[неофициальный перевод]
ЕВРОПЕЙСКИЙ СУД ПО ПРАВАМ ЧЕЛОВЕКА
СУДЕБНОЕ РЕШЕНИЕ
ФИНДЛИ (FINDLAY) ПРОТИВ СОЕДИНЕННОГО КОРОЛЕВСТВА
(Страсбург, 25 февраля 1997 года)
(Извлечение)
КРАТКОЕ НЕОФИЦИАЛЬНОЕ ИЗЛОЖЕНИЕ ОБСТОЯТЕЛЬСТВ ДЕЛА
A. Основные факты
Заявитель, Александр Финдли, родился в 1961 г. и проживает в
Виндзоре. В 1980 г. он поступил на службу в вооруженные силы
Великобритании и должен был выйти в отставку в октябре или ноябре
1992 г. Во время Фолклендской кампании 1982 г. он стал свидетелем
гибели и увечья своих друзей и получил увечья сам. В последующем у
него были проблемы с психикой (психические отклонения как
результат посттравматического стресса), которые до 1990 г. не были
диагностированы.
29 июля 1990 г., находясь в состоянии сильного опьянения, он
направил оружие на солдат своего подразделения, угрожая убить их и
себя. Выстрелив дважды в направлении телевизора, он сдал пистолет,
а затем был арестован. В заключениях психиатров указывалось, что
причина инцидента связана с психическими отклонениями.
Военное должностное лицо - офицер, имеющий право созывать
заседания военного трибунала, принял в связи с данным инцидентом
решение выдвинуть против г-на Финдли обвинения в совершении шести
гражданских и двух военных правонарушений. Созывающий офицер
назначил офицера - обвинителя и членов военного трибунала, который
состоял из председателя и четырех членов; все они были офицерами
более низкого звания, чем созывающий офицер, и служили под его
командованием. Консультант по вопросам военного судопроизводства,
барристер, чья роль заключалась в юридической помощи военному
трибуналу, был назначен Службой юрисконсульта короны по военному и
морскому праву.
11 ноября 1991 г. заявитель предстал перед трибуналом и
признал себя виновным по семи обвинениям. Он был приговорен к двум
годам тюремного заключения, разжалован в рядовые и уволен из
армии. Никаких аргументов в обоснование данного решения приведено
не было.
Обращения заявителя к офицеру, утверждающему решения трибунала
(это тот же созывающий офицер), а также в первую и вторую
инстанцию по пересмотру приговора с ходатайством о его смягчении
были отклонены. В пересматривающей инстанции заседали не имеющие
юридической квалификации армейские офицеры, которые пользовались
помощью Службы юрисконсульта короны по военному и морскому праву.
Апелляция заявителя в Высокий Суд была отклонена.
На момент суда над г-ном Финдли процедура рассмотрения дел
военным трибуналом регламентировалась Законом об армии 1955 г.
Впоследствии Законом о Вооруженных силах 1996 г. в статус
созывающего офицера были внесены изменения.
B. Разбирательство в Комиссии по правам человека
В жалобе, поданной в Комиссию 28 мая 1993 г., заявитель
утверждал, что было нарушено предусмотренное статей 6 п. 1 право
на рассмотрение дела независимым и беспристрастным судом,
созданным на основании закона. Жалоба была объявлена приемлемой
23 февраля 1995 г.
В своем докладе от 5 сентября 1995 г. Комиссия установила
фактические обстоятельства дела и пришла к выводу, что нарушение
статьи 6 п. 1 Конвенции имело место.
ИЗВЛЕЧЕНИЕ ИЗ СУДЕБНОГО РЕШЕНИЯ
ВОПРОСЫ ПРАВА
I. Предмет разбирательства
A. Жалобы по статье 6 п. 1 Конвенции
61. В своем письменном обращении и выступлении в Суде
г-н Финдли утверждал, что военный трибунал не является
"независимым и беспристрастным судом", что он не провел
"публичного разбирательства дела" и что он не был судом,
"созданным на основании закона".
62. Правительство и представитель Комиссии отмечали во время
слушаний, что, поскольку два последних утверждения не содержались
в жалобах, рассмотренных Комиссией, Суд должен отказаться от их
рассмотрения.
63. Суд напомнил, что пределы его компетенции обусловлены
Решением Комиссии о приемлемости и что он не вправе рассматривать
новые и самостоятельные жалобы, которые перед Комиссией не
ставились (см. inter alia Решение по делу Сингх против
Соединенного Королевства от 21 февраля 1996 г. Reports, 1996-I,
с. 293, п. 44).
Г-н Финдли в своей жалобе в Комиссию, возможно, прямо не
говорил о своем праве на "публичное разбирательство" и
рассмотрение дела "судом, созданным на основании закона", тем не
менее он, как представляется, затронул суть большинства связанных
с этим проблем. Так, в Решении Комиссии о приемлемости говорится,
что он ссылался, в частности, на то обстоятельство, что члены
военного трибунала назначаются ad hoc, что рекомендация военного
консультанта по поводу приговора была закрытой, что в приговоре
военного трибунала отсутствуют мотивы решения, отсутствовали они и
при утверждении приговора офицерами, ответственными за пересмотр и
надзорное производство, что вся процедура обжалования носит
преимущественно административный характер и дело рассматривалось в
закрытом заседании (см. Решение Комиссии о приемлемости жалобы
N 22107/93, с. 32 - 35).
Отсюда следует, что речь не идет о новых и отдельных жалобах,
и, соответственно, Суд компетентен рассматривать эти вопросы (см.
inter alia и mutatis mutandis Решение по делу Джеймс и другие
против Соединенного Королевства от 21 февраля 1986 г. Серия A,
т. 98, с. 46, п. 80).
B. Жалоба по статье 25 Конвенции
и статье 2 Европейского соглашения
64. В своем дополнительном обращении заявитель утверждал, что
в переписке с Коллегией солиситоров по вопросу, не имевшему
прямого отношения к настоящему делу, генеральный консультант
вооруженных сил жаловался, что при рассмотрении дела г-на Финдли в
Комиссии адвокат заявителя намекал, что советы, которые давала
трибуналу Служба генерального консультанта Вооруженных сил, не
были беспристрастными. Генеральный консультант, судья Рант
прокомментировал это как "чрезвычайно серьезные утверждения".
Далее в письме говорится:
"Я хотел бы внести полную ясность, что на данной стадии, не
предвосхищая каких-либо возможных будущих действий, я не приношу
формальную жалобу по поводу происшедшего, поскольку дело Финдли
будет обсуждаться в Европейском суде по правам человека в сентябре
1996 г. и мне представляется уместным отложить принятие мер до
окончания разбирательства".
Заявитель утверждал, что его адвокат, представляя свои доводы
в суде, чувствовал себя связанным, зная, что в будущем это может
послужить основанием для дисциплинарного производства против него,
в связи с чем заявитель сослался на свои права по статье 25
Конвенции и статье 2 Европейского соглашения относительно лиц,
участвующих в процедурах в Европейской комиссии и в Европейском
суде по правам человека.
65. Поскольку этот вопрос во время слушаний заявителем не
ставился и никак не затрагивался Правительством или представителем
Комиссии, Суд не считает нужным его рассматривать.
C. Новое законодательство
66. При письменном и устном изложении своей позиции
Правительство просило Суд принять во внимание изменения, которые
вносит в систему военных трибуналов Закон о Вооруженных силах
1996 г.
67. Суд напоминает, что этот Закон вступил в силу с апреля
1997 г. и потому не подлежал применению в то время, когда дело
г-на Финдли рассматривалось в военном трибунале. Выносить
постановление о законодательстве in abstracto в задачу Суда не
входит, и поэтому он не может высказать свою точку зрения по
поводу совместимости с Конвенцией положений нового
законодательства (см. mutatis mutandis Решение по делу Силвер и
другие против Соединенного Королевства от 25 марта 1983 г.
Серия A, т. 61, с. 31, п. 79). Тем не менее он с удовлетворением
отмечает, что власти Соединенного Королевства внесли изменения в
систему военных трибуналов с целью обеспечить соблюдение своих
обязательств по выполнению Конвенции.
II. О предполагаемом нарушении статьи 6 п. 1 Конвенции
68. Заявитель утверждал, что процедура рассмотрения его дела
военным трибуналом не соответствовала требованиям статьи 6 п. 1
Конвенции, которая предусматривает (в той мере, в какой подлежит
применению) следующее:
"Каждый человек имеет право... при рассмотрении любого
уголовного обвинения, предъявляемого ему, на справедливое и
публичное разбирательство дела... независимым и беспристрастным
судом, созданным на основании закона..."
Комиссия признала, что заявителю не было обеспечено
справедливое разбирательство независимым и беспристрастным судом
и, таким образом, имело место нарушение. Правительство не
оспаривало этот вывод.
A. Применимость
69. С точки зрения Суда, статья 6 п. 1, бесспорно, применима к
процедуре разбирательства данного дела военным трибуналом,
вынесшим г-ну Финдли приговор после того, как он признал себя
виновным в отношении предъявленных ему уголовных обвинений. Это
мнение никем не оспаривалось (см. Решение по делу Экле и другие
против Федеративной Республики Германии от 15 июля 1982 г.
Серия A, т. 51, с. 34 - 35, п. 76 - 77).
B. Соблюдение
70. Заявитель жаловался, что военный трибунал не является
"независимым и беспристрастным судом", как того требует статья 6
п. 1, потому что inter alia все назначенные в него офицеры
находятся в непосредственном подчинении у созывающего офицера, и
он же правомочен возбуждать дело. Отсутствие юридической
квалификации и опыта у офицеров, выносящих решения в военном суде
или пересматривающих дела на последующих стадиях, лишает их
возможности действовать независимо или беспристрастно.
Кроме того, заявитель утверждал, что не была обеспечена
открытость судебного разбирательства в смысле статьи 6 п. 1, т.к.
рекомендации консультанта по военному судопроизводству трибуналу,
утверждающему офицеру и надзорным органам носили конфиденциальный
характер; мотивировки решений, принятых на всех стадиях
разбирательства, не приводились; процесс утверждения приговора
проходил в административном порядке, приватно, без соблюдения
каких-либо процессуальных гарантий.
Наконец, заявитель утверждал, что рассматривавший его дело
военный трибунал не был "судом, созданным на основании закона",
т.к. нормативные акты, регулирующие его деятельность, отличаются
неточностью и расплывчатостью; например, в них ничего не говорится
о порядке назначения созывающего и утверждающего офицеров.
71. У Правительства не было замечаний по поводу вывода
Комиссии о нарушении статьи 6 п. 1 Конвенции по той причине, что
полномочия созывающего офицера чрезмерно широки и члены трибунала
находятся у него в подчинении. Правительство просило Суд учесть
изменения, внесенные в систему военных трибуналов Законом о
Вооруженных силах 1996 г., который, по его мнению, снимает
озабоченность Комиссии.
72. Комиссия установила, что созывающий офицер играл
центральную роль в процессе обвинения, члены военного трибунала
были ниже его по званию и находились под его командованием. Он
также действовал как офицер, утверждающий вынесенные решения,
после чего они вступали в силу. Эти обстоятельства дают серьезные
основания сомневаться в независимости военного трибунала от
органов, возбуждающих уголовное преследование. Участия в деле
консультанта по военному судопроизводству недостаточно, чтобы
развеять эти сомнения, т.к. он не входит в состав трибунала и не
принимает официального участия в его заседаниях.
Комиссия дополнительно отметила, что в составе военного
трибунала, рассматривавшего дело Финдли, не было ни
профессиональных судей, ни дипломированных юристов, ни гражданских
лиц, что он был создан ad hoc, и созывающий офицер имел право
распустить трибунал до или во время суда. Требование принести
присягу не является достаточной гарантией независимости.
Соответственно Комиссия сочла, что опасения заявителя
относительно независимости военного трибунала объективно выглядят
оправданными, в особенности с учетом характера и объема полномочий
созывающего офицера, состава трибунала и того, что он был созван
ad hoc. Более того, эти недостатки не компенсировались последующим
судебным контролем, обеспечивающим гарантии, предусмотренные
статьей 6 п. 1, поскольку "утверждающий офицер" был тем же самым
лицом, что и созывающий офицер, а в состав надзорного органа
входили офицеры вооруженных сил. Неэффективность рассмотрения дела
этим органом еще более подчеркивается окружающей дело обстановкой
секретности и отсутствием у г-на Финдли возможности принимать
реальное участие в процессе.
73. Суд напоминает, что для решения вопроса, можно ли считать
данный суд "независимым", следует обратить внимание inter alia на
способ назначения его членов, сроки пребывания в должности,
существование гарантий от внешнего давления и наличие у органа
внешних признаков независимости (см. Решение по делу Брайан против
Соединенного Королевства от 22 ноября 1995 г. Серия A, т. 335-A,
с. 15, п. 37).
Что касается "беспристрастности", то у этого требования есть
два аспекта. Во-первых, трибунал должен быть субъективно свободен
от личных предубеждений или пристрастий. Во-вторых, он должен быть
объективно беспристрастен, т.е. должен гарантированно исключать
какие-либо обоснованные сомнения в этом отношении (см. Решение по
делу Пуллар против Соединенного Королевства от 10 июня 1996 г.
Reports, 1996-III, с. 792, п. 30).
Понятия независимости и объективной беспристрастности тесно
взаимосвязаны, и Суд применительно к настоящему делу будет
рассматривать их вместе.
74. Суд отмечает, что созывающий военный трибунал офицер, чья
компетенция определялась в соответствии с применявшимися в то
время нормами, играл значительную роль до начала слушаний по делу
г-на Финдли. Он решал, какие обвинения должны быть предъявлены и
какой тип военного трибунала лучше всего подходит для данного
дела. Он созывал военный трибунал, назначал его членов, а также
офицеров, осуществляющих обвинение и защиту (см. п. 14 - 15 и
36 - 37 выше).
Согласно действовавшим тогда нормам, в его задачу входила
подготовка для обвинителя и для консультанта по военному
судопроизводству резюме доказательств по делу, причем он имел
право отмечать в показаниях те из них, которые могли быть
объявлены неприемлемыми. Он обеспечивал участие на суде свидетелей
обвинения, а также тех свидетелей, которых "обоснованно требовала"
защита. Его согласие должно было предварять возможную сделку
обвинения с обвиняемым, в соответствии с которой последний признал
бы себя виновным в совершении менее тяжкого преступления.
По этим основаниям Суд, как и Комиссия, полагает что
созывающий офицер был центральной фигурой в судебном преследовании
г-на Финдли.
75. Таким образом, встает вопрос, являются ли члены военного
трибунала в достаточной степени независимыми от созывающего
офицера и предоставляет ли организация процесса адекватные
гарантии беспристрастности суда.
В этом отношении Суд разделяет озабоченность Комиссии. Следует
отметить, что все члены военного трибунала, назначенные созывающим
офицером, были ниже его по званию. Многие из них, включая
председателя, так или иначе находились под его командованием (см.
п. 16 выше). Более того, полномочия созывающего офицера включали,
хотя и в предписываемых обстоятельствах, возможность распустить
военный трибунал либо до, либо во время суда.
76. Для веры в независимость и беспристрастность суда важны их
внешние признаки. Поскольку все члены военного трибунала, который
решал дело г-на Финдли, были ниже по званию созывающего офицера и
находились под его началом, сомнения г-на Финдли по поводу
независимости и беспристрастности суда объективно оправданны (см.
mutatis mutandis Решение по делу Срамек против Австрии от
22 октября 1984 г. Серия A, т. 84, с. 20, п. 42).
77. Кроме того, Суд считает существенным то обстоятельство,
что офицер, созывающий трибунал, действует и как офицер,
утверждающий его решения. Приговор военного трибунала вступает в
силу лишь после такого утверждения, причем офицер вправе изменять
приговор так, как считает целесообразным. Это противоречит глубоко
укоренившемуся принципу, что право принимать обязывающие решения,
которые не могут быть изменены несудебными властями, является
неотъемлемым правом самого суда и представляет собой один из
компонентов той "независимости", которой требует статья 6 п. 1
(см. mutatis mutandis Решение по делу Ван де Хурк против
Нидерландов от 19 апреля 1994 г. Серия A, т. 288, с. 16, п. 45).
78. Суд согласен с Комиссией, что эти принципиальные пороки
организации военных трибуналов не устраняются наличием такой
гарантии, как участие консультанта по военному судопроизводству,
который в состав военного трибунала не входит и чьи рекомендации
трибуналу не предаются огласке; не служит гарантией и клятва,
которую приносят члены военного трибунала.
79. Недостатки, о которых говорилось выше (п. 75, 77), не
поддаются исправлению при помощи процедуры последующего контроля.
Поскольку слушания по делу заявителя касались серьезных обвинений,
подпадающих под классификацию "уголовных", согласно внутреннему
законодательству и праву Конвенции он имел право на рассмотрение
его дела в суде первой инстанции, который бы полностью
соответствовал требованиям статьи 6 п. 1 (см. Решение по делу
Де Куббер против Бельгии от 26 октября 1984 г. Серия A, т. 86,
с. 16 - 18, п. 31 - 32).
80. По всем этим основаниям, и в особенности в связи с
центральной ролью в организации судопроизводства созывающего
офицера, Суд считает, что сомнения г-на Финдли относительно
независимости и беспристрастности суда, который занимался его
делом, были объективно оправданны.
В свете вышесказанного нет необходимости рассматривать другие
жалобы заявителя на основании статьи 6 п. 1, а именно, что
слушания по делу не велись "публично" судом, "созданным на
основании закона".
Вывод: нарушение статьи 6 п. 1 Конвенции имело место.
III. Применение статьи 50 Конвенции
81. Заявитель потребовал справедливого возмещения согласно
статье 50 Конвенции, которая гласит:
"Если Суд установит, что решение или мера, принятые судебными
или иными властями Высокой Договаривающейся Стороны, полностью или
частично противоречат обязательствам, вытекающим из настоящей
Конвенции, а также если внутреннее право упомянутой Стороны
допускает лишь частичное возмещение последствий такого решения или
такой меры, то решением Суда, если в этом есть необходимость,
предусматривается справедливое возмещение потерпевшей стороне".
A. Имущественный ущерб
82. Заявитель потребовал компенсации, общая сумма которой
составила 440200 фунтов, на том основании, что, если бы не
осуждение, он завершил бы двадцатидвухлетнюю службу в армии,
получив, возможно, звание главного сержанта, с правом выхода на
пенсию по достижении 40 лет.
83. Правительство заявило, что признание факта нарушения само
по себе является достаточным возмещением или в субсидиарном
порядке ему может быть присуждена весьма скромная сумма.
Во-первых, нет оснований полагать, что заявитель не был бы
осужден, приговорен к тюремному сроку и уволен из армии после суда
(на котором он признал себя виновным), даже если бы военный
трибунал был организован иначе. Во-вторых, в любом случае
маловероятно, чтобы его ждала долгая карьера в армии, учитывая
психический стресс после травмы и повреждение спины, от которых он
страдал. Заявитель уже получил 100 тысяч фунтов в порядке
урегулирования его гражданского иска к Министерству обороны.
84. Во время слушаний представитель Комиссии отметил, что не
установлена причинная связь между нарушением Конвенции и
предположительным материальным ущербом, но отметил также, что
нельзя спекулировать по поводу того, привел бы процесс к иным
последствиям, если бы он соответствовал требованиям статьи 6 п. 1.
85. Суд согласен с тем, что нельзя строить предположения по
поводу того, какими были бы последствия, если бы нарушения
Конвенции не было (см., например, Решение по делу Шмауцер против
Австрии от 23 октября 1995 г. Серия A, т. 328-A, с. 16, п. 44).
Присуждение г-ну Финдли компенсации за материальный ущерб
невозможно.
B. Моральный вред
86. Заявитель потребовал компенсацию в сумме 50000 английских
фунтов за переживания и страдания, вызванные разбирательством в
военном трибунале, и за восемь месяцев, проведенных им в тюрьме.
Он также потребовал отмены обвинительного приговора.
87. Правительство указало, что отмена обвинительного приговора
заявителя выходит за пределы полномочий настоящего Суда.
88. Суд, со своей стороны, также подчеркнул, что не имеет
права отменять приговоры, вынесенные национальными судами (см.
вышеупомянутое Решение по делу Шмауцера).
В итоге Суд пришел к выводу, что признание факта нарушения
само по себе является достаточной компенсацией заявителю за
моральный вред.
C. Издержки и расходы
89. Заявитель потребовал 23956 фунтов 25 пенсов в возмещение
судебных издержек и расходов, включая 1000 фунтов на оплату
адвоката и 250 фунтов за составление жалобы в Высокий Суд.
90. Правительство полагало, что расходы заявителя в Высоком
Суде должны быть исключены, а итоговая сумма в 22500 фунтов
представляется разумной.
91. Суд считает, что, принимая во внимание обстоятельства
настоящего дела, апелляция в Высокий Суд с целью добиться
устранения нарушения была разумной. Поэтому он принимает решение
присудить полную оплату всех требуемых расходов за вычетом сумм,
полученных в порядке судебной помощи от Совета Европы.
D. Проценты за просрочку
92. Согласно имеющейся у Суда информации, действующая в
Соединенном Королевстве процентная ставка на день вынесения
настоящего Судебного решения составляет 8% годовых.
ПО ЭТИМ ОСНОВАНИЯМ СУД ЕДИНОГЛАСНО
1. Постановил, что имело место нарушение статьи 6 п. 1
Конвенции;
2. Отклонил требование об имущественном ущербе;
3. Постановил, что установление факта нарушения представляет
собой достаточное и справедливое возмещение морального вреда,
причиненного заявителю;
4. Постановил, что
a) государство - ответчик должно в течение трех месяцев
выплатить заявителю в возмещение издержек и расходов 23956,25
(двадцать три тысячи девятьсот пятьдесят шесть фунтов стерлингов и
двадцать пять пенсов) за вычетом 26891 (двадцати шести тысяч
восьмисот девяносто одного) французского франка, которые должны
быть переведены в фунты стерлингов по обменному курсу на дату
вынесения настоящего Судебного решения;
b) по истечении вышеупомянутого трехмесячного срока и вплоть
до погашения уплачивается простой процент из расчета 8% годовых.
Совершено на английском и французском языках и оглашено во
Дворце прав человека в Страсбурге 25 февраля 1997 г.
Председатель
Рольф РИССДАЛ
Грефье
Герберт ПЕТЦОЛЬД
В соответствии со статьей 51 п. 2 Конвенции и статьей 53 п. 2
Регламента Суда A к настоящему Решению прилагается совпадающее
мнение судьи Де Мейера.
СОВПАДАЮЩЕЕ МНЕНИЕ СУДЬИ ДЕ МЕЙЕРА
К данному Судебному решению, результат которого я полностью
одобряю, хотелось бы добавить одно короткое замечание.
В приведенных доводах вновь делается ссылка на "внешние
признаки" (п. 73, 76).
Прежде всего я бы хотел отметить, что у Суда нет необходимости
полагаться на "внешние признаки", т.к. было предъявлено достаточно
убедительных доказательств, позволяющих ему сделать вывод, что та
система организации военного трибунала, которая признала виновным
сержанта Финдли и вынесла приговор по данному делу, является
неприемлемой.
Более того, я бы хотел подчеркнуть, что мы принципиально не
должны ничего решать на основании "внешних признаков" и что
особенно нам не следует позволять себе оказываться в плену
произведенного ими впечатления при решении вопроса, является ли
суд независимым и беспристрастным. Мы были не правы, делая это в
прошлом, и не должны делать это в будущем.
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
CASE OF FINDLAY v. THE UNITED KINGDOM
JUDGMENT
(Strasbourg, 25.II.1997)
In the case of Findlay v. the United Kingdom <1>,
The European Court of Human Rights, sitting, in accordance
with Article 43 (art. 43) of the Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ("the Convention") and the
relevant provisions of Rules of Court A <2>, as a Chamber composed
of the following judges:
--------------------------------
<1> The case is numbered 110/1995/616/706. The first number is
the case's position on the list of cases referred to the Court in
the relevant year (second number). The last two numbers indicate
the case's position on the list of cases referred to the Court
since its creation and on the list of the corresponding
originating applications to the Commission.
<2> Rules A apply to all cases referred to the Court before
the entry into force of Protocol No. 9 (P9) (1 October 1994) and
thereafter only to cases concerning States not bound by that
Protocol (P9). They correspond to the Rules that came into force
on 1 January 1983, as amended several times subsequently.
Mr R. Ryssdal, President,
Mr J. De Meyer,
Mrs E. Palm,
Mr A.N. Loizou,
Mr J.M. Morenilla,
Sir John Freeland,
Mr D. Gotchev,
Mr P. Jambrek,
Mr K. Jungwiert,
and also of Mr H. Petzold, Registrar, and Mr P.J. Mahoney,
Deputy Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 27 September 1996 and 21
January 1997,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the
last-mentioned date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case was referred to the Court by the European
Commission of Human Rights ("the Commission") on 8 December 1995,
within the three-month period laid down by Article 32 para. 1 and
Article 47 of the Convention (art. 32-1, art. 47). It originated
in an application (no. 22107/93) against the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland lodged with the Commission
under Article 25 (art. 25) by Mr Alexander Findlay, a British
citizen, on 28 May 1993.
The Commission's request referred to Articles 44 and 48 (art.
44, art. 48) and to the declaration whereby the United Kingdom
recognised the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court (Article 46)
(art. 46). The object of the request was to obtain a decision as
to whether the facts of the case disclosed a breach by the
respondent State of its obligations under Article 6 para. 1 of the
Convention (art. 6-1).
2. In response to the enquiry made in accordance with Rule 33
para. 3 (d) of Rules of Court A, the applicant stated that he
wished to take part in the proceedings and designated the lawyer
who would represent him (Rule 30).
3. The Chamber to be constituted included ex officio Sir John
Freeland, the elected judge of British nationality (Article 43 of
the Convention) (art. 43), and Mr R. Ryssdal, the President of the
Court (Rule 21 para. 4 (b)). On 8 February 1996, in the presence
of the Registrar, the President drew by lot the names of the other
seven members, namely Mr J. De Meyer, Mrs E. Palm, Mr A.N. Loizou,
Mr J.M. Morenilla, Mr D. Gotchev, Mr P. Jambrek and Mr K.
Jungwiert (Article 43 in fine of the Convention and Rule 21
para. 5) (art. 43).
4. As President of the Chamber (Rule 21 para. 6), Mr Ryssdal,
acting through the Registrar, consulted the Agent of the United
Kingdom Government ("the Government"), the applicant's lawyer and
the Delegate of the Commission on the organisation of the
proceedings (Rules 37 para. 1 and 38). Pursuant to the order made
in consequence, the Registrar received the applicant's memorial on
28 June 1996 and the Government's memorial on 4 July 1996.
On 29 August 1996 the President decided to admit to the Court
file an additional memorial submitted by the applicant which had
been received by the Registrar on 7 August 1996 (Rule 37 para. 1).
5. In accordance with the President's decision, the hearing
took place in public in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on
25 September 1996. The Court had held a preparatory meeting
beforehand.
There appeared before the Court:
(a) for the Government
Ms S. Dickson, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Agent,
Mr P. Havers QC,
Mr J. Eadie, Barrister-at-Law, Counsel,
Mr G. Rogers, Ministry of Defence,
Ms J. Murnane, Ministry of Defence,
Mr D. Woodhead, Ministry of Defence, Advisers;
(b) for the Commission
Mr N. Bratza, Delegate,
(c) for the applicant
Mr J. Mackenzie, Solicitor, Counsel,
Mr G. Blades, Solicitor,
Mr D. Sullivan, Solicitor, Advisers.
The Court heard addresses by Mr Bratza, Mr Mackenzie and
Mr Havers.
AS TO THE FACTS
I. Circumstances of the case
6. The applicant, Alexander Findlay, is a British citizen who
was born in 1961 in Kilmarnock, Scotland, and now lives in
Windsor, England.
7. In 1980 he joined the British army and became a member of
the Scots Guards. His service was due to terminate in October or
November 1992 when he would have received a resettlement grant
and, at the age of sixty, an army pension.
8. In 1982 Mr Findlay took part in the Falklands campaign.
During the battle of Mount Tumbledown he witnessed the death and
mutilation of several of his friends and was himself injured in
the wrist by a mortar-shell blast. According to the medical
evidence prepared for his court martial (see paragraphs 11 - 13
below), as a result of these experiences he suffered from
post-traumatic stress disorder ("PTSD"), which manifested itself
by flashbacks, nightmares, feelings of anxiety, insomnia and
outbursts of anger. This disorder was not diagnosed until after
the events of 29 July 1990 (see paragraph 10 below).
9. In 1987 he sustained an injury during training for service
in Northern Ireland when a rope which he was climbing broke and he
fell to the ground, severely damaging his back. This injury was
extremely painful and affected his ability to perform his duties,
which, again according to the medical evidence, led him to suffer
from feelings of stress, guilt and depression.
10. In 1990 the applicant, who had become a lance-sergeant,
was sent with his regiment to Northern Ireland. On 29 July 1990,
after a heavy drinking session, he held members of his own unit at
pistol point and threatened to kill himself and some of his
colleagues. He fired two shots, which were not aimed at anyone and
hit a television set, and subsequently surrendered the pistol. He
was then arrested.
1. The medical evidence
11. On 31 July 1990 an ex-naval psychiatrist, Dr McKinnon,
examined Mr Findlay and found that he was responsible for his
actions at the time of the incident. However, a combination of
stresses (including his back injury and posting to Northern
Ireland) together with his heavy drinking on the day, had led to
an "almost inevitable" event. Dr McKinnon recommended "awarding
the minimum appropriate punishment".
Following this report, the decision was taken to charge
Mr Findlay with a number of offences arising out of the incident
on 29 July (see paragraph 14 below).
12. In order to establish that he was fit to stand trial, at
the request of the army he was examined on two occasions by
Dr Blunden, a civilian consultant psychiatrist who had been
employed by the Ministry of Defence since 1980.
In her report of January 1991, Dr Blunden confirmed that
Mr Findlay was fit to plead and knew what he was doing at the time
of the incident. However, his chronic back problem (which caused
him to be frustrated and depressed at not being fit for duty in
his Northern Ireland posting) together with "his previous combat
stresses and a very high level of alcohol ... combined to produce
this dangerous behaviour".
In her second report, of March 1991, she explained that the
applicant had reacted to the stress caused by his back problems in
the way he did on 29 July 1990 because of his experiences in the
Falklands war. Whilst she did not clearly state that he suffered
from PTSD, she confirmed that similar patterns of behaviour
frequently occurred at a late stage in those who experienced this
disorder. She confirmed that the consumption of alcohol on the
relevant day was a result of his condition and not a cause of it.
13. Mr Findlay was also examined by Dr Reid, at the request of
his (Mr Findlay's) solicitor. Dr Reid diagnosed him as suffering
from PTSD as a result of his service in the Falklands.
2. The composition of the court martial
14. The position of "convening officer" (see paragraphs 36 -
41 below) for the applicant's court martial was assumed by the
General Officer Commanding London District, Major General Corbett.
He remanded Mr Findlay for trial on eight charges arising out of
the incident of 29 July 1990 and decided that he should be tried
by general court martial.
15. By an order dated 31 October 1991, the convening officer
convened the general court martial and appointed the military
personnel who were to act as prosecuting officer, assistant
prosecuting officer and assistant defending officer (to represent
Mr Findlay in addition to his solicitor) and the members of the
court martial (see paragraph 37 below).
16. The court martial consisted of a president and four other
members:
(1) the president, Colonel Godbold, was a member of London
District staff (under the command of the convening officer: see
paragraph 14 above). He was appointed by name by the latter and
was not a permanent president;
(2) Lieutenant-Colonel Swallow was a permanent president of
courts martial, sitting in the capacity of an ordinary member. He
had his office in the London District Headquarters. He was
appointed by name by the convening officer;
(3) Captain Tubbs was from the Coldstream Guards, a unit
stationed in London District. His reporting chain was to his
officer commanding, his commanding officer and the Brigade
Commander, after which his report could, in exceptional
circumstances, go to the convening officer; he was a member of a
footguard unit and the convening officer, as General Officer
Commanding, was responsible for all footguard units. He was
appointed to the court martial by his commanding officer;
(4) Major Bolitho was from the Grenadier Guards, also a
footguard unit stationed in London District. The convening officer
was his second superior reporting officer. He was appointed to the
court martial by his commanding officer;
(5) Captain O'Connor was from the Postal and Courier
Department, Royal Engineers (Women's Royal Army Corps), which is
under the direct command of the Ministry of Defence and is
administered by the London District. She was appointed by her
commanding officer.
In summary, all of the members of the court martial were
subordinate in rank to the convening officer and served in units
stationed within London District. None of them had legal training.
17. The assistant prosecuting and defending officers were both
officers from the Second Scots Guards stationed in the London
District and had the same reporting chain as Captain Tubbs (see
paragraph 16 (3) above).
18. The judge advocate for the general court martial was
appointed by the Judge Advocate General (see paragraphs 42 - 45
below). He was a barrister and assistant judge advocate with the
Judge Advocate General's Office.
3. The court martial hearing
19. On 11 November 1991, Mr Findlay appeared before the
general court martial, at Regent's Park Barracks in London. He was
represented by a solicitor.
He pleaded guilty to three charges of common assault (a
civilian offence), two charges of conduct to the prejudice of good
order and military discipline (a military offence) and two charges
of threatening to kill (a civilian offence).
20. On 2 November 1991, his solicitor had made a written
request to the prosecuting authorities to ensure the appearance of
Dr Blunden at the court martial and on 5 November 1991 the
prosecuting officer had issued a witness summons requiring her
attendance. However, the defence was informed on the morning of
the hearing that Dr Blunden would not be attending. Mr Findlay
claims that her absence persuaded him to plead guilty to the above
charges. However, his solicitor did not request an adjournment or
object to the hearing proceeding.
21. The defence put before the court martial the medical
reports referred to above (paragraphs 11 - 13) and called Dr Reid
to give evidence. The latter confirmed his view that the applicant
suffered from PTSD, that this had been the principal cause of his
behaviour, that he had not been responsible for his actions and
that he was in need of counselling. During cross-examination, Dr
Reid stated that this was the first time he had dealt with
battle-related PTSD.
The prosecution did not call any medical evidence in rebuttal
or adopt any of the evidence prepared by the army-instructed
psychiatrists, Drs McKinnon and Blunden (see paragraphs 11 - 13
above).
22. In the course of his speech in mitigation, Mr Findlay's
solicitor urged the court martial that, in view of the fact that
his client had been suffering from PTSD at the time of the
incident and was extremely unlikely to reoffend, he should be
allowed to complete the few remaining months of his service and
leave the army with his pension intact and a minimal endorsement
on his record.
23. Having heard the evidence and speeches, the court martial
retired to consider their decision on sentence, accompanied by the
judge advocate. On their return they sentenced the applicant to
two years' imprisonment, reduction to the rank of guardsman and
dismissal from the army (which caused him to suffer a reduction in
his pension entitlement). No reasons were given for the sentence
(see paragraph 46 below).
4. The confirmation of sentence and review process
24. Under the Army Act 1955, the decision of the court martial
had no effect until it was confirmed by the "confirming officer"
(see paragraph 48 below). In Mr Findlay's case, as was usual
practice, the confirming officer was the same person as the
convening officer. Mr Findlay petitioned him for a reduction in
sentence.
Having received advice from the Judge Advocate General's
Office, the confirming officer informed the applicant on
16 December 1991 that the sentence had been upheld.
25. The applicant, who had been under close arrest since the
morning before the court martial hearing, was removed on 18
November 1991 to a military prison and thereafter to a civilian
prison on 21 December 1991.
26. He appealed by way of petition to the first of the
"reviewing authorities" (see paragraph 49 below), the Deputy
Director General of Personal Services, as delegate of the Army
Board, a non-legally qualified officer who obtained advice from
the Judge Advocate General's Office. By a letter dated 22 January
1992, Mr Findlay was informed that this petition had been
rejected.
27. He then petitioned the second of the reviewing
authorities, a member of the Defence Council who also was not
legally qualified and who also received advice from the Judge
Advocate General's Office. This petition was rejected on 10 March
1992.
28. The advice given by the Judge Advocate General's Office at
each of these three stages of review was not disclosed to the
applicant, nor was he given reasons for the decisions confirming
his sentence and rejecting his petitions.
29. On 10 March 1992, the applicant applied to the Divisional
Court for leave to challenge by judicial review the validity of
the findings of the court martial. He claimed that the sentence
imposed was excessive, the proceedings were contrary to the rules
of natural justice and that the judge advocate had been hostile to
him on two occasions during the hearing.
On 14 December 1992 the Divisional Court refused leave on the
basis that the court martial had been conducted fully in
accordance with the Army Act 1955 and there was no evidence of
improper conduct or hostility on the part of the judge advocate
(R. v. General Court Martial (Regent's Park Barracks), ex parte
Alexander Findlay, CO/1092/92, unreported).
5. Civil proceedings
30. Mr Findlay commenced a civil claim in negligence against
the military authorities, claiming damages in respect of his back
injury and PTSD. In a report dated 16 January 1994 prepared for
these purposes, Dr Blunden confirmed her previous opinion (see
paragraph 12 above) and clearly diagnosed PTSD.
31. In March 1994 the civil action was settled by the
Secretary of State for Defence, who paid the applicant 100,000 GBP
and legal costs, without any admission of liability. The
settlement did not differentiate between the claims in respect of
PTSD and the back injury.
II. Relevant domestic law and practice
1. The law in force at the time
of Mr Findlay's court martial
(a) General
32. The law and procedures which applied to the applicant's
court martial were contained in the Army Act 1955 ("the 1955
Act"), the Rules of Procedure (Army) 1972 ("the 1972 Rules") and
the Queen's Regulations (1975). Since the Commission's
consideration of the case, certain provisions in the 1955 Act have
been amended by the Armed Forces Act 1996 ("the 1996 Act"), which
comes into force on 1 April 1997 (see paragraphs 52 - 57 below).
33. Many civilian offences are also offences under the 1955
Act (section 70 (1)). Although the final decision on jurisdiction
lies with the civilian authorities, army personnel who are accused
of such offences are usually tried by the military authorities
unless, for example, civilians are involved in some way.
Depending on their gravity, charges against army law can be
tried by district, field or general court martial. A court martial
is not a standing court: it comes into existence in order to try a
single offence or group of offences.
34. At the time of the events in question, a general court
martial consisted of a president (normally a brigadier or colonel
in the army), appointed by name by the convening officer (see
paragraphs 36 - 41 below), and at least four other army officers,
either appointed by name by the convening officer or, at the
latter's request, by their commanding officer.
35. Each member of the court martial had to swear the
following oath:
"I swear by almighty God that I will well and truly try the
accused before the court according to the evidence, and that I
will duly administer justice according to the Army Act 1955,
without partiality, favour or affection, and I do further swear
that I will not on any account at any time whatsoever disclose or
discover the vote or opinion of the president or any member of
this court martial, unless thereunto required in the due course of
law."
(b) The convening officer
36. Before the coming into force of the 1996 Act, a convening
officer (who had to be a field officer or of corresponding or
superior rank, in command of a body of the regular forces or of
the command within which the person to be tried was serving)
assumed responsibility for every case to be tried by court
martial. He or she would decide upon the nature and detail of the
charges to be brought and the type of court martial required, and
was responsible for convening the court martial.
37. The convening officer would draw up a convening order,
which would specify, inter alia, the date, place and time of the
trial, the name of the president and the details of the other
members, all of whom he could appoint (see paragraph 15 above). He
ensured that a judge advocate (see paragraph 43 below) was
appointed by the Judge Advocate General's Office and, failing such
appointment, could appoint one. He also appointed, or directed a
commanding officer to appoint, the prosecuting officer.
38. Prior to the hearing, the convening officer was
responsible for sending an abstract of the evidence to the
prosecuting officer and to the judge advocate, and could indicate
the passages which might be inadmissible. He procured the
attendance at trial of all witnesses to be called for the
prosecution. When charges were withdrawn, the convening officer's
consent was normally obtained, although it was not necessary in
all cases, and a plea to a lesser charge could not be accepted
from the accused without it.
39. He had also to ensure that the accused had a proper
opportunity to prepare his defence, legal representation if
required and the opportunity to contact the defence witnesses, and
was responsible for ordering the attendance at the hearing of all
witnesses "reasonably requested" by the defence.
40. The convening officer could dissolve the court martial
either before or during the trial, when required in the interests
of the administration of justice (section 95 of the 1955 Act). In
addition, he could comment on the "proceedings of a court martial
which require confirmation". Those remarks would not form part of
the record of the proceedings and would normally be communicated
in a separate minute to the members of the court, although in an
exceptional case "where a more public instruction [was] required
in the interests of discipline", they could be made known in the
orders of the command (Queen's Regulations, paragraph 6.129).
41. The convening officer usually acted as confirming officer
also (see paragraph 48 below).
(c) The Judge Advocate General and judge advocates
42. The current Judge Advocate General was appointed by the
Queen in February 1991 for five years. He is answerable to the
Queen and is removable from office by her for inability or
misbehaviour.
At the time of the events in question, the Judge Advocate
General had the role of adviser to the Secretary of State for
Defence on all matters touching and concerning the office of Judge
Advocate General, including advice on military law and the
procedures and conduct of the court-martial system. He was also
responsible for advising the confirming and reviewing authorities
following a court martial (see paragraph 49 below).
43. Judge advocates are appointed to the Judge Advocate
General's Office by the Lord Chancellor. They must have at least
seven and five years experience respectively as an advocate or
barrister.
44. At the time of the events in question, a judge advocate
was appointed to each court martial, either by the Judge Advocate
General's Office or by the convening officer. He or she was
responsible for advising the court martial on all questions of law
and procedure arising during the hearing and the court had to
accept this advice unless there were weighty reasons for not doing
so. In addition, in conjunction with the president, he was under a
duty to ensure that the accused did not suffer any disadvantage
during the hearing. For example, if the latter pleaded guilty, the
judge advocate had to ensure that he or she fully understood the
implications of the plea and admitted all the elements of the
charge. At the close of the hearing, the judge advocate would sum
up the relevant law and evidence.
45. Prior to the coming into force of the 1996 Act, the judge
advocate did not take part in the court martial's deliberations on
conviction or acquittal, although he could advise it in private on
general principles in relation to sentencing. He was not a member
of the court martial and had no vote in the decision on conviction
or sentence.
(d) Procedure on a guilty plea
46. At the time of the events in question, on a plea of
guilty, the prosecuting officer outlined the facts and put in
evidence any circumstance which might have made the accused more
susceptible to the commission of the offence. The defence made a
plea in mitigation and could call witnesses (rules 71 (3) (a) and
71 (5) (a) of the 1972 Rules). The members of the court martial
then retired with the judge advocate to consider the sentence,
which was pronounced in open court. There was no provision for the
giving of reasons by the court martial for its decision.
47. Certain types of sentence were not available to courts
martial at the time of the applicant's trial, even in respect of
civilian offences. For example, a court martial could not suspend
a prison sentence, issue a probation order or sentence to
community service.
(e) Confirmation and post-hearing reviews
48. Until the amendments introduced by the 1996 Act, a court
martial's findings were not effective until confirmed by a
"confirming officer". Prior to confirmation, the confirming
officer used to seek the advice of the Judge Advocate General's
Office, where a judge advocate different to the one who acted at
the hearing would be appointed. The confirming officer could
withhold confirmation or substitute, postpone or remit in whole or
in part any sentence.
49. Once the sentence had been confirmed, the defendant could
petition the "reviewing authorities". These were the Queen, the
Defence Council (who could delegate to the Army Board), or any
officer superior in command to the confirming officer (section 113
of the 1955 Act). The reviewing authorities could seek the advice
of the Judge Advocate General's Office. They had the power to
quash a finding and to exercise the same powers as the confirming
officer in relation to substituting, remitting or commuting the
sentence.
50. A petitioner was not informed of the identity of the
confirming officer or of the reviewing authorities. No statutory
or formalised procedures were laid down for the conduct of the
post-hearing reviews and no reasons were given for decisions
delivered subsequent to them. Neither the fact that advice had
been received from the Judge Advocate General's Office nor the
nature of that advice was disclosed.
51. A courts martial appeal court (made up of civilian judges)
could hear appeals against conviction from a court martial, but
there was no provision for such an appeal against sentence when
the accused pleaded guilty.
2. The Armed Forces Act 1996
52. Under the 1996 Act, the role of the convening officer will
cease to exist and his functions will be split among three
different bodies: the "higher authorities", the prosecuting
authority and court administration officers (see 1996 Act,
Schedule I).
53. The higher authority, who will be a senior officer, will
decide whether any case referred to him by the accused's
commanding officer should be dealt with summarily, referred to the
new prosecuting authority, or dropped. Once the higher authority
has taken this decision, he or she will have no further
involvement in the case.
54. The prosecuting authority will be the Services' legal
branches. Following the higher authority's decision to refer a
case to them, the prosecuting authority will have absolute
discretion, applying similar criteria as those applied in civilian
cases by the Crown Prosecution Service to decide whether or not to
prosecute, what type of court martial would be appropriate and
precisely what charges should be brought. They will then conduct
the prosecution (1996 Act, Schedule I, Part II).
55. Court administration officers will be appointed in each
Service and will be independent of both the higher and the
prosecuting authorities. They will be responsible for making the
arrangements for courts martial, including arranging venue and
timing, ensuring that a judge advocate and any court officials
required will be available, securing the attendance of witnesses
and selection of members. Officers under the command of the higher
authority will not be selected as members of the court martial
(1996 Act, Schedule I, Part III, section 19).
56. Each court martial will in future include a judge advocate
as a member. His advice on points of law will become rulings
binding on the court and he will have a vote on sentence (but not
on conviction). The casting vote, if needed, will rest with the
president of the court martial, who will also give reasons for the
sentence in open court. The Judge Advocate General will no longer
provide general legal advice to the Secretary of State for Defence
(1996 Act, Schedule I, Part III, sections 19, 25 and 27).
57. Findings by a court martial will no longer be subject to
confirmation or revision by a confirming officer (whose role is to
be abolished). A reviewing authority will be established in each
Service to conduct a single review of each case. Reasons will be
given for the decision of the reviewing authority. As part of this
process, post-trial advice received by the reviewing authority
from a judge advocate (who will be different from the one who
officiated at the court-martial) will be disclosed to the accused.
A right of appeal against sentence to the (civilian) courts
martial appeal court will be added to the existing right of appeal
against conviction (1996 Act, section 17 and Schedule V).
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION
58. In his application to the Commission (no. 22107/93) of
28 May 1993, Mr Findlay made a number of complaints under Article
6 para. 1 of the Convention (art. 6-1), inter alia that he had
been denied a fair hearing before the court martial and that it
was not an independent and impartial tribunal.
59. The Commission declared the application admissible on 23
February 1995. In its report of 5 September 1995 (Article 31)
(art. 31), it expressed the unanimous opinion that there had been
a violation of Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention (art. 6-1), in
that the applicant was not given a fair hearing by an independent
and impartial tribunal, and that it was unnecessary to examine the
further specific complaints as to the fairness of the
court-martial proceedings and the subsequent reviews or the
reasonableness of the decisions taken against him and the
available sentencing options. The full text of the Commission's
opinion is reproduced as an annex to this judgment <3>.
--------------------------------
<3> For practical reasons this annex will appear only with the
printed version of the judgment (in Reports of Judgments and
Decisions 1997-I), but a copy of the Commission's report is
obtainable from the registry.
FINAL SUBMISSIONS TO THE COURT
60. At the hearing, the Government said that it did not
contest the Commission's conclusions but asked the Court to take
note of the changes to the court-martial system to be effected by
the Armed Forces Act 1996 which, they submitted, more than
satisfactorily met the Commission's concerns.
On the same occasion, the applicant asked the Court to find a
violation of Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) and to award him just
satisfaction under Article 50 of the Convention (art. 50).
AS TO THE LAW
I. Scope of the case
A. The complaints concerning Article 6 para. 1
of the Convention (art. 6-1)
61. In his written and oral pleadings before the Court, Mr
Findlay complained that the court martial was not an "independent
and impartial tribunal", that it did not give him a "public
hearing" and that it was not a tribunal "established by law".
62. The Government and the Commission's Delegate both observed
at the hearing that since the latter two complaints had not been
expressly raised before the Commission, the Court should decline
to entertain them.
63. The Court recalls that the scope of its jurisdiction is
determined by the Commission's decision on admissibility and that
it has no power to entertain new and separate complaints which
were not raised before the Commission (see, inter alia, the Singh
v. the United Kingdom judgment of 21 February 1996, Reports of
Judgments and Decisions 1996-I, p. 293, para. 44).
However, while Mr Findlay in his application to the Commission
may not expressly have invoked his rights under Article 6 para. 1
of the Convention (art. 6-1) to a "public hearing" and a "tribunal
established by law", he does appear to have raised in substance
most of the matters which form the basis of his complaints in
relation to these two provisions. Thus, in the Commission's
decision on admissibility, he is reported as referring in
particular to the facts that the members of the court martial were
appointed ad hoc, that the judge advocate's advice on sentencing
was not disclosed, that no reasons were given for the decisions
taken by the court-martial board and the confirming and reviewing
officers, and that the post-hearing reviews were essentially
administrative in nature and conducted in private (see the
Commission's decision on admissibility, application no. 22107/93,
pp. 32 - 35).
It follows that these are not new and separate complaints, and
that the Court has jurisdiction to consider these matters (see,
inter alia and mutatis mutandis, the James and Others v. the
United Kingdom judgment of 21 February 1986, Series A no. 98,
p. 6, para. 80).
B. The complaint concerning Article 25 of the Convention
(art. 25) and Article 2 of the European Agreement
64. In his additional memorial (see paragraph 4 above) the
applicant asserted that, in correspondence with the Solicitors'
Complaints Bureau (a professional disciplinary body) concerning a
matter of no relevance to the present case, the Judge Advocate
General had complained that, during the course of Mr Findlay's
application to the Commission, his solicitor had made allegations
concerning a lack of impartiality in the advice given by the Judge
Advocate General's Office. The Judge Advocate General, Judge Rant,
had commented: "These are extremely serious allegations ...". In a
later letter, Judge Rant wrote:
"I wish to make it clear that, at this stage and without
prejudice to any action which might have to be taken in the
future, I am making no formal complaint about the passage [from
the applicant's submission to the Commission] quoted in that
letter. The reason for this is that the case of Findlay is to be
argued before the European Court of Human Rights in September 1996
and therefore it is only proper for me to defer action until the
end of those proceedings."
The applicant alleged that his solicitor felt constrained in
presenting his arguments to the Court in the knowledge that they
might subsequently form the basis of disciplinary proceedings and
he invoked his rights under Article 25 of the Convention (art. 25)
and Article 2 of the European Agreement relating to Persons
Participating in Proceedings before the European Commission and
Court of Human Rights.
65. Since this issue was not pursued by the applicant at the
hearing or referred to by the Government or the Delegate of the
Commission at any time, the Court does not find it appropriate to
examine it.
C. The new legislation
66. In their written and oral pleadings, the Government asked
the Court to take note in its judgment of the changes to be
effected in the court-martial system by the Armed Forces Act 1996
(see paragraphs 52 - 57 above).
67. The Court recalls that this new statute does not come into
force until April 1997, and thus did not apply at the time of Mr
Findlay's court martial. It is not the Court's task to rule on
legislation in abstracto and it cannot therefore express a view as
to the compatibility of the provisions of the new legislation with
the Convention (see, mutatis mutandis, the Silver and Others v.
the United Kingdom judgment of 25 March 1983, Series A no. 61,
p. 31, para. 79). Nonetheless, it notes with satisfaction that the
United Kingdom authorities have made changes to the court-martial
system with a view to ensuring the observance of their Convention
commitments.
II. Alleged violation of Article 6 para. 1
of the Convention (art. 6-1)
68. The applicant claimed that his trial by court martial
failed to meet the requirements of Article 6 para. 1 of the
Convention (art. 6-1), which provides (so far as is relevant):
"In the determination of ... any criminal charge against him,
everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing ... by an
independent and impartial tribunal established by law..."
The Commission found that there had been a violation, in that
the applicant was not given a fair hearing by an independent and
impartial tribunal, and the Government did not contest this
conclusion.
A. Applicability
69. In the view of the Court, Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) is
clearly applicable to the court-martial proceedings, since they
involved the determination of Mr Findlay's sentence following his
plea of guilty to criminal charges; indeed, this point was not
disputed before it (see the Engel and Others v. the Netherlands
judgment of 18 June 1976, Series A no. 22, pp. 33 - 36, paras.
80 - 85, and the Eckle v. Germany judgment of 15 July 1982,
Series A no. 51, pp. 34 - 35, paras. 76 - 77).
B. Compliance
70. The applicant complained that the court martial was not an
"independent and impartial tribunal" as required by Article 6
para. 1 (art. 6-1), because, inter alia, all the officers
appointed to it were directly subordinate to the convening officer
who also performed the role of prosecuting authority (see
paragraphs 14 - 17 and 36 - 41 above). The lack of legal
qualification or experience in the officers making the decisions
either at the court martial or review stages made it impossible
for them to act in an independent or impartial manner.
In addition, he asserted that he was not afforded a "public
hearing" within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1), in
that the judge advocate's advice to the court-martial board, the
confirming officer and the reviewing authorities was confidential;
no reasons were given for the decisions made at any of these
stages in the proceedings; and the process of confirming and
reviewing the verdict and sentence by the confirming officer and
reviewing authorities was carried out administratively, in
private, with no apparent rules of procedure (see paragraphs 42 -
46 and 48 - 51 above).
Finally, he claimed that his court martial was not a tribunal
"established by law", because the statutory framework according to
which it proceeded was too vague and imprecise; for example, it
was silent on the question of how the convening officer,
confirming officer and reviewing authorities were to be appointed.
71. The Government had no observations to make upon the
Commission's conclusion that there had been a violation of Article
6 para. 1 of the Convention (art. 6-1) by reason of the width of
the role of the convening officer and his command links with
members of the tribunal. They asked the Court to take note of the
changes to the court-martial system to be effected by the Armed
Forces Act 1996 which, in their submission, more than
satisfactorily met the Commission's concerns.
72. The Commission found that although the convening officer
played a central role in the prosecution of the case, all of the
members of the court-martial board were subordinate in rank to him
and under his overall command. He also acted as confirming
officer, and the court martial's findings had no effect until
confirmed by him. These circumstances gave serious cause to doubt
the independence of the tribunal from the prosecuting authority.
The judge advocate's involvement was not sufficient to dispel this
doubt, since he was not a member of the court martial, did not
take part in its deliberations and gave his advice on sentencing
in private.
In addition, it noted that Mr Findlay's court-martial board
contained no judicial members, no legally qualified members and no
civilians, that it was set up on an ad hoc basis and that the
convening officer had the power to dissolve it either before or
during the trial. The requirement to take an oath was not a
sufficient guarantee of independence.
Accordingly, it considered that the applicant's fears about
the independence of the court martial could be regarded as
objectively justified, particularly in view of the nature and
extent of the convening officer's roles, the composition of the
court martial and its ad hoc nature. This defect was not,
moreover, remedied by any subsequent review by a judicial body
affording all the guarantees required by Article 6 para. 1 (art.
6-1), since the confirming officer was the same person as the
convening officer, and the reviewing authorities were army
officers, the second of whom was superior in rank to the first.
The ineffectiveness of the post-hearing reviews was further
underlined by the secrecy surrounding them and the lack of
opportunity for Mr Findlay to participate in a meaningful way.
73. The Court recalls that in order to establish whether a
tribunal can be considered as "independent", regard must be had,
inter alia, to the manner of appointment of its members and their
term of office, the existence of guarantees against outside
pressures and the question whether the body presents an appearance
of independence (see the Bryan v. the United Kingdom judgment of
22 November 1995, Series A no. 335-A, p. 15, para. 37).
As to the question of "impartiality", there are two aspects to
this requirement. First, the tribunal must be subjectively free of
personal prejudice or bias. Secondly, it must also be impartial
from an objective viewpoint, that is, it must offer sufficient
guarantees to exclude any legitimate doubt in this respect (see
the Pullar v. the United Kingdom judgment of 10 June 1996, Reports
1996-III, p. 792, para. 30).
The concepts of independence and objective impartiality are
closely linked and the Court will consider them together as they
relate to the present case.
74. The Court observes that the convening officer, as was his
responsibility under the rules applicable at the time, played a
significant role before the hearing of Mr Findlay's case. He
decided which charges should be brought and which type of court
martial was most appropriate. He convened the court martial and
appointed its members and the prosecuting and defending officers
(see paragraphs 14 - 15 and 36 - 37 above).
Under the rules then in force, he had the task of sending an
abstract of the evidence to the prosecuting officer and the judge
advocate and could indicate passages which might be inadmissible.
He procured the attendance at trial of the witnesses for the
prosecution and those "reasonably requested" by the defence. His
agreement was necessary before the prosecuting officer could
accept a plea to a lesser charge from an accused and was usually
sought before charges were withdrawn (see paragraphs 38 and 39
above).
For these reasons the Court, like the Commission, considers
that the convening officer was central to Mr Findlay's prosecution
and closely linked to the prosecuting authorities.
75. The question therefore arises whether the members of the
court martial were sufficiently independent of the convening
officer and whether the organisation of the trial offered adequate
guarantees of impartiality.
In this respect also the Court shares the concerns of the
Commission. It is noteworthy that all the members of the court
martial, appointed by the convening officer, were subordinate in
rank to him. Many of them, including the president, were directly
or ultimately under his command (see paragraph 16 above).
Furthermore, the convening officer had the power, albeit in
prescribed circumstances, to dissolve the court martial either
before or during the trial (see paragraph 40 above).
76. In order to maintain confidence in the independence and
impartiality of the court, appearances may be of importance. Since
all the members of the court martial which decided Mr Findlay's
case were subordinate in rank to the convening officer and fell
within his chain of command, Mr Findlay's doubts about the
tribunal's independence and impartiality could be objectively
justified (see, mutatis mutandis, the Sramek v. Austria judgment
of 22 October 1984, Series A no. 84, p. 20, para. 42).
77. In addition, the Court finds it significant that the
convening officer also acted as "confirming officer". Thus, the
decision of the court martial was not effective until ratified by
him, and he had the power to vary the sentence imposed as he saw
fit (see paragraph 48 above). This is contrary to the
well-established principle that the power to give a binding
decision which may not be altered by a non-judicial authority is
inherent in the very notion of "tribunal" and can also be seen as
a component of the "independence" required by Article 6 para. 1
(art. 6-1) (see, mutatis mutandis, the Van de Hurk v. the
Netherlands judgment of 19 April 1994, Series A no. 288, p. 16,
para. 45).
78. The Court further agrees with the Commission that these
fundamental flaws in the court-martial system were not remedied by
the presence of safeguards, such as the involvement of the judge
advocate, who was not himself a member of the tribunal and whose
advice to it was not made public (see paragraphs 45 - 46 above),
or the oath taken by the members of the court-martial board (see
paragraph 35 above).
79. Nor could the defects referred to above (in paragraphs 75
and 77) be corrected by any subsequent review proceedings. Since
the applicant's hearing was concerned with serious charges
classified as "criminal" under both domestic and Convention law,
he was entitled to a first-instance tribunal which fully met the
requirements of Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) (see the De Cubber v.
Belgium judgment of 26 October 1984, Series A no. 86, pp. 16 - 18,
paras. 31 - 32).
80. For all these reasons, and in particular the central role
played by the convening officer in the organisation of the court
martial, the Court considers that Mr Findlay's misgivings about
the independence and impartiality of the tribunal which dealt with
his case were objectively justified.
In view of the above, it is not necessary for it to consider
the applicant's other complaints under Article 6 para. 1
(art. 6-1), namely that he was not afforded a "public hearing" by
a tribunal "established by law".
In conclusion, there has been a violation of Article 6 para. 1
of the Convention (art. 6-1).
III. Application of Article 50
of the Convention (art. 50)
81. The applicant claimed just satisfaction pursuant to
Article 50 of the Convention (art. 50), which states:
"If the Court finds that a decision or a measure taken by a
legal authority or any other authority of a High Contracting Party
is completely or partially in conflict with the obligations
arising from the ... Convention, and if the internal law of the
said Party allows only partial reparation to be made for the
consequences of this decision or measure, the decision of the
Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured
party."
A. Pecuniary damage
82. The applicant claimed compensation for loss of income
totalling 440,200 pounds sterling (GBP), on the basis that, had he
not been convicted and sentenced as he was, he would have
completed a twenty-two year engagement in the army, eventually
attaining the rank of Colour Sergeant, with entitlement to a
pension from the age of forty.
83. The Government submitted that a finding of a violation
would constitute sufficient satisfaction, or, in the alternative,
that only a very modest amount should be awarded. First, there
were no grounds for believing that the applicant would not have
been convicted, sentenced to a term of imprisonment and dismissed
from the army following his trial (at which he pleaded guilty),
even if the court martial had been differently organised.
Secondly, it was in any case unlikely that he would have enjoyed a
long career in the army, in view of the post traumatic stress
disorder and back injury from which he suffered (see paragraphs 8,
9 and 30 above); he had already received GBP 100,000 in settlement
of his civil claim against the Ministry of Defence, a large part
of which related to loss of earning capacity.
84. At the hearing, the Commission's Delegate observed that no
causal link had been established between the breach of the
Convention complained of by the applicant and the alleged
pecuniary damage, and submitted that it was not possible to
speculate as to whether the proceedings would have led to a
different outcome had they fulfilled the requirements of Article 6
para. 1 (art. 6-1).
85. The Court agrees; it cannot speculate as to what the
outcome of the court-martial proceedings might have been had the
violation of the Convention not occurred (see, for example, the
Schmautzer v. Austria judgment of 23 October 1995, Series A no.
328-A, p. 16, para. 44). It is therefore inappropriate to award Mr
Findlay compensation for pecuniary damage.
B. Non-pecuniary damage
86. The applicant claimed compensation of GBP 50,000 for the
distress and suffering caused by the court-martial proceedings and
for the eight months he spent in prison. He also asked that his
conviction be quashed.
87. The Government pointed out that it was beyond the power of
the Court to quash the applicant's conviction.
88. The Court reiterates that it is impossible to speculate as
to what might have occurred had there been no breach of the
Convention. Furthermore, it has no jurisdiction to quash
convictions pronounced by national courts (see the above-mentioned
Schmautzer judgment, loc. cit.).
In conclusion, the Court considers that a finding of violation
in itself affords the applicant sufficient reparation for the
alleged non-pecuniary damage.
C. Costs and expenses
89. The applicant claimed GBP 23,956.25 legal costs and
expenses, which included GBP 1,000 solicitor's costs and GBP 250
counsel's fees for the application before the Divisional Court.
90. The Government expressed the view that the costs of the
application to the Divisional Court should be disallowed, and
submitted that a total of GBP 22,500 would be a reasonable sum.
91. The Court considers that, in the circumstances of the
present case, it was reasonable to make the application to the
Divisional Court, in an attempt to seek redress for the violation
of which Mr Findlay complains. It therefore decides to award in
full the costs and expenses claimed, less the amounts received in
legal aid from the Council of Europe which have not already been
taken into account in the claim.
D. Default interest
92. According to the information available to the Court, the
statutory rate of interest applicable in the United Kingdom at the
date of adoption of the present judgment is 8% per annum.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
1. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 para. 1
of the Convention (art. 6-1);
2. Dismisses the claim for pecuniary damage;
3. Holds that the finding of a violation in itself constitutes
sufficient just satisfaction for any non-pecuniary damage alleged
by the applicant;
4. Holds
(a) that the respondent State is to pay to the applicant,
within three months, in respect of costs and expenses, GBP
23,956.25 (twenty-three thousand, nine hundred and fifty-six
pounds sterling and twenty-five pence) less 26,891 (twenty-six
thousand, eight hundred and ninety-one) French francs, to be
converted into pounds sterling at the rate applicable on the date
of delivery of the present judgment;
(b) that simple interest at an annual rate of 8% shall be
payable from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until
settlement.
Done in English and in French and delivered at a public
hearing in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 25 February
1997.
Signed: Rolv RYSSDAL
President
Signed: Herbert PETZOLD
Registrar
In accordance with Article 51 para. 2 of the Convention
(art. 51-2) and Rule 53 para. 2 of Rules of Court A, the
concurring opinion of Mr De Meyer is annexed to this judgment.
Initialled: R.R.
Initialled: H.P.
CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE DE MEYER
To this judgment, the result of which I fully approve, I would
add a brief remark.
Once again reference is made in its reasoning to "appearances"
(paragraphs 73 and 76).
First of all, I would observe that the Court did not need to
rely on "appearances", since there were enough convincing elements
to enable it to conclude that the court-martial system, under
which Lance-Sergeant Findlay was convicted and sentenced in the
present case, was not acceptable.
Moreover, I would like to stress that, as a matter of
principle, we should never decide anything on the basis of
"appearances", and that we should, in particular, not allow
ourselves to be impressed by them in determining whether or not a
court is independent and impartial. We have been wrong to do so in
the past, and we should not do so in the future.
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