor is the Court persuaded that the Court of Appeal made
sufficient effort to assess the threat of reprisals against the
police officers or their families. It does not appear from that
court's judgment that it sought to address the question whether
the applicants would have been in a position to carry out any such
threats or to incite others to do so on their behalf. Its decision
was based exclusively on the seriousness of the crimes committed
(see paragraph 26 above).
In this connection, it is to be noted that Mr Engelen, a
civilian witness who in the early stages of the proceedings had
made statements identifying one of the applicants as one of the
perpetrators, did not enjoy the protection of anonymity and it has
not been claimed that he was at any time threatened.
62. It is true - as noted by the Government and the Commission
(see paragraph 48 above) - that the anonymous police officers were
interrogated before an investigating judge, who had himself
ascertained their identity and had, in a very detailed official
report of his findings, stated his opinion on their reliability
and credibility as well as their reasons for remaining anonymous.
However these measures cannot be considered a proper
substitute for the possibility of the defence to question the
witnesses in their presence and make their own judgment as to
their demeanour and reliability. It thus cannot be said that the
handicaps under which the defence laboured were counterbalanced by
the above procedures.
63. Moreover, the only evidence relied on by the Court of
Appeal which provided positive identification of the applicants as
the perpetrators of the crimes were the statements of the
anonymous police officers. That being so the conviction of the
applicants was based "to a decisive extent" on these anonymous
statements.
64. In the Court's view, the present case falls to be
distinguished from that of Doorson: in the latter case it was
decided on the basis of information contained in the case file
itself that the witnesses Y.15 and Y.16 - who were both civilians,
and who knew the accused personally - had sufficient reason to
believe that he might resort to violence, and they were heard in
the presence of counsel (see the above-mentioned Doorson judgment,
pp. 454-55, para. 25, pp. 455-56, para. 28, and pp. 470-71,
paras. 71 and 73).
In addition, in the latter case other evidence providing
positive identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the
crimes charged was available from sources unrelated to the
anonymous witnesses (ibid., pp. 458-59, para. 34, and p. 472,
para. 76).
65. Against this background the Court cannot find that the
proceedings taken as a whole were fair.
C. Conclusion
66. There has been a violation of Article 6 para. 1 taken
together with Article 6 para. 3 (d) (art. 6-1 + 6-3-d).
II. Application of Article 50 of the Convention (art. 50)
67. Article 50 of the Convention (art. 50) provides as
follows:
"If the Court finds that a decision or a measure taken by a
legal authority or any other authority of a High Contracting Party
is completely or partially in conflict with the obligations
arising from the ... Convention, and if the internal law of the
said Party allows only partial reparation to be made for the
consequences of this decision or measure, the decision of the
Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured
party."
A. Damage
68. The applicants argued that if the 's-Hertogenbosch Court
of Appeal had not relied on the statements of the anonymous police
officers, there would have been no case against them and they
would have been acquitted. They each claimed non-pecuniary damage
to an amount of 250 Netherlands guilders (NLG) for each day of
detention.
The Government considered the applicants' claims for damage
"disproportionately high".
The Delegate of the Commission did not comment.
69. The Court considers that in the circumstances this aspect
of the case is not yet ready for decision. It is accordingly
necessary to reserve it, due regard being had to the possibility
of agreements being reached between the respondent State and the
applicants.
B. Costs and expenses
70. The applicants made no claims in respect of costs and
expenses incurred in the domestic criminal proceedings.
As regards the costs and expenses incurred in the proceedings
before the European Commission and Court of Human Rights, the
applicants' claims were as follows:
Mr van Mechelen and Mr Willem Venerius (represented by
Ms Spronken): NLG 16,598.07 including value-added tax;
Mr Johan Venerius (represented by Mr {Sjocrona}):
NLG 30,446.43 including value-added tax;
Mr Pruijmboom (represented by Mr Knoops): NLG11,905 including
value-added tax.
The Government and the Delegate of the Commission did not
comment on these claims.
71. The Court notes that Mr van Mechelen, Mr Johan Venerius
and Mr Willem Venerius were granted legal aid by the Convention
institutions.
72. The Court is satisfied that the costs and expenses claimed
were actually and necessarily incurred by the applicants in their
attempts to obtain redress for the violation found. It also finds
the sums claimed by the applicants Van Mechelen, Willem Venerius
and Pruijmboom reasonable as to quantum.
On the other hand, the claim of Mr Johan Venerius is
disproportionate when compared with the claims of the other
applicants. No explanation has been given for this discrepancy.
73. The Court awards Mr Pruijmboom the sum claimed.
To Mr van Mechelen and Mr Willem Venerius jointly it awards
the sums claimed, less the amount paid to them by the Council of
Europe by way of legal aid, namely 11,412 French francs (FRF).
Deciding on an equitable basis, the Court awards Mr Johan
Venerius NLG 20,000 including value-added tax, less the amount
paid to him by the Council of Europe by way of legal aid, namely
FRF 11,436.
C. Default interest
74. According to the information available to the Court, the
statutory rate of interest applicable in the Netherlands at the
date of adoption of the present judgment is 5% per annum.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT
1. Holds by six votes to three that there has been a violation
of Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention taken together with
Article 6 para. 3 (d) (art. 6-1 + 6-3-d);
2. Holds unanimously that the respondent State is to pay,
within three months, in respect of costs and expenses,
(a) to the applicants Van Mechelen and Willem Venerius
jointly, 16,598 (sixteen thousand five hundred and ninety-eight)
Netherlands guilders and 7 (seven) cents, less 11,412 (eleven
thousand four hundred and twelve) French francs to be converted
into Netherlands guilders at the rate of exchange applicable on
the date of delivery of the present judgment;
(b) to the applicant Johan Venerius, 20,000 (twenty thousand)
Netherlands guilders, less 11,436 (eleven thousand four hundred
and thirty-six) French francs to be converted into Netherlands
guilders at the rate of exchange applicable on the date of
delivery of the present judgment;
(c) to the applicant Pruijmboom, 11,905 (eleven thousand nine
hundred and five) Netherlands guilders;
(d) that simple interest at an annual rate of 5% shall be
payable from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until
settlement;
3. Rejects unanimously the remainder of the claim of the
applicant Johan Venerius for reimbursement of costs and expenses;
4. Holds unanimously that the question of the application of
Article 50 of the Convention (art. 50) in respect of the
applicants' claims for damages is not ready for decision; and
consequently,
(a) reserves the said question;
(b) invites the Government and the applicants to submit,
within the forthcoming three months, their written observations on
the matter and, in particular, to notify the Court of any
agreement they may reach;
(c) reserves the further procedure and delegates to the
President of the Chamber the power to fix the same if need be.
Done in English and in French, and delivered at a public
hearing in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 23 April
1997.
Signed: Rudolf BERNHARDT
President
Signed: Herbert PETZOLD
Registrar
In accordance with Article 51 para. 2 of the Convention
(art. 51-2) and Rule 55 para. 2 of Rules of Court B, the following
separate opinions are annexed to this judgment:
(a) dissenting opinion of Mr Matscher and Mr Valticos;
(b) dissenting opinion of Mr van Dijk.
Initialled: R. B.
Initialled: H. P.
DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGES MATSCHER AND VALTICOS
(Translation)
This is a borderline case. On the one hand, the conditions in
which the trial took place and the witnesses were examined were
certainly not entirely satisfactory and no doubt they could have
been improved, although it has to be acknowledged that efforts had
been made in Netherlands law to adapt the procedure for hearing
anonymous witnesses to the requirements of Article 6 of the
Convention (art. 6) as set out in the judgment of Kostovski v. the
Netherlands (20 November 1989, Series A no. 166). On the other
hand, this was a case of armed robbery and it is understandable
that the witnesses - even though they were police officers -
should be in fear of reprisals from trigger-happy criminals. Were
a similar situation to arise in the future, it would certainly be
desirable for even more attention to be paid to the requirements
of Article 6 of the Convention (art. 6) when measures were taken.
In the instant case, however, having regard to all the
circumstances, we are unable to find a violation of Article 6 of
the Convention (art. 6) and concur on the whole with the opinion
of Judge van Dijk.
DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE VAN DIJK
1. To my regret I am unable to agree with the conclusion of
the majority that there has been a violation of Article 6 para. 1
in conjunction with Article 6 para. 3 (d) of the Convention
(art. 6-1 + 6-3-d). Nor can I follow the majority as regards the
essence of the reasoning supporting that conclusion.
2. Although the Court's case-law has not yet been fully
developed as to the conditions subject to which a conviction in
criminal proceedings may be based partly on statements of
anonymous witnesses, the Court has drawn certain lines. I am of
the opinion that the present judgment is neither within these
lines nor a logical continuation thereof, while on the other hand
the facts of the case are not specific to such a degree as to
justify distinguishing the present case from, especially, the
Doorson case (Doorson v. the Netherlands judgment of 26 March
1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-II, in which the
Netherlands were found not to have acted in violation of Article 6
para. 1 taken together with Article 6 para. 3 (d) of the
Convention (art. 6-1 + 6-3-d)). Even though the Court is not bound
by precedent, legal certainty and legal equality require that the
Court's case-law be both consistent and transparent as well as
reasonably predictable in so far as the facts of the case are
comparable to those of earlier cases.
3. Since "the admissibility of evidence is primarily a matter
for regulation by national law and as a general rule it is for the
national courts to assess the evidence before them" (see the
previously cited Doorson judgment, p. 470, para. 67), the
applicable national legislation and case-law and the practice
followed by the domestic courts are to some extent relevant also
for the Court.
The Netherlands Supreme Court revised its case-law concerning
the conditions under which a conviction may be based on statements
of anonymous witnesses in view of the judgment of the Court in the
Kostovski case (see paragraph 40 of the present judgment).
Moreover, taking that revised case-law as a starting-point and
basing itself, inter alia, on an analysis of the Court's case-law
on the admissibility of statements of anonymous witnesses in
criminal proceedings and the implications of the Court's case-law
for the relevant domestic law and legal practice in the
Netherlands, the Netherlands Government proposed, and the
legislature adopted, several amendments to the Code of Criminal
Procedure (see paragraph 42 of the judgment, and the explanatory
memorandum to the Act of 1993 cited there).
The Act of 1993 was not yet in force when the judgments of the
domestic courts in the present case were given. However, had it
been in force, the procedure followed by the Court of Appeal would
have been in conformity with the rules thereby introduced. It is
true that the reasons listed in the Act for keeping the identity
of a witness secret do not include the desirability, for tactical
reasons, of not disclosing the identity of a police officer in
order not to impair his future effectiveness. The explanatory
memorandum of the Act states in so many words that in the opinion
of the Government the public interest in investigating serious
crimes cannot alone justify guaranteeing complete anonymity (see
paragraphs 41 and 42 of the present judgment). However, the Court
of Appeal did not base its acceptance of the wish of the witnesses
to remain anonymous on this reason, but on the fear of the
witnesses for their lives and safety and those of their families
(see paragraph 26 of the present judgment), which is a ground
provided for in Article 226a of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
The foregoing does not, of course, guarantee per se that the
revised case-law of the Supreme Court and/or the relevant
provisions of the amended Code of Criminal Procedure will in all
circumstances be found to be in conformity with the Convention.
However, as noted above, in this matter the domestic case-law and
legislation have a relevance of their own. Moreover, in the
present case, in view of the legal background of the relevant
Netherlands case-law and the drafting history of the new
legislation, in both of which Strasbourg case-law was expressly
taken into account, there would seem to be good cause for a
presumption of conformity, at least in so far as the issues dealt
with have also been considered in the Strasbourg case-law.
4. Consideration of the various issues involved ultimately led
me to the conclusion that Article 6 paras. 1 and 3 (d) (art. 6-1,
art. 6-3-d) have not been violated in the present case. It might
have been preferable for the Court of Appeal or the investigating
judge to have interrogated the witnesses in the presence of
counsel and the Procurator General, the accused being able to
follow the proceedings in a separate room. I cannot discover from
the case file that was before the Court whether this possibility
was considered at all. Be that as it may, taking all the facts and
circumstances into account, I am of the opinion that the right of
the defence to examine the witnesses was not limited to such an
extent that the defence was not given an adequate and proper
opportunity to challenge and question the witnesses, as required
by Article 6 paras. 1 and 3 (d) (art. 6-1, art. 6-3-d) (see the
{Ludi} v. Switzerland judgment of 15 June 1992, Series A no. 238,
p. 21, para. 47). I therefore consider the trials to have been
fair, taking into account also the compensating elements of the
procedure decided on by the Court of Appeal and followed by the
investigating judge. In reaching this conclusion I would stress
the following aspects:
(a) The anonymous witnesses were not interrogated only by a
prosecuting authority, but also by an independent and impartial
judge who, judging from his official report of his findings to the
Court of Appeal, took great care to compensate the defence for the
handicap resulting from the lack of a face-to-face confrontation.
The applicants and their counsel were able to hear the
interrogation by the investigating judge and to ask questions of
their own. In these respects, as was also observed by the
Commission, the present case differs from the cases of Kostovski
(Kostovski v. the Netherlands judgment of 20 November 1989,
Series A no. 166, p. 20, para. 42), Windisch (Windisch v. Austria
judgment of 27 September 1990, Series A no. 186, p. 10, para. 27),
{Ludi} (loc. cit., p. 21, para. 49), and {Saidi} ({Saidi} v.
France judgment of 20 September 1993, Series A no. 261-C, pp. 56 -
57, para. 44). The practice in cases such as the present of having
witnesses heard by an investigating judge instead of by the trial
court itself was accepted by the Court in its Doorson judgment as
being in conformity with the Convention (loc. cit., p. 471, para.
73).
(b) The Court of Appeal has given reasons for delegating the
hearing of the witnesses to the investigating judge. The weight
which the minority of the Commission laid on the fact that the
Court of Appeal, being the trial court, did not avail itself of
the possibility to assess for itself the reliability of the
witnesses, is in my opinion not conclusive; there is no good
reason why the court could not rely for this on the assessment of
the equally independent and impartial investigating judge. In that
respect, it is also of relevance that the interrogations before
the investigating judge did not take place in a pre-trial phase
but during a suspension of the trial before the Court of Appeal
and pursuant to an order of the Court of Appeal; they formed part
of the trial. In the Kostovski case, where the Court emphasised
the importance of the possibility for the trial judge to observe
the witness, only one of the witnesses was heard by a judge, who
was, however, unaware of the identity of the person concerned
(loc. cit., p. 21, para. 43).
(c) The statements made before the investigating judge were
statements by witnesses who had been identified by the
investigating judge as having been, at the relevant moment, sworn
police officers who were authorised to perform prosecuting duties
invested with investigative competence and were under oath in
relation to any statement made in that context (see the {Ludi}
judgment previously cited p. 21, para. 49).
(d) The investigating judge, who had observed the witnesses
during the interrogations, gave a reasoned opinion as to their
reliability; this was also intended to compensate the defence for
being deprived of the visual information which would have
permitted them to test the witnesses' reliability (see the
Windisch judgment previously cited, pp. 10 - 11, paras. 28 - 29).
(e) The investigating judge gave his reasoned opinion as to
whether the wish of the police officers to remain anonymous was
justified; these reasons were also found to be justified by the
Court of Appeal on the grounds set out in its judgment. Their
shared opinion that the accusations and events were such that fear
of violent repercussions was not unsubstantiated cannot be
considered unreasonable. Article 6 (art. 6) does not guarantee an
unlimited right to question witnesses. It is necessary not only to
recognise the discretion of the competent domestic court in
maintaining conformity with the exigencies of the proper
administration of justice, but also to balance the interests of
the defence under Article 6 (art. 6) against the interests of
witnesses protected by other substantive provisions of the
Convention (see the Doorson judgment previously cited, p. 470,
para. 70). Although in the {Ludi} judgment (loc. cit., p. 21,
para. 49) the Court considered the interest of the police
authorities in preserving the anonymity of their agents
"legitimate", greater weight should be given in this case, as was
done by the Court of Appeal, to the agents' interest in the
protection of their lives and safety and those of their families
(Articles 2, 3, 5 and 8 of the Convention) (art. 2, art. 3,
art. 5, art. 8).
(f) The defence were given ample opportunity to hear and
question the witnesses, and to comment on the recording of their
answers, and in fact made extensive use of that opportunity; the
technical deficiencies complained of were inconvenient and might
perhaps have been avoided, but, given especially the extensive
time reserved for the hearings and the detailed way in which the
statements were recorded, these deficiencies were not such as to
hamper the defence to a significant extent.
(g) The Court of Appeal did not exclude beforehand the
possibility that additional questions might be put to witnesses at
the trial, but was of the opinion that the defence had
insufficiently substantiated their wish to do so. Moreover, the
defence were offered the possibility to challenge the statements
and their use as evidence in open court before the Court of
Appeal.
(h) The convictions were not based solely upon the statements
of anonymous witnesses. Although these were undoubtedly the core
of the evidence, there were also statements by identified
witnesses, there was some technical evidence and there was the
recording of the telephone conversation. In this respect, too, the
Court should recognise that "as a general rule it is for the
national courts to assess the evidence before them".
In the Doorson judgment, in which the criterion of "decisive
extent" was developed and applied (loc. cit., p. 472, para. 76),
the Court found that this criterion had been met in a situation
where the conviction was based, in addition to statements of
anonymous witnesses, on a statement made by an identified witness
to the police but retracted during the trial and a statement by an
identified witness who disappeared before the defence had had the
opportunity to question him (loc. cit., p. 472, para. 76, in
conjunction with pp. 458-59, para. 34).
In view of all these aspects of the case I come to the
conclusion that the trial which led to the applicants' conviction
was "fair" in the sense of Article 6 of the Convention (art. 6) as
construed in the Court's previous case-law.
Having stated my conclusion I wish, with due respect, to make
the following observations with regard to the reasoning on which
the majority bases its conclusion.
5. Like the majority, and in accordance with the case-law of
the Court, I take as my starting-point that evidence must normally
be produced at a public hearing. Therefore, I find in the abstract
that interrogation of the police officers at the trial before the
Court of Appeal, in disguise if necessary to protect their
anonymity, would have been preferable. However, I also take note
of the opinion of the Court of Appeal that this would have been
too risky because disclosure of the identity of the witnesses
could not have been excluded. I would have preferred it if the
Court of Appeal had given concrete arguments for that opinion. On
the other hand, I lack the expertise - as, I assume, do my
colleagues in the Court - to judge whether its fear was justified
or not. Then again, one may well wonder whether the defence would
have been in a better position to observe the witnesses' demeanour
and test their reliability had they appeared in disguise, given
the fact that an effective disguise may also substantially
disguise the sound and intonation of the voice and the body
language of the person concerned. A national court may in general
be considered to be in a better position to judge such a complex
and factual issue than is our Court, which should substitute its
judgment for that of the national court only if the latter's
judgment is unreasonable. From the wording of the Doorson judgment
it is clear that in that case the Court recognised this primary
responsibility of the national court.
6. The fact that police officers were fired at in pursuit does
not necessarily mean that at a later stage, during or after the
trial, their lives and safety and/or those of their families were
in danger. However, on both points the national authorities - in
this case the national courts - should be left some latitude to
balance the interests of the defence against those of the
witnesses (see the Doorson judgment previously cited, p. 470,
para. 71, where a reasonableness test was applied). In my opinion
the Court of Appeal has not overstepped the mark in finding that
the risk of disclosure of the identity of the witnesses was
present and that their fear for their lives and safety or those of
their families was justified in view of the seriousness of the
crimes committed and the violence used.
I disagree with the majority that the Court of Appeal failed
to make any real effort to assess the threat of reprisals. The
Court of Appeal had at its disposal the report of findings of the
investigating judge, in which the latter referred not only to the
statements made on this subject by the police officers concerned -
which were in some cases supported by previous experience
(paragraphs 17 and 21 of the judgment) - but also gave his own
evaluation, based upon the seriousness of the crimes and the
violence used by the perpetrators. Given these reasoned opinions
of both the investigating judge and the Court of Appeal, the
latter of which was reviewed by the Supreme Court, the Government
were not called upon to give an explanation of their own, as held
by the majority (see paragraph 60 of the judgment); nor in my
opinion would the Government have been in a position to do so.
In the Doorson judgment (loc. cit., pp. 470-71, para. 71) the
Court found that an actual threat against the witnesses was not
required for the decision to maintain their anonymity to be
reasonable, and that previous experience might be relevant. In the
present case it should also be taken into consideration that some
of the witnesses had been wounded while pursuing the robbers. Even
if one were to take the position that a certain risk is implicit
in the profession of police officer, that should not mean that the
latter has to take unnecessary risks and it certainly does not
mean that the lives and safety of his family deserve any less
protection than that of other persons. The "general duty of
obedience to the State's executive authorities" (see paragraph 56
of the judgment) owed by policemen cannot imply that their lives
and safety and those of their families are any less worthy of
protection. Therefore I cannot agree with the majority that, for
the sole reason that in the present case members of the police
force were involved, the case has to be distinguished from that of
Doorson as far as the balancing of the interests of the defence
against those of witnesses is concerned.
The fact that Mr Engelen, who had originally made a highly
incriminating statement, was not granted anonymity by the police
and nevertheless did not suffer any harm at the hands of the
applicants cannot be decisive in this context. The police may have
made a mistake in his case by revealing his identity, but in any
case later events do not automatically and retrospectively
invalidate a reasonable assessment of a risk. One can hardly blame
a witness who expresses serious fears for not waiting until
something serious happens to him or any other witness; the only
criterion for the national court to consider is the reasonableness
of the fear.
7. I fail to see why policemen should be under a special duty
to give evidence in open court (see paragraph 56 of the judgment)
since this is a general civic duty prescribed by law. And even if
one may agree that the use of policemen as anonymous witnesses
"should be resorted to only in exceptional circumstances" (ibid.),
one may argue on the other hand that their anonymity should meet
with fewer objections from the point of view of the defence,
because their statements are statements by sworn professionals,
whose identity and investigative competence can easily be checked
by the investigating judge.
8. The majority also deal with the question whether
"operational needs" provided sufficient justification for
preserving the anonymity of the police officers. Reference is made
in that context to the explanatory memorandum of the Act of
11 November 1993 in which the Netherlands Government indicate that
in their opinion that interest can be sufficiently protected by
less far-reaching restrictions on the rights of the defence.
However, in my opinion that issue is of only minor importance in
the present case, since the Court of Appeal stated in its judgment
that, of the arguments advanced by the witnesses for claiming
anonymity, it considered the argument concerning the personal
safety of these witnesses and their families to be "decisive" (see
paragraph 26 of the judgment).
9. It cannot be denied - and indeed it has not been denied -
that the possibilities for the defence to interrogate the
witnesses were not without limitations. Nor are they always
without limitations in normal situations, where the identity of
the witnesses is known to the defence. The fact that certain
questions were not answered by witnesses and that this was
accepted by the investigating judge may be open to criticism but
this would in all probability also have occurred had the witnesses
been interrogated in open court in some form of disguise. It may
therefore be questioned whether it was necessary and proportionate
to refuse to answer certain questions put by the defence in order
to protect the anonymity of the witnesses and the secrecy of the
police tactics. However, this question has to be answered
primarily by the competent domestic court, and indeed it was
answered in the affirmative by the investigating judge, and after
his decision was challenged by the defence before the Court of
Appeal, by the latter as well. On the whole, in my opinion,
neither the limitations necessitated by the situation nor those
accepted by the investigating judge were such as to warrant the
finding that there was no "adequate and proper opportunity to
question the witnesses" as required by the Court in its Kostovski
judgment (loc. cit., p. 20, para. 41). The handicaps under which
the defence laboured were, therefore, sufficiently counterbalanced
by the procedures followed by the judicial authorities (see the
Kostovski judgment previously cited, p. 21, para. 43, and the
Doorson judgment previously cited, p. 472, para. 76).
10. Finally, although the statements of the anonymous
witnesses were an essential part of the evidence, it cannot be
said that the convictions were based solely on these statements.
Whether they were based on these statements "to a decisive
extent", as the majority holds (paragraph 63 of the judgment), is
hard to say. I share the opinion expressed by the Delegate of the
Commission at the Court's hearing that this criterion, laid down
in the Doorson judgment (loc. cit., p. 472, para. 76), is
difficult to apply, because if the testimony of anonymous
witnesses is used by the court as part of the evidence, that will
always be because the court considers it a "decisive" part of that
evidence, making the proof complete or at least sufficient. Here
again, the Court's finding that "as a general rule it is for the
national courts to assess the evidence before them" (paragraph 50
of the present judgment) should prevail. Moreover, as already
mentioned (see paragraph 3 (h) above), in this respect the facts
of the case would not seem to differ substantially from those of
the Doorson case.
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